& Oxford University Press and Community Development Journal.

2013
All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
doi:10.1093/cdj/bst024

Mining, development and

corporate – community
conflicts in Peru
Fiorella Triscritti*

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Abstract Peru has been the largest gold producer in Latin America since 1996.
This is mainly attributable to the open-pit gold mines in the northern
regions of Ancash, Cajamarca and La Libertad, which are managed by
Barrick Gold Corporation and Newmont Mining Corporation. The
expansion of these large-scale mining projects has engendered social
protests and conflicts that, in a context of weak institutions, have
developed with little oversight from the central government. In some
cases, corporate – community conflicts have driven mining corporations
towards more responsible management of natural resources. For
example, in some remote areas, the mining industry has filled the gap left
by the State and has promoted sustainable socio-economic development
through public – private partnerships. However, evidence indicates that
an enhanced democratic framework with more attentive public
management of natural resources is needed before such best practices
may be established as the norm rather than the exception. Sustainable
mining goes hand-in-hand with good governance.

Introduction
The potential for social and environmental conflicts over large-scale mining
projects is significant in developing countries. Contracts for, and the manage-
ment of, the exploration and exploitation of natural resources are negotiated
largely at a bilateral level, between governments and corporations. Weak
public institutions often struggle to negotiate fair deals, and a lack of transpar-
ency nurtures corruption. Furthermore, once a mining project becomes
licensed to explore and exploit mining concessions in remote areas, regional

*Address for correspondence: email: fiorella.triscritti@gmail.com

Community Development Journal Vol 48 No 3 July 2013 pp. 437– 450 437
438 Fiorella Triscritti

authorities and local communities are typically left with limited rights to ne-
gotiate their interests and preserve their livelihoods. As a result, local commu-
nities may resort to violence to express their discontent.
For the last three decades, Peru’s governments have based their models of
economic growth on the mining industry. Indeed, privatization programmes
launched under the neo-liberal agenda of the Fujimori administration
attracted several foreign mining corporations. However, Peru’s economic
success story is now threatened by the increased intensity and violence of
social conflicts surrounding mining. Such conflicts have become an import-

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ant aspect of the public debate on good governance and development and,
in the context of an international financial crisis that offers limited options
for boosting economic growth, the Peruvian Government has been further
pressured to resolve this issue.
The evidence of increasing conflicts has drawn interest from scholars and
practitioners, who have analysed their causes and their effect on government
policies (Arellano-Yanguas, 2008; Bebbington et al. 2008; Urkidi, 2010). In
2001, the World Bank and the Canadian International Development Research
Centre (IDRC) published a report on large mines and community relations in
Latin America, Canada and Spain (McMahon and Remy, 2001). The report
concluded that increased consultation and participation of local communities
in the management of natural resources was needed in order to ensure sus-
tainable mining practices. This paper contributes to this literature by examin-
ing how corporate – community relations can shape social peace and
sustainable development for communities affected by mining.
This paper is divided into three sections. The first section reviews corpor-
ate–community conflicts related to large-scale gold mining in Peru and iden-
tifies the chief actors in anti-mining protests. The second section is based on
fieldwork interviews conducted in Peru during 2012 and compares the cor-
porate – community relations of two open-pit mine projects, one managed
by Barrick Gold Corporation (Barrick) and the other managed by Newmont
Mining Corporation (Newmont). The final section of the paper analyses the
challenges driving social conflicts related to large-scale gold mining in Peru
and suggests that sincere corporate –community relations are an effective
conflict resolution tool.

Corporate – community conflicts in Peru: actors and key

issues
Gold has played an important role in the history of Peru. In 1532, when the
Inca Emperor Atahualpa was captured by Pizarro, he offered to buy his
liberty by having his prison cell filled with gold and the two adjacent
rooms with silver, as high as his arms could reach. Pizarro agreed, and
 Mining, development and corporate–community conflicts in Peru 439

some 24 tons of gold and silver from throughout the Inca Empire were
brought to the conquistadores to pay the ransom. Despite this, in 1533,
Atahualpa was tried, convicted and sentenced to death by a Spanish tribunal.
Today, some Andean communities feel that history is repeating itself: newco-
mers are exporting gold from their land at the cost of the residents’ human and
environmental rights.
In Peru, large- and medium-sized open-pit heap leach mines account for
about 80 percent of total gold production (Instituto Cuanto, 2012, p. 540). In
most cases of low-level violent civil resistance to these projects, the Peruvian

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Government has either been absent or has failed to help parties reach mutual
agreements. As a consequence, many local populations directly affected by
mining operations, as well as the populations residing in nearby towns,
have begun to perceive the State as a biased mediator that backs corporations
and criminalizes social protests. Furthermore, as a result of the weakness of
State institutions and their lack of transparency, independence and legitim-
acy, corporations and local communities have tended to adopt informal
arrangements, rather than a more formal legal framework, to manage
issues related to mining operations.
In the absence of a stable institutional framework, the failure of corporate –
community dialogue has led to several polarized corporate –community
conflicts and to the use of violence. Anti-mining actions have caused hostage-
taking, organized road blocks and disruptions to production through damage
to property owned by corporations. The militarization of areas near mining
projects has stifled community opposition (Holden and Jacobson, 2007,
p. 478). In most extreme cases, the use of violence has forced corporations
to delay or to abandon projects due to significant financial losses.
Two notable examples of this occurred in 2004. That year, Yanacocha, the
largest gold-mining corporation in Peru, after weeks of violent confrontation
between the police and protesters, publicly stated that it had underestimated
the concerns of local people and asked the Ministry of Energy and Mines to
revoke its permit to explore for minerals on Cerro Quilish. Cerro Quilish is a
small mountain that comprises the top of the watershed supplying the city
of Cajamarca and the valleys of the Porcón and Grande Rivers (WRI, 2007,
p. 3). The same year, a violent conflict affected Buenaventura’s gold mine
La Zanja. After months of unsuccessful dialogue, hundreds of peasants
occupied the premises of the mining company and burned its exploration
camp and vehicles. Six years later, following changes in Buenaventura’s com-
munity relations policies, an agreement was reached with local communities
and La Zanja commenced operations, producing its first gold bar in
September 2010.
After decades of violent corporate – community disputes, one of the
most significant outcomes has been the creation of civil society networks
440 Fiorella Triscritti

advocating for more sustainable mining and dialogue. Since 2001, the grass-
roots initiative Dialogue Group Mining and Sustainable Development2GDMDS
(Grupo de Dialogo Mineria y Desarrollo Sostenible) has promoted agendas and
spaces for intercultural dialogue on mining and its relation to environmental
protection and sustainable development. Also, to better articulate their
demands to corporations and authorities, communities have created a nation-
al grass-roots association, the National Confederation of Peruvian Communities
Affected by Mining2CONACAMI (Confederación Nacional de Comunidades del
Perú Afectadas por la Minerı́a). Most of these movements condemn the use of

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violence and seek negotiated peaceful solutions to conflict. Priorities vary
according to each mining project, but the right to free, prior and informed
consent is often at the top of the agenda. Free, prior and informed consent
is the principle that a community has the right to give or withhold its
consent to proposed projects that may affect the lands they customarily
own, occupy or otherwise use (ICESCR, 1966, p. 1).
Since 2004, the work of the Peruvian Ombudsman’s office has been crucial
for the analysis, management and traceability of hundreds of social conflicts
across the country and its data are widely regarded as reliable by stake-
holders. The Peruvian Ombudsman’s office recorded that, from January
2006 to September 2011, social conflicts increased from 73 to 215 per month.
Over the same time period, conflicts saw 2312 injured and 195 lives claimed
(Defensorı́a del Pueblo, 2012, p. 53). According to the Peruvian Ombuds-
man’s office, the more communities experience social conflict, the higher
the risk of violence. More than 40 percent of the conflicts stemmed from envir-
onmental issues, and the most violent were related to the management of ex-
tractive resource activities.
Impacts on water quality and quantity are among the most contentious
aspects of gold mining projects (Bebbington, 2008, p. 190). Over time, com-
munities and grass-roots networks have shown increased concern for the
environmental damage caused by mining operations. In Cajamarca, the
work of the national NGO Training and Intervention Group for Sustainable
Development—GRUFIDES (Grupo de Formación e Intervención para el Desarrollo
Sostenible) has focused, among other things, on supporting community environ-
mental monitoring. Marco Arana, its founder and leader, has led several human
and environmental rights campaigns, which have gained support from the
public and international organizations. Environmental concerns expressed by
Jose de Echave, director of the national NGO CooperAcción and the former
Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Environment (2011), have also attracted
political attention. Echave was one of the first people to voice concern over
the increase in risks of mining activities as a result of climate change in Peru:
the rise in temperatures has been reducing glaciers in the high Andes, putting
several headwaters and watersheds at risk (Echave, 2008, p. 384).
 Mining, development and corporate–community conflicts in Peru 441

Frequent and intense conflicts have also led international actors to invest
resources to address issues related to mining activities in Peru. For instance,
in 2004, the Government of the Netherlands launched a 4-year programme to
aid the development of a governance system for headwaters environments.
Two years later, the European Union launched a 4-year project to support
the Peruvian Government’s capacity to mediate conflicts. More recently, in
November 2011, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
launched a US$ 4 million project, sponsored by the government of Canada,
to promote mediation and dialogue among mining conflict stakeholders.

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Moreover, since 2008, the Poverty, Reduction and Alleviation (PRA) project,
co-sponsored by United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) and several mining companies, has contributed to easing tensions
in the proximity of mines by promoting economic development in these areas.
In 2006, the World Bank Peru Country Management Unit published a
report providing recommendations to the Peruvian Government on the man-
agement of large- and medium-scale mining operations (World Bank, 2006). It
highlighted that communities were increasingly aware of the adverse effects
of past and present mining and smelting operations and that such knowledge
exacerbated community opposition to current and new projects and created a
continued source of conflict. In the view of the World Bank, a sense of mistrust
among all stakeholders based on historical roots made dialogue difficult,
given the high expectations and the low negotiating capacities. It recom-
mended that both the government and industry assume their respective re-
sponsibilities in contributing to the promotion of environmentally and
socially responsible mining in Peru.

Corporate – community relations of Barrick and Yanacocha

Since 1999, 50 percent of Peru’s gold has been extracted by Barrick and
Yanacocha at open-pit mines located in remote, high-altitude areas of the
Andes. These mines are managed by world leaders in the production of
gold: Barrick, which is based in Canada, and Newmont, which is based in
the United States. They are, respectively, the largest and second-largest
pure gold companies in the world. They have extensive and diverse inter-
national experience and have faced challenges and conflicts with rural
communities in many parts of the world.
An analysis of two specific mining projects, Barrick’s Lagunas Norte and
Yanacocha’s Conga, illustrates that despite the industry’s oligarchic nature,
these actors have developed different approaches to dealing with community
issues. While Yanacocha’s corporate strategy has led to increasing tensions
and a destructive conflict, Barrick’s community-driven approaches have con-
tributed to peaceful solutions.
442 Fiorella Triscritti

Conga (Yanacocha)
In 2004, Yanacocha launched its second ‘mega-gold’ project in Peru, located
73 km northeast of the city of Cajamarca at about 4000 m above sea level at
the headwaters of multiples rivers (Yanacocha, 2010: RE-18). The project,
called ‘Conga’, was planned as an investment of US$ 4.5 billion, which
would have made it the largest gold mine in Latin America. It originally
involved removing four lakes and replacing them with four man-made reser-
voirs and was expected to create 5000 jobs, equivalent to 20 percent of formal
jobs in the department of Cajamarca.

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In October 2010, despite continuous anti-mining protests and a 2004 local
bylaw (ordenanza provincial) banning mining activities at that specific site (Or-
dinance N. 020-2004-MPC/A), the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM)
approved Conga’s Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). Immediately
thereafter, local opposition movements, led by peasants from the province
of Celendı́n, declared that the EIA was socially unviable (Defensorı́a del
Pueblo, 2010). First, they did not believe that Yanacocha’s reservoirs would
ensure the necessary supplies of water for human and agricultural use.
Second, as a consequence of Yanacocha’s previous operations in Peru, they
did not trust it to operate without polluting the environment.
In July 2011, the Regional President of Cajamarca, Gregorio Santos, joined
the communities’ protest, supported by other rural movements in Cajamarca
and northern Peru. In September 2011, with Yanacocha maintaining its firm
intention to implement the EIA as approved by the Government, local com-
munities declared that the Conga project would not, under any circum-
stances, receive a ‘social license’ to proceed. In November 2011, due to the
rising protests and at the request of the Government, Newmont halted
project operations. According to Mr. Santa Cruz, Newmont’s top executive
in Peru, the cost of the stoppage in the first few days was around US$ 2
million per day (Mining Weekly, 2012, 14 March). Activity was reduced
to control costs and, as of March 2012, around 6000 workers were left
without a contract and 700 machines were withdrawn by entrepreneurs (La
República, 2012, 2 March ).
The newly elected government of Humala was faced with a difficult choice:
it could either allow the exploitation of one of the world’s top gold deposits
and honour the contracts signed by the former Garcia government, or it
could preserve the natural sources of water and accede to the demands of
Humala’s chief constituents. This delicate balancing of interests resulted in
growing tension within the Government itself, both between the MINEM
and the Ministry of Environment and between the President and the then
Prime Minister, Salomon Lerner.
The Government’s intervention as mediator became visible in January
2012, with the establishment of an international three-person commission
 Mining, development and corporate–community conflicts in Peru 443

tasked with proposing measures to improve mitigation of the environmental

impacts of the Conga project. The experts’ study made several recommenda-
tions related to the allocation of water resources and the Government required
Yanacocha to comply with these recommendations before implementing its
project. Yanacocha accepted the new terms in June 2012. For its part, the Gov-
ernment, jointly with the Ombudsman’s office, reached out to local commu-
nities to obtain their consent for the revised Conga project. Despite these
efforts, local communities rejected the new conditions and became involved
in clashes with the police and the army. In July 2012, a state of emergency was

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declared, which lasted for 60 days. At the peak of violence, clashes with police
left many wounded and five peasants were killed. As of September 2012,
Newmont decided to postpone mining until 2014, while beginning the con-
struction of the water reservoirs.

Lagunas Norte (Barrick)

According to Barrick representatives, Lagunas Norte represents the efforts of
the company to promote a sustainable mining model through a modern op-
eration that incorporates lessons learned from previous experiences in Peru
and abroad. Barrick argues that Lagunas Norte is an investment which
demonstrates that it is possible to maintain low production costs while ensur-
ing clean and sustainable production and promoting local development. In
2011, Lagunas Norte produced 763,000 ounces of gold at a relatively low
total cost of US$ 269 per ounce, almost half of Barrick’s average total cash
cost in 2011 (Barrick, 2011, p. 13). Its operations are expected to continue
until 2021.
The Lagunas Norte open-pit mine is located in the Peruvian Andes at 4260
m above sea level. The site is approximately 90 km east of the coastal city of
Trujillo in northern Peru. The area is not densely populated. The closest
town to the mine, Quiruvilca, is 15 km away and has about 5000 habitants
(INEI, 2012). Some forty other villages are located within a 40 km radius of
the mine.
Barrick’s Lagunas Norte EIA received regulatory approval in April 2004.
Construction began immediately, with an investment of US$ 321 million.
Today, the mine provides about 500 direct jobs and 3000 contractor jobs. All
of the mine’s unskilled workforce is locally recruited, and a 3-month work ro-
tation system is adhered to. Training is also provided to increase the numbers
of locally recruited skilled workers. Despite the fact that local authorities had
requested Barrick to situate the employee and contractor accommodations
within the village to reduce the risk of social tension between employees
and local communities, Barrick preferred to construct an independent
camp at the outskirts of the mining site.
444 Fiorella Triscritti

Barrick has also taken a number of steps to prevent and mitigate conflicts with
local communities. Since the mine’s opening in 2005, a communication team and
a community-relation team have been based at Lagunas Norte. These teams are
each composed of approximately ten members of both men and women. The
members are Peruvian nationals, usually not from the region, with degrees in
humanities such as sociology, anthropology and conflict management. They
work in close partnership with local communities to identify their needs,
attend to any issue they might raise and jointly manage development pro-
grammes. Work at the community level involves ongoing face-to-face dialogue

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with community leaders to understand their concerns and to identify areas of
intervention for the company. Relations with local authorities are aimed at im-
proving issues related to the environment, education, health and labour. For
example, jointly with community leaders, Barrick provides advice on how to
invest local tax revenues to fund development programmes. Barrick also oper-
ates an on-site radio station that it uses to broadcast information related to its
community programmes and employment opportunities for the population.
To monitor community grievances, Barrick uses a mechanism that it calls
the ‘Community Grievance Management Resolution Procedures’ (CGMRP).
The CGMRP defines the generic process (identification, tracking and redress)
used to manage grievances from communities and other local stakeholders.
One of its most notable aspects is that grievances can be submitted by an indi-
vidual or a group at no cost and at any time. Depending on the issue, the grie-
vances are either resolved directly by the community-relation team or with the
intervention of the General Manager of the site. In more serious cases, a third-
party mediator can be involved, or the matter can be referred to the Peruvian
judicial system. In 2011, a total of 149 grievances were submitted, with 129
resolved and 18 pending at the end of the year (Barrick, unpublished work).
Barrick has further promoted its social license by cleaning up the environ-
mental liabilities of an abandoned coal mine located within its concession,
Cayacullan, and by permitting local communities to enter the premises of
the mine to pay tribute to Shulcahuanca Dome, a prominent and topographic
feature that is located immediately west of the Lagunas Norte pit which has
sacred importance to the local communities. Moreover, at the foot of the leach-
ing pool and the lower processing plant, Barrick established a ranch of two
hectares with more than one hundred Andean animals (Barrick, 2010,
p. 27). Barrick argues that the healthy condition of the animals demonstrates
the viability of the coexistence of agriculture and sustainable mining.
Finally, Barrick adopted a water management system which appears
to efficiently recycle water. Barrick trains and encourages local community
leaders, along with company employees, to take water samples and to
submit them to laboratories of their choice. As of March 2012, a
carbon-in-column (CIC) circuit was planned to be installed, to decrease the
 Mining, development and corporate–community conflicts in Peru 445

level of metals and cyanide used to spray the leach pads. The current closure
plan envisages that treatment of acid rock drainage water will continue for ap-
proximately 34 years, which Barrick says indicates its commitment to mining
cleanup and to restore the soil to its original condition.
According to several civil society representatives living in the immediate
proximity of the mine, Barrick’s presence has helped the socio-economic de-
velopment of the area. Local residents compare Barrick’s practices with other
mines operating in the area to emphasize how varied the Barrick approach
has been and how it has promoted development by launching long-term

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initiatives and helping small businesses.
Barrick has not being immune to resistance and social tension with local
communities. However, confrontations have rarely turned violent and,
through dialogue, compromises have been reached. For example, in
January 2011, the Mayor of Santiago de Chuco objected to Barrick’s interest
in exploiting satellite deposits located in the proximity of the open-pit
mine, arguing that doing so would destroy and pollute several mountain
lakes. The Mayor and representatives of twenty-eight local communities
also accused Barrick of polluting natural water supplies. Their allegations
were backed by environmental studies produced by a local NGO. Barrick’s
representatives met with local communities and the Mayor, reached an agree-
ment whereby Barrick promised that any future expansion project would be
subject to the communities’ approval, pledged not to mine the satellite depos-
its and agreed to fund reforestation in the area surrounding the lakes. As of
April 2012, discussions between Barrick and communities about the manage-
ment and protection of the lakes still remains an issue, despite an announce-
ment made by Barrick’s Director of Corporate Affairs in Peru claiming that
the corporation does not have water permits to operate in the lakes and has
no immediate plans to mine in that area (La Republica, 2011, 1 December).

Conflict analysis: more dialogue and good governance

There are four observations that can be drawn from the corporate–community
conflicts and the case studies presented in this paper. First, there has been an
increased awareness of the high environmental costs of modern large-scale
gold mining. Since 2005, impacts on water quality and quantity are among
the most contentious aspects of mining projects. Irresponsible environmental
practices related to water and waste management have nurtured communities’
mistrust and social opposition to mining projects located in headwaters or
affecting natural water supplies. According to a Barrick representative in
Peru, mining projects located at headwaters are now unlikely to receive a
social license from local communities, hence jeopardizing the viability of a
project in Peru (Quijandria, 2012, March).
446 Fiorella Triscritti

Increasing concerns about environmental issues seem not to have affected

the quantity of foreign mining investments in Peru, although they have
impacted the manner in which such investments are regulated, as well as
the redistribution of tax revenues. All stakeholders now acknowledge that
the lack of water infrastructure at high altitudes in the Andes, combined
with the effect of climate change on natural water supplies, is particularly im-
portant issues. Water supply systems in areas close to large-scale mining
operations have not been adequately enhanced to satisfy new demands,
which can result in shortages or unsafe water supplies for the communities.

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In response, both the Peruvian Government and corporations have been en-
hancing investments on water management infrastructures. These initiatives
are part of the solution, but do not seem to address communities’ expectations
related to corporate responsibilities for environmental damage and the gov-
ernment’s role in regulating mining environmental standards.
Second, as demonstrated by the two case studies, the time and resources
invested by mining corporations in corporate–community relations may
have a direct impact on the level of conflict. The Conga and Lagunas Norte con-
texts have much in common: the mines are both located near rural communities
in northern Peru, with comparable livelihoods, political traditions and experi-
ence with mining activities. They are also located in remote areas at high
altitudes in the Andes, in close proximity to water sources, with similar
infrastructures. However, Yanacocha and Barrick have adopted opposite
approaches to managing community relations. The Barrick example highlights
that investments aimed at strengthening corporate–community relations can
prevent conflict and improve sustainable mining practices, while keeping pro-
duction costs relatively low. By focusing on strengthening a solid partnership at
the local level, from the very earliest stages of the project Barrick has managed to
prevent conflict. Yanacocha’s strategy, on the other hand, has been to uncondi-
tionally claim its right to operate. It has preferred to negotiate with officials in
Lima rather than with local and regional authorities and has failed to use the
knowledge gained from its past experiences in Peru to attend to community
demands. This approach, and the absence of dialogue, has exacerbated local
opposition to its project, creating a polarized and destructive context and aug-
menting the challenges to the social viability of Conga.
Third, historical events may burden present-day operations. Yanacocha’s
reputation in Peru has presented a further challenge to the acceptance of
the Conga project. Yanacocha has been present in Cajamaraca for almost
two decades and has launched initiatives to respond to the population’s con-
cerns (Sosa, 2011, pp. 204–205; see also Pasco-Font et al., 2001, pp. 158–176).
Moreover, Newmont is signatory to several Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR) initiatives, such as the UN Global Compact (2004), International
Council of Mining and Metals (2001), the Voluntary Principles on Security
 Mining, development and corporate–community conflicts in Peru 447

and Human Rights (2002). However, evidence indicates that Yanacocha’s

efforts and development programmes have not managed to offset commu-
nity distrust due to the company’s past environmental performance and con-
cerns about water scarcity.
By and large, peasants have little faith in the mining industry, and are in-
creasingly resistant to corporations in northern Peru. This complex frame-
work makes dialogue among all parties more difficult than in other areas of
the country. Mutual agreements can be reached, but will require more time
and dialogue (e.g. La Zanja). As the life of a large-scale mining project is

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several decades, it would be a valuable investment for corporations to
build trust with communities over time to ensure that a project expands
smoothly. The Conga case suggests that it can be challenging to regain trust
once it has been lost because of past mistakes.
Fourth, the increase in tensions and levels of violence reached in several
mining conflicts are also symptoms of the central Government’s failure to
act as a credible and independent mediator. As outlined in the case of
Conga, the Government intervened only once corporate –community ten-
sions had polarized, accentuating confusion about the management of
natural resources within the Peruvian decentralization process. As of 2012,
several forums for dialogue aimed at managing conflict and promoting con-
structive solutions have been made available to the actors mediating mining
related social conflicts in Peru. Despite the fact that mining corporations have
started to recognize that time and effort are needed to mediate peaceful solu-
tions to mining conflicts, there has been a lag in their implementation due to
the State’s inability to police such matters.
Without clear governmental involvement, corporations have assumed the
role of negotiating agreements with civil society and local authorities.
However, given the imbalance of power between corporations and communi-
ties, when in disagreement and in the absence of a mediator, communities
show their discontent through peaceful protests and, if ignored, may resort
to the use of violence. Social conflicts in Peru have been described as ‘the con-
tentious expression of an emerging and fragmented representation of local
interests by actors with little access to or faith in state mediating institutions’
(Panfichi, 2011, p. 89). Scholars argue that, in the twenty-first century, anti-
mining movements are a form of protest against social exclusion in Peru
(Crabtree, 2011; Cotler, 2011).

Conclusions: the road ahead

Many agree that social conflicts present an opportunity to shift from abuse to
improved equal rights in society. Over two decades of mining conflicts across
Peru offer a vast source of valuable information for authorities, miners and
448 Fiorella Triscritti

communities to collectively evaluate the viability of a mining project. While the

1990s saw little communication between the mining industry and local com-
munities, since 2000 the intensity of conflicts has led miners to recognize the
importance of consultation with local communities. At the 10th Gold Sympo-
sium (May 2012) in Lima, Peru, Buenaventura’s CEO stated that miners in Peru
understand that it is no longer possible to build a mine without engaging the
community (El Comercio, 2012, May 16). Miners seem to agree that grass-roots
movements seek the respect of their rights to their environment and economic
future. At the outset, the majority of debates are neither in favour nor against

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mining but, rather, focus on how to integrate mining into the development of
rural communities. Interviews conducted by the author with miners and com-
munity relations experts in Peru confirm widespread agreement that, in order
to reach successful outcomes, corporate–community relations have to be tai-
lored to suit each context. Communities’ expectations vary depending on
their past relationships with mining and their livelihoods and political ideolo-
gies are also influential.
This article therefore suggests that dynamic corporate –community rela-
tions might be a necessary condition to prevent conflict and ensure sustain-
able mining, but they are not sufficient, in and of themselves, to promote
sustainable development. In a context of weak institutions with severe
social inequalities, sustainable mining practices per se are unlikely to generate
long-term sustainable development. Without government oversight, the eco-
nomic bonanza will continue to be distributed unevenly. Residents in Lima,
on the coast, or employed by mining companies are primarily the ones enjoy-
ing the greatest benefits. To generate sustainable development, three actors
ought to be able to negotiate the management of mining projects and revenues
as equal partners: the Government, civil society and the private sector. Sus-
tainable development goes hand-in-hand with good governance. This
article encourages further research seeking to analyse how stakeholders
can convert corporate –community conflicts to an arena for constructive dia-
logue and how governments can encourage and benefit from successful
community-relation cases to promote development for all.

Funding
Fiorella Triscritti is grateful for financial support from the Fund for Global
Environment, a joint initiative between Columbia University’s Center for
International Conflict Resolution (www.cicr-columbia.org) and the Italian
Ministry for the Environment, Land and Sea, for sponsoring this paper’s
research.
 Mining, development and corporate–community conflicts in Peru 449

Fiorella Triscritti worked with the Center for International Conflict Resolution, Columbia
University, New York City, NY 10027, USA. She has a multidisciplinary background in inter-
national affairs, with a specialization in conflict studies. Her exposure to post-conflict countries
and democratic transition contexts in Africa and Latin America have enhanced her understanding
of the challenges faced by civil societies in promoting sustainable development. She holds a PhD in
Political and Social Sciences from the European University Institute, a Master’s in Economics
from Bocconi University and a Bachelor of Arts in Politics and Economics from the University
of Essex.

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