Annegret Flohr

Corporate-Community Conflict and Dialogue in Peru’s Mining Sector

Paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association

International Congress, Chicago, 21-24 May 2014

Work in Progress – Comments Welcome1

Abstract

Corporate-community conflict is a constant theme in Peru’s extractive sector and seems to

have escalated over the past few years during which violent confrontations between anti-
mining/anti-oil protestors and the state’s security forces have resulted in many tragic deaths in
Bagua, Espinar and Islay, among others. The most frequent causes of these conflicts are
allegations of serious environmental pollution, competition for scarce water resources and
distribution of the wealth generated by extractive operations.
Faced with the complex challenge of addressing these underlying issues while maintaining
Peru’s attractiveness to foreign investments, the Peruvian government has been fostering a
strategy of multi-actor dialogue processes. Numerous so called ‘mesa de diálogo’ or ‘mesa de
desarollo’ are now under way across the country’s extractive sector. In the area of mining, one
can hardly find a mining company that has operations in Peru and is not currently sitting at
any dialogue table, more often one finds a single mine involved in many local level dialogue
processes at the same time.
This paper will attempt a (first) analysis about these relatively young processes’ effectiveness
and, in particular, their potential for reducing local level conflict and violence. For this
purpose, the paper draws on field research conducted in Peru between April and August 2013.
It compares the dialogue tables between the Peruvian state, Antamina and the alcaldes of the
province of Huari, Ancash with two regional dialogue tables involving Anglo American’s
Quellaveco project as well as the Southern Peru Copper Corporation in Moquegua. Drawing
on a comparison of these cases and focusing, in particular, on the characteristics of the
underlying conflicts, the paper attempts a few tentative propositions about variables that do
and variables that do not impact mesa effectiveness.

1
Contact details: Annegret Flohr, research fellow at Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Germany, e-mail:
flohr@hsfk.de
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1. Introduction

Peru is a country heavily dependent on extractive industries. The dominance of the sector is
visible in macroeconomic statistics – but not only there. Approximately 6% of Peru’s national
income are generated in the extractive sector (Carlevarino 2012: 8). 62% of exports are
mining products (ICMM 2012: 5). The sector generates 32% of tax income and investments
until 2020 are estimated to stand at $52 billon (Carlevarino 2012: 7-8). But beyond these
numbers, the pervasiveness of the sector goes much further. In few other countries in the
world, the extractive sector is as permanently present as a topic – in politics, in the media, in
conversations of people on the street. And in Peru, few other topics are as contentious.
Ministers have resigned over issues related to the sector multiple times over the past few
years. Country-wide associations of communities affected by mining as well as a number of
NGOs and other civil society organisations at local, regional and national level have formed
as a result of mining conflicts (Echave et al. 2004: 6-7). According to Peru’s national
Ombudsman, the Defensoría del Pueblo, as of March 2014, there are 104 social conflicts in
the mining sector, 89 of which are active, the rest latent (Defensoría del Pueblo 2014: 12-3).

While these numbers give a good indication of the level of conflictivity of the mining sector
in Peru, they do little more than that. In particular – as is, of course, a defining feature of such
quantitative statistics – they tell us little about the great internal variation between these
numerous conflicts. They vary on a number of counts, in terms of conflict intensity or conflict
duration, in terms of who is actually in conflict with whom and in terms of the chances for
conflict resolution or transformation, etc. This paper will focus on some of these variables
differentiating mining conflicts from one another in order to assess under which conditions so
called Mesa de Diálogo can be effective in addressing, or transforming these conflicts.
Establishing Mesa de Diálogo is one of the primary policy instruments employed by the
Peruvian government to address the numerous and multidimensional mining conflicts all over
the country. For the purpose of this paper, ‘effectiveness’ of these Mesa de Diálogo is
understood as transformation of the respective conflict from one publicly and violently
erupting into one dealt with by peaceful means of dialogue and negotiation. Hence, Mesa are
effective in transforming mining conflicts when after their installation, no more violent
protests occur. Theoretically, candidate variables that might impact success or failure of the
mesa-model in specific cases, could, potentially, stem from two universes: On the one hand,
characteristics of the mining conflict itself could determine its amenability through a mesa
process as it can be hypothesized that certain types of conflicts are more easily solvable or

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transformable than others. Secondly, however, mesa effectiveness could also depend on
characteristics of the respective mesa, its institutional design, the actors participating, etc.
Hence, a theoretical model of mesa effectiveness could look as follows.

Figure 1: Modelling the Research Question (while bracketing/blackboxing mesa characteristics)

This paper, however, will solely look to characteristics of the respective mining conflict and
will inquire whether or not some of these are more or less likely to be effectively
transformable by a Mesa de Diálogo. The paper will, hence, bracket the variables
differentiating between specific instances of Mesa de Diálogo and treat the mesa-model as a
blackbox. Since this paper is part of a larger research project only just begun by the author,
the blackbox will, however, be reopened at a later stage in order to establish a more complete
picture of factors impacting mesa effectiveness.

Methodologically, the paper draws on field research conducted in Peru between April and
August 2013. It proceeds by, first, recapping existing definitions and typologies of ‘social
conflicts’ and ‘mining conflicts’ as a subset of these. This brief literature review will serve to
identify variables differentiating mining conflicts that could, potentially, impact the
effectiveness of Mesa de Diálogo. The paper will then briefly introduce its three cases,
namely: 1) the Antamina Mesa between the mining companies Antamina and Nyrestar, the
alcaldes of the province of Huari in Ancash and the central government; 2) the regional Mesa
concerning Anglo American’s Quellaveco project as well as 3) the regional Mesa on the
Southern Peru Copper Corporation, both in Moquegua. Thirdly, the paper briefly
problematizes the measurement of ‘effectiveness’ before then comparing the three mesa
processes in terms of their independent variables and degrees of effectiveness.

2. Defining Social Conflicts

For the purpose of this paper, mining conflicts will be defined as a subset of social conflicts –
namely the subset that substantively relates to mining operations, in one way or another.
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Peru’s Defensoría del Pueblo (DDP) in its monthly report defines social conflicts as ‘a
complex process in which sectors of society, the state or enterprises perceive that their
objectives, interests, values or needs are in contradiction and the contradiction could possible
lead to violence’ (DDP 2013: 3, own translation). Hence, for the DDP, conflicts are not equal
to and do not necessarily involve violence but could potentially escalate to violence. The DDP
further differentiates between latent conflicts – in which the actual contradictions are not
publicly expressed – and active conflicts that manifest in public demands. The DDP uses a
one-(and partly two-)dimensional categorization of conflicts that refers, first, to the substance
of the respective dispute. The latter can concern public affairs (local, regional or national),
socio-environmental issues, border demarcation, coca cultivation, labor issues, community
issues, electoral affairs or other. The differentiation between these nine types of conflicts is
not wholly systematic because some types are identified by the substance of conflict, others
by the actors involved. For example, community conflicts are defined by the parties they
involve, namely local communities. Hence, socio-environmental and community conflicts
may both substantively deal with the access to natural resources but the latter occur between
communities. Mining conflicts, as understood in this paper, are one of several types forming
part of the socio-environmental conflicts identified by the DDP, along with hydrocarbon,
energy, forest, sanitation, agro-industrial, electricity and other conflicts. Here again,
differentiation is not fully systematic as it is not wholly clear what precisely differentiates
hydrocarbon, energy and electricity conflicts from one another. These limitations of the
typology are, however, unproblematic for the Defensoría because the exercise merely serves
ordering purposes but is not an analytical tool that would need more conceptual clarity.

The ONDS differentiates between differences (diferencias), controversies (controvercias) and

social conflicts (conflictos sociales). Differences are described as cognitive conflicts or
‘contrapositions of opinions’ in which one party believes that the other is ‘wrong’ about
certain real world facts. Controversies, for their part, are understood as oppositions of
interests or positions about a concrete fact, an action or a decision (ONDS 2012a). This
differentiation between differences and controversies appears to rely on at least two
dimensions: First, it seems to distinguish between conflicts of cognition or perception versus
more ‘real’ conflicts when differentiating between opinions, on the one hand, and interests
and positions, on the other hand. How opinions, positions and interests can be told apart in
concrete instances is, however, not explicated any further and hence, these remain rather

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vague concepts. Second, differences and controversies seem to also differ in terms of the level
of concreteness of the respective subject of dispute between general ‘real facts’ in the case of
differences and more concrete actions and decisions in the case of controversies. Here again it
remains somewhat unclear how distinction between the two would work in concrete cases.

A further dimension that seems to be implicit in the distinction between differences and
controversies (and the third category of social conflicts) seems to be the intensity of the
respective dispute that rises from a low level for differences, to a more intensity for
controversies and is most intense for social conflicts. This escalation is implied in ONDS
depiction of differences, controversies and social conflicts as a sequence (ONDS 2012a: 18)
with the different stages requiring different forms of intervention by the ONDS. Hence,
differences, controversies and social conflicts seem to represent an alternative way of
depicting states of conflict that the Defensoría describes as either latent, active or resolved
(ONDS, however, does not explicitly refer to conflict intensity as a separate indicator).
Finally, and, importantly, the ONDS differentiation between differences and controversies,
first, and between the former two and social conflicts, second, does not rely on the same
variables and indicators. Instead, when social conflicts are defined, additional dimensions are
introduced, including the nature of relationships between the actors involved (as
interdependent) and effects of the conflict (on public order and governmentability) (ONDS
2012a: 17). Hence, from an analytical perspective, the ONDS typology is not very useful as it
lumps together a rather large set of indicators without explicitly defining them. Nevertheless,
for the purposes of ONDS, the rough differentiation may be sufficient, as it mainly serves to
identify with what degree of urgency the office should intervene in any given conflict. But if
both, in the end, depict states of conflict, it can be asserted that the DDP’s typology, by
relying solely on the objective fact of whether conflict is publicly expressed or not, is superior
to the ONDS that lumps together subjective/ cognitive and vague dimensions in order to
differentiate between the state of difference from the state of controversy and finally, the state
of social conflict. For this reason, our understanding of (mining) conflicts will depart from the
Defensoría’s definition of active social conflicts as ‘complex processes in which sectors of
society, the state or enterprises perceive that their objectives, interests, values or needs are in
contradiction and manifest these perceptions in public demands (that can, potentially, involve
or lead to violence).

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3. Focusing on Mining Conflicts

Mining conflicts are a subset of this broader category of social conflicts, namely a subset
concerned with mining operations. Mining conflicts, for their part, exhibit a great degree of
variation, they differ in terms of the actors they involve, in terms of the issues being
controversial, in terms of conflict intensity and duration. In such scenarios, in which social
phenomena to be studied are highly complex and show high degrees of variation, social
science often uses typologies in order to simplify the real world phenomena for analytical
purposes. However, due to the multidimensionality of mining conflicts and since we do not
yet know which of the many variables differentiating mining conflicts from one another are
most decisive in terms of their transformability, drawing up a catch-all typology that – while
simplifying and systematizing the phenomenon – captures all important dimensions is
probably not possible. Hence, this section will merely give an overview of existing
categorizations and typologies of mining conflicts in order to deduce candidate variables that
may impact transformability from these.

When looking more closely at mining conflicts as one subtype of social conflicts, the ONDS
categorization – along with others – does offer important insights. In sum, we can rely on
three influential models typologizing mining conflicts, respectively forwarded by Echave et
al. in 2009, by Arellano-Yanguas in 2011 and by the ONDS in 2012. All three explicitly focus
on extractive or mining conflicts, leaving aside the further subtypes of social conflicts
explicated above. However, since each of them develops its typology for different purposes,
each has a different focus. Arellano-Yanuguas (Arellano-Yanguas 2011: 629-32) and the
ONDS (ONDS 2012a: 27) share an approach that looks more closely to what is actually the
subject or substance of mining conflicts. Echave et al. instead, focus on factors that can
explain why conflicts emerge and what particular path they take in their evolution (Echave et
al. 2009: 192-200).

More precisely, Echave et al. differentiate mining conflicts by reference to two variables: The
perception of affected populations about the degree to which they will be (negatively) affected
by mining), on the one hand, and the pre-existing capacity of any community to organize
itself for the purpose of opposition. The specific combination of these two characteristics
explains why certain cases of mining conflict remain of low intensity and exhibit only
sporadic moments of escalation and protest (San Marcos); why others exhibit sporadic but
recurrent manifestations of conflict and protest that are never really calmed down
(Yanacocha); yet others are solved through negotiations (Tintaya); and finally, some succeed
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in wholesale abolition of specific mining projects (Tambogrande) (Echave, et al. 2009: 192-
200).

Arellano-Yanguas, who is less interested in using his typology for any particular explanatory
purpose but more for arriving at a complete description of the types of conflicts occurring in
Peru’s mining sector, also looks to two variables in further differentiating extractive (but not
solely mining) conflicts, namely the actors involved and the issues at stake: He distinguishes
between a Type 1 conflict involving local populations and mining companies and a Type II
conflict between local populations and local governments (Arellano-Yanguas 2011: 628).
Each of the two then has several subtypes: Type I conflicts are either of such nature that local
populations aim to stop a new mining project or its expansion; Type II conflicts, in contrast,
are merely a strategy employed by the local population in order to foster formal negotiations
and achieve better results in these. In Type II conflicts, what is at stake is the distribution of
fiscal transfers from the central government, usually in form of the canon minero. These can
take four more specific forms as either conflicts between the local population and local
authorities; between different levels of government; over the control of territory and
demarcation of boundaries that determines how the canon is distributed; and over
employment opportunities in the public sector that are created by the resources from the
canon. Hence, the typology also brings in the substance of what is actually at stake in the
conflict.

Finally, the ONDS differentiation of mining conflicts relies on only this latter dimension by
distinguishing the between substantive demands brought forward by the local population. The
ONDS identifies five different types of demands that vary between mining conflicts, namely
accusations of contamination, wholesale rejection of particular projects or expansions,
demands for greater benefits, claims for compensation and demands to change previous
agreements.

As this paper aims to investigate which of the variables characterizing mining conflicts
influences their amenability to transformation through Mesa de Diálogo, we will include all of
the factors identified in these three studies in our analysis of the three different mining
conflicts below. Table 1 recaps these variables and orders them by reference to three broad
clusters, namely, the substance of demands, actors involved and actor characteristics.

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Table 1: Independent variables differing between mining conflicts

Clusters of ONDS variables Arrelano-Yanguas De Echave et al.

Variables variables variables
Substance of Complaints about
demands pollution
Complete rejection of Complete rejection of
projects projects or expansions
Demanding greater Demanding greater
benefits benefits
Claiming
compensation for
harm
Demands for
changing previous
accords
Actors Populations and
involved corporations
Local populations and
local government
Actor Capacity to organize
Characteristics (depending on whether
affected population is
more rural or urban in
nature)
Perception of Impacts
(depending on whether
the affected region has
previous experience
with mining)

4. History and Philosophy of Mesa de Diálogo

According to the Defensoriá as well as the ONDS, the by far largest number of social
conflicts relates to the mining sector (Defensoría del Pueblo 2014; ONDS 2014). The number
and intensity of mining (and other extractive) conflicts in Peru became increasingly
problematic in the past few years from a number of perspectives. From a macro-economic
perspective, these conflicts threaten to negatively impact the prospects for further foreign
investment in mining that Peru’s economy is so heavily dependent on. And from a societal
perspective, the conflictivity in the mining sector continues to increase the general level of
mistrust and friction in Peruvian society and is likely to have further negative impacts on the
governmentability of the state in the longer term. As a result, from a political perspective, the
increasing conflictivity and the state’s inability to improve the situation brought ever more
instability to Peru’s political sector (as well as insecurity to its political elite). For all of these
8
reasons, the Peruvian government and state needed to find ways of addressing the issue of
mining conflicts. In 2010, the Oficina de Gestíon de Conflictos Sociales was established and
during 2011, specialized units dedicated to addressing social conflicts were integrated in
several ministries (ONDS 2013: 11). President Humalla, in particular, emphasized the idea of
dialogue as a solution to the country’s social conflicts. As one form of institutionalizing such
dialogues, Mesa de Diálogo – that have a long history as instruments for addressing political
problems in Peru – began to mushroom all over the country and in particular, in many of the
regions subject to mining conflicts (ONDS 2013). Until that point, the most famous
antecedents of Mesa de Diálogo concerned the cases of Yanacocha in Cajamarca (Lingan
2008) and Tintaya in Cusco (Echave, et al. 2004; Aroca 2008). With the creation of the
Oficina Nacional de Diálogo y Sostenibilidad (ONDS) in 2012, at the height of the Conga
conflict, this new ‘dialogue policy’ became fully institutionalized (Presidente de la República
2012). In March 2014, the Oficina is involved in 55 dialogue processes (casos en gestion)
majority of which concern mining conflicts (ONDS 2014 48).

The creation of the ONDS should not be seen totally uncritically because it partly works in
competition to the Defensoría, one of Peru’s most widely accepted democratic institutions, as
it aims to present a picture of overall less conflictivity than the one drawn by the Defensoría2.
Nevertheless, the ONDS as an institution fulfils a highly important role in the Peruvian
context. On the one hand, it fills an institutional vacuum with regards to the many mining and
extractive conflicts as these were not effectively addressed by any governmental institution.
Even the DDP rarely intervened in mining conflicts as these do not directly implicate state
organs or state action and hence, sit somewhat squarely with the DDPs mandate. Ahead of the
ONDS creation, mining conflicts were the sole responsibility of the MEM – whose reputation,
in particular in the eyes of local and marginalized Andean populations – had long been
heavily damaged as it was seen as acting solely in the interests of mining corporations. The
creation of the ONDS, hence, offered the possibility, or at least the hope, of re-introducing the
state as a more neutral actor into conflicts between local populations and mining corporations.
Hence, the ONDS is an important institution because it filled an institutional vacuum.

Secondly, the ONDS is important because of the very particular approach it embodies: The
idea of dialogue as a means of addressing social conflicts stands in the broader tradition of
Alternative Dispute Resolution that, broadly speaking, comprises mechanisms ranging from
arbitration to mediation (Shapiro 1981; Reuben 1997; Mattli 2001). All of these are

2
This point of view was forwarded by several experts working in Peruvian politics in interviews with the author.
9
understood as ‘alternative’ to judicial or court-based dispute resolution that is seen as
ineffective. From the perspective of ADR, courts do not even aim to ‘solve’ underlying
conflicts, they merely pronounce a ‘winner’ by judging who was ‘right’ and who was ‘wrong’
according to the terms of the law. This judgement is expected to be accepted by the ‘wrong’
or ‘loosing’ party – which, however, is far from an actual solution to the conflict. ADR
mechanisms, instead, seek to mediate between the interests of the parties and to find a
compromise acceptable to all those involved. They, hence, are more compatible with the
philosophy of conflict transformation. Peru’s Mesa de Diálogo need to be understood in this
context, hence as a form of ADR and as an alternative to much more adversarial and
confrontative investigative or court proceedings. They, hence, are more compatible with the
philosophy of conflict transformation than with judicial dispute resolution.

It is important to bear this differentiation in mind in order to understand what a Mesa is meant
and able to provide and what cannot do. Mesa de Diálogo seek to mediate between the
interests of all parties involved and to establish compromise solutions acceptable to all. They
do not – and this is important – aim to deliver ‘justice’ in the sense that wrongs done by one
party or another will be rectified or in the sense that wrongdoers will be punished. Such ideas
belong to the realm of restitutive and retributive justice, not to the realm of ADR.

In the Peruvian context, and specifically with regard to mining conflicts, relying on ADR-type
mechanisms offers a number of advantages in particular when taking into account that the
judicial sector itself is not a reliable alternative (ONDS 2012b: 7) but faced with a number of
severe challenges, ranging from limited capacities to limited legitimacy and trust. But at the
same time, the ADR-based institution of Mesa de Diálogo is limited from the outset in its
conflict resolution or transformation capacities because it cannot offer what some disputants
seek: restitution and retribution.

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5. Mesa de Diálogo: Selected Cases

The cases of Mesa de Diálogo selected for comparison in this paper have the advantage of
depicting variation in a number of the above described dimensions, hence, enabling us to
observe which of these are more or less amenable to effective conflict transformation.

Antamina Mesa

The first mesa to be studied involves the Antamina mine (currently owned by BHP Biliton,
Xstrata, Teck and Mitsubishi) as well as the smaller Nyrestar operation; the alcaldes of
centros poplados of the district of Huari (42 in total), aligned in the association AMUCEPS;
and the central government, represented by the PCM. Antamina operates in the district of San
Marcos, province of Huari since the year 2001 and has, over the years, been involved in a
relatively large number of social conflicts (Szablowski 2007; Salas Carreño 2008; Gil 2009),
usually, however, of low intensity (Echave, et al. 2009). Even at the moment, the company is
participating in several Mesa de Diálogo and is also employing other instruments to address,
more or less directly, several conflicts surrounding its operations. For the purpose of this
paper, however, we will focus solely on the conflict between AMUCEPS and Antamina that
culminated in a strike in November 2011 blocking the access road to the mine for several
days. In response to this event, a Mesa de Diálogo was established by the PCM though not by
a resolución ministerial (Huamani 2013: 8; MEM 2014). The mesa’s work is undertaken in
two technical commissions, the environmental and the social commission that meet
independently and present the result of their work to the plenary. A central role in the mesa
process is played by the church-based organization CEAS that is counseling AMUCEPS and
partially acting as a facilitator of the process (Huamani 2013).

By the time of writing, mesa sessions were still ongoing and accords achieved so far were
limited relating primarily to a major forestation project as well as to further environmental
monitoring and testing, in particular around the village of Juprog that had long accused
Antamina of major contamination, to no avail.

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Quellaveco Mesa

The second case, involving the Quellaveco project of AngloAmerican in Moquegua, is

located in a very different setting. Most importantly, when the Quellaveco Mesa took place,
the mining project was not even in construction yet. Indeed, it was still lacking a number of
permits and it was not yet guaranteed whether it would come on stream. The Mesa was set up
in April 2011, was formalized by a PCM resolution in May 2012 and ran through August
2012 when it reached an agreement between the participants on how a number of social and
environmental aspects of the proposed mining operation should be handled. Hence, it is the
only one of the three mesas studies here that has actually been concluded (though several of
its technical commissions continue monitoring the implementation of the agreements
reached).

The table’s proceedings were governed by a written set of rules, the so called ‘reglamento’
that was developed and agreed upon during its first sessions. The reglamento specified that
the dialogue table ‘is a participatory space for the purpose of generating consensus between
civil society, the state and the private sector’ (Gobierno Regional Moquegua 2011a articulo
4°). Beyond that, the reglamento identified the initial participants of the Mesa – though
further participants were officially incorporated at many of its sessions – and defined the
topics it would deal with, namely, water resources, the environment and social responsibility
(Gobierno Regional Moquegua 2011b: articulo 5°)). It also established the Mesa’s organs: a
plenary, special invitees, technical commissions and a technical secretariat. Participants of the
mesa included, in addition to representatives of the mine, members of the central and regional
government as well as representatives of civil society from several municipalities of
Moquegua (PCM 2012a).

The Quellaveco Mesa is widely held to be one of the most successful examples of dialogue
processes in the mining sector in Peru so far. It did not only achieve a general calming down
of tense relations in Moquegua but also, and importantly, resulted in heavy adjustments in the
actual design of the mine in order to better accommodate community claims and concerns.
Central among these design changes were changes in the water management system of the to-
be-mining project. AngloAmerican originally intended to use waters from underwater
reserves below the Chilota river but changed this plan – in response to public protests –
already in 2010 when it acquired rights to draw on water reserved for the Pasto Grande
project, thereby again stimulating heated opposition of Moqueguans. As a result of the Mesa,
these plans were changed again and Anglo agreed to a relatively complex solution for
12
satisfying its water needs that would at the same time improve water quality of the Tambo
river by constructing an additional dam on the low quality Titire (Scurrah 2013: 17-8). In
addition to these water management aspects, the Mesa also resulted in establishment of the
Moquegua Development Fund to which Anglo committed 1 billion Nuevo Soles
(AngloAmerican 2012: 13)

While the revision of Quallaveco’s water management plan is considered by many to be one
of the greatest successes of the Quellaveco Mesa and one that makes it unique in its results, it
is not quite clear whether this success can really be attributed to the Mesa alone since
Quellaveco represented a rare case of the state withholding a license that is an absolute
prerequisite for beginning mining operations until a dialogue process addressed the
controversial issues. Hence, this already points to one factor that could determine Mesa
effectiveness – but actually is external to the Mesa process itself: The changing, or leveling,
of power relations between the local population and the mining company that, in this case,
was achieved by withholding the license.

Southern Mesa

The final Mesa de Diálogo to be included in this paper represents a particularly complex case.
The mining conflict concerns the Southern Peru Copper Corporation who operates the
Cuajone mine in Moquegua and Toquepala mine in Tacna respectively. In addition to the two
mines, Southern also operates a smelter and a refinery in Ilo, both of which are the oldest such
operations in Peru dating back to the 1960s. In its long presence in the region, Southern has
been the subject of many social and mining conflicts, often circling around contamination
resulting from its operations in Ilo but also concerning a number of further topics (Scurrah
2013). The Mesa process under study here, also, is not the first aiming to solve conflicts
surrounding Southern’s operations. A first Mesa was installed in 2004, ran until 2009 and is
widely regarded as having been a complete failure. A second Mesa took place in Tacna where
Southern planned to expand its Toquepala operation in 2011 and resulted in a sizeable
investment of Southern in regional infrastructure and development (though much below the
one billion Nuevo Soles invested by Anglo). This latter Mesa and its accord is seen as having
sparked the latest conflict in Moquegua as well because it demonstrated to the regional
population that it was possible to negotiate a better deal with Southern than the one that had
prevailed for decades. The current Moquegua Mesa was established in 2012 by Ministerial

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Resolution, it consists of the plenary plus three technical commissions dealing with water
resources, the environment and sustainable development respectively and it is also tripartite in
nature, meaning it incorporates regional and central government organs alongside civil society
and the company (PCM 2012b). The Southern mesa is also still ongoing at the time of
writing, making judgment about its effectiveness somewhat speculative.

6. Measuring Effectiveness of Mesa de Diálogo: Caveats and Propositions

Measuring the effectiveness of political institutions is a complex and often very difficult
undertaking. In Political Science, in particular, debates about whether or how effectiveness
can be measured have been ongoing for decades (Dahl 1994; Young and Levy 1999;
Underdal 2002; Wolf 2010). This paper is not the place to delve into this debate but will
merely content with recapping and applying some of its results.

Two challenges that severely hamper any attempt to measure effectiveness should be borne in
mind: The first is the question of who defines effectiveness or, put differently, whose
perspective counts in evaluating effectiveness? Looking to our example of Mesa de Diálogo,
it will probably make a major difference whether one asks the local population or the
respective mining company about how effectiveness should be measured. A second and
closely related difficulty concerns the realm or scope of the respective search for effects: How
much can expected of one particular political process? And where are the limits of what can
be expected of it, in thematic, spatial and temporal terms? This measurement issue becomes
even more complicated when seeking – as in our case – to compare the effectiveness of
several institutions that may vary strongly in scope and scale, as do, for example, the mesas of
Antamina and Southern under study here. Comparability, hence, is one of the central
challenges in measuring effectiveness of institutions and processes.

When pondering about what should count as Mesa effectiveness in theory, one might
sympathize with a measure that looks to the (number and quality of) agreements achieved by
a Mesa and, furthermore, to whether and in how far these are actually implemented, hence,
making mesa effectiveness depictable on two continuous scales.

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 Figure 2: Mesa Effectiveness: Model 1

Degree of
implementation

Mesa C

= high effectiveness

Mesa B

= medium effectiveness

Mesa A

= low effectiveness

Agreements achieved

Looking more closely, however, it soon becomes evident that judging number and quality of
agreements as indicating either effectiveness or ineffectiveness is far from easy. Out of the
possible universe of agreements that could be made, what number can be judged as
satisfactory, what number as insufficient? And even more tricky, when can agreements be
understood as of good versus bad quality? Again: From whose perspective? And finally, how
would one compare the number and quality of agreements of two Mesa de Diálogo, in
particular when they are set up to deal with conflicts of very different scope and scale? For
example, how would one compare number and quality of the Antamina mesa and the
Southern mesa when the former is merely one of many mesa Antamina is sitting at, dealing
solely with the claims of the centros poblados (that do not benefit from the canon); and the
Southern mesa has the ambition of tackling all problems Moqueguans have with Southern at
the regional level (PCM 2012)?

Bearing these difficulties of measuring effectiveness in mind and aiming to, at least partially,
address them, this paper will employ only one, relatively simple and unambitious measure of

15
effectiveness that aims to bracket the issue of whose perspective counts and to address the
problem of comparability: The paper will measure mesa effectiveness in terms of one simple
dichotomous indicator, namely, whether conflict – in the form of manifest protests or violence
– continues or stops during and after mesa proceedings. Hence, indicators of an ineffective
mesa would be, among other things, the resurgence of demonstrations or protests, blocking of
streets or other infrastructure or overt aggression against mining operations themselves.
However, in addition to these violent manifestations, further indicators of continued conflict –
despite (ineffective) mesa proceedings – would include resort of mesa participants to other,
less dialogical and more adversarial means of dispute settlement, such as, for example, court
trials or other forms of formal investigations. Since Mesa de Diálogo are intended to be –
dialogical and cooperative – alternatives to such formal investigations, resort to the letter
would indicate mistrust, and hence, ineffectiveness of the overall mesa process in the sense of
continued, and untransformed, conflict outside of it.

This measure – of either continued or halted conflict – may seem to be a low hanging fruit,
however, it is one of few possible indicators that make mesa effectives comparable,
measurable in objective terms and depictable on a – dichotomous – scale.

Figure 3: Mesa Effectiveness: Model 2

Continued manifestations of conflict = No more manifestations of conflict = effective

ineffective
Mesa A
Mesa B
Mesa C

When applying this measure to the three mesa under study here, they can all be counted as
relatively ‘effective’. In none of the cases, violent protests reoccurred after mesa negotiations
began (or after they were completed). There is a partial exception, however, with regard to the
Southern mesa: while no public manifestations of conflict have resurfaced yet, it is noticeable
that in the Moqueguan context, the local population seems not to contend sufficiently with the
mesa process so as to stop all efforts at trying other avenues for recourse. In particular, civil
society representatives of Ilo and Torata keep trying ways of drawing more
‘confrontative’/adversarial institutions into the case, such as OEFA (Gobierno Regional de
Moquegua 2014b) or the recently planned international environmental audit (Gobierno
Regional de Moquegua 2014a). While there are attempts at integrating these processes also
into the overall mesa process, investigations by these institutions seem to not fully fit with the
16
model of Mesa de Diálogo as non-adversarial proceedings. Thus, we will count the Southern
mesa as exhibiting somewhat less effectiveness than the other two.

This comparative design, of three cases that do not vary significantly on the dependent
variable and also show only partial variation on the independent variable is not ideal from a
methodological point of view as it neither constitutes a ‘most similar-different-outcome’ nor a
‘most different-similar outcome’ design (Gerring 2001: 210)3. The conclusions we can draw
from this design, hence, are limited. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify which factors do
not matter in determining mesa effectiveness – because they were present in all three mesas
that nevertheless concluded more or less effectively. Furthermore, if one accepts the
observation that the Southern mesa has a tendency towards less effectiveness – in terms of
calming the underlying conflict – we can also determine which attributes of the Southern
conflict may be responsible for these limits in effectiveness. However, for these, we can only
derive hypothesis from this comparative design that we would have to test in other settings.

7. Comparing the Three Mesa and the Underlying conflicts

Now looking to the above variables characterizing mining conflicts, trying to establish which
of these impact the possibility of conflict transformation through a mesa process, it should be
noted from the outset that the cases vary on several counts, some of them acknowledged in the
above typologies, some of them not. A major difference of course exists between Quellaveco
and the other two cases. Quellaveco was not even operational when the Mesa took place while
the other two mines already have a relatively long history and the particular mesas studied
here are not the first the two companies have sat at. Furthermore, the Huari case, on the one
hand, and the Moqueguan case on the other hand differ significantly in the level at which the
mesa is located: The Moqueguan mesa is set up as a regional process, incorporating all
Moqueguan actors that sought participation, in particular from civil society, while the
Antamina mesa is much more local in nature and involves only AMUCEPS, i.e. local
alcaldes. All of these characteristics, however, belong to the realm of ‘mesa characteristics’
that have been bracketed for the purpose of this paper but will be tackled at a later stage of the
author’s research project.

3
This non-ideal constellation is due tot he author’s approach to these cases, as she engaged in inductive field
research and participative observation of these, prior to knowing their characteristics, instead of selecting them in
accordance with a systematic deductive design.
17
Another important remark to be noted from the outset is that the two cases of Moquegua
allow for an ideal comparative design in which a number of variables are held constant – such
as regional characteristics, politics and history – hence allowing for more reliable judgments
about the importance of those factors that are varying between them (with the caveat,
however, that the dependent variable is varying only slightly between the Quellaveco and the
Southern Mesa).

What the three cases have in common is that all three are cases of conflict between local
populations and mines, i.e. Type I conflicts in Arellana-Yanguas terms. This, however, is a
result of case selection and a certain bias therein: When doing field research, the author of this
paper was interested in the potential of Mesa de Diálogo in precisely this conflict
constellation, she was intentionally not looking at cases of conflict between local populations
and local government. Secondly, all three cases are instances where local populations –
among other things – demand higher benefits from the respective mining operations. This can
probably be considered a constant factor in mining conflicts between local populations and
corporations generally, except in the rarer cases where populations are wholly opposed to a
new project or to the expansion of an existing one. Hence, Arellano-Yanguas rightly identifies
these as the two primary types of mining conflicts – conflicts resulting from wholesale
rejection and conflicts resulting from claims for greater benefits.

When looking more closely to the demands of the local populations that, in the first place,
gave rise to the mining conflict and then to the Mesa being established, these vary more
strongly between the cases – which is a quasi-necessary result of the mining projects being at
different stages. In the Antamina case, the demands made by alcaldes of Huari primarily
relate to greater benefits for the centros poblados that, so far, do not profit from any of the
mine’s contributions, neither direct nor indirect ones. Due to the relative great internal
variation between the centros poblados agrouped in AMUCEPS, a number of more specific
claims also come into play but were not dominant in the Mesa negotiations. These include, for
example, accusations of contamination by the people of the small village of Juprog. People
from Juprog also are negotiating (and fighting) with Antamina over land rights and a next
wave of land acquisition by the mine and in this regard, they also have special claims that,
however, are dealt with largely outside of the mesa context.

In both, the cases of Quellaveco and Southern, one issue materializes as particularly important
that had not been explicated in any of the above typologies, namely, the issue of access to and
allocation of water usage rights. Studies such as those of de Echave et al. as well as of
18
Arallana-Yunguas are aware of the centrality of these issues to mining conflicts and touch
upon them in their case describing narratives but have chosen not to include them as central
features defining mining conflicts.

One could perhaps subsume the issue of water rights under several of the claim categories
included in the ONDS typology, either in the context of contamination claims or in the
context of demands for greater benefits. Nevertheless, the author would like to treat them as a
separate set of demands because they are, on the one hand, recurring in many of Peru’s major
mining conflicts (compare, for example, the Conga case) and they are, on the other hand, very
different in nature from the other demands listed: In contrast to accusations of pollution, water
rights issues do not occur only ex-post, when the mine is already operational, but they are
allocated ex-ante. And importantly, in disputes over water rights, the claims of local
populations do not relate to accusations of harm done by the mine but to its acquisition of
rights that – from the perspective of the local population – should not be his. Furthermore,
water rights sit squarely in the category of claims for greater benefits as they do not constitute
benefits to be given out by the company but instead, to not be taken away from the
community. These issues, to the mind of the author, justify treating water rights a separate
category of claims.

While in the Quellaveco case, water rights and benefits constituted the primary demands –
since the mine was not yet operational – the Southern conflicts and Mesa are the result of a
broad set of community claims that, indeed, cover all forms of demands identified by the
ONDS and others. On the one hand, the local population, in particular of Ilo, regularly
accuses Southern of contamination, in particular by the smelter and refinery and they demand
compensation for the many years of unabated pollution (up until their modernization in 2008)
(Scurrah 2013). On the other hand, they also demand greater contributions of the mine to the
development of the region, inspired both by the Quellaveo Mesa as well as by Southern’s
Mesa in Tacna. In that sense, they also demand the changing of previous accords (or non-
accords), namely of all those explicit or tacit rules governing Southern’s operations that never
foresaw for Southern to increase its contribution to the region. Finally, much of the population
in Moquegua also were opposed to Southern’s latest expansion of the Cuajone mine.

Finally, in terms of the factors identified by de Echave et al. that determine the dynamics and
evolution of a mining conflict, differences only exist between the Antamina case, on the one
hand, and the two Moqueguan cases, on the other hand. In Huari, the capacity of the local
population to mobilize, organize itself and voice its demands is severely restricted, in
19
particular due to the very rural nature of the region and the fact that AMUCEPS does not
really have an institutional existence, outside of the particular Mesa context. Nevertheless, the
perception of impacts from Antamina’s operations is great – though the perception in this case
does not relate to any particular new project or expansion plan but to the mere existence of the
mine in the vicinities of the centros poblados that were never included in any of the previous
dialogues and negotiations with the mine.

In relative contrast, in the two cases in Moqeugua, the capacity to mobilize and organize is
extremely high, not only because Moqeugua (and Ilo) are urban areas with high levels of
development but also for the simple reason that Southern has operated in the region for almost
fifty years and the opposition to Southern, and mining more generally, also had a long
timeframe for constituting and institutionalizing itself.

Table 2: Conflict characteristics and Mesa de Diálogo in comparison

Clusters Variables Antamina Quellaveco Southern

Substance of Complaints about Yes Not applicable Yes
demands pollution
Complete rejection of No No Yes (expansion)
projects
Demanding greater Yes Yes Yes
benefits
Claiming compensation No Not applicable Yes
for harm (solely for
Juprog)
Demands for changing Not applicable Yes
previous accords
Claims for water rights No Yes Yes
Actors involved Populations and Yes Yes Yes
corporations
Local populations and No No No
local government
Actor Capacity to organize Low (very rural) High (urban) High (Urban)
Characteristics Perception of Impacts High High (mining High (mining
(mining legacy) legacy) legacy)

8. Conclusion

In sum, what can be concluded from these cases about the amenability of mining conflicts to
solution/transformation via Mesa de Diálogo?

At a first glance, the overall potential of Mesa de Dialogo to effectively address mining
conflicts of the kinds under study here seems to be high. However, one has to bear in mind

20
that none of the cases studied here can be classified as an example of all-out rejection of a
specific mining project by the respective local population, hence, we cannot tell whether the
mesa-model would stand a chance of addressing these (which could, however, be assumed to
be unlikely. In cases, however, where the population is not wholly averse of mining but
‘merely’ seeks to improve its overall impacts, The mesa-model does seem to offer high
potential and this holds true for future mining projects – such as Quellaveco – as well as for
those with an extensive regional history, such as those of Antamina or Southern. In all of
these cases, the dialogue process was able to calm down heated protests and street blockades
and to bring opposing actors to the dialogue table in a continuous process, hence making them
discuss rather than violently fight over their disputes. While two of the above mesa have not
yet been concluded and one, the Antamina one, has not yet resulted in significant agreements,
the period of relative calm and peace has now been lasting for approximately 18 months in the
Southern case, three years in the Antamina case and three years in the Quellaveco case.
Furthermore, success of Mesa de Díalogo, at least in terms of conflict transformation, seems
not to depend significantly on an affected population’s capacity to organize itself since this
capacity varies significantly between the Moqueguan and the Huari cases but all of them were
effectively addressed by their respective mesa process. We cannot, however, make any
inferences about whether the respective perception of mining impacts by the local population
makes a difference for mesa success, since this variable was constantly high in all three cases.
Theoretically, one may consider it illogical why perception of lower negative impacts should
hamper mesa effectiveness.

When now looking to the factors that differentiate the Southern case from the other two, while
assuming that the Southern mesa is less effective in calming down the local conflict because
civil society actors participating in it keep trying to transform it into a somewhat more
adversarial setting, the factor that emerges most clearly is the existence of claims for
compensation of harms done in the past. Neither in the Quellaveco case – as a result of it not
being operational case – nor in the Antamina case have such claims figured prominently.
Hence, they might be the factor that best explains the partial failure of the Southern mesa.
And of course, many observers and experts on the Southern case would share this
observation: the long legacy of Southern’s negative impacts on regional communities, in
particular on the population in Ilo and Torata, has left such an heavy imprint on the collective
memory of Moqueguans, that relations with Southern, and with the broader mineral sector,
are heavily damaged and characterized by deep mistrust if not outright hatred. Indeed, the
author was able to observe first hand that dialogue at the Southern mesa is of very different
21
nature and quality than dialogue in the Antamina or Quellaveco processes. Sessions of the
Southern mesa, of its technical commissions as well as of its plenary, often erupt in shouting
and wild accusations between the two sides, the representatives of the mine and those of the
local population. A frequent figure in these most heated instances of debate is the pointing out
of environmental harm done in the, relatively distant, past by civil society actors to which
Southern regularly responds by pointing out that discussing these is not within the ambit of
the Mesa’s mandate. These two positions regularly prove to be irreconcilable, hence showing
that the Southern mesa has only made limited progress in terms of the factors that are ascribed
to be milestones towards success in dialogue processes: the generation of mutual
understanding and softening of contradictory positions. Should this preliminary observation
prove to hold true and the Southern mesa indeed result in a less effective addressing of the
underlying conflict, it will be important to further investigate and determine what factors best
explain this ineffectiveness, whether it is characteristics of the Southern mesa as such or the
mere fact that local populations, in this case, voice demands for compensations – as these
seem to sit squarely with the mesa model that underlines cooperation and compromise rather
than such more adversarial restitutive measures.

Hence, in follow-up research to this paper, the author will, on the one hand, investigate
different institutional designs of Mesa de Diálogo for their impact on mesa effectiveness
(compare Scurrah 2013) and in order to do so, aim to depart from a more appropriate
comparative design that allows for more robust inferences. Special attention will be paid to
the role of historic legacy of mining conflicts and to the amenability of claims for
compensation to be – or not to be – effectively addressed by Mesa de Diálogo.

22
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