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COMPARATIVE TERRITORIAL POLITICS

Intergovernmental
Relations in
Divided Societies
Edited by Yonatan T. Fessha
Karl Kössler · Francesco Palermo
 Comparative Territorial Politics

Series Editors
Agustina Giraudy, American University, Washington, USA
Arjan H. Schakel, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway
Michaël Tatham, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway
Territorial politics is one of the most dynamic areas in contemporary polit-
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lution, government, federal reform and urban dynamics have reshaped
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racy and the nature of political community. Important policy fields such
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ment are managed at new spatial levels. Regions, stateless nations and
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 Yonatan T. Fessha · Karl Kössler ·
Francesco Palermo
Editors

Intergovernmental
Relations in Divided
Societies
Editors
Yonatan T. Fessha Karl Kössler
University of the Western Cape Institute for Comparative Federalism
Cape Town, South Africa Eurac Research
Bolzano, Italy
Francesco Palermo
Institute for Comparative Federalism
University of Verona and Eurac
Research
Bolzano, Italy

Comparative Territorial Politics

ISBN 978-3-030-88784-1 ISBN 978-3-030-88785-8 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88785-8

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 Introduction

1. Why This Book: Filling the Research Gap

As we finalise this book, the horror of ethnic conflict is on display
worldwide. There are media reports of conflict in Ethiopia; in Europe,
uncertainty looms large about the territorial integrity of countries such as
Spain, the United Kingdom and Belgium as they grapple with the nation-
alistic claims of groups and territories; similarly, India has again found
itself embroiled in communal tensions following the decision of the Pres-
ident to abolish the special status of the states of Jammu and Kashmir
(Kaushik, 2019). These and many other countries use arrangements of
territorial autonomy1 to manage their divided societies.2 Yet although
granting territories with distinctive identity a degree of self-government
in the form of territorial autonomy might help address the challenges of
divided societies, what needs equal attention is the integration of these
territories into the legal and political framework of the state and, in
particular, their relations with the national government (Marko, 1995).
In order to link different levels of government to each other and
manage the balance between autonomy and integration, states typically

1 From Autonomous Communities in Spain, cantons in Switzerland, and states in India

and Ethiopia to provinces in Canada and regions in Italy, territorial autonomies form an
important part of the institutional response that states have adopted to deal with the
challenges emanating from their divided societies.
2 See Palermo (2015).

v
vi INTRODUCTION

establish a number of institutions and instruments that fall under the

heading of ‘intergovernmental relations’ (IGR). In divided societies, it
is even more essential than for others that mechanisms of IGR be effi-
cient and effective, given that intergovernmental conflicts in societies like
these are particularly likely to be pervasive and deeply rooted.
To be sure, IGR is a topical issue not only in the case of divided soci-
eties. Several factors have contributed to the growing importance, more
generally, of how relations between government levels are shaped through
legal and political instruments. First, the expansion of the welfare and
regulatory state in the twentieth century made modern governance so
complex that in a number of policy fields it is virtually impossible for
a single level of government to act alone (Palermo & Kössler, 2017,
p. 55). In fields such as environmental protection and social welfare, to
mention but two examples, efficient and effective IGR is indispensable
for successful policy-making. Secondly, economic integration—within one
and the same country and on a supranational scale—has created the need
for denser networks of IGR among multiple governmental levels. In this
regard, the European Union is an evident example, but similar trends
have also been observed for other parts of the world, including Canada
and Australia (Brown, 2002). Thirdly, globalisation in all its manifold
forms, including global governance for addressing globalised problems,
is another set of factors which has contributed to the increasing relevance
of IGR.
The fact that these trends have entailed an increase of intergovern-
mental interaction in recent decades makes it surprising that ‘intergov-
ernmental relations remain largely opaque to the public, scholars, and
even sometimes to public authorities’ (Poirier & Saunders, 2015, p. 442).
While it is true that comparative research on the politics and law of terri-
torial autonomy and federalism is beginning to focus on IGR, the bulk
of this literature deals mostly with the nature and dynamics of IGR,
providing accounts of existing instruments and procedures yet without
recognising their implications for identity politics or the implications
identity politics have for them in turn.
Put differently, comparative research so far has failed to address the
unique challenges of IGR in situations where subnational units have
distinctive identities. For instance, one recent comparative study lists
seven variables that may affect the form and operation of IGR, but iden-
tity politics are not among them (Parker, 2015). Another edited volume
 INTRODUCTION vii

acknowledges to some extent the particularities of the distinctive iden-

tity of autonomous territories and the nature of their relations with the
national government, but it does so merely in few paragraphs, briefly
stating, with regard to Quebec and Catalonia, that such territories are
more likely to put up resistance to the centralisation which is often
a corollary of IGR (Poirier & Saunders, 2015). Yet another compar-
ative analysis (Bolleyer, 2009) comes close to the issue by examining
how ‘internal substate dynamics’ affect intergovernmental interaction.
However, the focus is on the effect of ‘the mode of decision making
within the subnational units’ on IGR rather than on identity politics.
In literature about arrangements of territorial autonomy, on the other
hand, much has been written over the last two decades about their rele-
vance in dealing with communal tensions.3 But the regulation of IGR and
its operation in practice has been neglected so far. Similarly, a third strand
of enquiry, comparative research on divided societies, has until now failed
to give this issue the attention it deserves. The research has concentrated
on exploring the most appropriate constitutional design for such societies
in order to manage internal conflicts—a topic that has become inextri-
cably linked with the so-called Lijphart-Horowitz debate or the broader
controversy between integrationists and accommodationists.4
It is apparent, then, that comparative research in the areas of IGR,
territorial autonomy and divided societies have left an obvious gap. This
edited volume seeks to contribute to filling it with a comparison of
the relevance and effectiveness of IGR in divided societies in nine case-
study countries where territorial autonomy is used to manage communal
tensions. Our starting point is the observation that the viability of any
form of territorial autonomy depends not only on the textual provisions of
the legal framework but also on how the territorial arrangement functions
in practice. In this regard, IGR between the governments of subnational
units with distinctive identity and their national counterparts is crucial
inasmuch ‘[e]xploring IGR allows one to read the subtext of federalism
as it is lived’ (Poirier & Saunders, 2015, p.11).
Awareness of this ‘subtext’ is particularly important in the case of
divided societies, where IGR is often complicated by rival nation-building

3 See, for example, Ghai (2000); Colino & Moreno (2010).

4 For excellent overviews of these two debates, see Choudhry (2008); McGarry,
O’Leary & Simeon (2008).
viii INTRODUCTION

projects and attendant contestation about the very nature of the state.
With autonomous territories emphasising diversity and the national
government insisting on unity, relations in divided societies are thus more
fraught than usual with tension, given that a durable balance between
autonomy and integration is more difficult to maintain. Autonomy may
indeed go a long way in addressing communal tensions, but equally
important are integrative institutions and procedures that provide the
glue to hold divided societies together.5 In this light, the overall objec-
tive of our edited volume is to examine the form and operation of IGR in
countries where there are at least some subnational units with distinctive
identities.

2. Key Concepts: ‘Intergovernmental

Relations’ and ‘Divided Societies’
According to Bednar (2019), ‘All of the pushing and pulling, and the
variety of interpreters, mean that the boundaries are always being ques-
tioned’ (p. 33). As the boundaries of authority are by nature continuously
contested in relations between autonomous territories and the national
government, mechanisms of IGR are bound to be an essential means
of shaping and channelling these dynamics. Therefore, it comes as no
surprise that, as explained above, institutions and instruments of IGR
have become ubiquitous and increasingly relevant. With more and more
phenomena being subsumed under IGR as an umbrella term, it is essen-
tial for our book that we clarify what we take this notion to mean. What
phenomena do we include and exclude in our comparative analysis across
the nine case-study countries?
To begin with, we look at institutions (e.g. conferences) as well as
instruments (e.g. intergovernmental agreements) of IGR. Two themes
usually figure prominently in research on intergovernmental interaction.
One is that IGR is dominated by the executive, the other is that it
is predominantly about vertical interaction—and both are true. Legisla-
tive IGR is in most cases either non-existent or ineffective, and IGR is
mostly about institutions that bring together the national government

5 This is not to suggest that IGR instruments can be used only for integration—they are
also used to facilitate autonomy. In many cases, especially in more recent devolutionary
systems, IGR-related mechanisms and processes are used to define the actual scope of
autonomy.
 INTRODUCTION ix

and constituent units. These institutions come in different forms: they

could be forums that bring together the leaders of national government
and the subnational units, or they could be sectoral structures that bring
together persons responsible for the relevant sector. However, that does
not represent the complex web of interactions through which IGR takes
place, which is why ‘IGR’ in this book refers to both the vertical and hori-
zontal dimensions of interaction between governments. While relations
between autonomous territories with distinctive identity and the national
government certainly predominate in the country case studies (for good
reason), horizontal relations with other territories also play a role in the
management of divided societies.
In addition, despite a tendency for IGR to incline towards mech-
anisms involving executives (Palermo & Kössler, 2017, p. 253), this
volume refers not only to interaction between representatives of execu-
tive branches of government but to relations involving legislatures, albeit
(and justifiably so) to a lesser extent.
The examples of IGR featured in our comparative analysis refer to
different stages of the legislative cycle, that is, either the making of laws
or their implementation. In the former case, the extent and effective-
ness of IGR typically depend on factors such as ideological differences,
partisan polarisation, regional diversity, the question of funding and levels
of politicisation (Hueglin & Fenna, 2015, pp. 240–41). Such a risk is
quite real because mechanisms in the law-making phase normally revolve
around senior civil servants, ministers or even heads of government, all
of whom might be tempted to let political posturing prevail over a more
compromise-oriented approach. In the implementation phase, however,
IGR is likely to be more technical in nature and mainly involve specialised
civil servants from the various ministries at different government levels.
Finally, the country case studies assembled in this book take into
account both informal and formalised IGR. A general trend towards
formalisation has been observed recently in a number of countries and
attributed to quite different factors, such as a need for safeguards against
national government domination (particularly in federal systems emerging
from an authoritarian past), compensation for a lack of trust in informal
mechanisms (particularly in divided societies) and efforts to counter the
frequent characterisation of IGR as lacking in democratic accountability
and transparency (Poirier & Saunders, 2015, pp. 488–489). Yet a trend
towards formalisation does not necessarily mean that informal interaction
by way of unofficial meetings of politicians, phone calls among them, and
x INTRODUCTION

the like, has become irrelevant. In fact, such informal IGR is sometimes
used to bypass formalised IGR and, on occasion, has proven at the very
least to be as effective as it.
As noted in the previous section, our aim is not simply to describe
existing institutions and instruments of IGR; it is to compare the form
and operation of IGR in the context of divided societies, a topic so far
neglected. With regard to the notion of ‘divided societies’, there is little
doubt that they are linked with ‘diverse societies’. The latter may well
espouse diversity by referring to strong identity factors such as ethnic,
linguistic, cultural or religious affiliation,6 and such societies have recently
attracted considerable attention in research and, in Europe, from interna-
tional organisations. As for the latter, the OSCE’s Ljubljana guidelines
on integration of diverse societies are a case in point. Importantly, these
guidelines recommend policies aimed at promoting the integration and
cohesion of diverse societies, and emphasise that, based on the OSCE’s
experience, diversity alone is neither correlated nor causally linked with
conflict; instead, violent disputes ‘are a consequence of political choices
that could have been different’ (OSCE, 2012, p. 2).
As much as there is no deterministic link between ethno-cultural diver-
sity and conflict, such a link is also absent between merely diverse and
divided societies. The latter notion, of ‘divided societies’, has gained
currency in political science and comparative constitutional law. On the
one hand, divided societies have become subjects of comprehensive and
in-depth country case studies, for example, concerning Northern Ireland
(McCrudden, et al., 2014, p. 8), Bosnia-Herzegovina (Marko, 2013,
p. 281) and Cyprus (Loizides, 2016, p. 139). On the other hand, compar-
ative studies on such societies—sometimes designated with the additional
attribute of ‘deeply’ divided societies7 —have also flourished, with the
focus alighting on, for instance, constitutional design (Choudhry, 2008)
or human rights (Harvey & Schwartz, 2012).
Some observers have used this term to denote one among several
types of societies. They regard deeply divided societies as the result of
social closure in the process of group formation and of the polarisa-
tion of society through the transformation of we-and-they configurations

6 Note that ‘ethnicity’ is also sometimes used as an umbrella term to refer to various
kinds of diversity related to linguistic, cultural and religious identity. See, for instance,
Ghai (2013, p. 2).
7 See Bieber (2004); Lerner (2011).
 INTRODUCTION xi

into clear-cut us-versus-them antagonism (Marko & Constantin, 2019,

p. 135). Others have taken the term ‘divided societies’ to mean societies
where, firstly, heterogeneity is based on (non-negotiable and/or ascrip-
tive) identities; where, secondly, a substantial degree of heterogeneity is
present, with at least 10 per cent of the population belonging to groups
other than the majority or plurality; and where, thirdly, heterogeneity has
become politically salient as a permanent fixture in terms of structures
(e.g. party system, horizontal and/or vertical distribution of power) and
agents (e.g. political parties, movements, elites) (Wolff, n.d., p. 1).
The latter of these definitional elements is key to what is the probably
most widely recognised conception of divided societies. This is the view
taken by Sujit Choudhry, and the one on which our book also relies. As
Choudhry explicitly declares, speaking in reference to Steiner’s review of
Lijphart’s Democracy in Plural Societies, ethno-cultural diversity must not
be confounded with political division (Steiner, 1981). The two things,
that is to say, must be kept apart. Thus, Choudhry argues that ‘[a]s a
category of political and constitutional analysis, a divided society is not
merely a society which is ethnically, linguistically, religiously, or culturally
diverse’; according to him, ‘what marks a divided society is that these
differences are politically salient—that is, they are persistent markers of
political identity and bases for political mobilization’ (Choudhry, 2008,
pp. 4–5). The fact that political competition and cooperation is, in such
societies, conducted along those same fault lines adds an additional layer
of complexity to IGR, but at the same time makes it (IGR) all the more
relevant and important.

3. The Objectives of This Book

The overarching objective of our edited volume is to examine the form
and operation of IGR in countries where the distinctive identity of at least
one subnational unit is acknowledged in a form of territorial autonomy.
This study into the interplay between ethno-cultural diversity and IGR has
three specific objectives, objectives which have also guided the structure
of the individual country case studies:

1. The first is to examine how the distinctive identity of particular

subnational units shapes the dynamics of IGR. The goal here is
not simply to determine whether intergovernmental interactions in
xii INTRODUCTION

such societies are less cordial and more conflictual than in other
societies. Such interaction in any society could be strained as a
result of disagreement over specific policy objectives. The question
is whether the distinctive identity of particular subnational units and
the attending competing constitutional visions themselves have been
a primary source of intergovernmental tension.
2. The second specific objective is to examine the impact of iden-
tity politics on IGR arrangements. The question is whether the
ethno-cultural divide and the tension it creates have the tendency
to affect the type of institutions and instruments employed in IGR.
The intention is to discern if identity politics have an impact on
whether IGR is conducted through formal or informal, multilateral
or bilateral, regional or national IGR institutions and instruments.
3. The third objective is to determine if and how institutions and
instruments of IGR have been used to manage communal tensions—
that is, to assess whether the range of institutions and instruments
employed in IGR have the capacity to contribute to the peaceful
management of divided societies. With that in mind, the objective is
to examine the relevance and effectiveness of institutions and instru-
ments of IGR in acknowledging and accommodating the distinctive
identities and specific demands of subnational units.

4. Case Selection and Structure of the Book

This volume examines Belgium, Canada, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Spain,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The reason for their inclusion is
that our study seeks to achieve its objectives by focusing on countries that
have instituted forms of territorial autonomy to deal with the challenges
of divided societies. Following Keating and Gagnon, we take ‘autonomy’
to be ‘a general idea but one that can take many forms’ (Keating &
Gagnon, 2012, p. 3). This is why we have included countries that provide
for different forms of territorial-autonomy arrangements.
The existing literature on IGR focuses on classic federations; autonomy
arrangements in other contexts have remained so far on the margins of the
discussion. This book thus includes countries, such as Canada, with long-
established, far-reaching autonomy arrangements, as well as those, such
as Ethiopia, with a more recent history of territorial autonomy. Equally
importantly, the book brings to fore the much-neglected debate on IGR
in Africa and Asia. In particular, it refers to Ethiopia and India, states
 INTRODUCTION xiii

designed primarily to manage the communal tensions that characterise

their respective societies.
In its structure, the book consists of eight case-study chapters. Each
case-study chapter provides a brief introduction of the divided nature of
the society in question that sets out the historical, political and social
context of its communal cleavages and also refers to the existence of
secessionist claims, if any. The introduction includes a discussion of the
history and organisation of the country’s autonomy arrangements. This
is followed by an overview of existing IGR institutions and instruments
applicable to the legislative and executive branches of government. Each
chapter then shifts to the main business of the book, which is to examine
how identity politics have affected the institutions and instruments of
IGR and determine if and how these institutions and instruments have
contributed to the peaceful management of communal tensions.
Chapter 1 commences the country case studies by focusing on Switzer-
land. The chapter discusses Swiss IGR with particular reference to its
connection with collective identity. It first presents two of the most impor-
tant political fault lines related to territorial belonging in Switzerland:
language communities and cantons. The chapter shows how these two
reinforce, yet also weaken, each other through intercantonal treaties of a
bi-, multi- and omnilateral nature. Above all, the chapter underlines the
basic dilemma of Swiss cantons: they need to cooperate with each other
and pool their resources if they are to remain autonomous and culturally
distinct.
Chapter 2 examines how Canada’s linguistic divide affects IGR. Rela-
tions between Quebec and the federal government have been tense since
the Quiet Revolution and the rise of Quebec nationalism in the 1960s.
Differing perspectives on what Canada is, Quebec’s insistence on its
distinctiveness, and its eagerness to protect and expand its autonomy have
been the source of federal-provincial conflict. Despite their having shaped
IGR considerably, identity-based tensions are not reflected in the arrange-
ments and practices through which the governments of the federation
interact. Obversely, Canada’s system of intergovernmental councils seems
to have been rather ineffective when it comes to solving them. Never-
theless, flexible use of intergovernmental agreements has proven to be a
means to satisfying some of Quebec’s demands.
Chapter 3 discusses how identity politics have created a double strategy
for the institutional design of the Belgian state, with one aspect of the
xiv INTRODUCTION

strategy revolving around language groups and the other, around territo-
rial divisions. The former, with power concentrated in two major language
groups, is more important. This explains why IGR, based on a multi-
polar playing field, is dominated by bipolar politics. On the one hand, the
result is a dyadic and conflict-enhancing federation, where subnational
communities live side by side in isolation; on the other, power-sharing
mechanisms, international obligations, health crises, fragmentation of
competences, and the territorial overlap of territorial sub-units, necessi-
tate cooperation, coordination and conflict management. Apart from its
role in the management of the COVID-19 pandemic, the federal govern-
ment is not the dominant actor in IGR; instead, antagonistic Flemish
and francophone political parties are at the centre of Belgian IGR—the
mutual distrust between these groups corrodes cooperation and makes it
ineffective in the long run.
Chapter 4 focuses on devolution, plurinationality and IGR in
the United Kingdom. IGR remains weak, informal and underdevel-
oped, notwithstanding two decades of devolution. The establishment
of devolved legislatures in the late 1990s was not accompanied by
detailed proposals for intergovernmental cooperation, and although some
form of intergovernmental infrastructure developed, this remains under-
institutionalised and the subject of much criticism from various quarters.
This chapter examines the evolution of IGR in the United Kingdom and
describes the different mechanisms that have emerged to manage inter-
governmental interaction. It explores the influence of identity politics
on intergovernmental workings and the impact that withdrawal from the
European Union will have on existing intergovernmental structures.
Chapter 5 discusses IGR in the context of Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism.
The Constitution has created nine subnational units principally on the
basis of ethnic criteria. Whether and how these units would interact with
the federal government and with each other was barely an issue in the
past three decades, given that all levels of government were controlled by
a single political party and IGR was thus an intra-party affair. However,
after three years of public protests (2015–2018) and the election of a
new prime minister, the states are increasingly assertive of their autonomy
from federal intrusion, with intergovernmental disputes growing louder
and more frequent. This chapter examines how a federal arrangement
that takes ethnicity as a basis for state organisation contends with the
 INTRODUCTION xv

ethnic undertone of the emerging intergovernmental disputes, an under-

tone which is shaping debate on and attitudes towards the establishment
of formal IGR institutions.
Chapter 6 examines how and to what extent identity politics underpins
IGR in India. IGR could not emerge as an underlying feature of Indian
federal system, ostensibly, due to the tumultuous yet fulfilling trajec-
tory of democratic experimentation, on the one hand, and imperatives of
social and economic development, on the other. Evidently, in prioritising
the requirement of rapid economic development through the mechanism
of centralised planning, the central government tended to muddle up
the valuable function of IGR through the institutions created primarily
for streamlining the planning process. In the meantime, as and as the
autonomy claims and identity politics started exhibiting their diverse
insalubrious visages ranging, at times, even to the demand for secession,
the government kept on evolving one institution or the other to grapple
with these apparently inscrutable quandaries. What is most disheartening
here is that the central government probably never takes the issue of IGR
as a matter of serious consideration and tries to pass it off as a trifling affair
that can be managed by the bodies set up to deal principally with some
other important issues. The basic argument of this paper is, therefore, the
existence of primary institutions and processes of IGR is ritualistic than
substantial, though India has indeed been able to present an example of
successful working of its federal democratic system despite innumerable
autonomy claims and conundrums of identity politics.
Chapter 7 focuses on Spain, a country which, since the 1980s, has
developed from a unitary state with a long-standing centralist tradition
to a strongly decentralised state. The authors note that the Spanish
Constitution does not establish an institutional framework which would
guarantee continuous political dialogue and legislative cooperation among
the different levels of government. Thus, there is neither permanent
institutionalised representation of regional interests at the national level
nor a framework for IGR, with the conferences already in existence
(Conference of Presidents and Sectoral Conferences) acting along partisan
lines. Largely due to the distinctive identity of some of the Autonomous
Communities, intergovernmental interactions are highly conflictual and
developed mainly at the bilateral level between the Autonomous Commu-
nities and central government. However, the secessionist claims of the
Catalan government cannot be explained by the absence of effective
intergovernmental institutions that promote peaceful relations across the
xvi INTRODUCTION

cultural divide. On the contrary, it is the Catalan government that

has refused to participate in cooperation and coordination mechanisms
among the Autonomous Communities and with the central state.
Chapter 8 discusses the manifold institutions that connect regions
and the centre and which reflect the asymmetrical nature of the Italian
regional design within the framework of a decentralising unitary state.
As in most countries that have progressively decentralised, the second
chamber of parliament performs no role in terms of linking the regions
with the centre, despite a generic reference to this effect in the text of
the Constitution. Rather, IGRs have developed in parallel with each other
through cooperation among the executives. Such a practice has been insti-
tutionalised through different steps, in the process creating a complex
system of executive conferences that bring together the national, regional
and, in some cases, local governments. The asymmetrical nature of the
Italian regional system is also mirrored in the different bilateral institu-
tions established to bring together each of the five special regions and
the national government. It is not by chance that those special regions
whose autonomy is rooted in the protection of a distinctive identity
have made wider use than others of such instruments, a fact that reveals
the strong link the link between IGR, identity politics and asymmetrical
constitutional design.
The comparative observations at the end of the book take up its
research questions and draw conclusions from the eight case-study chap-
ters. Based on the experience of these eight countries, it reflects on the
question of whether IGR tends to work in different ways in societies
where ethno-cultural boundaries match up with territorial design. This
is not only about whether identity politics affect the dynamics of inter-
governmental interaction; it is also about whether they dictate the form
of IGR institutions and instruments employed in divided societies. Finally,
the chapter discusses the track record of IGR institutions and instruments
in accommodating the distinctive identities and demands of subnational
units and thereby promoting the peaceful management of communal
tensions.

Yonatan T. Fessha
Karl Kössler
Francesco Palermo
 INTRODUCTION xvii

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Ghai, Y. (2013). Introduction: Nature and origins of autonomy. In Ghai,
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Keating, M., & Gagnon, A.-G. (2012). Introduction. In Gagnon, A.-G., &
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OSCE Office of the High Commissioner for National Minorities (2012). The
Ljubljana guidelines on integration of diverse societies. OSCE.
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Poirier, J., & Saunders, C. (2015). Conclusion: Comparative experience of inter-
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 Contents

1 The Paradox of Cooperation: Intergovernmental

Relations and Identity Conflict in Switzerland 1
Sean Mueller
2 Bilingualism, Quebec’s Distinctiveness,
and Intergovernmental Relations in Canada 31
Johanna Schnabel
3 Intergovernmental Relations in Belgium: Obstacles
to Effective Cooperation in Dyadic Federalism 61
Patricia Popelier
4 Plurinationalism, Devolution and Intergovernmental
Relations in the United Kingdom 91
Paul Anderson
5 Intergovernmental Relations and Ethnic Federalism
in Ethiopia 113
Zemelak A. Ayele and Yonatan T. Fessha
6 Redundancy of Existence: Intergovernmental Relations
in India 133
Rajendra K. Pandey

xix
xx CONTENTS

7 Intergovernmental Relations and Communal Tensions

in Spain 159
Josep M. Castellà Andreu and Mario Kölling
8 Intergovernmental Relations and Identity Politics
in Italy 183
Nicolò Paolo Alessi and Francesco Palermo

Comparative Observations 219

 Editors and Contributors

About the Editors

Yonatan T. Fessha is Professor of Law at the University of the Western

Cape. His research interests include constitutional law and human rights.
His teaching and research focuses on examining the relevance of consti-
tutional design in dealing with the challenges of divided societies. He has
published widely on matters pertaining to but not limited to federalism,
constitutional design, autonomy and politicised ethnicity. His publications
include books on ‘Ethnic diversity and federalism: Constitution making in
South Africa and Ethiopia’ and ‘Courts and federalism in Africa: Design
and impact in comparative perspective’. He was a Marie Curie Fellow at
EURAC Research and a Michigan Grotius Research Scholar. He was also
recipient of the Andrew Mellon post-doctoral fellowship.

Karl Kössler is Senior Researcher at the Institute for Comparative Feder-

alism at Eurac Research Bolzano/Bozen (Italy). He obtained a Ph.D.
in comparative public law and political science from the University of
Innsbruck (Austria) and his main fields of interest and expertise are
comparative federalism and autonomy studies and, more broadly, consti-
tutional design in diverse societies. He has provided consultancy to the
Council of Europe as well as to various national and subnational govern-
ments. He has lectured on the above-mentioned subjects in Europe and

xxi
xxii EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS

beyond at universities, as well as in master programmes targeted at post-

doc researchers, civil servants and political decision-makers. Kössler is
the author of more than 30 peer-reviewed publications on the above-
mentioned subjects, including five books. He is the co-author of the
book Comparative Federalism: Constitutional Arrangements and Case
Law(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017). Since 2018, he is representative
for Austria in the Council of Europe’s Group of Independent Experts
on the European Charter of Local Self-Government. Moreover, he is the
Coordinator of the five-year EU-funded project ‘LoGov—Local Govern-
ment and the Changing Urban-Rural Interplay’ which brings together 18
partner institutions from around the world.

Francesco Palermo is Professor for Comparative Public Law at the

University of Verona and Director of the Institute for Comparative
Federalism at Eurac Research in Bolzano/Bozen. He is president of the
International Association of Centers for Federal Studies (IACFS), Consti-
tutional Adviser to the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of
the Council of Europe, member of the Scientific Committee of the Euro-
pean Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Previously he was senior
legal adviser to the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities,
president of the Advisory Committee under the Council of Europe’s
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and a
non-party member of the Italian Senate. Full CV at: http://www.eurac.
edu/fpalermo.

Contributors

Nicolò Paolo Alessi is a joint-Ph.D. candidate in Public Comparative

Law at the University of Verona and at the University of Fribourg. He
holds a LLM degree in Administrative Law from the University of Torino.
His main research interests are Italian and Comparative Constitutional
Law, Minority Rights, Autonomy Studies, Regionalism and Federalism.
He is also an expert of Aosta Valley’s legal system; in particular, he has
published and lectured about linguistic rights and educational system. His
research project, entitled ‘Constitutional instruments for the accommoda-
tion of diversity’, enquires the new challenges that Constitutional Law is
facing today, dealing with the evolution of the multicultural society.
 EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS xxiii

Paul Anderson is Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at

Canterbury Christ Church University (CCCU), UK. He holds master
degrees from the University of Glasgow and Pompeu Fabra University
and obtained his Ph.D. from CCCU in 2019. His main research inter-
ests include territorial politics, autonomy and secessionist movements and
federalism/decentralisation as tools of conflict resolution. He is currently
co-lead of the UACES-JMCT Research Network ‘(Re)Imagining Terri-
torial Politics in Times of Crisis’.
Zemelak A. Ayele is an Associate Professor at the Addis Ababa Univer-
sity, where he is also the Director of the Center for Federal Studies.
He received LL.B from Addis Ababa University, Advanced Diploma in
Federalism from the Institute of Federalism, Fribourg University, and
LL.M and LL.D from the UWC. He has widely published in the area of
decentralisation and federalism in Ethiopia and Africa, including a book
titled Local Government in Ethiopia: Advancing development and accom-
modating ethnic minorities Baden-Baden-Nomos Verlagsges. He was a
National Research Foundation (NRF) post-doctoral research fellow under
the South African Research Chair in (SARCHi) Multilevel Government,
Law and Policy, at the Dullah Omar Institute for Constitutional Law,
Governance and Human Rights of the University of the Western Cape
(UWC), South Africa. He was also a visiting researcher at the Institute of
Federalism, Fribourg University, and the Catholic University of Leuven.
Josep M. Castellà Andreu is Professor of Constitutional Law at the
University of Barcelona and Head of the Research group on Democ-
racy and Constitutionalism (GEDECO). He is a member of the Venice
Commission of the Council of Europe (since 2014), and its Enlarged
Bureau. His main research fields are Representative, Direct and Partic-
ipatory democracy, and Decentralization in Spain and in Comparative
Law, particularly Canadian and US federalism and Italian regionalism.
Currently is member of the European Research Project ‘Democratic
Efficacy and the varieties of populism in Europe’ (DEMOS) (Horizon
2020, European Commission, 2018–2021). He has authored and edited
several books. He was Director of the Revista Catalana de Dret Públic
(2012–2016) and currently he is member of the Board of the Anuario
Iberoamericano de Justicia Constitucional (2015–) and Revista General
de Derecho Constitucional (2016–). He is also member of the Academic
Council of the Red Mundial Electoral and member of the Advisory Body
of EURAC (Bolzano, Italy).
xxiv EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS

Mario Kölling is Professor at the Department of Political Science at the

Spanish National Distance University (UNED) and Senior Researcher of
the Manuel Giménez Abad Foundation, Zaragoza. From 2011 to 2014,
he was Garcia Pelayo Researcher at the Centro de Estudios Politicos
y Constitucionales (CEPC) in Madrid. He holds a Ph.D from the
University of Zaragoza.. He collaborates as an international expert with
the Forum of Federations and the Bertelsmann Foundation. He works
and publishes on issues related to federalism and the EU budget. He
recently co-published the book: Nohlen, Dieter, Kölling, Mario, ‘Spanien.
Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft, Politik’, 2020, Wiesbaden VS Springer. Mario
Kölling has been a visiting researcher at the Centre for European Inte-
gration of the Otto-Suhr Institute for Political Science in Berlin, the
University College Dublin, the Institute for European Studies of the Free
University of Brussels and the European University Institute in Florence.
Sean Mueller is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Political Science,
University of Lausanne. His position is funded entirely by the Swiss
National Science Foundation (‘Eccellenza’ grant, 2020–2025). Before
that, he was post-doctoral researcher at the University of Bern and edito-
rial assistant of the Swiss Political Science Review. He obtained his Ph.D.
in Politics & Government from the University of Kent/UK (2013) and
his MA from the University of Fribourg/CH (2006). His main research
areas are Swiss and comparative federalism as well as subnational politics
and Multilevel Governance more broadly.
Rajendra K. Pandey is Professor in Department of Political Science,
Chaudhary Charan Singh University, Meerut, India. Besides earning
his Master’s, M. Phil. and Doctorate degrees from the University of
Delhi, he also holds the prestigious Post Graduate Diploma (with summa
cum laude: excellent grade) in Federalism, Decentralization and Conflict
Resolution from the Institute of Federalism, University of Fribourg,
Switzerland. He has previously taught at University of Delhi (1998–2009)
and Centre for Federal Studies, Jamia Hamdard University (2009–
2018), New Delhi. Besides publishing fifty research papers in reputed
journals/edited books, he has authored/co-authored five books-Indian
Government and Politics (Sage, 2008), Modern Indian Political Thought:
Text and Context (Sage, 2009), Local Governance in India (Sage, 2018),
Reconceptualising Indian Democracy: The Changing Electorate (Sage,
2020) and Disaster Management in India (Sage, 2020). The current focus
of his academic pursuits is public policy and governance with special
 EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS xxv

reference to the issues of federalism, disaster management and human

rights.
Patricia Popelier is Professor constitutional law at the University of
Antwerp and Director of the research group on Government and Law.
She is vice-president of the International Association of Legislation,
convenor of the standing research group on subnational constitutions
in federal and quasi-federal systems of the International Association of
Constitutional Law, member of the scientific committee of EURAC—
Institute for Federalism (Bolzano), of the scientific committee of the Sofia
Legal Science Network (SLSN) and of the scientific committee of the
Ossevatorio AIR (Rome), co-promoter of the interdisciplinary Centre
of Excellence TRUSTGOV and member of several editorial boards,
including the journal Theory and Practice of Legislation (TPLeg) and
the book series Law and Cosmopolitan Values and Diversitas.
Johanna Schnabel is a Lecturer at the Otto Suhr Institute of Polit-
ical Science, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany. She holds a Ph.D. from
the University of Lausanne. Her research focuses on comparative feder-
alism with particular attention to intergovernmental relations and the
coordination of public policy in such federations as Australia, Belgium,
Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the United States. She is the author
of Managing Interdependencies in Federal Systems: Intergovernmental
Councils and the Making of Public Policy (Palgrave Macmillan 2020).
 List of Figures

Chapter 1
Fig. 1 The 26 cantons and the four official linguistic
regions/communities of Switzerland (2017) (Source
BFS [2020]. The French-speaking area is also referred
to as Romandie/Welschland, and the German-speaking
region as Deutschschweiz/Suisse alémanique) 4
Fig. 2 Strength of left-wing parties by linguistic community,
National Council elections 1971–2019 [%] (Note D-CH
= German-, F-CH = French-, I-CH = Italian-speaking
areas as per Fig. 1; Romansh included in D-CH. Left-wing
parties include the Social Democrats, Greens and smaller left
and radical left parties. Source Own graph based on data
from BFS [2020]) 8
Fig. 3 Multiple attachments in Switzerland (Source Own graph
with data from Selects [2017]. N = 12,004) 22

Chapter 7
Fig. 1 Responses in Catalonia to the question, ‘Which statement
better reflects your identity?’ (Values in %). Source Own
elaboration of data from Centro de Investigaciones
Sociológicas) 162
Fig. 2 Public opinion on different options for Spain’s territorial
organisation (Source Own elaboration of data from Centro
de Investigaciones Sociológicas) 162

xxvii
xxviii LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 3 Intergovernmental conflict and legal litigation (Source

Subdirección General de Régimen Jurídico Autonómico,
Informe sobre conflictividad Estado-Comunidades
Autónomas) 174
 List of Tables

Chapter 1
Table 1 Number, type and coverage of intercantonal treaties, 2016 15
Table 2 Number, type and coverage of intercantonal treaties,
overall and Romandie, 2016 18

Chapter 2
Table 1 Distribution of English and French as first languages 34

xxix
 CHAPTER 1

The Paradox of Cooperation:

Intergovernmental Relations and Identity
Conflict in Switzerland

Sean Mueller

1 Introduction
The Swiss federation is known above all for two elements: cantonal
autonomy and consensus-seeking. Most of the time the two go hand
in hand. For instance, a new federal policy is developed either in close
collaboration with the cantons, through a jointly staffed expert group, or
in such a way as to give cantons maximum leeway when applying it on the
ground (Linder & Vatter, 2001). One could go so far as to say that, from
the perspective of deliberation theory, consensus necessitates autonomous
actors.
Every once in a while, though, the consensus forged at federal level
goes against the wishes of a large enough group of cantons to create
conflict. Cantonal executives in particular are quick to decry a loss of

S. Mueller (B)
Institute of Political Studies, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
e-mail: sean.muller@unil.ch

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2022
Y. T. Fessha et al. (eds.), Intergovernmental Relations in Divided Societies,
Comparative Territorial Politics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88785-8_1
2 S. MUELLER

regional1 autonomy or warn against unfunded mandates. In 2003, the

Conference of Cantonal Governments (KdK) helped to coordinate the
first ever cantonal referendum: article 141(1) of the Federal Constitution
(FC) of 1999 allows at least eight cantons to submit any federal law to a
binding nationwide referendum. For reasons related to revenue-sharing,
the federal tax reform so challenged would have led to significant income
loss at regional level. That the reform was rejected by a large majority
of voters greatly strengthened the political influence of the cantons—or,
rather, of the KdK.
More generally, intercantonal cooperation and the ‘voluntary’ harmon-
isation of citizens’ rights and duties have gained a new dimension in that
they are often sold as helping to avoid centralisation: if the cantons can
collectively solve a task, there is no need for the federation to inter-
vene. But while horizontal cooperation might seem a natural extension
of regional autonomy, if one’s own survival as a canton depends on the
goodwill of other cantons, then self-rule is no longer quite the irreducible
bedrock it is often thought to be. Indeed, in regard to the ‘tragedy of the
commons’,2 one could go as far as seeing the cantons themselves caught
up in such a tragedy: in engaging in ever-deeper and wider cooperation,
they restrict the very regional autonomy they aim to preserve. In other
words, although horizontal intergovernmental relations (IGR) undoubt-
edly contribute to solving public problems in an efficient, pragmatic
manner, their medium- and long-term costs are as yet unclear.3
However—and herein lies the good news not only for problem-
solving but also for cantonal autonomy itself—Swiss IGR largely transcend
cultural identities. It is, conversely, an exaggeration to say that ‘cantons
within the same linguistic group increasingly pool their resources and act
collectively, while their relations with the cantons across the language line
continue to diminish’ (Erk, 2008, p. 85; emphasis added SM). While true
that all three of the main linguistic communities span several cantons,
the latter each possess their own form of collective, and indeed ‘civic’,
identity. Given that not even Ticino unites all Italian-speaking Swiss, the
‘ethnic’ path to cantonal identity-building was never an option. Even

1 ‘Cantonal’ and ‘regional’ are used as synonyms, as are ‘federal’ and ‘national’.
2 The term refers to the overuse and depletion of a public good or shared resource,
such as a communal pasture or river, when rational individuals each ruthlessly pursue their
own self-interests. See, for example, Ostrom (1990, 2f.).
3 See, for example, Mader (2013, 59f.); Iff, et al. (2010).
 1 THE PARADOX OF COOPERATION: INTERGOVERNMENTAL … 3

more striking is the case of Canton Jura: despite its creation in the
1970s as a French-speaking canton out of German-speaking Bern, several
French-speaking districts refused to join.
What I aim to show in this chapter, therefore, is the complex rela-
tionship in Switzerland between intercantonal cooperation and cultural-
identity differences (which sometimes translate into open political
conflict). On the one hand, cantons compete and cooperate with each
other and with the linguistic group(s) in which they are nested; on the
other, linguistic communities depend on cantonal borders and institutions
as well as intercantonal cooperation for their continued existence. The
Swiss cantons are thus both a means and an obstacle for cultural-identity
conflicts. Section 2 delineates these two types of identity—cantonal and
linguistic—in greater detail. Section 3 describes the nature and evolution
of Swiss self-rule and shared rule, Sect. 4 presents the different forms
of IGR, and Sect. 5 discusses their interplay with identity politics. The
conclusion summarises the main insights offered by the Swiss case.

2 Identity Divisions in Switzerland:

Languages and Cantons
2.1 Definitions and Demographics
In the Switzerland of the twenty-first century, ‘collective identity’ can
refer to one of two things: to one’s territorial origins, that is, one’s canton
or municipality, or to one’s linguistic community. ‘Collective identity’ can
also be understood in terms of religious identity—mainly whether one
belongs to either the Catholic or Protestant church—yet while it was all-
important in the nineteenth century, this dimension of identity has been
largely superseded by urban–rural divisions (Linder et al., 2008). Never-
theless, Switzerland being a small country lacking a single dominant city,
it is not always clear where the urban–rural frontier should be drawn.
In addition, formally all 2,000 or so municipalities have the exact same
status, and inter-local conflicts, where they exist, are contained within
cantonal terms of reference. Where the cantonal and linguistic borders
are located, in turn, is both very clear and very important, as neither has
moved much over the past centuries. This is why this chapter focuses only
these two forms of identity and the politics around them.
Figure 1 is a map of Switzerland showing its four linguistic regions
and 26 cantons. A ‘canton’ is a constituent unit of the Swiss federation,
 4
S. MUELLER

Fig. 1 The 26 cantons and the four official linguistic regions/communities of Switzerland (2017) (Source BFS
[2020]. The French-speaking area is also referred to as Romandie/Welschland, and the German-speaking region as
Deutschschweiz/Suisse alémanique)
 1 THE PARADOX OF COOPERATION: INTERGOVERNMENTAL … 5

competent in all matters not explicitly assigned to the federation (FC

1999, article 3). While some cantons can look back on several centuries
of autonomous and indeed, until 1798, sovereign existence, others came
into being ‘only’ in 1803 or 1815. The ‘historic’ cantons are, in offi-
cial order (FC 1999, article 1), Zurich, Bern, Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz,
Obwalden and Nidwalden, Glarus, Zug, Fribourg, Solothurn, Basel-
City and Basel Countryside, Schaffhausen, and Appenzell Outer- and
Appenzell Inner-Rhodes. ‘Newer’ cantons are St. Gall, Grisons, Aargau,
Thurgau, Ticino, Vaud, Valais, Neuchâtel, Geneva, and Jura. Canton Jura
is a special case since the territory was attached to Canton Bern in 1815
and became its own unit only in 1979.
A ‘linguistic region’, in turn, is much vaguer in meaning and shakier
in legal grounding. The Federal Constitution uses the term only once:
‘[when] electing the Federal Council [i.e. the Swiss government], care
must be taken to ensure that the various geographical and language
regions of the country are appropriately represented’ (FC 1999, article
175(4)). That German, French, Italian and Romansh are meant must be
inferred from article 4, which defines these four as Switzerland’s ‘national
languages’. However, as if to validate its lack of formal standing, the
French version of the Constitution uses communautés linguistiques, and
the Italian one componenti linguistiche in said article 175(4). The term
‘region’ is in fact used only in the German (Sprachregionen), Romansh
(regiuns linguisticas ) and the unofficial English versions. Because the
‘Federal Act on the National Languages and Understanding between the
Linguistic Communities’ of 2007 also uses, in all four national languages,
the term ‘linguistic communities’ (Sprachgemeinschaften, in German), and
so as to avoid confusion with the synonymous use of ‘region’ for ‘canton’,
I henceforth use that term.4
From Fig. 1 it can be inferred that 22 out of 26 cantons are mono-
lingual. In other words, cantonal and linguistic borders overlap only
imperfectly. A canton’s autonomy to define its own official languages
is guaranteed by article 70(2) of the Federal Constitution; however,
under the same article, this is subject to the condition that, ‘[i]n order
to preserve harmony between linguistic communities [here: Sprachge-
meinschaften, also in German], the Cantons shall respect the traditional
territorial distribution of languages and take account of indigenous

4 Adding to the confusion is article 70 of the Federal Constitution, which twice uses
‘linguistic communities’ in German, Romansh and English.
6 S. MUELLER

linguistic minorities’. Accordingly, 17 cantons are officially German-, four

French- and one Italian-speaking. In turn, Fribourg and Valais are bilin-
gual, with a French-speaking majority of 76 and 78%, respectively, and
German-speaking minorities. Bern is predominantly German-speaking,
with a French-speaking minority of just 5%. Grisons is officially tri-lingual,
with a German-speaking majority of 80%, followed by Romansh with 12
and Italian with 7% (data from BFS, 2020).
All in all, (Swiss-)German is the predominant language in an area
covering some six million people (71% of the total); French covers an area
of two million inhabitants (25%); Italian, 360,000 (4%); and Romansh,
23,000 (0.3%).5 What matters for our purposes here is that German is
spread over a total of 21 cantons, French over seven, Italian over two, and
Romansh over five non-contiguous valleys in Grisons. All this brings with
it the need for intra-linguistic group cooperation across cantonal borders
or, in the case of Romansh, across different districts.
Despite their importance in Swiss politics (see also Sect. 2.2), language
communities as such do not formally exist. They are not communities
in the sense of possessing a permanent political structure, own revenue,
official recognition and/or democratic legitimacy.6 Instead, it is up to
the federal government and the cantons to ‘encourage understanding and
exchange between the linguistic communities’ (FC 1999, article 70(3)).
In other words, Swiss linguistic pluralism works through territoriality, that
is, cantons and municipalities. Even the determination of which official
texts ought to be published in Romansh is undertaken by consulting the
authorities of the Canton of Grisons (Languages Act of 2007, article 11).

2.2 Identities and Conflicts

When and how do cantonal and linguistic identities give rise to conflict?
To be begin with, language is indeed as much a factor in uniting people
speaking the same as dividing those speaking another—but the salience of

5 The last Swiss census was conducted in 2000. Since then, registry data and estimates
have been used, with people having the option to indicate more than one dominant
language. My data are derived by summing the 2017 population figures of municipalities
located in any of the four language regions displayed in Fig. 1.
6 To be sure, there are plenty of private associations defending one or more, even
all, national languages. For a good overview, see https://forum-helveticum.ch/de/net
zwerk/.
 1 THE PARADOX OF COOPERATION: INTERGOVERNMENTAL … 7

these differences and similarities depends both on historical periods and

policy issues. In general, linguistic ties have never given rise to a sense
of separate nationhood below (sub-state), let alone against (secessionism)
the Swiss nation.7
Inter-linguistic tensions, especially between the French- and German-
speaking Swiss as the two largest groups, were greatest in the late nine-
teenth century during the French-German War 1870–1871, and again
during World War One. They subsided afterwards, but have since the
1990s re-emerged in regard to Switzerland’s relationship with the Euro-
pean Union, migration policy and globalisation questions more generally
(Linder, et al., 2008; Seitz, 2014: 149ff.). French-speakers and the areas
in which they are dominant tend to support European integration, the
free movement of persons, voting rights for non-Swiss citizens and easier
naturalisation processes for second- and third-generation foreign resi-
dents. Because of their minority status, French-speakers are regularly
overruled on those questions in federal referenda. Such divisions are
captured by the term Röschtigraben (literally ‘Röschti Canyon’, after the
potato dish).
However, the language communities differ from each other more in
degree than kind. Direct democracy and local autonomy, for instance,
are valued throughout the civic Swiss nation, even if the Deutschschweiz
values and practises them more intensely than the Romandie and Ticino
(Mueller, 2015a; Bühlmann, et al., 2014; Vatter, 2018: 129f. & 144). In
turn, left-wing parties demanding state intervention in the economy, as
well as higher and more progressive taxes, have consistently fared better in
French-speaking Switzerland, as Fig. 2 shows. Indeed, the difference with
Italian-speaking Switzerland reached a new peak in 2019. Yet the ebbs and
flows of left-wing party fortunes have taken place largely in parallel and
all major parties win votes throughout Switzerland.
Other noteworthy differences between the three main language areas8
relate to the importance given to ‘the state’, which refers to both
the Confederation and the canton. Hence, in the Romandie more
people complete public high school (47% on average vs 35 in the
Deutschschweiz), less is spent on roads (CHF 720 per capita and year

7 See, for example, Dardanelli & Stojanović (2011).

8 Romansh is included here in the German-speaking category due to a lack of fine-
grained statistical data.
8 S. MUELLER

50

40

30

20

10

0
1971 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019

D-CH F-CH I-CH

Fig. 2 Strength of left-wing parties by linguistic community, National Council

elections 1971–2019 [%] (Note D-CH = German-, F-CH = French-, I-CH
= Italian-speaking areas as per Fig. 1; Romansh included in D-CH. Left-wing
parties include the Social Democrats, Greens and smaller left and radical left
parties. Source Own graph based on data from BFS [2020])

vs CHF 830), almost twice as many inhabitants rely on social aid (4.2%
vs 2.4) and unemployment benefits (3.2% vs 1.7), and cantonal taxes
are almost 50% higher, on average, than in the Deutschschweiz. Ticino
scores sometimes closer to or higher than the Romandie (55% high school
degrees), sometimes closer to the Deutschschweiz (CHF 810 per capita
and year on roads, 2.7% on social benefits), and sometimes in between
them (taxes and unemployment benefits). Also, the share of residents
studying at one of the 10 cantonal or two federal universities, with only
half these institutions located in the Deutschschweiz, is almost double in
French-speaking Switzerland (2.8% vs 1.5; Ticino: 1.8%) (BFS, 2020).
However, since most if not all of these socio-political characteris-
tics relate to cantonal spheres of competence, their potential to induce
conflict at the national level is limited. In other words, if some cantons
prefer to spend more on roads rather than universities, that is as much
their prerogative as their responsibility. Policy diversity could give rise
to inter-linguistic conflict if it were found that the more interventionist
French-speaking activity is cross-funded by minarchist German-speakers.
Yet we find economically better- and worse-off cantons on both sides of
the main linguistic border, with Ticino again in the middle (EFV, 2020;
see also Schmid, 1981, 33ff.). Moreover, precisely the economic dimen-
sion shows that language is far from the only identity game in town (see
also Schmid, 1981, 93ff.; CS, 2019, p. 14), with cantons dominating
the scene. The new fiscal equalisation scheme introduced in 2008 clearly
 1 THE PARADOX OF COOPERATION: INTERGOVERNMENTAL … 9

separates ‘resource-rich’ from ‘resource-poor’ cantons. Although most

equalisation money actually comes from the federal government in the
form of vertical transfers (Linder & Mueller, 2021, p. 96), that distinc-
tion gives rise to two camps: cantons that ‘give’ and cantons that ‘get’
(terminology from Schultz & Cummings, 2020). Economic and resulting
inter-cantonal tensions obscure and alleviate inter-linguistic rivalries.
Thus, whereas in 2003/2004 several cantons activated the cantonal
referendum to challenge a federal tax reform that would have made
everybody worse off, in 2015 four cantons (Schwyz, Nidwalden, Zug
and Schaffhausen—all four German-speaking) sought in vain to contest
a federal law that made only them worse off (Tages-Anzeiger, 2015).
In 2005, the five donor-cantons of Zurich, Schwyz, Nidwalden, Zug
and Basel Countryside had already created their own political organi-
sation, the ‘Conference of NFA Donor Cantons’ (Konferenz der NFA-
Geberkantone/Conférence des cantons contributeurs à la RPT ), to defend
their interests. By 2020, Basel Countryside was replaced by Basel City,
while Obwalden and Geneva, the only French-speaking donor canton,
had joined.9
More generally, and in stark contrast to linguistic communities, it is
very much the case that cantons are formal as well as informal realities.
Each has its own constitution and flag, a directly elected government and
parliament, a cantonal judiciary and police force, and its own education
and health system. Indeed, perhaps the main reason why all four linguistic
communities lack their own political structures is that cantonal identities
remain far too strong to be subsumed by linguistic commonality.10 More-
over, cantonal identities are of the civic rather than ethnic kind (Hughes,
1993; Mueller, 2013), meaning that their specific political structures and
institutions, rather than their official language or ‘state’ religion, are the
terms of reference. The slightly derogatory term Kantönligeist (literally
‘cantonal spirit’) is used to deride such cantonal attachment, especially
when it stands in the way of cantonal merger projects such that of Vaud
and Geneva (rejected by 77 and 80% of cantonal voters in 2002, respec-
tively) or Basel City and Countryside (accepted in the former but rejected
by 68% of voters in the latter in 2014) (Le Temps, 2002; SRF, 2014).

9 See https://fairer-nfa.ch/de/ueber-uns/geberkantone.
10 Cf. also for example, Lacey (2017, p. 187).
10 S. MUELLER

In sum, the relationship between cantonal and linguistic identity is

both enabling and obstructing. Through cantonal autonomy and inter-
cantonal cooperation, linguistic communities come about in the first place
and then continue to survive. Moreover, by defining its own official
language(s), each canton adds a cultural element to its otherwise civic
‘nationhood’,11 but none has a monopoly on any of the languages. At the
same time, the existence of different cantonal identities within the same
language community, along with the extensive cantonal cooperation that
occurs across linguistic boundaries (pace Erk, 2008: see below, Sect. 5),
avoids too strong a reification of language.12 Instead of only cutting
across each other, then, cantonal and linguistic identities also overlap
in some policy domains. One of these domains is precisely protecting
cantonal autonomy, as explained next.

3 Swiss Federalism Over Time: Loss

of Self-Rule and Insufficient Shared Rule
The Swiss federation practices—like Germany—a system of administrative
federalism. The general rule is that the Confederation legislates and the
cantons implement both federal and their own policies. A similar func-
tional division of competencies can be observed within the cantons, even
though cross-regional variations in the degree of local autonomy abound
(Mueller, 2015a).
In 1848, when the Swiss system was created in the wake of brief
civil war between mainly urban Protestant progressives and rural Catholic
conservatives, the new central state was given only few powers. The
degree of self-rule that cantons possessed, therefore, was very high. At
the same time, several institutional safeguards ensured the inclusion of
cantons in federal decision-making. As in any other federal system, these
were meant to prevent the cantonal sphere of autonomy from being
encroached upon.
Chief among the instruments of shared rule has been the Council of
States (Conseil des Etats/Ständerat ), in which every full canton is enti-
tled to two seats and the six former half-cantons to one seat each. Note
that although the term ‘half-canton’ was abolished in 1999, inequality in

11 See, for example, Andre (2012, 232ff.); Mueller (2013); Bernhard (1998).
12 See, for example, Vatter (2018: p. 248).
 1 THE PARADOX OF COOPERATION: INTERGOVERNMENTAL … 11

representation has persisted. Hence, since the creation of Jura as the 23rd
(full) canton in 1979, there are 46 Councillors of State: 40 from the 20
former ‘full-cantons’ and six from the former ‘half-cantons’. However,
very much like in the US Senate, the Council of States has lost its
immediacy in territorial representation with the spread of the popular
election of its members to all cantons up until the 1970s—the difference
being that all cantons voluntarily moved to the popular election of their
senators (Vatter, 2016). What is more, with one exception (Appenzell
Inner-Rhodes), elections to the Council of States are held on the same
day as elections to Switzerland’s lower chamber, the National Council.
This concurrency in timing further contributes to giving elections an
increasingly national character (Bochsler, et al., 2016), even more so since
both chambers—the National Council with 200 members, allocated to
cantons in proportion to demographics, and the Council of States with
46 members—possess the exact same powers and similar party-political
configurations (Linder & Mueller, 2021).
Four other formal instruments of shared rule have had a more varied
history. Firstly, in 1848 cantons were empowered to call an extraordinary
meeting of the federal parliament, but this provision was never used and
abolished in 1999 (Vatter, 2016, p. 464). Secondly, any canton can peti-
tion the federal parliament on a matter that falls within its power (FC
1999, article 160(1)). However, Parliament is under no obligation to do
anything more than discuss the matter in one of its committees, which
is why the instrument has developed into a token of symbolic cantonal
parliamentary protest rather than genuine co-decision-making (Mueller &
Mazzoleni, 2016).
Thirdly, all amendments of the Federal Constitution need the (manda-
tory) approval of a majority of both voters and cantons. Although this
seems at first sight a powerful collective veto, since 1874 the position
of each canton is determined by its own popular majority and not its
government or parliament; moreover, even though a cantonal majority
has on ten occasions blocked a popular majority (Linder & Mueller, 2021,
p. 72), the resulting status quo was in favour of only some cantons, namely
those with a more rural, conservative-minded population, at the expense
of urban, mainly French-speaking cantons (Vatter, 2016, pp. 422–426;
Mueller, 2015b). Only on three occasions has the reverse happened, that
is, a popular majority blocking a majority of cantons. Note that the double
majority is needed for an amendment to pass, meaning that blocking is
much easier. Also, given the uneven demographic size of the cantons, in
12 S. MUELLER

theory some 10% of the Swiss electorate—if ideally distributed—could

block constitutional change. In practice, the federal veto as exercised
between 1955 and 2020 amounted to between 14 and 25% of votes cast
(Linder & Mueller, 2021, p. 102; see also Germann, 1991, p. 266).
Fourth and finally, in terms of the already-mentioned cantonal refer-
endum (FC 1999, article 141), at least eight cantons can demand that any
Parliamentary Act, within 100 days of its publication, be put to a nation-
wide popular vote which alone decides on its adoption. As seen above, this
measure has been used only once so far, in 2003/2004 (Fischer, 2006),
but recourse to it delivered an important political victory to the cantons—
or, rather, to their primary political organisation, the KdK, which at the
time was key to coordinating them (Pedrazzini, 2013, p. 51).
In parallel with those developments in the shared-rule sphere, the Swiss
federation has become ever more centralised in that the scope of self-
rule has increasingly been narrowed. Dardanelli and Mueller (2019), in
measuring the legislative and administrative centralisation of 22 policy
areas in 10-year intervals between 1850 and 2010, conclude that central-
isation has been of an evolutionary kind and especially evident in the
legislative sphere. What is more, centralisation has been most pronounced
in the technical domains, where significant economies of scale to the
benefit of all—that is, the nation as such, rather than only a few selected
cantons—can be produced. A case in point is key national infrastruc-
ture, such as the federal railway (1902) and the national highway system
(1960).
In turn, cantonal self-rule has been preserved first and foremost in
‘soft’ areas to do either with identity (education, culture and language)13
or proximity and face-to-face interaction with citizens (law enforcement
and voting). The media are an interesting case since although cultur-
ally sensitive and hence a prime suspect for decentralisation—or, as in
Germany with public television, at least for harmonisation or regional-
isation—the technicalities of issuing licenses, regulating frequencies and
re-balancing the inequality in size and resources between the different
language regions necessitated a central solution early on (Dardanelli &
Mueller, 2019). To compensate for this loss of autonomy, the Swiss public
broadcast company consists of four separate units—one for each language

13 See also Erk (2008).

 1 THE PARADOX OF COOPERATION: INTERGOVERNMENTAL … 13

community—and has its own system of fiscal equalisation through which

money is transferred from the German-speaking unit to the other three.14
In sum, the Swiss federation today is much more centralised than
170 years ago. Still, together with fiscal autonomy, cantons have retained
a significant degree of self-rule in areas which are either culturally impor-
tant (education, language and culture) or require regular interaction with
citizens, such as elections, voting, the police and courts. The same applies
to the overall functional division: the Swiss federation is much more
centralised in legislation than in administration or fiscally. At the same
time, however, there is but little shared rule.15 The instruments created in
1848 have either withered away (the right to call a federal parliamentary
session), succumbed to a nationalised party-political logic (the Council of
States) or changed into mere instruments of protest (the cantonal initia-
tive). Alternatively, they require explicit (cantonal referendum) or implicit
(mandatory cantonal majority) cooperation among at least eight or 12
cantons. This shows the paradox at the heart of this chapter: the need for
collective action to effectively defend individual cantonal interests.16

4 IGR as an Alternative
to centralisation---and Cantonal Autonomy
Centralisation is of course far from an inevitable road to take. Indeed,
between full cantonal autonomy, on the one hand, and complete federal
authority, on the other, IGR offers three alternatives: bi-, multi- and
omnilateral cooperation.17 Each of these entails a mutual recognition
of rules, the reciprocal harmonisation of standards, and/or the creation
of new institutions situated between the cantons and the federation. In
principle, IGR can be either vertical, that is, between different orders
of governments, or horizontal, that is, between governments at the
same level. In addition, IGR might involve executive, legislative, judi-
cial or administrative organs. In practice, however, the Swiss landscape is
composed almost entirely of horizontal and executive IGR,18 the purpose

14 See https://www.srgssr.ch/en/who-we-are/funds/revenue-sharing/ for details.

15 See also Hooghe, et al. (2016).
16 See also Vatter (2018, p. 88).
17 See, for example, Buser (2011).
18 Cf. Pfisterer (2015).
14 S. MUELLER

of these kinds of IGR being precisely to avoid centralisation and maintain

non-centralisation.19
To be sure, the federal government as well as members of the federal
parliament do talk to representatives of cantonal governments, either
with cantonal ministers themselves or their civil servants and lobbyists.
However, apart from the ‘federal dialogue’, which is the name of the
biannual encounter between the federal government and the Conference
of Cantonal Governments (Mader, 2013, p. 52), such encounters are ad
hoc, policy-specific and rather informal. The same is true for meetings
between the KdK and the bureau of the Council of States20 : when it
comes to defending their interests at federal level, the cantons must be as
united as possible and as specific in their demands as necessary. Moreover,
given their political and historical importance, cantonal voices certainly
carry weight, but so do organisations representing important economic
sectors such as banking, insurance companies or farmers. Where IGR
do have a monopoly and can thus acquire far greater importance is in
structuring horizontal affairs. Legally binding cooperation is expressed
via treaties called ‘concordats’, with political coordination taking place in
‘conferences’.
Alexander Arens’ database of all cantonal treaties in force by 2016
allows us to quantify the extent to which cantons cooperate with only one
or two neighbours (bilateral) or engage in wider, macro-regional (multi-
lateral) or even omnilateral horizontal cooperation (23–26 cantons, see
Table 1). Twenty-one treaties are currently in force that are binding for
all the 26 cantons: of these, six additionally include Liechtenstein, and
four, the Swiss Confederation. All four treaties signed by all 26 cantons
plus Switzerland relate to domestic security, including, for instance, the
2009 treaty on the application of Schengen/Dublin (Arens, 2020). A
further six treaties apply to 23, 24 or 25 cantons. All in all, security and
education account for almost half the cooperation in this category. At the
other end of the scale, 587 treaties apply to just two cantons, seven to
just one canton plus the federal government or Liechtenstein, and 43 to
three cantons. The largest group here, amounting to 32% of the total, are
financial agreements—mainly mutual recognitions of tax regimes, a core
cantonal power.

19 See, for example, Vatter (2018, p. 75).

20 https://kdk.ch/de/kooperation/bund/eidgenoessische-raete/.
 1 THE PARADOX OF COOPERATION: INTERGOVERNMENTAL … 15

Table 1 Number, type and coverage of intercantonal treaties, 2016

Type of cooperaƟon: Bilateral MulƟlateral Omnilateral
1–3 4–22 23–26 Total
Policy area
cantons cantons cantons
Finances and taxes 202 32% 2 2% 3 11% 207 27%
State organisaƟon and
110 17% 28 25% 10 37% 148 19%
security
EducaƟon and culture 89 14% 43 38% 8 30% 140 18%
Infrastructure and
104 16% 17 15% 0 - 121 16%
environment
Economy and agriculture 92 14% 10 9% 4 15% 106 14%
Health and social welfare 40 6% 13 12% 2 7% 55 7%

Total 637 100% 113 100% 27 100% 777 100%

Source: own elaboraƟon based on data from Arens (2020).

Let us look at just one example to understand the importance of inter-

cantonal treaties. The Intercantonal Agreement on the Recognition of
Diplomas,21 to which all 26 cantons have subscribed, is meant to regu-
late the qualifications of teachers and health-care professionals. It applies
the Cassis-de-Dijon principle: diplomas from any one canton are recog-
nised in all others. What is more, it empowers two different intercantonal
conferences, namely of the Cantonal Education and Health Ministers, to
implement at least some of the provisions of the agreement. These operate
in lieu of a federal office for diploma recognition. The treaty thus falls
squarely within the cantonal self-rule domain of education. But while a
consequence of cantonal autonomy, it also obligates cantons to abide by
its rules, in the process limiting that very same autonomy.
How often a canton makes use of its opportunity to enter into binding
agreements with others is mainly a function of its location (Bochsler &
Sciarini, 2006, p. 29; Vatter, 2016, pp. 470–472; Vatter, 2018, 69ff.;
Arens, 2020). The most networked cantons are St. Gall, Bern and both
Basels, all of whom have plenty of neighbours with which to coop-
erate. Since there is no reason to believe that the authorities of Ticino
or Schaffhausen are any less interested in intercantonal cooperation than

21 Interkantonale Vereinbarung über die Anerkennung von Ausbildungsab-

schlüssen/Accord intercantonal sur la reconnaissance des diplômes de fin d’études, of
18 February 1993 and in force since 1 January 1995, at http://edudoc.ch/record/
38062/files/Vereinb_d.pdf.
16 S. MUELLER

those of St. Gall or Bern, we can safely conclude that treaty-federalism

is first of all a consequence of necessity. Harmonisation arises because
cantons need to cooperate, not because they want to. Sharing cantonal
rule in this horizontal way, with or without the involvement of the federal
government, should thus be regarded less as a way out of Switzerland’s
fragmented federalism than as a means to preserve it.
The same goal is pursued more explicitly by the various cantonal
conferences. Apart from the KdK, which brings together entire govern-
ments, there are policy-specific and macro-regional conferences. Located
in the House of Cantons in Bern are the Conferences of Ministers for
Construction, Planning and Environment (BPUK); Education (EDK);
Energy (EnDK); Finance (FDK); Forest, Wild Animals and Landscape
(KWL); Health (GDK); Justice and Policy (KKJPD); Public Transport
(KöV); Military, Civil Protection and Firefighters (RK MZF); Social
Affairs (SODK); Economy (VDK); and Agriculture (LDK). Macro-
regional conferences exist for Western, North-Western, Central and
Eastern Switzerland. There is also a Conference of Alpine Cantons, and
another for the Metropolitan Area of Zurich.22
Although macro-regional membership is in principle mutually exclu-
sive, Bern and Jura belong to both the Western and the North-Western
conferences (Vatter, 2018, p. 81). At the same time, the BPUK includes
the Principality of Liechtenstein, as well as a delegate from the local
level,23 while alongside those domestic bodies we find several cross-
border conferences, especially around Geneva, Basel and Lake Constance
(Mader, 2013, p. 53). This shows the variety and openness of hori-
zontal cooperation. As regards their purpose, their function is both to
coordinate among cantons and to communicate collective needs to the
federal government (Behnke & Mueller, 2017). A final institution to
be mentioned here is the Tripartite Conference (until 2016 called the
‘Tripartite Agglomeration Conference’), which brings together repre-
sentatives of federal, cantonal and local governments.24 The Tripartite
Conference is the only body to explicitly address problems that cut across
all three levels of government, notably regarding spatial planning and
integration policy.

22 See also Vatter (2018, p. 76).

23 See, for example, Ziegler (2020, p. 198).
24 See, for example, Mader (2013, p. 56).
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
Saltpeter, or niter, is a compound of this metal (or rather its oxide)
with nitric acid. It is one of the ingredients of gunpowder, and has the
property of quickening the combustion of all combustible bodies.
Mix some chlorate of potash with lump sugar, both being powdered,
and drop on the mixture a little strong sulphuric acid, and it will
instantly burst into flame. This experiment also requires caution.
Want of space precludes us from considering the individual metals
and their compounds in detail; it must suffice to describe some
experiments showing some of their properties.
The different affinities of the metals for oxygen may be exhibited in
various ways. The silver or zinc tree has already been described.

Experiments.
1. Into a solution of nitrate of silver in distilled water immerse a clean
plate or slip of copper. The solution, which was colorless, will soon
begin to assume a greenish tint, and the piece of copper will be
covered with a coating of a light gray color, which is the silver
formerly united to the nitric acid, which has been displaced by the
greater affinity or liking of the oxygen and acid for the copper.
2. When the copper is no longer coated, but remains clean and
bright when immersed in the fluid, all the silver has been deposited,
and the glass now contains a solution of copper.
Place a piece of clean iron in the solution, and it will almost instantly
be coated with a film of copper, and this will continue until the whole
of that metal is removed, and its place filled by an equivalent quantity
of iron, so that the nitrate of iron is found in the liquid. The oxygen
and nitric acid remain unaltered in quantity or quality during these
changes, being merely transferred from one metal to another.
A piece of zinc will displace the iron in like manner, leaving a solution
of nitrate of zinc.
Nearly all the colors used in the arts are produced by metals and
their combinations; indeed, one is named chromium, from a Greek
word signifying color, on account of the beautiful tints obtained from
its various combinations with oxygen and the other metals. All the
various tints of green, orange, yellow, and red, are obtained from this
metal.
Solutions of most of the metallic salts give precipitates with solutions
of alkalies and their salts, as well as with many other substances,
such as what are usually called prussiate of potash, hydro-sulphuret
of ammonia, etc.; and the colors differ according to the metal
employed, and so small a quantity is required to produce the color
that the solutions before mixing may be nearly colorless.

Experiments.
1. To a solution of sulphate of iron add a drop or two of a solution of
prussiate of potash, and a blue color will be produced.
2. Substitute sulphate of copper for iron, and the color will be a rich
brown.
3. Another blue, of quite a different tint, may be produced by letting a
few drops or a solution of ammonia fall into one of sulphate of
copper—a precipitate of a light blue falls down, which is dissolved by
an additional quantity of the ammonia, and forms a transparent
solution of the most splendid rich blue color.
4. Into a solution of sulphate of iron let fall a few drops of a strong
infusion of galls, and the color will become a bluish-black—in fact,
ink. A little tea will answer as well as the infusion of galls. This is the
reason why certain stuffs formerly in general use for dressing-gowns
for gentlemen were so objectionable; for as they were indebted to a
salt of iron for their color, buff as it was called, a drop of tea
accidentally spilt produced all the effect of a drop of ink.
5. Put into a largish test tube two or three small pieces of granulated
zinc, fill it about one-third full of water, put in a few grains of iodine
and boil the water, which will at first acquire a dark purple color,
gradually fading as the iodine combines with the zinc. Add a little
more iodine from time to time, until the zinc is nearly all dissolved. If
a few drops of this solution be added to an equally colorless solution
of corrosive sublimate (a salt of mercury) a precipitate will take place
of a splendid scarlet color, brighter if possible than vermilion, which
is also a preparation of mercury.

Crystallization of Metals.
Some of the metals assume certain definite forms in returning from
the fluid to the solid state. Bismuth shows this property more readily
than most others.

Experiment.
Melt a pound or two of bismuth in an iron ladle over the fire; remove
it as soon as the whole is fluid; and when the surface has become
solid break a hole in it, and pour out the still fluid metal from the
interior; what remains will exhibit beautifully-formed crystals of a
cubic shape.
Sulphur may be crystallized in the same manner, but its fumes, when
heated, are so very unpleasant that few would wish to encounter
them.
One of the most remarkable facts in chemistry, a science abounding
in wonders, is the circumstance, that the mere contact of hydrogen,
the lightest body known, with the metal platinum, the heaviest, when
in a state of minute division, called spongy platinum, produces an
intense heat, sufficient to inflame the hydrogen; of course this
experiment must be made in the presence of atmospheric air or
oxygen.
Time and space (or rather the want of them) compel us to conclude
with a few experiments of a miscellaneous character.

To Form a Solid From Two Liquids.

Prepare separately, saturated solutions of sulphate of magnesia
(Epsom salts) and carbonate of potash. On mixing them the result
will be nearly solid.
Solutions of muriate of lime and carbonate of potash will answer as
well.
 To Form a Liquid From Two Solids.
Rub together in a Wedgewood mortar a small quantity of sulphate of
soda and acetate of lead, and as they mix they will become liquid.
Carbonate of ammonia and sulphate of copper, previously reduced
to powder separately, will also, when mixed, become liquid, and
acquire a most splendid blue color.
The greater number of salts have a tendency to assume regular
forms, or become crystallized, when passing from the fluid to the
solid state; and the size and regularity of the crystals depend in a
great measure on the slow or rapid escape of the fluid in which they
were dissolved. Sugar is a capital example of this property; the
ordinary loaf-sugar being rapidly boiled down, as it is called: while to
make sugar-candy, which is nothing but sugar in a crystallized form,
the solution is allowed to evaporate slowly, and as it cools it forms
into those beautiful crystals termed sugar-candy. The threads found
in the center of some of the crystals are merely placed for the
purpose of hastening the formation of the crystals.

Experiments.
1. Make a strong solution of alum, or of sulphate of copper, or blue
vitriol, and place in them rough and irregular pieces of clinker from
stoves, or wire-baskets, and set them by in a cool place, where they
will be free from dust, and in a few days crystals of the several salts
will deposit themselves on the baskets, etc.; they should then be
taken out of the solutions, and dried, when they form very pretty
ornaments for a room.
2. Fill a Florence flask up to the neck with a strong solution of
sulphate of soda, or Glauber’s salt, boil it, and tie the mouth over
with a piece of moistened bladder while boiling, and set it by in a
place where it cannot be disturbed. After twenty-four hours it will
probably still remain fluid. Pierce the bladder covering with a
penknife, and the entrance of the air will cause the whole mass
instantly to crystallize, and the flask will become quite warm from the
latent caloric, of which we have spoken before, given out by the salt
in passing from the fluid to the solid state. It is better to prepare two
or three flasks at the same time, to provide against accidents, for the
least shake will often cause crystallization to take place before the
proper time.

Changes of Color Produced by Colorless Liquids.

Make a strong infusion of the leaves of the red cabbage, which will
be of a beautiful blue color; drop into it a few drops of dilute sulphuric
acid, and the color will change to a bright red; add some solution of
carbonate of potash, or soda, and the red color will gradually give
way to the original blue; continue adding the alkaline solution, and
the fluid will assume a bright green color. Now resume the acid, and
as it is dropped in, the color will again change from green to blue,
and from blue to red. Now this simple experiment illustrates three
points: first, that acids change the color of most vegetable blues and
greens to red; second, that alkalies change most blues and reds to
green; and third, that when the acid and alkali are united together,
they both lose their property of changing color, and become what is
called a neutral salt, i.e. a compound possessing the properties of
neither of its constituents.
 ACOUSTICS.
Acoustics is the science relating to sound and hearing. Sound is
heard when any shock or impulse is given to the air, or to any other
body which is in contact directly or indirectly with the ear.

Difference Between Sound and Noise.

Noises are made by the crack of whips, the beating of hammers, the
creak of a file or saw, or the hubbub of a multitude. But when a bell is
struck, the bow of a violin drawn across the strings, or the wetted
finger turned round a musical glass, we have what are properly
called sounds.

Sounds, How Propagated.

Sounds are propagated on all bodies much after the manner that
waves are in water, with a velocity of 1,142 feet in a second. Sounds
in liquids and in solids are more rapid than in air. Two stones rubbed
together may be heard in water at half a mile; solid bodies convey
sounds to great distances, and pipes may be made to convey the
voice over every part of the house.

To Show How Sound Travels Through a Solid.

Take a long piece of wood, such as the handle of a hair broom, and
placing a watch at one end, apply your ear to the other, and the
tickings will be distinctly heard.

To Show That Sound Depends on Vibration.

Touch a bell when it is sounding, and the noise ceases; the same
may be done to a musical string with the same results. Hold a
musical pitch-fork to the lips, when it is made to sound, and a
quivering motion will be felt from its vibrations. These experiments
show that sound is produced by the quick motions and vibrations of
different bodies.

Musical Figures Resulting From Sound.

Cover the mouth of a wine-glass, having a foot-stalk, with a thin
sheet of membrane, over which scatter a layer of fine sand. The
vibrations excited in the air by the sound of a musical instrument,
held within a few inches of the membrane, will cause the sand on its
surface to form regular lines and figures with astonishing celerity,
which vary with the sound produced.

To Make an Æolian Harp.

This instrument consists of a long, narrow box of very thin deal,
about six inches deep, with a circle in the middle of the upper side of
an inch and a half in diameter, in which are to be drilled small holes.
On this side seven, ten or more strings of very fine catgut are
stretched over bridges at each end, like the bridges of a fiddle, and
screwed up or relaxed with screw-pins. The strings must all be tuned
to one and the same note, and the instrument should be placed in a
window partly open, in which the width is exactly equal to the length
of the harp, with the sash just raised to give the air admission. When
the air blows upon these strings with different degrees of force, it will
excite different tones of sound. Sometimes the blast brings out all
the tones in full concert, and sometimes it sinks them to the softest
murmurs.
A colossal imitation of the instrument just described was invented at
Milan in 1786 by the Abbate Gattoni. He stretched seven strong iron
wires, tuned to the notes of the gamut, from the top of a tower sixty
feet high, to the house of a Signor Moscate, who was interested in
the success of the experiment; and this apparatus, called the “giant’s
harp,” in blowing weather yielded lengthened peals of harmonious
music. In a storm this music was heard at a greater distance.
 FIREWORKS.
We know full well the intense delight taken by boys in risking their
limbs or their lives, especially when such risk is accompanied with
noise. Boys always have done so, and always will do so in spite of
the very best of advice or precautions. As, therefore, it is impossible
to keep them from making noises, and endangering themselves, we
have, in this article, endeavored to show them how to make as much
noise as possible, with as little danger as possible.
What is there that makes the most noise, and is most dangerous?
Gunpowder, of course. Therefore, we have given descriptions of the
best methods of employing this material, feeling quite sure that of
accidents with gunpowder nine out of every ten are caused by
ignorance. We knew a boy who lost the use of a thumb, and took all
the skin off the palm of his right hand, by ignorant management of
powder. He had read of blasting rocks, and nothing would satisfy him
but blasting a bank. So he bored a deep hole in it with a stick, filled
the hole with gunpowder, and then poked a lighted lucifer into the
powder. The consequence was that his face was so scorched as not
to be recognized, all his eyebrows and eyelashes, and most of his
hair were burned off, while his right hand was injured, as has been
already mentioned. Now that boy had been studiously kept out of the
way of powder by female relatives, and was naturally profoundly
ignorant of its effects. Had he been taught to handle it, he would not
now be forced to keep his right hand closed, or to write by holding
the pen between the fingers of his clenched hand.

Gunpowder.
It will not be very advisable for the firework boy to make his own
powder, but still it will not be amiss that he should know how it is
prepared. Pulverize separately 5 drams of nitrate of potass, 1 dram
of sulphur, and 1 dram of newly-burnt charcoal; mix them together in
a mortar, with a little water, so as to make the compound into a
dough, which roll out into round pieces of the thickness of a pin upon
a slab. This must be done by moving a board backwards and
forwards until the dough is of a proper size. When three or four of
these pieces are ready put them together, and cut them off into small
grains. Place these grains on a sheet of paper, in a warm place,
where they will soon dry, but away from a fire. During granulation the
dough must be prevented from sticking by using a little of the dry
compound powder. This mode of granulation, though tedious, is the
only one to be used for so small a quantity for the sake of
experiment. In making powder in a large way it is granulated by
passing the composition through sieves.

How to Make Touch-Paper.

Dissolve in a little spirits of wine or vinegar a little saltpeter, then take
some purple or blue paper, and wet it with the above liquor, and it will
be fit for use. When pasting paper on any of the following works take
care that the paste does not touch that part which is to burn. The
method of using this paper is to cut it into slips long enough to go
once round the mouth of a serpent, cracker, etc.

Cases for Squibs, Flower-Pots, Rockets, Roman

Candles, Etc.
Procure a hard wooden cylinder, or, if possible, one made of metal,
whose diameter corresponds with that of the interior of the proposed
case. Roll round it several folds of cartridge paper, and paste the
edges well, so that it may be held securely. Tie it round until dry.

To Choke the Cases.

When the cases are thus made they will require to be tied at the
lower end. This is called choking them, and as much force is
required it is necessary. Fix a wire into a small solid cylinder. Take
another short piece, an inch or two long, with a hole up it to admit the
other end of the wire, fit it on, and pass it up the case. Then having
fastened a piece of whip-cord to a post, wind it round the part left
hollow by the wire, which should be about half an inch from the end;
pull it tight with the right hand, and work the case round with the left.
Cut out a piece of touch paper two inches long, and an inch and a
half broad, wind it round the choke, and tie it on with a piece of fine
string—twist it to a point. The cases are best choked while damp.

Composition for Squibs, Etc.

Gunpowder, half a pound; charcoal, 1 ounce; brimstone, 1 ounce, or
in like proportion; grind them in a muller or pound them in a mortar.
Or you may take 1 part steel filings, 1 charcoal, 1 sulphur, and 4
powder, which is a very good mixture, and can be rubbed together in
a mortar.

How to Fill the Cases.

Your cases must be very dry when ready, and should be put into an
iron or wooden mold; first put in a thimble full of your powder, and
ram it down very hard with your ruler, then put in a little more till the
case is full, ramming it down hard every time. If you have no mold,
hold the case in your left hand with the twisted touch-paper
downwards, and fill it after the same manner. When you have filled
within an inch of the top, fill up this with loose powder not rammed,
for a bang, and fold in the ends; after filling a dozen or two melt
some pitch in a small ladle, and smear the end of the case with it by
means of a small brush.

To Make Crackers.
Cut some stout cartridge-paper into pieces three inches and a half
broad and one foot long, fold down one edge of these pieces
lengthwise about three-quarters of an inch broad, then fold the
double edge down a quarter of an inch, and turn the single edge
back half over the double fold. Open it, and lay all along the channel
which is formed by the folding of the paper some meal powder, then
fold it over and over till the paper is doubled up, rubbing it down at
every turn; this being done bend it backwards and forwards two
inches and a half, or thereabouts, at a time, as often as the paper
will allow. Hold all these folds flat and close, and with a small
pinching cord give one turn round the middle of the cracker and
pinch it close; bind it with pack thread as tight as you can, then in the
place where it was pinched prime one end and cap it with touch-
paper.
When these crackers are fired they will give a loud report at every
turn of the paper: if you want a great number of these, you have only
to cut the paper longer, or join it on to a greater length; but if they are
made very long you must have a piece of wood with a groove in it
deep enough to let in half the cracker, which will hold it straight while
you are pinching it.

Roman Candles and Stars.

These are best made with the following ingredients: 1 ounce of
powder, 1 ounce of sulphur, and 2 ounces of niter. Some persons,
however, prefer 1 part sulphur, 1 charcoal, 1 iron filings, 4 of powder,
and 8 of niter. The composition being made, in filling the cases fill the
contrary way to a squib—stop up the choke by driving down a piece
of paper. Put in 1 quill of gunpowder loose and 1 star made in the
following manner: 1 ounce of camphor, 1 of sulphur, 2 of meal
powder, 1 ounce of the colored fires, moisten them with oil of
turpentine, and work them into little round balls. Having placed a star
within the case, put in above it 3 quills of the composition, ram down,
then powder, star, and composition alternately, till the case is full.
Paste touch-paper round the top and twist to a point.

Rockets.
There are several recipes for making rockets, the best of which is 3
ounces of charcoal, 6 of sulphur, 8 of niter, 32 of meal powder.
Another very good one is, 3 ounces of iron filings, 4 of powdered
charcoal, 8 of sulphur, 16 of niter, and 64 of meal powder. If a
smaller quantity is wanted divide each proportion by 2, if a still
smaller divide by 4.
 Rains.
Sometimes gold or silver rains are added to rockets, which give them
a very beautiful appearance. A gold rain is made of 2 parts sawdust,
4 sulphur, 4 meal powder, 6 glass dust, 16 niter, in all 32 parts. A
silver rain may be made of 2 parts salt prunella, 8 sulphuret of
antimony, 8 sulphur, 8 meal powder, and 14 niter, in all 32 parts.

Catherine Wheels.
These are very pretty fireworks, and are made to turn on a pivot.
There are many recipes for the composition of which they are
formed; 1 part camphor, 1 sulphur, 1 niter, 2 meal powder. Another
is, 3 parts iron filings, 4 sulphur, 12 niter, 16 meal powder. This
composition is to be rammed into small cases, and bound round a
small wheel having a hole for a pivot in the center.

Various Colored Fires.

The following recipes will give the young firework maker a great
variety of the most beautiful fires. They should never be fired in a
room, however, and always away from a dwelling.

Crimson Fire.
The principal ingredient in this is nitrate of strontium, of which 40
parts are taken, with 13 of sulphur, 15 of chlorate of potass, 4 of
sulphuret of antimony, and 2 of lamp-black. These, as all the
ingredients for the other fires, should be rubbed in a ladle, and they
may be used in a ladle or iron dish set on the ground.

Blue Fire.
The ingredients of blue fire are 20 parts; 12 of niter, 4 of sulphur, 2 of
sulphuret of antimony, and 2 of lamp-black.

Green Fire.
The ingredients for green fire are in 54 parts; 42 of nitrate of barytes,
8 of sulphur, 3 of chlorate of potass, and 1 of lamp-black.

Purple Fire.
The best recipe for purple fire is of 60 parts; 25 of niter, 25 of nitrate
of strontium, 7 of sulphur, 2 of realgor, and 1 of lamp-black.

White Fire.
The best and purest white fire is made of 24 parts of niter, 7 of
sulphur, 2 of red arsenic, and one of lamp-black.

Spur Fire.
9 parts of niter, 4 of sulphur, and 3 of lamp-black, well rubbed
together.

Blue Lights.
These are made of 4 parts of sulphur, 2 of niter, and 1 of powder,
and are rammed into squib-cases the contrary way.

Port or Wildfires.
Saltpeter 4 parts, meal powder 6 parts, and sulphur 3 parts. The
composition to be moistened with linseed-oil.

Slow Fire for Wheels.

Saltpeter 4 parts, sulphur 2 parts, and meal powder 2 parts.

Dead Fire for Wheels.

Saltpeter 5 parts, sulphur 1 part, lapis calaminaris 1 part, and
antimony 1 part.
 Cautions.
Such are the principles and methods by which fireworks may be
made; but we would advise our young friends to be very cautious,
and never to attempt making any fireworks by candlelight; always to
select some outhouse for their operations; to see that no iron or steel
implements are about the place in which their fireworks are being
manufactured, or they may go off before they wish it; to use wooden
or brass implements in the bruising, grinding, and sifting of their
mixtures; and never to bring the fireworks, or any of their ingredients,
into the dwelling-house, or they may suddenly receive a
“Heavy blow and great discouragement.”

To Make an Illuminated Spiral Wheel.

Procure a circular horizontal wheel two feet in diameter with a hole
quite through the nave, then take four thin pieces of deal three feet
long each, and three-quarters of an inch broad each. One end of
each of these pieces is to be nailed to the felloe of the wheel at an
equal distance from one another, and the other end nailed to a block
with a hole in its bottom, which must be perpendicular with that in the
block of the wheel, but not so large. The wheel being thus made, a
hoop planed down very thin must be nailed to the felloe of the wheel,
and wound round the four sticks in a spiral line from the wheel to the
block at the top; on the top of this block a case of Chinese fire must
be fixed, and on the wheel any number of cases, which must incline
downwards and burn two at a time. The axis of the wheel must be a
little longer than the cone, and made very smooth at the top, on
which the upper block is to turn and the whole weight of the wheel to
rest.

[THE END.]
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