The Challenges of Creating Democracies in The Americas: The United States, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Guatemala Alex Roberto Hybel

The Challenges of Creating
Democracies in the Americas: The

United States, Mexico, Colombia,
Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Guatemala
Alex Roberto Hybel
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The Challenges of Creating
Democracies in the
Americas
The United States, Mexico,
Colombia, Venezuela,
Costa Rica, and Guatemala
Alex Roberto Hybel
with
Zander Weisman Mintz and Elise Hope Dunn
The Challenges of Creating Democracies in the
Americas
Alex Roberto Hybel
The Challenges of
Creating Democracies
in the Americas
The United States, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela,
Costa Rica, and Guatemala
With Zander Weisman Mintz and Elise Hope Dunn

Alex Roberto Hybel
Marina del Rey, CA, USA
ISBN 978-3-030-21232-2 ISBN 978-3-030-21233-9 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21233-9
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2020
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Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
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known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
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For my wife Jan
and
my mother-in-law Barbara
Preface
This book may be my last one. The approach of my 74th birthday, accompa-
nied by the invasion of an unexpected and often destructive disease, engen-
dered a new awareness about my mortality. Regardless of whether I will have
the energy and drive to initiate and complete a book that I have been planning
for several years, I consider myself a very fortunate individual.
My move to the United States in 1965 opened doors to a future I could
never have imagined. After spending 19 turbulent years in Argentina, a
long stint in Vietnam in the late 1960s as an Army reporter and photog-
rapher, and the attainment of US citizenship, I finally found my passion.
My mother said it best in 1983 when she stated, “Who would have
dreamed that you, who barely made it through high school, cared about
little but swimming in the Rio de la Plata, and skipped classes regularly to
go to the movies, would eventually get a Ph.D. from Stanford University.”
I don’t have a clue as to what made that transformation possible, but I am
very grateful that it happened.
This project would have never been completed without the hard work
and tremendous patience of two of my Connecticut College students.
Zander Weisman Mintz spent months collecting data and writing about
Venezuela’s and Colombia’s distinct political experiences. Elise Hope
Dunn carried out the same task in her analysis of Mexico. Zander also
contributed to the analysis of the Mexican case at a later stage.
I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their very helpful criti-
cisms and suggestions. I am also thankful to Connecticut College for
granting me multiple sabbaticals and providing the necessary financial
support via my endowed chair.
vii
viii PREFACE
As in the past, I am indebted to my mother-in-law, Barbara Peurifoy,

for her willingness to edit countless drafts and in the process teach me how
to write in English. Her kindness, thoughtfulness, and intelligence con-
tinue to motivate me. But when all is said and done, nothing that I have
written for the past 30-plus years would have been published had I not
had Jan’s constant support and love.
Final responsibility for the structure and content of every chapter in
this book and for whatever errors may remain is mine alone.
Marina del Rey, California Alex Roberto Hybel

2019
Contents
1 Introduction: The Nature of the Problem 1

Alex Roberto Hybel
2 Theories of State Creation and Democratization 17

Alex Roberto Hybel
3 The Challenges of State Creation and Democratization in

the United States 55
Alex Roberto Hybel

Mexico 91
Alex Roberto Hybel, Elise Hope Dunn and Zander Weisman
Mintz

Colombia and Venezuela137
Zander Weisman Mintz and Alex Roberto Hybel
ix
x Contents
6 State Creation and Democratization in Costa Rica and

Guatemala209
Alex Roberto Hybel
7 An Exploratory Theory of State Creation and

Democratization: The United States, Mexico, Venezuela,
Colombia, Costa Rica, and Guatemala247
Alex Roberto Hybel
Index261
CHAPTER 1
Introduction: The Nature of the Problem
Introduction
This book’s principal objectives are threefold. The initial goal is to identify
the key challenges encountered by six political entities in the Americas as
each one tried to create its own state and form its own political regime.
The second objective is to postulate a set of time-related hypotheses that
capture the evolutionary processes of state creation and political-regime
formation. The third objective, which is closely related to the first two, is
to explain why some states in the Americas have been more effective than
others at creating a democratic regime. Since the arguments presented
here are built on the contention that past developments can affect the
state-creation and political-regime-formation processes, the analysis begins
with the identification of the main conditions each newly freed entity
inherited from the colonial period. An examination of the challenges each
group encountered as it sought to create a state and form a political regime
is followed by an evaluation of its effectiveness in addressing those tasks.
The six cases investigated in this book are the United States, Mexico,
Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Guatemala.
Rationale
Democracy is in peril. Just a few decades ago, most Western political sci-
entists would not have voiced such a concern. They would have agreed
with the contention that democracy was the “only game in town.”1 They
© The Author(s) 2020 1

A. R. Hybel, The Challenges of Creating Democracies in the
Americas, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21233-9_1
2 A. R. HYBEL
would have added that in places where democracy had been consolidated,
the return to authoritarianism had become an unacceptable alternative.2
Today, such a bold assertion would be questioned, and with very
good reasons.
In the 1920s, only a very small number of sovereign states had political
regimes that would have qualified as democratic. By 1990, that number
had increased to 69, and by 2012 to 117. Between the years 2005 and
2013, however, more countries experienced a decline in political rights
and civil liberties than an increase.3 Equally disturbing are the figures rep-
resenting the percentage of millennials in developed democracies who
actually support democracy. In the United States, the number of millenni-
als who believe it is “essential to live in a democracy” is only 30 percent.
In Australia, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and New Zealand the per-
centage is at 40 percent or lower. Ironically, the last four states are among
the 16 most developed democracies in the world. The numbers remain
troubling as the analysis focuses on those who believe that it is preferable
to have a “strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and
elections.” As could be expected, the percentage in places such as Russia,
Romania, Ukraine, and Turkey oscillates between the high 50s and the
high 70s. But sadly, though the percentages are much lower, they have
increased in the United States and Germany, as well as in Mexico,
Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay, four South American countries that seemed
to have finally embraced democracy some two to three decades ago.4
Is the world beginning to witness the steady downfall of democracy?
Will a modified form of authoritarianism arise, one in which autocratic
leaders limit the access to multiple sources of information in order to mold
the preferences of the public? The two questions beg another question:
Should democracy be desired?
Any serious attempt to answer the questions forces analysts to recog-
nize that despite democracy’s present allure among many people in vari-
ous corners of the world, for much of history political leaders and
philosophers did not view it favorably. Plato posited that oligarchies turned
into democracies when elites overindulged, became idle and wasteful, and
developed interests separate from those they ruled. Democracies did not
fare much better. Democracies became tyrannies when mob passion over-
took political reason and autocrats became the darling of the masses.
Machiavelli was no less critical. He argued that democracies catered to the
whims of the people, who too often accepted false ideas, misused their
resources, and failed to take into consideration potential threats until it
1 INTRODUCTION: THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 3
was too late. The founders of the United States also feared democracy.
John Adams warned that democracies never lasted long. Every democracy
throughout history self-destructed. James Madison was equally troubled.
But then Winston Churchill told us to keep in mind that no one “pretends
that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democ-
racy is the worst form of government except for all those other forms that
have been tried from time to time.”5
Churchill’s implicit warning should not be taken lightly. Democracies
have not always enabled the wisest to lead, and too often, they have
become victims of the whims of uninformed populists. But it should not
be forgotten that though open and competitive political systems have not
always shielded democracies from grave errors, they have enhanced the
chances to correct those mistakes before they became unbearably costly.
Other political systems lack such safety measures. Moreover, no other sin-
gle type of political system has empowered the voices of those who, forced
to remain quiet throughout history, can finally be heard and counted.
The study of the conditions that either facilitate or obstruct the forma-
tion of democratic regimes is an old enterprise. Some investigators have
focused on single cases; others have conducted comparative studies in dif-
ferent regions. Based on their works, analysts have derived multiple argu-
ments, often in the form of theories. Because democracies have emerged
in every region of the world, and at different times in history, it would be
futile to attempt to develop a theoretical argument applicable to states
worldwide without first acquiring a clear understanding of the struggles
that states in particular regions endured at different point in time as they
strove to consolidate and legitimize their power and establish democratic
regimes. Hence the rationale for focusing solely on a few states in the
Americas.6
Methodology
Process-tracing procedure is an analytical tool utilized to draw “descrip-
tive and causal pieces from diagnostic pieces of evidence—often under-
stood as part of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena.”7 As David
Collier explains, process-tracing helps to: (a) identify and describe political
and social phenomena, (b) evaluate prior explanatory hypotheses, discover
new ones, and assess the new causal claims, (c) gain insights into causal
mechanisms, and (d) provide alternative ways of addressing challenging
problems such as reciprocal causation, spuriousness, and selection bias.8
4 A. R. HYBEL
Stated differently, the investigator tries to identify the intervening steps or

cause-and-effect links that might exist between the dependent, interven-
ing, and independent variables within a particular case, conduct the same
analyses in other related cases, and then compare the cause-and-effect
links across cases.9 In cases where a similar sequence does not emerge, the
investigator attempts to find out what might have caused the discrepancy.
Case Selection
The decision to study the United States, Mexico, Guatemala, Costa Rica,
Colombia, and Venezuela demands answers to two questions: Why com-
pare the state-creation and political-regime-formation processes of the
United States with those of Spanish American states when their histories
and cultures are so different? Why include in the analyses the experiences
of Mexico, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Venezuela, and Colombia and not of
other Spanish American states?
The analysis presented here rejects the contention that the inclusion of
the United States in the comparison would elicit arguments of limited
theoretical value. The United States’ pathway to democracy was neither
predetermined nor intentional. Much of its evolution was defined by a
combination of domestic and external factors that compelled the US lead-
ers to steadily transform the nature of the state and of their political sys-
tem. As demonstrated in this study, though differences existed between
the ways the United States and the Spanish American colonies evolved
into states and formed their respective political regimes, many similarities
were also present. The identification of the differences and similarities
helps develop a better understanding of the types of obstacles and oppor-
tunities newly independent entities in the Americas encountered as they
created their respective states and political regimes and, as a result, helps
determine what enabled or prevented the development of democratic
regimes. In short, despite the fact that the founders of the United States
feared democracy, unintentionally they helped set up its foundation, which
in turn served in a number of cases as a model for the Spanish American
leaders who were determined to create their own sovereign states and
distinct political regimes after they gained independence from Spain.
With regard to the second question, it is evident that the comparison of
cases other than Mexico, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Venezuela, and Colombia
would help elicit valuable explanatory hypotheses.10 In a separate book,
the state-creation and political-regime-formation experiences of the
United States are compared with those of Argentina, Chile, and Peru.
Needless to say, there are many other Spanish American cases that could
also be studied, and this analyst hopes that other investigators will assume
such responsibility and compare their conclusions with those arrived at in
this volume and its companion.
There are several distinct rationales for selecting Mexico, Venezuela,
Colombia, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. Mexico is one of Spanish America’s
most idiosyncratic states. Because of its richness and vastness, and its sig-
nificance to Spain for much of its colonial period, Mexico stood singularly
apart from the other Spanish American colonies. For much of the nine-
teenth century, the same type of domestic political turmoil that afflicted
other Latin American entities plagued Mexico. However, despite this simi-
larity, none of the other Spanish American states was forced to surrender
large parcels of its territory to the United States, had its own capital threat-
ened by the US military forces, or was governed for a brief period by a
European political figure who assumed the title of emperor.11 In addition,
Mexico, from the late 1920s until 2000, was the only Spanish American
state that did not experience a military coup; was ruled by a single political
party despite having relatively open elections; and ultimately managed to
partially overcome its past and give rise to a regime that, notwithstanding
its multiple deficiencies, is democratic. To explain these differences, it is
important to examine what made Mexico’s political history so unique.
What was it about Mexico that led it to undergo such a distinctive trans-
formation? Why did a state that experienced many of the same conditions
generated by colonialism in other colonies throughout Spanish America,
and that suffered many of the same problems the other newly freed states
encountered during the nineteenth century, ultimately moved along a dif-
ferent political path in the twentieth century?
The comparative analysis of Colombia and Venezuela builds on the con-
clusions arrived at in the Mexican study. The investigation is guided by this
question: Why would Colombia ultimately be markedly more successful
than Venezuela at creating the state and forming a quasi-democratic
regime, when the two shared common borders, achieved independence at
almost the same time, and were members of the same confederation during
their immediate years after independence? The question becomes substan-
tially more intriguing when one considers that for some three decades after
1959, Venezuela was viewed by many researchers as one of the few Spanish
American states that had succeeded at creating a stable democracy, while
during the same period Colombia’s political regime was being challenged
6 A. R. HYBEL
by the rise of four major drug-trafficking cartels and several revolutionary

movements. And yet, as the twentieth century gave way to the twenty-first,
a dramatic turnaround took place. Venezuela’s democracy was assailed by a
set of leaders determined to transform its economic system and to gain and
retain full political control, while Colombia moved steadily to eliminate the
conditions that had given rise to the drug cartels and revolutionary move-
ments during the previous decades. Though Colombia is still afflicted by
many of its earlier problems and remains a flawed democracy, its political
system is substantially more open and more competitive than Venezuela’s.
The argument repeats itself when their respective levels of corruption are
assessed. Venezuela today is one of the most corrupt states in the world,
while Colombia, though not a model of integrity, is markedly less corrupt
than its regional counterpart. Moreover, Venezuela was recently ranked as
one of the world’s most violent countries, while Colombia has of late man-
aged to reduce the violence that plagued it in decades past. In sum, step-
by-step historical analyses of the emergence of both states and of their
political regimes reveal the causal conditions that engendered critical
changes at different points in time, and help explain why Colombia, despite
its troubled past in the later part of the twentieth century, today has a more
open and competitive political regime than Venezuela.
At first light, the inclusion of Guatemala and Costa Rica may seem
unjustified. The territorial and population sizes of each country are measur-
ably smaller than those already mentioned. There are at least three reasons
why both states should be included in the analysis. First, it is important to
ascertain whether the challenges of creating states and political regimes
encountered by Central American states differed substantially from those
encountered by the other states. Second, though Guatemala and Costa
Rica do not share common borders, geographically they are not far from
one another, and from 1823 until 1840, both were part of the Federal
Republic of Central America. And third, today Costa Rica is considered to be
the second most developed democracy in Spanish America—after Uruguay,
while Guatemala is ranked markedly lower than the other political regimes
investigated here, but ahead of Venezuela. Hence, the questions: Why did
two states that were colonized by the Spaniards, attained independence at
nearly the same time and were part of the same confederation after inde-
pendence, evolve so differently? Or more to the point, why did Costa Rica’s
inhabitants (Ticos) manage to create one of Spanish America’s most devel-
oped democracies, while Guatemalans e stablished one of Spanish America’s
most undemocratic and corrupt political regimes?
A few final points about the selection of cases: Brazil is Latin America’s
biggest country, has the largest population, economy, and military force,
and houses one of the most populated democracies in the world. Those
characteristics alone would justify its inclusion in the analysis. Two reasons
dictate its exclusion. First, this analyst does not possess the knowledge about
Brazil needed to conduct a meaningful study. Second, the intent through-
out the book is to conduct a comparative analysis of the United States and
Spanish American states, not of the United States and Latin American states.
This analyst recognizes that the comparison of Brazil’s state-creation and
political-regime-formation experiences with a number of Spanish American
states, and possibly the United States, would bring to light some valuable
arguments, but such an analysis is beyond the scope of this study.
To sum up, the six cases investigated throughout this book share both
similarities and differences in the creation of their respective states and
political regimes. The analysis of how each state and its political regime
evolved through time helps reveal possible causal relationships between
the conditions that either facilitated or obstructed the construction of
stable states and democratic political regimes. It is imperative to keep in
mind that the relationships between state creation and regime formation,
though distinct, are generally dependent on one another. As the study
shows, many states that initially were assumed to have attained stability, in
fact, had not; and political regimes that early on were deemed to be demo-
cratic often became nondemocratic. To understand what brought such
changes, it is essential to study the interconnections between the creation
of the state and the formation of its political regime. Stated differently,
because setbacks in attaining state stability and achieving democracy were
not uncommon, investigators are compelled to expose the conditions that
brought about changes in one or the other process, or in both, at specific
points in time, and determine how those conditions differed when some
of those same entities were finally able to create stable states and form last-
ing democratic regimes.
Structure of the Book

Chapter 2 is both conceptual and theoretical. An investigation of democ-
ratization and the conditions that facilitate, delay, or obstruct the process
of liberalization has to be built on a set of well-defined concepts. Since
part of the argument presented here is constructed on the contention that
today’s democracies cannot emerge in failed states, the first task is to
8 A. R. HYBEL
determine what constitutes a state, and then to discuss alternative theories

of state creation and their possible applicability to the state-building pro-
cess in the Americas.
Disagreements regarding the definition of democracy persist. Charles
Tilly notes that analysts choose among four types of definitions: constitu-
tional, substantive, procedural, and process-oriented.12 Tilly’s analysis
presents a rationale for combining the procedural and process-oriented
methods in the definition. Because there are multiple theories of democ-
ratization, the first chapter ends with a summary and analysis of the most
important ones.
The empirical cases are built on axioms generally accepted by students
of democracy. They are:
Axiom 1: Democracies do not emerge in stateless territories or in states

that have failed to consolidate and legitimize their power.
Axiom 2: States that have existed for extended periods, and whose power
and legitimacy may seem to have been consolidated, may lose some or
all of both conditions.
Axiom 3: Though the consolidation and legitimization of a state’s power
is a necessary condition for the creation of a stable democracy, it is not
a sufficient one; other factors can derail the democratization process.
Axiom 4: None of today’s well-established Western democracies that
began to create representative governments in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries did so with the intent of forming democratic regimes.
Axiom 5: Conditions in the international arena can either weaken or
strengthen the drive to create democratic regimes.
The study of each country’s processes of state creation and political-

regime formation is conducted from the same vantage point. Initially, the
focus is on each colony’s pre-colonial conditions. Each colony’s topogra-
phy and natural resources are described, along with the political, eco-
nomic, and social systems in which its native inhabitants lived. Consideration
is given to the size of the native population, how extensively various native
groups interacted, and whether any of the existing societies had a hierar-
chical structure. In addition, attention is paid to the region’s abundance
or lack of minerals such as gold and silver, and the kinds of crops grown or
that could be grown. Also discussed are the colonizers’ general values,
beliefs, and ideas; the way they tried to transform the human and natural
conditions they encountered in the colonies; and the level of opposition
they faced. This portion of the analysis is completed with a description of

each colony’s political, economic, and social structure, and with an evalu-
ation of the types of tensions that afflicted each colony as the drive for
independence was about to begin.
Independence arrived differently in the various colonies. The third sec-
tion identifies the core conditions that prompted the drive for indepen-
dence and the obstacles each colony encountered. Since commitment to
independence within each colony was not universal, the reasons for such
divisions are discussed, along with the types of tensions the internal strug-
gles generated.
The hardships each colony confronted as it became independent
affected the early stages of its state-creation process. Because the newly
independent entities inherited different sets of problems from their colo-
nial past, some were more effective than others at setting up the founda-
tion of a new state. During this portion of the analysis, an attempt is made
to identify the most cumbersome obstacles each prospective state encoun-
tered, explain how effective its leaders were at addressing those obstacles,
and examine why some states consolidated their power and gained legiti-
macy sooner than others.
The processes of state creation and regime formation did not evolve
separately. As the political elites in each newly freed state sought to con-
solidate and legitimize the power of the state, they also tried to create a
political regime. The problems they faced varied. This part of the empirical
analysis identifies and discusses the main factors that affected the state-
creation and regime-formation processes, and examines the types of posi-
tive and negative effects that developments in one process had on the
other. Specifically, the intent of this section is to:
1. Describe the processes of state creation and of regime formation for

each state after it had attained independence.
2. Identify the elements that generated either positive or negative
changes in the processes of state creation and regime formation
within each state.
3. Discuss the tensions such changes engendered.
4. Isolate the conditions that facilitated the initial development of
quasi-democratic regimes and, in certain instances, the circum-
stances that provoked their downfall.
5. Explain why some of today’s states have been more effective at cre-
ating stable democracies than others.
10 A. R. HYBEL
Each empirical case closes with a two-part examination. In the first part,
the factors that either served democratization well or impeded its develop-
ment are identified. The contents of the analyses can vary substantially
from case to case. Because this study uses cases as building blocks and as a
way of assessing the explanatory value of earlier conclusions, some analyses
are more detailed and more complex than others. The second part exam-
ines the obstacles to further democratization and compares those conclu-
sions with the ones derived in the previous cases.
The empirical cases are arrayed in a specific order. Chapter 3 explains
the creation of the United States as a state actor and the development of
its political regime. Mexico is a unique case, and thus also merits its own
separate chapter. Its analysis is conducted in Chap. 4. Chapter 5 focuses on
Colombia and Venezuela’s distinct experiences and presents several
hypotheses. Chapter 6 focuses on the state-creation and political-regime-
formation processes of Guatemala and Costa Rica, and also posits a small
set of hypotheses designed to explain their distinct experiences. Chapter 7
brings the various arguments together in the form of revised hypotheses.
To fulfill the objectives identified at the start of the Introduction, it is
necessary to address a set of questions:
1. What compelled the colonizers to colonize?

2. What led the new inhabitants of the colonies to seek independence?
3. Why were the leaders of some colonies more inclined to seek inde-
pendence than those of the other colonies?
4. What conditions helped or mired the consolidation and legitimiza-
tion of the power of the state?
5. What conditions helped or mired the formation of stable demo-
cratic regimes?
This is not the place to bring to the fore the multiple hypotheses pos-
tulated in the conclusion, but the presentation of a summary version of
the arguments derived from them is justified.
First, the empirical examinations establish that the values, beliefs, and
ideas the British and Spanish colonizers brought to the Americas influ-
enced greatly their approaches to colonization—approaches that after
independence affected significantly their processes of state creation and
political regime formation.
Second, the analyses demonstrate that a region’s topography, natural
resources, and characteristics of the indigenous population also played a
critical role in shaping the colonization processes of the Americas by the

Spaniards and the British. Notwithstanding the similar values, beliefs, and
ideas the settlers of the 13 North American colonies brought with them,
they encountered various natural and human environments, and as they
adapted to them, they started to generate different economies. The differ-
ent economies, in turn, helped shape their political and social structures.
By the time the leaders of colonies agreed to seek independence, the
northern and southern colonies had developed different economies and
social norms that would generate deeper roots as each sought to construct
a state and a political regime. The same type of argument applies to the
Spanish colonization of the Americas. Though the Spaniards were also
guided by their own common set of values, beliefs, and ideas during the
early stages of colonization, the type of terrain, the kind and scope of the
natural resources, and the size and attributes of the indigenous population
they encountered had profound effects on how they went about coloniz-
ing a region.
In both the British and the Spanish American cases, a region’s eco-
nomic significance helped determine the size of the military—the greater
a region’s economic importance, the greater the size of the military
deployed by the colonial power. However, it is at this juncture that the
processes began to differ markedly, not only between the British and the
Spanish colonizers but also among members of the latter group. Though
a great number of the British colonizers were deeply religious and devel-
oped strict rules of social behavior, the structures of control they imposed
on themselves were markedly less hierarchical than those created by the
Catholic Church. In Spanish America the relationship between the two
sets of factors was relatively simple—the greater a region’s wealth and size
of its indigenous population, the larger the size of the armed forces
deployed by the Spanish monarchy and the number of clerics posted by
the Catholic Church.
Third, this study concurs with analysts who have noted that though
both the British and Spanish colonizers traversed the Atlantic in search of
a more prosperous material life, the role religion played in their lives dif-
fered measurably. A vast number of British colonizers emigrated in order
to be able to practice their own faith freely. Though anti-Catholicism was
predominant among the various Protestant sects that settled in the North
American colonies, and though many of them demanded the strict enforce-
ment of their religious doctrine, its practice was not controlled by an all-
powerful centralized church. The lives of the Spaniards and their
12 A. R. HYBEL
progenitors in the Americas were bounded by a religious construct that

was as severe and hierarchical as the one they had left behind in their
homeland. This difference between the Spanish American and the British
American colonies are reflected, in part, in their state-creation and political-
regime-formation processes.
The fourth finding is related to Stein Rokkan’s and Charles Tilly’s sepa-
rate analyses of state creation in Europe. Both analysts stress that the first
step in the state-construction process entails generating an agreement
between competing elites. In Spanish America, a small number of factors
determined the likelihood that rival elites would agree on how to structure
the new state. Typically, the challenge they faced was determining whether
to create a federal or a unitary state. Leaders of a state where regional divi-
sions had been substantial had a much harder time agreeing on whether to
create a federal or a unitary state than leaders of a state where regional
divisions had been minor or nonexistent. The Catholic Church com-
pounded the problem in cases in which critical divisions existed between
those who aspired to create a unitary state and those who advocated form-
ing a federal one. In those situations, advocates of a unitary form invari-
ably wanted the Catholic Church to continue the vital role it had played
during the colonial period, while supporters of a federalist arrangement
argued that it should not. The presence or absence of such reinforcing
cleavages explains why some Spanish American entities found the task of
creating the state and its political regime less or more cumbersome
than others.13
The fifth finding is closely related to the fourth one. As other scholars
have noted, military force has been one of the most commonly used and
effective means for creating a state and forming its regime. Its constant
use, however, also had a negative effect—the longer political leaders relied
on martial means to address critical domestic political problems, the lon-
ger it took them to consolidate and legitimize the power of the state. For
much of the nineteenth century, newly empowered Spanish American
political leaders used their own militias to address political, social, and
economic differences. The stronger the reinforcing cleavages, the longer
they relied on martial means. During that period, political rivals advocated
economic growth and created their own distinct political parties. Economic
growth and the emergence of rival political parties did not bring a reduc-
tion in violence; rivals continued to use force in an attempt to impose their
will and vision on others.
The sixth argument explains the connections between economic
growth, the rise of non-status quo parties, and military activity. Every
newly created state in the Americas underwent an economic transforma-

tion. Differences on how to generate economic growth and development
divided political leaders. Economic growth was accompanied by demands
that voting restrictions be reduced or eliminated, by the emergence of
political parties with distinct political, economic, and social agendas, and
by the increase in actual political participation. As those changes ensued,
the military evolved; but it evolved differently depending on the state. In
the United States, the military did not seek to dictate the country’s politi-
cal path. Its involvement during the Civil War was the exception. On the
other hand, throughout much of the twentieth century, the armed forces
continued to intervene in the political affairs of Guatemala, Venezuela,
and Colombia either to prevent the political participation of unacceptable
political leaders and/or parties or to remove those who upon assuming
power generated too much uncertainty or threatened to challenge the
status quo. The behavior of Mexico’s military was different from Costa
Rica’s. In the case of Mexico, the military agreed to diminish measurably
its political role after the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) had
incorporated it into one of its political branches. In the case of Costa Rica,
the winner of the 1948 Civil War put an end to the role of the military.
This decision helped transform Costa Rica into a democracy.
The seventh inference brings to light the critical but very different
effects the Second World War, the Korean War, the Cold War, and the end
of the Cold War had on the United States and a substantial number of
Spanish American states. Participation by African Americans in the Second
World War and the Korean War helped strengthen their argument that
they merited equal rights. Though other factors also contributed, the wars
enhanced the status of African Americans and reduced, but did not
eliminate, the racism that had permeated the American political system
since its conception. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 were reaffirmations of the equal status deserved by African
Americans and people in general, regardless of gender, race, or religion.
In their introduction to their edited volume, Larry Diamond, Jonathan
Hartlyn, and Juan Linz initially state that studies have provided little sup-
port for the view that the source of Latin America’s political turmoil and
democratic failures was primarily external. Subsequently, however, they
acknowledge that throughout history, international factors have had an
impact, sometimes crucial, on the development of Spanish American dem-
ocratic regimes. Their argument needs to be placed in a time framework.
The end of the Second World War brought to the fore the Cold War. The
net impact of the Cold War on Spanish American states was negative. The
14 A. R. HYBEL
fear of communist takeovers emboldened the military throughout Spanish

America, often with the backing of the United States, to intervene if they
suspected that a communist takeover was likely. Thus, between the early
1960s and middle 1980s, military regimes became the norm in several
Spanish American states and prevented or delayed the creation of demo-
cratic regimes.
Two more arguments must be considered. Military regimes through-
out Spanish America failed to cure their countries’ economic ills. With the
end of the Cold War and communism no longer being perceived as a criti-
cal threat, attempts to create democratic regimes throughout Spanish
America gained momentum. The so-called third wave of democratization,
however, was not caused primarily by deep public commitments to creat-
ing political systems governed by democratic norms and rules. Rather, it
was born largely out of discontent with the failure by military regimes to
solve the grave economic problems of the Spanish American states.
No longer able to justify their domestic political involvement, military
regimes gave in to domestic and international pressures to authorize the
establishment of democratic governance. The reduction in the domestic
political role played by military regimes, however, did not always give way
to the creation of effective democratic systems. Failures by a few embry-
onic democracies to resolve the economic problems that had afflicted ear-
lier military regimes led to the rise of authoritarian populist regimes. The
Hugo Chávez phenomenon in Venezuela spread rapidly into Nicaragua,
Bolivia, and temporarily Ecuador and Argentina. In every instance, the
common claim by the emerging authoritarian leaders and their closest
allies was that they possessed the capacity and knowledge to build equitable
and just socioeconomic systems. In order to strengthen the power and
authority of the executive power, such leaders and their closest allies typi-
cally relied on democratic instruments to diminish the capabilities of
potential adversaries to pose viable political challenges. The end result has
been the creation of populist authoritarian regimes.
Notes
1. Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracy,”
Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, Number 2, April 1996: 14–33.
2. See Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk, “The Signs of Deconsolidation,”
Journal of Democracy, Vol. 28, No. 1 (January 2017): 5–16.
3. See Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2014, https://freedomhouse.

org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2014.
4. Foa and Mounk, “The Signs of Deconsolidation.” See also, “Democracy
Index 2016: Revenge of the ‘deplorables’,” The Economist Intelligence
Unit, January 25, 2017.
5. Winston Churchill, Churchill by Himself, edited by Richard Langworth
(New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 574. Churchill did not originate the
comment, according to Langworth, he was quoting someone else.
6. See Alex Roberto Hybel, The Making of Flawed Democracies in the
Americas: A Comparative Analysis of the United States, Argentina, Chile
and Peru. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).
7. David Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing,” in Political Science and
Politics, 44 (No. 4), 2011: 823–830.
8. Ibid, 823–830.
9. See Alex Roberto Hybel, The Logic of Surprise in International Conflict
(Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1986), 18. See also Hybel’s
endnote 57, 23.
10. See Hybel, The Making of Flawed Democracies in the Americas.
11. In late 1903, Panama proclaimed its independence from Colombia and
granted rights to the United States “as if it were sovereign” to a zone
where the United States built a canal, administered it, fortified it, and
defended it until the late 1970s. Other states did lose territory, but the
United States was not the actor that provoked their loss. Puerto Rico was
appropriate by the United States during the Spanish American war in the
late nineteenth century, but prior to that time Puerto Rico had not existed
as an independent state.
12. Charles Tilly, Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007),
7–11.
13. See Chaps. 2 and 5 in Hybel, The Making of Flawed Democracies in the
Americas: The United States, Chile, Argentina, and Peru.
Bibliography
Collier, Simon. 1967. Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence: 1808–1833.
Cambridge University Press. Print.
Diamond, Jared. 1997. Guns, Germs, and Steel. New York: W. W. Norton and
Company. Print.
Diamond, Larry, Jonathan Hartlyn, and Juan J. Linz. 1999. Introduction: Politics
Society, and Democracy in Latin America. In Democracy in Developing
Countries, ed. Larry Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour
Martin Lipset. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers.
16 A. R. HYBEL
Foa, Roberto Stefan, and Yascha Mounk. 2017. The Signs of Deconsolidation.
Journal of Democracy 28 (1): 5–15. Print.
Freedom House. 2017. Freedom in the World, 2014. Web. January 24.
Hybel, Alex Roberto. 1986. The Logic of Surprise in International Conflict.
Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company. Print.
———. 2019. The Making of Flawed Democracies in the Americas – the United
States. Chile, Argentina; Peru, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Print.
Langworth, Richard. 2008. Churchill by Himself. New York: Public Affairs. Print.
Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Toward Consolidated Democracy. Journal
of Democracy 7 (2). Print.
CHAPTER 2
Theories of State Creation

and Democratization
Introduction
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part discusses and evalu-
ates alternative definitions of the state and theories of state creation. The
second one examines and assesses different conceptualizations of democ-
racy and theories of democratization.
The State
Charles Tilly proposes that an organization that controls the population
occupying a defined territory is a state insofar as it is characterized by the
following conditions:1
1. It is differentiated from other organizations in the same territory.

2. It is autonomous.
3. It is centralized.
4. Its divisions are formally coordinated with one another.
Jorge Dominguez’s version of the state differs somewhat from Tilly’s.

Dominguez defines the state as “a set of institutions with claim to legiti-
mate monopoly of force over a certain territory and an ability to exercise
it.”2 By asserting that a state is a set of institutions with claim to the legiti-
mate monopoly of force, Dominguez concurs with Tilly that such institu-
tions are different from other organizations in the same territory, are
© The Author(s) 2020 17

A. R. Hybel, The Challenges of Creating Democracies in the
Americas, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21233-9_2
18 A. R. HYBEL
autonomous, and are either centralized or divided but formally coordi-

nated. Tilly, however, does not specify the way the state controls the popu-
lation, while Dominguez emphasizes that such control is a function of the
state’s claim to the monopoly of force.3 Both Tilly and Dominguez stipu-
late that for an entity to be a state, it must be sovereign.
Eric Nordlinger challenges the tendency to define the state in the con-
text of institutions. Institutions, he contends, do not engage in authorita-
tive action; only individuals do. Nordlinger’s alternative is to define the
state as “all those individuals who occupy offices that authorize them, and
them alone, to make and apply decisions that are binding upon any and all
parts of a territorially circumscribed population. The state is made up of,
and limited to, those individuals who are endowed with society-wide deci-
sion-making powers.”4
Nordlinger’s challenge and proposed alternative have limited value.
First, his definition does not escape the problem he attributes to those
who place the emphasis on the legitimate monopoly of power. States differ
and change in terms of how much authority their representatives have to
make decisions, and how binding their decisions are. Second, the concept
of legitimacy, which is closely linked to sovereignty, pertains to a system of
relations, and some states are not more sovereign or legitimate than oth-
ers; an entity is not a state if it is not legitimate or sovereign. Third,
although Nordlinger is correct in stipulating that individuals, not institu-
tions, engage in authoritative actions, the authority of such actions resides
not with the individuals but with the institutions. The authority of the
decision-maker, in other words, is a function of the authority of the insti-
tution in which she or he works. And finally, by placing the emphasis on
individuals rather than institutions, Nordlinger is unintentionally con-
tending that every time a new group replaces a core group of individuals,
the state changes. Obviously, that would not always be the case.
In 1758, Eric Vattel contended that sovereignty helps maintain the
relationship between the “international community and the preservation
of the separate existence of its parts.” It does so by legitimizing the right
of only one actor to claim possession and control over a certain territory
and its population, and by setting up a system of relations among the enti-
ties that make up the international system.5 Internally, the state must be
able to claim supremacy over all other institutions within a particular ter-
ritory and population. Externally, it must be able to assert its indepen-
dence from outside authorities.6 In short, the state refers to an organization,
or set of institutions, that is guided by specialized personnel who control
2 THEORIES OF STATE CREATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION 19
a consolidated territory and its population, and that is recognized as the

ultimate sovereign authority by other organizations operating in the same
territory and by the agents of other states.7
Students of states in the developing world have proposed the inclusion
of two additional categories: failed and collapsed states. A failed state is
one that is “deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by war-
ring factions.” The state cannot control its borders—it lacks authority over
sections of its territory.8 A collapsed state is an extreme version of a failed
state. A collapsed state displays a vacuum of authority in which security is
equated with the rule of the strong, and political goods are obtained
through private or ad hoc means.9
It has been argued that the modern state is not an entirely autonomous
actor and that its strength is not static. Timothy Mitchell writes that the
“boundary between the state and society is elusive, porous, and mobile.”10
Theodore Lowi emphasizes that “there is no single dimension of strength,
and there is no single dimension of autonomy.”11 Theda Skocpol reminds
analysts that state autonomy “is not a fixed structural feature of any gov-
ernmental system. It can come and go.”12 This study is attentive to the
above warnings.
Theories of State Creation

Few analysts have paid more attention to the issue of state formation than
Tilly and Stein Rokkan. Their initial focus was the process of state creation
throughout Europe. Their general argument has been that entities north
and west of the city belt in the middle of Europe were markedly more suc-
cessful at forging centralized states earlier than the territories in the center
of Europe, which remained fragmented until the nineteenth century.
Their capacity to create centralized states depended on relative ethnic,
religious, and language homogeneity, as well as access to extractable
resources. Control over resources could not be attained without the pres-
ence of a powerful army.
According to Tilly, the ability of a European entity to form a state was
determined by whether it possessed the following advantages:13
1. Access to extractable resources;

2. Relative invulnerability to military attacks or conquests for signifi-
cant periods;
3. Competent political leaders;
20 A. R. HYBEL
4. Powerful army and success in wars;

5. Homogeneous population;
6. Capacity to design a strong coalition with the major segments of the
landed elites; and
7. Advantageous position within the international system
Tilly presents two arguments. A culturally divided society will be less

willing to accept the authority of the state than a culturally homogeneous
one. European actors that took firm steps to homogenize the population
by imposing a state religion, expelling minorities, institutionalizing a
national language, and standardizing education, were more successful at
creating stable and unified states than those that tolerated diversity.14 He
also notes that the continuous, aggressive competition for trade and terri-
tory among changing European states of unequal size made war a driving
force. To fight a war, a political entity had to build an effective political
machine. If the political actor was militarily successful, it would have polit-
ical institutions capable of delivering revenues for other purposes and
would possess an army with the power to enforce the government’s will
over stiff resistance.15 The centralized state apparatus typically started in
one or more fairly well-populated cities. Urban ruling classes relied on
capital to “extend their influence through the urban hinterland and across
far-flung trading networks.”16
Rokkan’s argument parallels Tilly’s. State-building, explains Rokkan,
can be divided into four phases. The first step entails “a period of political,
economic, and cultural unification at the elite level: a series of bargains are
struck and a variety of cultural bonds are established across networks of
local power-holders and a number of institutions are built for the extrac-
tion of resources for common defense, for the maintenance of internal
order and the adjudication of disputes, for the protection of established
rights and privileges and for the elementary infrastructure requirements of
the economy and the polity.”17 During the second phase, the center creates
new channels of contact with the peripheries in order to induce the popu-
lation to identify more closely with the political system. In the third phase,
the level of participation of the masses increases through the establishment
of privileges of opposition, the creation of political parties, and the exten-
sion of the electorate. In the final phase, the state experiences growth in
the agencies of redistribution.18
Rokkan then isolates the conditions that affected the ability of European
actors to create the state. First, the only efforts of aggressive state-building
took place on the fringes of economic Europe. “In the smaller of these
peripheral nation-states, the typical sequence was one of gradual build-up
at the ethnic center, rapid imperial expansion, [and] consolidation within
a more homogeneous territory.”19 Second, democracy in Europe began to
take form only after political, economic, and cultural unification at the
elite level had been attained and channels of contact between the center
and the periphery had been established.
The drive to form a nation requires building a national identity, unify-
ing administrations, and roping in territories that were accustomed to
high levels of autonomy and had resisted centralization.20 Before the era of
mass politics, the transition from state-building to nation-building, and
then to the development of unified cultures, depended greatly on three
factors. States that underwent the Protestant Reformation were markedly
more successful than states that did not experience such change. States
that were not deeply divided along linguistic and ethnic lines were also
more effective.21
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan address questions similar to those just
articulated. They first differentiate the state from the nation. The nation
lacks autonomy, agents, or rule. Its only resources are derived from the
psychological identity developed by leaders and the people within a state.22
Based on this differentiation, they ask: “Under what empirical conditions
are the logics of state policies aimed at nation-building congruent with
those aimed at crafting democracy?” Conflicts, they explain, are reduced
“when almost all of the residents of a state identify with one subjective
idea of the nation, and when that nation is virtually coextensive with the
state. These conditions are met only if there is no significant irredenta
outside the state’s boundaries, if there is only one nation existing (or
awakened) in the state, and if there is little cultural diversity within the
state.”23 When such conditions are present, governmental leaders can pur-
sue democratization and nation-state policies at the same time.
The United States did not become a state overnight. In Saskia Sassen’s
words, a powerful and legitimate state “evolved out of a loose confedera-
tion—eventually a federation—with extensive decentralized powers resid-
ing at local levels, with a culture of local self-government, and with strong
participatory democracy.”24 An examination of existing studies of the
United States’ state-creation experience, however, reveals that the com-
mon shortcomings they all share are failures to explain the actual evolu-
tion of the United States as a state and the reasons it evolved in the
manner it did.
22 A. R. HYBEL
Samuel Huntington proposes that there are three patterns of political

modernizations: Continental, British, and American. There is no need at
this stage to discuss the differences and similarities between the three. For
the moment, all that is required is to explicate the way the American pat-
tern differed from the other two, but principally from the British. In the
seventeenth century, notes Huntington, the state replaced fundamental
law as the source of political authority, and within each state, a single
authority replaced the many sources of authority that had existed during
the feudal era. In the newly independent American states, its people con-
tinued to adhere to fundamental law as the source of authority for human
actions and as an authoritative restraint on human behavior. Sovereignty
was never concentrated in a single institution or individual. Instead, it was
dispersed throughout society and among many political bodies.25 The dis-
tinctions identified by Huntington are helpful as one tries to understand
the initial stages of the state-creation process in the United States. But as
he also notes, it was not the intent of his discourse to explain the transi-
tions the United States experienced as a state, and the types of effects such
transitions had on the US polity.
According to Stephen Skowronek, American leaders tried to create a
state with a structure that would differ measurably from the type of frame-
work the arising European entities were designing. Skowronek concurs
with Alexis de Tocqueville, Marx, and Hegel, all of whom, in their own
distinct ways, argued that the United States was the great anomaly among
Western states.26 Hans Daalder does not necessarily challenge the conclu-
sions arrived at by the aforementioned scholars, but emphasizes that
though the United States sought to create a different type of state system,
ultimately it is an offshoot “of English political traditions, whittling down
the royal powers of colonial days in favor of elected chief executives at
federal and state levels, giving greater weight to representative principles,
creating institutional checks and balances both in central institutions and
in the federal makeup of the new polity, and providing a greater role for
popular control and election.”27
Though Skowronek’s work is not designed to explain the evolution of
the United States as a state, his work merits careful consideration.28 The
sovereignty of the United States, he writes, was embodied in 13 separate
state legislatures. This kind of power distribution left government “at the
mercy of fast-changing popular sentiments.” Aware of the destabilizing
effects of such a loose arrangement, those who met in Philadelphia in
1787 tried to create a state organization that would enable a central
government to control the territory and would distribute power between

three branches that would share it equally at the national level.
“Constitutional federalism,” he writes, “inhibited the penetration of cen-
tral power throughout the nation by ensuring the integrity of these states,
each with its own institutional organization, legal code, and law enforce-
ment apparatus.”29 By the start of the last quarter of the nineteenth cen-
tury, political and economic leaders, along with members of the intellectual
elite, recognized that they had to readjust the organization of the state.
They concluded that in order to deal with the forces of industrialization,
Washington had to expand the administrative capacities of the central
state. The modernization of the state did not involve making it more effi-
cient—instead, it entailed “building a qualitatively different state.”30
A number of students have sought to explain the conditions that facili-
tated and obstructed the process of state creation throughout Latin
America. According to Frank Safford, the literature on state-building in
Spanish America can be divided into three categories. One category
stresses the significance of Spanish American culture, the second contends
that structural economic problems were the principal influences, and a
third emphasizes the conflicting ideologies and the fear of the potential
power of the lower classes.31 As an alternative, Safford proposes a more
complex argument. He contends that a combination of seven factors
enabled or inhibited state development in Spanish America during the
nineteenth century. Independently, they are: (i) economic geography,
including topography, resources, and relative economic integration; (ii)
political geography, including geographic and transportation conditions
affecting political integration; (iii) relative economic and fiscal strength;
(iv) relative public acceptance of the political systems, regardless of whether
it was framed in the constitution or not; (v) the extent to which the civilian
authorities control the military; (vi) the role of the Catholic Church; and
(vii) the relative vulnerability of the evolving state to external pressure or
attack.32 The significance of those factors, adds Safford, varied from state
to state, as did the way they were combined.
In a comparative analysis of five Latin American states, Fernando
López-Alves postulates several additional arguments. He proposes that
state formation throughout Latin America has been defined as a pro-
cess whereby elites committed to creating states overcame deeply seated
opposition from their populations and vanquished regional political
leaders.33 The feudal characteristics of rural life in Argentina, Uruguay,
and Colombia, he adds, are poor predictors of state-making, and
24 A. R. HYBEL
mode-of-productions arguments regarding state creation in Latin America

are not particularly relevant. Though he acknowledges the significance of
domestic structural elements, he stresses that the inclusion of war and
conflict-resolution factors enhances measurably the predictive quality of a
theory of state creation. “Conflict and concomitant collective action,” he
explains, “determined access to the means of production, altered property
relations, created new classes, and displaced old monopolies and land and
trade.” He adds that the ability of the state to recruit members of the
nobility and secure their support during wars affected the timing and char-
acter of class alliances and the development of state bureaucracies.
Based on the above generalizations, López-Alves advances several
hypotheses that can be summarized as follows:
1. Failure on the part of a rebellious upper class to coalesce against the

central power accelerated power centralization.
2. When the landed gentry were defeated in their own domains, the
process of centralizing power took place faster.
3. When wars ensued within the area controlled by the central govern-
ment and territory nearby, the process of power centralization pro-
ceeded at a slow pace. If battles were fought far away, political
leaders were able to invest more resources in the construction of a
central army, which in turn strengthened the elites’ capacity to con-
solidate the power and authority of the state.34
The Resource Curse or Paradox of Plenty Theory has been designed to

explain the process of state creation in states with extensive mineral wealth.
According to the theory, states rich in minerals and fuel are predisposed to
generate high levels of corruption, ineffective governance, and violence.35
Terry Karl uses elements of the theory to explain the type of impact
Venezuela’s dependence on oil revenues had on its state capacity.
Venezuela’s heavy reliance on petrodollars, she notes, expanded the state’s
jurisdiction and weakened its authority as other extractive capabilities
withered. As a result, when faced with competing pressures, state officials,
accustomed to relying on the progressive use of public spending as a sub-
stitute for statecraft, weakened the state’s capacity to address problems.36
The first thing that becomes evident from the brief discussion is that
analysts are not in agreement as to which are the leading factors that help
explicate the state-creation processes throughout Latin America. For
Safford, the most important ones for each country are: political and
economic geography; economic and fiscal strength; public acceptance of

the political systems; extent to which the civilian authorities control the
military; the role played by the Catholic Church; and vulnerability to
external pressure or attack. For López-Alves, the leading causes are con-
flict and concomitant collective action. Together they determined access
to the means of production, altered property relations, created new classes,
and displaced old land and trade monopolies. Related to the issue of con-
flict was whether those striving to create the state and consolidate its
power were able to recruit members of the nobility and secure their sup-
port during wars. Their level of success affected the timing and character
of class alliances and the development of state bureaucracies. In related
arguments, López-Alves proposes that the process of centralizing the
power of the state was less cumbersome when the members of the rebel-
lious upper class were unable to unite against the elites at the center, when
the landed gentry were defeated in their own domains, and when battles
took place in distant regions not controlled by the central government.
Karl does not posit a theory of state creation. Instead, she applies elements
of the Resource Curse Theory to explain the effects oil has had on the capa-
bility of the Venezuelan state. She does not suggest that all resource-rich
states are destined to experience Venezuela’s fate.37
For present purposes, it is not necessary to engage in a critical analysis
of the various theoretical alternatives. Such an analysis will evolve from the
empirical cases.
Democracy
According to Robert Dahl, a contemporary democracy is a political system
that is “completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens.” A
political system will remain responsive to the preferences of its citizens
only if they have unimpaired opportunities to:
1. Formulate their preferences;

2. Manifest their preferences to one another and to the government by
individual and collective action; and
3. Have their preferences weighted equally, with no discrimination
because of the content or source of the preference.
For the aforementioned opportunities to exist, the regime must pro-

vide its citizens the following guarantees:
26 A. R. HYBEL
1. Freedom to form and join organizations;

2. Freedom of expression;
3. Right to vote;
4. Eligibility for public office;
5. Right of political leaders to compete for support and votes;
6. Access to alternative sources of information;
7. Free and fair elections; and
8. Institutions for making government policies that depend on votes
and other expressions of preference38
The extent to which the eight conditions are present in a contemporary

political regime can be represented along two dimensions: liberalization
(public contestation) and inclusiveness (participation). Throughout his-
tory, political systems have varied in terms of which, or whose, political
preferences were accounted for when policies were made. At one extreme,
the government responded to the political preferences of only one person;
at the other extreme, it weighted equally the political preferences of all the
citizens and formulated its policies based on the preferences of the greater
number. Political systems, however, have also varied in terms of the barri-
ers or opportunities they extended for “the expression, organization, and
representation of political preferences and thus in the opportunities avail-
able to potential oppositions.” The fact that all the eligible adult citizens
in a political system had the right to vote did not mean that such a regime
respected their votes. For such votes to be meaningful, the voters had to
have open access to political institutions that they could employ openly to
challenge the government.39
By positioning public contestation on the vertical axis and participation
on the horizontal one, Dahl creates a theoretical space in which he can
place at least four types of regimes. Where public contestation and partici-
pation are nonexistent, Dahl situates closed hegemonic regimes. These
regimes ban completely the expression, organization, and representation
of political preferences, and prohibit any form of organized dissent and
opposition.40 In the second space are polyarchies, that is, regimes that
“impose the fewest restraints on the expression, organization, and repre-
sentation of political preferences and on the opportunities available to
opponents of government.”41 Competitive oligarchies occupy the third
space. These are regimes that authorize an increase in public contestation
but limit extensively the number of participants. Though opportunities to
oppose the government exist, only a small number of individuals are
authorized to participate in the political process. And finally, in the fourth

space are the inclusive hegemonies. In these regimes, there are no major
constraints on participation, but the participants lack access to organiza-
tions with the authority and power to project dissent and oppose the
government.42
According to Wolfgang Merkel, each liberal democracy consists of five
partial regimes with these requirements:
1. It must have an electoral regime that is competitive and transparent;

2. Elections and the pursuit of collective interests must be allowed by
granting citizens the right to freedom of speech, of opinion, of asso-
ciation, and of demonstration;
3. Civil rights that contain and limit the exercise of power by the state
must exist;
4. Power between the executive, legislative, and judiciary bodies must
be divided, and each must be accountable; and
5. The government must be able to govern without the threat of being
vetoed, overruled, or overthrown by a nonelected group.43
Merkel proposes that for a political regime to be considered a democ-

racy, certain partial conditions must support the performance of other
partial conditions. The division into partial regimes serves several analyti-
cal purposes. First, it enables the analyst to identify defects within a democ-
racy. Second, by aggregating the defects within a democracy, the analyst
can compare them with the defects of other democracies. And third, it
enables the analyst to conduct a systematic and comparative analysis of the
way in which defects in a partial condition affect other partial conditions.44
Merkel completes his analysis with the identification of four types of
defective democracies. In an exclusive democracy, one or more segments of
all adult citizens are “excluded from the civil right of universal suffrage.”
In an illiberal democracy, “constitutional norms have little binding impact
on government actions and individual rights are either partially suspended
or not yet established.” In a delegative democracy, the division of power is
not well rooted and the power of the executive branch is not kept fully in
check by the legislative and judiciary branches. And finally, in a domain
democracy, the effective conditions that prevent the illegal intervention by
unelected officials, such as the military, are absent.45 Merkel’s types of
democracy are built on the idea that certain defects are qualitatively worse
than others. Defects present in an exclusive democracy are considered to be
28 A. R. HYBEL
the worst, while defects found in either a delegative or a domain democ-

racy are thought to be the least troublesome.46
Giovanni Sartori reminds us that the standard way of delimiting a concept
is by establishing its opposite. Thus, in order to determine what a democracy
is, one must also establish what it is not. He also prompts us to keep in mind
that when discussing democracy, it is critical to differentiate between two
questions: “What is democracy?” and “How much democracy?” These two
questions complement one another, but in order to answer the second ques-
tion, one must first establish what a democracy is, and what it is not. Sartori
contends that the tendency to overlook the critical difference between both
questions is a result of our general tendency to place tremendous emphasis
on quantitative analysis. He does not suggest that such focus is misplaced;
instead, he proposes that sometimes it compels us to overlook the value of
differentiating between regimes that are democratic and those that are not.
Failure to attend to this distinction could easily lead one to infer that all
political regimes are to a lesser or greater degree a democracy.47
Dahl’s and Merkel’s alternative conceptualizations of democracy do not
address the problem identified by Sartori. Neither framework enables the
analyst to determine when a political regime is no longer a democracy. The
problem can be best identified in the form of distinct but related q uestions:
When does a polyarchy become a competitive oligarchy? Is a competitive
oligarchy a defective democracy? When does a defective democracy
become a non-democracy?
A partial analysis of the political conditions in the United States during
the final decades of the nineteenth century and the first few decades of the
twentieth century helps illustrate the problem. During that period, the
level of political competition between the Democratic Party and the
Republican Party was intense, but not every adult was allowed to partici-
pate. White women who had been born in the United States, or who had
been naturalized and were in “good moral standing,” were legal citizens;
members of neither group, however, had the right to vote until 1920.
African American men were recognized as citizens in 1867 but were
denied the right to vote for two more years. Then, between 1896 and
1900, several Southern states adopted “grandfather clauses” in order to
prevent former slaves and their descendants from voting. Many of these
clauses remained in place until the mid-1960s. Native Americans were not
considered citizens until 1924, and in many states, they were denied the
right to vote until 1957. Thus, were one to adhere to Merkel’s criteria that
a democracy protects the civil rights of adults to participate in elections,
speak freely, voice their opinions, and associate, one could claim that in the
year 1900 the United States was both an exclusive democracy and an illib-
eral democracy, but still some kind of democracy.
The above argument begs the question: How do we justify categorizing
the United States as a defective democracy in 1900 when more than half
of its citizens did not possess the legal right to vote? More directly, why
even label the United States a democracy? Were one to rely on Dahl’s
alternative classification, in 1900 the United States was a competitive oli-
garchy, not a polyarchy. Or if one were to use Guillermo O’Donnell’s
terminology, it was a democratic oligarchy, as less than half of the adult
population who were born in the United States or who were naturalized
citizens and over the age of 21 possessed the right to vote. Though other
states throughout the globe that were permitting only a portion of its
population to participate in the electoral process did not have to cope with
a racial divide, they would also be depicted as a competitive oligarchy or a
democratic oligarchy rather than a polyarchy.
Based on Sartori’s argument and the example just presented, it is clear
that one must first differentiate democratic regimes from nondemocratic
ones. A competitive oligarchy is not a democracy, not even a defective
democracy. This distinction does not preclude determining which
democratic regimes are more or less democratic. In short, a minimum
standard must be designed to determine when a regime begins being, or
stops being, a democracy.
The modern demos is a vast, atomized, and depersonalized mass soci-
ety, incapable of functioning as a collective decision-making body. This
condition forces the members of the demos to rely on representatives to
design policies. In such a world, free elections become the protectors of
the people’s power. Representatives make policies, but free elections force
policymakers to account for the preferences of the demos during the poli-
cymaking process. Without open access to information, however, free
elections would express nothing. To the extent that free elections protect
the power of the people, open access to information ensures that the rep-
resentatives do not undermine such power. In addition to representation,
elections, and access to competing sources of information, the contempo-
rary democratic state is characterized by the presence of political parties.
As Dahl notes, “elections cannot be contested in a large system without
organization. To forbid political parties would make it impossible for citi-
zens to coordinate their efforts in order to nominate and elect their pre-
ferred candidates.”48
30 A. R. HYBEL
A regime is nondemocratic when contested elections are not permitted.

The absence of public contestation can take at least two forms. In its first
form, the state has only one party, which is a duplicate of the state. A
party-state system is a “system of unitarism.”49 Communist, Nazi, and
fascist regimes fit in this category. In its second form, the state has one
party and permits the presence of secondary minor parties. This system is
noncompetitive, because the state does not authorize the peripheral par-
ties to compete with the hegemonic party on an equal footing. A hege-
monic party system remains undemocratic even if competition were to
ensue solely among leaders of the party. It is not the case, as Maurice
Duverger argues, that to the extent that competition within a party ensues
freely, the system can be categorized as being democratic. Competition
within a party between leaders who do not have to consider the voters’
preferences is very different from competition when such preferences must
be taken into account. Competition in the first case lacks the elements that
make a system democratic: electoral competition and free elections.50
To the extent that public contestation focuses on the degree of opposi-
tion permitted, participation focuses on whose preferences the system
considers. As already explained, constitutions have differed throughout
history partly by dictating who possessed the legal right to participate in
the electoral process. Thus, if by democracy one means the rule or power
of the people, then one must first determine who the people are. The
analysis must begin with this question: “What persons have a rightful claim
to be included in the demos?”51 According to Dahl, the Strong Principle of
Equality provides the ground needed for the criteria of inclusion. In line
with this principle, all members of an association “are adequately qualified
to participate on an equal footing with the others in the process of govern-
ing the association.”52 Dahl then uses the principle to infer that the “demos
should include all adults subject to the binding collective decisions of the
association.”53
Dahl’s rule rejects Joseph Schumpeter’s claim that it is “not relevant
whether we the observers admit the validity of those reasons or of the
practical rules by which they are made to exclude portions of the popula-
tion; all that matters is that the society in question admits it.”54 To agree
with Schumpeter’s justification, notes Dahl, is to accept the argument that
if a group of people within an association were not considered to be “peo-
ple” by another group also in the same association, the system could not
be considered to be undemocratic.
Dahl is cognizant of how difficult it is to rely on logical criteria to deter-

mine who the people are. But he questions the idea of relying on the
principle of competence to decide who should be part of the demos. This
principle has been used repeatedly to prevent women, artisans, laborers,
those without property, and racial minorities from acting on behalf of their
own interests. Moreover, whenever such constraints existed, those who
were part of the demos did not necessarily protect the interests of those
who were excluded from the political process. Dahl emphasizes that the
rule has always been applied to ensure that children were not considered
part of the demos, and argues that such a stand is justified.55 He accepts its
application to children by siding with John Locke, who argues that though
children are denied certain rights, they receive them as they mature, while
for excluded adults “the bonds of … subjection” never “quite drop off.”56
Dahl concludes that though it is necessary to rely on a judgment of com-
petence, it is imperative to use a standard that helps reduce the arbitrari-
ness of such a judgment. O’Donnell concurs, adding the very important
clarification that in a democracy the “attribution of rights and obligations
is assigned by the legal system to most adults in the territory of a state.”57
This brings us back to one of the original questions. When does a polit-
ical regime stop being democratic? Neither O’Donnell nor Merkel pro-
vides clear guidelines. Throughout his analysis, O’Donnell refers to an
“inclusive democracy,” to a “non-inclusive democracy” and to an “oligar-
chic democracy.” These three references generate confusion. By classifying
one type of government as an inclusive democracy, O’Donnell is propos-
ing that if a regime enables political competition between parties but not
every adult citizen is authorized to vote, it can also be referred to as a
democracy, albeit an oligarchic democracy or a non-inclusive democracy
or, as Merkel would call it, an exclusive democracy. Based on this unclear
differentiation, it is difficult to determine when a democracy ceases to be
a democracy.
The boundary between a democratic and a nondemocratic regime is
delineated along the public contestation axis, which indicates whether free
competition between at least two political parties is permitted, and along
the participation axis, which specifies the extent to which a state’s adult
citizens can participate in the electoral process. Accordingly, a political
regime is democratic if all adult citizens are empowered to participate in
contested free elections between at least two political parties. It is non-
democratic if political competition between at least two political parties is
32 A. R. HYBEL
not permitted, or if the criterion of inclusion provided by the Strong

Principle of Equality is not applied.
Adherence to the proposed rule would indicate that the United States
did not become a democracy until after 1965. At that time, of more than
five million African Americans of voting age living in 11 Southern states,
only 1.4 million were registered to vote. Moreover, during debates in the
Senate, 18 southern Democratic senators and 1 Republican senator
launched a filibuster designed to prevent the passage of the Civil Rights
Act. No single senator explained his intent to deny racial equality, and
consequently his opposition to the idea of creating a democracy, more
unmistakably than Richard Russell (D-GA) when he stated: “We will resist
to the bitter end any measure or any movement which would have a ten-
dency to bring social equality and intermingling and amalgamation of the
races in our Southern states.”58
As already noted, to argue that there must be a well-defined boundary
between a democratic regime and a nondemocratic one is not to propose
that all democratic regimes are equally democratic. Because preferences
within a state can vary notably, no single political party can represent all of
them at all times; hence, there is competition between political parties.
The level of competition is dictated by constitutional design.59 Certain
constitutions decree that elections use proportional representation and
multimember electoral districts, while others rule that elections be
bounded by a plurality system and single-member districts. Of the two,
the first one is more “democratic.”60 As Sartori, an ardent defender of the
“elite” theory of democracy, notes, if democracy is rooted in the concept
of the people’s power, then logic dictates that “true representation is, and
can only be, proportional representation.”61 Proportional representation
is more democratic in the sense that it facilitates the formation of a multi-
party system, while plurality elections promote the construction of two-
party systems. One of the critical differences between these two types of
systems is that in a proportional-representation type of system the political
parties are responsive, in the aggregate, to a broader set of preferences
than in a plurality-type system.62 Stated in Dahl’s terms, public contesta-
tion is greater in the first system than in the second one.63 It can be pro-
posed, thus, that a democracy’s degree of democracy is in part determined
by its level of public contestation—the broader the range of preferences
the political parties can respond to, the more democratic the regime.
A democratic regime’s capacity to address a wide range of preferences
is not the only determinant of its level of democracy. Elections alone do
not guarantee that the elected officials will be permitted to perform their
assigned roles. Throughout history, there have been many cases in which
elected officials were prevented from assuming office, Congress or the
Judiciary was dismissed, or the holder of the executive office was either
toppled or forced to resign by a group or organization insulated from the
electoral process.64 Those actions engender an analytical problem.
Let us imagine a regime in which there is political competition between
the parties, information flows relatively unhindered, civil rights are fairly
well protected, and public participation is not restricted in any of the
forms identified earlier. At the same time, however, the voters’ level of dis-
satisfaction and the tension between the competing parties have grown
measurably. Then, after repeated failed attempts on the part of the elected
political leaders to resolve their differences, the military intervenes, top-
ples the government, dismisses the Congress, and decides who should rule
or appoint some of their own as the new rulers. Is the regime that was
toppled a nondemocratic regime? Or is it a democratic regime that was
not solid enough to protect itself by resolving the existing tensions, and
thus unintentionally empowered the military to take over the reins of
government?
It is not possible to draw a precise line that separates one category from
the other. However, it is feasible to differentiate between two types of
regimes: one is structured according to democracy’s basic tenets and exists
uninterruptedly for an extended period, but at some point, is toppled by
the military; the other is a regime that, despite its one or many attempts to
adhere to democracy’s basic tenets, is toppled by the military shortly after
its creation. The crucial factor in this comparison is the longevity of the
political regime. The regime in the first case can be characterized as a
defective democracy; the regime in the second case never managed to
achieve the status of democracy. In other words, durability matters.
Theories of Democracy
What are the conditions that enable certain countries, but not others, to
develop stable polyarchies? According to Dahl, a country’s chance to
develop a polyarchy is dependent on whether the following conditions are
present:65
1. Means of violent coercion are dispersed and controlled by the civil-

ian government;
34 A. R. HYBEL
2. Those who control the means of coercion are subject to the demo-
cratic process; and
3. Power, influence, authority, and control are dispersed from a single
center toward a variety of entities;
4. Society is marked by a “relatively high level of income and wealth
per capita, long-run growth in per capita income and wealth, a high
level of urbanization, rapidly declining or relatively small agricul-
tural population, great occupational diversity, extensive literacy, a
comparatively large number of persons who have attended institu-
tions of higher education; an economic order in which production
is mainly carried on by relatively autonomous firms whose decisions
are strongly oriented toward national and international markets, and
relatively high levels of conventional indicators of well-being, such
as physicians and hospital beds per thousand persons, life expec-
tancy, infant mortality, percentage of families with various consumer
durables, and so on;”66
5. People are culturally homogeneous or are at least not segmented
into strong and distinctive subcultures;
6. People are supportive of democratic institutions, particularly in their
political activities and
7. Government is free of threats by foreign powers hostile to
democracy.67
Linz and Stepan identify a similar set of factors. The creation of the
state, they note, is a necessary condition for a regime to become a consoli-
dated democracy, but not a sufficient one. Five other mutually reinforcing
conditions must also be present. They are:68
1. A free and lively society;

2. A relatively autonomous political society;
3. Laws that regulate the actions of all the political actors and the gov-
ernment, and that protect individual freedoms and associa-
tional rights;
4. A functional state bureaucracy; and
5. An institutionalized economic society
Linz and Stepan then postulate that a state that has a plurality of
national, linguistic, religious, or cultural societies will have great difficulty
creating and maintaining a stable democracy.69
For a somewhat more detailed discussion of the extent to which differ-

ent factors contributed to the creation of democratic regimes and their
consolidation in Latin America, it is helpful to rely on, and when appropri-
ate combine, the conclusions derived by Jeff Haynes, and by Larry
Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn, and Juan Linz.
Haynes reviews the effects three distinct conditions have had on the
consolidation, or the failure to consolidate, democracy in Latin America.
They are:70 political culture and the legitimacy of the post-authoritarian
regime; political participation and institutions; and economic and interna-
tional factors. Based on the analysis of the aforementioned factors, Haynes
proposes that in the consideration of cultural conditions, what matters is
whether a political regime is backed by a civic culture “characterized by
high levels of mutual trust, tolerance of diversity and a propensity for
accommodation and compromise.” The development of such a culture is
the by-product of democratic institutions and structures working jointly
over time. More to the point, institutions help engender and disseminate
democratic values and beliefs among the people of the state.71
Political leaders, adds Haynes, particularly in developing states, are
rarely willing to relinquish power. Power-holders in developing countries
typically rely on the military to either retain power or topple those in
power. Or as he notes, in many cases the military intervenes to help
“defend members of the political and economic elite from the rigors of
democracy.” To obstruct this process, continues Haynes, a strong civil
society must be present.
The last issues Haynes addresses are whether economic and interna-
tional factors affect the democratization process. He takes as his starting
point a question posited by Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, José
Antonio Chibub, and Fernando Limongi. The four scholars ask: What
conditions should be present in any country for it to have a democratic
regime the following year? They contend that for a country to have a
democracy in the following year, it must already have a democracy in
place, be affluent, experience economic growth but with no-more-than-
moderate inflation, undergo a decline in inequality, face a favorable inter-
national climate, and have parliamentary institutions.72 Last, Haynes
points out that despite an initial, multipronged drive by developed coun-
tries and institutions in the Western world to nondemocratic regimes to
transform themselves into democracies, the outcomes have been disap-
pointing. Though initially, efforts by members of the international com-
munity seemed to compel some developing countries to hold their first
36 A. R. HYBEL
free elections, as time went by the intensity of the external appeals and
pressures weakened.73
Diamond and his co-authors present and assess the relevance of a large
number of potential “causal” variables. Within those variables, they some-
times identify conditions that impact them. They are the following:74
1. Historical legacies, paths, and sequences;

2. State structure and strength:
a. The crisis of state expansion and economic intervention,
b. Centralization and decentralization, and
c. The military;
3. Political institutions:
a. Parties and party systems,
b. Constitutional structure;
4. Political leadership:
a. Founding of democratic leadership,
b. Political adaptation and reform,
c. Response to economic crisis,
d. Response to generalized political crisis;
5. Political culture:
a. Sources of political culture,
b. Effects;
6. Socioeconomic development and economic performance:
a. Economic performance;
7. Inequality, class, and other cleavages;

8. Civil society and associational life:
a. The mass media;
9. International factors:
a. US Policy.
The three authors’ first contention is that colonial rule throughout

Spanish America did not leave behind a homogeneous legacy. They add
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herättämiseksi laajoissa massoissa, jotka vielä uinuvat kapitalististen
ryövärisaalistajain tekopyhyyden synkän uhrisauhun tainnuttamina.
Puhemies Näppinen ehdotti ulkopuolella virallisen pöytäkirjan

keskusteltavaksi kysymyksestä, mihin toimenpiteisiin olisi ryhdyttävä
vallankumouksellisen esitaistelijan suojelemiseksi virkavallan
haikalojen ohranamaisilta sapelihampailta, jos toveri Kuusinen
osoittaa Pöllölän kommuunille sen kunnian että saapuu sen turviin.
Vallinneessa pitkällisessä äänettömyydessä kuultiin ainoastaan

piippujen kurinaa sekä joutomies Lötjösen murahdus, että kun kuka
keksisi oikein lojaalin jutkun virkakunnan petkuttamiseksi.
Tov. Israel Huttunen loi katsauksen vallankumouksellisen

köyhälistön turvattomuuteen valkohirviöitten pistinvaltakunnassa,
jota vastaan luokkatietoisilla kansanaineksilla ei ole muuta kuin
räkäiset nyrkkinsä. Arveli ja uskoi näiden nyrkkien kuitenkin olevan
valmiit puolustamaan toveri Kuusista kaikella maan-alaisella tavalla
ja kysyi, ovatko kaikki läsnäolijat suostuvaiset kaikki yhden ja yksi
kaikkien puolesta antamaan toveri Kuusiselle aineellista ja
aatteellista apua valkoisen porvariston kukistamisessa?
Läsnäolijoiden vastattua tähän myöntävästi vallankumouksellisella

ankaruudella, laulettiin innostavan tunnelman vallitessa
moniäänisesti:
»Taitaapa tulla tukkipoikia

Joelta kuuluu laulu…»
4 §.
Puhemies Jerobeam Näppisen astuttua pöydän taakse ja

niistettyä nenänsä ryhdyttiin jälleen jatkamaan kokouksen
pogrommia, muutamien kommunististen solujen jäädessä vielä
kahvilan puolelle, mistäkäsin kuitenkin seurasivat
vallankumouksellisella valppaudella asiain käsittelyä.
Sihteeri Mikko Tarjus ilmoitti esityslistalla olevan kysymyksen

osanotosta eduskuntavaaleihin. Israel Huttunen teki tyhjentävästi
selkoa nykyisestä ajasta, jolloin vallankumouksellinen köyhälistö
elää suuressa lumivalkoisessa rosvoleirissä, ja itkevien rosvojen
hammastenkiristys ilmoittaa, että loppu on lähellä, koska ei heillä
enää ole muita rosvottavia kuin toisia rosvoja. Ollen sitä mieltä, että
vallankumouksellisen köyhälistön on yleismaailmallisen
vallankumouksen hengähdysaikana saatava solujaan myöskin
eduskuntaan, missä enkelimäinen noskelaisuus on tähän asti
hautonut turmiollisia käenmuniaan porvarillisten haaskalintujen
likaisessa pesässä. Puhuja ilmaisi, että tämä pesä alkaa olla ilkeästi
rentullaan, joten kommunistiset solut siellä voivat aiheuttaa
hajoittavan käymisprosessin, raivaten historiallisella
välttämättömyydellä tietä köyhälistön vallankumoukselle, joka avaa
kansalle uusia elinkeinohaaroja.
Puhujan siirtyiltyä asiasta toiseen ja johduttua vihdoin

käsittelemään kaninhoidon kannattavaisuutta yleismaailmallisen
vallankumouksen valaistuksessa, kehoitti puhemies Jerobeam
Näppinen häntä pysymään asiassa.
Tov. Israel Huttunen lausui puhemies Jerobeam Näppiselle

surkuttelunsa äänivallan sortamisesta lahtarimaisella tavalla.
Puhemies Näppisen iskettyä nyrkin pöytään ja kiivaasti
huomautettua, ettei puhemiestä yhtiöjärjestyksen nojalla saa
vastustaa virantoimituksessa, huusi tov. Huttunen, että iske vain,
kyllä se pöytä kestää, kun on Holopais-vainajan tekemä.
Puhemies kysyi sihteeri Mikko Tarjukselta, huomasiko sihteeri

Israel
Huttusen juovan useampia löröjä kuin muut.
Sihteeri Tarjus kertoi tov. Huttusen tehneen ylimääräisen lörön

juuri ennen täysi-istunnon alkua.
Joutomies tov. Aatami Lötjönen murahti sen olleen hyvin lojaalin

lörön, kun ei siinä ollut kahvia ollut muuta kuin vähän väriksi, vaikka
oli kukkurapää kuppi.
Tov. Israel Huttusen jatkaessa sillävälin puhettaan, mikä nyt

kosketteli Pohjolan kesäöiden vaikutusta kuun nousuun ja laskuun
ynnä erinäisiä muita asioita, saneli puhemies Näppinen pöytäkirjaan
kummastuksensa. Merkittiin.
Puhemiehen kysyttyä, eikö hänen velvollisuutensa ollut riistää

Israel Huttuselta puheenvuoro, vastasivat toiset myöntävästi, toiset
jyrkästi kieltäen. Tämän johdosta alisti puhemies asian huuto-
äänestykseen, johon myöskin tov. Huttunen kaikin voimin otti osaa.
Puhemies katsoi että »jaa» on voitolla, aiheuttaen useita

vastalauseita, joita ei merkitty pöytäkirjaan.
Koska tov. Israel Huttunen näytti vähän väsyneeltä, työnsivät

toverit Lötjönen ja Simo Turtiainen hänet penkille pitkälleen
lepäämään, nimittäen tällöin Israel Huttunen mainituita tovereita
loukkaavasti pikku Pismarkeiksi.
Tov. Huttusen ollessa esteellisen ryhtyi tov. Justus Tiilikainen

pohjustamaan kysymystä kommunistien osanotosta vaaleihin, ollen
sitä mieltä, ettei luokkatietoisen köyhälistön olisi annettava pettyä
itseään porvarillisen pimityksen harhaanjohtavilla Botjamkinin
kulasseilla.
Muutamien huudettua, että puhua suomea, onko mentävä

vaaleihin vai ei, vastasi tov. Tiilikainen empimättä: eikä helvetissä!
Puhemies Näppinen lausui mielipiteenään, että tov. Tiilikainen on

väärinkäsittänyt nykyaikaisen vallankumouksellisen taktiikan, ja
kysyi, olisiko joku muu halukas valaisemaan asian tätä puolta.
Paavo Pellikka siteerasi selvänäköisesti puoluelehtien artikkeleita

parlamenttaarin merkityksestä vallankumouksellisessa
joukkotoiminnassa.
Koska Israel Huttunen alkoi osoittaa pahoinvointisuuden oireita,

käski puhemies kantaa tov. Huttusen rappusille, ettei ryvettäisi pirtin
lattiaa. Tehtävän toimeenpaneminen uskottiin edellämainittujen
Aatami Lötjösen ja Simo Turtiaisen huoleksi.
— Ehkä se siellä pihalla selviää, arveli Mikko Tarjus, mihin kokous

yhtyi.
Simo Turtiainen huusi, läsnäoleviin kommunistisiin soluihin

vedoten, että tulkaa joku auttamaan, kun se tarttui kiinni pihtipieliin!
Useiden nauraessa iski Kaisa Kompura tov. Huttusta kynsille

hiilihangolla, niin että tov. Huttusen täytyi päästää irti oven
pihtipielistä.
Häiritsevän välikohtauksen jälkeen otettiin jatkokäsittelyssä esille

kysymys parlamenttaarisesta toiminnasta, jolloin useat riistetyt
työläiset ilmaisivat inhomielistä vastahakoisuutta parlamenttaarista
joukkotoimintaa kohtaan, lausuen ihmettelynsä kysymyksen
herättämisen johdosta.
Puhemies Näppisen ryhdyttyä selittämään asiaa taktillisuuden

valossa huusivat mainitut toverit alas puhemiehen.
Puhemies Näppinen käski Mikko Tarjuksen merkitä pöytäkirjaan

raivoisan vastalauseen tällaista ala-arvoista menettelyä vastaan.
Sihteeri Mikko Tarjus esitti mukaansatempaavassa valossa

köyhälistön älymyksien katsantokannat porvarillisen typeryyden
nenästävetämiseksi parlamentillisella toiminnalla valkoisen
tasavallan luokkalakien varjossa, mille monet läsnäolijat osoittivat
vilkasta myöntymystä.
Koska yhä useammat puhujat kiivaasti harasivat

eduskuntavaaleihin osaaottamista vastaan, julisti puhemies
puheenvuorot rajoitetuiksi, aiheuttaen yleismölinän, johon myös
kahvilanpuolella olijat yhtyivät.
Puhemies ilmoitti, että koska puheenvuorot ovat rajoitetut, ei

mitään puheenvuoroja enää voida antaa.
Kaikkien huutaessa sai puhemies lopuksi asian äänestykseen,

esittäen vastattavaksi, että ne, jotka äänestävät myötäpäivään,
äänestävät »jaa», jos joku tahtoo vastapäivään, saa huutaa »ei».
Jaa tai ei?
Suuren enemmistön huudettua »ei» ilmoitti puhemies pöytäkirjaan,
että Pöllölän kommuuni on yksimielisesti päättänyt ottaa osaa
eduskuntavaaleihin.
Kun mieliala syvissä riveissä osoittaikse myrskyiseksi, aloittivat

kahvilanpuolella istujat tunnelman rauhoittamiseksi sihteeri Mikko
Tarjuksen kehoituksesta laulun:
»Likka oli illalla iloinen,

Mutta aamulla surumielin».
Tämän jälkeen puhemies Näppinen ilmoitti äänestyksen

tuloksena, että kommunistinen köyhälistö oli huimaavalla
yksimielisyydellä päättänyt ottaa osaa eduskuntavaaleihin omana
puolueena.
Kommunistinen solu Justus Tiilikainen, käyttäen häpeällisiä

sanoja, väitti puhemiehen menettelystä leimahtavan vastaan
humpuukin tuoksun.
Puhemies selitti laajasti ja valaisevasti, että »jaa» tarkoitti niitä,

jotka tahtoivat kannattaa Justus Tiilikaisen esitystä, ja »ei» muita.
Muutamien vaatiessa uutta äänestystä, sanoen puhemiehen

kenkkuilevan, ja toisten ylimalkaan huutaessa asian
kannattamiseksi, vastasi puhemies, ettei yhtiöjärjestyksen mukaan
voitu uutta äänestystä toimittaa.
Justus Tiilikaisen ilmoitettua panevansa sitä vastaan haisevan

vastalauseensa, käski puhemies Jerobeam Näppinen uunin lähellä
istuvia avaamaan pellit ja Kaisa Kompuraa panemaan tuvan oven
raolleen ilmakehän raikastuttamiseksi.
5 §.
Puhemies Näppisen ehdotuksesta ryhdyttiin Pöllölän kommuunista

asettamaan yleisehdokasta eduskuntavaaleja varten.
Justus Tiilikaisen esilletuotua olevansa persoonallisesti sitä

mielipuolta, ettei Pöllölän kommuunissa ole ketään sellaista, joka
voitaisiin lähettää eduskuntaan, lausui puhemies Näppinen
ulkopuolella pöytäkirjan kummastuksensa.
Simo Turtiaisen kysymykseen, minkälaisen miehen pitäisi olla,

kyetäkseen ajamaan eduskunnassa vallankumouksen asiaa, ilmoitti
sihteeri Mikko Tarjus päävaatimuksen olevan, että valittu on
alotekykyinen proletaari kommunismin katsannossa.
Puhemies Näppinen esitti älyllisessä tutkielmassa, yhtyen osaksi

sihteerin lausuntoon, pääasian olevan, että valitulla on ennenkaikkea
proletaarinen vaisto.
Justus Tiilikainen sylkäisi ja sanoi, että semmoinen vaisto on kyllä

joka miehellä.
Puhemiehen ehdotuksesta lausui konkressi Justus Tiilikaiselle

kummastuksensa.
Justus Tiilikainen mainitsi nostavansa häntäänsä mainitulle

konkressille ja sen kummastukselle.
Tov. Aatami Lötjönen murahti, että jos valittaisiin tov. Israel

Huttunen, ollen ruumiillisessakin katsannossa raavas ja lojaali mies.
Puhemies huomautti, ettei Israel Huttusta voida valita, koska on
päissään.
Justus Tiilikainen vastasi, että kyllä se siihen mennessä ennättää

selvitä kun eduskunta kokoontuu, mille eräät puolinosket päästelivät
nauru- y.m. pärskähdyksiä.
Aatami Lötjönen, pistäydyttyään pihalla, ilmoitti kommunististen

solujen tietoon, että Israel Huttunen on jo selviämään päin.
Puhemies Näppinen selvitteli aatepitoisessa puheessa

kapitalististen teollisuusjehujen ahnaat imukärsät, jotka kietovat
paljaaksiriistetyn köyhälistön Gordeliinin solmun, sekä esiintoi
lahtarilurjusten salakähmäiset pimeydenteot vastavallankumouksen
palveluksessa, asettaen raatajaluokalle historiallisen velvoituksen
koota voimat viimeiseen rynnäkköön luhistuvan
yhteiskuntajärjestyksen kukistamiseksi, ratkaisemalla
aleksandrialaisella miekaniskulla Gordeliinin solmun sfinksimäisen
arvoituksen.
Israel Huttusen tultua sisälle kysyi Simo Turtiainen, joko hän on

selvä päänsä puolesta, Vastaten Huttunen jyrkässä äänilajissa ei
koskaan humalassa olleensakaan.
Puhemies Näppinen pyysi kokousta nimeämään

eduskuntaehdokkaita äänestyksen toimittamista varten.
Kokouksessa suositeltiin ehdokkaiksi Israel Huttusta, Jerobeam

Näppistä, Mikko Tarjusta, Reeta Sinkkosta ja Justus Tiilikaista.
Puhemies Näppinen vastusti Justus Tiilikaisen ehdokkuutta, koska

Tiilikainen ei ole parlamenttaarisuuden kannalla.
Justus Tiilikainen, hyökäten puhemiehen auktoriteettia vastaan,
sanoi ala-arvoisesti, että Näppinen näkyy jo etukäteen päättäneen
valita itsensä eduskuntaan.
Puhemies ilmoitti riistävänsä Tiilikaiselta puheenvuoron, jonka

johdosta Tiilikaisen koplakunta, häiriten kokouksen järjestystä,
huuteli puhemiehelle häpeällisiä soimauksia, mitkä aiheuttivat
levottomuutta.
Puhemies ehdotti, että ne, jotka tahtovat häntä, Näppistä,

eduskuntaan, äänestäkööt »jaa»; jotka tahtovat jotain muuta,
äänestäkööt »ei».
Huutoäänestyksen tapahduttua ilmoitti puhemies Näppinen

tulleensa valituksi yleisehdokkaaksi ehdottomalla
ääntenenemmistöllä.
Tiilikaisen koplakunnan ryhdyttyä vaatimaan äänten laskemista

puolinoske Paavo Pellikan kannatuksella, ilmoitti puhemies
kokouksen työjärjestyksen mukaan ei voivansa purkaa jo
tekemäänsä päätöstä.
Monen karjuessa huusi Tiilikainen, että Näppiselle on annettava

selkään, leimaten puhemies Tiilikaisen provokaattoriksi.
Yleistilanteen uhatessa kääntyä vaaralliseksi vallankumouksen

saavutuksille pyysi puhemies saada tarjota puolikuppiset koko
kommuunille, mikä yksimielisesti hyväksyttiin.
Keskustelun päätyttyä kysyi puhemies Näppinen, katsooko

vallankumouksellinen köyhälistö siis, että hänet on yksimielisesti
valittu Pöllölän kommuunin yleisehdokkaaksi? Vastattiin, että katsoo.
Merkittiin pöytäkirjaan.
Israel Huttunen ja Justus Tiilikainen vaativat saada panna

pöytäkirjaan vastalauseensa. Asiata harkittuaan antoi puhemies
välipäätöksellä hylkäyksensä tähän aiheettomaan vaatimukseen.
Puhemies huusi, että tuokaa akat kahvikuppeja tähän pöydälle

joka miehelle ja kaksi limonaatipottua, mikä täytettiin.
Reeta Sinkkosen kysymykseen, kuka ne maksaa, ilmoitti

puhemies kahden kesken, että saa panna huvitoimikunnan tiliin
myöhemmällä pidettävissä tanssi-iltamissa.
Virvokkeita nautittaessa laulettiin puhemiehen johdolla sointuvasti:
»Seitsemän ämmää seinän takana

seisoo kuin pilaria vaan».
Simo Turtiaisen kysymykseen, onko ainetta riittävästi, lausui

Pussisen poika, että jos loppuu, niin noskelaisilla on lisää.
Eräitten kysyttyä tarkemmin ilmoitti Pussisen poika jättäneensä

osan varastoaan Törkysen saunaan, johon noskelaiset ovat
kokoontuneet kortinpeluuseen.
Jerobeam Näppinen lausui vallankumouksellisen valittelunsa sen

johdosta, että Pussisen poika avittaa petturimaista noskelaisuutta,
vastaten Pussisen poika ahväärin kannalta liikkuvansa eri
yhteiskuntapiireissä.
Tov. Kusti Pirhonen kysyi, eikö olisi ryhdyttävä puuhaamaan

vaaliliittoa noskelaisten kanssa.
Puhemiehen avatessa suunsa astui sisään tuntematon
pienenpuolinen mies.
Jerobeam Näppisen kysymykseen, tunteeko kukaan tuota

vierasta, vastattiin yleisesti, että ei tunneta.
Sihteeri Mikko Tarjus meni kysymään, mitä vieraalla on asiaa,

vastaten vieras ei voivansa julkisesti mainita asioistaan.
Mikko Tarjuksen ilmoitettua, että täällä on puoluekokous, jossa ei

saa olla sivullisia, vastasi tuntematon ei olevansa niinkään sivullinen
puustakatsoja vallankumouksen riveissä.
Mikko Tarjuksen vietyä tämän sanoman Jerobeam Näppiselle

arvelivat muutamat, että se on kukaties joku ohrana.
Puhemies Näppinen sanoi, että siitä on selvä otettava, ennenkuin

kokousta jatketaan.
Näppisen käytyä matalalla äänellä puhuttelemassa vierasta tuli

puhemies ilmoittamaan, ettei se tahdo sanoa nimeään, mutta jos saa
puhua tovereille, niin kyllä kuulevat onko luotettava.
Joutomies Lötjönen murahti, että sillä tavallahan se asia ratkeaa

lojaalisti.
Katseltuaan jonkun aikaa ovensuussa istuvaa tuntematonta, joka

näytti ulkonaisesti tosi toverilta, myöntyivät läsnäolijat siihen, että
puhukoon sitten, jos on puhuakseen.
6 §.
Tuntematon mies astui tämänjälkeen puhemies Näppisen
kehoituksesta pöydän taakse ja piti mukaansariipaisevan valtiollisen
esitelmän, jota läsnäolevat kommunismin solut kuuntelivat
lämpimällä mielihalulla.
Puhuja lausui aluksi, että Neuvostovallan taistellessa

murtumattomalla rintamalla rosvokoplia vastaan ja kohottaessa
kuivuneilta huuliltaan järkyttävän kehoitushuudon
maailmankaikkeuden proletaareille, yrittivät toisen internationalen
maantieritarit värjätä omat sulkansa purppuralla ja hyvänhajuisella
balsamilla, voimatta siten kuitenkaan silata niiden
haaskalinnuntahmaa. Myöskin kapitalistisen hirmuvallan pääpesässä
Suomessa irvistelee ohranamainen porvaripirullisuus riistettyjä
proletaareja vastaan valkoisia hampaitaan, eduskunnan myöntäessä
rajattomasti sotilasmiljoonia pihtikintuille pöksyrahoiksi. Tämä
ohranamainen kansa syöksyy päätähuimaisevalla nopeudella
raakalaistilaa kohti. Noskelaisjuudaksien antaessa ohranoille likaisia
ilmiantosuudelmia vallitsee maassa porvariston tiktatuuri
keskiaikaisine inkvitsioonilaitoksineen ja pistinjärjestöineen
sitomassa luokkatietoisen köyhälistön käsiä kaikkien
noskelaistörkeyksien perättömyyden paljastamisessa.
Puhujan vielä selitettyä, että halpamaisia tarkoitusperiään

peitelläkseen luokkatietoiselta köyhälistöltä ovat noskelaispomot
lastanneet lantatunkiostaan raihnaiselle, mutta silti hyvin
häntimykselle konilleen ylen suuren kuorman politillista lantaa,
palkitsi taajaväkinen kuulijakunta puhujan lennokkaan ja miellyttävän
selostuksen suurilla suosionosoituksilla.
Puhemies Näppisen lausuttua puhujalle kunnioitettavat kiitoksensa

näistä valaisevista tiedoista, pyysi Reeta Sinkkonen vierasta
kahvilanpuolelle nauttimaan virvokkeita.
Yksityisesti keskusteltiin siitä, kuka vieras on.
Israel Huttunen sanoi kohta huomanneensa, että vieras oli

vallankumouksen johtomiehiä, niinkuin sitten puheestakin kuuli.
Justus Tiilikainen lausui mielipiteensä, että se voi olla itse toveri

Kuusinen, koska on kerran Kuusinen täälläpäin liikkeellä.
Simo Turtiainen esiintoi, että jos se on Kuusinen, niin tietää se

kertoa asioita Pietarista.
Kusti Pirhonen lisäsi, että jos se tietää kertoa asioita Pietarista,

niin on se siis toveri Kuusinen.
Salaisella huutoäänestyksellä uskottiin toverien Turtiaisen ja

Pirhosen tehtäväksi mennä haastattelemaan vierasta, tietääkö se
asioista Pietarissa.
Jatkettiin kokousta, ryhtyen käsittelemään kysymystä ohranoista.
Laajan puheenvaihdon jälkeen, jossa esiinvedettiin häpeällisiä

paheksumisia lahtarimaisesta porvarillisuudesta, päätettiin
yksimielisesti, että ohranat pois.
Päätöstä toteuttamaan valtuutettiin puhemies Näppinen ja sihteeri

Tarjus, varalle Israel Huttunen.
Justus Tiilikainen ehdotti pöytäkirjaan lisättäväksi, että ohrana on

rikka mustien taantumuksen korppien inhassa rikosrokassa.
Hyväksyttiin keskustelutta.
Solutar Mari Kukkonen kertoili valaisevia piirteitä ohranoista, joilla
on ihmisluita kellareissaan, todistaen nämä punikin luiksi.
Kokous lausui inhonsa mainittujen luiden johdosta. Merkittiin.
Läsnäolevien toivomuksesta päätettiin lausua virkanyrkeille

vaatimus, että luut ovat tutkittavat, ovatko punikin luita vai lahtarin, ja
sitten haudattavat.
Paavo Pellikan kysyttyä, miten on sitten meneteltävä, jos luut ovat

tavallisia lehmän tai hevosen luita, lausui kokous mainitulle Pellikalle
kummastuksensa.
Siirryttiin keskustelemaan militaarista ja esiintuotiin Saksan ynnä

muiden maiden sosialidemokraattisten johtajien kurjaa kätyröimistä
maailmansodan aikana porvarimilitaarin suurpyövelien kanssa, ja
että ne olivat myöntämässä määrärahoja kansojen teurastukseen
sisällä ja ulkona ympäri vuorokauden.
Puhemies Näppisen ehdotuksesta huudettiin militaari alas.
Justus Tiilikainen ilmoitti, että samaa veriveljeyttä ajaa myös

Suomessa Antti Kotolaisen likki, karkoittaen työkansan rajalle aseilla
sotimaan neuvostovallan ytimellisiä punajoukkoja vastaan.
Puolinosket Paavo Pellikka ja Heikki Putkonen panivat vastaan,

väittäen valheeksi.
Kokous päätti yksimielisesti, ettei se ole valhetta.
Justus Tiilikainen ehdotti, että petturi Kotolaiselle lausuttaisiin

kansan tuomio. Hyväksyttiin huutoäänestyksellä.
Kaisa Kompura esitti, että Kotolainen sysättäisiin pois
kommunistipuolueesta.
Kokous päätti lyhyen keskustelun jälkeen eroittaa ent. toveri

Kotolaisen pois puolueesta. Päätöksen perilletoimittaminen jätettiin
sihteerin tehtäväksi.
Heikki Putkonen ilmoitti, ettei Kotolaista voida eroittaa, koska hän

ei ole koskaan kuulunutkaan kommunistiseen puolueeseen. Kokous
päätti lausua Kotolaiselle tämän johdosta kansan paheksumisen.
Justus Tiilikainen lausui toivomuksen, että myöskin toveri

Putkoselle lausuttaisiin surkuttelu, mikä hyväksyttiin.
Puolinoskelaisen koplakunnan tyrskiessä pyysi Heikki Putkonen,

että hän saisi sen kirjallisesti ja puhtaassa kuvertissa. Hylättiin
yksimielisesti.
Kusti Pirhonen tuli salaisesti ilmoittamaan, että vieras taitaa olla

Kuusinen, koska tietää niin pirun paljon Pietarista. Tiedonanto
aiheutti suurta huomiota kansan syvissä riveissä.
Puhemies Näppinen lausui, että jos uskaltaisi siltä suoraan kysyä,

onko hän toveri Kuusinen.
Asiasta keskusteltua päätti Pöllölän kommunistien internaali, että

kysy sinä Kusti Pirhonen siltä kuin tyhmyyttäsi, koska näyt jo alkavan
olla valmiiksi humalassakin.
Kokouksen enemmistön siirtyessä ovensuuhun kuuntelemaan

meni tov.
Pirhonen vieraan luo ja kysyi, että etteköhän te taida ollakin toveri
Kuusinen?
Toveri Kuusisen vilkaistua säpsähtäen ympärilleen ja sanottua että
hyss, ei saa ääneen mainita sitä nimeä täällä Suomessa,
tunkeutuivat kaikki puristamaan toveri Kuusisen kättä ja lausumaan
hänet tervetulleeksi tähän ohranamaiseen kotimaahan.
Toveri Kuusinen pyysi kaikkia kommunistisen valan

velvollisuudella vaikenemaan, että hän on täällä, mikä luvattiin
intomielisessä vallankumouksellisessa tunnelmassa.
Puhemies Näppinen sanoi akoille, että pitäkää akat huolta siitä,

ettei toveri Kuusiselta mitään puutu.
Sihteeri Mikko Tarjuksen neuvoteltua Jerobeam Näppisen kanssa

kysyi tov. Tarjus tov. Kuusiselta, tahtoisiko hän kunnioittaa Pöllölän
internaalia ryhtymällä johtamaan puhetta, johon tov. Kuusinen
kiittäen vastasi kieltämällä, sanoen valtiollisista syistä täytyvänsä olla
ingognito.
Puhemies Näppinen lausui kunnioittaen, että toveri Kuusinen ottaa

sitten vaan täällä kahvilan puolella mitä tarvitsee, kyllä nämä akat
joutavat passaamaan.
Mihin toveri Kuusinen vastasi liikutetuin mielin useilla

kommunistisilla kiitoksilla.
7 §.
Internaalia ylevän mielialan vallitessa jatkettaessa otettiin esille

kysymys lahtareista.
Justus Tiilikainen esitti sattuvasti lahtarien ala-arvoisen toiminnan
lahon porvarillisen yhteiskunnan pöngittäjänä, ollen pistinniekat
suuresti vaaralliset vallankumouksellisen joukkotahdon kiteytymiselle
nykyistä yhteiskuntaa kukistavaksi vallankumoustoiminnaksi. Tuoden
päivänvaloon säälittäviä esimerkkejä pikkutilallistenkin kuulumisesta
lahtariarmeijaan, jotka eivät havahdu sikeästä tiedottomuuden
unesta ennenkuin luokkatietoisen proletaarin sääret viimeisiä kertoja
sätkyttelevät valkoisen porvarillisuuden ohranamaisen luokkakoston
verenhimoisessa hirsipuuhuumorissa. Ehdotti lausuttavaksi ankaran
paheksumisen sitä vastaan, että kansan verirahoja uhrataan
luokkakaartien pystyssäpysyttämiseksi vastoin kommunistisen
internaalin vallankumouksellisia tarkoitusperiä.
Hyväksyttiin yksimielisesti.
Puhemies Näppinen ehdotti ponsilauseen päiväjärjestykseen

siirtymismuodoksi, että lahtarien on luovutettava aseensa
luokkatietoisen köyhälistön vartioitaviksi, mikä hyväksyttiin.
Tov. Heikki Putkosen kysyttyä, luuliko kokous lahtarien ottavan

tämän vaatimuksen huomioonsa, lausuttiin tov. Putkoselle
vallankumouksellisen proletaarin kummastus.
Tov. Justus Tiilikaisen ehdotuksesta lisättiin tov. Putkoselle

varoitus epämääräisestä esiintymisestä luokkataistelun aikana.
Paavo Pellikan ilmoitettua sitä vastaan vastalauseensa huomautti

puheenjohtaja, että Paavo Pellikka on samaa maata kuin
Putkonenkin.
Paavo Pellikka vastasi hyvin tietävänsä, mitä maata kunniasolu

Jerobeam
Näppinen itse on.
Puhemies Näppisen esityksestä lausuttiin Paavo Pellikalle kansan

halveksiminen. Pellikka ilmoitti koettavansa kantaa sen nääntymättä,
mutta pyytävänsä Näppistä avuksi, jos taakka käy liian raskaaksi,
mille jotkut syrjempänä istuvat nauroivat, osoittaen vähemmän
valveutunutta kommunistista vakavuutta.
Heikki Putkonen ilmitoi, että Näppinen on alkanut liiaksi paisua

valta-asemassaan, mutta että saattaa vielä kukistua korkeudestaan.
Puhemies ilmoitti antavansa Heikki Putkoselle julkisen

varoituksen.
Heikki Putkonen ilmoitti levottomuuden kiihtyessä kansan

keskuudessa, että Pöllölän kommunistit ovat kuin Riikoniemen
lampaat, joita suutari Näppinen juoksuttaa edellään minne tahtoo.
Puhemies Näppinen puolestaan ilmoitti, että suutarin nimen

käyttäminen hänestä on loukkaus häntä vastaan.
Paavo Pellikka vastasi, että se pikemminkin on loukkaus

suutareita vastaan, koska Näppinen on huonoin suutari, mitä
Pöllölässä on miesmuistiin ollut.
Puhemies Näppinen sanoi ryhtyvänsä ankarampiin toimenpiteisiin,

jolleivät Pellikka ja Putkonen pidä suutaan kiinni, vaan häiritsevät
kokouksen lakimääräistä järjestystä.
Paavo Pellikka kysyi, että luuletko sinä meitä säikytteleväsi, ja

Heikki Putkonen sanoi, että jos Näppinen haluaa selvittää välinsä
kahdenkesken hänen kanssaan, niin on hän vaikka kohta valmis
lähtemään navetan taakse odottamaan.
Puhemies Näppinen saneli pöytäkirjaan, että puhemiestä on
uhattu ruumiillisella väkivallalla virantoimituksessa.
Israel Huttunen pyysi tovereita rauhoittumaan kunnioitettavan

vieraan toveri Kuusisen läsnäolon takia.
Useiden ärjyttyä, että asian käsittelyä on jatkettava, ehdotti tov.

Justus Tiilikainen lisäykseksi lahtareita koskevaan pykälään
vaatimuksen, että porvarihirviöt panisivat ilkeät torahampaansa
pöytälaatikkoon. Hyväksyttiin huutoäänestyksellä.
Kaisa Kompura tuli pihalta ja ilmoitti, että poliisi Pekka Suova

näkyy maantiellä olevan tulossa tänne päin.
Muutamien huudettua, että toveri Kuusinen pitää saada piiloon,

sanoi Reeta Sinkkonen, että menköön vaateaittaan, ei se Suova
sieltä arvaa hakea.
Sittenkun toveri Kuusinen oli saatettu turvaan, sanoi puhemies

Näppinen, että kokousta jatketaan niinkuin ei mitään olisi tapahtunut,
ja jos Suova kysyy toveri Kuusisesta, niin ei kukaan tiedä mitään.
Tähän kaikki kansalaiset suhtautuivat myötätuntoisella

ymmärtämyksellä.
Otettiin esille kysymys veroista, jolloin poliisi Pekka Suova astui

sisään, sanoen että näkyy siellä taas alkavan vähitellen poutaantua.
Sihteeri Mikko Tarjuksen kysymykseen, mitä tälle Pekalle muuta

kuuluu, vastasi poliisi Suova tulleensa nimismiehen määräyksestä
seuraamaan keskustelua, ettei saa esittää mitään lainvastaista.
Puhemies Näppinen kysyi, eikö kansalaisilla ole valta vapaasti
keskustella elinkysymyksistä.
Poliisi Suova vastasi, että riippuu vähän siitä, minkälaisia ovat

kansalaiset ja varsinkin ne elinkysymykset.
Puhemies Näppisen ilmoitettua vastalauseensa

kokoontumisvapauden sortoa vastaan sanoi Pekka Suova, että
mitäs siitä minulle ähmistelette. Käy pakottamassa nimismies
peruuttamaan käskynsä, niin kyllä minusta pian pääsette, eikä
taideta kuolla ikävään puolella jos ei toisellakaan.
Puhemies Näppinen lausui toivomuksen, että pian koittaisi päivä,

jolloin kansa pääsisi tekemään tiliä vainoojiensa kanssa, ja mainitsi
Pekka Suova siihen yhtäkaikkisesti, että toivo sinä vain, jos ehkä
hyvinkin auttaisi.
Puhemies ilmoitti, että kokous, merkiten vakavan vastalauseensa,

siirtyy päiväjärjestykseen.
Verotusasiassa oli Kusti Pirhosen laatima ponsi, että veroista ovat

vapautettavat kaikki sellaiset palkkatyöläiset ja pientilalliset, joilla ei
ole korko- y.m. sivutuloja ja jotka eivät käytä palkkatyöväkeä.
Hyväksyttiin yksimielisesti sillä Justus Tiilikaisen lisäyksellä, että

sikäli kuin järjestyneillä työläisillä verotettavat tulot ovat korkeammat,
on poikkeus, ja vaadimme heille täydellistä verovelvollisuudesta
vapautusta.
Sihteeri Mikko Tarjuksen mainittua puhemiehelle, että poliisia

näkyy naurattavan, vastasi Näppinen, että antaapa tuon nauraa,
virkanyrkin.

The Challenges of Creating Democracies in The Americas: The United States, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Guatemala Alex Roberto Hybel

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The Challenges of Creating Democracies in The Americas: The United States, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Guatemala Alex Roberto Hybel

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The Challenges of Creating

Democracies in the Americas: The

With Zander Weisman Mintz and Elise Hope Dunn

ISBN 978-3-030-21232-2 ISBN 978-3-030-21233-9 (eBook)

Cover illustration: © Marina Lohrbach / shutterstock.com

As in the past, I am indebted to my mother-in-law, Barbara Peurifoy,

Marina del Rey, California Alex Roberto Hybel

1 Introduction: The Nature of the Problem 1

2 Theories of State Creation and Democratization 17

3 The Challenges of State Creation and Democratization in

4 The Challenges of State Creation and Democratization in

5 The Challenges of State Creation and Democratization in

6 State Creation and Democratization in Costa Rica and

7 An Exploratory Theory of State Creation and

Introduction: The Nature of the Problem

© The Author(s) 2020 1

Stated differently, the investigator tries to identify the intervening steps or

by the rise of four major drug-trafficking cartels and several revolutionary

Structure of the Book

determine what constitutes a state, and then to discuss alternative theories

Axiom 1: Democracies do not emerge in stateless territories or in states

The study of each country’s processes of state creation and political-­

they faced. This portion of the analysis is completed with a description of

1. Describe the processes of state creation and of regime formation for

1. What compelled the colonizers to colonize?

critical role in shaping the colonization processes of the Americas by the

progenitors in the Americas were bounded by a religious construct that

newly created state in the Americas underwent an economic transforma-

fear of communist takeovers emboldened the military throughout Spanish

3. See Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2014, https://freedomhouse.

Theories of State Creation

1. It is differentiated from other organizations in the same territory.

Jorge Dominguez’s version of the state differs somewhat from Tilly’s.

© The Author(s) 2020 17

autonomous, and are either centralized or divided but formally coordi-

a consolidated territory and its population, and that is recognized as the

Theories of State Creation

1. Access to extractable resources;

4. Powerful army and success in wars;

Tilly presents two arguments. A culturally divided society will be less

Samuel Huntington proposes that there are three patterns of political

government to control the territory and would distribute power between

mode-of-productions arguments regarding state creation in Latin America

1. Failure on the part of a rebellious upper class to coalesce against the

The Resource Curse or Paradox of Plenty Theory has been designed to

economic geography; economic and fiscal strength; public acceptance of

1. Formulate their preferences;

For the aforementioned opportunities to exist, the regime must pro-

1. Freedom to form and join organizations;

The extent to which the eight conditions are present in a contemporary

authorized to participate in the political process. And finally, in the fourth

1. It must have an electoral regime that is competitive and transparent;

Merkel proposes that for a political regime to be considered a democ-

the worst, while defects found in either a delegative or a domain democ-

A regime is nondemocratic when contested elections are not permitted.

Dahl is cognizant of how difficult it is to rely on logical criteria to deter-

not permitted, or if the criterion of inclusion provided by the Strong

1. Means of violent coercion are dispersed and controlled by the civil-

1. A free and lively society;

For a somewhat more detailed discussion of the extent to which differ-

1. Historical legacies, paths, and sequences;

7. Inequality, class, and other cleavages;

The three authors’ first contention is that colonial rule throughout

Marina del Rey, California Alex Roberto Hybel

1 Introduction: The Nature of the Problem 1

2 Theories of State Creation and Democratization 17

3 The Challenges of State Creation and Democratization in

4 The Challenges of State Creation and Democratization in

5 The Challenges of State Creation and Democratization in

6 State Creation and Democratization in Costa Rica and

7 An Exploratory Theory of State Creation and

The study of each country’s processes of state creation and political-