THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

(Exec. Order No. 209 as amended by Exec. Order No. 227)

TITLE 1. MARRIAGE (ARTS. 1-54)
Acebedo vs. Arquero, A.M. # P-94-1054, Mar. 11, 2003

EDWIN A. ACEBEDO v. EDDIE P. ARQUERO

399 SCRA 10 (2003)

Position in the judiciary requires greater moral righteousness and uprightness.

Edwin A. Acebedo charged Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the Municipal Trial

Court (MTC) of Brooke’s Point, Palawan for immorality, alleging that his wife, Dedje
Irader Acebedo, a former stenographer of the MTC Brooke’s Point, and Arquero
unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as husband and wife.

Arquero claimed that Acebedo himself had been cohabitating with another woman.
Based on Arquero’s testimony, he justified his having a relationship with Irader
solely on the written document purportedly a ―Kasunduan‖ or agreement entered
into by Acebedo and Irader, consenting to and giving freedom to either of them to
seek any partner and to live with him or her.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Arquero should be held guilty of immorality

HELD:

Arquero’s justification fails. Being an employee of the judiciary, Arquero ought to

have known that the Kasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on the validity of
the marriage between Acebedo and Irader. Article 1 of the Family Code provides that
marriage is ―an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation.‖ It is an institution
of public order or policy, governed by rules established by law which cannot be made
inoperative by the stipulation of the parties.

Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a

greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an individual than in
the judiciary. That is why the Court has firmly laid down exacting standards of
morality and decency expected of those in the service of the judiciary.

Their conduct, not to mention behavior, is circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility, characterized by, among other things, propriety and decorum so as to
earn and keep the public’s respect and confidence in the judicial service. It must be
free from any whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to their duties in the judicial
branch but also to their behavior outside the court as private individuals
Arquero’s act of having illicit relations with Irader is, within the purview of Section
46 (5) of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as
the Administrative Code of 1987, a disgraceful and immoral conduct.

by Jayco

EDWIN A. ACEBEDO v. EDDIE P. ARQUERO, A M No. P-94-1054, 2003-03-11

Facts:
By letter-complaint[1] dated June 1, 1994, Edwin A. Acebedo charged Eddie P. Arquero,
Process Server of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Brooke's Point, Palawan for
immorality
Complainant alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a former stenographer of the
MTC Brooke's Point, and respondent unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as husband
and wife at Bancudo Pulot, Brooke's Point, Palawan as a result of which a girl, Desiree
May Irader Arquero,... was born to the two on May 21, 1989. Attached to the letter-
complaint was the girl's Baptismal Certificate[2] reflecting the names of respondent and
Dedje Irader as her parents. Also attached to the letter-complainant was a copy of a
marriage... contract[3] showing that complainant and Dedje Irader contracted marriage
on July 10, 1979.
respondent vehemently denied the charge of immorality, claiming that it is "just a (sic)
mere harassment and a product of complainant's hatred and extreme jealousy to (sic)
his wife."[6] Attached to... the answer were the September 27, 1987 affidavit of
desistance[7] executed by complainant in favor of his wife with respect to an
administrative complaint he had much earlier filed against her, and complainant's sworn
statement[8]... dated September 13, 1994 acknowledging paternity of a child born out of
wedlock, which documents, respondent claims, support his contention that the complaint
filed against him is but a malicious scheme concocted by complainant to harass him.
respondent claimed that sometime in 1991, complainant likewise instituted a criminal
complaint against him for "adultery" which was, however, dismissed after preliminary
investigation.
Finally, respondent claimed that complainant himself had been cohabiting with another
woman.
Issues:
GUILTY of immorality
Ruling:
By Resolution of February 6, 1995, this Court referred the case to then Executive Judge
Filomeno A. Vergara of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan for
investigation, report and recommendation.[9] Judge Vergara having retired during the...
pendency of the investigation, the case was referred to Executive Judge Nelia Y.
Fernandez who was, by Resolution of August 16, 2000, directed by this Court to (1)
verify the authenticity of the marriage certificate and baptismal certificate submitted by
complainant; (2) conduct... an investigation as to the information contained in the said
baptismal certificate and the circumstances under which it was issued, and such other
verifiable matters relevant to the charge; and (3) submit her report and recommendation
thereon
In her Investigation Report of February 12, 2001, Judge Fernandez recommends that
the complaint be dismissed for failure to adduce adequate evidence to show that
respondent is guilty of the charge.[11] The report focuses on the non-appearance of
complainant... and Dedje Irader Acebedo
By Resolution of April 25, 2001, this Court referred the case to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation
By Memorandum of December 12, 2001, the OCA, disagreeing with the
recommendation of the Investigating Judge that the case should be dismissed,
recommends that respondent be held guilty of immorality and that he be suspended from
office for a period of one (1) year without... pay
Respondent justified his pursuing a relationship with complainant's wife with the spouses
having priorly entered into a settlement with respect to their marriage which was
embodied in a "Kasunduan", the pertinent portions of which are reproduced hereunder
By respondent's own admission, however, he had an illicit relationship with
complainant's wife
Respondent's justification fails. Being an employee of the judiciary, respondent ought to
have known that the Kasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on the validity of the
marriage between complainant and his wife. Article 1 of the Family Code provides that...
marriage is "an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation." It is an institution of public order or
policy, governed by rules established by law which cannot be made inoperative by the...
stipulation of the parties
Respondent's act of having illicit relations with complainant's wife is, within the purview
of Section 46 (5) of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987, a disgraceful and immoral conduct.
Under Rule IV, Section 52A (15) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service, an immoral conduct is classified as a grave offense which calls for a
penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first
offense, and... dismissal is imposed for the second offense
Since the present charge of immorality against respondent constitutes his first offense,
his suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day is in order.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the
Municipal Trial Court of Brooke's Point, Palawan, GUILTY of immorality, for which he is
hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months and one (1) day without pay with a STERN
WARNING that commission of the same... or similar acts shall be dealt with severely
Let a copy of this decision be filed in the personal record of respondent.
HIRD DIVISION

[A.M. No. P-94-1054. March 11, 2003.]

EDWIN A. ACEBEDO, Petitioner, v. EDDIE P. ARQUERO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By letter-complaint 1 dated June 1, 1994, Edwin A. Acebedo charged Eddie P.
Arquero, Process Server of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Brooke’s Point,
Palawan for immorality. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Complainant alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a former stenographer of
the MTC Brooke’s Point, and respondent unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as
husband and wife at Bancudo Pulot, Brooke’s Point, Palawan as a result of which a
girl, Desiree May Irader Arquero, was born to the two on May 21, 1989. Attached to
the letter-complaint was the girl’s Baptismal Certificate 2 reflecting the names of
respondent and Dedje Irader as her parents. Also attached to the letter-complaint
was a copy of a marriage contract 3 showing that complainant and Dedje Irader
contracted marriage on July 10, 1979.

By Resolution of September 7, 1994, this Court required respondent to file an

answer to the complaint. 4

By his Answer 5 of October 6, 1994, respondent vehemently denied the charge of

immorality, claiming that it is "just a (sic) mere harassment and a product of
complainant’s hatred and extreme jealousy to (sic) his wife." 6 Attached to the
answer were the September 27, 1987 affidavit of desistance 7 executed by
complainant in favor of his wife with respect to an administrative complaint he had
much earlier filed against her, and complainant’s sworn statement 8 dated
September 13, 1994 acknowledging paternity of a child born out of wedlock, which
documents, respondent claims, support his contention that the complaint filed
against him is but a malicious scheme concocted by complainant to harass him.

Additionally, respondent claimed that sometime in 1991, complainant likewise

instituted a criminal complaint against him for "adultery" which was, however,
dismissed after preliminary investigation.

Finally, respondent claimed that complainant himself had been cohabiting with
another woman.

By Resolution of February 6, 1995, this Court referred the case to then Executive
Judge Filomeno A. Vergara of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan
for investigation, report and recommendation. 9 Judge Vergara having retired during
the pendency of the investigation, the case was referred to Executive Judge Nelia Y.
Fernandez who was, by Resolution of August 16, 2000, directed by this Court to (1)
verify the authenticity of the marriage certificate and baptismal certificate submitted
by complainant; (2) conduct an investigation as to the information contained in the
said baptismal certificate and the circumstances under which it was issued, and such
other verifiable matters relevant to the charge; and (3) submit her report and
recommendation thereon. 10

In her Investigation Report of February 12, 2001, Judge Fernandez recommends

that the complaint be dismissed for failure to adduce adequate evidence to show
that respondent is guilty of the charge. 11 The report focuses on the non-
appearance of complainant and Dedje Irader Acebedo, thusly: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x           x          x
Having appeared that the complainant Edwin Acebedo and Dedjie Irader who per
reliable information cannot be notified for reason that subject persons are no longer
residing in their given address and their whereabouts is unknown as shown by the
return of the subpoena dated November 7, 2000, and the inadmissibility of the
baptismal certificate alleging therein that the father of Desiree Arquero is the
respondent herein, and for the reason that the same had not been testified to by
Dedje Irader who is the informant of the entries contained therein, this Court had
not received adequate proof or relevant evidence to support a conclusion that
respondent herein could be held liable of the charge imputed against him, hence, he
should be absolved from any liability.

x       x       x 12 (Quoted verbatim).

By Resolution of April 25, 2001, this Court referred the case to the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation.

By Memorandum of December 12, 2001, the OCA, disagreeing with the

recommendation of the Investigating Judge that the case should be dismissed,
recommends that respondent be held guilty of immorality and that he be suspended
from office for a period of one (1) year without pay. 13 Thus the OCA ratiocinates:
library
chanrob1es virtual 1aw

. . . [R]espondent admitted the fact that for eight (8) to nine (9) months, he a single
man maintained relations with Dedje Irader Acebedo, wife of herein complainant,
attended with "sexual union" (TSN dated 23 November 2000, pp. 14-15). Based on
his testimony, we observed that respondent justified his having a relationship with
Dedje I. Acebedo solely on the written document purportedly a "Kasunduan" or
agreement entered into by complainant and his wife, consenting to and giving
freedom to either of them to seek any partner and to live with him or her. Being a
court employee respondent should have known that said agreement was void
despite it having been notarized. Even granting that Dedjie I. Acebedo was
separated from her husband during their short lived relation, to hold on to said
scandalous agreement and enter an immoral relationship with a very much married
woman and a co-court employee at that is highly improper. It is contrary to the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officials and Employees which
provides that public employees of which respondent is one, . . . "shall at all times
(sic) respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law,
good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest. Moreover, respondent cannot seek refuge and "sling mud" at complainant
for having executed an Affidavit dated September 13, 1994, acknowledging that he
bore a woman other than his wife, a child. It would seem that respondent would
want to apply the principle of in pari delicto in the instant case. Respondent would
have it appear that a married man with an extra-marital relation and an illegitimate
child is precluded from complaining if his wife enters into a relationship with another
man.

Second, the records show that an Affidavit of Desistance was executed by herein
complainant. However, a cursory reading of said document reveals that it favors
only Dedje Irader Acebedo and not herein Respondent. Interestingly, the date of
said affidavit is 2 September 1987. Respondent had the temerity to claim it as
evidence in his favor when the instant complaint was only filed sometime in 1994.

Third, when respondent was asked by the investigating judge if he attended the
baptism of the daughter of Dedje Irader Acebedo, his former co-employee and ex-
intimate friend, he answered, "I did not. I’m not sure the child is mine." From his
answer, we could infer that respondent did not categorically rule out the possibility
that said child might be her (sic) daughter, only that he is doubtful of her paternity.

x       x       x 14 (Emphasis supplied; underscoring in the original

While the complainant appears to have lost interest in the prosecution of the present
case, the same does not ipso facto warrant its dismissal. Once administrative
charges have been filed, this Court may not be divested of its jurisdiction to
investigate and ascertain the truth thereof. 15 For it has an interest in the conduct
of those in the service of the Judiciary and in improving the delivery of justice to the
people, and its efforts in the direction may not be derailed by the complainant’s
desistance from prosecuting the case he initiated. 16

On the merits of the case, the entry of respondent’s name as father in the baptismal
certificate of Desiree May I. Arquero cannot be used to prove for her filiation and,
therefore, cannot be availed of to imply that respondent maintained illicit relations
with Dedje Irader Acebedo. A canonical certificate is conclusive proof only of the
baptism administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church by the
priest who baptized the child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations
and statements contained therein which concern the relationship of the person
baptized. 17 It merely attests to the fact which gave rise to its issue, and the date
thereof, to wit, the fact of the administration of the sacrament on the date stated,
but not the truth of the statement therein as to the percentage of the child baptized.
18

By respondent’s own admission, however, he had an illicit relationship with

complainant’s wife: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q: During the formal offer of the possible nature of your testimony before the Court
by your counsel, did the Court get it correct that there has been a short lived
relation between you and Dedgie Irader, am I correct in my impression?

A: During that time that I have heard she and her husband have parted ways
already, I joking informed her that she is now being separated, she is now single
and is free to have some commitment. So, I courted her and she accepted me, so
we have a short lived relation and after that we parted ways.

Q: For how long was this short lived relation you made mention a while ago?

A: May be (sic) about eight (8) to nine (9) months.

Q: When you said you have (sic) a short lived relationship from 8 to 9 months, you
mean to tell the Court that you have (sic) a sexual union with this woman?

A: Yes ma’am. 19 (Emphasis and Italics supplied).

Respondent justified his pursuing a relationship with complainant’s wife with the
spouses having priorly entered into a settlement with respect to their marriage
which was embodied in a "Kasunduan", the pertinent portions of which are
reproduced hereunder: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Kami, EDWIN AGUINALDO ACEBEDO at DEDJE IRADER ACEBEDO, may sapat na

taong gulang, mag-asawa, Pilipino, at kasalukuyang nakatira sa Poblacion, Broke’s
(sic) Point, Palawan, ay malayang nagkasundo ng mga sumusunod: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Na, yayamang hindi kami magkasundo bilang mag-asawa, at magiging miserable
lamang ang aming mga buhay kung aming ipagpapatuloy pa ang aming pagsasama
bilang mag-asawa, kami ay malayang nagkasundo ngayon na maghiwalay na bilang
mag-asawa, at ang bawat isa sa amin ay may kalayaan na humanap na ng kaniyang
makakasama sa buhay bilang asawa at hindi kami maghahabol sa isat isa sa alin pa
mang hukuman;

x       x       x 20 (Italics supplied)

Respondent’s justification fails. Being an employee of the judiciary, respondent

ought to have known that the Kasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on the
validity of the marriage between complainant and his wife. Article 1 of the Family
Code provides that marriage is "an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation." It
is an institution of public order or policy, governed by rules established by law which
cannot be made inoperative by the stipulation of the parties. 21

Republic Act 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees, enunciates the State’s policy of promoting a high
standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. 22

Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts
a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an individual than
in the judiciary. 23 That is why this Court has firmly laid down exacting standards
morality and decency expected of those in the service of the judiciary. 24 Their
conduct, not to mention behavior, is circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility, 25 characterized by, among other things, propriety and decorum so
as to earn and keep the public’s respect and confidence in the judicial service. 26 It
must be free from any whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to their duties in
the judicial branch but also to their behaviour outside the court as private
individuals. 27 There is no dichotomy of morality; court employees are also judged
by their private morals. 28

Respondent’s act of having illicit relations with complainant’s wife is, within the
purview of Section 46(5) of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, a disgraceful and immoral
conduct.

Under Rule IV, Section 52A(15) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, an immoral conduct is classified as a grave offense which
calls for a penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year
for the first offense, and dismissal is imposed for the second offense.

Since the present charge of immorality against respondent constitutes his first
offense, his suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day is in order.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the
Municipal Trial Court of Brooke’s Point, Palawan, GUILTY of immorality, for which he
is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months and one (1) day without pay with a STERN
WARNING that commission of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with severely.
1aw 1ibrary
chanrob1es virtua1

Let a copy of this decision be filed in the personal record of Respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Espinosa, et. al. vs. Atty. Julieta A. Omana, A.C. # 9081, Oct. 12, 2011
Espinosa v.Atty. Omana, A.C. No. 9081, October 12, 2011

FACTS:

On 17 November 1997, Rodolfo Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal sought
Omana’s legal advice on whether they could dissolve their marriage and live
separately. Omana prepared a document entitled “Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.”
Espinosa and Marantal started implanting the conditions of the said contract.
However, Marantal took custody of all their children and took possession of most of
the conjugal property. Espinosa sought the advice of Glindo, his fellow employee
who is a law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by Omana was
not valid. They hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omana
before the IBP-CBD. Omana denied that she prepared the contract. She admitted
that Espinosa went to see her and requested for the notarization of the contract but
she told him that it was illegal. Omana alleged that Espinosa returned the next day
while she was out of the office and managed to persuade her part-time office staff to
notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signature and notarized the
contract.

ISSUE: W/N Omaña violated the CPR in notartizing the “Kasunduan Ng

Paghihiwalay.” W/N the Kasunduaan ng Paghihiwalay is valid.

HELD: SC has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership
without judicial approval is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should
not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the
separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership,
which is exactly what Omaña did in this case.

.C. No. 9081               October 12, 2011

RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and MAXIMO A. GLINDO, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Rodolfo A. Espinosa (Espinosa) and
Maximo A. Glindo (Glindo) against Atty. Julieta A. Omaña (Omaña).

The Antecedent Facts

Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaña with violation of her oath as a lawyer,
malpractice, and gross misconduct in office.

Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997, Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal
(Marantal) sought Omaña’s legal advice on whether they could legally live separately and
dissolve their marriage solemnized on 23 July 1983. Omaña then prepared a document entitled
"Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" (contract) which reads:

REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS
BAYAN NG GUMACA
LALAWIGAN NG QUEZON

KASUNDUAN NG PAGHIHIWALAY

KAMI, ELENA MARANTAL AT RODOLFO ESPINOSA, mga Filipino, may sapat na gulang,
dating legal na mag-asawa, kasalukuyang naninirahan at may pahatirang sulat sa Brgy.
Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, at COMELEC, Intramuros, Manila ayon sa pagkakasunod-
sunod, matapos makapanumpa ng naaayon sa batas ay nagpapatunay ng nagkasundo ng mga
sumusunod:

1. Na nais na naming maghiwalay at magkanya-kanya ng aming mga buhay ng

walang pakialaman, kung kaya’t bawat isa sa amin ay maaari ng humanap ng
makakasama sa buhay;

2. Na ang aming mga anak na sina Ariel John Espinosa, 14 na taong gulang;
Aiza Espinosa, 11 taong gulang at Aldrin Espinosa, 10 taong gulang ay namili na
kung kanino sasama sa aming dalawa. Si Ariel John at Aiza Espinosa ay sasama
sa kanilang ama, Rodolfo Espinosa, at ang bunso, Aldrin Espinosa at sasama
naman sa ina na si Elena;

3. Na dahil sina Ariel John at Aiza ay nagsisipag-aral sa kasalukuyan sila ay

pansamantalang mananatili sa kanilang ina, habang tinatapos ang kanilang pag-
aaral. Sa pasukan sila ay maaari ng isama ng ama, sa lugar kung saan siya ay
naninirahan;

4. Na ang mga bata ay maaaring dalawin ng sino man sa aming dalawa tuwing
may pagkakataon;

5. Na magbibigay ng buwanang gastusin o suporta ang ama kay Aldrin at ang

kakulangan sa mga pangangailangan nito ay pupunan ng ina;

6. Na lahat ng mga kasangkapan sa bahay tulad ng T.V., gas stove, mga

kagamitan sa kusina ay aking (Rodolfo) ipinagkakaloob kay Elena at hindi na ako
interesado dito;

7. Na lahat ng maaaring maipundar ng sino man sa amin dalawa sa mga

panahong darating ay aming mga sari-sariling pag-aari na at hindi na
pinagsamahan o conjugal.

BILANG PATUNAY ng lahat ng ito, nilagdaan namin ito ngayong ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997,
dito sa Gumaca, Quezon.

(Sgd) (Sgd)
ELENA MARANTAL RODOLFO ESPINOSA
Nagkasundo Nagkasundo
PINATUNAYAN AT PINANUMPAAN dito sa harap ko ngayong ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997, dito
sa Gumaca, Quezon

ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA

Notary Public
PTR No. 3728169; 1-10-97
Gumaca, Quezon

Doc. No. 482;

Page No. 97;
Book No. XI;
Series of 1997.

Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully convinced of the validity of the contract
dissolving their marriage, started implementing its terms and conditions. However, Marantal
eventually took custody of all their children and took possession of most of the property they
acquired during their union.

Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, complainant Glindo, a law graduate, who
informed him that the contract executed by Omaña was not valid. Espinosa and Glindo then
hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omaña before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).

Omaña alleged that she knows Glindo but she does not personally know Espinosa. She denied
that she prepared the contract. She admitted that Espinosa went to see her and requested for
the notarization of the contract but she told him that it was illegal. Omaña alleged that Espinosa
returned the next day while she was out of the office and managed to persuade her part-time
office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signature and notarized the
contract. Omaña presented Marantal’s "Sinumpaang Salaysay" (affidavit) to support her
allegations and to show that the complaint was instigated by Glindo. Omaña further presented a
letter of apology from her staff, Arlene Dela Peña, acknowledging that she notarized the
document without Omaña’s knowledge, consent, and authority.

Espinosa later submitted a "Karagdagang Salaysay" stating that Omaña arrived at his residence
together with a girl whom he later recognized as the person who notarized the contract. He
further stated that Omaña was not in her office when the contract was notarized.

The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline

In its Report and Recommendation1 dated 6 February 2007, the IBP-CBD stated that Espinosa’s
desistance did not put an end to the proceedings. The IBP-CBD found that Omaña violated Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The IBP-CBD stated that Omaña
had failed to exercise due diligence in the performance of her function as a notary public and to
comply with the requirements of the law. The IBP-CBD noted the inconsistencies in the defense
of Omaña who first claimed that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract but then
later claimed that it was her former maid who notarized it. The IBP-CBD found:

Respondent truly signed the questioned document, yet she still disclaimed its authorship, thereby
revealing much more her propensity to lie and make deceit, which she is deserving [of]
disciplinary sanction or disbarment.

The IBP-CBD recommended that Omaña be suspended for one year from the practice of law and
for two years as a notary public.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

Omaña filed a motion for reconsideration.

In a Resolution dated 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied Omaña’s motion for
reconsideration.

The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether Omaña violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility
in the notarization of Marantal and Espinosa’s "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay."

The Ruling of this Court

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

This case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal
partnership without judicial approval is void.2 The Court has also ruled that a notary public should
not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the
spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, 3 which is exactly what Omaña did
in this case.
1avvphi1

In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza,4 the Court cited a number of cases where the lawyer was
sanctioned for notarizing similar documents as the contract in this case, such as: notarizing a
document between the spouses which permitted the husband to take a concubine and allowed
the wife to live with another man, without opposition from each other; 5 ratifying a document
entitled "Legal Separation" where the couple agreed to be separated from each other mutually
and voluntarily, renouncing their rights and obligations, authorizing each other to remarry, and
renouncing any action that they might have against each other; 6 preparing a document
authorizing a married couple who had been separated for nine years to marry again, renouncing
the right of action which each may have against the other; 7 and preparing a document declaring
the conjugal partnership dissolved. 8

We cannot accept Omaña’s allegation that it was her part-time office staff who notarized the
contract. We agree with the IBP-CBD that Omaña herself notarized the contract. Even if it were
true that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract, it only showed Omaña’s negligence
in doing her notarial duties. We reiterate that a notary public is personally responsible for the
entries in his notarial register and he could not relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the
blame on his secretaries9 or any member of his staff.

We likewise agree with the IBP-CBD that in preparing and notarizing a void document, Omaña
violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a]
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Omaña knew fully
well that the "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" has no legal effect and is against public policy.
Therefore, Omaña may be suspended from office as an attorney for breach of the ethics of the
legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 10

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Julieta A. Omaña from the practice of law for ONE YEAR.
We REVOKE Atty. Omaña’s notarial commission, if still existing, and SUSPEND her as a notary
public for TWO YEARS.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Omaña’s personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.

Vda. de Avenido vs. Avenido, G.R. # 173540, Jan. 22, 2014

G.R. No. 173540               January 22, 2014

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,

vs.
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.ofthe Rules of Court, assailing the 31
August 2005 Decision  of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444, which reversed
1

the 25 March 2003 Decision  of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8 of Davao City, in a
2

complaint for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage· docketed as Civil Case No. 26, 908-98.

The Facts

This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to
the same man, now deceased.

Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the
ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her
complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942
in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to her, the fact
of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II, records were destroyed. Thus,
only a Certification  was issued by the LCR.
3

During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four (4) children, namely:
Climaco H. Avenido, born on 30 March 1943; Apolinario H. Avenido, born on 23 August 1948;
Editha A. Ausa, born on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H. Avenido, Jr., born on 15 December
1952. Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was not known. In 1958,
Tecla and her children were informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another
woman by the name of Buenaventura Sayson who later died in 1977 without any issue.

In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name
of Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous – an
action she sought to protect the rights of her children over the properties acquired by Eustaquio.

On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with counterclaim,  essentially
4

averring that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in
Davao City, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in
Davao City. She also contended that the case was instituted to deprive her of the properties she
owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio.

Trial ensued.

Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:

 1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and Tecla
herself to substantiate her alleged prior existing and valid marriage with (sic) Eustaquio;

2) Documentary evidence such as the following:

a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944

issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon, Bohol; 5

b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the Office of

the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office (NSO), R. Magsaysay Blvd.,
Sta Mesa, Manila; 6

c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages that
were actually filed in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO Manila,
started only in 1932; 7

d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the Civil
Registrar General, NSO, from 1932 to the early part of 1945, were totally
destroyed during the liberation of Manila; 8

e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido; 9

f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.; 10

g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido; 11

h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the

Parish Priest of Talibon, Bohol on 30 September 1942; 12

i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by Second
World War issued by the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that
they cannot furnish as requested a true transcription from the Register of Birth of
Climaco Avenido; 13

j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30 March 1943

to spouses Eustaquio and Tecla; 14

k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and Peregrina. 15

On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to Eustaquio that took
place in Davao City on 3 March 1979; her life as a wife and how she took care of Eustaquio
when he already had poor health, as well as her knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife, but
was once a common law wife of Eustaquio.  Peregrina likewise set forth documentary evidence
16

to substantiate her allegations and to prove her claim for damages, to wit:

1) Marriage Contract  between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the date of
17

marriage on 3 March 1979;

2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single when he

contracted marriage with the petitioner although he had a common law relation with one
Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4) children namely: Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha and
Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed Avenido; 18

3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil Registrar of
the Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del Norte;  and 19
 4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as the Civil
Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte. 20

In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was initiated in bad
faith so as to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio;
hence, her entitlement to damages and attorney’s fees.

On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision  denying Tecla’s petition, as well as
21

Peregrina’s counter-claim. The dispositive portion thereof reads:

For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE" filed by
petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO against respondent PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby
DENIED.

The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA against petitioner TECLA

HOYBIA AVENIDO is hereby DISMISSED. 22

Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial court’s alleged disregard of the
evidence on the existence of her marriage to Eustaquio.

In its 31 August 2005 Decision,  the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the validity of her
23

marriage to Eustaquio, while pronouncing on the other hand, the marriage between Peregrina
and Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and void. The CA ruled:

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina],
the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of
her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco],
the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to
his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the
outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the condition sine qua non, for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents,
were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded. 24

Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of the CA to
appreciate the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), in its Memorandum  dated 5 June 2008, raises the following legal issues:
25

1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the "presumption of marriage" to overturn
the validity of a subsequent marriage;

2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken cognizance of,
without proof of the execution or existence and the cause of the unavailability of the best
evidence, the original document;

and

3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a probative value to
prove the existence of a valid marriage without the priest who issued the same being
presented to the witness stand. 26

Our Ruling

Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented during the trial
proves the existence of the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.
The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on
Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the
trial court considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon,
Bohol, that it has no more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. The same thing
was said as regards the Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila. The trial
court observed:

Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it, likewise, issued
a Certification (Exhibit "B") stating that:

records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila
on February 4, 1945. What are presently filed in this office are records from the latter part of
1945 to date, except for the city of Manila which starts from 1952. Hence, this office has no way
of verifying and could not issue as requested, certified true copy of the records of marriage
between [Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on 30th September 1942, in
Talibon, Bohol. 27

In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the testimony of
Tecla and her witnesses as it considered the same as mere self-serving assertions. Superior
significance was given to the fact that Tecla could not even produce her own copy of the said
proof of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the
trial court declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence of the first marriage.

The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage between
Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four (4)
children. Such presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same
Certifications disregarded by the trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially that of
Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created, according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage.
Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of the evidence presented by
Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in Añonuevo v.
Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,  we said, citing precedents, that:
28

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a
person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his
parents.

The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of the fact
can be accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals.  Thus: 29

It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents,
were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence
to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath,
the Court clarified this misconception thus:

x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of
the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the
document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be proven by secondary evidence when the

instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or
non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due
execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the inroduction of secondary
evidence of the contents.

xxxx

Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary.
It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually
produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its
contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when available, to
establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility
of such evidence.

The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on
Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other
competent evidence.

Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing
officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to
whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also held that
"[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s]
made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the
document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation
which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."

In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was
present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The
subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor
Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of
the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–
testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. 30

As correctly stated by the appellate court:

In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was
established by the testimonial evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present during
the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the event. The loss was
shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant,
competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence – testimonial and
documentary – may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the

Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. The
testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage has
been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the
solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."

xxxx

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina],
the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of
her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco],
the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to
his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the
outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the condition sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents,
were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded. 31

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,  this Court has elucidated on the rationale
32

behind the presumption:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.  Marriage in this
1âwphi1

jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus
hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of
law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec.
334, No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.

In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of
Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish
priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido
and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as
to costs.

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner, vs. TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.

G.R. No. 173540, 22 January 22 2014.

PEREZ, J.:

This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to the
same man, now deceased.

Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that Tecla is the
lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio).

Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon,
Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. While the a marriage certificate was
recorded with the local civil registrar, the records of the LCR were destroyed during World War II.
Tecla and Eustaquio begot four children, but Eustaquio left his family in 1954.

In 1979, Tecla learned that Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of Peregrina, which
marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous. In support of her claim, Tecla
presented eyewitnesses to the ceremony, the birth certificate of their children and certificates to the
fact that the marriage certificate/records were destroyed.

Peregrina, on the other hand averred that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on
22 September 1989, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 and showed the
marriage contract between her and Eustaquio.

RTC ruled in favor of Peregrina. It relied on Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of marriage to
Eustaquio. Without such certificate, RTC considered as useless the certification of the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Talibon over the lack of records.
The CA, on appeal, ruled in favor of Tecla. It held there was a presumption of lawful marriage
between Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four
children. Such presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications
disregarded by the RTC, and testimonial evidence created sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. The
CA found that its appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Between Tecla and Peregrina, who was the legal wife of Eustaquio?

RULING: TECLA

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as
the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. The fact of marriage may be proven by relevant
evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be
recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.

It is an error on the part of the RTC to rule that without the marriage certificate, no other proof can be
accepted.

The execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by
witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the
parties have previously narrated the execution thereof.

In this case, due execution was established by the eyewitness testimonies and of Tecla herself as a
party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony of the officiating priest. Since the
due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented,
secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case,
to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were
not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of
decency and of law.

CHAPTER 1. REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE (ARTS. 1-34)

Republic vs. Albios, G.R. # 198780, Oct. 16, 2013

G.R. No. 198780               October 16, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the
September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which
affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring
the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from
the beginning.

The facts

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia
I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588. 3

On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her
marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a
married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .

Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios
filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a
collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could
not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.

At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits
ensued.

Ruling of the RTC

In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of

Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary
consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as
she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife
of respondent.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.6

The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving
credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage
to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay
him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that
Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn,
she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The
RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment
of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying
the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties
failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by
it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found
that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not
understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a
marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their
purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for
Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.

Hence, this petition.

Assignment of Error

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A

MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP
WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT. 8

The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for
Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they
knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of
being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter
being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.

The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest.
The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were
otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.

On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment 9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her
marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.

On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply 10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on
certiorari.

Ruling of the Court

The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the
sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the
ground of lack of consent?

The Court resolves in the negative.

Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for
the purposes of immigration.

Marriage Fraud in Immigration

The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of
marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States,
marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific
benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages. 11 A common limited purpose
marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child. 12 Another, which is the subject
of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the
intention of the couple at the time of their marriage, 13 and it attempts to filter out those who use
marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 15 established the
principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a
"marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time
they were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that
the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to
determining the intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this
standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the
legal validity or existence of a marriage.

The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the
limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited
purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of

United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the
country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six
months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into
permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:

x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to
every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating
the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x
Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite
true that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a
marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the
understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they
have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is
ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to
deceive others.18

(Italics supplied)

On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, 19 which declared
as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating
that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a
limited purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a
fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.

Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as
problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is
first necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving"
limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and
have upheld such marriages as valid.23

The Court now turns to the case at hand.

Respondent’s marriage not void

In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered
into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce
and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for
reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally
bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held
that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in
the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering
that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in
exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never
intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.

The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of consent.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the
same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab
initio.

Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties
willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the
Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. 24 Consent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the
nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. 25 Their understanding
should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism. 26

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent
was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their
consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately
contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as
to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and
complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that
precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to
a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered
into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct
indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. 27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be
real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine
consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent,
but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have
absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.

The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.  Albios and Fringer had
1âwphi1

an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the
respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow
them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an
application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual
marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was,
therefore, clearly present.

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish
a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real
intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered
into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and
incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus,
only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law
declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and
formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional
questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love
one another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they
comply with all the legal requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a
marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded
by law, may validly support a marriage.

Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest
purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be
considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and
continues to be valid and subsisting.

Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of
the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may
constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude;
(2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually
transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No
other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a
marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not
qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of
fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no
injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage
with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court
cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration
benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These
unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent
schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience;
she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. 32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded
from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression
that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily
nullified when no longer needed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for
utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
Case Digest: Republic vs Albios
G.R. No. 198780               October 16, 2013

This is a case of MARRIAGE FOR CONVENIENCE.

FACTS

Respondent Libert Albios married Daniel Lee Fringer, an American

citizen. She later on filed a petition to nullify their marriage. She
alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any
intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their
essential marital obligations. She said that she contracted Fringer to
enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship;
that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
$2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate
ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again
communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the
$2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship.
She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null
and void ab initio.

The RTC ruled in her favor.

In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when
a marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and
should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying
the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that
the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely
give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be
legally bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to
acquire American citizenship.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA,
however, upheld the RTC decision.

Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of
consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand
the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein
case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest
considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the
acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They
never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to
live as husband and wife or build a family.

The OSG then elevate the case to the Supreme Court

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Albios and Fringer be

declared null and void.

RULING:

No, respondent’s marriage is not void.

The court said:

“Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and
Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also
conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as
nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely
given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates
that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was
a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully
comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There
was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be
created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was
necessary to accomplish their goal.”

The court also explained that “There is no law that declares a

marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign
citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal
requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable
under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.”

“No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in

violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the
whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot
leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it
suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no
longer needed.”
Santiago vs. People, G.R. # 200233, July 15, 2015

LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J.:

We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G.

Santiago from the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 33566.1 The CA affirmed the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Criminal Case No. 72322 convicting her of bigamy.

THE FACTS

Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, 3 Leonila G.
Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information 4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded
“not guilty,” while her putative husband escaped the criminal suit. 5 redarclaw

The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela
Galang since 2 June 1974,6 asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who was a 43-
year-old widow then, married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her
brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she should choose
someone who was “without responsibility.” 7 redarclaw

Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an
accused in the crime of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos
was still single when they got married. She also averred that for there to be a
conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be proven valid by the
prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the
lack of a marriage license.

Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang,
testified for the prosecution. She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as
March and April 1997, on which occasions the former introduced herself as the legal
wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this allegation and averred that she met Galang
only in August and September 1997, or after she had already married Santos.

THE RTC RULING

The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the
subsistence of his marriage to Galang. Based on the more credible account of
Galang that she had already introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos in March
and April 1997, the trial court rejected the affirmative defense of petitioner that she
had not known of the first marriage. It also held that it was incredible for a learned
person like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos. 8redarclaw

The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, “her marriage was
celebrated without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the
Family Code, which is an admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the
celebration of their marriage.”9 Thus, the trial court convicted petitioner as
follows:10 redarclaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G.

Santiago GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and
penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and imposes against her the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correctional as
minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos
was void ab initio for having been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of
the Family Code, which provides an exemption from the requirement of a marriage
license if the parties have actually lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years prior to the celebration of their marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted
that she and Santos had not lived together as husband and wife for five years prior
to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage license
effectively rendered their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from
bigamy.

The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus: 11 redarclaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and
void as it was celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that
theory, accused wants this court to pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to
accused Santos, something this court can not do. The best support to her argument
would have been the submission of a judicial decree of annulment of their marriage.
Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their marriage null and void in these
proceedings.

THE CA RULING

On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on
proof beyond reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted
that the former had not known of the previous marriage of Santos.

Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses’
narration. It likewise disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a
marriage license, the appellate court simply stated that the claim was a vain attempt
to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in question. Consequently, the CA
affirmed her conviction for bigamy. 12 redarclaw

THE ISSUES

Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant
case, because she was not aware of Santos’s previous marriage. But in the main,
she argues that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage
must be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Citing People v. De Lara,13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because
of the absence of a marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall
under any of those marriages exempt from a marriage license, because they have
not previously lived together exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years.
She alleges that it is extant in the records that she married Santos in 1997, or only
four years since she met him in 1993. Without completing the five-year
requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is void.

In the Comment14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent

advances the argument that the instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising
factual issues as regards her husband’s subsequent marriage. As regards petitioner’s
denial of any knowledge of Santos’s first marriage, respondent reiterates that
credible testimonial evidence supports the conclusion of the courts a quo that
petitioner knew about the subsisting marriage.

The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides: LawlibraryofCRAlaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

In Montañez v. Cipriano,15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as

follows: LawlibraryofCRAlaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married;
(b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second
or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all
the essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the
celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the
prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
(Emphasis supplied)

For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime,  People v.

Nepomuceno, Jr.16 instructs that she should have had knowledge of the previous
subsisting marriage. People v. Archilla17 likewise states that the knowledge of the
second wife of the fact of her spouse’s existing prior marriage constitutes an
indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes her
responsible as an accomplice.

The Ruling of the Court

The penalty for bigamy and petitioner’s

knowledge of Santos’s first marriage

The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who
marry each other while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting.
As explained in Nepomuceno:18 redarclaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended
parties depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the
accused without being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse
had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused could
she be included in the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner’s knowledge of Santos’s

marriage to Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first
marriage as shown by the totality of the following circumstances: 19 (1) when Santos
was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly showed
their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to
not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness
compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies,
straightforwardly testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that
the former was the legal wife of Santos.

After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the
factual findings of the RTC, less so in the present case in which its findings were
affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of
witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the important opportunity to observe
firsthand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses during the trial. 20 redarclaw

Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling
that she was validly charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower
courts’ imposition of the principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which the
CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty within the range of prision correccional as
minimum to prision mayor as maximum.

Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla21 holds that the second

spouse, if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In
referring to Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes
that “a person, whether man or woman, who knowingly consents or agrees to be
married to another already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the
crime of bigamy.”22 Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an accomplice
to the crime.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal
in the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six years and one
day to twelve years. Since the criminal participation of petitioner is that of an
accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the penalty next lower in
degree,23prision correccional, which has a duration of six months and one day to six
years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this penalty
shall be imposed in its medium period consisting of two years, four months and one
day to four years and two months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law,24 petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a duration of one month and
one day to six months imprisonment.

The criminal liability of petitioner

resulting from her marriage to
Santos

Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the
second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity. 25 If
the accused wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a
matter of defense during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the
criminal case.26 In this case, petitioner has consistently 27 questioned below the
validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages celebrated without
the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio.28 redarclaw

Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that
it could not pass judgment on the validity of the marriage. The CA held that the
attempt of petitioner to attack her union with Santos was in vain.

On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and
facts,29 and given that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for
review,30 this Court now resolves to correct the error of the courts  a quo.

After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and
Santos took place without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is
purportedly explained in their Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union
was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family Code. The provision reads as
follows: LawlibraryofCRAlaw

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without
any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the
marriage.

Therefore, the marriage of petitioner and Santos would have been exempted from a
marriage license had they cohabited exclusively as husband and wife for at least five
years before their marriage.31 redarclaw

Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in
February 199632 and that after six months of courtship, 33 she married him on 29 July
1997. Without any objection from the prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos
had frequently visited her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage.
However, he never cohabited with her, as she was residing in the house of her in-
laws,34 and her children from her previous marriage disliked him. 35 On cross-
examination, respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime in
1993, she first met Santos as an agent who sold her piglets. 36 redarclaw

All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known
each other for only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could
not have cohabited for at least five years prior to their marriage.

Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable
fact. Although the records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of
cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the Family Code, it appears that the two of
them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually
cohabited for at least five years before they married each other. Unfortunately,
subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage, 37 in which the
solemnizing officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary,
because the marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.

The legal effects in a criminal case

of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the
marriage

The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the

misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage
without a license. We thus face an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to
be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a
marriage license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation
requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her
marriage contract.

We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit
marriage in an effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage,
such as bigamy, punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent and
sacrosanct character of this special bond between spouses. 38 In Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals,39 we had the occasion to emphasize that the State’s penal laws on bigamy
should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals “to deliberately ensure that
each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless
women with the promise of futurity and commitment.”

Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner’s illegal acts of feigning a
marriage and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do
so would only make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage. 40 redarclaw

Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will “lend its aid to x x x
one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which
the cause of action is founded.”41 If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi
causa or that which involves a transgression of positive law, parties shall be left
unassisted by the courts. 42As a result, litigants shall be denied relief on the ground
that their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest or fraudulent, or
deceitful as to the controversy in issue.43
redarclaw

Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this
criminal case of bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been
secured without a marriage license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves
perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by misrepresenting that they were
exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated claim that they
had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years prior their
marriage. In violation of our law against illegal marriages, 44 petitioner married
Santos while knowing fully well that they had not yet complied with the five-year
cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently, it will
be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to
escape criminal conviction.

The applicability of People v. De Lara

Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for

bigamy on the ground that the second marriage lacked the requisite marriage
license. In that case, the Court found that when Domingo de Lara married his
second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local Civil Registrar had yet to
issue their marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was
celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage license, the Court acquitted
him of bigamy.
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in
order to contract a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently
secured a Certificate of Marriage, and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as
basis for seeking her exculpation. Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused
in De Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime.

No less than the present Constitution provides that “marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.” 45 It
must be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. 46|||In
keeping therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of
petitioner for bigamy.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G.

Santiago is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila
G. Santiago is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy
as an accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months
of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of prision correccional as maximum plus
accessory penalties provided by law.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary

Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 56-70, 72-73; the CA Decision dated 21 September 2011 and Resolution
dated 5 January 2012 were penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-
Fernando, with Associate Justices Michael P. Elbinias and Elihu A. Ybañez,
concurring.

2
 Id. at 75-83, 85-86; the RTC Decision dated 21 May 2010 and Order dated 24 June
2010 were penned by Judge Celso O. Baguio of RTC Branch 34, Gapan City, Nueva
Ecija.

3
Id. at 88; Certificate of Marriage issued by the Civil Registry of Nueva Ecija.

4
 Records, p. 1.

5
 Id. at 117; his Certificate of Death showed that he died during the pendency of the
case on 28 November 2001.

6
Rollo, p. 87; Marriage Contract between Nicanor Santos and Estela Galang.

7
 Id. at 57-58; CA Decision, pp. 2-3.

8
 Id. at 80; RTC Decision, p. 6. See also records, pp. 269-270, 117; the appointment
papers of petitioner showed that she worked as a faculty member of Divina Pastora
College, and the Death Certificate of Nicanor Santos indicated that he was a laborer.

9
 Id. at 83; RTC Decision, p. 9.

10
 Id.
11
 Id. at 86; RTC Order, p. 2.

12
 Id. at 70, 73; CA Decision, p. 15, CA Resolution, p. 2.

13
 No. 12583-R, 14 February 1955, 51 O.G. 4079.

14
 Id. at 152-169; Comment filed on 23 August 2012 by the Office of the Solicitor
General.

15
 G.R. No. 181089, 22 October 2012, 684 SCRA 315.

16
 159-A Phil. 771 (1975).

17
 111 Phil. 291 (1961).

18
 Supra note 16, at 775.

19
Rollo, pp. 64-68, CA Decision dated 21 September 2011, pp. 9-13; rollo, pp. 80-
81; RTC Decision dated 21 May 2010, pp. 6-7.

20
People v. Arcilla, 326 Phil. 774 (1996).

21
 Supra note 17, at 293.

22
 Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, Book Two, p. 979, Volume
II (2012) citing Viada, 3 Cod. Pen. 274.

23
 Revised Penal Code, Art. 52.

24
 Act No. 4103 (1965).

25
De la Cruz v. Ejercito, 160-A Phil. 669 (1975), Zapanta v. Montesa, 114 Phil. 1227
(1962), Merced v. Diez, 109 Phil. 155 (1960), and People v. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246
(1935).

26
Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, 391 Phil. 648 (2000).

27
Rollo, p. 77, RTC Decision, p. 3; records, pp. 311-312, Motion for Reconsideration
filed by Santiago before the RTC, pp. 2-3.

28
 Family Code, Art. 3.

29
Formilleza v. Sandiganbayan, 242 Phil. 519 (1988).

30
People v. Flores, 442 Phil. 561 (2002).

31
Republic v. Dayot, 573 Phil. 553 (2008).

32
 The TSN dated 13 June 2002, p. 3 reflected that petitioner met Santos in 1996;
but according  to the TSN dated 10 August 2004, she clarified in her additional direct
testimony that she met Santos in 1993. In both cases, she only knew Santos for less
than five years prior their marriage on 29 July 1997.
33
 Id. at 4.

34
 Id. at 7-8.

35
 TSN, 24 October 2002, p. 14.

36
 Id. at 2.

37
 Records, p. 88. Certified True Copy of the Certificate of Marriage between Nicanor
F. Santos and Leonila G. Santiago.

38
Tenebro v. CA, 467 Phil. 723 (2004).

39
 Id. at 744.

40
Republic v. Albios, G.R. No. 198780, 16 October 2013.

41
Manuel v. People, 512 Phil 818, 851 (2005).

42
Acabal v. Acabal, 494 Phil. 528 (2005).

43
Muller v. Muller,  531 Phil. 460 (2006).

44
 REVISED PENAL CODE, Arts. 349-352. Art. 350 punishes the crime of illegal
marriages as follows: LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Art. 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws. — The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any person
who, without being included in the provisions of the next proceeding article, shall
have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal
impediment.

If either of the contracting parties shall obtain the consent of the other by means of
violence, intimidation or fraud, he shall be punished by the maximum period of the
penalty provided in the next preceding paragraph.

45
 CONSTITUTION, Article XV, Sec. 2.

Leonila Santiago v. People of the PH

GR 200233      
July 15, 2015

Facts:
            4 months after solemnization of marriage, Leonila (petitioner) and Nicanor
Santiago were served an information for Bigamy for the prosecution adduced that
Nicaonor was still married to Estela when he entered into the 2nd marriage; he was able
to escape while petitioner pleaded ‘not guilty’ relying on the fact that when she married
him, she thought he was single. She soon averred that their marriage was void due to
lack of marriage license, wherein she should not then be charged with bigamy. 11 years
after inception if criminal case, Estela Galang, the first wife, testified for the prosecution.
She alleged that she had met petitioner and introduced herself as the legal wife.
Petitioner denied allegation and stated that she met Estela only after she had already
married Nicanor.

            Issue:   W/N petitioner is co-accused in the instant case of Bigamy.

                        W/N marriage between Leonila and Nicanor is valid
Held:

            Lower courts consistently found that petitioner indeed knew of the first marriage
as shown by the totality of the following circumstances: (1) when Nicanor was courting
and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval
of him (2) it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true
civil status (3) Estela, who was the more credible witness, compared to petitioner who
had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she had already told
petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Nicanor. In People v.
Archilla, knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse’s existing prior marriage,
constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission of Bigamy, which makes her
responsible as an accomplice. She is not co-accused. She is guilty of Bigamy as an
accomplice thereby sentenced to 6m arresto mayor to 4y prision correccional. 

Ronulo vs. People, G.R. # 182438, July 2, 2014

G.R. No. 182438               July 2, 2014

RENE RONULO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari  filed by petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo
1

challenging the April 3, 2008 decision  of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028
2

which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.

The Factual Antecedents

The presented evidence showed that  Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to
3

marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario
Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a
marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong,and Claire,
clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the
Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested
the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite
having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.

The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He
conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and
secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests. 4

An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was
filed against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for
allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony. 5

The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on arraignment.
The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the
ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding.
Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride walk down the aisle. She also saw the couple
exchange their wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a document.  She heard the petitioner
6

instructing the principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the
reception, had lunch and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also identified the
wedding invitation given to her by Joey.7

Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the
ceremony that they take each other as husband and wife.  Days after the wedding, she went to
8

the municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr.
where she was given a certificate that no marriage license was issued to the couple. 9

The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the
couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law. 10

The MTC Judgment

The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and
imposed on him a ₱200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the
petitioner’s act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an official
church recognition of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife.  It further ruled that in
11

performing a marriage ceremony without the couple’s marriage license, the petitioner violated
Article 352 of the RPC which imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage
Law. The MTC applied Section 44 of the Marriage Law which pertinently states that a violation of
any of its provisions that is not specifically penalized or of the regulations to be promulgated,
shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more
than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court.

The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty for violation of the
latter law. Applying these laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of
₱200.00. 12

The RTC Ruling

The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances surrounding the act
of the petitioner in "blessing" the couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had
transpired. It further ruled that the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve
more credence than the petitioner’s negative statements.  The RTC, however, ruled that the
13

basis of the fine should be Section 39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.

The CA Decision

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that although there is no
prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum
standards in determining whether a marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the
contracting parties must appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should
declare that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses
of legal age.  According to the CA, the prosecution duly proved these requirements. It added that
14

the presence of a marriage certificate is not a requirement in a marriage ceremony. 15

The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability under Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, is not dependent on whether Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under Article
350 of the same Code. 16
The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the fine is Section 44 of the
Marriage Law since it covers violation of regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities
such as the RPC.

The Petition

The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds: First, Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended, is vague and does not define what constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony."
Assuming that a marriage ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the
Civil Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the verbal declaration that
the couple take each other as husband and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the
declaration in writing which is duly signed by the contracting parties and attested to by the
solemnizing officer.  The petitioner likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that the
17

contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.  Second,
18

under the principle of separation of church and State, the State cannot interfere in ecclesiastical
affairs such as the administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert the
"blessing" into a "marriage ceremony." 19

Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the "blessing" in good faith for
purposes of giving moral guidance to the couple. 20

Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article 350 of the RPC, as
amended, should preclude the filing of the present case against him. 21

Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The present case is
not covered by Section 44 of the Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found violating its
provisions nor a regulation promulgated thereafter. 22

THE COURT’S RULING:

We find the petition unmeritorious.

The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, were proven
by the prosecution

Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall
perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows:
(1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage. Hence,
the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is tantamount to
the performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is punishable under Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended.

While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a "marriage ceremony"
and what constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on
these matters. These provisions were taken from Article 55  of the New Civil Code which, in turn,
23

was copied from Section 3  of the Marriage Law with no substantial amendments. Article 6  of
24 25

the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the
marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife."  Pertinently, Article
26

3(3)  mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that
27

which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer
and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was
clear that no prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required.
However, as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements constituting a
marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties
before a solemnizing officer; and second, heir declaration in the presence of not less than two
witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.

As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this
fact was testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the
petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the
contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.

The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails
to persuadeus. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory
questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out
relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position
taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he
propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one party. 28

At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge objectionable, its failure to
timely register this bars it from belatedly invoking any irregularity.

In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioner’s admission
regarding the circumstances of the ceremony, support Florida’s testimony that there had indeed
been the declaration by the couple that they take each other as husband and wife. The testimony
of Joey disowning their declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome these clear and
convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense failed to show that the prosecution
witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the petitioner.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State
precludes the State from qualifying the church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to
the petitioner’s allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code
when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is
required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its
respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the core requirements of law be
observed.

We emphasize at this point that Article 15  of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an
29

inviolable social institution and that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a
mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State has
paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of the
sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the
disintegration and mockery of marriage.

From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage
ceremony, as the minimum requirements set by law were complied with. While the petitioner may
view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of a
marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as contemplated by
Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.

We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage
ceremony was illegal.
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence
of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the
couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their relationship.

Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the
essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony,
therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates
his defense of good faith.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his
criminal liability in the present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has
been conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article
3(3) of the Family Code, as discussed above.

Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal liability of
the petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the crime.
The penalty imposed is proper

On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, this provision
clearly provides that it shall be imposed in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law.
The penalty provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which provide as follows:
Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:

Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or minister solemnizing marriage
without being authorized by the Director of the Philippine National Library or who, upon
solemnizing marriage, refuses to exhibit the authorization in force when called upon to do so by
the parties or parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any bishop or
officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or sect the regulations and practices whereof
require banns or publications previous to the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with
section ten, who authorized the immediate solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently
declared illegal; or any officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in violation of this act, shall
be punished by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than two years, or by a fine
of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]

On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:

Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically
penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by
a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or
both, in the discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]

From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC
that the penalty imposable in the present case is that covered under Section 44, and not Section
39, of the Marriage Law.

The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present case.  As 1âwphi1

correctly found by the MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the provisions of the Marriage
Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition of the penalty for the
violation of this provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this point, Article 352 falls
squarely under the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which provides for the penalty for any
violation of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities; Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended, which was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of such regulations.

Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of ₱200.00 pursuant to Section 44 of
the Marriage Law.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April
3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 3-26.

 Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justices
2

Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Ramon M. Bato, Jr.; id. at 28-55.

 From the testimonies of Joseph Yere, id. at 89-90; Mary Anne Yere, id. at 182-183; the
3

petitioner, id. at 118-123, 129 and 133-136; Joey Umadac, id. at 145-153; and
Dominador Umadac, id. at 166-167.

4
 Id. at 30.
5
 Id. at 29.

6
 Id. at 35.

7
 Id. at 36-37.

8
 Id. at 85-86 (TSN dated August 5, 2004 of Florida Umadac, p. 14).

9
 Id. at 31.

10
 Id. at 49-50.

11
 Id. at 60-61.

12
 Id. at 62-63.

13
 Id. at 68.

14
 Id. at 46.

15
 Id. at 51.

16
 Ibid.

17
 Id. at 12-14.

18
 Id. at 15.

19
 Id. at 15-16.

20
 Id. at 18.

21
 Ibid.

22
 Id. at 19.

 Art. 55. No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties with
23

legal capacity to contract marriage must declare, in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take each other as
husband and wife. This declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed
by signature or mark by the contracting parties and said two witnesses and attested by
the person solemnizing the marriage.

 Mutual Consent. — No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the
24

parties with legal capacity to contract marriage must declare, in the presence of the
person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take each
other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in
triplicate, signed by signature or mark by the contracting parties and said two witnesses
and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage.

 Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is
25

required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally
before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses
of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be
 contained in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties and
their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer.

 This provision was taken from Article 55 of the New Civil Code which was, in turn, a
26

reproduction of Section 3 of the Marriage Law.

27

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this
Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration
that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age.

 People v. Zheng Bai Hui, 393 Phil. 68, 115 (2000).

28

 Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
29

Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Section 2. Marriage, an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family

and shall be protected by the State.

Case Digest: Ronulo v. People

RENE RONULO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 182438, 2 July 2014.

BRION, J.:

Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry on 29 March 2003 at the Sta. Rosa
Catholic Parish Church in Ilocos Norte. But on the day of the wedding, the church's officiating priest
refused to solemnize the marriage because of lack of a marriage license.

With the couple and the guests already dressed for the wedding, they headed to an Aglipayan
Church. The Aglipayan priest, herein petitioner Ronulo, conducted a ceremony on the same day
where the couple took each other as husband and wife in front of the guests. This was despite
Petitioner's knowledge of the couple's lack of marriage license.

Petitioner was eventually charged of violating Article 352 of the RPC for performing an illegal marriage
ceremony.

The MTC did not believe Petitioner's defense that what he did was an act of blessing and was not
tantamount to solemnization of marriage and was found guilty.

The decision was affirmed by both the RTC and the CA.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioner committed an illegal marriage.

RULING: Yes.

Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any
illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are: 

1. authority of the solemnizing officer; and 

2. his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
The first element is present since Petitioner himself admitted that he has authority to solemnize a
marriage.

The second element is present since the alleged "blessing" by Petitioner is tantamount to the
performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.

There is no prescribed form or rite for the solemnization of a marriage. However, Article 6 of the
Family Code provides that it shall be necessary: 
1. for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and 
2. declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other
as husband and wife.
The first requirement is present since petitioner admitted to it. The second requirement is likewise
present since the prosecution, through the testimony of its witnesses, proved that the contracting
parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.

The penalty for violating Article 352 of the RPC is in accordance with the provision of the Marriage
Law, specifically Article 44, which states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically
penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by a
fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both, in
the discretion of the court.

As such, Petitioner was held guilty of violating Article 352 and was fined P200 as penalty.

Kho vs. Republic G.R. # 187462, June 1, 2016

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 187462, June 01, 2016

RAQUEL G. KHO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND

VERONICA B. KHO, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari are the Decision1 and

Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City dated March 30, 2006 and
January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-GR. CV No. 69218. The assailed CA Decision
reversed and set aside the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan,
Eastern Samar, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 464, which ruled in petitioner's favor in
an action he filed for declaration of nullity of his marriage with private respondent,
while the CA Resolution denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The present petition arose from a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed
by herein petitioner with the RTC of Oras, Eastern Samar. Pertinent portions of the
Petition allege as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

3. Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner's parents summoned one
Eusebio Colongon, now deceased, then clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer,
instructing said clerk to arrange and prepare whatever necessary papers were
required for the intended marriage between petitioner and respondent supposedly to
take place at around midnight of June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the public from
witnessing the marriage ceremony;

4. Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage

ceremony which actually took place at around 3:00 o'clock before dawn of June 1,
1972, on account that there was a public dance held in the town plaza which is just
situated adjacent to the church whereas the venue of the wedding, and the dance
only finished at around 2:00 o'clock of same early morning of June 1, 1972;

5. Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for
marriage license and had not seen much less signed any papers or documents in
connection with the procurement of a marriage license;

6. Considering the shortness of period from the time the aforenamed clerk of the
treasurer's office was told to obtain the pertinent papers in the afternoon of May 31,
1972 so required for the purpose of the forthcoming marriage up to the moment the
actual marriage was celebrated before dawn of June 1, 1972, no marriage license
therefore could have been validly issued, thereby rendering the marriage solemnized
on even date null and void for want of the most essential requisite;

7. For all intents and purposes, thus, Petitioner's and Respondent's marriage
aforestated was solemnized sans the required marriage license, hence, null and void
from the beginning and neither was it performed under circumstances exempting the
requirement of such marriage license;

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable

Court that after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered:

1. Declaring the contract of marriage between petitioner and respondent held on

June 1, 1972, at Arteche, Eastern Samar, null and void ab initio and of no legal
effect;

x x x x4 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a Certification 5 issued by

the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar which attested to the fact
that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar has neither record nor copy of a marriage
license issued to petitioner and respondent with respect to their marriage celebrated
on June 1, 1972.

Respondent filed her Answer6 praying that the petition be outrightly dismissed for
lack of cause of action because there is no evidence to prove petitioner's allegation
that their marriage was celebrated without the requisite marriage license and that,
on the contrary, both petitioner and respondent personally appeared before the local
civil registrar and secured a marriage license which they presented before their
marriage was solemnized.

Upon petitioner's request, the venue of the action was subsequently transferred to
the RTC of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, where the parties submitted their
respective pleadings as well as affidavits of witnesses.

On September 25, 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the petition. The
dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declares the marriage
contracted between Raquel G. Kho and Veronica Borata on June 1, 1972 null and
void ab initio, pursuant to Article 80 of the Civil Code and Articles 4 and 5 of the
Family Code. The foregoing is without prejudice to the application of Articles 50 and
51 of the Family Code.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche,
Eastern Samar for proper registration of this decree of nullity of marriage.

SO ORDERED.7 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The RTC found that petitioner's evidence sufficiently established the absence of the
requisite marriage license when the marriage between petitioner and respondent
was celebrated. As such, the RTC ruled that based on Articles 53(4), 58 and 80(3) of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, the absence of the said marriage license rendered
the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.

Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA in Cebu City. On March 30, 2006, the
CA promulgated its assailed Decision, disposing thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated 25 September 2000 of

Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between the petitioner-appellee
Raquel Kho and Veronica Kho is declared valid and subsisting for all intents and
purposes.

SO ORDERED.8 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The CA held that since a marriage was, in fact, solemnized between the contending
parties, there is a presumption that a marriage license was issued for that purpose
and that petitioner failed to overcome such presumption. The CA also ruled that the
absence of any indication in the marriage certificate that a marriage license was
issued is a mere defect in the formal requisites of the law which does not invalidate
the parties' marriage.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 9 but the CA denied it in its Resolution
dated January 14, 2009.

Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASCRIBING A

SO-CALLED "ETHICAL DIMENSION" TO PETITIONER'S CAUSE, ALLUDING TO AN
ALLEGED LIAISON WITH ANOTHER WOMAN AS A FACTOR IN REVERSING THE
JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH VOIDED HIS MARRIAGE IN QUESTION
WITH RESPONDENT;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
APPRECIATING AGAINST PETITIONER THE FACT THAT DESPITE THE LAPSE OF 25
YEARS HE DID NOTHING TO ATTACK, EVEN COLLATERALLY, HIS APPARENTLY VOID
MARRIAGE WITH RESPONDENT;

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALTOGETHER

DISREGARDING PETITIONER'S OBVIOUSLY OVERWHELMING DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCES OF LACK OF MARRIAGE LICENSE AND GIVING WEIGHT INSTEAD TO
UNSUPPORTED PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT, IN ITS ASSAILED
DECISION; and

4 WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING

ASIDE OR REVERSING THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT A NULLITY FOR ABSENCE OF THE
REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE.10 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Petitioner's basic contention in the present petition centers on the alleged failure of
the CA to give due credence to petitioner's evidence which established the absence
or lack of marriage license at the time that petitioner and respondent's marriage was
solemnized. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in deciding the case not on the basis
of law and evidence but rather on the ground of what the appellate court calls as
ethical considerations as well as on the perceived motive of petitioner in seeking the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with respondent.

The Court finds for the petitioner.

At the outset, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), raises a
procedural question by arguing that the issues presented by petitioner in the present
petition are factual in nature and it is not proper for this Court to delve into these
issues in a petition for review on certiorari.

The Court does not agree.

The issues in the instant petition involve a determination and application of existing
law and prevailing jurisprudence. However, intertwined with these issues is the
question of the existence of the subject marriage license, which is a question of fact
and one which is not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. This rule, nonetheless, is not without exceptions, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures;

(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(7) When the findings arc contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 11 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In the present case, the findings of the RTC and the CA, on whether or not there
was indeed a marriage license obtained by petitioner and respondent, are
conflicting. Hence, it is but proper for this Court to review these findings.

The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code.12 Hence, the Civil Code governs their union.
Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of
marriage as a contract, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ART 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. 13 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized
without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality
where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional
character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75. 14 Under the
Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title 111,
comprising Articles 72 to 79. These marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo
mortis or at the point of death during peace or war; (2) marriages in remote places;
(3) consular marriages; (4) ratification of marital cohabitation; (5) religious
ratification of a civil marriage; (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages; and (7) mixed
marriages. Petitioner's and respondent's marriage does not fall under any of these
exceptions.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without
the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the
legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the
marriage contract.15 The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license
under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting
parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to
contract marriage.16 Stated differently, the requirement and issuance of a marriage
license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every
marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. 17

In the instant case, respondent claims that she and petitioner were able to secure a
marriage license which they presented to the solemnizing officer before the marriage
was performed.

The OSG, on its part, contends that the presumption is always in favor of the validity
of marriage and that any doubt should be resolved to sustain such validity. Indeed,
this Court is mindful of this principle as well as of the Constitutional policy which
protects and strengthens the family as the basic autonomous social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family.

On the other hand, petitioner insists that the Certification issued by the Civil
Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with the testimony of the former Civil
Registrar, is sufficient evidence to prove the absence of the subject marriage
license.

The Court agrees with petitioner and finds no doubt to be resolved as the evidence
is clearly in his favor.

Apropos is the case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño.18 There, it was held that the
certification of the Local Civil Registrar, that their office had no record of a marriage
license, was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. 19 It was further held
that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and
that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the
marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured. 20

As stated above, petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the

Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting that the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar "has no record nor copy of any marriage license ever issued in
favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose
marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972."21 Thus, on the basis of such Certification,
the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent has been
overcome and it becomes the burden of respondent to prove that their marriage is
valid as it is she who alleges such validity. As found by the RTC, respondent was not
able to discharge that burden.

It is telling that respondent failed to present their alleged marriage license or a copy
thereof to the court. In addition, the Certificate of Marriage 22 issued by the officiating
priest does not contain any entry regarding the said marriage license. Respondent
could have obtained a copy of their marriage contract from the National Archives
and Records Section, where information regarding the marriage license, i.e., date of
issuance and license number, could be obtained. However, she also failed to do so.
The Court also notes, with approval, the RTC's agreement with petitioner's
observation that the statements of the witnesses for respondent, as well as
respondent herself, all attest to the fact that a marriage ceremony was conducted
but neither one of them testified that a marriage license was issued in favor of
petitioner and respondent. Indeed, despite respondent's categorical claim that she
and petitioner were able to obtain a marriage license, she failed to present evidence
to prove such allegation. It is a settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. 23

Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern
Samar, coupled with respondent's failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage
license or of any evidence to show that such license was ever issued, the only
conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was, in fact, issued.
Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it cannot be said that there was a simple defect,
not a total absence, in the requirements of the law which would not affect the
validity of the marriage. The fact remains that respondent failed to prove that the
subject marriage license was issued and the law is clear that a marriage which is
performed without the corresponding marriage license is null and void.
As to the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence, the OSG further argues that, on the
basis of this Court's ruling in Sevilla v. Cardenas,24 the certification issued by the
local civil registrar, which attests to the absence in its records of a marriage license,
must categorically state that the document does not exist in the said office despite
diligent search.

However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court considered

the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar as a certification of due search
and inability to find the record or entry sought by the parties despite the absence of
a categorical statement that "such document does not exist in their records despite
diligent search." The Court, citing Section 28,26 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, held
that the certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry as to the
purported marriage license, issued by the civil registrar, enjoys probative value, he
being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there
is absence of a marriage license that would render the marriage void ab initio.

Moreover, as discussed in the abovestated case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee

Cariño,27 this Court considered the marriage of the petitioner and her deceased
husband as void ab initio as the records reveal that the marriage contract of
petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by
the local civil registrar, their office has no record of such marriage license. The court
held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the
non-issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized
without the necessary marriage license and not being one of the marriages exempt
from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the
deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio. This ruling was reiterated in the more recent
case of Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr.28

Furthermore, in the fairly recent case of Abbas v. Abbas,29 this Court echoed the
ruling in Republic v. CA30 that, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a
marriage license was lacking, this Court relied on the Certification issued by the local
civil registrar, which stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as
the same did not appear in their records. Contrary to petitioner's asseveration,
nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved
conducted a diligent search. In this respect, this Court held that Section 28, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court does not require a categorical statement to this effect.
Moreover, in the said case, this Court ruled that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that
an official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence
to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." No such
affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in
performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption
must stand. x x x31 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In all the abovementioned cases, there was clear and unequivocal finding of the
absence of the subject marriage license which rendered the marriage void.

From these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of
absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage
license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported
by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was
issued to the parties.32
Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was
conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence
of a valid marriage license.33 As cited above, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code clearly
provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning,
except marriages of exceptional character under Articles 72 to 79 of the same Code.
As earlier stated, petitioner's and respondent's marriage cannot be characterized as
among the exceptions.

As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his marriage to respondent, it may

well be that his motives are less than pure - that he seeks a way out of his marriage
to legitimize his alleged illicit affair with another woman. Be that as it may, the same
does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid
marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The law
must be applied. As the marriage license, an essential requisite under the Civil Code,
is clearly absent, the marriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab initio. chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, Cebu City, dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69218, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, dated
September 25, 2000, in Civil Case No. 464 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary

Raquel Kho v. Republic of the PH

GR 187462      
June 1, 2016

Facts:
             Petitioner’s parents summoned a clerk to arrange necessary papers on one
afternoon of May 31, 1972 for the intended marriage of parties herein on the midnight
as to exclude the public from witnessing the marriage ceremony. They were only able to
fulfill such ceremony at 3AM of June 1, 1972 for reason that there was a public dance
held in town plaza that was adjacent to the church and such dance only finished at 2AM.
Due to the shortness of period, said clerk was not able to secure them a marriage
license. RTC declared their marriage null and void. CA reversed it stating that the
marriage was valid and subsisting.

            Issue: W/N CA erred to give due credence to petitioner’s evidence which
established the absence or lack of marriage license when the marriage was
solemnized.

Held:

            Marriage is void. Art 58 and Art 80 (3) of the Civil Code explicitly provides that
no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first issued by the LCR (Art. 58).
Marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void (Art. 80 (3)).
Court favors petitioner.

Niñal, et. al. vs. Bayadog, G.R. # 133778, Mar. 14, 2000

FIRST DIVISION
 [G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000.]

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE
NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., Petitioners, v.
NORMA BAYADOG, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
after his death?

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage
were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24,
1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent
Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage
license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father’s death,
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed
under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioner’s successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an
action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code. chanrobles.com : law library

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure,
insufficient" to resolve the following issues: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is
already dead;

(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs’ deceased father with defendant is null
and void ab initio;

(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage
after it was dissolved due to their father’s death. 1

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and
void their father’s marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of
the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for
annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure
question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of
petitioner’s averment that the allegations in the petition are ‘true and correct’." It was thus
treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the
1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and
reinstated the petition for review. 4

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was
the law in effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage
void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and
issuance of marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement and participation
in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. 9 This interest
proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution" 10
Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is
the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family
Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law
considers it not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13

However there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license
is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of
a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The
rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of
persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a
marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons
from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and
suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the
publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them
from that requirement. chanrobles.com.ph:red

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners’ father to respondent Norma was
celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating
that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." 16 The
only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated
under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to
exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation
wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year
continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period
regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which
impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation
period?

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife
for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on
the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special
contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should
be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality
and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special
relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on
the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any
excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element
as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption
from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two
persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge
of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. 17
The Civil Code provides: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Article 63: ". . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment
to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library

Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil
registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Article 17 provides in part: ". . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of
any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof . . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library

Article 18 reads in part: ". . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or
brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in
the application for a marriage license. . . ."  chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any
marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and
void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the
contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered
felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have
lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day.
From the time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with
each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a
perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting
with Respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already
been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where
there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife" .

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence
of such element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to
declare their father’s marriage void after his death?

Contrary to respondent judge’s ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied
even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for
annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file
an annulment suit "at any time before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47
pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare
the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is
annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab
initio is considered as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights.
The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the
other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a
direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void
marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can
be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case
the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That
is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where
the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except
those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-
ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children
born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well
as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing
voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its
annulment are legitimate.

Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the death of petitioner’s father extinguished the alleged
marital bond between him and Respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a
wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should
be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the
death of either extinguished nothing. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to
restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence
of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for
the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under
ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of
legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore,
being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which
the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any
parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the
wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or
treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be
collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so
that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26
But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration
of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28
For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would
extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered
imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment
need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Pardo, J., on official business abroad.

Endnotes:

1. The dispositive portion of the Order dated March 27, 1998 issued by Judge
Ferdinand J. Marcos of Regional Trial Court (RTC) - Branch 59, Toledo City, reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant’s motion to dismiss is hereby granted
and this instant case is hereby ordered dismissed without costs." (p. 6; Rollo, p. 21).

2. Order, p. 4; Rollo, p. 19.

3. Minute Resolution dated July 13, 1998; Rollo, p. 39.

4. Minute Resolution dated October 7, 1998; Rollo, p. 50.

5. Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 (1998).

6. Now Article 3. Family Code. Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all
the requisites are complied with: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties, their consent, freely given;

(2) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(3) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

7. Now Article 4. Family Code. Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from
the beginning: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x           x          x

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional

character

x           x          x

8. Art 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this

Title but not those under article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a
license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides.

9. Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975).

10. Section 12, Article II, 1987 Constitution; Hernandez v. CA, G.R. No. 126010,
December 8, 1999; See also Tuazon v. CA, 256 SCRA 158 (1996).

11. Section 2, Article XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution.

12. Article 1. Family Code provides: "Marriage is a special contract of permanent

union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal or family life . . .

13. Santos v. CA, 58 SCAD 17 (1995); 310 Phil. 21, 41 (1995).

14. Now Article 34. Family Code. Art. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary
when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to
marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest
or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took
steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and
that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

15. Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.

16. Rollo, p. 29.

17. Articles 63 and 64, Civil Code; Articles 17 and 18, Family Code.

18. Article 83, Civil Code provides "Any marriage subsequently contracted by any
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other
than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years . . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library

Article 41 of the Family Code reads: "A marriage contracted by any person during
the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years . . ."
cralaw virtua1aw library

19. Arts. 333 and 334, Revised Penal Code.

20. Art. 17. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following
persons and within the periods indicated herein: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or
guardian did not give his or her consent within five years after attaining the age of
twenty-one, or by the parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the
minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one;

(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the sane spouse, who had no
knowledge of the other’s insanity, or by any relative or guardian or person having
legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of either party, or by the
insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;

(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45 by the injured party, within five
years after the discovery of the fraud;

(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45 by the injured party, within five
years from the time the force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or
ceased;

For causes mentioned in numbers 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within
five years after the marriage.

21. Suntay v. Cojuanco-Suntay, 300 SCRA 760 (1998); People v. Retirement Board,
272 III, App. 59 cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed. p. 271.
22. In re Conza’s Estate, 176 III. 192, Miller v. Miller, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac 394
cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed., p. 271.

23. Article 148-149, Family Code; Article 144, Civil Code.

24. Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977); Weigel v. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499
(1986); People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 (1954); 50 O.G. (10) 4767 cited in People
v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957); 53 O.G. 3749.

25. 35 Am. Jur. 219-220.

26. 18 RCL 446-7; 35 Am. Jur. 221.

27. Apiag v. Cantero, 335 Phil. 511 (1997); 268 SCRA 47 (1997); Atienza v. Judge
Brilliantes, Jr., 60 SCAD 119; 312 Phil. 939 (1995).

28. Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572 (1993).

29. Article 39, Family Code as amended by E.O. 209 and 227 s. 1987 and further
amended by R.A. No. 8533 dated February 23, 1998.

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of

the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL
& PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, v. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000

Facts:

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. She was shot
by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months
thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February
19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident

After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or
invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of
action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for annulment
of marriage under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Issues:

(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as husband and wife for at least
five years exempts them from obtaining a marriage license under Article 34 of the
Family Code of the Philippines.
(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for
the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal,
with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their
father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead

Ruling:

(a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and
wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
computed on the basis of cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only missing
factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the
five-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. The five-year period should be the years immediately before
the day the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity—meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years,
and continuity—that is, unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-year cohabitation period is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated
to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing
them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.

(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Voidable and void marriages are not identical. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed
only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.

Republic vs. Dayot, G.R. # 175581, Mar. 28, 2008

G.R. No. 175581               March 28, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179474

FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for
Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa
Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage
between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.

The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City
Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza. 2 In lieu of a marriage license,
Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of
them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.

On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage
with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he
did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at
least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same.
According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live
as a boarder in Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa
requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package
sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal
from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that
Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially
refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of
them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the
pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when
he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of
paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisa’s house. When he perused the same, he
discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa,
the latter feigned ignorance.

In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of their
marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the
legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with
him on account of their age difference. 5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her
marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual
(Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.
Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the
Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and
Coordinating Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and
immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year
without emolument.7

On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision 8 dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:

WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties,
this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration.
Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose]. 9

The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated
between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the
story as implausible, and rationalized that:

Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a
blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as
they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign
the pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could
have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother
would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to
"discover" that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract.
[Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by
[Felisa.]

[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he
acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly notarized
statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the
marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D.,
wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does
not believe that the only reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was because he
was residing there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his
lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.

When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her
name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25,
November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose
Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract
(page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable
Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered
yes. The testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured
through fraud.10

Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action had prescribed. It cited Article
8711 of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:

That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through
fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and
false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest
instance. x x x.12

Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a
Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The
dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13

The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the
circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 86 14 of the
Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided
by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Jose’s appeal in the following manner:

Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his
consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87
(4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground
that the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by
said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the
time the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in
February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment
of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of
his marriage to Felisa.15
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that his marriage to Felisa was
void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under
Article 7616 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an
affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that
Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did
not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the
statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-
faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further
noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the
solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals
dismissed Jose’s argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev.
Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 56 17 of the Civil Code did
not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the
solemnizing officer’s church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in Article
718 of the Family Code which does not govern the parties’ marriage.

Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration
thereof.  His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption
1avvphi1

from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at
bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been
living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he
maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.

The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly,
it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another
one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.

Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City. 19

In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Niñal v.
Bayadog,20 and reasoned that:

In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being
unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each
other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:

"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from
the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of
the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to
whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the
law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships
and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage
being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly
observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded
any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element
as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two
persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of
any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license,
save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the
marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license. 21

Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court
rendered a Resolution22 dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa’s motion.

Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of
Appeals’ Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit,
and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a
separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate
court’s Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two
Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for
resolution.23

The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its
Petition, to wit:

RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF

HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.

II

RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD
NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.

III

RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE

FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24

Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Niñal. 25 She
differentiates the case at bar from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an
existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose.
Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal
case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability.
Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any
liability.

For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered
ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of
the Philippines and Felisa.

The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption
that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Court’s ruling in
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals. 26 To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit
executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the
Republic’s position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of
the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing
officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The
Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license
was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties
incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for
at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties’ marriage contract states that
their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of
the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To
further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Jose’s notarized
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as his
wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ,
District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in
said barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisa’s name as
his wife.

The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false
affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.

It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986,
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article
53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:

ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)

Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being
issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually
resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those
under Article 75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed
without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate
consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract. 30 This
is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage license did not
make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under
the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the
proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage. 32

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III,
comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the
point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages, 33 (3)
ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or
pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.34

The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained
the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts
in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or
minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.

The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a
marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from
legalizing their status.36

It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of
maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other." 37 One of the central
issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation,
where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively
renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.

We answer in the affirmative.

Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory
construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly 38 but reasonably construed.39 They
extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of
the general provisions rather than the exception. 40 Where a general rule is established by statute
with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication. 41 For the
exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must
have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.

A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read
the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to
those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry
each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five
years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is
precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the
language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact
cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one
that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that
the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts42 in an affidavit before any person authorized
by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage
shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of
the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose
and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration
of their marriage.43 The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced
to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA
Revolution.44 The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986
when Jose commenced to live in her house. 45

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year
requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth
or falsehood of the alleged facts.46 Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to
this Court’s review.47 It is already well-settled that:

The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A
recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case
the administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in
every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The
factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are
supported by the record or based on substantial evidence. 48

Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to
exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties’
affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were
complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage
license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they
should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from
the requirement of a marriage license.

Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds
no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is
with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 49 Restated more explicitly,
persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. 50 The present case does not
involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no
question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986,
hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.

In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code51 that every intendment of law or fact leans
towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from
the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the
requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under
exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear
violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against
innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making
a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.52 The protection of marriage as a sacred
institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid
one as well.53 To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an
abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage,
we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a
license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage
not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years
as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the
marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all.
Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and
Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential
fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the
essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force
and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity,
Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit
from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room
for application where there is a law.54 There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation,
which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are
consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their
criminal liability.55

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from
assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and
Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage to
Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the
declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. 56 Jose and Felisa’s marriage
was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is
void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be
raised any time.

Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage.57 It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity
that is unbroken.58

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa
Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

DANTE O. TINGA* PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.**

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Per Special Order No. 497, dated 14 March 2008, signed by Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno designating Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga to replace Associate Justice
Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, who is on official leave under the Court’s Wellness Program
and assigning Associate Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez as Acting Chairperson.

** Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. was designated to sit as additional member replacing
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated 12 September 2007.

1
 Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon with Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña
III and Santiago Javier Ranada, concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 175581), pp. 65-70; rollo,
(G.R. No. 179474), pp. 156-161.

2
 Records, p. 170.

3
 Id.

4
 Id. at 1-8.

5
 The marriage contract shows that at the time of the celebration of the parties’ marriage,
Jose was 27 years old, while Felisa was 37.

6
 The Administrative complaint before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the
Office of the Ombudsman was docketed as OMB-ADM-0-93-0466; Records, pp. 252-
258.

7
 Id. at 257.

8
 Id. at 313-323.

9
 Id. at 323.

10
 Id. at 321-322.

 ART. 87. - The action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the parties
11

and within the periods as follows:

 (1) For causes mentioned in Number 1 of Article 85, by the party whose parent or
guardian did not give his or her consent, within four years after attaining the age
of twenty or eighteen years, as the case may be; or by the parent or guardian or
person having legal charge, at any time before such party has arrived at the age
of twenty or eighteen years;

(2) For causes mentioned in Number 2 of Article 85, by the spouse who has been
absent, during his or her lifetime; or by either spouse of the subsequent marriage
during the lifetime of the other;

(3) For causes mentioned in Number 3 of Article 85, by the sane spouse, who
had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative or guardian of the
party of unsound mind, at any time before the death of either party;

(4) For causes mentioned in Number 4, by the injured party, within four years
after the discovery of the fraud;

(5) For causes mentioned in Number 5, by the injured party, within four years
from the time the force or intimidation ceased;

(6) For causes mentioned in Number 6, by the injured party, within eight years
after the marriage.

12
 Records, p. 322.

13
 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 125.

 ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in number
14

4 of the preceding article:

(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;

(2) Nondisclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving
moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years or
more;

(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband;

No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity

shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage.

15
 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 122.

 ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have
16

attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall
state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

17
 ART. 56. Marriage may be solemnized by:
 (1) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court;

(2) The Presiding Justice and the Justices of the Court of Appeals;

(3) Judges of the Courts of First Instance;

(4) Mayors of cities and municipalities;

(5) Municipal judges and justices of the peace;

(6) Priests, rabbis, ministers of the gospel of any denomination, church, religion
or sect, duly registered, as provided in Article 92; and

(7) Ship captains, airplane chiefs, military commanders, and consuls and vice-
consuls in special cases provided in Articles 74 and 75.

18
 ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction;

(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly
authorized by his church or religious sect and registered with the civil registrar
general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted him by his church
or religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs
to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;

(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the cases mentioned in Article 31;

(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the

absence of the latter, during a military operation, likewise only in the cases
mentioned in Article 32; or

(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10.

19
 CA rollo, p. 279.

20
 384 Phil. 661 (2000).

21
 CA rollo, pp. 278-279.

22
 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), pp. 173-174.

23
 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 180.

24
 Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), pp. 44-45.

25
 Erroneously cited as Niño v. Bayadog; rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 18.

26
 377 Phil. 919 (1999).

27
 ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this
Title, but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license
first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting
party habitually resides.
  ART. 75. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by consuls
28

and vice-consuls of the Republic of the Philippines. The duties of the local civil registrar
and of a judge or justice of the peace or mayor with regard to the celebration of marriage
shall be performed by such consuls and vice-consuls.

29
 ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional

character.

30
 People v. De Lara, No. 12583-R, 14 February 1955, 51 O.G. 4079, 4082.

 The Marriage Law, otherwise known as Act No. 3613, requires the following essential
31

requisites: (1) legal capacity of the contracting parties; and (2) their mutual consent.

 Report of the Code Commission, pp. 79-80; see also Ambrosio Padilla, Civil Code
32

Annotated, 1956 Edition, Vol. I, p. 195.

33
 Must be read with Article 58 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of

this Title, but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without
a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where
either contracting party habitually resides.

 Edgardo L. Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated (1984 Eleventh Ed.), pp.
34

302-310.

 In Niñal v. Bayadog (supra note 20 at 668-669), this Court articulated the spirit behind
35

Article 76 of the Civil Code, thus:

"However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a
marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,
referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken
period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is
required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside
a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage
license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such
persons from legitimizing their status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid the
peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip
arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve
their privacy and exempt them from that requirement."

 The Report of the Code Commission states that "No marriage license shall be
36

necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who,
being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years desire to
marry each other. In such case, the publicity attending a marriage license may
discourage such persons from legalizing their status," Report of the Code Commission, p.
80.
  Records, p. 49. The affidavit was denominated by the parties as an "Affidavit on (sic)
37

Marriage Between Man and Woman Who Haved (sic) Lived Together as Husband and
Wife for at Least Five Years."

38
 Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 722, 744 (2001).

39
 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 130, 137 (1999).

40
 Id.

 Id. citing Samson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43182, 25 November 1986, 145
41

SCRA 654, 659.

42
 The first part of Article 76 states, "No marriage license shall be necessary when a man
and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other x x
x."

43
 Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), p. 38.

44
 Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 158, citing TSN (Civil Case No. B-4143), 15 April 1999.

45
 Id. at 159.

 First Dominion Resources Corporation v. Peñaranda, G.R. No. 166616, 27 January

46

2006, 480 SCRA 504, 508.

 Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521, 30 September 2005, 471
47

SCRA 589, 605.

48
 Id.

49
 Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 708 (1999).

50
 Id.

51
 ART. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus,
every intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of
the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during
marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any
member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.

52
 People v. De Lara, supra note 30 at 4083.

53
 Malcampo-Sin v. Sin, 407 Phil. 583, 588 (2001).

 Salavarria v. Letran College, 357 Phil. 189, 196 (1998); Aparente, Sr. v. National Labor
54

Relations Commission, 387 Phil. 96, 108 (2000).

 Supra note 33 at 306. Alicia V. Sempio-Diy in A Handbook on the Family Code of the
55

Philippines (1995 Ed., p. 38) wrote that "If the parties falsify their affidavit in order to have
an instant marriage, although the truth is that they have not been cohabiting for five
years, their marriage will be void for lack of a marriage license, and they will also be
 criminally liable." Article 76 of the Civil Code is now Article 34 of the Family Code, which
reads:

ART. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without
any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.

56
 Niñal v. Bayadog, supra note 20 at 134.

Republic v.Dayot, G.R. No. 175581/179474, March 28, 2008

FACTS: Jose was introduced to Felisa in 1986.  He later came to live as a boarder in
Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady.  Later, Felisa requested him to
accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, so she could claim a package sent to her by
her brother from Saudi.  There, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper
approached them.  They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the
package could be released to Felisa.  He initially refused to do so.  However, Felisa
cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother
who had learned about their relationship. He signed the papers and gave them to the
man. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage
with Felisa.  When he confronted Felisa, she said she does not know of such. Jose
claimed that their marriage was contracted with fraud. Felisa denied Jose’s
allegations and defended the validity of their marriage. Felisa expounded that while
her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain
Rufina Pascual on August 31, 1990.  On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for
bigamy against Jose.  Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against
Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both
employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. The Ombudsman
found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct ans
suspended him for one year without emolument. The RTC ruled against Jose
claiming that his story is impossible. RTC cited Article 87 of the New Civil Code
which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the
injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud.

ISSUE: W/N the issue of validity of marriage due to fraud is prescriptible

HELD: SC held that an action for nullifying a marriage is imprescriptible.  It may be

raised anytime. Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated without a marriage
license.  No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio.

Llave vs. Republic, et. al., G.R. # 169766, Mar. 30, 2011

G.R. No. 169766               March 30, 2011

ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD
A. TAMANO, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of subsequent marriage
laws, no vested rights shall be impaired that pertain to the protection of the legitimate union of a
married couple.

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution 2 dated September 13,
2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89
declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave’s (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano
(Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.

Factual Antecedents

Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially under the
Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City3 and, subsequently, under a civil
ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. 4 In their
marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano’s civil status was indicated as ‘divorced.’

Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano’s wife,
and upon his death, his widow.

On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her
son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano’s
legitimate children with Zorayda,5 filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the
declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The
complaint6 alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil
rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993. The
complaint likewise averred that:

11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having been celebrated
under the New Civil Code, is therefore governed by this law. Based on Article 35 (4) of
the Family Code, the subsequent marriage entered into by deceased Mamintal with
Defendant Llave is void ab initio because he contracted the same while his prior marriage
to Complainant Zorayda was still subsisting, and his status being declared as "divorced"
has no factual or legal basis, because the deceased never divorced Complainant
Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could not have validly done so because divorce is not
allowed under the New Civil Code;

11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced Complainant Zorayda
by invoking the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws, for the simple reason that the marriage of the deceased with Complainant Zorayda
was never deemed, legally and factually, to have been one contracted under Muslim law
as provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they (deceased and Complainant
Zorayda) did not register their mutual desire to be thus covered by this law; 7

Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then asked from the court
for an extension of 30 days to file her answer to be counted from January 4, 1995, 8 and again,
another 15 days9 or until February 18, 1995, both of which the court granted. 10
Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss 11 on February 20,
1995 where she declared that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were married
under the Muslim rites, as had been averred in the latter’s disbarment complaint against Sen.
Tamano.12 Estrellita argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case
because under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines (Muslim Code), questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall
under the exclusive jurisdiction of shari’a courts.

The trial court denied Estrellita’s motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case for declaration
of nullity.13 Thus, Estrellita filed in November 1995 a certiorari petition with this Court questioning
the denial of her Motion to Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we referred the petition to the
CA14 which was docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.

During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued to try the case since there
can be no default in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage even if the respondent failed to file
an answer. Estrellita was allowed to participate in the trial while her opposing parties presented
their evidence. When it was Estrellita’s turn to adduce evidence, the hearings set for such
purpose15 were postponed mostly at her instance until the trial court, on March 22, 1996,
suspended the proceedings16 in view of the CA’s temporary restraining order issued on February
29, 1996, enjoining it from hearing the case.17

Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in its Decision dated
September 30, 1996.18 Estrellita then elevated the appellate court’s judgment to this Court by way
of a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 126603. 19

Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita to present her
evidence on June 26, 1997. 20 As Estrellita was indisposed on that day, the hearing was reset to
July 9, 1997.21 The day before this scheduled hearing, Estrellita again asked for a
postponement.22

Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib moved to submit the
case for decision,23 reasoning that Estrellita had long been delaying the case. Estrellita opposed,
on the ground that she has not yet filed her answer as she still awaits the outcome of G.R. No.
126603.24

On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon City, 25 stating as one of the
reasons that as shari’a courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction in cases of
marriages celebrated under both the Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a court of general
jurisdiction, is not precluded from assuming jurisdiction over such cases. In our Resolution dated
August 24, 1998,26 we denied Estrellita’s motion for reconsideration27 with finality.

A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the RTC rendered the aforementioned
judgment declaring Estrellita’s marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio. 28

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were never severed,
declared Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab initio for being bigamous
under Article 35 of the Family Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.29 The court said:

A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows that the second marriage of
the late Senator with [Estrellita] was entered into during the subsistence of his first marriage with
[Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent marriage void from the very beginning. The fact that the
late Senator declared his civil status as "divorced" will not in any way affect the void character of
the second marriage because, in this jurisdiction, divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse is not
an acceptable method of terminating the effects of a previous marriage, especially, where the
subsequent marriage was solemnized under the Civil Code or Family Code. 30

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In her appeal,31 Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be heard as

the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of the Decision of the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 126603. She claimed that the RTC should have required her to file
her answer after the denial of her motion to dismiss. She maintained that Sen. Tamano is
capacitated to marry her as his marriage and subsequent divorce with Zorayda is governed by
the Muslim Code. Lastly, she highlighted Zorayda’s lack of legal standing to question the validity
of her marriage to the deceased.

In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004, 32 the CA held that Estrellita can
no longer be allowed to file her answer as she was given ample opportunity to be heard but
simply ignored it by asking for numerous postponements. She never filed her answer despite the
lapse of around 60 days, a period longer than what was prescribed by the rules. It also ruled that
Estrellita cannot rely on her pending petition for certiorari with the higher courts since, as an
independent and original action, it does not interrupt the proceedings in the trial court.

As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellita’s marriage to Sen.
Tamano is void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda and Sen.
Tamano is governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide for an absolute divorce. It noted
that their first nuptial celebration was under civil rites, while the subsequent Muslim celebration
was only ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to the CA, had the legal standing to file the action
as she is Sen. Tamano’s wife and, hence, the injured party in the senator’s subsequent
bigamous marriage with Estrellita.

In its September 13, 2005 Resolution, 33 the CA denied Estrellita’s Motion for
Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where it debunked the additional
errors she raised. The CA noted that the allegation of lack of the public prosecutor’s report on the
existence of collusion in violation of both Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court 34 and Article
48 of the Family Code35 will not invalidate the trial court’s judgment as the proceedings between
the parties had been adversarial, negating the existence of collusion. Assuming that the issues
have not been joined before the RTC, the same is attributable to Estrellita’s refusal to file an
answer. Lastly, the CA disregarded Estrellita’s allegation that the trial court erroneously rendered
its judgment way prior to our remand to the RTC of the records of the case ratiocinating that G.R.
No. 126603 pertains to the issue on the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and not to the issue of
the validity of Estrellita’s marriage to Sen. Tamano.

The Parties’ Respective Arguments

Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now argues that the CA erred in
upholding the RTC judgment as the latter was prematurely issued, depriving her of the
opportunity to file an answer and to present her evidence to dispute the allegations against the
validity of her marriage. She claims that Judge Macias v. Macias 36 laid down the rule that the
filing of a motion to dismiss instead of an answer suspends the period to file an answer and,
consequently, the trial court is obliged to suspend proceedings while her motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction has not yet been resolved with finality. She maintains that she
merely participated in the RTC hearings because of the trial court’s assurance that the
proceedings will be without prejudice to whatever action the High Court will take on her petition
questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction and yet, the RTC violated this commitment as it rendered an
adverse judgment on August 18, 1998, months before the records of G.R. No. 126603 were
remanded to the CA on November 11, 1998.37 She also questions the lack of a report of the
public prosecutor anent a finding of whether there was collusion, this being a prerequisite before
further proceeding could be held when a party has failed to file an answer in a suit for declaration
of nullity of marriage.

Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late senator is valid as the latter
was already divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he married her. She asserts that such
law automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased without need of
registering their consent to be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims whose marriage was
solemnized under Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano married all his wives under
Muslim rites, as attested to by the affidavits of the siblings of the deceased. 38

Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to file suit because only
the husband or the wife can file a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage under
Supreme Court Resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.39

Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the CA’s reasoning and
stresses that Estrellita was never deprived of her right to be heard; and, that filing an original
action for certiorari does not stay the proceedings of the main action before the RTC.

As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there is collusion, the Sol Gen
says that this is no longer essential considering the vigorous opposition of Estrellita in the suit
that obviously shows the lack of collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private respondents’ legal
standing to challenge the validity of Estrellita’s purported marriage with Sen. Tamano, reasoning
that any proper interested party may attack directly or collaterally a void marriage, and Zorayda
and Adib have such right to file the action as they are the ones prejudiced by the marital union.

Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment.

Issues

The issues that must be resolved are the following:

1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment, even though the latter was
rendered prematurely because: a) the judgment was rendered without waiting for the
Supreme Court’s final resolution of her certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No. 126603; b) she
has not yet filed her answer and thus was denied due process; and c) the public
prosecutor did not even conduct an investigation whether there was collusion;

2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous;
and

3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellita’s marriage
declared void ab initio.

Our Ruling

Estrellita’s refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to answer; and her
pending petition for certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss
before the higher courts does not at all suspend the trial proceedings of the principal suit before
the RTC of Quezon City.

Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right to due process. She was
never declared in default, and she even actively participated in the trial to defend her interest.

Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias 40 to justify the suspension of the period to file an
answer and of the proceedings in the trial court until her petition for certiorari questioning the
validity of the denial of her Motion to Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In said case, we
affirmed the following reasoning of the CA which, apparently, is Estrellita’s basis for her
argument, to wit:

However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a ‘Motion to Dismiss,’ instead of filing an Answer to
the complaint. The filing of said motion suspended the period for her to file her Answer to the
complaint. Until said motion is resolved by the Respondent Court with finality, it behooved the
Respondent Court to suspend the hearings of the case on the merits. The Respondent Court, on
April 19, 2001, issued its Order denying the ‘Motion to Dismiss’ of the Petitioner. Under Section
6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [now Section 4], the Petitioner had the balance of
the period provided for in Rule 11 of the said Rules but in no case less than five (5) days
computed from service on her of the aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court within which to file
her Answer to the complaint: x x x41 (Emphasis supplied.)

Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced therein is that the trial court is
mandated to suspend trial until it finally resolves the motion to dismiss that is filed before it.
Nothing in the above excerpt states that the trial court should suspend its proceedings should the
issue of the propriety or impropriety of the motion to dismiss be raised before the appellate
courts. In Macias, the trial court failed to observe due process in the course of the proceeding of
the case because after it denied the wife’s motion to dismiss, it immediately proceeded to allow
the husband to present evidence ex parte and resolved the case with undue haste even when,
under the rules of procedure, the wife still had time to file an answer. In the instant case,
Estrellita had no time left for filing an answer, as she filed the motion to dismiss beyond the
extended period earlier granted by the trial court after she filed motions for extension of time to
file an answer.

Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment, as it should have waited first
for the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently, before this Court.
However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ruled that the pendency of a petition for
certiorari does not suspend the proceedings before the trial court. "An application for certiorari is
an independent action which is not part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the
rendition of the judgment complained of."42 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating that
"[t]he petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from
further proceeding in the case."43 In fact, the trial court respected the CA’s temporary restraining
order and only after the CA rendered judgment did the RTC again require Estrellita to present her
evidence.

Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we never issued any
order precluding the trial court from proceeding with the principal action. With her numerous
requests for postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in refusing to file an answer or to
present her evidence when it was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial court should wait first
for our decision in G.R. No. 126603. Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to present her
evidence were attributable only to herself and she should not be allowed to benefit from her own
dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the other party. Sans her answer, the trial court correctly
proceeded with the trial and rendered its Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have waived her
right to present her side of the story. Neither should the lower court wait for the decision in G.R.
No. 126603 to become final and executory, nor should it wait for its records to be remanded back
to it because G.R. No. 126603 involves strictly the propriety of the Motion to Dismiss and not the
issue of validity of marriage.

The Public Prosecutor issued a report as

to the non-existence of collusion.

Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC)44 also requries the participation of the public prosecutor in cases involving void
marriages. It specifically mandates the prosecutor to submit his investigation report to determine
whether there is collusion between the parties:

Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.–(1) Within one month after receipt of the
court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a
report to the court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the
parties and their respective counsels, if any.

(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in
his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of collusion
within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the report for
hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.

(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for
pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-
trial.

Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public prosecutor to submit the
required report,45 which we find to have been sufficiently complied with by Assistant City
Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated March 30, 1995, 46 wherein he attested
that there could be no collusion between the parties and no fabrication of evidence because
Estrellita is not the spouse of any of the private respondents.

Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even assuming that there is a
lack of report of collusion or a lack of participation by the public prosecutor, just as we held in
Tuason v. Court of Appeals,47 the lack of participation of a fiscal does not invalidate the
proceedings in the trial court:

The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation
proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that
the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment
proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no
allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties.
Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney
to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the
proceedings in the trial court.48

The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was
never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized
under civil and Muslim rites.49 The only law in force governing marriage relationships between
Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only
one marriage can exist at any given time.50 Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code,
divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 51 which was not
availed of during its effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by
way of divorce under PD 1083,52 the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083
cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to "marriage
and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the
marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the
Philippines." But we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not
provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites." 53

Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot
retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of
Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the prospective application of its
provisions unless otherwise provided:

Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. —Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall
be governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution, and nothing herein except as
otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any
right acquired or liability incurred thereby.

It has been held that:

The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate prospectively,
unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably expressed or necessarily
implied; accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of
laws. Article 186 aforecited enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions
applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body of law,
specifically, the Civil Code – in respect of civil acts that took place before the Muslim Code’s
enactment.54

An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2) which states:

A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code in accordance with
non-Muslim law shall be considered as one contracted under Muslim law provided the spouses
register their mutual desire to this effect.

Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be considered as
one contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent between Zorayda and
Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under
both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their
personal status since this was in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage. In view of
Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their
subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.

Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the declaration of
nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the husband or the wife the filing
of a petition for nullity is prospective in application and does not shut out the prior spouse from
filing suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage.

Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines, 55 Estrellita relies on A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that under Section 2(a) 56 thereof, only the
husband or the wife, to the exclusion of others, may file a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity, therefore only she and Sen. Tamano may directly attack the validity of their own marriage.

Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this interpretation does not apply if the reason behind
the petition is bigamy.

In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the petition to the
exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in
the following manner, viz:

(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages
and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not
have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior
to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to
preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. 57

Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the
"aggrieved or injured spouse." If Estrellita’s interpretation is employed, the prior spouse is
unjustly precluded from filing an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule contemplated.

The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered
during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss
had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous
marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and
thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one
in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous
marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage
but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will
always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
sanctity is protected by the Constitution.

Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from impugning the subsequent
marriage.  But in the case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities to file an action
1âwphi1

for nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs marriages celebrated under the Family
Code, such is prospective in application and does not apply to cases already commenced before
March 15, 2003.58

Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellita’s marriage in November
1994. While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void
marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may
be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. 59 Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
does not apply, Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir,
is likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since
both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. 60

Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be interpreted in a
way that would preserve their respective rights which include striking down bigamous marriages.
We thus find the CA Decision correctly rendered.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as well as its subsequent Resolution issued on September
13, 2005, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
 CA rollo, pp. 129-142; penned by Associate Justice Aurora Santiago-Lagman and
concurred in by Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Rebecca de Guia-
Salvador.

2
 Id. at 205-210.

3
 Records, p. 103.

4
 Id. at 13.

5
 Namely Jamila, Jacob, Amina, Macapanton, Ysmael, Soraya, Adel and Aquil.

6
 Rollo, pp. 54-60.

7
 Id. at 57.

8
 Records, pp. 14-15, 25-26.

9
 Id. at 25-26.

10
 Id. at 17, 29.

11
 Id. at 32-38.
12
 Id. at 38-40.

13
 Id. at 109-111, 123.

14
 Id. at 143.

15
 Id. at 151, 153, 173, 174.

16
 Id. at 213.

17
 Id. at 176.

18
 Id. at 230-236.

19
 Tamano v. Hon. Ortiz, 353 Phil. 775 (1998).

 Records, p. 237. The trial court erred in stating that ‘let reception of plaintiff’s evidence
20

herein be set on June 26, 1997 x x x" when in fact, it was already defendant’s turn.

21
 Id. at 240.

22
 Id. at 242-244.

23
 Id. at 315-318.

24
 Id. at 319-322.

25
 Rollo, pp. 69-76.

26
 Records, p. 367.

27
 Id. at 354-362.

28
 Rollo, pp. 77-82; penned by Judge Elsa de Guzman.

29
 Family Code, Article 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;

xxxx

New Civil Code, Article 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than
such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;

xxxx

30
 Rollo, p. 80.
31
 CA rollo, pp. 17-41.

32
 Rollo, pp. 34-46.

33
 Id. at 48-53.

34
 Rules of Court, Rule 9, Section 3(e) Where no defaults allowed. — If the defending
party in an action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal
separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to
intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.

 Family Code, Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
35

marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear
on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take
care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based

upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.

36
 457 Phil 463 (2003).

37
 Rollo, p. 217.

38
 Id. at 133, 135.

39
 Inadvertently referred to as A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC.

40
 Supra note 36.

41
 Id. at 468.

42
 Sps. Diaz v. Diaz, 387 Phil 314, 334 (2000).

43
 Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 7.

44
 Dated March 4, 2003, with an effectivity date of March 15, 2003.

45
 Records, p. 30.

46
 Id. at 56.

47
 326 Phil 169 (1996).

48
 Id. at 181.

 Supra note 12, where Zorayda’s disbarment complaint stated that the marriage was
49

conducted under both rites.

50
 Malang v. Judge Moson, 398 Phil. 41 (2000).

 An Act Authorizing For A Period Of Twenty Years Divorce Among Moslems Residing In
51

Non-Christian Provinces In Accordance With Moslem Customs and Practices (approved

on June 18, 1949), Section 1 of which provides:
 Section 1. For a period of twenty years from the date of the approval of this Act,
divorce among Moslems residing in non-Christian provinces shall be recognized
and be governed by Moslem customs and practices.

52
 Under Articles 45-57.

53
 Tamano v. Hon. Ortiz, supra note 19 at 781.

54
 Malang v. Judge Moson, supra note 50 at 57.

55
 Executive Order No. 209, which took effect on August 3, 1988.

56
 Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.–

(a) Who may file.–A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.

 Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Eulogio B. Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli, G.R. No.
57

173614, September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA 418, 429, citing Rationale of the Rules on
Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages,
Legal Separation and Provisional Orders.

 Carlos v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 116, 132 citing
58

Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Eulogio B. Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli, supra note
57 at 428.

59
 Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil 661, 673 (2000).

60
 Rules of Court, Rule 3, Section 2.

LLAVE V. REPUBLIC 

G.R. No. 169766, [March 30, 2011]

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision dated August 17, 2004 of

the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution
dated September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave s
(Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.

FACTS:

Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamanomarried Estrellita twice – initially
under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and,
subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao
del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was
indicated as “divorced”. Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the
whole world as Sen. Tamano s wife, and upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano
(Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in
behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a
complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage
between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged that
Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this
marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.

ISSUE:

Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.

HELD:

Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zoraydaand late Sen. Tamano; their
marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano s subsequent marriage to
Estrellita is void ab initio.

RATIO:

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958,
solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950,
under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under
the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has been
severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal
laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof
provides that the law applies to “marriage and divorce wherein both parties are
Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized
in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.” But
Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties
were married both in civil and Muslim rites.”

HELD:

The petition is DENIED.

USECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 206220, August 19, 2015

LUIS UY, SUBSTITUTED BY LYDIA UY VELASQUEZ AND SHIRLEY UY

MACARAIG, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES JOSE LACSAMANA AND
ROSAURA* MENDOZA, SUBSTITUTED BY CORAZON BUENA, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the Decision dated 14 September
20112 and Resolution dated 1 March 20133 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 93786.

The subject of the litigation involves a parcel of land known as Lot 5506 of the
Cadastral Survey of Batangas plan (LRC) SWO-2817, L.R. Case No. N-445, L.R.C.
Record No. N-22499. The land, situated in Barrio Alangilan, Batangas City, contains
an area of 484 square meters under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
24660.4 The land was previously owned by spouses Anastacio Manuel and Mariquita
de Villa (Spouses Manuel) under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-2840.

On 4 May 1979, petitioner Luis Uy (Uy) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pallocan West, Batangas City, Branch 4, a Complaint 5 for Declaration of Nullity of
Documents with Damages against respondents Petra Rosca (Rosca), and spouses
Jose Lacsamana and Rosaura Mendoza (Spouses Lacsamana).

In the Complaint, Uy alleged that he was the lawful husband of Rosca. He stated
that they lived together as husband and wife from the time they were married in
1944 until 1973 when they separated and lived apart. Uy and Rosca had eight
children.

Uy alleged that on 29 January 1964,6 he and his wife acquired a 484 square meter
residential land for a consideration of P1,936 evidenced by a Deed of Sale 7 from the
Spouses Manuel. The sellers' OCT No. 0-2840 was cancelled and TCT No. T-24660
was issued in the name of "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy."

On 15 June 1964, Uy and Rosca allegedly purchased, as evidenced by a Deed of

Absolute Sale,8 another residential land adjacent to the 484 square meter land from
the spouses Felix Contreras and Maxima de Guzman (Spouses Contreras). The
second purchase consisted of 215 square meters, as declared under Tax Declaration
No. 61724, for a consideration of P700. Thereafter, a split level house with a floor
area of 208.50 square meters was constructed on the 484 square meter land.

Uy further alleged that Rosca, in gross and evident bad faith, executed and signed a
false and simulated Deed of Sale9 dated 18 April 1979 on the 484 square meter
land, together with the house erected thereon, for a consideration of P80,000 in
favor of Spouses Lacsamana.

Uy prayed that (1) the Deed of Sale dated 18 April 1979 executed by Rosca in favor
of Spouses Lacsamana be declared null and void with respect to his rights, interest,
and ownership; (2) that defendants be directed to pay, jointly and severally, to Uy
the amounts of P100,000 as moral damages, P10,000 as attorney's fees, P2,000 as
expenses incident to litigation, plus costs of suit; (3) upon declaration of the nullity
of the Deed of Sale, the Register of Deeds of Batangas City and the City Assessor be
directed to register Uy as the sole owner of the real properties; (4) if defendant
Spouses Lacsamana are found by the court to be buyers in good faith, Rosca be
ordered to turn over to Uy the entire proceeds of sale of the properties and be
adjudged to pay the damages; and (5) that the sum of P600,000 taken by Rosca
from Uy be collated into the mass of the conjugal partnership properties.

In her Answer with Counterclaim dated 22 May 1979, Rosca denied the allegations
of Uy and claimed that she lawfully acquired the subject real properties using her
paraphernal funds. Rosca added that she was never married to Uy and prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. In her Counterclaim, Rosca prayed
that the court award her (1) P200,000 as moral damages; (2) P100,000 as
exemplary damages; (3) P12,000 as attorney's fees; (4) P3,000 as incidental
litigation expenses; and (5) costs of suit. Spouses Lacsamana also filed their Answer
with Counterclaim dated 21 May 1979 claiming that they were buyers in good faith
and for value and that they relied on the Torrens title which stated that Rosca was
the owner of the subject property.

In the meantime, Uy questioned the registrability of the Deed of Sale before the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Batangas City. The Register of Deeds elevated the
matter, on consulta,10 with the Land Registration Commission (LRC) because of an
affidavit subsequently filed by Uy contesting the sale and alleging, among others,
that the property was conjugal in nature and sold without his marital consent.

In a Resolution11 dated 7 November 1979, the LRC decided in favor of registration

stating that since the property in question was registered in Rosca's name, such
circumstance indicated that the property belonged to Rosca, as her paraphernal
property. The LRC added that litigious matters, such as a protest from the other
party based on justifiable and legal grounds, were to be decided not by the Register
of Deeds but by a court of competent jurisdiction. The dispositive portion of the
Resolution states: LawlibraryofCRAlaw

WHEREFORE, this Commission is of the opinion that the subject document should be
admitted for registration.

SO ORDERED.12

On 18 February 1981, Uy died.13 His two daughters, Lydia Uy Velasquez (Lydia) and

Shirley Uy Macaraig (Shirley) substituted him in the case. Fifteen years later or on
10 May 1996, Rosca also died.14 Earlier, respondent Jose Lacsamana died on 20
March 1991.15 redarclaw

Meanwhile, on 24 December 1982, Spouses Lacsamana sold the property to Corazon

Buena (Buena) through a Deed of Absolute Sale.16 Thus, both Rosca and the
Spouses Lacsamana were substituted by Buena as respondent in this case.

During the trial, Uy presented the testimonies of his two daughters, Lydia and
Shirley, as his own witnesses, as well as Rosca, as an adverse witness.

Lydia testified that the Uy family lived in the house built on the land acquired by Uy
and Rosca. She alleged that the house existed until it was demolished by Buena's
agent sometime in 2006. Lydia also stated that the funds used to construct the
family dwelling came from Uy's business. Shirley corroborated the testimony of
Lydia on all material points.

Rosca, on the other hand, testified that sometime before or during World War II, she
and Uy cohabited and settled in Batangas. The couple attempted to formalize their
marital union with a marriage ceremony. However, the celebration was not
consummated because of the bombings which occurred on the day of the ceremony.
Likewise, they were unable to secure a marriage contract.

Rosca stated that on 29 January 1964, she alone purchased, as sole vendee, with
money coming from her own personal and paraphernal funds, the land covered by
OCT No. 0-2840 and owned by Spouses Manuel. Thereafter, on 15 June 1964, she
again purchased, using her own personal and paraphernal funds, the land adjacent
to the first purchased property owned by Spouses Contreras and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 61724. Immediately after, she caused the construction of a split
level house on the land using her own paraphernal funds which became their family
dwelling.

Rosca alleged that Uy had an affair with another woman and sired children with her
which led to their physical separation before the year 1973. On 17 September 1976,
Rosca obtained a real estate loan in the amount of P50,000 from Philippine Banking
Corporation (PBC) using the house and lot as collateral. In support of this loan,
Rosca executed an Affidavit of Ownership 17 dated 27 September 1976, stating that
(1) she was the lawful and sole owner of the 484 square meter land, together with
the building erected thereon, and (2) the land was registered under her name and
that the phrase "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy" in TCT No. T-24660 was merely
a description of her status.

Defendants offered the testimony of Rosca, Atty. Teodulfo Dequito, Jr., Rosaura
Mendoza, and Buena.

Atty. Teodulfo Dequito, Jr. testified that Uy questioned the registrability of the Deed
of Sale before the Office of the Register of Deeds of Batangas City. The Register of
Deeds elevated the matter on consulta with the LRC, which issued a Resolution
dated 7 November 1979 recognizing Rosca as the sole registered owner of the
property.

Rosaura Mendoza testified that she and her husband purchased, in the amount of
P80,000, the 484 square meter property of Rosca on 18 April 1979 through a Deed
of Absolute Sale of House and Lot. 18 The Registry of Deeds of Batangas City
cancelled TCT No. T-24660 and issued TCT No. T-35 19 in favor of the spouses. Then,
Spouses Lacsamana mortgaged the property to PBC for P48,000. Upon full payment
of the mortgage debt on 15 April 1982, PBC issued a Release of Real Estate
Mortgage.

Buena testified that she purchased the same property under TCT No. T-35 from
Spouses Lacsamana on 24 December 1982 for a consideration of P80,000.
Consequently, the Registry of Deeds of Batangas City cancelled TCT No. T-35 and
issued TCT No. T-324420 in her name. Likewise, the Assessor's Office of Batangas
City issued Tax Declaration No. 90210.21 redarclaw

Before the resolution of the case, Shirley and Lydia filed a Motion for Issuance of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. They claimed that
Buena entered the property and caused the construction of structures without any
court order. Consequently, the RTC issued an Order dated 21 September 2007
granting the preliminary injunction. Thereafter, the case was submitted for
resolution.

In a Decision22 dated 21 April 2009, the RTC decided the case in favor of

respondents. The lower court found that (1) there was no valid marriage between Uy
and Rosca; (2) the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca over the house and lot in favor
of Spouses Lacsamana was valid; and (3) both parties were not entitled to their
respective claims for damages. The dispositive portion of the Decision states: LawlibraryofCRAlaw

WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the instant Complaint filed by plaintiff Uy is

hereby DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction and bond are cancelled and are
rendered of no force and effect. The claims for damages of both parties are hereby
DENIED. Cost against both parties.

SO ORDERED.23

Uy filed an appeal24 with the CA. In a Decision25 dated 14 September 2011, the CA

affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The appellate court found that respondents
were able to overthrow the presumption of marriage and that the subject property
was Rosca's paraphernal property. The appellate court also upheld the validity of the
sale. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated April 21, 2009 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.26

Uy then filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the appellate court
in a Resolution27 dated 1 March 2013.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue

The main issue for our resolution is whether the Deed of Sale dated 18 April 1979,
executed by Rosca alone, without Uy's consent, in favor of Spouses Lacsamana, is
valid.

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Uy contends that the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca is not valid for being
simulated or fictitious for lack of consideration and consent. Uy states that no proof
was presented by Spouses Lacsamana to show that they actually paid P80,000 to
Rosca for the purchase of the property. Uy also insists that he did not give his
consent to the sale which prejudiced his rights and interest. Uy argues that Rosca
did not give physical possession of the house and lot to the alleged buyers. Further,
Uy adds, without admitting that the sale is valid, that the consideration paid was
unreasonably low and unconscionable such that it constitutes an equitable
mortgage. Uy insists that Spouses Lacsamana and Buena cannot be considered
buyers in good faith.

Respondents, on the other hand, assert that the contentions of Uy rely on the re-
examination and re-evaluation of the evidence of the parties which had previously
been passed upon exhaustively by both the trial and appellate courts. Respondents
added that only questions of law may be raised under Rule 45. Since the findings of
fact of the trial and appellate courts were supported by substantial evidence and
none of the recognized exceptions allowing this Court to exercise its power to review
is present, then the petition should be dismissed.

We agree with respondents.

The issues raised by Uy had been thoroughly passed upon by the trial and appellate
courts. We find no reason to disturb their factual findings. In petitions for review on
certiorari as a mode of appeal under Rule 45, like in the present case, a petitioner
can raise only questions of law. Here, Uy would like us to review again the factual
circumstances surrounding the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca with the Spouses
Lacsamana and to declare the Deed of Sale invalid for being simulated due to lack of
consideration and consent. Clearly, these are questions of fact which are within the
purview of the trial and appellate courts to determine. Also, the issues raised do not
come within the purview of the recognized exceptions 28 for this Court to take
cognizance of the case. We have reiterated time and again that this Court is not the
proper venue to consider factual issues as it is not a trier of facts.

Here, the main issue in determining the validity of the sale of the property by Rosca
alone is anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage. There is a
presumption established in our Rules "that a man and woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." 29Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage.30 However, this
presumption may be contradicted by a party and overcome by other evidence.

Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. In Pugeda v.

Trias,31 we held that testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of
the witnesses to the marriage, as well as the person who officiated at the
solemnization of the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of
marriage.

Documentary evidence may also be shown. In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals,32 we

held that the best documentary evidence of a marriage is the marriage contract
itself. Under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law of 1929, 33 as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 114,34 which is applicable to the present case being the
marriage law in effect at the time Uy and Rosca cohabited, the marriage certificate,
where the contracting parties state that they take each other as husband and wife,
must be furnished by the person solemnizing the marriage to (1) either of the
contracting parties, and (2) the clerk of the Municipal Court of Manila or the
municipal secretary of the municipality where the marriage was solemnized. The
third copy of the marriage contract, the marriage license and the affidavit of the
interested party regarding the solemnization of the marriage other than those
mentioned in Section 5 of the same Act shall be kept by the official, priest, or
minister who solemnized the marriage.

Here, Uy was not able to present any copy of the marriage certificate which he could
have sourced from his own personal records, the solemnizing officer, or the
municipal office where the marriage allegedly took place. Even the findings of the
RTC revealed that Uy did not show a single relevant evidence that he was actually
married to Rosca. On the contrary, the documents Uy submitted showed that he and
Rosca were not legally married to each other. The pertinent portions of the RTC
Decision state:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

x x x In the case under consideration, the presumption of marriage, on which

plaintiff Uy anchored his allegations, has been sufficiently offset. Records reveal that
there is plethora of evidence showing that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca were
never actually married to each other, to wit: LawlibraryofCRAlaw

First. In his Petition for Naturalization as a Filipino citizen filed before the then Court
of First Instance of Batangas on 12 November 1953, plaintiff Uy himself stated in the
fifth paragraph of his Petition, to quote: "I am married (not legally)."

Second. The Sworn Statement of no less than the Governor of the Province of
Batangas executed in support of the plaintiff Uy's Petition for Naturalization
categorically states, in Nos. 2 and 4 thereof, that plaintiff Uy was married (not
legally).

Third. The Immigrant Certificate of Residence shows that as late as 9 October 1951,
plaintiff Uy also known by his Chinese name of Uy Suan Tee, regarded himself as
"single" when filling up his civil status therein.

Fourth. The Alien Certificate of Registration No. 83758 establishes that plaintiff Uy
was an alien duly registered with the Bureau of Immigration of the Philippines and
that his civil status was single.

Fifth. The Affidavit of Vicente J. Caedo, a prominent citizen of Batangas, establishes

in Nos. 2 and 4 thereof that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to defendant Rosca.

Sixth. The testimony of defendant Rosca as an adverse witness reveals that plaintiff
Uy was not legally married to her because their marriage was not consummated.

For his part, plaintiff Uy tried to justify the non-presentation of their marriage
certificate by presenting public documents, namely: LawlibraryofCRAlaw

First. Decision in the case entitled: "In the matter of the Petition of Uy Suan Tee
alias Luis G. Uy, to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines";

Second. Certificate of Live Birth of Violeta Uy, daughter of plaintiff Uy and

defendant Rosca and the descriptive word "legitimate" showing that Violeta Uy was
legitimate;

Third. Death Claim under SSS Employee Compensation executed and signed by
defendant Rosca, stating that she is the wife of plaintiff Uy;

Fourth. Various pictures of the plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca with their children;

Fifth. Special Power of Attorney executed by defendant Rosca dated 19 July 1985
wherein she admitted being the wife of plaintiff Uy;

Sixth. Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 3 August 1982 executed by defendant Rosca

admitting she is the widow of plaintiff Uy which was not testified to nor identified by
Rosca;

Seventh. Affidavit of Ownership dated 27 September 1976 signed by defendant

Rosca admitting her status as married;

to establish the fact of his marriage with defendant Rosca. Likewise, plaintiff Uy
presented defendant Rosca as an adverse witness purportedly to elicit from her the
fact of his marriage with the latter. However, this presumption had been debunked
by plaintiff Uy's own evidence and most importantly, by the more superior evidence
presented by the defendants.

While it is true that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca cohabited as husband and wife,
defendant Rosca's testimony revealed that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to her
because their marriage was not consummated. In People vs. Borromeo, this Court
held that persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, absent any
counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. 
Consequently, with the presumption of marriage sufficiently overcome, the onus
probandi of defendant Rosca shifted to plaintiff Uy. It then became the burden of
plaintiff Uy to prove that he and defendant Rosca, were legally married. It became
necessary for plaintiff Uy therefore to submit additional proof to show that they were
legally married. He, however, dismally failed to do so. 35

Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was legally married to Rosca, their
property relations would be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which
applies when a couple living together were not incapacitated from getting married.
Article 147 provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed
to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted
in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of
the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent
party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.

The provision states that properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed co-
owned unless there is proof to the contrary. We agree with both the trial and
appellate courts that Rosca was able to prove that the subject property is not co-
owned but is paraphernal.

First, in the Resolution dated 7 November 1979 of the LRC in LRC Consulta No.
1194, Rosca was recognized as the sole registered owner of the property. 36 redarclaw

Second, in the Deed of Sale dated 29 January 1964 between Spouses Manuel and
Rosca covering the 484 square meter land, Uy served as a mere witness to Rosca's
purchase of the land as evidenced by his signature under "signed in the presence
of."37 This could only mean that Uy admitted the paraphernal nature of Rosca's
ownership over the property.

Third, in the Affidavit of Ownership dated 27 September 1976 executed by Rosca in

support of her real estate loan application with PBC in the amount of P5 0,000,
Rosca stated that she was the sole and lawful owner of the subject property and that
the land was registered under her name and that the phrase "Petra Rosca, married
to Luis G. Uy" in TCT No. T-24660 was merely a description of her status. 38 redarclaw

Last, the title to the property in the name of "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy"
was notice to the world, including her heirs and successors-in-interest, that such
belonged to Rosca as her paraphernal property. 39 The words "married to" were
merely descriptive of Rosca's status at the time the property was registered in her
name.40 Otherwise, if the property was conjugal, the title to the property should
have been in the names of Luis Uy and Petra Rosca. 41 redarclaw

In Ruiz v. Court of Appeals,42 the property subject of the mortgage was registered in

the name of "Corazon G. Ruiz, of legal age, married to Rogelio Ruiz, Filipinos." This
Court ruled that the title is registered in the name of Corazon alone because the
phrase "married to Rogelio Ruiz" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Corazon
and should not be construed to mean that her husband is also a registered owner.

Based on the evidence she presented, Rosca was able to sufficiently overcome the
presumption that any property acquired while living together shall be owned by the
couple in equal shares. The house and lot were clearly Rosca's paraphernal
properties and she had every right to sell the same even without Uy's consent.

Uy further contends that the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca is not valid for being
simulated or fictitious for lack of consideration. Uy states that no proof was
presented by Spouses Lacsamana to show that they actually paid P80,000 to Rosca
for the purchase of the property or even if there was consideration, such was
unreasonably low and unconscionable. Thus, Spouses Lacsamana and Buena cannot
be considered as buyers in good faith.

We disagree.

Uy did not present any proof to show that Rosca did not receive any consideration
for the sale. Neither did he submit any evidence, whether documentary or
testimonial, showing the fair market value of the property at the time of the sale to
prove that the purchase price was unreasonably low or unconscionable. It was even
mentioned by the appellate court that "appellants failed to prove that on April 18,
1979, the property might have been worth millions of pesos." Thus, Uy's allegations
lack sufficient substantiation.

Moreover, the factual findings of the appellate court carry great weight and are
binding on this Court when they coincide with the factual findings of the trial court.
This Court will not weigh the evidence all over again since payment of the purchase
price and the consideration for the sale are factual issues which cannot be raised in
this petition.

In sum, we find that the Deed of Sale, executed by Rosca on her paraphernal
property in favor of Spouses Lacsamana, is valid.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 14

September 2011 and Resolution dated 1 March 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 93786.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary

Brion, Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

*
Also referred to in the Records as Rosauro Mendoza.

[1
 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

2
Rollo, pp. 45-63.   Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. de Leon, with
Associate Justices Mario V. Lopez and Socorro B. Inting concurring.

3
 Id. at 7-8.

4
 Sometimes designated as TCT No. (T-24660)-T-1296 in the records. Exhibit "B,"
folder of exhibits for the plaintiffs.

5
 Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-6, Docketed as Civil Case No. 1832.

6
 In the original and amended complaints, the date indicated is 29 May 1964.

7
 Records, Vol. I, p. 7.

8
 Id. at 8.

9
 Records, Vol. I, pp. 225-226.

10
 Docketed as LRC Consulta No. 1194.

11
 Exhibit "3," folder of exhibits for the defendants.

12
 Resolution p. 4. Exhibit "3," folder of exhibits for the defendants.

13
 As evidenced by a Certificate of Death. Records, Vol. I, p. 146.

14
 As evidenced by Certificate of Death Registry No. 96- 0527. Records, Vol. II, p.
698.

15
 As evidenced by Certificate of Death Registry No. 91-278. Id. at 699.

16
 Records, Vol. I, pp. 223-224.

17
 Exhibit "11," folder of exhibits for the defendants.

18
 Records, Vol. I, p. 12.

19
 Id. at 228.

20
 Id. at 227.

21
 Id. at 232.

22
 CA rollo, pp. 82-94.

23
 Id. at 94.
24
 Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 93786.

25
 Supra note 2.

26
 Supra note 2, at 63.

27
 Supra note 3.

28
 Recognized exceptions to this rule are: LawlibraryofCRAlaw

(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of facts are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the
case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record; and
(11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion. (E.Y. Industrial Sales, Inc. v. Shen Dar Electricity and Machinery Co.,
Ltd., 648 Phil. 572, 580-581 (2010).

29
 Section 3(aa), Rule 131, Rules of Court.

30
Delgado vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs ofMarciana Rustia vda. de Damian, 516 Phil.
130 (2006).

31
 114 Phil. 781(1962).

32
 G.R. No. 84464, 21 June 1991, 198 SCRA 472.

33
 Approved on 4 December 1929. Effective six months after its approval.

34
An Act to Amend the Marriage Law, so as to Grant Facilities for Securing Marriage
Licenses, Among Other Purposes. Approved and effective on 3 November 1936.

35
 Records, Vol. II, pp. 997-999.

36
 Supra note 11.

37
 Supra note 7.

38
 Supra note 17.

39
Pisuena v. Heirs of Unating, 372 Phil. 267, 281 (1999).
40
 Id., citing Magallon v. Montejo, 230 Phil. 366, 377 (1986).

41
 See Stuart v. Yatco, 114 Phil. 1083, 1084 (1962). Citations omitted.

42
 449 Phil. 419, 431 (2003).

y vs. Sps. Lacsamana, G.R. # 20622, Aug. 19, 2015

Morigo vs. People, G.R. # 145226, Feb. 6, 2004

G.R. No. 145226             February 06, 2004

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision dated October 21, 1999 of the
1 

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment dated August 5, 1996
2 

of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court
found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and
sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the
resolution of the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigo’s motion for
3 

reconsideration.

The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina
Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-
1978).

After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.

In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from
Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became
sweethearts.

In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While
in Canada, they maintained constant communication.

In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her
in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at
the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
 On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant
Lucio behind.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for
divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to
take effect on February 17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at 4 

the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The
complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage with
Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.

On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information filed by the5 

City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. 6

The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for
judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.
His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the
prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.

On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as
follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y
Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision
Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as
maximum.

SO ORDERED. 7

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his first marriage to
Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals, the trial court ruled that
8 

want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a
marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but
must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed
to marry again.

Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur, which held 9 

that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both
spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to
determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not
entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucio’s defense of good faith in contracting the
second marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu, everyone is presumed to
10 

know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law
does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.

Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the
appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage
between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No
appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.

On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby

AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED. 11

In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent
declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio.
The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code is the
12 

act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the
CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a
bigamy case.

The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the
Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 of the
13 

Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article
17 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment
14 

promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, contending that the
doctrine in Mendiola v. People, allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect
15 

of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.

On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit. However, the
16 

denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate court’s original decision in CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P.
Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared void ab initio,
then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of
the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he
cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.

The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:

A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE

RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER
OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE]
PETITIONER’S LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND
MARRIAGE.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT
BAR.

C.
 WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE
RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF
THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. 17

To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so,
whether his defense of good faith is valid.

The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce
decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly
and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further
argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case.
The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in
se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He
stresses that there is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to
perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second
marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.

For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the
instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling
in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all
18 

the elements concur, stressing that under Article 40 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of
19 

nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said
Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that
petitioner’s contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the
Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Lucia.

Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first
determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v.
Bobis, we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
20 

(1) the offender has been legally married;

(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;

(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and

(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of
the first.

Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No.
6020, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the

annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on
August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar,
Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.

SO ORDERED. 21

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and
Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage
contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that
the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. As the
22  23 

dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that there was
no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first
marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration
of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the
accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married." The records show that no appeal was
24 

taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long
become final and executory.

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married.
But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there
is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared
void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it
bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner
was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The
existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy,
it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first
marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan. In the latter
25 

case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second
marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent

one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first
obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the
earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void." 26

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just
once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again
six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared
to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own.
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and
thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless
he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in
favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to
ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner
has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the
validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court
dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of
BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

Rollo, pp. 38-44. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and concurred in by
1 

Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Edgardo P. Cruz.

Records, pp. 114-119.

2 

Rollo, pp. 46-58. Per Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, with Associate Justices Cancio
3 

C. Garcia and Marina L. Buzon, concurring and Eugenio S. Labitoria and Bernardo P.
Abesamis, dissenting.

Her correct name is Maria Jececha Limbago (Italics for emphasis). See Exh. "B," the
4 

copy of their marriage contract. Records, p. 10.

The accusatory portion of the charge sheet found in Records, p. 1, reads:

5 

"That, on or about the 4th day of October, 1992, in the City of Tagbilaran,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Lucia Barrete on August
23, 1990 and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with
Maria Jececha Limbago to the damage and prejudice of Lucia Barrete in the
amount to be proved during trial.

"Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code."

Rollo, pp. 38-40.

6 

Records, p. 119.
7 

G.R. No. 104818, 17 September 1993, 226 SCRA 572.

8 

42 Phil. 855, 863 (1918).

9 

10 
58 Phil. 817 (1933).

11 
Rollo, p. 43.

ART. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person
12 

who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
13 

capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.

Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall
14 

be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.

 When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials
of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established
by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

15 
G.R. Nos. 89983-84, 6 March 1992, 207 SCRA 85.

16 
Rollo, p. 51.

17 
Id. at 20-21.

18 
G.R. No. 138509, 31 July 2000, 336 SCRA 747, 752-753.

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
19 

remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

20 
Supra.

21 
CA Rollo, p. 38.

22 
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this
Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration
that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age.

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
23 

marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as
provided in Article 45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage
but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally
and administratively liable.

24 
Rollo, p. 54.

25 
G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA 122.

26 
Id. at 124.

Morigo v. People, G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004

FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol for four years.
The lost contacts when the school year ended. When Lucio received a card from
Lucia Barrete from Singapore, constant communication took place between them.
They later became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left
again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant
communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition
appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married
on August 30, 1990 in Bohol. Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving
appellant Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a
petition for divorce against appellant which was granted on January 17, 1992 and to
take effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo
married Maria Jececha Lumbago in Bohol. On September 21, 1993, accused filed a
complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage on the ground that no
marriage ceremony actually took place.

ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage
with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.

HELD: Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no
actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead
they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file
declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage
with Lumbago.  Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.

Lavadia vs. Heirs of Luna, et. al., G.R. # 171914, July 23, 2014

G.R. No. 171914               July 23, 2014

SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA
ZABALLERO-LUNA, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine
law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage involving
Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent
judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a
subsequent marriage.

The Case

The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision
promulgated on November 11, 2005,  whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with
1

modification the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 138, in Makati City.  The CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of
2
the husband in a condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired during the
second marriage.

Antecedents

The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:

ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip,
Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with
his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially
married ina civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on
September 10, 1947 and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San
Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNA’s marriage to EUGENIA, they begot
seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano,
Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio
Luna. After almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed
to live apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to which
end, they entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately
and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.

On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA
from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance
of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same
date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY.
LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until
1987.

Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and
Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.

On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora
Development Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium
unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square meters, for ₱1,449,056.00, to be
paid on installment basis for 36months starting on April 15, 1978. Said condominium unit was to
be usedas law office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the
condominium unit was executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10,
1983, which was registered bearing the following names:

"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to
Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan
(17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in
the condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was
issued on February 7, 1992 in the following names:

"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to
Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100)
x x x"

Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the
partners but the same was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties
stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share.
ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela
Cruzand used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted
until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office
furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son
of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit
belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named
Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.

The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law books,
office furniture and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against
the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10, 1999,
docketed as Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were
acquired during the existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through
their joint efforts that since they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said
properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of ¾ pro-indiviso share consisting of her
½ share in the said properties plus her ½ share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was
bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will and testament; and thatthe heirs of ATTY. LUNA
through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the subject properties. The
complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the ¾ portion of the subject
properties;that the same be partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on the condominium
unit pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be appointed to preserve
ad administer the subject properties;and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay
attorney’s feesand costs of the suit to SOLEDAD. 3

Ruling of the RTC

On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the aforementioned
facts,  disposing thusly:
4

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at the SIXTH FLOOR
of the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100)
SQUARE METERS is adjudged to have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through his
sole industry;

(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the condominium unit,
hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds of
Makati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN
LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia
Zaballero Luna";

(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the
condominium unit and defendants are ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as
appropriate arrangements have been madefor transport and storage.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 5

Decision of the CA

Both parties appealed to the CA. 6

On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC, namely:
 I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS
ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT
CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE

TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE
ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS
TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;

IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT
THAT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND INTERVENOR-
APPELLANT WAS ALREADY DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE UNION
OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND LUNA;

V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE

ABSENCE OF THE DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;

VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE

FACTTHAT THE NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED
OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION OVER THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;

VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF THE
FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE
APPLICABLE;

VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION
OF THE INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED BY PESCRIPTION AND
LACHES; and

IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE

INTERVENTION FOR FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING FEE. 7

In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the trial court, to wit:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW BOOKS
IN THE LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH THE USE OF
PLAINTIFF’S MONEY;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY

PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN
LAW BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNA’S LAW OFFICE; and

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF
PAID FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD
PRESCRIBED AND BARRED BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL. 8

On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision,  holding and ruling:
9

EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter’s death on July
12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican Republic did
not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens
is not recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x10

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision of the RTC of
MakatiCity, Branch 138, is hereby MODIFIEDas follows:

(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the
KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of
Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE
METERS is hereby adjudged to defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and
Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage), having been acquired from the sole funds and
sole industry of Juan Luces Luna while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still subsisting and valid;

(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any other concept
over the condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No.
21761 of the Registry of Deeds ofMakati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces
Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to
"JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";

(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-
Luna(first marriage) are hereby declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris,
Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports
found in the condominium unit.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 11

On March 13, 2006,  the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
12 13

Issues

In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on certiorarithat:

A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Agreement for Separation and
Property Settlement executed by Luna and Respondent Eugenia was unenforceable;
hence, their conjugal partnership was not dissolved and liquidated;

B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the Dominican Republic
court’s approval of the Agreement;

C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to adduce
sufficient proof of actual contribution to the acquisition of purchase of the
subjectcondominium unit; and

D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to the
subject law books. 14

The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be entitled to
the 25/100 pro indivisoshare in the condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris,
Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the law that should
determine, firstly, whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia)
had validly dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly, whether the second marriage entered into
by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property. Ruling of the
Court

We affirm the modified decision of the CA.

1. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia

subsisted up to the time of his death

The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the
Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the
Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued to follow the
nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
although living abroad.  Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed thiscase by
15

virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on
July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.

From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present,
absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-
recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family
Code,  even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.  Indeed, the only two types of
16 17

defective marital unions under our laws have beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such,
the remedies against such defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity
ofthe marriage and the annulment of the marriage.

It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia.  Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained
18

abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the
time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes
marriage as an inviolable social institution,  and regards it as a special contract of permanent
19

union between a man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family life.  The non-
20

recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity
of the marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid
marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly
provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce
decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and
enforcement in this jurisdiction.

2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement

was void for lack of court approval

The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement (Agreement)
that the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had entered into and executed in connection with the
divorce proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic to dissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed
reversible error in decreeing otherwise.

The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.

Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to
their marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership
of gains governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then
in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the
event that they had not entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the
marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Codeclearly so provides, to wit:

Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community
or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.

Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly:

Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and
divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or
benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.

The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various causes of
termination enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz:

Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

(3) When the marriage is annulled;

(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.

The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per sedissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent court
was still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:

Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation
of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial
order. (1432a)

Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be
decreed when the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it
civil interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.

xxxx

The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as
of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicialapproval or the voluntary
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear atthe hearing to
safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership,
the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.

After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall apply.
The provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be
applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the late
Atty. Luna and Eugenia?

The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took place only as
an incident ofthe action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the
justifications for their execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds raised in the
action for divorce.  With the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law for
21

being contrary to Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was not
also legally valid and enforceable under Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership
of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.

3. Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,

was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership

What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between Atty. Luna and
Soledad?

The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12,
1976 was void for being bigamous,  on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and
22

Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in
the Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.

The Court concurs with the CA.

In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71
of the Civil Codeclearly states:

Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine
law.

Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before

the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.  A bigamous
23

marriage is considered void ab initio. 24

Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of
its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the
rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:

Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, ortheir marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by eitheror both of
them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership.(n)

In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such
fact.  To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof
1âwphi1

of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership,
without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As the Court
explained in Saguid v. Court of Appeals: 25
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-
ownership ofproperties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the
bigamous and adulterousunion is without basis because they failed to substantiate their
allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also in Adriano
v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of
the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership absent evidence of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and
not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in the
instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte.  The plaintiff is not
1âwphi1

automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendantsome measure of
protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be
granted only after the court isconvinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief.
Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mereallegation is not
evidence. 26

The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual contributions in the purchase
of the condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at least ₱306,572.00, consisting in direct
contributions of ₱159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had obtained from Premex
Financing and Banco Filipino totaling ₱146,825.30;  and that such aggregate contributions of
27

₱306,572.00 corresponded to almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the
condominium unit amounting to ₱362,264.00 of the unit’s purchase price of ₱1,449,056.00.  The 28

petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely out of her personal funds, proof
of which Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you" note;  that she had the financial capacity to
29

make the contributions and purchases; and that Atty. Luna could not acquire the properties on
his own due to the meagerness of the income derived from his law practice.

Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?

In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioner’s assertions on her actual
contributions through the following findings and conclusions, namely:

SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds
were used to buy the law office condominium and the law books subject matter in contentionin
this case – proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the
Family Code to apply – as to cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman
living together as husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which was void ab
initio. Under Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership would govern. But this
was not readily applicable to many situations and thus it created a void at first because it applied
only if the parties were not in any way incapacitated or were without impediment to marry each
other (for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there still exists a prior conjugal
partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife). This void was filled
upon adoption of the Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the property acquired by both
of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned
in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares were prima faciepresumed to be equal. However, for this presumption to
arise, proof of actual contribution was required. The same rule and presumption was to apply to
joint deposits of money and evidence of credit. If one of the parties was validly married to
another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith was not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties were in bad faith.
Co-ownership was the exception while conjugal partnership of gains was the strict rule whereby
marriage was an inviolable social institution and divorce decrees are not recognized in the
Philippines, as was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escaño, G.R. No. L-
19671, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 355, thus:

xxxx

As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to

prove that she made an actual contribution to purchase the said property. She failed to establish
that the four (4) checks that she presented were indeed used for the acquisition of the share of
ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the Decision of the trial court,
viz.:

"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for ₱55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was issued
on January 27, 1977, which was thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of Agreement,
Exhibit "7" was signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978 in the amount of ₱97,588.89,
Exhibit "P" was payable to Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff, thiswas in payment of the
loan of Atty. Luna. The third check which was for ₱49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was dated
May 19, 1979, also for payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit "M", for
₱4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980. None of the foregoing prove that the amounts
delivered by plaintiff to the payees were for the acquisition of the subject condominium unit. The
connection was simply not established. x x x"

SOLEDAD’s claim that she made a cash contribution of ₱100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly,
there is no basis for SOLEDAD’s claim of co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of the
condominium unit and the trial court correctly found that the same was acquired through the sole
industry of ATTY. LUNA, thus:

"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the condominium unit was in the name of Atty.
Luna, together with his partners in the law firm. The name of the plaintiff does not appear as
vendee or as the spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired for the use of the Law firm of
Atty. Luna. The loans from Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust Company
were loans of Atty. Luna and his partners and plaintiff does not have evidence to show that she
paid for them fully or partially. x x x"

The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the name of "JUAN
LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna" was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the
condominium unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well
settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase
"married to" preceding "Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil status of ATTY. LUNA.

SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that SOLEDAD had no
participation in the law firm or in the purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove
that she had anything to contribute and that she actually purchased or paid for the law office
amortization and for the law books. It is more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who
bought the law office space and the law books from his earnings from his practice of law rather
than embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that he headed. 30

The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA both because they were
substantiated by the records and because we have not been shown any reason to revisit and
undo them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did not discharge her
burden of proof. Her mere allegations on her contributions, not being evidence,  did not serve the
31

purpose. In contrast, given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia,
the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds and effort
remained. It should then be justly concluded that the properties in litislegally pertained to their
conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole ownership of the
25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to
the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 11, 2005; and
ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

by Airah Ibardolaza

SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA v. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, GR No. 171914, 2014-07-23

Facts:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by
Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first
marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a... foreign
country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets
of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
ATTY. LUNA... was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar,
Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with
his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(EUGENIA), whom he initially married in a civil ceremony
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with
EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the
Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto. Domingo,
Dominican Republic, on the same... date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage,
this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the
Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the
lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z.
Luna, ATTY. LUNA's son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the
25/100 portion of the... condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la
Cruz who established his own law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision,[9] holding
and ruling:
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter's death
on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA in the
Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign
divorce between
Filipino citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x[10]
Issues:
The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be
entitled to the 25/100 pro indiviso share in the condominium unit; and to the law books
(i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal
Supreme Court
Reports).
Ruling:
Atty. Luna's first marriage with Eugenia... subsisted up to the time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in
the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization
was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Code
continued to... follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons were
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad.[15] Pursuant to the...
nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and
Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997
terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the
present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the
Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained
even under the Family
Code,[16] even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.[17] Indeed, the only
two types of defective marital unions under our laws have been the void and the
voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such... defective marriages have
been limited to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the annulment of the
marriage.
Atty. Luna's marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,... was void; properties acquired
during their marriage... were governed by the rules on co-ownership
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna's subsequent marriage to Soledad on
January 12, 1976 was void for being bigamous,[22] on the ground that the marriage
between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree
rendered by the CFI... of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic but... n the
Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71
of the Civil Code clearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as...
determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent
marriage before the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.[23] A bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio.[24]
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are
not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either
or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed... by the rules on co-ownership.(n)
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own
independent funds were used to buy the law office condominium and the law books
subject matter in contention in this case proof that was required for Article 144 of the
New Civil Code and Article
148 of the Family Code to apply as to cases where properties were acquired by a man
and a woman living together as husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage
which was void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on co-
ownership would... govern. But this was not readily applicable to many situations and
thus it created a void at first because it applied only if the parties were not in any way
incapacitated or were without impediment to marry each other (for it would be absurd to
create a co-ownership where there... still exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute
community between the man and his lawful wife). This void was filled upon adoption of
the Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the property acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of... money, property or industry shall be
owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions
and corresponding shares were prima facie presumed to be equal. However, for this
presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution was... required. The same rule and
presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of credit. If one of the
parties was validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to
the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such... valid marriage. If the
party who acted in bad faith was not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on
forfeiture applied even if both parties were in bad faith.
Principles:
Republic vs. Orbecido III, G.R. # 154380, Oct. 5, 2005

G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the
Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?

Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this
apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July 4,
2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein
respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code
and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is
given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.3

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church
of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years
later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and
then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566
A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2
of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court
granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY

CODE4

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a
petition for annulment or for legal separation. 5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that
governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of
judicial determination.6

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that
when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is
likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. 7

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually
constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court provides:

RULE 63

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an
action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity
arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

...

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party
seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.8

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two
Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and
remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a
private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief,
has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination
inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of
his second marriage.

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to
the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the
first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof
states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227
was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the
case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the
time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife
was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings 9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’
Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of
Article 26:

1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who
divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the
spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.

2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For
those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly
divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after
more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)

Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph
2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by
naturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the
parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a
naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein
hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no
longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise
be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the
interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous
results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its
spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore
be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its
spirit or intent.12

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly,
the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case.
Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is
to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long
and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage
of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation
would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally
separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is
settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.13

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was
naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized
by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and
proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife
to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient
to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
(E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen,
who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence
submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that
his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could
only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed

Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

Chairman

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO, ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
 Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 20-22.

2
 Id. at 27-29.

3
 Id. at 21-22.

4
 Id. at 105.

5
 Id. at 106-110.

6
 Id. at 110.

7
 Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty
of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government.

8
 Office of the Ombudsman v. Ibay, G.R. No. 137538, 3 September 2001, 364 SCRA 281,
286, citing Galarosa v. Valencia, G.R. No. 109455, 11 November 1993, 227 SCRA 729,
737.

9
 Held on January 27 and 28, 1988 and February 3, 1988.

10
 No. L-68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 139.

11
 G.R. No. 124862, 22 December 1998, 300 SCRA 406.

 Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, No. L-9274, 1 February 1957, 100 Phil.
12

850, 855.

13
 Cortes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121772, 13 January 2003, 395 SCRA 33, 38.

14
 Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 447.

15
 Id. at 451.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
G.R. No. 154380           October 5, 2005
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts:
Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City, on May 24,

1981.  They were blessed

with a with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido.
Lady Myros left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer in 1986.
After few years, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen.

Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree
sometime in 2000 and then married a certain Innocent Stanley and lived in
California.

He then filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding
merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it
was denied. Orbecido filed a petition for review of certiorari on the Decision of the
RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family
Code.
Held:
Yes. The Court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced
by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under
Philippine law.

The article should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,one of them
became naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtained a divorce decree.

The instant case was one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the
parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to
remarry, and indeed, she remarried an American citizen while residing in the US.
The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

However, since Orbecido was not able to prove as fact his wife’s naturalization, he
was still barred from remarrying.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

G.R. No.154881,         October 5, 2005

Facts:

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the

United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage
was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and
Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son, Kristoffer.
A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a
divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. The respondent
thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

Ruling:
The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would
be to sanction absurdity and injustice.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

The Court ruled that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code should be
interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering
that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record,
the Court is unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife,
who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such
declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the
aforecited evidence in his favor.

Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas, et. al., G.R. # 186571, Aug. 11, 2010

G.R. No. 186571               August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag
City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari 2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court (present petition).

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married
respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines
sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a
petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s
petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on
January 8, 2006.5

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love.
Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics
Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under
Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by
a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. 6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any
responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She
offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case
herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that
she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that
Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can
avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, 8 in order for
him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law. 9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v.
Orbecido III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse."11

THE PETITION

From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that
filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the
benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in
Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse – an interpretation
he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the
case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina
fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the
Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,14 both support Gerbert’s position.

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of
a foreign divorce decree.

THE COURT’S RULING

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void15 and
voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other
hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage. 17 Our
family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien,
President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to
its present wording, as follows:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated
into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both
cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a
foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized
that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court
reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to
[the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino
spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.22

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse." 23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree.
Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing
the marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces
cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second
paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves
as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or
her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is
likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can
make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the
decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law. 26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision
for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this
provision.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal
interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the
unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the
alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order
is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest
by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe
a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the
foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by
an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to
his or her national law.27

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained
that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered
by a tribunal of another country."28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must
be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law
to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. 29 The recognition may be made
in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires
proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of
the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated
by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as
the required certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law
on divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for
insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to
the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that
will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand,
at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and
overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the
foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata 32 between the parties, as
provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 33

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of
foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce
serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse
bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse
were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree

As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has
already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the
mere presentation of the decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the
need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal
capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not."35

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal
capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil
Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:

Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in
which shall be entered:

(a) births;

(b) deaths;

(c) marriages;

(d) annulments of marriages;

(e) divorces;

(f) legitimations;
 (g) adoptions;

(h) acknowledgment of natural children;

(i) naturalization; and

(j) changes of name.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the
following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil
status of persons:

(1) Birth and death register;

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but
also divorces and dissolved marriages.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration.
The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial
order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the
foreign decree presented by Gerbert.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court
recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, 36 and Department of Justice Opinion
No. 181, series of 198237 – both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court
before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it,
nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of
the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot
produce any legal effect. 1avvphi1

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the
Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil
registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code
by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry
may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the
jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires,
among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located; 38 that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest must be made parties to the proceedings; 39 and that the time and place for hearing
must be published in a newspaper of general circulation. 40 As these basic jurisdictional
requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert
filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two
separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for
recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule
108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding 41 by which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional
infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30,
2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar
General. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes
* Designated additional Member of the Third Division, in view of the retirement of Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno, per Special Order No. 843 dated May 17, 2010.

1
 Dated October 30, 2008, penned by Judge Perla B. Querubin; rollo, pp. 24-31.

2
 Id. at 3-20.

3
 Id. at 27.

4
 Marriage Certificate, id. at 37.

5
 Certificate of Divorce, id. at 38.

6
 Id. at 47-50; the pertinent portion of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, states:

It would therefore be premature to register the decree of annulment in the

Register of Annulment of Marriages in Manila, unless and until final order of
execution of such foreign judgment is issued by competent Philippine court.

7
 Supra note 1.

8
 Executive Order No. 209, enacted on July 6, 1987.

9
 Rollo, p. 31.

10
 G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114.

11
 Id. at 121.

 Gerbert’s motion for reconsideration of the RTC’s October 30, 2008 decision was
12

denied in an order dated February 17, 2009; rollo, p. 32.

13
 Supra note 2.

14
 Rollo, pp. 79-87 and 125-142, respectively.

 The void marriages are those enumerated under Articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44, and
15

53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code.

16
 The voidable marriages are those enumerated under Article 45 of the Family Code.

17
 Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 452.

 Ibid. See A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
18

Philippines, Volume One, with the Family Code of the Philippines (2004 ed.), p. 262.

19
 Proclamation No. 3, issued on March 25, 1996.

20
 G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.

21
 G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.

22
 Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20 at 144.
23
 Republic v. Orbecido, supra note 10 at 121.

24
 The capacity of the Filipino spouse to remarry, however, depends on whether the
foreign divorce decree capacitated the alien spouse to do so.

25
 See Article 17 in relation to Article 15 of the Civil Code:

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.

xxxx

Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

 Parenthetically, we add that an alien’s legal capacity to contract is evidenced by a

26

certificate issued by his or her respective diplomatic and consular officials, which he or
she must present to secure a marriage license (Article 21, Family Code). The Filipino
spouse who seeks to remarry, however, must still resort to a judicial action for a
declaration of authority to remarry.

27
 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 447; citing Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20.

28
 Remedial Law, Volume II, Rules 23-56 (2007 ed.), p. 529.

 Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 10 at 123 and Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at
29

448; see also Bayot v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155635, November 7, 2008, 570
SCRA 472.

30
 Rollo, pp. 38-41.

31
 The foreign divorce decree only stated that the marriage between Gerbert and Daisylyn
was dissolved by the Canadian court. The full text of the court’s judgment was not
included.

32
 Literally means "a thing adjudged," Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed.), p. 1178; it
establishes a rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits, on
points and matters determined in the former. Supra note 28 at 462.

 See Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103493, June 19,
33

1997, 274 SCRA 102, 110, where the Court said:

While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in
several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given
ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. It is not
necessary for this purpose to initiate a separate action or proceeding for
enforcement of the foreign judgment. What is essential is that there is opportunity
to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court to properly determine its
efficacy. This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam,
as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima
 facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to
proof to the contrary.

34
 On the face of the marriage certificate, the word "DIVORCED" was written in big, bold
letters; rollo, p. 37.

 Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007, 537 SCRA 373, 390, citing
35

Beduya v. Republic, 120 Phil. 114 (1964).

36
 Rollo, pp. 47-50.

37
 Id. at 51.

38
 Section 1, Rule 108, Rules of Court.

39
 Section 3, Rule 108, Rules of Court.

40
 Section 4, Rule 108, Rules of Court.

 When the entry sought to be corrected is substantial (i.e., the civil status of a person), a
41

Rule 108 proceeding is deemed adversarial in nature. See Co v. Civil Register of Manila,
G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 420, 430.

GERBERT R. CORPUZ vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The

SOLICITOR GENERAL
G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010

Facts: Petitioner (Gerbert Corpuz) is a former Filipino citizen who became a

Canadian citizen through naturalization. Subsequently, the petitioner
married the respondent (Daisylyn Sto. Tomas), a Filipina, in Pasig City.
After the wedding, petitioner went back to Canada due to work
commitments; however, when he came back he was shocked to discover
that the respondent is having an affair with another man. Thus, petitioner
went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of
Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted the petitioner’s petition for
divorce. The divorce decree took effect a month later, January 8, 2006.
Two years later, the petitioner has already moved on and found another
woman that he wants to marry. Thus, for his love to his fiancée; the
petitioner went to the Pasig Civil Registry Office and registered the
Canadian divorce decree on his and the respondent’s marriage certificate.
Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National
Statistic’s Office (NSO) informed the petitioner that the marriage between
him and the respondent still subsists under the Philippine Law and to be
enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized
by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, Series of
1982.
Accordingly, the petitioner filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and/or declaration of marriage dissolved with the RTC. The RTC
denied his petition, hence this recourse by the petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family

Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for
the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
Ruling: No.
Even though the trial court is correct in its conclusion that the alien spouse
can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
due to the given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and as such
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code limits its
applicability for the benefit of the Filipino spouse.
However, we qualify the above conclusion made by the trial court because
in our jurisdiction, the foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a
right that clothes the party with legal interest to petitions for its
recognition. Even though, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens- with the complementary
statement that his conclusion is not a sufficient basis to dismiss the petition
filed by Corpuz before the RTC. the unavailability of the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert
of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and
conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to
our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a

judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment
or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or

final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign
judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to
institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign
judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce
obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, “no sovereign
is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a
tribunal of another country.” This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together
with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment
on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party
invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law
of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to
be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines,
these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce
decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but
failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this
situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency
of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the
case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with
the Canadian divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the
Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s)
obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will
allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome
a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure
conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign
judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the
parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of
reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res
judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis
for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse
bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for
the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree.

Fujiki vs. Marinay, et. al., G.R. # 196409, June 26, 2013

G.R. No. 196049               June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon
City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure
question of law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case
No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality
of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

The Facts

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with
petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually,
they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical
abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. 3

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010,
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. 4 On 14 January 2011,
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab
initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; 5 and (3) for the RTC to
direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment
on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to
the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office
(NSO).6

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the
petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket. 7 The RTC cited the following
provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –

(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or
in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the
election of the petitioner. x x x

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above
provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition." 8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband
or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage
void, and not Fujiki.

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special
proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact," 9 and not a civil action
which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." 10 In
other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of
Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family
Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of
bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4)
of the Family Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by
Philippine courts.12

In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages
under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. 13 Thus, Section
2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would
be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is
not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared
a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage." 14 Fujiki had material interest
and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.

Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register
Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code. 16 The Civil Register Law imposes
a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the
final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled
marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry
relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction. 18 The petition in the
RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the
certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred"
when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC
may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of
jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v.
Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s
prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the
case."20 Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed"
the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the
provision.

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its
Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect,
prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for
dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person" 22 in the proceeding because he
"is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now
seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground
of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a
ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the
Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City
Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. 25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a
special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in
the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x." 26 Braza
emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned
only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack
such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27

The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was
not authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also
warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.

The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of
Marinay and Maekara

On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for
review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator
and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General.
Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion. 31

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that
the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the
case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings. 32 The Solicitor General argued that
Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-
Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases
of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:

[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered
during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss
had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous
marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and
thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one
in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous
marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage
but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will
always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
sanctity is protected by the Constitution. 34

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held
that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself,
as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely
to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign
divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil
status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.

The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record
"[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as
required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and
status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino
citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.

Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared
that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked." 41

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to
comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was
previously married to Fujiki.43 Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition. 45 She
would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding
between her and Fujiki.46

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding
for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.
 The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not
apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."48

I.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment
may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. 49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese
Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by
the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country
such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the
Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office. 50

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would
mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and
contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public
prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd
because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments,
which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues." 57 The interpretation of the RTC is
tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that
"[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced
back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded
litigation."59

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of the
Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad."
This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may
require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment
affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition
and legal capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign
judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal
capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine
courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order
against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states
that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts
exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a
foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can
only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the
policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations, 61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction
of other states.62

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce
decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of
evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of
ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however,
recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce
decree abroad.65

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy.
While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent
with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

II.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State
pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such
as birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the
Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or
right of a party or a particular fact."67

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto,
with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
(Emphasis supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances 68) his most
intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law
the moment he contracts marriage. 69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" 70 and preserving the property
regime of the marriage.71

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, 72 but a spouse’s right
in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and
Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. 73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot
"diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his
marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by
limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to
question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when
Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting
marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the
beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under
the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a)
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is
the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a
public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an
interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. 77 If anyone can file a criminal action which
leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, 78 there is more reason to confer
personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not
only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally
interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured
party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior
spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial
and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in
order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize
a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such
judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment
to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.

III.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a
"trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x
can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage. 82 The RTC relied on Braza in
dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara.

Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment

nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of
proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, 83 support pendente lite of the spouses
and children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, 85 and the
investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. 86 A direct action for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of
the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court
"where the corresponding civil registry is located." 87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot
dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry
based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A.
No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action
for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a
case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369
define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a
foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of
the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides
that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v.
Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26
which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse" 89 under the
laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes
Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the
Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it
is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that
results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign
citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The
correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which
is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that
the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served."91

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a
foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy.
The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of
bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because
the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry
under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines,
the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino
spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered
to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine
courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the
extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference
between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine
public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy
available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights
and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to
the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend
its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil
Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party
is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither
inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b),
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence
of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes
conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the
civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a
subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact 92 that needs to be reflected in the
civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity
of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines. 1âwphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without

prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. 93 The
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of
criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91
of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when
the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the
questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5,
respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution
dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-
11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
 Penned by Judge Jose L. Bautista Jr.

2
 In Pasay City, Metro Manila.

3
 See rollo, p. 88; Trial Family Court Decree No. 15 of 2009, Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage between Maria Paz Galela Marinay and Shinichi Maekara dated 18 August
2010. Translated by Yoshiaki Kurisu, Kurisu Gyoseishoshi Lawyer’s Office (see rollo, p.
89).

4
 Id.

5
 FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (E.O. No. 209 as amended):

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;

xxxx

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous

marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

6
 Rollo, pp. 79-80.

7
 The dispositive portion stated:

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby ordered DISMISSED and WITHDRAWN from
the active civil docket of this Court. The RTC-OCC, Quezon City is directed to refund to
the petitioner the amount of One Thousand Pesos (₱1,000) to be taken from the Sheriff’s
Trust Fund.

 Rollo, pp. 44-45. Section 5 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
8

Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) provides:

Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. – (1) The petition shall allege the complete
facts constituting the cause of action.

(2) It shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties and
specify the regime governing their property relations, as well as the properties
involved.
 If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the parties, the
petitioner may apply for a provisional order for spousal support, custody and
support of common children, visitation rights, administration of community or
conjugal property, and other matters similarly requiring urgent action.

(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping.

The verification and certification must be signed personally by the petitioner. No
petition may be filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.

If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against

forum shopping shall be authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the
Philippine embassy or legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular
agent in said country.

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition
on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial
Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof
of such service within the same period.

Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition.

 RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(c). See rollo, pp. 55-56 (Petitioner’s Motion for
9

Reconsideration).

10
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(a).

 FAMILY CODE (E.O. No. 209 as amended), Art. 35. The following marriages shall be
11

void from the beginning:

xxxx

(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;

xxxx

12
 Rollo, p. 56.

 FAMILY CODE, Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
13

celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital

obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.

14
 Rollo, p. 68.

15
 Enacted 26 November 1930.

 CIVIL CODE, Art. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall
16

be governed by special laws.

 Act No. 3753, Sec. 7. Registration of marriage. - All civil officers and priests or
17

ministers authorized to solemnize marriages shall send a copy of each marriage contract
solemnized by them to the local civil registrar within the time limit specified in the existing
Marriage Law.
 In cases of divorce and annulment of marriage, it shall be the duty of the
successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the
final decree of the court to the local civil registrar of the municipality where the
dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized.

In the marriage register there shall be entered the full name and address of each
of the contracting parties, their ages, the place and date of the solemnization of
the marriage, the names and addresses of the witnesses, the full name, address,
and relationship of the minor contracting party or parties or the person or persons
who gave their consent to the marriage, and the full name, title, and address of
the person who solemnized the marriage.

In cases of divorce or annulment of marriages, there shall be recorded the names

of the parties divorced or whose marriage was annulled, the date of the decree of
the court, and such other details as the regulations to be issued may require.

18
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. —
Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled
or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k)
election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

19
 273 Phil. 1 (1991).

20
 Id. at 7. See rollo, pp. 65 and 67.

21
 Rollo, p. 47.

22
 Id. at 46.

23
 Id. at 48.

24
 Id.

25
 G.R. No. 181174, 4 December 2009, 607 SCRA 638.

26
 Id. at 641.

27
 Id. at 643.

28
 See rollo, p. 49.

29
 Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC states in part:

Contents and form of petition. – x x x

xxxx

(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping.

The verification and certification must be signed personally by the petitioner. No
petition may be filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.
 If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against
forum shopping shall be authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the
Philippine embassy or legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular
agent in said country.

xxxx

Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition.

30
 Resolution dated 30 May 2011. Rollo, p. 105.

31
 Under Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz.

 Rollo, p. 137. The "Conclusion and Prayer" of the "Manifestation and Motion (In Lieu of
32

Comment)" of the Solicitor General stated:

In fine, the court a quo’s pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with the
requirements provided in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC should accordingly be set aside. It is,
thus, respectfully prayed that Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 be reinstated for further
proceedings.

Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.

33
 G.R. No. 169766, 30 March 2011, 646 SCRA 637.

 Id. at 656. Quoted in the Manifestation and Motion of the Solicitor General, pp. 8-
34

9. See rollo, pp. 132-133.

35
 Rollo, p. 133.

36
 G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266.

37
 Id. at 287.

38
 Rollo, p. 133.

39
 G.R. No. 160172, 13 February 2008, 545 SCRA 162.

40
 384 Phil. 661 (2000).

41
 De Castro v. De Castro, supra note 39 at 169.

42
 Supra note 30.

43
 See rollo, p. 120.

44
 Id.

45
 See rollo, p. 146.

46
 Id.

47
 Supra note 33.
 48
 Supra note 33 at 655.

49
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose,
may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is
not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office
in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document

or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal,
under the seal of such court.

Rule 39, Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. — The effect of a
judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
render the judgment or final order, is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final
order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final
order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact.

 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 24-25. See also Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,
50

supra note 36 at 282

Case Digest: Fujiki vs. Marinay

GR No. 196049, June 26, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married

respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines.
The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki
could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they
lost contact with each other.

Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without

the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara got married
in Quezon City. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to re-establish
their relationship. Fujiki then helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a
family court in Japan declaring her marriage in Maekara void on the
ground of bigamy.

Later, back in the Philippines, Fujiki filed a petition for a Judicial

Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the RTC. However, the trial
court dismissed the petition maintaining that Fujiki lacks personality
file the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition

to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy.

RULING:

Yes, a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to

recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact

of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of the said rule provides for who may
file such petition, to wit:

Sec. 1: Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which
has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for
the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.

In this case, there is no doubt that the prior spouse, Fujiki, has a
personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it.
Thus, he has the legal personality to file the petition. PETITION
GRANTED.
Medina vs. Koike, LCR of Quezon City & NSO, G.R. # 215723, July 27, 2016

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016

DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA, A.K.A. "DOREEN GRACE MEDINA

KOIKE," Petitioner, v. MICHIYUKI KOIKE, THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated July 31,
2014 and the Resolution3 dated November 28, 2014, of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 106 (RTC), in Sp. Proc. No. Q-13-72692, denying petitioner's
petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to
remarry pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code.

The Facts

Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki
Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon
City, Philippines.4 Their union bore two children, Masato Koike, who was born on
January 23, 2006, and Fuka Koike who was born on April 4, 2007. 5 chanrobleslaw

On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for
divorce6 before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were
divorced on even date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate 7 and the same was
duly recorded in the Official Family Register of Michiyuki Koike. 8
chanrobleslaw

Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of

Marriage9 on file with the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on
February 7, 2013 a petition10 for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and
declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code11 before the RTC, docketed as Sp. Proc.No. Q-13-72692.

At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition. 12 On the other hand, Doreen
presented several foreign documents, namely, "Certificate of Receiving/Certificate of
Acceptance of Divorce"13 and "Family Register of Michiyuki Koike"14 both issued by
the Mayor of Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republic of
the Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She also presented a certified machine copy of a
document entitled "Divorce Certificate" issued by the Consul for the Ambassador of
Japan in Manila that was authenticated by the Department of the Foreign Affairs, as
well as a Certification15 issued by the City Civil Registry Office in Manila that the
original of said divorce certificate was filed and recorded in the said Office. In
addition, photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and their corresponding English
translation, as well as two (2) books entitled "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" 16 and
"The Civil Code of Japan 2009"17 were likewise submitted as proof of the existence of
Japan's law on divorce.18chanrobleslaw

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision19 dated July 31, 2014, the RTC denied Doreen's petition, ruling that in
an action for recognition of foreign divorce decree pursuant to Article 26 of the
Family Code, the foreign divorce decree and" the national law of the alien
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance
with Sections 2420 and 2521 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The RTC
ruled that while the divorce documents presented by Doreen were successfully
proven to be public or official records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of proving
the national law of her husband, particularly the existence of the law on divorce. The
RTC observed that the "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code of Japan
2009," presented were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan as
required by Sections 24 and 25 of the said Rules, adding too that the testimony of
Doreen relative to the applicable provisions found therein and its effect on the
matrimonial relations was insufficient since she was not presented as a qualified
expert witness nor was shown to have, at the very least, a working knowledge of the
laws of Japan, particularly those on family relations and divorce. It likewise did not
consider the said books as learned treatises pursuant to Section 46, 22 Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence, since no expert witness on the subject matter was
presented and considering further that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign judgments and law.23 chanrobleslaw

Doreen's motion for reconsideration24 was denied in a Resolution25  dated November cralawred

28, 2014; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in denying
the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce.

The Court's Ruling

At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code -
which addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry. The provision reads: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the above-highlighted paragraph, the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine
courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. 26 chanrobleslaw
In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,27 the Court had the occasion to rule that: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the

acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and
laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This
means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the
purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral
aspect of his claim or defense.28 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citation
omitted)
Thus, in Garcia v. Recio,29 it was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained
abroad by the alien spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown
that the divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Both
the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained
the divorce must be proven.30 Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and
the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.31 chanrobleslaw

Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as
well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual
that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue
raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit
of a Rule 45 petition for review.

Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The resolution of
factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on these matters
are received with respect and are in fact binding subject to certain exceptions. 32 In
this regard, it is settled that appeals taken from judgments or final orders rendered
by RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in
accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. 33 chanrobleslaw

Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule 45 appeals as above-

adverted, the Court may refer the case to the CA under paragraph 2, Section 6 of
Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, which provides: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. - x x x

An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court
submitting issues of fact may be referred to the Court of Appeals for decision or
appropriate action. The determination of the Supreme Court on whether or not
issues of fact are involved shall be final.
This, notwithstanding the express provision under Section 5 (f) thereof that an
appeal likewise "may" be dismissed when there is error in the choice or mode of
appeal.34chanrobleslaw

Since the said Rules denote discretion on the part of the Court to either dismiss the
appeal or refer the case to the CA, the question of fact involved in the instant appeal
and substantial ends of justice warrant that the case be referred to the CA for
further appropriate proceedings. It bears to stress that procedural rules were
intended to ensure proper administration of law and justice. The rules of procedure
ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help
secure, not override, substantial justice. A deviation from its rigid enforcement may
thus be allowed to attain its prime objective, for after all, the dispensation of justice
is the core reason for the existence of the courts. 35
chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the case
is hereby REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action including the
reception of evidence to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent factual issues in
accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Caguioa, JJ.,

concur.

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 3-54.

2
 Id. at 58-65. Penned by Judge Angelene Mary W. Quimpo-Sale.

3
 Id. at 66-70.

4
 Id. at 80.

5
 Id. at 59.

6
 See Certificate of Receiving; id. at 109.

7
 Id. at 81.

8
 See id.

9
 Id. at 97.

10
 Id. at 71-79.

11
 Executive Order No. 209, as amended, entitled "The Family Code of the
Philippines," August 4, 1988.

12
Rollo, p. 58.

13
 Id. at 109-110.

14
 Id. at 101-107.

15
 Id. at 83.

16
 Id. at 111-115.

17
 Id. at 116-119.

18
 See id. at 62.
19
 Id. at 58-65.

20
 SECTION 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to
in paragraph (a) of section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in
the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul-general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office.

21
 SECTION 25. What attestation of copy must state. - Whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must
state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under
the seal of such court.

22
 SECTION 46. Learned treatises. - A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a
subject of history, law, science, or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of
a matter stated therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the
subject testifies, that the writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or
pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the subject.

23
Rollo, pp. 63-64.

24
 Id. at 169-193.

25
cralawred  Id. at 66-70.

26
Fujiki v. Marinay, 712 Phil. 524, 555 (2013).

27
 642 Phil. 420 (2010).

28
 Id. at 432-433.

29
 418 Phil. 723(2001).

30
 Id. at 725.

31
 Id. at 735.

32
Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Sarabia Manor Hotel Corporation, 715 Phil. 420,
433-435 (2013).

33
 See Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. People, 721 Phil. 760, 766-767
(2013).

34
CGP Transportation and Services Corporation v. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., 548
Phil. 242, 253-254 (2007).
35
Spouses Agbulos v. Gutierrez, 607 Phil. 288, 295 (2009).
by Lynn Clauna

DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA v. MICHIYUKI KOIKE, GR No. 215723, 2016-07-

27
Facts:
Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki
Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City,
Philippines.[4] Their union bore two children, Masato Koike, who was born on January
23, 2006, and Fuka Koike who was born on April 4, 2007.[5]
On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for
divorce[6] before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were
divorced on even date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate[7] and the same was duly
recorded in the Official Family Register of Michiyuki Koike.[8]
Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage[9]
on file with the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a
petition[10] for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to
remarry pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code[11] before
the RTC
At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition.[12] On the other hand, Doreen
presented several foreign documents, namely, "Certificate of Receiving/Certificate of
Acceptance of Divorce"[13] and "Family Register of Michiyuki Koike"[14] both issued by
the Mayor of Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republic of the
Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She also presented a certified machine copy of a
document entitled "Divorce Certificate" issued by the Consul for the Ambassador of
Japan in Manila that was authenticated by the Department of the Foreign Affairs, as well
as a Certification[15] issued by the City Civil Registry Office in Manila that the original of
said divorce certificate was filed and recorded in the said Office. In addition, photocopies
of the Civil Code of Japan and their corresponding English translation, as well as two (2)
books entitled "The Civil Code of Japan 2000"[16] and "The Civil Code of Japan
2009"[17] were likewise submitted as proof of the existence of Japan's law on divorce.
[18]
In a Decision[19] dated July 31, 2014, the RTC denied Doreen's petition, ruling that in an
action for recognition of foreign divorce decree pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code,
the foreign divorce decree and" the national law of the alien recognizing his or her
capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven
The RTC ruled that while the divorce documents presented by Doreen were successfully
proven to be public or official records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of proving the
national law of her husband, particularly the existence of the law on divorce. The RTC
observed that the "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009,"
presented were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan... adding too
that the testimony of Doreen relative to the applicable provisions found therein and its
effect on the matrimonial relations was insufficient since she was not presented as a
qualified expert witness nor was shown to have, at the very least, a working knowledge
of the laws of Japan, particularly those on family relations and divorce.
since no expert witness on the subject matter was presented and considering further that
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign judgments and law.[23]
Doreen's motion for reconsideration[24] was denied in a Resolution[25] dated November
28, 2014
Issues:
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in denying the
petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce.
Ruling:
At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce;
hence, our courts cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which
addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner -
allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly
obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The provision
reads:... the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of
the dissolution of the marriage.[26]
This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under
our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect
of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.
Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who
obtained the divorce must be proven.[30] Since our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree
and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.[31]
Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as
well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that
calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised in
the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45
petition for review.
The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on
these matters are received with respect and are in fact binding subject to certain
exceptions.[32] In this regard, it is settled that appeals taken from judgments or final
orders rendered by RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction raising questions of fact
or mixed questions of fact and law should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA)
It bears to stress that procedural rules were intended to ensure proper administration of
law and justice. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical
sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. A deviation
from its rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its prime objective, for after all,
the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of the courts.[35]
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the case is
hereby REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action including the
reception of evidence to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent factual issues in
accordance with this Decision.
Republic vs. Manalo, G.R. # 221029, Apr. 24, 2018
G.R. No. 221029

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent

RESOLUTION

PERALTA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse
and set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision  and October 12, 2015 Resolution  of the Court
1 2

of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the

Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO.
2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.

SO ORDERED. 3

The facts are undisputed.

On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for
cancellation of

Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment of
divorce Japanese court.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and
the notice of initial hearing were published once a week for three consecutive weeks in
newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the
documentary evidence (consisting of the trial courts Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of
publication, and issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March
5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the
Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf.
Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the petition
considering that based on the allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.

As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The
Amended Petition, which captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgment alleged:

2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named

YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;

3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after die
proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x
x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce Japanese
husband are no longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living
separately from said Japanese former husband;

5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry of San Juan,
Metro Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was
previously registered, in order that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still married to
the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her, she shall
not be bothered and disturbed by aid entry of marriage;

6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the
marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce
decree; [and]

7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry of her
marriage, that she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname, MANALO. 4

Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her
employment. Among the documents that were offered and admitted were:

1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in
form and in substance;

2. Affidavit of Publication;

3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and
March 6-12, 2012;

4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;

5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;

6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the

Notification of Divorce; and

7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce. 5

The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.

On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce
obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the
New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether
they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they
celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are
naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related
to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal
capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, inclusing marriages."6

On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her
Japanese husband because the decree may obtained makes the latter no longer married to the
former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita,
et al.  ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in
7

view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to consider Manalo
as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the
appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as
similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo, Jr.  where the mariage between a foreigner
8

an a Filipino was dissolved filed abroad by the latter.

The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.

We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.

Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage, are of two
types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.  In this 9

jurisdiction, the following rules exist:

1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. 10

2. Consistent with Articles 15  and 17  of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between
11 12

two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad. 13

3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. 14

4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to

contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. 15

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No.
209, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3,
1988.  Shortly thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987.  Aside from amending
16 17

Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph was added to Article 26.  This 18

provision was originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee),but it was
presented and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209.  As 19

modified, Article 26 now states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the where country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her to remarry under
Philippine law.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage.  It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce
20

decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.  Philippine courts cannot try the
21

case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.  Under the principles of
22

comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign nationality,
but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property
relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts. 23

According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the amendment
is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse,
although the latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce
abroad that is recognized by his or national law.  The aim was that it would solved the problem of
24
many Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien
husbands even after the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the husbands')
national laws and perhaps have already married again. 25

In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a
favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III: 26

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the
parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became
naturalized American citizen n 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The court therein
hinted, by the way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is
no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of marriage,
but their citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
the latter to remarry.

Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the
capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and
obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry.
Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition of enforcement of the divorced decree rendered
by the Japanese court and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry "
in order that it would not appear anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese national
who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides
to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to use
her maiden surname.

We rule in the affirmative.

Both Dacasin v. Dacasin  and Van Dorn  already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was
28 29

initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child
custody and property relation, respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of
their minor daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce
the Agreement, alleging that it was only the latter who exercised sole custody of their child. The
trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the
divorce decree is binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The
husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife is
void, but it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to
enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:

Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court
lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was
obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability . The argument that
foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron
v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce
decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting
of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce
(obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30

Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by
the ex-husband , who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a
business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared with right to manage the
same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action was barred by
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the
motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court
could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that
the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public
policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction . In
dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign
divorce on the parties and their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is
contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same
being contrary to local law and public policy.

Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the
Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife,
and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as stone party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the
law. When the law provides in the nature of penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again,
that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely feed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is estopped by his own representation before said court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 31

In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be
recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v.
Marinay, et al.  and Medina v. Koike.
32 33

In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to
obtain a judgment from Japan's family court. Which declared the marriage between her and her
second husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the
issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the
ground of bigamy, We ruled:

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most
intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law
the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage included the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property
regime of the marriage.

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right
in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and
Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x 34

On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for
divorce, which was granted.  Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial
1âwphi1

recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of

Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in
accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court
agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.  and Garcia v. Recio,  the
35 36

divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing
the case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to
determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.

There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court
recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and
extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop
short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute
divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and
observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the
domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is subject
to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she
obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of
Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is said that that a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention
of the framers of the law, but also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in the Constitution. The
Court is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the
same.

We beg to differ.

Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute;
neither can We put words in the mouth of lawmakers.  The legislature is presumed to know the
37

meaning of the words to have used words advisely and to have expressed its intent by the use of
such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words if a
statute there should be departure." 38

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that
the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not
follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or
would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.  Law have
39

ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends
and purposes.  As held in League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:
40 41

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting
law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may
render it meaningless and lead to inconvience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this
aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself,
resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law control its letter.

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is
effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
provision is a corrective measure is free to marry under the laws of his or her countr.  Whether
42

the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving
the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result:
the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a
distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the
foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operations of their alien spouses are severed by operation on the latter's national law.

Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article
15 of the City Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mer e existence of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception thereto.
Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust
discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected
by law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only
if they are constitutional.
43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that its
decision is accorded recognition and respect by the court of justice, such classification may be
subjected to judicial review.  The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental
44

right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution.  When these
45

violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional
guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations.  If a 46

legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or

operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is required since
it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest. 47

"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection
clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.  It includes
48

the right to free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and
the right to vote.  On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state interest is measured by
49

the scale rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history.  It is akin to the
50

paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the
promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare.  It essentially involves a public
51

right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the former to
take precedence over the latter. 52

Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with
respect to the acts of the President which have the force and effect of law unless declared
otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the
essential requisites  of the equal protection clause.  Particularly, the limitation of the provision
53 54

only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on
superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.

A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married
to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they
should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt,
there are political, economic cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems
and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has
to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against
another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his her Filipino
spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner. 55

On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or
her alien spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos
who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The circumstances surrounding them
are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner
spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them
based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or
not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate
against the other.

Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment

because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his
or her alien spouse would not be recognized even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36,
37 and 38 of the Family Code.  In filing for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse
56

cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should
be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should
be "reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her martial ties before
the RTC in accordance with the mechanism now existing under the Family Code" is anything but
comforting. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent
discussed in detail what these "mechanism" are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's case
as well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that our courts will
automatically grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All
to the prejudice of our kababayan.

It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 encourages Filipinos
to marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying
foreign nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.

The supposition is speculative and unfounded.

First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn to support
what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction.
Under the rules on evidence, it is disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and
overcome by other evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or wrong,  that a person takes
57

ordinary care of his concerns,  that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced
59

in was conformable to the law and fact,   that a man and woman deporting themselves as
60

husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,  and that the law has been
61

obeyed.  It is whimsical to easily attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of
62

a Filipino just because he or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is
presumed that interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and affection, rather than
prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are
relatively more forbearing and conservative in nature and that they are more often the victims or
losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the motive behind
Filipino's decision to marry an alien national. In one case, it was said:

Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictated on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions.
The right marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way
they see it fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or
not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the
legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is
not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly
support a marriage. 63

The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.  Nevertheless, it was not meant to
64

be a general prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in

response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this point.  Their exchange reveal as follows:
65

MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.

FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I refer
specifically to the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be understood as a prohibition of a
general law on divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot
pass a divorce law.

MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was
primarily to encourage the social institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce.
But now that the mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage it. Mr.
Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a
divorce law?

MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. Thank you. 66

Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11, 1917,
Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife
or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine
Legislature.  On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the
67

Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of
the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141
("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven ground for absolute
divorce, such as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the
filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an
extent as to make further living together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity.  When
68

the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to
have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed.  From August 30, 1950, upon the
69

effectivity of Republic Act No. 836 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by
Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized. 70

Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine society
to re-institute absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the currnet 17 th Congress, House Bill (H.B.)
Nos. 116  1062  2380  and 6027  were filed in the House of representatives. In substitution of
71 72 73 74

these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of
Marriage in the Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House
Committee on Population

And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading
- with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial
decree of absolute divorce are as follows:

1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or amended,
as follows:

a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common
child, or a child of the petitioner;

b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or

political affiliation;

c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of

a petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;

d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6) years,
even if pardoned;

e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of respondent;

f. Homosexuality of the respondent;

 g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the
Philippines or abroad;

h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than one's
spouse during the marriage, except when upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a
child is born to them by in vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife bears a child after
being a victim of rape;

i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a child of
a petitioner; and

j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one
(1) year.

When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2) years, either or
both spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree
of legal separation.

1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated as follows:

a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen (18)
years of age or over but below twety-one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without
the consent of the parents guradian or personl having substitute parental authority over
the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21) such party freely
cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;

b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards with
full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other husband
and wife;

d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless
the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the
other as husband and wife;

e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and
such incapacity continues or appears to be incurable; and

f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to be serious or
appears to be incurable.

Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the marriage or
supervening after the marriage.

1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time the
petition for absolute divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is highly improbable;

2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code,
whether or not the incapacity was present at the time of the celebration of the marriage or later;

3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transition from one
sex to another, the other spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or
transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total breakdown of
the marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.

To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any
attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and
traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution and their nature of
permanence,

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with
religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the
government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere
to a particular religion and, thus establish a state religion. 76

The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the
rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it is sincerely
believes that they are good for country.  While marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil
77

and legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code.  It is in this aspect, bereft of
78

any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.

The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be
harmonized with other constitutional provision. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the
Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively promote its total development.  It is also
79

obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.  To 80

Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligation s if We limit the application of
Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss
to point that the women and children are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of
domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize,
if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012") and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-
Trafficking in Person Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking
in Persons Act of 2012"). Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic
autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value
the dignity of every human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men. 81

A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a
Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2
Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family
Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be
considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-
marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but
a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold
a restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of
marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage
and against unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and
assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs. 82

This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement
of communication and information technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation
system that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed marriages have
become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven
and that imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions.  Living in a flawed
83
world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the individual's full human
potential and self fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus it is
hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside
the truth that some of them are rotten quality.

Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties,
cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from
the marital bond while the other remains bound to it.  In reiterating that the Filipino spouse
84

should not be discriminated against in his or her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served, San Luis v. San Luis  quoted:
85

x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we may add, by
its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the
judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law
should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the
legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of
the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law
and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that,
while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because only of our
nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What
we do instead is find a balance between the sord and the will, that justice may be done even as
the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it
worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence.
"Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of law," so we are warned, by Justice
Holmes agaian, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to
render every one of his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the
facts and the law in ever case brought to it for decisions. Justice is always an essential ingredient
of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way that will render
justice, presuming that it was the intention if the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be
dispensed with justice.86

Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.  A
87

statute may therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as
they come within its spirit or intent.
88

The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo's
petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to
cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.

Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of foreign country.
Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice.  The fact of divorce must still first be
89

proven.  Before a a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it
90

must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first
be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce
decree itself. The decree purports to be written act or record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven
as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office. 92

In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:

In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese
Court allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines Consulate
General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of
Divorce byu the Petitioner and the Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the
subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's
judgment decreeing the divorce. 93

If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered
admissible a a written act of the foreign court.  As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree
94

was not denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the
validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or
law, albeit an opportunity to do so. 95

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of
proving the material defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their
answer when they introduce new matters. x x x

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like
any other facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be
exercise d with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the
negative. 96

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law
validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her.
Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges
are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision
and October 12, 2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076, are
AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and
reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

SO ORDERED
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
v. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO (G.R. No.
221029, April 24, 2018; En Banc)
PONENTE: Peralta, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) was previously married in the
Philippines to a Japanese national. She filed for divorce in Japan, and after due
proceedings, a divorce decree was rendered by the Japanese Court. Manalo sought
for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment and to have the entry of
marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the
petitioner and the former Japanese husband’s marriage was previously registered.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC), however, denied the petition for lack of merit. It
opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law “does not
afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or living
abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their
marriage in the Philippines or in another country”.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) overturned the RTC decision. It held that
Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it
was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree
they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to
remarry.
MAIN ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce decree abroad obtained by the Filipino
spouse be recognized and enforced in the Philippines?
COURT’S RULING:
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 (Family Code) speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. ” Based on a clear
and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly
obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should
be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It
does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in
the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute;
neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign
divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an
anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is
free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse
initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the
marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the
same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A
Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in “like
circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated
proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both
instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign
divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operation of the latter’s national law.

Juego-Sakai vs. Republic, G R. # 224015, July 23, 2018

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 224015, July 23, 2018

STEPHEN I. JUEGO-SAKAI, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Amended Decision 1 dated March 3, 2016
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 104253 that set aside its former
Decision dated November 25, 2015, which in turn, affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, granting petitioner's
Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married on August 11,
2000 in Japan pursuant to the wedding rites therein. After two (2) years, the
parties, by agreement, obtained a divorce decree in said country dissolving their
marriage.2 Thereafter, on April 5, 2013, petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40,
Camarines Norte. In its Decision dated October 9, 2014, the RTC granted the
petition and recognized the divorce between the parties as valid and effective under
Philippine Laws.3 On November 25, 2015, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

In an Amended Decision4 dated March 3, 2016, however, the CA revisited its findings

and recalled and set aside its previous decision. According to the appellate court, the
second of the following requisites under Article 26 of the Family Code is missing: (a)
there is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and (b) a divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry.5 This is because the divorce herein was consensual in nature,
obtained by agreement of the parties, and not by Sakai alone. Thus, since petitioner,
a Filipino citizen, also obtained the divorce herein, said divorce cannot be recognized
in the Philippines. In addition, the CA ruled that petitioner's failure to present
authenticated copies of the Civil Code of Japan was fatal to her cause. 6

On May 2, 2016, petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the following
arguments:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS] GRAVELY ERRED UNDER

LAW WHEN IT HELD THAT THE SECOND REQUISITE FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE
SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE IS NOT PRESENT
BECAUSE THE PETITIONER GAVE CONSENT TO THE DIVORCE OBTAINED BY HER
JAPANESE HUSBAND.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS] GRAVELY ERRED UNDER

LAW WHEN IT HELD THAT THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH
REQUIREMENT ON THE SUBMISSION OF AUTHENTICATED COPIES OF [THE] CIVIL
CODE OF JAPAN RELATIVE TO DIVORCE AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES. 7
Petitioner posits that the divorce she obtained with her husband, designated as
Divorce by Agreement in Japan, as opposed to Judicial Divorce, is the more practical
and common type of divorce in Japan. She insists that it is to her great disadvantage
if said divorce is not recognized and instead, Judicial Divorce is required in order for
her to avail of the benefit under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, since their divorce had already been granted abroad. 8 Moreover, petitioner
asserts that the mere fact that she consented to the divorce does not prevent the
application of Article 26 for said provision does not state that where the consent of
the Filipino spouse was obtained in the divorce, the same no longer finds application.
In support of her contentions, petitioner cites the ruling in Republic of the
Philippines v. Orbecido III wherein the Court held that a Filipino spouse is allowed to
remarry in the event that he or she is divorced by a Filipino spouse who had
acquired foreign citizenship.9 As to the issue of evidence presented, petitioner
explains that the reason why she was unable to present authenticated copies of the
provisions of the Civil Code of Japan relative to divorce is because she was unable to
go to Japan due to the fact that she was pregnant. Also, none of her friends could
obtain a copy of the same for her. Instead, she went to the library of the Japanese
Embassy to photocopy the Civil Code. There, she was issued a document which
states that diplomatic missions of Japan overseas do not issue certified true copies
of Japanese Law nor process translation certificates of Japanese Law due to the
potential problem in the legal interpretation thereof. Thus, petitioner maintains that
this constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules on Evidence. 10

We grant the petition.

The issue before Us has already been resolved in the landmark ruling of Republic v.
Manalo,11 the facts of which fall squarely on point with the facts herein. In Manalo,
respondent Marelyn Manalo, a Filipino, was married to a Japanese national named
Yoshino Minoro. She, however, filed a case for divorce before a Japanese Court,
which granted the same and consequently issued a divorce decree dissolving their
marriage. Thereafter, she sought to have said decree recognized in the Philippines
and to have the entry of her marriage to Minoro in the Civil Registry in San Juan,
Metro Manila, cancelled, so that said entry shall not become a hindrance if and when
she decides to remarry. The trial court, however, denied Manalo's petition and ruled
that Philippine law does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether
they are in the country or abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or
if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country.

On appeal, however, the Court therein rejected the trial court's view and affirmed,
instead, the ruling of the CA. There, the Court held that the fact that it was the
Filipino spouse who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted
should not affect the application nor remove him from the coverage of Paragraph 2
of Article 26 of the Family Code which states that "where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." We observed
that to interpret the word "obtained" to mean that the divorce proceeding must
actually be initiated by the alien spouse would depart from the true intent of the
legislature and would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general
purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, which is, specifically, to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a
foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse. The subject provision, therefore, should not
make a distinction for a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the
same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an
alien initiated proceeding. 12

Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the case at hand, the Court similarly rules
that despite the fact that petitioner participated in the divorce proceedings in Japan,
and even if it is assumed that she initiated the same, she must still be allowed to
benefit from the exception provided under Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Consequently,
since her marriage to Toshiharu Sakai had already been dissolved by virtue of the
divorce decree they obtained in Japan, thereby capacitating Toshiharu to remarry,
petitioner shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Nevertheless, as similarly held in Manalo, We cannot yet grant petitioner's Petition

for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment for she has yet to comply with certain
guidelines before our courts may recognize the subject divorce decree and the
effects thereof. Time and again, the Court has held that the starting point in any
recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do
not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. 13 This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment
on the alien himself or herself.14 Since both the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport
to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24 15 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court applies.16 Thus, what is required is proof, either by (1) official publications or
(2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the
copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 17

In the instant case, the Office of the Solicitor General does not dispute the existence
of the divorce decree, rendering the same admissible. What remains to be proven,
therefore, is the pertinent Japanese Law on divorce considering that Japanese laws
on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. 18

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed

Amended Decision dated March 3, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
104253 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the court of
origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese
law on divorce.

SO ORDERED.

Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

Carpio, Senior Associate Justice, (Chairperson), J., I concur in result. See Separate
Opinion.

Endnotes:

1
 Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices
Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla and Socorro B. Inting, concurring; rollo, pp. 18-21.

2
Rollo, pp. 5 and 33.

3
Id. at 33-34.

4
Supra note 1.

5
Rollo, p. 19.

6
Id. at 20.

7
Id. at 7.

8
Id. at 9.

9
Id. at 10.

10
Id. at 13-14.

11
 G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018.

12
Id.

13
Corpus v. Sto. Tomas, 642 Phil. 420, 432 (2010).

14
Id.

15
 Section 24 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 24. Proof of official record. - The record of public documents referred to in

paragraph (a) of section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in
the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul-general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office.

16
Id.

17
Id.

18
Republic v. Manalo, supra note 11.
Juego-Sakai vs. Republic (2018)
Petitioners
: STEPHEN I. JUEGO-SAKAI
Respondents
: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Ponente
: Peralta (Second Division)
Topic
: Civil Law; Remedial Law
SUMMARY
: The SC applied the landmark ruling in
Republic vs. Manalo
 in this similarly-situated case.
DOCTRINE
:
 
The fact that it was the Filipino spouse who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce
decreewas granted should not affect the application nor remove him from the coverage of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 ofthe Family Code which states that "where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validlycelebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her toremarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." We observed that tointerpret the word "obtained"
to mean that the divorce proceeding must actually be initiated by the alien spousewould depart
from the true intent of the legislature and would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with
thegeneral purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, which is, specifically, to avoid the absurd situation
where theFilipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree
that is effective in thecountry where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
The subject provision, therefore,should not make a distinction for a Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place andin like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.---Time and again, the Court has held that the
starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is theacknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. This means that theforeign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with
thealien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.
Since both theforeign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her
capacity to obtain a divorce,purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24 [15] of
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court applies.Thus, what is required is proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legalcustody of the documents. If the copies
of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign servicestationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
FACTS
: Petitioner Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married on August 11, 2000 in
Japanpursuant to the wedding rites therein. After two (2) years, the parties, by agreement,
obtained a divorce decreein said country dissolving their marriage. Thereafter, on April 5, 2013,
petitioner filed a Petition for JudicialRecognition of Foreign Judgment before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 40, Camarines Norte. In itsDecision dated October 9, 2014, the RTC granted
the petition and recognized the divorce between the partiesas valid and effective under Philippine
Laws.On November 25, 2015, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.In an Amended Decision
dated March 3, 2016, however, the CA revisited its findings and recalled and set asideits previous
decision.

 
ISSUES

 WoN the CA gravely erred when it held that the second requisite for the application of

the secondparagraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not present because the petitioner gave
consent to thedivorce obtained by her Japanese husband
 
o
 YES. The issue before Us has already been resolved in the landmark ruling of
Republic v. Manalo
,the facts of which fall squarely on point with the facts herein.
 
o
 Despite the fact that petitioner participated in the divorce proceedings in Japan, and even if it
isassumed that she initiated the same, she must still be allowed to benefit from the
exceptionprovided under Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Consequently, since her marriage to
Toshiharu Sakaihad already been dissolved by virtue of the divorce decree they obtained in
Japan, therebycapacitating Toshiharu to remarry, petitioner shall likewise have capacity to remarry
underPhilippine law.
o
 Nevertheless, as similarly held in Manalo, We cannot yet grant petitioner's Petition for
JudicialRecognition of Foreign Judgment for she has yet to comply with certain guidelines before
ourcourts may recognize the subject divorce decree and the effects thereof.
o
 The Office of the Solicitor General does not dispute the existence of the divorce decree,
renderingthe same admissible. What remains to be proven, therefore, is the pertinent Japanese
Law ondivorce considering that Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among
thosematters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
CHAPTER 3. VOID and VOIDABLE MARRIAGES (ARTS. 35-54)
Adm. Matter No. 02-11-10 SC. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (effective March 15, 2003)

Capili vs. People, et. al., G.R. # 183850, July 3, 2013

G.R. No. 183805               July 3, 2013

JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, PETITIONER,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
reversal of the Decision1 dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution 2 dated July 24, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City in an Information which reads:

On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without
said marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice
of the latter.

Contrary to law.3

Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending
civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by
Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would
exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the
declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant
criminal case.

Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City, in view of the
filing of the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by petitioner.

In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient
invalidity of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a
subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from
the beginning.

Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second
marriage between him and private respondent had already been declared void by the RTC.

In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted petitioner’s Manifestation and
Motion to Dismiss, to wit:

The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be dismissed as a decision dated
December 1, 2004 had already been rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City,
Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 01-6043 (entitled: "Karla Medina-Capili versus James Walter P.
Capili and Shirley G. Tismo," a case for declaration of nullity of marriage) nullifying the second
marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo and said decision is already final.

In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was stated, among others, that
the issues raised in the civil case are not similar or intimately related to the issue in this above-
captioned case and that the resolution of the issues in said civil case would not determine
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and arguments of the parties, this Court
is of the humble opinion that there is merit on the Motion to dismiss filed by the accused as it
appears that the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo had
already been nullified by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72 of Antipolo City which has declared
"the voidness, non-existent or incipient invalidity" of the said second marriage. As such, this
Court submits that there is no more bigamy to speak of.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.

Thus, in a Decision5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision.
The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 152 in Crim. Case No. 128370 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.

SO ORDERED.6

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but the same was denied
in a Resolution[7] dated July 24, 2008.

Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that:

THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DISREGARD

EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT AND TO REVERSE THE ORDER DATED JULY 7, 2006 OF THE TRIAL
COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 128370 GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE OF
BIGAMY AGAINST PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID
ORDER IS BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF THE CASE IN THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72, IN
CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 AND THE CONCLUDING AND DISPOSITIVE PORTION IN
THE SAID DECISION WHICH STATES THAT, AFTER PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE
ON RECORD AND THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES X X X, THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT
SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS HEREBY NULL AND VOID.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE DECLARATION
OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI
AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY,
BRANCH 72 IN ITS DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043, IS ON THE GROUND
THAT IT IS BIGAMOUS IN NATURE, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH
FINDINGS OR FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VIII,
SECTION 14 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF
THE BIGAMY CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, WHICH RULING IS NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS OF THE CASE OF THE SAID DECISION AND
WHICH IS CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE.
 THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT IS AN
EXCEPTION TO EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE SET OF FACTS IN THE
SAID CASE, AND THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR
ABANDONING EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE INSTANT CASE THE
GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS VIOLATIVE OF
ARTICLE 3 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE USE BY
RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO OF THE SURNAME "CAPILI" IS ILLEGAL
INASMUCH AS THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO
CITY, BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD
LONG BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE DATE OF THE SAID
DECISION ON DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND DULY RECORDED IN THE RECORDS OF
ENTRIES IN THE CORRESPONDING BOOK IN THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY AND THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE. 8

In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second
marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.

We rule in the negative.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows:

Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts
a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity. 9

In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when
the Information was filed on June 28, 2004.

It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was
contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between
petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of
Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and
private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being
bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime
of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long
as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.

In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accused’s conviction for bigamy ruling that the crime
of bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous
one having been judicially declared null and void, viz.:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because
prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover,
petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an
accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had
no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for
bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage
be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until
declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. 11

In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and ruled that
what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further held that the parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is
that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. 12

Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the
commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as
provided by law.13 It is clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the
time he contracted the second marriage with private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioner’s second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal
charge for bigamy against him.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 1,
2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Abad, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

July 16, 2013

N O T I C E OF J U D G M E N T

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on ___July 3, 2013___ a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered
by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this
Office on July 16, 2013 at 2:30 a.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)
LUCITA ABJELINA SORIANO
Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes

 Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, with Associate Justices

1

Regalado E. Maambong and Sixto C. Marella, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 44-54.

2
 Id. at 56-57.

3
 Records, p. 1.

4
 Rollo, p. 58.

5
 Id. at 44-54.

6
 Id. at 52. (Emphasis in the original)

7
 Id. at 56-57.

8
 Id. at 20.

9
 Mercado v. Tan, 391 Phil. 809, 818-819 (2000).

10
 G.R. No. 164435, September 29, 2009, 601 SCRA 236.

11
 Id. at 245-246. (Emphasis in the original.)

 Merlinda Cipriano Montañez v. Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano, G.R. No. 181089, October
12

22, 2012.

13
 Teves v. People, G.R. No. 188775, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 307, 314.

Capili vs People GR 183805

FACTS: On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before
the RTC of Pasig City. Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings
alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second
marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the
event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the
charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity
of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage
is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.

RULING: NO. It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private
respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid
first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on
September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous
nature of the second marriage between petitioner and
private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage
for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime
of bigamy.

Capili vs. People G.R. No. 183805, July

03, 2013 Bigamy
JANUARY 27, 2018

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the RTC. Petitioner thereafter filed a
Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration
of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-
Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him
from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of
nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.

RULING:

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as
follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon

any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings.

The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally
married; (2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3)
that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.9
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when
the Information was filed on June 28, 2004.

It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was
contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between
petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of
Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner
and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for
being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the
crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was
celebrated.

Cariño vs. Cariño, G.R. # 132529, Feb. 2, 2001

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner,

vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages contracted
by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, whose “death benefits” is now the subject of the
controversy between the two Susans whom he married.  1âwphi1.nêt

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision  1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.

During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the first
was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan
Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the second
was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan
Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in
1982.

In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by
pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee,
who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government
agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from “MBAI,
PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,”  3 while respondent Susan Yee received a
total of P21,000.00 from “GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).”  4
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of
money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to
her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively
denominated as “death benefits” which she (petitioner) received from “MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.” Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file
her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.

Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between
petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous
marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met
petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection
of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In
support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the
petitioner which bears no marriage license number; 5 and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994,
from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads –

This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO
CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969.
Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License number
from the records of this archives.

This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cariño for whatever legal
purpose it may serve.  6

On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows:

WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half
of the amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4
Santiago S. Cariño, plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.

IT IS SO ORDERED.  7

On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN

THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF
THE FAMILY CODE.

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE

CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED
AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. 9 However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be
limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.  11

It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of
the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully
entitled to the subject “death benefits” of the deceased.

Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao
and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage, 12 and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions,  13 renders the marriage void
ab initio. 14

In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not
fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was
indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the
marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as
certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court held that such a certification is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of
suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to
the issuance of a marriage license.

Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has
been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is
valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in default
before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of
a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner
conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her
case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.

It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of
the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.

It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death benefits” under scrutiny would now be
awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for
purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second
marriage would also be void.

Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the
deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased
with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.

One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the
spouses according to the applicable property regime.  16 Considering that the two marriages are
void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal
partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the
Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”

Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where
both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married
man, 17 -

“... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions ...”

In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong
to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and
household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime.  18

Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous
marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed
to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in
order.

The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM,
Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from
governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan
Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or
industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by
respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right
whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased
shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one
of them.

As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family
Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred
by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other
reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads -

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.
 xxx

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of
or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.

In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party
during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally
between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute
thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by the deceased alone
as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the
petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case,
both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject
“death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and
the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs,
namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.

In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de
Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System,  20 where the Court awarded one-half of the
retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding
that:

“... [S]ince the defendant’s first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal
partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or
relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to
share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal
partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husband’s
share in the property here in dispute....” And with respect to the right of the second wife, this
Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of
such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was
dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, “[t]he only just and equitable solution in this
case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property
acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal
partnership of the first marriage.”   21

It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which
requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in
the said case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their existing
property regime.

In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family Code,
clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition
precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to
contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first
marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second
marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void because
the parties are not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage.
However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money
anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is
necessary. All that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that
would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the
court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage
involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable
laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:

[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause “on
the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family
Code connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering
petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorney’s fees in the amount of
P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is
hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. 1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Puno J., on official leave.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 43-47

2. Rollo, pp. 49-55

3. Exhibit “F”, Records, p. 38

4. Ibid

5. Exhibit “D-1”, Records, p. 36

6. Exhibit “E”, Records, p. 37

7. Rollo, p. 55

8. Rollo, p. 18

9. Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993]

10. Niñal, et al., v. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000

11. Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra

12. ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied
with:

(1)Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2)Their consent, freely given;
(3)Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4)A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
13. ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this
Title, but not those under article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license
first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting
party habitually resides

14. ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

x x x             x x x             x x x

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional

character;

x x x             x x x             x x x

15. 236 SCRA 257, 261-262; citing the Rules of Court, Rule 132, Section 29

16. Art. 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in
Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio
or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.

The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.

14. ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

x x x             x x x             x x x

Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding
Article shall produce the following effects:

14. ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

x x x             x x x             x x x

(2)The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case

may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said
marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property
or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children
or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or,
in default of children, the innocent spouse;

14. ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

x x x             x x x             x x x

Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said
marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and
testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by
operation of law

17. Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, p. 233-234 (1995)
 18 Id., p. 234.18

19. Id., p. 230

20. 37 SCRA 316 [1971]

21. Id., p. 326

22. Supra

23. Supra

SANTIAGO CARINO, petitioner vs. SUSAN CARINO, defendant

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

Facts:

During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S. Carino, he contracted two marriages, the first
with Susan Nicdao Carino with whom he had two offsprings (Sahlee and Sandee) and
with Susan Yee Carino with whom he had no children in their almost ten year
cohabitation. In 1988, Santiago passed away under the care of Susan Yee who spent
for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 and Yee
received a total of P21,000.00. Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money
against Nicdao, contending that the marriage of the latter with Santiago is void ab
initio because their marriage was solemnized without the required marriage license.
The trial court ruled in favor of Yee, ordering Nicdao to pay Yee half of
acquired death benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the marriage of Santiago Carino and Susan Nicdao is void for lack of
marriage license.

Ruling:

Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of Nicdao and
Carino was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage
and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab
initio. In the case at bar, the marriage does not fall within any of
those exceptions and a marriage license therefore was indispensable to the validity of
it. This fact is certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila. Such
being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of Nicdao and Carino has been
sufficiently overcome and cannot stand. The marriage of Yee and Carino is void ab
initio as well for lack of judicial decree of nullity of marriage of Carino and Nicdao at
the time it was contracted. The marriages are bigamous; under Article 148 of the
Family Code, properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. The decision of the trial court and
Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Quiazon, et. al. vs. Belen, et. al., G.R. # 189121, July 31, 2013

G.R. No. 189121               July 31, 2013

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER

QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE
QUIAZON, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589, 1 the decretal portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
275, Las Piñas City are AFFIRMED in toto.2

The Facts

This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon
(Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter. The
petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was
married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer
Quiazon (Jennifer).

Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.

On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma.
Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims
that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her
parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and
Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it
was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with
one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others,
attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth 4 signed by Eliseo
as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth
₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth ₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of
Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix
of her late father’s estate.

Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children,
Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death
Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his
death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, 7 the petition for settlement
of decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In
addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and
legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration
to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition
was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that
Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision
reads:

Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any disqualification or
incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of administration over the estate of the
decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the
approval by this Court of a bond in the amount of ₱100,000.00 to be posted by her. 9

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008
Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the findings
of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived
together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road,
Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the
conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. The
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.

The Issues

The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution
on the following grounds:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO

QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS
PIÑAS;

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA

GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO
PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS
NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION.12

The Court’s Ruling

We find the petition bereft of merit.

Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at
the time of his death:

Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate
of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis
supplied).

The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. 13 Even
where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile
in the technical sense.14 Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and
"domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey
the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."15 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the
same meaning.18 As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing
more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.19

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming
the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in
Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the
settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.

In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseo’s
Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be
settled. While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s
residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts.
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting
themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is
consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties
against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is
void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia
before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of
his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners’
submission that the lower courts’ findings arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence
on record. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held
to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.21

Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring
Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has
taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage
directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties
to the marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of
Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the
ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no
uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their
father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void
from voidable marriages, to wit:

Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in
which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where
the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage.24

It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be
the source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally
without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. 25

Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be
prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even
after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action
attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as
a compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void
marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not
extinguish such cause of action.

Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to
determine whether or not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous.

Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between
Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued
by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de
Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage
and the certification from the National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage
exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the
fact that the first marriage was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a
record of marriage can no longer be found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is
not completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had
been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the inescapable
conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio. 27

Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that Elise has not shown
any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are
entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration
must be filed by an interested person, thus:

Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the
creditors, of the decedent;

(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;

(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.

An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as
an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate
proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is
such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees. 28

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of
Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record
produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest
in the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to
reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed
administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a
compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are
satisfied.29 Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural
children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, arc
AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justic
Chairpersone

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation be lore the case
was assigned to the writer or the opinion or the Court’s Division.

ATONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer or the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

 Penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia with Associate Justices Josefina

1

Guevara-Salonga and Magdangal M. De Leon, concurring, CA rollo, pp.94-106.

2
 Id. at 105.

3
 Special Proceeding No. M-3957. Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-9.

4
 Id. at 10.

5
 Id. at 40-44.

6
 Id. at 11.

7
 Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of
the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original
case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

8
 Penned by Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. CA rollo, pp. 33-38.

9
 Id. at 38.

10
 Id. at 94-106.

11
 Id. at 118-119.
12
 Rollo, pp. 32-33.

 Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-40502 and L-42670, 29 November 1976,
13

74 SCRA 189, 199.

14
 Id.

15
 Id.

16
 Id.

17
 Id.

18
 Jao v. Court of Appeals, 432 Phil. 160, 170 (2002).

19
 Id.

20
 Quiazon v. Garcia, Civil Case No. Q-43712. Records, Vol. II, pp. 234-240.

 Golden (Iloilo) Delta Sales Corporation v. Pre-Stress International Corporation, G.R.

21

No. 176768, 12 January 2009, 576 SCRA 23, 35; Seaoil Petroleum Corporation v.
Autocorp Group, G.R. No. 164326, 17 October 2008, 569 SCRA 387, 394; Ejercito v.
M.R. Vargas Construction, G.R. No. 172595, 10 April 2008, 551 SCRA 97, 106.

 Juliano-Llave v. Republic, G.R. No. 169766, 30 March 2011, 646 SCRA 637, 656-657
22

citing Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 673 (2000).

23
 Id.

24
 Id. at 673.

25
 Id.

26
 New Civil Code. Art. 961. In default of the testamentary heirs, the law vests the
inheritance, in accordance with the rules hereinafter set forth, in the legitimate and
illegitimate relatives of the deceased, in the surviving spouse, and in the State.

New Civil Code. Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or

ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased.

27
 Old Civil Code. Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during
the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first
spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of
the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee
being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven
years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse
present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is
presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted
 shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a
competent court.

28
 Solinap v. Locsin, Jr., 423 Phil. 192, 199 (2001).

29
 New Civil Code. Art. 961. In default or the testamentary heirs, the law, vests the
inheritance, in accordance with the rules hereinafter set forth, in the legitimate and
illegitimate relatives of the deceased, in the surviving spouse, and in the State.

New Civil Code. Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or

ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased

by Christiaan Castillo

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON v. MA. LOURDES BELEN, GR No. 189121, 2013-07-31

Facts:
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo
Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo's common-law wife and
daughter.  The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon
(Amelia) to whom Eliseo... was married.  Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth
Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her
mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.
Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the
time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other.  Insisting on the legal
capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of
Eliseo's marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted
during the subsistence of the latter's marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito).  To
prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for
Letters... of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth[4] signed by Eliseo as her father.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her
children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by
filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.[5]  The petitioners asserted that as... shown by
his Death Certificate,[6] Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas
City, at the time of his death.  Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court,[7] the petition for settlement of... decedent's estate should have been filed in
Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City.
In a Decision[8] dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of
Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond.  The lower court ruled that the
venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting... the
position taken by the petitioners that Eliseo's last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as
hearsay.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008
Decision[10] rendered by the Court of Appeals
In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able... to
prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a
common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City,
from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo's death in 1992.  For purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement... of Eliseo's estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached
by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City.
Issues:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO
QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND THEREFORE[,] THE PETITION
FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE [RTC] OF
LAS PIÑAS
THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS
NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION[.]
Ruling:
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of
the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent
resides at the time of his death
Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the... terms are synonymous, and convey the
same meaning as the term "inhabitant."[15]  In other words, "resides" should be viewed
or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation
of a person, actual residence or... place of abode.
As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more
than a person's actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for
affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo
was properly laid in Las Piñas City.  It is evident from the records that during his
lifetime,... Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas
City.  For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said
city.
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners' contention that Elise has not
shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who
are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.  Also, in
estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the...
decedent is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.[28]
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the
distribution of Eliseo's estate, is deemed to be an interested party.  With the
overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the
petitioners' pounding... on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent's
estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court
of Appeals.  Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of
Eliseo is on good... grounds.  It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under
the law, is entitled to her legitime after the debts of the estate are satisfied.[29]  Having a
vested right in the distribution of Eliseo's estate as one of his natural... children, Elise
can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY (Art. 36)
Suazo vs. Suazo, G.R. # 164493, Mar. 12, 2010

G.R. No. 164493               March 10, 2010

JOCELYN M. SUAZO, Petitioner,
vs.
ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Jocelyn Suazo (Jocelyn) from the July 14, 2004
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443, which reversed the January
29, 1999 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 119, Pasay City in Civil Case No.
97-1282.2 The reversed RTC decision nullified Jocelyn’s marriage with respondent Angelito
Suazo (Angelito) on the ground of psychological incapacity.

THE FACTS

Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they were residents of
Laguna at that time. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and some
friends. Having been gone for three days, their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after
finding them, brought them back to Biñan, Laguna. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and Angelito’s
marriage was arranged and they were married on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the
Mayor of Biñan.

Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelito’s parents
after their marriage. They had by this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked
for Angelito’s relatives as household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work and was
most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels often resulted
because of Jocelyn’s efforts.

Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom
he has since lived. They now have children.

Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. She claimed
that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. In addition to the above historical narrative of their relationship, she alleged in her
complaint:

xxxx
8. That from the time of their marriage up to their separation in July 1987, their relationship had
been marred with bitter quarrels which caused unbearable physical and emotional pains on the
part of the plaintiff because defendant inflicted physical injuries upon her every time they had a
troublesome encounter;

9. That the main reason for their quarrel was always the refusal of the defendant to work or his
indolence and his excessive drinking which makes him psychologically incapacitated to perform
his marital obligations making life unbearably bitter and intolerable to the plaintiff causing their
separation in fact in July 1987;

10. That such psychological incapacity of the defendant started from the time of their marriage
and became very apparent as time went and proves to be continuous, permanent and incurable;

xxxx

Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit himself to a psychological
examination with psychologist Nedy Tayag (who was presumably hired by Jocelyn).

The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no collusion existed
between the parties. Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane Serrano, and the psychologist testified at the
trial.

In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in her petition, including the alleged
incidents of physical beating she received from Angelito. On cross-examination, she remained
firm on these declarations but significantly declared that Angelito had not treated her violently
before they were married.

Asst. Sol. Gen. Kim Briguera:

Q. Can you describe your relationship with the respondent before you got married?

A. He always go (sic) to our house to court me.

Q. Since you cited violence, after celebration of marriage, will you describe his
behavioural (sic) pattern before you got married?

A. He show (sic) kindness, he always come (sic) to the house.

Q. So you cannot say his behavioral pattern composing of violent nature before you got
married (sic), is there any signs (sic) of violence?

A. None maam (sic), because we were not sweethearts.

Q. Even to other people?

A. He also quarrel (sic).3

Maryjane Serrano corroborated parts of Jocelyn’s testimony.

When the psychologist took the witness stand, she declared:

Q. What about the respondent, did you also make clinical interpretation of his behavior?
A. Apparently, the behavior and actuation of the respondent during the time of the
marriage the respondent is suffering from anti-social personality Disorder this is a serious
and severe apparently incurable (sic). This disorder is chronic and long-standing before
the marriage.

Q. And you based your interpretation on the report given by the petitioner?

A. Based on the psychological examination wherein there is no pattern of lying when I

examined her, the petitioner was found to be very responsive, coherent, relevant to
marital relationship with respondent.

Q. And the last page of Exhibit "E" which is your report there is a statement rather on the
last page, last paragraph which state: It is the clinical opinion of the undersigned that
marriage between the two, had already hit bottom rock (sic) even before the actual
celebration of marriage. Respondent(’s) immature, irresponsible and callous emotionality
practically harbors (sic) the possibility of having blissful relationship. His general behavior
fulfill(s) the diagnostic criteria for a person suffering from Anti Social Personality Disorder.
Such disorder is serious and severe and it interferred (sic) in his capacity to provide love,
caring, concern and responsibility to his family. The disorder is chronic and long-standing
in proportion and appear(s) incurable. The disorder was present at the time of the
wedding and became manifest thereafter due to stresses and pressure of married life. He
apparently grew up in a dysfunctional family. Could you explain what does chronic
mean?

A. Chronic is a clinical language which means incurable it has been there long before he
entered marriage apparently, it came during early developmental (sic) Basic trust was not
develop (sic).

Q. And this long standing proportion (sic).

A. That no amount of psychological behavioral help to cure such because psychological

disorder are not detrimental to men but to others particularly and this (sic) because the
person who have this kind of disorder do not know that they have this kind of disorder.

Q. So in other words, permanent?

A. Permanent and incurable.

Q. You also said that this psychological disorder is present during the wedding or at the
time of the wedding or became manifest thereafter?

A. Yes, ma’am."

xxxx

Court:

Q. Is there a clinical findings (sic)?

A. That is the clinical findings. Personality Disorder labeled on Anti-Social Personality

Disorder (sic).

Q. How was shown during the marriage (sic)?

A. The physical abuses on the petitioner also correlated without any employment
exploitative and silent (sic) on the part of the respondent is clearly Anti-Social Disorder.

Q. Do the respondent know that he has that kind of psychological disorder (sic)?

A. Usually a person suffering that psychological disorder will not admit that they are
suffering that kind of disorder (sic).

Court:

Q. So because of this Anti-Social Disorder the petitioner suffers a lot (sic)?

A. Yes, because the petitioner is a victim of hardships of marital relation to the

respondent (sic).

Court:

Q. Was the Anti-Social Personality Disorder also shown to the parents (sic)?

A. Yes, according to the petitioner, respondent never give due respect more often than
not he even shouted at them for no apparent reason (sic).

Court:

Q. Did you say Anti-Social Disorder incurable (sic)?

A. Yes, sir.

Court:

Q. Is there a physical violence (sic)?

A. Actually, I could see the petitioner is tortured mentally of the respondent (sic).

Court:

Q. How was the petitioner tortured?

A. She was able to counter-act by the time she was separated by the respondent (sic).

Court:

Q. Do you mean to tell us that Anti-Social disorder is incurable?

A. Yes, sir.

Court:

Q. Why did you know?

A. Anti-Social disorder is incurable again because the person itself, the respondent is not
aware that this kind of personality affect the other party (sic).
 Court:

Q. This Anti-Social behavior is naturally affected the petitioner (sic)?

A. They do not have children because more often than not the respondent is under the
influence of alcohol, they do not have peaceful harmonious relationship during the less
than one year and one thing what is significant, respondent allowed wife to work as
housemaid instead of he who should provide and the petitioner never receive and enjoy
her earning for the five months that she work and it is also the petitioner who took
sustainance of the vices. (sic)

Q. And because of that Anti-Social disorder he had not shown love to the petitioner?

A. From the very start the respondent has no emotion to sustain the marital relationship
but what he need is to sustain his vices thru the petitioner (sic).

Court:

Q. What are the vices?

A. Alcohol and gambling.

Court:

Q. And this affected psychological incapacity to perform marital obligation?

A. Not only that up to this time from my clinical analysis of Anti-Social Personality
Disorder, he is good for nothing person.4

The psychologist also identified the Psychological Report she prepared. The Report pertinently
states:5

Report on the psychological condition of JOCELYN M. SUAZO, a petitioner for "Nullity of

Marriage" versus ANGELITO D. SUAZO

GENERAL DATA

[This pertains to Jocelyn’s]

BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY

xxxx

Husband is Angelito D. Suazo, 28 years old reached 3rd year high school, a part time tricycle
driver, eldest among 4 siblings. Father is a machine operator, described to be an alcoholic,
womanizer and a heavy gambler. While mother is a sales agent. It was a common knowledge
within their vicinity that she was also involved in an illicit relationship. Familial relationship was
described to be stormy, chaotic whose bickering and squabbles were part and parcel of their day
to day living.

TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION

Projective data reveal an introvert person whose impulse life is adequately suppressed so much
so that it does not create inner tension and anxiety. She is fully equipped in terms of drives and
motivation particularly in uplifting not, only her socio-emotional image but was as her morale. She
may be sensitive yet capable of containing the effect of such sensitiveness; in order to remain in
goodstead (sic) with her immediate environment.

She is pictured as a hard-working man (sic) who looks forward for a better future in spite of
difficulties she had gone through in the past. She is fully aware of external realities of life that she
set simple life goals which is (sic) commensurate with her capabilities and limitations. However,
she needs to prioritize her interest in order to direct her energy toward specific goals. Her
tolerance for frustration appears to be at par with her coping mechanism that she is able to
discharge negative trends appropriately.

REMARKS :

[Already cited in full in the psychologist’s testimony quoted above] 6

The Office of the Solicitor General – representing the Republic of the Philippines – strongly
opposed the petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage. Through a Certification filed with
the RTC, it argued that the psychologist failed to examine and test Angelito; thus, what she said
about him was purely hearsay.

THE RTC RULING

The RTC annulled the marriage under the following reasoning:

While there is no particular instance setforth (sic) in the law that a person may be considered as
psychologically incapacitated, there as (sic) some admitted grounds that would render a person
to be unfit to comply with his marital obligation, such as "immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective
sense of rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the
husband to support the family or excessive dependence on parents or peer group approval) and
habitual alcoholism, or the condition by which a person lives for the next drink and the next
drinks" (The Family Code of the Phils, Alicia Sempio-Diy, p.39, 1988 ed.)

The evidence presented by the petitioner and the testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Tayag,
points (sic) to one thing – that the petitioner failed to establish a harmonious family life with the
respondent. On the contrary, the respondent has not shown love and respect to the petitioner
manifested by the former’s being irresponsible, immature, jobless, gambler, drunkard and worst
of all – a wife beater. The petitioner, unable to bear any longer the misbehavior and attitude of
the respondent, decided, after one year and four months of messy days, to leave the respondent.

In this regard, the petitioner was able to prove that right from the start of her married life with the
respondent, she already suffered from maltreatment, due to physical injuries inflicted upon her
and that she was the one who worked as a housemaid of a relative of her husband to sustain the
latter’s niece (sic) and because they were living with her husband’s family, she was obliged to do
the household chores – an indication that she is a battered wife coupled with the fact that she
served as a servant in his (sic) husband’s family.

This situation that the petitioner had underwent may be attributed to the fact that at the time of
their marriage, she and her husband are still young and was forced only to said marriage by her
relatives. The petitioner and the respondent had never developed the feeling of love and respect,
instead, the respondent blamed the petitioner’s family for said early marriage and not to his own
liking.

Applying the principles and the requisites of psychological incapacity enunciated by this Court in
Santos v. Court of Appeals,7 the RTC concluded:
The above findings of the psychologist [referring to the psychologist’ testimony quoted above]
would only tend to show that the respondent was, indeed, suffering from psychological incapacity
which is not only grave but also incurable.

Likewise, applying the principles set forth in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina, 268 SCRA 198, wherein the Supreme Court held that:

x x x x [At this point, the RTC cited the pertinent Molina ruling]

The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented and the testimony of the petitioner and Dr.
Familiar (sic) [the psychologist who testified in this case was Nedy Tayag, not a Dr. Familiar]
attesting that there is psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to comply with the
essential marital obligations has been sufficiently and clearly proven and, therefore, petitioner is
entitled to the relief prayed for.

A claim that the marriage is valid as there is no psychological incapacity of the respondent is a
speculation and conjecture and without moral certainty. This will enhanced (sic) a greater
tragedy as the battered wife/petitioner will still be using the surname of the respondent, although
they are now separated, and a grim and sad reminder of her husband who made here a slave
and a punching bag during the short span of her marriage with him. The law on annulment
should be liberally construed in favor of an innocent suffering petitioner otherwise said law will be
an instrument to protect persons with mental illness like the serious anti-social behavior of herein
respondent.8

THE CA RULING

The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC decision, ruling
that:

True, as stated in Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755, the guidelines set in Santos vs Court of
Appeals and Republic vs Court of Appeals do not require that a physician personally examine the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. The Supreme Court adopted the totality of
evidence approach which allows the fact of psychological incapacity to be drawn from evidence
that medically or clinically identify the root causes of the illness. If the totality of the evidence is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to. Applied in Marcos, however, the aggregate testimony
of the aggrieved spouse, children, relatives and the social worker were not found to be sufficient
to prove psychological incapacity, in the absence of any evaluation of the respondent himself, the
person whose mental and psychological capacity was in question.

In the case at bench, there is much scarcer evidence to hold that the respondent was
psychologically incapable of entering into the marriage state, that is, to assume the essential
duties of marriage due to an underlying psychological illness. Only the wife gave first-hand
testimony on the behavior of the husband, and it is inconclusive. As observed by the Court in
Marcos, the respondent may have failed to provide material support to the family and has
resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were manifestations of a
deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or medically identified. The theory of the
psychologist that the respondent was suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at the
time of the marriage was not the product of any adequate medical or clinical investigation. The
evidence that she got from the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show that the behavior
of the respondent was due simply to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which are not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, Pesca vs Pesca 356 SCRA 588, or the failure or refusal to
work could have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been
forced into a loveless marriage. In any event, the respondent was not under a permanent
compulsion because he had later on shown his ability to engage in productive work and more
stable relationships with another. The element of permanence or incurability that is one of the
defining characteristic of psychological incapacity is not present.

There is no doubt that for the short period that they were under the same roof, the married life of
the petitioner with the respondent was an unhappy one. But the marriage cannot for this reason
be extinguished. As the Supreme Court intimates in Pesca, our strict handling of Article 36 will be
a reminder of the inviolability of the marriage institution in our country and the foundation of the
family that the law seeks to protect. The concept of psychological incapacity is not to be a mantra
to legalize what in reality are convenient excuses of parties to separate and divorce.

THE PETITION

Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the reversal of the CA
ruling based on the following arguments:

1. The Court of Appeals went beyond what the law says, as it totally disregarded the
legal basis of the RTC in declaring the marriage null and void – Tuason v. Tuason (256
SCRA 158; to be accurate, should be Tuason v. Court of Appeals) holds that "the finding
of the Trial Court as to the existence or non-existence of petitioner’s psychological
incapacity at the time of the marriage is final and binding on us (the Supreme Court);
petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial court’s factual findings and evaluation of
the testimonies of private respondent’s witnesses vis-à-vis petitioner’s defenses are
clearly and manifestly erroneous";

2. Article 36 of the Family Code did not define psychological incapacity; this omission
was intentional to give the courts a wider discretion to interpret the term without being
shackled by statutory parameters. Article 36 though was taken from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which gives three conditions that would make a person unable
to contract marriage from mental incapacity as follows:

"1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

(1) who lack the sufficient use of reason;

(2) who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial
rights and duties which are to be mutually given and accepted;

(3) who are not capable of assuming the essential obligations of matrimony due to
causes of a psychic nature."

The decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims, intelligently conforms to these criteria. The RTC, being
clothed with discretionary functions, applied its finding of psychological incapacity based on
existing jurisprudence and the law itself which gave lower court magistrates enough latitude to
define what constitutes psychological incapacity. On the contrary, she further claims, the OSG
relied on generalities without being specific on why it is opposed to the dissolution of a marriage
that actually exists only in name.

Simply stated, we face the issue of whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage with
Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code.

THE COURT’S RULING

We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of law in setting aside
the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito a nullity under
Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
The Law, Molina and Te

Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.

A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended application, as it merely introduced an
abstract concept – psychological incapacity that disables compliance with the contractual
obligations of marriage – without any concrete definition or, at the very least, an illustrative
example. We must therefore apply the law based on how the concept of psychological incapacity
was shaped and developed in jurisprudence.

Santos v. Court of Appeals9 declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)

gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." It must be
confined to "the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage." 10

The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of the law in
Republic v. Court of Appeals11 (Molina) as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties or one of them was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
 those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x
xx

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.12

Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded on the basic requirements of

Santos.13

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,14 further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as
a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under
Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists
and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. 15

Pesca v. Pesca16 clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even to cases then already pending,
under the reasoning that the court’s interpretation or construction establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law; the latter as so interpreted and construed would
thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling
of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may
have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have
acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."

On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 08-11-10 SC, Rules) promulgated by the Court took effect.
Section 2(d) of the Rules pertinently provides:

(d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need
not be alleged.

Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the evidence presented,
including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the nature and purpose of these
pieces of evidence. Section 14(b) requires the court to consider during the pre-trial conference
the advisability of receiving expert testimony and such other matters as may aid in the prompt
disposition of the petition. Under Section 17 of the Rules, the grounds for the declaration of the
absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved.

All cases – involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code – that came to us were
invariably decided based on the principles in the cited cases. This was the state of law and
jurisprudence on Article 36 when the Court decided Te v. Yu-Te 17 (Te) which revisited the Molina
guidelines.

Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family Code did not give any
examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it would limit the applicability of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis; that the Committee desired that the courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, by the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals that,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself
was taken from the Canon Law.18 Te thus assumes it a basic premise that the law is so designed
to allow some resiliency in its application. 19

Te then sustained Santos’ doctrinal value, saying that its interpretation is consistent with that of
the Canon Law.

Going back to its basic premise, Te said:

Conscious of the law’s intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should
determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining
the lower court’s judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, ruled that the findings of
the trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts.

Again, upholding the trial court’s findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on
the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, explained that when private respondent
testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she
thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel
decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of
the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.

With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the resiliency with which the
concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be
interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the
imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina. Molina, to Te, has become a strait-jacket, forcing
all sizes to fit into and be bound by it; wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying
Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the
like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.

Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts. Courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the abandonment of Molina,
but that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked at other perspectives that should also
govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. The subsequent Ting
v. Velez-Ting20 follows Te’s lead when it reiterated that Te did not abandon Molina; far from
abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements, cognizant of
the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages: 21

To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological
incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or
psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to
justice of poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not
available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement
enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a
psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be
determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.

Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing from Molina, 22 merely stands for a more flexible
approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological
incapacity. It is also noteworthy for its evidentiary approach in these cases, which it expounded
on as follows:

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on
the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.

xxxx

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to

establish the precise cause of a party’s psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at
the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert
proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or
expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.23 [Underscoring supplied]

This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting. 24

Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current string of cases on Article 36 of the
Family Code, what should not be lost on us is the intention of the law to confine the application of
Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders, clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage; that the psychological
illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. 25 It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to
be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was
unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an
adverse integral element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated
him from complying with his essential marital obligations – must be shown. 26 Mere difficulty,
refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is
different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness;
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility
and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36,
as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.27

If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but iterations of Santos’ juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability requisites. This is proof of Santos’ continuing doctrinal validity.

The Present Case

As the CA did, we find Jocelyn’s evidence insufficient to establish Angelito’s psychological

incapacity to perform essential marital obligations. We so conclude based on our own
examination of the evidence on record, which we were compelled to undertake because of the
differences in the trial court and the appellate court’s appreciation and evaluation of Jocelyn’s
presented evidence.

a. The Expert Opinion Evidence

Both the psychologist’s testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively show the root
cause, gravity and incurability of Angelito’s alleged psychological condition.

We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion evidence – the
psychologist’s testimony and the psychological evaluation report – that Jocelyn presented. Based
on her declarations in open court, the psychologist evaluated Angelito’s psychological condition
only in an indirect manner – she derived all her conclusions from information coming from
Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the
information upon which the psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the
evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care and with the application of the more rigid and
stringent set of standards outlined above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a
psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.

In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of examination is
not a mandatory requirement. While such examination is desirable, we recognize that it may not
be practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged relations between the parties. For a
determination though of a party’s complete personality profile, information coming from persons
intimately related to him (such as the party’s close relatives and friends) may be helpful. This is
an approach in the application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if
not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion based entirely on
doubtful sources of information.

From these perspectives, we conclude that the psych`ologist, using meager information coming
from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could
not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological
condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn’s
psychological condition, this is not true for Angelito’s. The methodology employed simply cannot
satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party
alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report
that the Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists. 1avvphi1

Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the psychologist’s report and testimony simply
provided a general description of Angelito’s purported anti-social personality disorder, supported
by the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was
conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to
the characterization she gave. These particulars are simply not in the Report, and neither can
they be found in her testimony.

For instance, the psychologist testified that Angelito’s personality disorder is chronic or incurable;
Angelito has long been afflicted with the disorder prior to his marriage with Jocelyn or even
during his early developmental stage, as basic trust was not developed. However, she did not
support this declaration with any factual basis. In her Report, she based her conclusion on the
presumption that Angelito apparently grew up in a dysfunctional family. Quite noticeable, though,
is the psychologist’s own equivocation on this point – she was not firm in her conclusion for she
herself may have realized that it was simply conjectural. The veracity, too, of this finding is highly
suspect, for it was based entirely on Jocelyn’s assumed knowledge of Angelito’s family
background and upbringing.

Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the questions of why and to what extent was
Angelito’s personality disorder grave and incurable, and on the effects of the disorder on
Angelito’s awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of
marriage.

The psychologist therefore failed to provide the answers to the more important concerns or
requisites of psychological incapacity, all of which are critical to the success of Jocelyn’s cause.

b. Jocelyn’s Testimony

The inadequacy and/or lack of probative value of the psychological report and the psychologist’s
testimony impel us to proceed to the evaluation of Jocelyn’s testimony, to find out whether she
provided the court with sufficient facts to support a finding of Angelito’s psychological incapacity.

Unfortunately, we find Jocelyn’s testimony to be insufficient. Jocelyn merely testified on

Angelito’s habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical
beatings she received from him – all of which occurred after the marriage. Significantly, she
declared in her testimony that Angelito showed no signs of violent behavior, assuming this to be
indicative of a personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at the earliest stages of her
relationship with him. She testified on the alleged physical beatings after the marriage, not before
or at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She did not clarify when these beatings exactly
took place – whether it was near or at the time of celebration of the marriage or months or years
after. This is a clear evidentiary gap that materially affects her cause, as the law and its related
jurisprudence require that the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of
the marriage.

Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological
incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate
difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence
holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of proof
that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition
or illness.

The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a different treatment. While we may
concede that physical violence on women indicates abnormal behavioral or personality patterns,
such violence, standing alone, does not constitute psychological incapacity. Jurisprudence holds
that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. The evidence of this nexus is
irretrievably lost in the present case under our finding that the opinion of the psychologist cannot
be relied upon. Even assuming, therefore, that Jocelyn’s account of the physical beatings she
received from Angelito were true, this evidence does not satisfy the requirement of Article 36 and
its related jurisprudence, specifically the Santos requisites.

On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment, whose factual bases we now find to
be clearly and manifestly erroneous. Our ruling in Tuason recognizing the finality of the factual
findings of the trial court in Article 36 cases (which is Jocelyn’s main anchor in her present
appeal with us) does not therefore apply in this case. We find that, on the contrary, the CA
correctly applied Article 36 and its related jurisprudence to the facts and the evidence of the
present case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the
appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443. Costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
  Penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña III, and concurred in by Associate Justice
1

Marina L. Buzon and Associate Justice Santiago Javier Rañada (both retired).

2
 Penned by Judge Pedro de Leon Gutierrez.

3
 TSN, March 31, 1998, pp. 16-17.

4
 TSN, July 16, 1998, pp. 15-22.

5
 Record, pp. 36-39.

6
 Parenthetical notes supplied.

7
 The RTC enumerated the requisites as follows: (1) that psychological incapacity refers
to no less than a mental not physical incapacity; (2) that the law intended psychological
incapacity to be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
marriage; and (3) that the psychological condition must exist at the time of the marriage
and must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. See citation
at note 9.

SUAZO v. SUAZO 

G.R. No.  164493 March 10, 2010

FACTS:
Angelito Suazo  and Jocelyn Suazo were married when they were 16 years old
only.  Without any means to support themselves, they lived with Angelito’s parents
while Jocelyn took odd jobs and Angelito refused to work and was most of the
time drunk. Petitioner urged him to find work but this often resulted to violent
quarrels. A year after their marriage, Jocelyn left Angelito. Angelito thereafter found
another woman with whom he has since lived.  10 years later, she filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Art. 36 Psychological incapacity. Jocelyn
testified on the alleged physical beating she received. The expert
witness corroborated parts of Jocelyn’s testimony. Both her psychological report and
testimony concluded that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated. However, B
was not personally examined by the expert witness. The RTC annulled the marriage
on the ground that Angelito is unfit to comply with his marital obligation, such
as “immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of rational judgment and
responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the husband to
support the family or excessive dependence on parents or peer group
approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the condition by which a person lives for
the next drink and the next drinks” but the CA reversed it and held that the
respondent may have failed to provide material support to the family and has
resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were
manifestations of a deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or medically
identified.  The theory of the psychologist that the respondent was suffering
from an anti-social personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was not
the product of any adequate medical or clinical investigation.  The evidence that
she got from the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show that the behavior
of the respondent was due simply to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which
are not equivalent to psychological incapacity, or the failure or refusal to work could
have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been
forced into a loveless marriage.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not there is a basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito under
Article 36 of the Family Code.

HELD:
The Court find the petition devoid of merit.  The CA committed no reversible error
of law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyn’s
marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related
jurisprudence.
Jocelyn’s evidence is insufficient to establish Angelito’s psychological
incapacity. The psychologist evaluated Angelito’s psychological condition only in an
indirect manner – she derived all her conclusions from information coming from
Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. The psychlologist,
using meager information coming from a directly interested party, could not have
secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an
objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological condition. While the report
or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn’s psychological condition,
this is not true for Angelito’s. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the
required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party
alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. Both the psychologist’s report
and testimony simply provided a general description of Angelito’s purported anti-
social personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as
chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however,
on the bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the
characterization she gave. Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing
a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity
and the psychological disorder itself. A’s testimony regarding the habitual
drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological
incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply
indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations. 
 It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated,
had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform
these obligations.  Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse
integral element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations – must
be shown.  Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in
some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not
by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the
same may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage

Kalaw vs. Fernandez, G.R. # 166357, Sept. 19, 2011; Jan. 14, 2015

G.R. No. 166357               January 14, 2015

VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In our decision promulgated on September 19, 2011,  the Court dismissed the complaint for
1

declaration of nullity of the marriage of the parties upon the following ratiocination, to wit:

The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial court's
Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.

xxxx

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological
incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were
premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven.
Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong
sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children.
Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the
detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a
psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions
of his experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting
these allegations of the petitioner.

For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their
children as a result. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she
engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife.
Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations that she played four to five times a week. She
maintained it was only two to three times a week and always with the permission of her husband
and without abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that they
were with their mother when she played mahjong in their relative’s home. Petitioner did not
present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that
respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second
grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondent’s mahjong-playing. The least that could
have been done was to prove the frequency of respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years
when these two children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no
dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on
the children were not proven.

Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about respondent’s alleged constant visits to the beauty
parlor, going out with friends, and obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof
whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons orher frequent partying with
friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during these nights-out)
in order to prove that respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only testified that
respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming arguendothat petitioner was able
to prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual
infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual
infidelity per seis a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity.

Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described
as constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically
incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair
assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of
appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not once did the children state that
they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of them,
was around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent
made real efforts tosee and take care of her children despite her estrangement from their father.
There was no testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties.
While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second
elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their academic short comings to
Malyn’s actions.

After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of
psychological incapacity. There is no error in the CA’s reversal of the trial court’s ruling that there
was psychological incapacity. The trial court’s Decision merely summarized the allegations,
testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of
these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court
did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusionof psychological
incapacity.

What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have
constrained them from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children.
There may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a
marriage.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ May 27,
2004 Decision and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 2

In his Motion for Reconsideration,  the petitioner implores the Court to take a thorough second
3

look into what constitutes psychological incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court as
supported by the testimonies of three expert witnesses; and consequently to find that the
respondent, if not both parties, were psychologically incapacitated to perform their respective
essential marital obligation.
Upon an assiduous review of the records, we resolve to grant the petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.

Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the
marriage that is permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume. Although the Family
Code has not defined the term psychological incapacity, the Court has usually looked up its
meaning by reviewing the deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee
that had drafted the Family Code in order to gain an insight on the provision. It appeared that the
members of the Family Code Revision Committee were not unanimous on the meaning, and in
the end they decided to adopt the provision "with less specificity than expected" in order to have
the law "allow some resiliency in its application."  Illustrative of the "less specificity than
4

expected" has been the omission by the Family Code Revision Committee to give any examples
of psychological incapacity that would have limited the applicability of the provision conformably
with the principle of ejusdem generis, because the Committee desired that the courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and the decisions of church tribunals that had
persuasive effect by virtue of the provision itself having been taken from the Canon Law. 5

On the other hand, as the Court has observed in Santos v. Court of Appeals,  the deliberations of
6

the Family Code Revision Committee and the relevant materials on psychological incapacity as a
ground for the nullity of marriage have rendered it obvious that the term psychological incapacity
as used in Article 36 of the Family Code"has not been meant to comprehend all such possible
cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances," and could not be taken and construed
independently of "but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage."
Thus correlated:-

x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68
of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the
Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the
void marriage to be "legitimate."7

In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,  the Court set some guidelines for the interpretation and
8

application of Article 36 of the Family Code, as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological — not physical, althoughits manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven tobe existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including suchprovision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
 harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — whatis decreed as canonically
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, inview of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect.
Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from
each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting
and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. 9

The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance
practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But
Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the
clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of "less specificity" obviously to
enable "some resiliency in its application." Instead, every court should approach the issue of
nullity "not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to
its own facts" in recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all fours" with the next one in
the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial
judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, asmuch as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."
10

In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of
marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology,
must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and
thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions
for the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by
experts.11

II

The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence of a party’s
psychological incapacity should be final and binding for as long as such findings and evaluation
of the testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be clearly and manifestly
erroneous.  In every situation where the findings of the trial court are sufficiently supported by
12

the facts and evidence presented during trial, the appellate court should restrain itself from
substituting its own judgment.  It is not enough reason to ignore the findings and evaluation by
13

the trial court and substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only because the Constitution and
the Family Code regard marriage as an inviolable social institution. We have to stress that the
fulfilment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social
institution  only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accordedto a marriage that is
14

null and void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence. 15

In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore, the Courts really assiduously defend
and promote the sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social institution. The foundation of our
society is thereby made all the more strong and solid.
Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it
was in the better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were
testifying.  The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the
16

psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and
respect.

Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court brushed aside the opinions tendered by Dr.
Cristina Gates,a psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the ground that their conclusions were
solely based on the petitioner’s version of the events.

After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and unwarranted to give to such
expert opinions a merely generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their
value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that
said experts sufficiently and competently described the psychological incapacity of the
respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions
reached by the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records and
affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of
the petitioner’s factual premises. 17

Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the transcript of the petitioner’s testimony, as well as
on her interviews of the petitioner, his sister Trinidad, and his son Miguel. Although her findings
would seem to be unilateral under such circumstances, it was not right to disregard the findings
on that basis alone. After all, her expert opinion took into consideration other factors extant in the
records, including the own opinions of another expert who had analyzed the issue from the side
of the respondent herself. Moreover, it is already settled that the courts must accord weight to
expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration
of the nullityof marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts,
"despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead,
must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties." 18

The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately necessary herein to enable the trial court to
properly determine the issue of psychological incapacity of the respondent (if not alsoof the
petitioner). Consequently, the lack of personal examination and interview of the person
diagnosed with personality disorder, like the respondent, did not per se invalidate the findings of
the experts. The Court has stressed in Marcos v. Marcos  that there is no requirement for one to
19

bedeclared psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician, because

what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the party’s
psychological incapacity. Hence, "if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to." 20

Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing
that a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record,
the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting
such other evidence on the causation.  Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity
21

should be considered as conjectural or speculative and without any probative value only in the
absence of other evidence to establish causation. The expert’s findings under such
circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence.  This
22

is so, considering that any ruling that brands the scientific and technical procedure adopted by
Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should be eschewed if it was clear that her psychiatric evaluation
had been based on the parties’ upbringing and psychodynamics.  In that context, Dr. Gates’
23

expertopinion should be considered not in isolation but along with the other evidence presented
here.
Moreover, in its determination of the issue of psychological incapacity, the trial court was
expectedto compare the expert findings and opinion of Dr. Natividad Dayan, the respondent’s
own witness, and those of Dr. Gates.

In her Psychological Evaluation Report,  Dr. Dayan impressed that the respondent had
24

"compulsive and dependent tendencies" to the extent of being "relationship dependent." Based
from the respondent’s psychological data, Dr. Dayan indicated that:

In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely to be reserved and seemingly detached in her
ways. Although she likes to be around people, she may keep her emotional distance. She, too,
values her relationship but she may not be that demonstrative of her affections. Intimacy may be
quite difficult for her since she tries to maintain a certain distance to minimize opportunities for
rejection. To others, Malyne may appear, critical and demanding in her ways. She can be
assertive when opinions contrary to those of her own are expressed. And yet, she is apt to be a
dependent person. At a less conscious level, Malyne fears that others will abandon her. Malyne,
who always felt a bit lonely, placed an enormous value on having significant others would
depend on most times.

xxxx

But the minute she started to care, she became a different person— clingy and immature,
doubting his love, constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most important person in
his life. She became relationship-dependent. 25

Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the results of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory
test  conducted on the respondent, observing that the respondent obtained high scores on
26

dependency, narcissism and compulsiveness, to wit:

Atty. Bretania

Q : How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory?

A : Sir, the cut of the score which is supposed to be normal is 73 percental round and there are
several scores wherein Mrs. Kalaw obtained very high score and these are on the score of
dependency, narcissism and compulsion.

Q : Would you please tell us again, Madam Witness, what is the acceptable score?

A : When your score is 73 and above, that means that it is very significant. So, if 72 and below, it
will be considered as acceptable.

Q : In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high score?

A : Under dependency, her score is 78; under narcissism, is 79; under compulsiveness, it is 84. 27

It is notable that Dr. Dayan’s findings did not contradict but corroborated the findings of Dr. Gates
to the effect that the respondent had been afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder as well
as with AntiSocial Disorder. Dr. Gates relevantly testified:

ATTY. GONONG

Q : Could you please repeat for clarity. I myself is [sic] not quite familiar with psychology terms.
So, more or less, could you please tell me in more layman’s terms how you arrived at your
findings that the respondent is self-centered or narcissistic?
A : I moved into this particular conclusion. Basically, if you ask about her childhood background,
her fatherdied in a vehicular accident when she was in her teens and thereafter she was
prompted to look for a job to partly assume the breadwinner’s role in her family. I gathered that
paternal grandmother partly took care of her and her siblings against the fact that her own
mother was unable to carry out her respective duties and responsibilities towards Elena
Fernandez and her siblings considering that the husband died prematurely. And there was an
indication that Elena Fernandez on several occasions ever told petitioner that he cannot blame
her for being negligent as a mother because she herself never experienced the care and
affection of her own mother herself. So, there is a precedent in her background, in her childhood,
and indeed this seems to indicate a particular script, we call it in psychology a script, the
tendency to repeat somekind of experience or the lack of care, let’s say some kind of deprivation,
there is a tendency to sustain it even on to your own life when you have your own family. I did
interview the son because I was not satisfied with what I gathered from both Trinidad and Valerio
and even though as a young son at the age of fourteen already expressed the he could not see,
according to the child, the sincerity of maternal care on the part of Elena and that he preferred to
live with the father actually.

Q : Taking these all out, you came to the conclusion that respondent is self-centered and
narcissistic?

A : Actually respondent has some needs which tempts [sic] from a deprived childhood and she is
still insearch of this. In her several boyfriends, it seems that she would jump from one boyfriend
to another. There is this need for attention, this need for love on other people.

Q : And that led you to conclude?

A : And therefore I concluded that she is self-centered to the point of neglecting her duty as a
wife and as a mother. 28

The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of her theory
or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can render to the courts in showing the facts that
serve as a basis for her criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is
founded.  Hence, we should weigh and consider the probative value of the findings of the expert
29

witnesses vis-à-vis the other evidence available.

The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon law expert, an advocate before the
Manila Archdiocese and Matrimonial Tribunal, and a consultant of the Family Code Revision
Committee. Regarding Father Healy’s expert testimony, we have once declared that judicial
understanding of psychological incapacity could be informed by evolving standards, taking into
account the particulars of each case, by current trends in psychological and even by canonical
thought, and by experience.  It is prudent for us to do so because the concept of psychological
30

incapacity adopted under Article 36 of the Family Code was derived from Canon Law.

Father Healy tendered his opinion onwhether or not the respondent’s level of immaturity and
irresponsibility with regard to her own children and to her husband constituted psychological
incapacity, testifying thusly:

ATTY. MADRID

Q : Now, respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez claims that she is not psychologically incapacitated.
On the facts as you read it based on the records of this case before this Honorable Court, what
can you say to that claim of respondent?

A : I would say it is a clear case of psychological incapacity because of her immaturity and
traumatic irresponsibility with regards to her own children.
Q : So what you are saying is that, the claim of respondent that she is not psychologically
incapacitated is not true?

A : Yes. It should be rejected.

Q : Why do you say so?

A : Because of what she has manifested in her whole lifestyle, inconsistent pattern has been
manifested running through their life made a doubt that this is immaturity and irresponsibility
because her family was dysfunctional and then her being a model in her early life and being the
bread winner of the family put her in an unusual position of prominence and then begun to inflate
her own ego and she begun to concentrate her own beauty and that became an obsession and
that led to her few responsibility of subordinating to her children to this lifestyle that she had
embraced.

Q : You only mentioned her relationship with the children, the impact. How about the impact on
the relationship of the respondent with her husband?

A : Also the same thing. It just did notfit in to her lifestyle to fulfill her obligation to her husband
and toher children. She had her own priorities, her beauty and her going out and her mahjong
and associating with friends. They were the priorities of her life.

Q : And what you are saying is that, her family was merely secondary?

A : Secondary.

Q : And how does that relate to psychological incapacity?

A : That she could not appreciate or absorb or fulfill the obligations of marriage which everybody
takes for granted. The concentration on the husband and the children before everything else
would be subordinated to the marriage withher. It’s the other way around.

Her beauty, her going out, her beauty parlor and her mahjong, they were their priorities in her life.

Q : And in medical or clinical parlance, what specifically do you call this?

A : That is narcissism where the person falls in love with himself is from a myt[h]ical case in
Roman history.

Q : Could you please define tous what narcissism is?

A : It’s a self-love, falling in love with oneself to make up for the loss of a dear friend as in the
case of Narcissus, the myth, and then that became known in clinical terminology as narcissism.
When a person is so concern[ed] with her own beauty and prolonging and protecting it, then it
becomes the top priority in her life.

xxxx

Q : And you stated that circumstances that prove this narcissism. How do you consider this
narcissism afflicting respondent, it is grave, slight or ….?

A : I would say it’s grave from the actual cases of neglect of her family and that causes serious
obligations which she has ignored and not properly esteemed because she is so concern[ed]
with herself in her own lifestyle. Very serious.
Q : And do you have an opinion whether or not this narcissism afflicting respondent was already
existing at the time or marriage or even thereafter?

xxxx

A : When you get married you don’t develop narcissism or psychological incapacity. You bring
with you into the marriage and then it becomes manifested because in marriage you accept
these responsibilities. And now you show that you don’t accept them and you are not capable of
fulfilling them and you don’t care about them.

Q : Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired by accident or congenital or what?

A : No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you become a model and still the family was depended
[sic] upon her and she was a model at Hyatt and then Rustan’s, it began to inflate her ego so
much that this became the top priority in her life. It’s her lifestyle.

Q : What you are saying is that, the narcissism of respondent even expanded after the marriage?

A : That could have expanded because it became very obvious after the marriage because she
was neglecting such fundamental obligations.

Q : And how about the matter of curability, is this medically or clinically curable, this narcissism
that you mentioned?

A : Let’s say, it was manifested for so many years in her life. It was found in her family
background situation. Say, almost for sure would be incurable now.

Q : What specific background are you referring to?

A : Well, the fact when the father died and she was the breadwinner and her beauty was so
important to give in her job and money and influence and so on. But this is a very unusual
situation for a young girl and her position in the family was exalted in a very very unusual manner
and therefore she had that pressure on her and in her accepting the pressure, in going along
with it and putting it in top priority.
31

Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon Law, Father Healy’s opinions and
findings commanded respect. The contribution that his opinions and findings could add to the
judicial determination of the parties’ psychological incapacity was substantive and instructive. He
could thereby inform the trial court on the degrees of the malady that would warrant the nullity of
marriage, and he could as well thereby provideto the trial court an analytical insight upon a
subject as esoteric to the courts as psychological incapacity has been. We could not justly
disregard his opinions and findings. Appreciating them together with those of Dr. Gates and Dr.
Dayan would advance more the cause of justice. The Court observed in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te: 32

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on
the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.

Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became
increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after
the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked togive professional
opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the
addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the
advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide
the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract
to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment
cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could
necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations
of a mature, lifelong commitmentare now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent.

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to
sexual anomalies but to all kinds ofpersonality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is
not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for hetero sexual acts,
but is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing
lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or
psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as
meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as
a distinct person; that the spouses must be `other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are
rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining
of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations ofmarriage depends, according to Church
decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal
sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but
in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:

"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent
and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3)
stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary
stresses and strains of marriage, etc."

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the
failure of a marriage:

"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the
best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his orher inability
to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of
loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real
freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently
fall short of reasonable expectations.

xxxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has
a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use.
Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the
time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the
parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised(lack
of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that at the
time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof
of someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promisedat the time the marriage was
entered into."

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to

establish the precise cause of a party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at
the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcosasserts, there is no requirement that the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if
the totalityof evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert
proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or
expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.33

Ngo Tealso emphasized that in light of the unintended consequences of strictly applying the
standards set in Molina,  the courts should consider the totality of evidence in adjudicating
34

petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, viz:

The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the
provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina, thus:

xxxx

Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court’s membership concurred in the
ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices
concurred "in the result" and another three--including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero--took pains
to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized
that "each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on ‘all fours’ with another case.
The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as
much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."

Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has applied the aforesaid
standards, without too much regard for the law's clear intention that each case is to be treated
differently, as "courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions
of church tribunals."

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the
one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was
then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to
the OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." The
unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with
deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites,
consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far
fromwhat was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into
and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has
allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like,
tocontinuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has
annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.

The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for
there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the
State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or
fabrication of evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases
involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological incapacity, the Court isnot
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage,
because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply
with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be
stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psycho sexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic
personality anomaly. Let itbe noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first
place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of
nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.

xxxx

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We
simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need
to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the
principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. 35

III

In the decision of September 19, 2011,the Court declared as follows:

Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so
frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s
allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to three
times a week and always withthe permission of her husband and without abandoning her
children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that theywere with their mother when
she played mahjong in their relatives home.Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his
own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her
family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link
this episode to respondent’s mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to prove
the frequency of respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in
second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played
mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not
proven.  (Emphasis supplied)
36

The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination
of the presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her
obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she
made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would
have known that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would
expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber.
Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely
impacted on her family life, particularly on her very young children. We do find to be revealing the
disclosures made by Valerio Teodoro Kalaw  – the parties’ eldest son – in his deposition,
37

whereby the son confirmed the claim of his father that his mother had been hooked on playing
mahjong, viz:

ATTY. PISON: From the time before your parent’s separation, do you remember any habit or
activity or practice which your mother engaged in, before the separation?

WITNESS: Yeah, habit? She was a heavy smoker and she likes to play mahjong a lot, and I can’t
remember.

xxxx

ATTY. PISON: You said that your mother played mahjong frequently. How frequent, do you
remember?

WITNESS : Not really, but it was a lot. Not actually, I can’t, I can’t…

ATTY. PISON: How long would she stay playing mahjong say one session?

WITNESS : Really long cuz’we would go to my aunt’s house in White Plains and I think we would
get there by lunch then leave, we fall asleep. I think it was like one in the morning. ATTY. PISON:
You, you went there? She brought you?

WITNESS : Yeah, to play withmy cousins, yeah and my brothers & sisters.

ATTY. PISON: Were you brought all the time?

WITNESS: Yeah, almost all the time but sometimes, I guess she’d go out by herself. 38

The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only
point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a
culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every
occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs
for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires. This was the
observation of Father Healy himself. In that regard, Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan both explained that
the current psychological state of the respondent had been rooted on her own childhood
experience.

The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development.
This disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children, as expressly
defined under Article 209 and Article 220 of the Family Code, to wit:

Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their
unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall includethe caring for and
rearing of such children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their
moral, mental and physical character and well-being.

Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their
unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:

(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept
and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
 (2) x x x x

(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty,
integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic
affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;

(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at all
times;

(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their
activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and
prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;

(6) x x x x

(7) x x x x

(8) x x x x

(9) x x x x (emphasis supplied)

The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take into consideration the findings of the RTC
to the effect that both the petitioner and the respondent had been psychologically incapacitated,
and thus could not assume the essential obligations of marriage. The RTC would not have found
so without the allegation to that effect by the respondent in her answer,  whereby she averred
39

that it was not she but the petitioner who had suffered from psychological incapacity.

The allegation of the petitioner’spsychological incapacity was substantiated by Dr. Dayan, as

follows:

ATTY. BRETAÑA:

Q : You stated earlier that both parties were behaviorally immature?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : And that the marriage was a mistake?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : What is your basis for your statement that respondent was behaviorally immature?

A : Sir, for the reason that even before the marriage Malyn had noticed already some of those
short temper of the petitioner but she was very much in love and so she lived-in with him and
even the time that they were together, that they were living in, she also had noticed some of his
psychological deficits if we may say so. But as I said, because she is also dependent and she
was one who determined to make the relationship work, she was denying even those kinds of
problems that she had seen.

Q : To make it clear, Madam witness, I’m talking here of the petitioner, Mr. Kalaw. What led you
to conclude that Mr. Kalaw was behaviorally immature?
A : I think he also mentioned that his concept of marriage was not duly stable then. He was not
really thinking of marriage except that his wife got pregnant and so he thought that he had to
marry her. And even that time he was not also a monogamous person.

Q : Are you saying, Madam Witness, that ultimately the decision to marry lied on the petitioner?
A : I think so, Sir.

Q : Now, in your report, Madam Witness, you mentioned here that the petitioner admitted to you
that in his younger years he was often out seeking other women. I’m referring specifically to page
18. He also admitted to you that the thought of commitment scared him, the petitioner. Now,
given these admissions by petitioner to you, my questions is, is it possible for such a person to
enter into marriage despite this fear of commitment and given his admission that he was a
womanizer? Is it possible for this person to stop his womanizing ways during the marriage?

A : Sir, it’s difficult.

Q : It would be difficult for that person?

A : Yes, Sir.

Q : What is the probability of this person giving up his womanizing after marriage?

A : Sir, I would say the probability of his giving up is almost only 20%.

Q : So, it is entirely possible that the respondent womanized during his marriage with the
respondent?

A : Yes, Sir.

Q : What is the bearing of this fearof commitment on the part of the petitioner insofar as his
psychological capacity to perform his duties as a husband is concerned?

A : Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual integrity and also to be fully committed to the role
of husband to Malyn.

Q : Madam Witness, you never directly answered my question on whether the petitioner was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his duty as a husband. You only said that the petitioner
was behaviorally immature and that the marriage was a mistake. Now, may I asked [sic] you that
question again and request you to answer that directly?

A : Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated. 40

Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to prove the nullity of the marriage, the
respondent, as the defendant spouse, could establish the psychological incapacity of her
husband because she raised the matter in her answer. The courts are justified in declaring a
marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of whether it is the
petitioner or the respondent who imputes the psychological incapacity to the other as long as the
imputation is fully substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in one
party alone or in both of them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is established, the
marriage has to be deemed null and void.

More than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted ways. By now, they must have
already accepted and come to terms with the awful truth that their marriage, assuming it existed
in the eyes of the law, was already beyond repair. Both parties had inflicted so much damage not
only to themselves, but also to the lives and psyche of their own children. It would be a greater
injustice should we insist on still recognizing their void marriage, and then force them and their
children to endure some more damage. This was the very same injustice that Justice Romero
decried in her erudite dissenting opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals: 41

It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive
interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for
purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.

Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today.  It is
1âwphi1

not, in effect, directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual
tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging
problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the
companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and towhich he is legally
entitled?

I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce
but I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny
to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a
nullity by reason of his wife’s psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.
In this case, the marriage never existed from the beginning because the respondent was afflicted
with psychological incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage. Hence, the Court should
not hesitate to declare the nullity of the marriage between the parties.

To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as the basic foundation of our
society does not preclude striking down a marital union that is "ill-equipped to promote family
life," thus:

Now is also the opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the
adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the
kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively
state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development[t]," and that [m]arriage,
as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection
accorded to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a
social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to
define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it,
based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the
qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional
provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through
the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the
corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as
prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may
appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the
constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory
definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if
circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional
considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity. Indeed,
Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically
incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional
protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation
of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding
interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio
marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and
family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are
not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.  (Emphasis
42

supplied)

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision
rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO due to the psychological
incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN**

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Per Special Order No. 1080 dated September 13, 2011.

** Pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 7, Rule 2, Internal Rules.

1
 657 SCRA 822.

2
 Id. at 836-839.

3
 Rollo, pp. 689-704.
4
 See Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20, 31.

5
 See Salita v. Magtolis, G.R No. 106429, June 13, 1994, 233 SCRA 100, 107-108.

6
 Supra note 4.

7
 Id. at 34.

8
 G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198.

9
 Id. at 209-213.

 Separate Statement of Justice Teodoro Padilla in Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra,

10

note 8, at 214.

 Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999, 320 SCRA 76;
11

Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 735.

12
 Tuason v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116607, April 10, 1996, 256 SCRA 158, 170.

 Separate Statement of Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in Republic v. Court of Appeals,

13

supra note 10.

14
 Article XV of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the

family and shall be protected by the State.

 Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, G.R. No. 185286, August 18, 2010, 628 SCRA 461 ("[B]lind
15

adherence by the courts to the exhortation in the Constitution and in our statutes that
marriage is an inviolable social institution, and validating a marriage that is null and void
despite convincing proof of psychological incapacity, trenches on the very reason why a
marriage is doomed from its inception should not be forcibly inflicted upon its hapless
partners for life.").

 Collado v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72780, February 13, 1992, 206
16

SCRA 206, 212; People v. Basmayor, G.R. No. 182791, February 10, 2009, 578 SCRA
369, 382-383.

17
 Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353, 379.

18
 Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193, 228.

19
 G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755, 757.

20
 Id. at 764.

21
 Herrera, Remedial Law, Volume V (1999), pp. 804-805.

22
 Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, supra, note 15, at 487.

23
 Carcereny, et al., Annulment in the Philippines: Clinical and Legal Issues (2010), p. 16.

24
 Records Volume II, pp. 87-105.
 25
 Id. at 100, 103.

 A psychological test used to find personality disorders based on the respondent’s

26

answers to 175 true/false questions (Ng, et al., Legal and Clinical Bases of Psychological
Incapacity [2006], p. 109).

27
 TSN dated January 30, 1996, p. 13.

28
 TSN dated February 15, 1995, pp. 8-10.

29
 Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, G.R. No. 176464, February 4, 2010, 611 SCRA 569, 585.

30
 Antonio v. Reyes, supra note 17, at 370.

31
 TSN dated June 17, 1998, pp. 24-28.

32
 Supra note 18.

33
 Id. at 229-232.

34
 Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 8.

35
 Supra note 18, at 220-228.

36
 Decision, pp. 837-838.

37
 Records, pp. 354-391.

38
 Id. at 363.

39
 Paragraph 3 (Records, Vol. I, p. 20) of which runs:

3. She specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the Petition
alleging that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations to the marriage and that such incapacity manifested itself only after
the marriage, the truth of the matter being that it is the petitioner who is psychologically
incapacitated.

4. VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,

5. vs. 

6. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.

7. G.R. No. 166357    January 14, 2015

8.  

9. Read the 2011 Kalaw v. Fernandez case digest HERE.

10. PONENTE: Bersamin, J.

11. TOPIC: Psychological incapacity, Declaration of Nullity of Marriage

12. FACTS:

13.                 In the case at bar, Kalaw presented the testimonies of two supposed
expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of
respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out
with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts
opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the
detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and
wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

14.                 However, the Supreme Court in its September 19, 2011 decision
dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage on the
ground that there was no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological
incapacity.

15.  

16. ISSUE:

17.                 Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of psychological
incapacity.

18.  

19. HELD:

20.                YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that
Fernandez was indeed psychologically incapacitated as they relaxed the
previously set forth guidelines with regard to this case.

21. Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions were just

given much respect in this case.

22. Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE

23.                 The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of Republic v. CA
have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance
practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of
certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and
too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to
adopt its enacted version of “less specificity” obviously to enable “some
resiliency in its application.” Instead, every court should approach the issue of
nullity “not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its own facts” in recognition of the verity that
no case would be on “all fours” with the next one in the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every “trial judge
must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must,
as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court.
24.                 In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as
a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly
not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of
necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform
themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at
an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the
malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth
diagnosis by experts.

25. Personal examination by party not required; totality of evidence

must be considered

26.                 We have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate
for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution only relates
to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null
and void

27. ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.

28.                There is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically

incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician, because what is
important is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the party’s
psychological incapacity. Hence, “if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.”

29.                 Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the
like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain
condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the
record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for
the court in interpreting such other evidence on the causation.

30.                Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be

considered as conjectural or speculative and without any probative value only
in the absence of other evidence to establish causation. The expert’s findings
under such circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would justify
their exclusion as evidence.

31.  

32. Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to psychological

and emotional temperaments

33.                 The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved
credence because it was in the better position to view and examine the
demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. The position and role of
the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological
incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance
and respect.
34.                 The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to give to such
expert opinions a merely generalized consideration and treatment, least of all
to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of
the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and competently
described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the standards
of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the
two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records
and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had
accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s factual premises.

35.  

36.                 The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to expert
testimony on the psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the
declaration of the nullity of marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of
the Family Code the courts, “despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”

37.  

38.Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of

parental duties

39.                 The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have
delimited our determination of the presence or absence of psychological
incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to fully
appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made
her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities,
she would have known that bringing along her children of very tender ages to
her mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and other
vices that would erode their moral fiber. Nonetheless, the long-term effects of
the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her family
life, particularly on her very young children.

40.                The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her
mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental duties, but also
manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully
exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her
mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their
needs for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist
desires.

41.                 The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s
moral and mental development. This disregard violated her duty as a parent to
safeguard and protect her children.

42. FALLO:
 43. WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration;
REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on September 19,
2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court
declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on
November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB JN/TIO due to the psychological
incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

Mallilin vs. Jamesolamin & Republic, G.R. # 192718, Feb. 18, 2015

G.R. No. 192718               February 18, 2015

ROBERT F. MALLILIN, Petitioner,
vs.
LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing
the November 20, 2009 Decision  of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its June 1, 2010 Resolution,2
1

in CA-G.R. CV No. 78303-MIN, which reversed and set aside the September 20, 2002 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City(RTC-Br.37), declaring the marriage
between petitioner Robert F. Mallilin (Robert) and private respondent Luz G. Jamesolamin (Luz)
null and void.

The Facts:

Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972. They begot three (3) children.

On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC,
Branch 23, Cagayan de Oro City (RTC-Br. 23). On March 7, 1996, RTC-Br. 23 denied the
petition. Robert appealed this judgment before the CA where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
54261. On January 29, 1999, the CA reversed the RTC-Br. 23 decision "due to lack of
participation of the State as required under Article 48 of the Family Code."  The case was
3

remanded to the RTC for further proceedings and its records were thereafter transferred from
RTC-Br. 23 to RTC-Br. 37, as the latter was designated as Family Court pursuant to the Family
Code Act of 1997.

In the complaint, Robert alleged that at the time of the celebration of their marriage, Luz was
suffering from psychological and mental incapacity and unpreparedness to enter into such
marital life and to comply with its essential obligations and responsibilities. Such incapacity
became even more apparent during their marriage when Luz exhibited clear manifestation of
immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational judgment, and inability to cope with
the heavy and oftentimes demanding obligation of a parent.

Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the complaint. She averred that it was Robert
who manifested psychological incapacity in their marriage. Despite due notice, however, she did
not appear during the trial. Assistant City Prosecutor Isabelo Sabanal appeared for the State.
When Robert testified, he disclosed that Luz was already living in California, USA, and had
married an American. He also revealed that when they were still engaged, Luz continued seeing
and dating another boyfriend, a certain Lt. Liwag. He also claimed that from the outset, Luz had
been remiss in her duties both as a wife and as a mother as shown by the following
circumstances: (1) it was he who did the cleaning of the room because Luz did not know how to
keep order; (2) it was her mother who prepared their meal while her sister was the one who
washed their clothes because she did not want her polished nails destroyed; (3) it was also her
sister who took care of their children while she spent her time sleeping and looking at the mirror;
(4) when she resumed her schooling, she dated different men; (5) he received anonymous letters
reporting her loitering with male students; (6) when he was not home, she would receive male
visitors; (7) a certain Romy Padua slept in their house when he was away; and (6) she would
contract loans without his knowledge.

In addition, Robert presented the testimony of Myrna Delos Reyes Villanueva (Villanueva),
Guidance Psychologist II of Northern Mindanao Medical Center.

On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the trial court, Robert filed a petition for
marriage annulment with the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manila
(Metropolitan Tribunal).

On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed down a decision declaring their marriage
invalid ab initio on the ground of grave lack of due discretion on the part of both parties as
contemplated by the second paragraph of Canon1095. This decision was affirmed by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT).

Prior to that, on September 20, 2002,the RTC had rendered a decision declaring the marriage
null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Luz as she failed to comply
with the essential marital obligations.

The State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed an appeal with
the CA. The OSG argued that Robert failed to make a case for declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Luz. It pointed out that the real cause of the marital discord was the sexual
infidelity of Luz. Such ground, the OSG contended, should not result in the nullification of the
marriage under the law, but merely constituted a ground for legal separation.

The CA, in its November 20, 2009 Decision,  granted the petition and reversed the RTC decision.
4

The decision, including the decretal portion, partially reads:

[W]e find that the trial court committed a reversible error. Closer scrutiny of the records reveals,
as correctly noted by the Solicitor General, sexual infidelity are not rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. x x x.

xxxx

In the case at bar, apart from his self-serving declarations, the evidence adduced by Robert fell
short of establishing the fact that at the time of their marriage, Luz was suffering from a
psychological defect which in fact deprived [her] of the ability to assume the essential duties of
marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.

xxxx

We commiserate with the plaintiff-appellee’s undeserved marital plight. Yet, Our paramount duty
as a court compels Us to apply the law at all costs, however harsh it may be on whomsoever is
called upon to bear its unbiased brunt.

FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed Decision dated September 20, 2002 in Civil Case No. 94-
178 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED. 5
Robert filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in its June 1, 2010
Resolution,  stating that the arguments of Robert were mere rehash of the same ground,
6

arguments and discussion previously pointed out by him, and that no new substance was
brought out to warrant the reconsideration or reversal of its decision.

Hence, this petition.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS’ HOLDING THAT THE ABSENCE OF THE

PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF THE WIFE UNDERSCORES THE EVIDENTIAL
GAP TO SUSTAIN THE DECISION OFTHE RTC DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF
PETITIONER TO RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.

II

THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO DECLARED BY THE NATIONAL APPELLATE

MATRIMONIAL TRIBUNAL OF THE CATHOLIC BISHOP’S CONFERENCE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AS GUILTY OF GRAVE LACKOF DUE DISCRETION.

III

THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO FOUND BY THE LOWER COURT AS

PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL
MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.

Robert now argues that he has sufficiently proven the nullity of his marriage even in the absence
of any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination of the wife by a competent and qualified
professional. To bolster his claim, he avers that the Metropolitan Tribunal already declared that
Luz exhibited grave lack of discretion in judgment concerning the essential rights and obligations
mutually given and accepted in marriage. The said decision was affirmed by the NAMT.

Robert further argues that the sexual indiscretion of Luz with different men coupled with the fact
that she failed to function as a home maker to her family and as a housewife to him incapacitated
her from accepting and complying with her essential marital obligations. For said reason, he
asserts that the case of Luz was not a mere case of sexual infidelity, but clearly an illness that
was rooted on some debilitating psychological condition which incapacitated her to carry out the
responsibilities of a married woman. Robert avers that a sex maniac is not just a mere sexual
infidel but one who is suffering from a deep psychological problem.

Position of the State

The OSG argues that the CA correctly ruled that the totality of evidence presented by Robert was
not sufficient to support a finding that Luz was psychologically incapacitated. His evidence fell
short of establishing his assertion that at the time of their marriage, Luz was suffering from a
psychological defect which deprived her of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage
and its concomitant responsibilities.

With regard to the findings of the Metropolitan Tribunal and the NAMT, the OSG claims that the
same were only given persuasive value and were not controlling or decisive in cases of nullity of
marriage. Further, the decision was based on grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning
matrimonial rights and obligations due to outside factors other than psychological incapacity as
contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code. The OSG also raises the strong possibility of
collusion between the parties as shown by the events that took place after the issuance of the
March 7, 1996 RTC Decision. The OSG wrote:

Significantly, the chronological events after the trial court issued its March 7, 1996 Decision
unmistakably show the collusion between the parties to obtain the reliefs pleaded. Among others,
respondent’s Retraction of Testimony was executed without the presence of counsel sometime in
1998, a few months before she married an American. This irregularity was even noticed by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54261:

xxxx

The involvement and active participation of the Solicitor General became indispensable, in the
present recourse, when, in a whirlwind turn of events, the Appellee made a VOLTE FACE
executed a "Retraction of Testimony" and a "Waiver of Custody" waiving custody of Franco Mark
J Mallillin, still a minor, her son by the Appellant. It bears stressing that the Appellee, in the Court
a quo, obdurately denied the material allegations of the Appellant’s complaint and declared that it
was the Appellant who was psychologically incapacitated. The sudden turn-about of the
appellee, in the present recourse, to the extent of disowning her testimony in the Court a quo and
even praying for the reversal of the Decision of the Trial Court is strongly suggestive, if not
constitutive, of collusion or a modus vivendi between the parties, outlawed by the Family Code of
the Philippines and the Constitution. x x x

The Court’s Ruling

The main issue is whether the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luz was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the
annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The petition is bereft of merit.

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which
provides:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligation of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
should refer to no less than a mental – not merely physical – incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family
Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together; observe love, respect and
fidelity; and render help and support. There is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. 7

Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)

juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be
rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
only emerge after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would
be beyond the means of the party involved. 8
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo C. De Quintos, Jr.,  the Court reiterated the well-
9

settled guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, embodied in

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,  based on Article 36 of the Family Code. Thus:
10

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. x x x.

xxxx

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. x x x.

xxxx

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. x x x.

xxxx

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. x x x.

xxxx

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. x x x.

xxxx

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts.

x x x.

xxxx

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. x x x.

Guided by these pronouncements, the Court is of the considered view that Robert’s evidence
failed to establish the psychological incapacity of Luz.
First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome the burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage. Other than his self-serving testimony, no other evidence was adduced to show the
alleged incapacity of Luz. He presented no other witnesses to corroborate his allegations on her
behavior. Thus, his testimony was self-serving and had no serious value as evidence.

Second, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz was not medically or
clinically identified, and sufficiently proven during the trial. Based on the records, Robert failed to
prove that her disposition of not cleaning the room, preparing their meal, washing the clothes,
and propensity for dating and receiving different male visitors, was grave, deeply rooted, and
incurable within the parameters of jurisprudence on psychological incapacity.

The alleged failure of Luz to assume her duties as a wife and as a mother, as well as her
emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity, cannot rise to the level of psychological
incapacity that justifies the nullification of the parties' marriage. The Court has repeatedly
stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations," not merely the refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.  Indeed, to be declared clinically or
11

medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties is another.
Psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. 12

As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not, by
themselves, constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity.
Robert argues that the series of sexual indiscretion of Luz were external manifestations of the
psychological defect that she was suffering within her person, which could be considered as
nymphomania or "excessive sex hunger." Other than his allegations, however, no other
convincing evidence was adduced to prove that these sexual indiscretions were considered as
nymphomania, and that it was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within the term of
psychological incapacity embodied in Article 36. To stress, Robert’s testimony alone is
insufficient to prove the existence of psychological incapacity.

In Sivino A. Ligeralde v. May Ascension A. Patalinghug and the Republic of the Philippines,  the 13

Court ruled that the respondent’s act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated
with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity
was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. The petitioner must be able to establish
that the respondent’s unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a disordered personality, which made
her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.

Third, the psychological report of Villanueva, Guidance Psychologist II of the Northern Mindanao
Medical Center, Cagayan deOro City, was insufficient to prove the psychological in capacity of
Luz. There was nothing in the records that would indicate that Luz had either been interviewed or
was subjected to a psychological examination. The finding as to her psychological incapacity was
based entirely on hearsay and the self-serving information provided by Robert.

Fourth, the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to prove the psychological
incapacity of Luz. Although it is true that in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina,  the Court stated that interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the
14

Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts, still it is
subject to the law on evidence. Thus:

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally – subject
to our law on evidence– what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x x
x. (Emphasis supplied)
Pertinently, Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Evidence provides:

The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which
the evidence is offered must be specified.

In this regard, the belated presentation of the decision of the NAMT cannot be given value since
it was not offered during the trial, and the Court has in no way of ascertaining the evidence
considered by the same tribunal.

Granting that it was offered and admitted, it must be pointed out that the basis of the declaration
of nullity of marriage by the NAMT was not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions
causes of a psychological nature similar to Article 36 of the Family Code, but the second
paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from grave lack of discretion of
judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and
accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portions of the NAMT decision are as follows:

The FACTS on the Case prove with the certitude required by law that based on the deposition of
the petitioner – the respondent understandably ignored the proceedings completely for which she
was duly cited for Contempt of Court – and premised on the substantially concordant testimonies
of the Witnesses, the woman Respondent demonstrated in the external forum through her action
and reaction patterns, before and after the marriage-in-fact, her grave lack of due discretion in
judgement for marriage intents and purposes basically by reason of her immaturity of judgement
as manifested by her emotional ambivalence x x x.

WHEREFORE, this COLLEGIAL COURT OF APPEALS, having invoked the Divine Name and
having in mind the Law, the Jurisprudence and the Facts pertaining to the Case, hereby declares
and decrees the confirmation of the nullity decision rendered by the Metropolitan Tribunal of First
Instance for the Archdiocese of Manil on the Marriage Case MALLILIN – JAMISOLAMIN with
Prot. N. 63/2000 on the ground provided by Canon 1095 par. 2CIC on the part of the woman
Respondent – but NOT on the part of the man Petitioner for lack of evidence. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied) 15

In Santos v. Santos,  the Court referred to the deliberations during the sessions of the Family
6

Code Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article
36 of the Family Code. It went out to state that a part of the provision is similar to the third
paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;

3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In Najera v. Najera,  the Court was also confronted with a similar issue of whether to consider an
17

annulment by the NAMT as also covering psychological incapacity, the only ground recognized in
our law. In the said case, the NAMT decision was also based on the second paragraph of Canon
1095. The Court ruled that it was not similar to, and only annulments under the third paragraph
of, Canon 1095 should be considered. Elucidating, the Court wrote: Petitioner’s argument is
without merit.
In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently did not have the
opportunity to consider the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless,
it is clear that the Court of Appeals considered the Matrimonial Tribunal’s decision in its
Resolution dated August 5, 2004 when it resolved petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In the
said Resolution, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very same issues now raised
before this Court and correctly held that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was devoid of
merit. It stated:

The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2, 2002, which was
forwarded to this Court only on February 11, 2004, reads as follows:

[T]he FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law
of Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June14, 1999, he did not appear before
the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate
and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that
the husband-respondent upon contracting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of
judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract: First, his family was dysfunctional in
that as a child, he saw the break-up of the marriage of his own parents; his own two siblings
have broken marriages; Second, he therefore grew up with a domineering mother with whom [he]
identified and on whom he depended for advice; Third, he was according to his friends, already
into drugs and alcohol before marriage; this affected his conduct of bipolar kind: he could be very
quiet but later very talkative, peaceful but later hotheaded even violent, he also was aware of the
infidelity of his mother who now lives with her paramour, also married and a policeman; Finally,
into marriage, he continued with his drugs and alcohol abuse until one time he came home very
drunk and beat up his wife and attacked her with a bolo that wounded her; this led to final
separation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine
Name and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the
Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a
quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the
1983 Code of Canon Law.

However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show that, other than herself,
petitioner-appellant offered the testimonies of the following persons only, to wit: Aldana
Celedonia (petitioner-appellant’s mother), Sonny de la Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon,
Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R. Gates (psychologist). Said witnesses testified, in particular, to
the unfaithful night of July 1, 1994 wherein the respondent allegedly made an attempt on the life
of the petitioner. But unlike the hearing and finding before the Matrimonial Tribunal, petitioner-
appellant’s sister-in-law and friends of the opposing parties were never presented before said
Court. As to the contents and veracity of the latter’s testimonies, this Court is without any clue.
True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme Court
held that the interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. However, the Highest Tribunal expounded as follows:

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally – subject
to our law on evidence– what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x x
x.

And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence states:

The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which
the evidence is offered must be specified.
Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not expect us to give credence to
the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently, it was made on a
different set of evidence of which We have no way of ascertaining their truthfulness.
Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments must be based on the evidence presented
before the court (Manzano vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And based on the evidence on
record, We find no ample reason to reverse or modify the judgment of the Trial Court.[31]

Santos v. Santos18 cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family
Code. It stated that a part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the
Code of Canon Law, which reads:

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential
matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;

3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.

It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions
causes of a psychological nature, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those
who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights
and obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portion of the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reads:

The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law
of Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before
the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate
and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that
the husband-respondent upon contacting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of
judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract x x x.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine
Name and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the
Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a
quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the
1983 Code of Canon Law. x x x.

Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts established by petitioner before the trial
court, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity
of marriage by the court a quo is not based on the psychological incapacity of respondent.
Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding
the psychological incapacity of respondent is supported by the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal.

In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the RTC. (Emphases in the
original; Underscoring supplied)

Hence, Robert’s reliance on the NAMT decision is misplaced. To repeat, the decision of the
NAMT was based on the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from
a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to
be mutually given and accepted, a cause not of psychological nature under Article 36 of the
Family Code. A cause of psychological nature similar to Article 36 is covered by the third
paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law (Santos v. Santos 19), which for ready
reference reads:

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

xxxx

3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.

To hold that annulment of marriages decreed by the NAMT under the second paragraph of
Canon 1095 should also be covered would be to expand what the lawmakers did not intend to
include. What would prevent members of other religious groups from invoking their own
interpretation of psychological incapacity? Would this not lead to multiple, if not inconsistent,
interpretations?

To consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under Article 36 would be
legislating from the bench.  As stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
1âwphi1

Molina,  interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines are given
20

great respect by our courts, but they are not controlling or decisive.

In Republic v. Galang,  it was written that the Constitution set out a policy of protecting and
21

strengthening the family as the basic social institution, and the marriage was the foundation of
the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the
whim of the parties. In petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show
the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a
situation where the parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by
reason of a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, the
Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.

In fine, the Court holds that the CA decided correctly. Petitioner Robert failed to adduce sufficient
and convincing evidence to prove the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz.

As asserted by the OSG, the allegations of the petitioner make a case for legal separation.
Hence, this decision is without prejudice to an action for legal separation if a party would want to
pursue such proceedings. In this disposition, the Court cannot decree a legal separation because
in such proceedings, there are matters and consequences like custody and separation of
properties that need to be considered and settled.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
78303-MIN, dated November 20, 2009, and its Resolution, dated June 1, 2010, are hereby
AFFIRMED, without prejudice.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

y Lynn Clauna

ROBERT F. MALLILIN v. LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN, GR No. 192718, 2015-02-18

Facts:
Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972. They begot three (3) children.
On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before
the RTC
On March 7, 1996, RTC... denied the petition... n January 29, 1999, the CA reversed the
RTC... decision "due to lack of participation of the State as required under Article 48 of
the Family Code."
In the complaint, Robert alleged that at the time of the celebration of their marriage, Luz
was suffering from psychological and mental incapacity and unpreparedness to enter
into such marital life and to comply with its essential obligations and responsibilities.
Such... incapacity became even more apparent during their marriage when Luz exhibited
clear manifestation of immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational
judgment, and inability to cope with the heavy and oftentimes demanding obligation of a
parent.
Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the complaint. She averred that it was
Robert who manifested psychological incapacity in their marriage. Despite due notice,
however, she did not appear during the trial.
When Robert testified, he disclosed that Luz was already living in California, USA, and
had married an American. He also revealed that when they were still engaged, Luz
continued seeing and dating another boyfriend, a certain Lt. Liwag. He also claimed that
from the outset, Luz... had been remiss in her duties both as a wife and as a mother as
shown by the following circumstances: (1) it was he who did the cleaning of the room
because Luz did not know how to keep order; (2)it was her mother who prepared their
meal while her sister was the one who washed... their clothes because she did not want
her polished nails destroyed; (3)it was also her sister who took care of their children
while she spent her time sleeping and looking at the mirror; (4) when she resumed her
schooling, she dated different men; (5) he received anonymous... letters reporting her
loitering with male students; (6) when he was not home, she would receive male visitors;
(7) a certain Romy Padua slept in their house when he was away; and (6) she would
contract loans without his knowledge.
In addition, Robert presented the testimony of Myrna Delos Reyes Villanueva
(Villanueva), Guidance Psychologist
On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the trial court, Robert filed a petition
for marriage annulment with the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the
Archdiocese of Manila
On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed down a decision declaring their
marriage invalid ab initio on the ground of grave lack of due discretion on the part of both
parties as contemplated by the second paragraph of Canon 1095. This decision was...
affirmed by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
Prior to that,on September 20, 2002, the RTC had rendered a decision declaring the
marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Luz as
she failed to comply with the essential marital obligations.
The State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed an
appeal with the CA.
The CA,... granted the petition and reversed the RTC decision.
Robert filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA
Issues:
whether the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luzwas psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the
annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36of the
Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental not merely physical incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed... and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed in Article 68of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual
obligations to live together; observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and
support. There is hardly a doubt that the intendment of... the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage.[7]
Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo C. De Quintos, Jr.,[9]the Court reiterated
the well-settled guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage,
embodied in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,[10] based on Article 36 of the
Family Code.Thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be... psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes.
The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts.
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state
Guided by these pronouncements, the Court is of the considered view that Robert's
evidence failed to establish the psychological incapacity of Luz.
First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome the burden of proof to show the nullity
of the marriage.  Other than his self-serving testimony, no other evidence was adduced
to show the alleged incapacity of Luz.
Second, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz was not medically
or clinically identified, and sufficiently proven during the trial.
As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not, by
themselves, constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological
incapacity.
Third, the psychological report of Villanueva, Guidance Psychologist II of the Northern
Mindanao Medical Center, Cagayan de Oro City, was insufficient to prove the
psychological incapacity of Luz.
Fourth, the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to prove the psychological
incapacity of Luz. Although it is true that in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina,[14] the Court stated that interpretations given by... the NAMT of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts, still it is subject to the law on evidence.
In fine, the Court holds that the CA decided correctly. Petitioner Robert failed to adduce
sufficient and convincing evidence to prove the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 188400

MARIA TERESA B. TANI-DE LA FUENTE, Petitioner

vs
RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR., Respondent

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Psychological incapacity is a mental illness that leads to an inability to comply with or

comprehend essential marital obligations.

This resolves the Petition for Review  filed by Maria Teresa B. Tani- De La Fuente (Maria Teresa)
1

assailing the Court of Appeals Decision  and Resolution  dated August 29, 2008 and May 25,
2 3

2009, respectively, in CA- G.R. CV. No. 76243, which reversed the Decision  dated August 14,
4

2002 of Branch 107 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q- 99-37829.

Petitioner Maria Teresa and respondent Rodolfo De La Fuente, Jr. (Rodolfo) first met when they
were students at the University of Sto. Tomas. Soon thereafter, they became sweethearts. 5

After graduating from college, Maria Teresa found work at the University of Sto. Tomas
Treasurer's Office.  Meanwhile, Rodolfo, who was unable to finish his college degree, found
6

continued employment at his family's printing press business. 7

While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that Rodolfo was an introvert and
was prone to jealousy.  She also observed that Rodolfo appeared to have no ambition in life and
8

felt insecure of his siblings, who excelled in their studies and careers.
9
On June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa and Rodolfo got married in Mandaluyong City. They had two
children: Maria Katharyn, who was born on May 23, 1985, and Maria Kimberly, who was born on
April 6, 1986. 10

Rodolfo's attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life. He was jealous of everyone
who talked to Maria Teresa, and would even skip work at his family's printing press to stalk
her.  Rodolfo's jealousy was so severe that he once poked a gun at his own 15-year old cousin
11

who was staying at their house because he suspected his cousin of being Maria Teresa's lover. 12

In addition, Rodolfo treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave. They would have sex four (4) or five
(5) times a day.  At times, Rodolfo would fetch Maria Teresa from her office during her lunch
13

break, just so they could have sex.  During sexual intercourse, Rodolfo would either tie her to the
14

bed or poke her with things.  Rodolfo also suggested that they invite a third person with them
15

while having sex, or for Maria Teresa to have sex with another man in Rodolfo's
presence.  Rodolfo's suggestions made Maria Teresa feel molested and maltreated.  Whenever
16 17

Maria Teresa refused Rodolfo's advances or suggestions, he would get angry and they would
quarrel. 18

Maria Teresa sought the advice of a doctor, a lawyer, and a priest, as well as any person she
thought could help her and Rodolfo.  Maria Teresa also suggested that she and Rodolfo undergo
19

marriage counselling, but Rodolfo refused and deemed it as mere "kalokohan". 20

Sometime in 1986, the couple quarrelled because Rodolfo suspected that Maria Teresa was
having an affair.  In the heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria Teresa's head. Maria
21

Teresa, with their two (2) daughters in tow, left Rodolfo and their conjugal home after the
gunpoking incident. Maria Teresa never saw Rodolfo again after that, and she supported their
children by herself. 22

On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage  before the
23

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was initially archived because Rodolfo failed to file
a responsive pleading.  Maria Teresa moved for the revival of the Petition.  The trial court
24 25

granted the motion and referred the case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for collusion
investigation.  Assistant City Prosecutor Jocelyn S. Reyes found no collusion and recommended
26

the trial of the case on the merits. 27

Despite notice, Rodolfo failed to attend the scheduled pre-trial conference.  The pre-trial
28

conference was declared closed and terminated, and Maria Teresa was allowed to present her
evidence. 29

Aside from Maria Teresa, Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, was
presented as an expert witness.  Dr. Lopez testified that he conducted an in-depth interview with
30

Maria Teresa to gather information on her family background and her marital life with Rodolfo,
and subjected her to a battery of psychological tests.  Dr. Lopez also interviewed Rodolfo's best
31

friend. 32

After subjecting Maria Teresa to interviews and tests, Dr. Lopez concluded that Maria Teresa
was not suffering from any severe mental disorder and had no indication of any organic or
functional impairment.  Although Dr. Lopez found that Maria Teresa had an emotionally
33

disturbed personality, he opined that this was not severe enough to constitute psychological
incapacity. 34

Dr. Lopez affirmed that he sent Rodolfo a letter of invitation through registered mail.  After two
35

(2) months, Rodolfo contacted Dr. Lopez and said, "Doctor, ano ba ang pakialam niyo sa amin,
hindi niyo naman ako kilala." Dr. Lopez explained that he only wanted to hear Rodolfo's side of
the story, but Rodolfo replied with, "[I]nuulit ko doktor, wala kayong pakialam sa akin." 36
Dr. Lopez diagnosed Rodolfo with "paranoid personality disorder manifested by [Rodolfo's]
damaging behavior like reckless driving and extreme jealousy; his being distrustful and
suspicious; his severe doubts and distrust of friends and relatives of [Maria Teresa]; his being
irresponsible and lack of remorse; his resistance to treatment; and his emotional coldness and
severe immaturity." 37

Dr. Lopez stated that Rodolfo's disorder was one of the severe forms of personality disorder,
even more severe than the other personality disorders like borderline and narcissistic personality
disorders.  Dr. Lopez explained that Rodolfo's personality disorder was most probably caused by
38

a pathogenic parental model.  Rodolfo's family background showed that his father was a
39

psychiatric patient, and Rodolfo might have developed psychic contamination called double
insanity, a symptom similar to his father's.  Dr. Lopez further claimed that Rodolfo's disorder was
40

serious and incurable because of his severe paranoia. 41

Dr. Lopez recommended that Maria Teresa and Rodolfo's marriage be annulled due to Rodolfo's
incapacity to perform his marital obligations. 42

Summons was served upon Rodolfo but he did not file any responsive leading.  He likewise did
43

not appear during the pre-trial conference.  He was given a specific date to present evidence but
44

he still failed to appear.  he trial court eventually deemed his non-appearance as a waiver of his
45

right to present evidence. 46

On June 26, 2002, the trial court directed the Office of the Solicitor General to submit its
comment on Maria Teresa's formal offer of evidence.  The Office of the Solicitor General was
47

also directed to submit its certification.  The Office of the Solicitor General, however, failed to
48

comply with the trial court's orders; thus, the case was submitted for decision without the
certification and comment from the Office of the Solicitor General. 49

On August 14, 2002, the trial court promulgated its Decision  granting the petition for declaration
50

of nullity of marriage.

While Dr. Lopez was not able to personally examine Rodolfo, the trial court gave credence to his
findings as they were based on information gathered from credible informants. The trial court
held that the marriage between Maria Teresa and Rodolfo should be declared null and void
because "[Rodolfo's] psychological incapacity [was] grave, serious and incurable."  The 51

dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:

WHEREFORE IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:

(1) Declaring the marriage of petitioner, MARIA TERESA B. TANI DE LA FUENTE to

respondent, RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR. null and void on the ground of respondent's
psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Their conjugal partnership
(sic) property relations is hereby dissolved. There being no mention of properties acquired by the
parties, no pronouncement as to its liquidation and partition is hereby made;

(2) Their children, Maria Katharyn and Maria Kimberly, both surnamed De la Fuente shall remain
legitimate. They shall remain in the custody of the petitioner.

(3) Both parties must support their children. There being no evidence presented as to the
capability of the respondent to give support, no pronouncement is hereby made in the meantime;

(4) Henceforth, the petitioner shall be known by her maiden name, TANI.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars of Quezon City and
Mandaluyong City where the marriage was celebrated upon the finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.  (Emphasis in the original)
52

On August 20, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration.  The 53

Office of the Solicitor General explained that it was unable to submit the required certification
because it had no copies of the transcripts of stenographic notes.  It was also unable to inform
54

the trial court of its lack of transcripts due to the volume of cases it was handling. 55

On September 13, 2002, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, with the dispositive
portion reading:

WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of
the Solicitor General is hereby deemed moot and academic.

This Court would like to call the attention of the Office of the Solicitor General that this case was
filed on June 3, 1999 and there should be no more delay in the disposition of the case. 56

The Office of the Solicitor General filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals.  It argued that the
57

trial court erred a) in deciding the case without the required certification from the Office of the
Solicitor General,  and b) in giving credence to Dr. Lopez's conclusion of Rodolfo's severe
58

personality disorder. It held that Dr. Lopez's finding was based on insufficient data and did not
follow the standards set forth in the Molina case. 59

The Court of Appeals granted  the Office of the Solicitor General's appeal.
60

The Court of Appeals ruled that the testimony of Dr. Lopez was unreliable for being hearsay,
thus, the trial court should not have given it weight.  The Court of Appeals also disagreed with
61

Dr. Lopez's finding that Rodolfo's behavior descended from psychological illness contemplated
under Article 36 of the Family Code. 62

In addition, the Court of Appeals emphasized that Maria Teresa's admission that she married
Rodolfo with the belief that he would change, and that they were in a relationship for five (5)
years before getting married, showed that they were in good terms during the early part of their
marriage. It also negated her claim that Rodolfo's psychological defect existed at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, and that it deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties
of marriage.  The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
63

WHEREFORE, the DECISION DATED AUGUST 14, 2002 is REVERSED and the petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of the parties is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.  (Emphasis in the original)

64

Maria Teresa moved for reconsideration  but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
65

Resolution  dated May 25, 2009.

66

On July 24, 2009, Maria Teresa filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. 67

Petitioner argued that based on current jurisprudence, trial courts had a wider discretion on
whether expert opinion was needed to prove psychological incapacity.  Petitioner further argued
68

that for as long as the trial court had basis in concluding that psychological incapacity existed,
such conclusion should be upheld. 69

Rodolfo filed a Comment  stating that he was not opposing Maria Teresa's Petition since "[h]e
70

firmly believes that there is in fact no more sense in adjudging him and petitioner as married." 71
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment,  agreed that a physician was not required to
72

declare a person psychologically incapacitated but emphasized that the evidence presented
must be able to adequately prove the presence of a psychological condition. The Office of the
Solicitor General maintained that Maria Teresa was unable to sufficiently prove Rodolfo's alleged
psychological incapacity. 73

The Office of the Solicitor General pointed out that Dr. Lopez's psychological report stated that
his assessment was based on interviews he made with petitioner and two (2) of the parties'
common friends. However, Dr. Lopez did not name the two (2) common friends in the
report.  Furthermore, during trial Dr. Lopez testified that he only interviewed petitioner and
74

Rodolfo's best friend, not two (2) friends as indicated in his report.  The Office of the Solicitor
75

General insisted that the finding of Rodolfo's psychological incapacity should be dismissed as
hearsay as it was based solely on information given by petitioner to Dr. Lopez. 76

The only issue raised for the resolution of this Court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
denying the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage because petitioner's evidence was
insufficient to prove that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital
obligations.

The Petition is granted.

The 1995 case of Santos v. Court of Appeals  was the first case that attempted to lay down the
77

standards for determining psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family

Code. Santos declared that "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."  Furthermore, the incapacity "should refer to no less
78

than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage[.]"79

Two (2) years later, Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,  provided the guidelines to be
80

followed when interpreting and applying Article 36 of the Family Code:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on
the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent

or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is
clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally - subject
to our law on evidence - what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly
void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Church - while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other - shall
walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage
and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.  (Emphasis in the original)
81
Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find that there was sufficient compliance
with Molina to warrant the nullity of petitioner's marriage with respondent. Petitioner was able to
discharge the burden of proof that respondent suffered from psychological incapacity.

The Court of Appeals chided the lower court for giving undue weight to the testimony of Dr.
Lopez since he had no chance to personally conduct a thorough study and analysis of
respondent's mental and psychological condition. The Court of Appeals cited Republic v.
Dagdag,  where this Court held that "the root cause of psychological incapacity must be
82

medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts."  The Court of Appeals then
83

ruled that "[o]bviously, this requirement is not deemed complied with where no psychiatrist or
medical doctor testifies on the alleged psychological incapacity of one party." 84

The Court of Appeals is mistaken.

Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes  states that the non-examination of one of the parties will not
85

automatically render as hearsay or invalidate the findings of the examining psychiatrist or

psychologist, since "marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The
totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and
genuinely witnessed mainly by the other." 86

Marcos v. Marcos  emphasizes that Molina does not require a physician to examine a person

87

and declare him/her to be psychologically incapacitated. What matters is that the totality of
evidence presented establishes the party's psychological condition. 88

Dr. Lopez's testimony, as corroborated by petitioner, sufficiently proved that respondent suffered
from psychological incapacity. Respondent's paranoid personality disorder made him distrustful
and prone to extreme jealousy and acts of depravity, incapacitating him to fully comprehend and
assume the essential obligations of marriage. As the trial court found:

Dr. Lopez testified that he arrived at his conclusion of respondent' [s] personality by taking into
consideration the psychological impression and conclusion he gathered from the analysis of the
different behaviors he manifested during the time that he and petitioner were living together.
According to him, under the Diagnostic Statistical Manual, he found the respondent to be
suffering from a paranoid personality disorder manifested by the respondent's damaging
behavior like reckless driving and extreme jealousy; his being distrustful and suspicious; his
severe doubts and distrust of friends and relatives of the petitioner; his being irresponsible and
lack of remorse; his resistance to treatment; and his emotional coldness and severe immaturity.
He also testified that this kind of disorder is actually one of the severe forms of personality
disorder even more severe than the other personality disorders like the borderline and
narcissistic personality disorders.

As to the root cause, [h]e explained that this must have been caused by a pathogenic parental
model. As he investigated the family background of the respondent, Dr. Lopez discovered that
his father was a psychiatric patient such that the respondent developed a similar symptom or
psychic contamination which is called double insanity. This, according to Dr. Lopez is usually
developed among close family members, bestfriends (sic), sweethearts and even couples who
are close to one another; that people close to one another get psychically contaminated; that
surprisingly, the symptom that the father manifested is the same as those of the respondent. The
said disorder started during respondent's late childhood years and developed in his early
adolescent years.

He further testified that this disorder is very severe, serious and incurable because of the severe
paranoia of the patient; that patients with this kind of personality disorder could never accept that
there is something wrong with them and if ever forced to seek treatment, they would rather
engage in an intellectual battle with the therapist rather than cooperate with them.
Dr. Lopez concluded that because of respondent's personality disorder, he is incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations of giving love, respect, and support to the petitioner.  He
1âwphi1

recommends that the marriage be annulled.  (Emphasis supplied)

89

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the ultimate task of decision-making, must
give due regard to expert opinion on the psychological and mental disposition of the parties. 90

The root cause of respondent's paranoid personality disorder was hereditary in nature as his own
father suffered from a similar disorder. Dr. Lopez stated that respondent's own psychological
disorder probably started during his late childhood years and developed in his early adolescent
years. Dr. Lopez explained that respondent's psychological incapacity to perform his marital
obligations was likely caused by growing up with a pathogenic parental model.

The juridical antecedence of respondent's psychological incapacity was also sufficiently proven
during trial. Petitioner attested that she noticed respondent's jealousy even before their marriage,
and that he would often follow her to make sure that she did not talk to anyone or cheat on
him.  She believed that he would change after they got married;  however, this did not happen.
91 92

Respondent's jealousy and paranoia were so extreme and severe that these caused him to poke
a gun at petitioner's head.
93

The incurability and severity of respondent's psychological incapacity were likewise discussed by
Dr. Lopez. He vouched that a person with paranoid personality disorder would refuse to admit
that there was something wrong and that there was a need for treatment. This was corroborated
by petitioner when she stated that respondent repeatedly refused treatment. Petitioner consulted
a lawyer, a priest, and a doctor, and suggested couples counselling to respondent; however,
respondent refused all of her attempts at seeking professional help. Respondent also refused to
be examined by Dr. Lopez.

Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and wife "to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." In this case, petitioner and
respondent may have lived together, but the facts narrated by petitioner show that respondent
failed to, or could not, comply with the obligations expected of him as a husband. He was even
apathetic that petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage.

This Court also noticed respondent's repeated acts of harassment towards petitioner, which
show his need to intimidate and dominate her, a classic case of coercive control. At first,
respondent only inflicted nonphysical forms of mistreatment on petitioner by alienating her from
her family and friends due to his jealousy, and stalking her due to his paranoia. However, his
jealousy soon escalated into physical violence when, on separate instances, he poked a gun at
his teenage cousin, and at petitioner.

Coercive control is a form of psychological abuse, which refers to a pattern of behavior meant to
dominate a partner through different tactics such as physical and sexual violence, threats,
emotional insults, and economic deprivation.  Although not specifically named, coercive control
94

as a form of psychological abuse or harm has been recognized in Republic Act No. 9262 or the
Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act of 2004:

SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. -As used in this Act,

(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by
any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which
result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or
emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking,
damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It
includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of
a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to
witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody
and/or visitation of common children.

Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating, stalking, and isolating

his wife from her family and friends, as well as his increasing acts of physical violence, are proof
of his depravity, and utter lack of comprehension of what marriage and partnership entail. It
would be of utmost cruelty for this Court to decree that petitioner should remain married to
respondent. After she had exerted efforts to save their marriage and their family, respondent
simply refused to believe that there was anything wrong in their marriage. This shows that
respondent truly could not comprehend and perform his marital obligations. This fact is
persuasive enough for this Court to believe that respondent's mental illness is incurable.

In granting the petition and declaring void the marriage of Maria Teresa and Rodolfo, this Court
reiterates the pronouncement we made in an opinion in Mallilin v. Jamesolamin: 95

Our choices of intimate partners define us - inherent ironically in our individuality. Consequently,
when the law speaks of the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage governed by law,
this refers to responsibility to children, property relations, disqualifications, privileges, and other
matters limited to ensuring the stability of society.  The state's interest should not amount to
1âwphi1

unwarranted intrusions into individual liberties.

Since the State's interest must be toward the stability of society, the notion of psychological
incapacity should not only be based on a medical or psychological disorder, but should consist of
the inability to comply with essential marital obligations such that public interest is imperiled. 96

Lastly, this Court takes note of Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu Te's observation that a straitjacket
application of the Molina guidelines "has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant
behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little
by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions."  Ironically, the ultimate
97

effect of such stringent application of the Molina guidelines is the perversion of the family unit,
the very institution that our laws are meant to protect.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The marriage of Maria Teresa

Tani-De La Fuente and Rodolfo De La Fuente is declared NULL and VOID. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated August 29, 2008 and May 25, 2009, respectively, in
CA-G.R. CV. No. 76243 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated August 14, 2002
of Branch 107, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-37829
is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

TANI-DE LA FUENTE v. DE LA FUENTE

MARIA TERESA B. TANI-DE LA FUENTE, petitioner, vs. RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE,
JR.,respondent. 
G.R. NO. 188400
March 08, 2017

Facts:
 On June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa Tani and Rodolfo De la Fuente Jr. got married in
Mandaluyong City after being in a relationship for five (5) years. They had two children.

While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that Rodolfo was an
introvert and was prone to jealousy. His attitude worsened as they went on with their marital
life. His jealousy became so severe that he even poked a gun to his 15 year old cousin and he
treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave who made the latter feel maltreated and molested.
Sometime in 1986, the couple quarreled because Rodolfo suspected that Maria Teresa was
having an affair. In the heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria Teresa's head. She
left and never saw Rodolfo again after that, and supported their children by herself.

On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
As support to her petitions, clinical psychologist, Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez was presented as an
expert witness. However, Rodolfo did not file any responsive pleading. The trial court
eventually deemed his non-appearance as a waiver of his right to present evidence.

Before the promulgation of its decision, on June 26, 2002, the trial court directed the
Office of the Solicitor General to submit its comment on Maria Teresa's formal offer of
evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General was also directed to submit its certification. The
Office of the Solicitor General, however, failed to comply with the trial court's orders; thus,
the case was submitted for decision without the certification and comment from the Office of
the Solicitor General. On August 14, 2002, the trial court promulgated its decision granting
the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.

On August 20, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion for
reconsideration. The Office of the Solicitor General explained that it was unable to submit the
required certification because it had no copies of the transcripts of stenographic notes. It was
also unable to inform the trial court of its lack of transcripts due to the volume of cases it was
handling On September 13 2002, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration..

The Office of the Solicitor General filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. It
argued that the trial court erred a) in deciding the case without the required certification from
the Office of the Solicitor General, 58 and b) in giving credence to Dr. Lopez's conclusion of
Rodolfo's severe personality disorder. It held that Dr. Lopez's finding was based on
insufficient data and did not follow the standards set forth in the Molina case. Still, Rodolfo
did not file any responsive pleading.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC. In its resolution dated May
25, 2009, CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Maria Teresa.

On July 24, 2009, Maria Teresa filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. This time
Rodolfo filed a Comment 70 stating that he was not opposing Maria Teresa's Petition since
"[h]e firmly believes that there is in fact no more sense in adjudging him and petitioner as
married."

Issue:
 Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage.

Held:

Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage

Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find that there was sufficient
compliance with Molina to warrant the nullity of petitioner's marriage with respondent.
Petitioner was able to discharge the burden of proof that respondent suffered from
psychological incapacity. The Court of Appeals is mistaken when it chided the lower court
for giving undue weight to the testimony of Dr. Lopez since he had no chance to personally
conduct a thorough study and analysis of respondent's mental and psychological condition.

Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes states that the non-examination of one of the parties will
not automatically render as hearsay or invalidate the findings of the examining
psychiatrist or psychologist, since "marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves
only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and
marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other.

Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and wife "to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." In this case,
petitioner and respondent may have lived together, but the facts narrated by petitioner show
that respondent failed to, or could not, comply with the obligations expected of him as a
husband. He was even apathetic that petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
their marriage.

The incurability and severity of respondent's psychological incapacity were likewise

discussed by Dr. Lopez. He vouched that a person with paranoid personality disorder would

refuse to admit that there was something wrong and that there was a need for treatment. This
was corroborated by petitioner when she stated that respondent repeatedly refused treatment.
Petitioner consulted a lawyer, a priest, and a doctor, and suggested couples counseling to
respondent; however, respondent refused all of her attempts at seeking professional help.
Respondent also refused to be examined by Dr. Lopez.

Dr. Lopez concluded that because of respondent's personality disorder, he is

incapacitated to perform his marital obligations of giving love, respect, and support to the
petitioner. He recommends that the marriage be annulled.

Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating, stalking, and

isolating his wife from her family and friends, as well as his increasing acts of physical
violence, are proof of his depravity, and utter lack of comprehension of what marriage and
partnership entail. It would be of utmost cruelty for this Court to decree that petitioner should
remain married to respondent. After she had exerted efforts to save their marriage and their
family, respondent simply refused to believe that there was anything wrong in their marriage.
This shows that respondent truly could not comprehend and perform his marital obligations.
This fact is persuasive enough for this Court to believe that respondent's mental illness is
incurable.

The petition is granted.

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RE-MARRIAGE DUE TO ABSENCE OF SPOUSE (Arts. 41-43)

Republic vs. Sareñogon, Jr., G.R. # 199194, Feb. 10, 2016

G.R. No. 199194

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE B. SAREÑOGON, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy to

challenge a trial court's declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 ofThe Family Code of
the Philippines  (Family Code).
1 2

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the October 24, 2011 Decision  of the Court of
3 4

Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. SP No. 04158-MIN dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by

petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic).

Factual Antecedents

On November 4, 2008, respondent Jose B. Sareñogon, Jr. (Jose) filed a Petition  before the
5

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ozamiz  City-Branch 15 for the declaration of presumptive death of
6

his wife, Netchie S.  Sareñogon (Netchie).

7 8

In an Amended Order dated Februrary 11, 2009, the RTC set the Petition for initial hearing on
April 16, 2009. It likewise directed the publication of said Order in a newspaper of general
circulation in the cities of Tangub, Ozamiz and Oroquieta, all in the province of Misamis
Occidental. Nobody opposed the Petition.  Trial then followed.
9 10

Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis Occidental in 1991.  They later became
11

sweethearts and on August 10, 1996, they got married in civil rites at the Manila City
Hall.  However, they lived together as husband and wife for a month only because he left to work
12

as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper.  For three months, he did
13

not receive any communication from Netchie.  He likewise had no idea about her
14

whereabouts.  While still abroad, he tried to contact Netchie’s parents, but failed, as the latter
15

had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental.  He returned home after his contract expired.  He
16 17

then inquired from Netchie’s relatives and friends about her whereabouts, but they also did not
know where she was.  Because of these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie was already
18

dead.  He filed the Petition before the RTC so he could contract another marriage pursuant to
19

Article 41 of the Family Code. 20

Jose’s testimony was corroborated by his older brother Joel Sareñogon, and by Netchie’s aunt,
Consuelo Sande.  These two witnesses testified that Jose and Netchie lived together as
21
husband and wife only for one month prior to their leaving the Philippines for separate
destinations abroad.  These two added that they had no information regarding Netchie’s
22

location.23

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision  dated January 31, 2011 in Spec. Proc. No. 045-08, the RTC held that Jose had
24

established by preponderance of evidence that he is entitled to the relief prayed for under Article
41 of the Family Code.  The RTC found that Netchie had disappeared for more than four years,
25

reason enough for Jose to conclude that his wife was indeed already dead.  The dispositive
26

portion of the Decision reads:

VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring

respondent presumptively dead for purposes of remarriage of petitioner.

SO ORDERED. 27

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

On April 19, 2011, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), elevated the
judgment of the RTC to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari  under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
28

of Court.

In its Decision  of October 24, 2011, the CA held that the Republic used the wrong recourse by
29

instituting a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA perceived
no error at all in the RTC’s judgment granting Jose’s Petition for the declaration of the
presumptive death of his wife, Netchie. The CA thus held in effect that the Republic’s appeal
sought to correct or review the RTC’s alleged misappreciation of evidence which could not
translate into excess or lack of jurisdiction amounting to grave abuse of discretion.  The CA
30

noted that the RTC properly caused the publication of the Order setting the case for initial
hearing.  The CA essentially ruled that, "[a] writ of certiorari may not be used to correct a lower
31

court’s evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. In other words, it is not a remedy for mere
errors of judgment, which are correctible by an appeal."  The CA then disposed of the case in
32

this wise:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed.

SO ORDERED. 33

Issues

The Republic filed the instant Petition  raising the following issues:
34

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN ITS

ASSAILED DECISION BECAUSE:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN

DISMISSING THE REPUBLIC’S PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65,
ON THE GROUND THAT THE PROPER REMEDY SHOULD HAVE BEEN TO APPEAL THE
RTC DECISION, BECAUSE IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENTS OR
DECISIONS ARE NOT APPEALABLE UNDER THE EXPRESS PROVISION OF LAW.

II
THE ALLEGED EFFORTS OF RESPONDENT IN LOCATING HIS MISSING WIFE DO NOT
SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORT A "WELLFOUNDED BELIEF" THAT RESPONDENT’S ABSENT
WIFE X X X IS PROBABLY DEAD. 35

Petitioner’s Arguments

The Republic insists that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is
the proper remedy to challenge an RTC’s immediately final and executory Decision on a
presumptive death. 36

The Republic claims that based on jurisprudence, Jose’s alleged efforts in locating Netchie did
not engender or generate a well-founded belief that the latter is probably dead.  It maintains that
37

even as Jose avowedly averred that he exerted efforts to locate Netchie, Jose inexplicably failed
to enlist the assistance of the relevant government agencies like the Philippine National Police,
the National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Bureau of
Immigration, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, or the Overseas Workers
Welfare Administration.  It likewise points out that Jose did not present any disinterested person
38

to corroborate his allegations that the latter was indeed missing and could not be found.  It also 39

contends that Jose did not advert to circumstances, events, occasions, or situations that would
prove that he did in fact make a comprehensive search for Netchie.  The Republic makes the
40

plea that courts should ever be vigilant and wary about the propensity of some erring spouses in
resorting to Article 41 of the Family Code for the purpose of terminating their marriage. 41

Finally, the Republic submits that Jose did not categorically assert that he wanted to have
Netchie declared presumptively dead because he intends to get married again, an essential
premise of Article 41 of the Family Code. 42

Respondent’s Arguments

Jose counters that the CA properly dismissed the Republic’s Petition because the latter’s petition
is erected upon the ground that the CA did not correctly weigh or calibrate the evidence on
record, or assigned to the evidence its due worth, import or significance; and that such a ground
does not avail in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.  Jose also
43

contends that the Republic should have instead filed a motion for reconsideration  of the RTC’s
44

Decision of January 31, 2011, reasoning out that a motion for reconsideration is a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in law. Jose furthermore submits that the RTC did not act arbitrarily or
capriciously in granting his petition because it even dutifully complied with the publication
requirement.  He moreover argues that to sustain the present petition would allow the executive
45

branch to unduly make inroads into judicial territory.  Finally, he insists that the trial court’s
46

factual findings are entitled to great weight and respect as these were arrived after due
deliberation.
47

This Court’s Ruling

This Court finds the Republic’s petition meritorious.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65

of the Rules of Court is the proper
remedy to question the RTC’s Decision
in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death

In the 2005 case of Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,  we held that the RTC’s Decision on a Petition
48

for declaration of presumptive death pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code is immediately
final and executory. Thus, the CA has no jurisdiction to entertain a notice of appeal pertaining to
such judgment.  Concurring in the result, Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban further
49
therein pointed out that the correct remedy to challenge the RTC Decision was to institute a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and not a petition for review under Rule 45.50

We expounded on this appellate procedure in Republic v. Tango: 51

This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in
summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions
thereon.

Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE
FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:

ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all
cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be
decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.

In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two
and three of the same title. It states:

ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary
proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable.
(Emphasis supplied.)

In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:

ART. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.

By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall
be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of
the trial court’s judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ
of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such
concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. x x x  (Citation
52

omitted; Underscoring supplied)

"In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that,
in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. From the Decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to
this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court."53

In fact, in Republic v. Narceda,  we held that the OSG availed of the wrong remedy when it filed
54

a notice of appeal under Rule 42 with the CA to question the RTC’s Decision declaring the
presumptive death of Marina B. Narceda. 55

Above all, this Court’s ruling in Republic v. Cantor  made it crystal clear that the OSG properly
56

availed of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to challenge the RTC’s Order therein declaring
Jerry Cantor as presumptively dead. 1âwphi1

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the Republic correctly availed of certiorari under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court in assailing before the CA the aforesaid RTC’s Decision.
The "well-founded belief" requisite
under Article 41 of the Family Code is
complied with only upon a showing that
sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had
indeed been made to ascertain whether
the absent spouse is still alive or is
already dead

We now proceed to determine whether the RTC properly granted Jose’s Petition.

Article 41 of the Family Code pertinently provides that:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of
only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse. (83a)

In Republic v. Cantor,  we further held that:

57

Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-
founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code,
there are four essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years
if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down
in Article 391 of the Civil Code;

2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and,

4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
of the absentee.58

(Underscoring supplied)

With respect to the third element (which seems to be the element that in this case invites
extended discussion), the holding is that the –

mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), or lack of news that such
absentee is still alive, failure to communicate [by the absentee spouse or invocation of the]
general presumption on absence under the Civil Code [would] not suffice. This conclusion
proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse
the burden of proving the additional and more stringent requirement of "well-founded belief"
which can only be discharged upon a due showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries
and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly, that the
absent spouse is [either] still alive or is already dead.
 xxxx

The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the circumstances
of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be
able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the
result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based
on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse
is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).  (Emphasis
59

omitted; underscoring supplied)

In the case at bar, the RTC ruled that Jose has "well-founded belief" that Netchie was already
dead upon the following grounds:

(1) Jose allegedly tried to contact Netchie’s parents while he was still out of the country, but did
not reach them as they had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental;

(2) Jose believed/presumed that Netchie was already dead because when he returned home, he
was not able to obtain any information that Netchie was still alive from Netchie’s relatives and
friends;

(3) Jose’s testimony to the effect that Netchie is no longer alive, hence must be presumed dead,
was corroborated by Jose’s older brother, and by Netchie’s aunt, both of whom testified that he
(Jose) and Netchie lived together as husband and wife only for one month and that after this,
there had been no information as to Netchie’s whereabouts.

In the above-cited case of Republic v. Cantor,  this Court held that the present spouse (Maria Fe
60

Espinosa Cantor) merely conducted a "passive search" because she simply made
unsubstantiated inquiries from her in-laws, from neighbors and friends. For that reason, this
Court stressed that the degree of diligence and reasonable search required by law is not met (1)
when there is failure to present the persons from whom the present spouse allegedly made
inquiries especially the absent spouse’s relatives, neighbors, and friends, (2) when there is
failure to report the missing spouse’s purported disappearance or death to the police or mass
media, and (3) when the present spouse’s evidence might or would only show that the absent
spouse chose not to communicate, but not necessarily that the latter was indeed dead.  The 61

rationale for this palpably stringent or rigorous requirement has been marked out thus:

x x x [T]he Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in nullifying their marriage, has
consistently applied the "strict standard" approach. This is to ensure that a petition for declaration
of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not used as a tool to conveniently
circumvent the laws. Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts and should ensure that the
stricter standard required by the Family Code is met. x x x

The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we consider the State’s
policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage. Since marriage serves as the family’s
foundation and since it is the state’s policy to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social
institution, marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the parties. x x x

x x x [I]t has not escaped this Court’s attention that the strict standard required in petitions for
declaration of presumptive death has not been fully observed by the lower courts. We need only
to cite the instances when this Court, on review, has consistently ruled on the sanctity of
marriage and reiterated that anything less than the use of the strict standard necessitates a
denial. To rectify this situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of the strict standard
this Court requires in cases under Article 41 of the Family Code." (Citations omitted) 62

Given the Court’s imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the Family Code, it must follow that there was no basis at all for the
RTC’s finding that Jose’s Petition complied with the requisites of Article 41 of the Family Code, in
reference to the "well-founded belief" standard. If anything, Jose’s pathetically anemic efforts to
locate the missing Netchie are notches below the required degree of stringent diligence
prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare claims that he had inquired from alleged
friends and relatives as to Netchie’s whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand specific
individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or quest for the
allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the assistance of the pertinent
government agencies as well as the media. Nor did he show that he undertook a thorough,
determined and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two years (and what those years
were), and naming the particular places, provinces, cities, barangays or municipalities that he
visited, or went to, and identifying the specific persons he interviewed or talked to in the course of
his search.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 24, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04158-MIN is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The respondent’s
Petition in said Spec. Proc. No. 045-08 is accordingly DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

by Gena Terre

REPUBLIC v. JOSE B. SAREÑOGON, GR No. 199194, 2016-02-10

Facts:
On November 4, 2008
Jose B. Sarefiogon, Jr. (Jose) filed a Petition[5] before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Ozamiz[6] City-Branch 15 the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Netchie S.[7]
Sareñogon (Netchie).
Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis Occidental in 1991,[11] They
later became sweethearts and on August 10,1996, they got married in civil rites at the
Manila City Hall.[12] However, they lived together as... husband and wife for a month
only because he left to work as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a
domestic helper.[13] For three months, he did not receive any communication from
Netchie.[14] He likewise had no idea about her... whereabouts.[15] While still abroad, he
tried to contact Netchie's parents, but failed, as the latter had allegedly left Clarin,
Misamis Occidental.[16] He returned home after his contract expired.[17] He then...
inquired from Netchie's relatives and friends about her whereabouts, but they also did
not know where she was.[18] Because of these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie
was already dead.[19] He filed the Petition before the RTC so... he could contract
another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.[20]
Jose's testimony was corroborated by his older brother Joel Sareñogon, and by
Netchie's aunt, Consuelo Sande.
The RTC... found that Netchie had disappeared for more than four years, reason enough
for Jose to conclude that his wife was indeed already dead.
the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), elevated the judgment of
the RTC to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari[28], under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
the CA held that the Republic used the wrong recourse by instituting a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA perceived no error at all
in the RTC's judgment granting
Jose's Petition for the declaration of the presumptive death of his wife, Netchie.
the Republic's appeal sought to correct or review the RTC's alleged misappreciation of
evidence which could not translate into excess or lack of jurisdiction... amounting to
grave abuse of discretion.
The Republic insists that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court is the proper remedy to challenge an RTC's immediately final and executory
Decision on a presumptive death
The Republic claims that based on jurisprudence, Jose's alleged efforts in locating
Netchie did not engender or generate a well-founded belief that the latter is probably
dead.
Finally, the Republic submits that Jose did not categorically assert that he wanted to
have Netchie declared presumptively dead because he intends to get married again, an
essential premise of Article 41 of the Family Code.
Issues:
COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN DISMISSING
THE REPUBLIC'S PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65, ON
THE GROUND THAT THE PROPER REMEDY SHOULD HAVE BEEN TO APPEAL
THE RTC DECISION, BECAUSE IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY
JUDGMENTS OR
DECISIONS ARE NOT APPEALABLE UNDER THE EXPRESS PROVISION OF LAW.
THE ALLEGED EFFORTS OF RESPONDENT IN LOCATING HIS MISSING WIFE DO
NOT SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORT A "WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF" THAT RESPONDENT'S
ABSENT WIFE X X X IS PROBABLY DEAD
Ruling:
This Court finds the Republic's petition meritorious.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy to
question the RTC's Decision in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death... the RTC's Decision on a Petition for declaration of presumptive death pursuant
to Article 41 of the Family Code is immediately final and executory. Thus, the CA has no
jurisdiction to... entertain a notice of appeal pertaining to such judgment.[49] Concurring
in the result, Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban further therein pointed out
that the correct remedy to challenge the RTC Decision was to institute a petition for...
certiorari under Rule 65, and not a petition for review under Rule 45.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be
had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive... death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes
without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to
question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be
filed in the Court of
Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the
Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and
the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an...
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on
the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse
of... discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the Decision of the C A, the
aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a
case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must
prove that... his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries
to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she
believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires
exertion of active effort (not a... mere passive one).
In the case at bar, the RTC ruled that Jose 1ms "well-founded belief that Netchie was
already dead upon the following grounds:
(1) Jose allegedly tried to contact Netchie's parents while he was still out of the country,
but did not reach them as they had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental;
(2) Jose believed/presumed that Netchie was already dead because when he returned
home, he was not able to obtain any information that Netchie was still alive from
Netchie's relatives and friends;
(3) Jose's testimony to the effect that Netchie is no longer alive, hence must be
presumed dead, was corroborated by Jose's older brother, and by Netchie's aunt, both
of whom testified that he (Jose) and Netchie lived together as husband and wife only for
one month and... that after this, there had been no information as to Netchie's
whereabouts.
Given the Court's imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code, it must follow that there was no
basis at all for the RTC's finding that Jose's Petition complied with the requisites of
Article 41 of the
Family Code, in reference to the "well-founded belief standard. If anything, Jose's
pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing Netchie are notches below the required
degree of stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare
claims that he had... inquired from alleged friends and relatives as to Netchie's
whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand specific individuals or persons whom
he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or quest for the allegedly missing
Netchie. Neither did he prove that he... sought the assistance of the pertinent
government agencies as well as the media, Nor did he show mat he undertook a
thorough, determined and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two years (and
what those years were), and naming the particular places, provinces,... cities, barangays
or municipalities that he visited, or went to, and identifying the specific persons he
interviewed or talked to in the course of his search.
Republic vs. Villanueva, G.R. # 210929, July 29, 2015
G.R. No. 210929               July 29, 2015

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
EDNA ORCELINO-VILLANUEVA, Respondent.

DISSENTING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

Edna Orcelino-Villanueva (Edna) was a domestic helper based in Singapore. In 1993, she came
home immediately after she heard news from her children that her husband, Romeo L.
Villanueva (Romeo), left their conjugal dwelling. She came home, leaving her work, for the
purpose of looking for her husband and taking care of her children. She had limited resources for
her search.

For 15 or 16 years, she endured the absence of her husband. Within those long years, whether
in good times or bad, she never heard from him. He did not discharge any of his duties as
husband.

In ruling against her and concluding that she did not search hard enough for Romeo, the majority
fails to appreciate several crucial facts:

First, Edna turned away from her livelihood, her modest means of subsistence, just to search for
Romeo.

Second, Edna did not only embark on a token search. She did not limit herself to her parents-in-
law and to common friends in Iligan City, the . place where she and Romeo were married. Edna
went all the way to Romeo's birthplace, which was Escalante, Negros Oriental. There, she
inquired from Romeo's relatives as to his whereabouts.

Third, 15 or 16 years had passed since Edna was told that Romeo had gone missing when she
filed her Petition to declare Romeo presumptively dead. If Edna merely intended to use a petition
for declaration of presumptive death as a convenient means for circumventing laws that protect
the institution of marriage, it is astounding that she would await the inconvenience of 15 or 16
years.

Edna established a well-founded belief that her husband, Romeo, is already dead.

I vote to sustain the assailed October 18, 2013 Decision  and January 8, 2014 Resolution  of the
1 2

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03768-MIN, affirming the October 8, 2009 Judgment  of the3

Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, declaring Romeo presumptively
dead pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.

I reiterate the position I articulated in my dissent to Republic of the Philippines v. Cantor.  I

4

maintain that a strict standard should not be used in evaluating the efforts made by a spouse to
ascertain the status and whereabouts of an absent spouse. The marital obligations provided for
by the Family Code require the continuing presence of each spouse. A spouse is well to suppose
that this shall be resolutely fulfilled by the other spouse. Failure to do so for the period
established by law gives rise to the presumption that the absent spouse is dead, thereby
enabling the spouse present to remarry.

Article 41 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of
only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse.

Article 41’s requirement of a "well-grounded belief" calls for an inquiry into a spouse’s state of
mind.  Otherwise abstract, one’s state of mind can only be ascertained through overt acts. Article
5

41 requires this belief to be "well-grounded." It therefore requires nothing more than for a spouse
to have a "reasonable basis for holding to such belief."  Article 41 relies on a basic and plain test:
6

rationality. 7

What is rational in each case depends on context. Rationality is not determined by the blanket
imposition of pre-conceived standards. Rather, it is better determined by an appreciation of a
person’s unique circumstances. 8

Moreover, all that Article 41 calls to sustain is a presumption. By definition, there is no need for
absolute certainty. A presumption is, by nature, favorable to a party and dispenses with the
burden of proving. Consequently, neither is there a need for conduct that establishes such a high
degree of cognizance that what is established is proof, and no longer a presumption:

In declaring a person presumptively dead, a court is called upon to sustain a presumption, it is

not called upon to conclude on verity or to establish actuality. In so doing, a court infers despite
an acknowledged uncertainty. Thus, to insist on such demanding and extracting evidence to
"show enough proof of a well-founded belief", is to insist on an inordinate and intemperate
standard. 9

It is improper for the majority to insist upon the same "strict standard approach"  that was relied
10

on in Cantor and conclude that Edna’s efforts "were not diligent and serious enough."  The 11

majority fails to appreciate several crucial facts in this case that define the limits of her situation.

Edna’s lack of resources appears in the records. She only had the ability to present herself as
witness.

Concededly, Edna could have engaged in other efforts—asking for the help of police officers,
filing a formal missing-person report, announcing Romeo’s absence in radio or television
programs—as would show how painstakingly she endeavored to search for Romeo. Insisting on
Edna to have also made these efforts, however, is to insist that she act in an ideal manner. It
takes her away from her own reality and requires her to fulfill pre-conceived notions of what
satisfies notice. It fails to appreciate the merit of the lengths she actually went through to search
for Romeo.

Unless Edna had the ability to gain access to radio or television programs with nationwide
coverage or ensure that her notices were posted in all precincts, then requiring this type of
search would have been futile and economically wasteful. If we are to lend truth to the concept of
social justice, we have to make judgments based on her context. To reiterate, she is one of the
millions who had to go abroad to earn a more prosperous life for herself and her children. She
had to cut short her employment to come home and make an honest search for her husband. To
require her to squander more time and money to reach media and the police would have been
economically expensive for her. The law should be interpreted in the context of reality—and ours
is different from Edna’s.

Edna was an abandoned wife whose husband was missing for 15 or 16 years. Her search for
Romeo began more than two decades ago in a province in Mindanao, far removed from this
nation’s capital. She was an overseas Filipino worker, a domestic helper, who was compelled to
return to the Philippines to tend to a missing husband. Twenty-two years ago, when she
embarked on her search, she could not have been aided by the convenience of ready access to
communication networks. To go to her husband’s birthplace and inquire from his relatives, she
could not have merely boarded an hour-long flight; she must have endured hours, even days at
sea. It is in light of these human realities that Edna’s efforts must be appreciated.

This court must realize that insisting upon an ideal will never yield satisfactory results. A stringent
evaluation of a party’s efforts made out of context will always reveal means through which a
spouse could have ‘done more’ or walked the proverbial extra mile to ascertain his or her
spouse’s whereabouts. A reason could always be conceived for concluding that a spouse did not
try ‘hard enough.’

So, too, insisting on Edna’s perceived shortcomings unjustly puts the blame on her and
undermines the shortcoming that Romeo himself committed. All marital obligations recognized in
the Family Code are predicated upon each spouse’s presence. The primordial marital obligation
is "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support."  As I explained in my dissent in Cantor:
12

The opinions of a recognized authority in civil law, Arturo M. Tolentino, are particularly
enlightening:

Meaning of "Absent" Spouse.– The provisions of this article are of American origin, and must be
construed in the light of American jurisprudence. An identical provision (except for the period)
exists in the California civil code (section 61); California jurisprudence should, therefore, prove
enlightening. It has been held in that jurisdiction that, as respects the validity of a husband’s
subsequent marriage, a presumption as to the death of his first wife cannot be predicated upon
an absence resulting from his leaving or deserting her, as it is his duty to keep her advised as to
his whereabouts. The spouse who has been left or deserted is the one who is considered as the
‘spouse present’; such spouse is not required to ascertain the whereabouts of the deserting
spouse, and after the required number of years of absence of the latter, the former may validly
remarry.

Precisely, it is a deserting spouse’s failure to comply with what is reasonably expected of him/her
and to fulfil the responsibilities that are all but normal to a spouse which makes reasonable (i.e.,
well-grounded) the belief that should he/she fail to manifest his/her presence within a statutorily
determined reasonable period, he/she must have been deceased. The law is of the confidence
that spouses will in fact "live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support" such that it is not the business of the law to assume any other
circumstance than that a spouse is deceased in case he/she becomes absent. 13

It is Romeo who has been absent. In so doing, he is rightly considered to be no longer in a

position to perform his marital obligations to Edna. Having been absent for the statutorily
prescribed period despite his legal obligations as a married spouse, Romeo should be rightly
considered presumptively dead.

The majority burdened itself with ensuring that petitions for declaration of presumptive death are
not used as procedural shortcuts that undermine the institution of marriage. While this is a valid
concern, the majority goes to unnecessary lengths to discharge this burden. Article 41 of the
Family Code concedes that there is a degree of risk in presuming a spouse to be dead, as the
absent spouse may, in fact, be alive and well. Thus, Article 41 provides that declarations of
presumptive death are "without prejudice to the reappearance of the absent spouse." The state is
thus not bereft of remedies.

Consistent with this, Article 42 of the Family Code provides for the automatic termination of the
subsequent marriage entered into by the present spouse should the absent spouse reappear:
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically
terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is
a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab nitio.

A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil
registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any
interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without
prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed.
Moreover, in Santos v. Santos,  we recognized that in cases where a declaration of presumptive
14

death was fraudulently obtained, the subsequent marriage shall not only be terminated, but all
other effects of the declaration nullified by a successful petition for annulment of judgment:

The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is
an action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the
person declared presumptively dead has never been absent.

....

Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying
the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of
an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. 15

The majority is gripped with the apprehension that a petition for declaration of presumptive death
may be availed of as a dangerous expedient. Nothing, in this case, sustains fear. A misplaced
anxiety is all that there is. As things stand, Edna has shown facts that warrant a declaration that
Romeo is presumptively dead. Proceeding from these merits, this Petition must be denied.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the Petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 03768-MIN, affirming the October 8, 2009 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, declaring Romeo L. Villanueva presumptively dead pursuant to
Article 41 of the Family Code, must be affirmed.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. EDNA ORCELINO-

VILLANUEVA CASE DIGEST - CIVIL LAW
REPUBLIC v. EDNA ORCELINO-VILLANUEVA                                     GR No. 210929, Jul 29, 2015

FACTS:

Edna worked as a domestic helper in Singapore in 1992 while her husband worked as a mechanic in Valencia,
Bukidnon. The two got married on December 21, 1978, in Iligan City. While she was in Singapore(1993) , her
children informed her that her husband left their home without telling them his whereabouts. Due to this
news, she was prompted to go back to the Philippines to look and find his husband. Edna searched and made
inquiries about her husband thru their common friends, and parents-in-law in Iligan and Valencia City and even
went far as to his birthplace in Negros Oriental.

15 years later she filed to the RTC a petition to declare Romeo presumptively dead under Article 41 of the
Family Code. During the trial, she was presented as the lone witness.

RTC grants her petition.

The OSG thru a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court questioned the decision of the RTC
on the ground that the conclusions reached by the RTC were in direct opposition to established jurisprudence,
as ruled by the Court in Republic v. Nolasco, and U.S. v. Biasbas.

CA dismissed the OSG’s petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the strict standard approach were followed by Edna before she filed a petition for declaration
of presumptive death of her husband.

RULING.

NO. Edna claimed that she made diligent search and inquiries to find her husband but it was found out that it
was all consisted of bare assertions without any corroborative evidence on record. Edna did not present
additional witnesses (her children, their common friends, parents-in-law) but herself alone. There was not
even any attempt to seek the aid of the authorities at the time her husband disappeared.

Therefore, The petition of respondent Edna Orcelino-Villanueva to have her husband declared presumptively
dead is DENIED.

Santos vs. Santos, G.R. # 187061, Oct. 8, 2014

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 187061, October 08, 2014

CELERINA J. SANTOS, Petitioner, v. RICARDO T. SANTOS, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by

extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is
not the proper remedy when the person declared presumptively dead has never
been absent.

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Celerina J. Santos, assailing the
Court of Appeals' resolutions dated November 28, 2008 and March 5, 2009. The
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for the annulment of the trial court's
judgment declaring her presumptively dead.

On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina
J. Santos (Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T.
Santos (Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive
death for the purpose of remarriage on  June 15, 2007.1 Ricardo remarried on
September 17, 2008.2 chanrobleslaw

In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death, Ricardo alleged that
he and Celerina rented an apartment somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila; after
they had gotten married on June 18, 1980.3 After a year, they moved to Tarlac City.
They were engaged in the buy and sell business. 4 chanrobleslaw
Ricardo claimed that their business did not prosper. 5 As a result, Celerina convinced
him to allow her to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong. 6 Ricardo initially
refused but because of Celerina's insistence, he allowed her to work abroad. 7 She
allegedly applied in an employment agency in Ermita, Manila, in February 1995. She
left Tarlac two months after and was never heard from again. 8 chanrobleslaw

Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina. 9 He went to
Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon City, but they, too, did not know their
daughter's whereabouts.10 He also inquired about her from other relatives and
friends, but no one gave him any information.11 chanrobleslaw

Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial Court
petition since Celerina left.  He believed that she had passed away. 12 chanrobleslaw

Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October
2008 when she could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief, or other appropriate remedies.13 chanrobleslaw

On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment 14 before
the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She
argued that she was deprived her day in court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge
of her true residence, misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac
City.15 According to Celerina, her true residence was in Neptune Extension,
Congressional Avenue, Quezon City.16 This residence had been her and Ricardo's
conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008. 17 As a result of Ricardo's
misrepresentation, she was deprived of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the
petition declaring her presumptively dead.18 chanrobleslaw

Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac.  She also never left and worked as
a domestic helper abroad.20 Neither did she go to an employment agency in
February 1995.21 She also claimed that it was not true that she had been absent for
12 years. Ricardo was aware that she never left their conjugal dwelling in Quezon
City.22 It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another
woman.23 Celerina referred to a joint affidavit executed by their children to support
her contention that Ricardo made false allegations in his petition. 24 chanrobleslaw

Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition
because it had never been published in a newspaper.25 She added that the Office of
the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not furnished copies
of Ricardo's petition.26
chanrobleslaw

The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008, dismissing
Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of
remedy.27 According to the Court of Appeals, the proper remedy was to file a sworn
statement before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance with
Article 42 of the Family Code.28 chanrobleslaw

Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' resolution dated
November 28, 2008.29 The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration in
the resolution dated March 5, 2009.30 chanrobleslaw

Hence, this petition was filed.

The issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing
Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong remedy for a
fraudulently obtained judgment declaring presumptive death.

Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family
Code is appropriate only when the spouse is actually absent and the spouse seeking
the declaration of presumptive death actually has a well-founded belief of the
spouse's death.31 She added that it would be inappropriate to file an affidavit of
reappearance if she did not disappear in the first place. 32 She insisted that an action
for annulment of judgment is proper when the declaration of presumptive death is
obtained fraudulently.33 chanrobleslaw

Celerina further argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of

the Family Code would not be a sufficient remedy because it would not nullify the
legal effects of the judgment declaring her presumptive death. 34 chanrobleslaw

In Ricardo's comment,35 he argued that a petition for annulment of judgment is not

the proper remedy because it cannot be availed when there are other remedies
available. Celerina could always file an affidavit of reappearance to terminate the
subsequent marriage. Ricardo iterated the Court of Appeals' ruling that the remedy
afforded to Celerina under Article 42 of the Family Code is the appropriate remedy.

The petition is meritorious.

Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment,
order, or resolution has become final, and the "remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no
fault of the petitioner."36 chanrobleslaw

The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.37 This court defined extrinsic fraud in Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi:38 chanrobleslaw

For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or

actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the
original action or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been
litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial
which prevents a parly from having a real contest, or from presenting all of his case,
such that there is no fair submission of the controversy.39 (Emphasis supplied)

Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment of judgment that there was fraud
when Ricardo deliberately made false allegations in the court with respect to her
residence.40 Ricardo also falsely claimed that she was absent for 12 years. There was
also no publication of the notice of hearing of Ricardo's petition in a newspaper of
general circulation.41 Celerina claimed that because of these, she was deprived of
notice and opportunity to oppose Ricardo's petition to declare her presumptively
dead.42chanrobleslaw

Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting Ricardo's petition for declaration of
presumptive death were false.43 Celerina further claimed that the court did not
acquire jurisdiction because the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial
Prosecutor's Office were not given copies of Ricardo's petition. 44 chanrobleslaw

These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Celerina alleged in
her petition with the Court of Appeals sufficient ground/s for annulment of
judgment.

Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment 45 on November 17, 2008. This
was less than two years from the July 27, 2007 decision declaring her presumptively
dead and about a month from her discovery of the decision in October 2008. The
petition was, therefore, filed within the four-year period allowed by law in case of
extrinsic fraud, and before the action is barred by laches, which is the period allowed
in case of lack of jurisdiction.46
chanrobleslaw

There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina at the time of her
discovery of the fraud perpetrated on her.

The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain
admissions, presumptions, and conditions.

The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four
consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the
absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage
during the subsistence of another marriage.47 chanrobleslaw

The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being
terminated by the presumptively dead spouse when he or she reappears. Thus: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be
automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the
absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or
declaring it void ab initio.

A sworn statement  of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded

in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the
instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent
marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially
determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis supplied)

In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with the
remedy of terminating the subsequent marriage by mere reappearance.

The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first

spouse that his or her marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he or
she was declared absent or presumptively dead.

Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the
subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to several conditions: (1) the non-
existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab
initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the
subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of
reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact
of reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or
judicially determined.

The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always
immediately cause the subsequent marriage's termination.  Reappearance of the
absent or presumptively dead spouse will cause the termination of the subsequent
marriage only when all the conditions enumerated in the Family Code are present.
Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or
presumptively dead spouse's reappearance (1) if the first marriage has already been
annulled or has been declared a nullity; (2) if the sworn statement of the
reappearance is not recorded in the civil registry of the subsequent spouses'
residence; (3) if there is no notice to the subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of
reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of law, and no judgment is yet
rendered confirming, such fact of reappearance.

When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of

presumptive death, a presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead and
that the second marriage is legal. This presumption should prevail over the
continuance of the marital relations with the first spouse. 48 The second marriage, as
with all marriages, is presumed valid. 49 The burden of proof to show that the first
marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity of the
second marriage.50 chanrobleslaw

This court recognized the conditional nature of reappearance as a cause for

terminating the subsequent marriage in Social Security System v. Vda. de
Bailon.51 This court noted52 that mere reappearance will not terminate the
subsequent marriage even if the parties to the subsequent marriage were notified if
there was "no step . . . taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by [filing
an] affidavit [of reappearance] or by court action[.]" 53 "Since the second marriage
has been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such
presumption continues inspite of the spouse's physical reappearance, and by fiction
of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent
marriage is terminated as provided by law."54 chanrobleslaw

The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of determining the
status of the second marriage and the liabilities of the spouse who, in bad faith,
claimed that the other spouse was absent.

A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists.  However, a bigamous

subsequent marriage may be considered valid when the following are present: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1) The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;
2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead;
3) There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absent spouse; and
4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.55

A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a

court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded
belief56 that the spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as.
validly terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting
marriage are generally considered bigamous and void. 57 Only a subsequent marriage
contracted in good faith is protected by law.

Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not
immune from an action to declare his subsequent marriage void for being bigamous.
The prohibition against marriage during the subsistence of another marriage still
applies.58chanrobleslaw

If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed his petition to
declare her presumptively dead and when he contracted the subsequent marriage,
such marriage would be considered void for being bigamous under Article 35(4) of
the Family Code. This is because the circumstances lack the element of "well-
founded belief under Article 41 of the Family Code, which is essential for the
exception to the rule against bigamous marriages to apply. 59 chanrobleslaw

The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the

termination of the subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was
declared presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in law. This court
had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing
"an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a
declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage." 60 chanrobleslaw

Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the
termination of the subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its effects. She
contends that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because it will only terminate
the subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration of her
presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.

Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of

the Family Code is valid until terminated, the "children of such marriage shall be
considered legitimate, and the property relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage
will be the same as in valid marriages."61 If it is terminated by mere reappearance,
the children of the subsequent marriage conceived before the termination shall still
be considered legitimate.62 Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is a
defense against prosecution for bigamy. 63 chanrobleslaw

It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent
marriage may nullify the effects of the subsequent marriage, specifically, in relation
to the status of children and the prospect of prosecuting a respondent for bigamy.

However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be
filed solely by the husband or wife."64  This means that even if Celerina is a real
party in interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the outcome of an action
to nullify the second marriage,65 this remedy is not available to her.

Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also
of nullifying the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent
marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's
choice to file an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.

WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for determination of

the existence of extrinsic fraud, grounds for nullity/annulment of the first marriage,
and the merits of the petition.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary

by Natasha Kaye

CELERINA J. SANTOS v. RICARDO T. SANTOS, GR No. 187061, 2014-10-08

Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Celerina J. Santos, assailing the Court of
Appeals' resolutions dated November 28, 2008 and March 5, 2009. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition for the annulment of the trial court's judgment declaring
her presumptively... dead.
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J.
Santos (Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos
(Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the
purpose of... remarriage on  June 15, 2007.[1] Ricardo remarried on September 17,
2008.[... business did not prosper.[5] As a result, Celerina convinced him to allow her to
work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong.[6]
She allegedly applied in an employment agency in Ermita, Manila, in February 1995.
She left Tarlac two months after and was never heard from again.[8]... icardo further
alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina.[
He went to Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon City, but they, too, did not know their
daughter's whereabouts.[10] He also inquired about her from other relatives... and
friends, but no one gave him any information.[11
Ricardo claimed that it w... as almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial Court
petition since Celerina left.  He believed that she had passed away.[12]
C... elerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October
2008 when she could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief,
or other appropriate remedies.[13]
On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment[14] be...
efor... e... he Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud an... nd... lack of
jurisdiction. S
According to Celerina, her true residence was in Neptune Extension, Congressional
Avenue, Quezon City.[16] This residence had been her and
Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008.[17] As a result of
Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was deprived of any notice of and opportunity to
oppose the petition declaring her presumptively dead.[18
Cel
.
elerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac.  She also never left and worked as a
domestic helper abroad.[20] Neither did she go to an employment agency in February
1995.[21] She also claimed that it was not true that she... had been absent for 12 years.
Ricardo was aware that she never left their conjugal dwelling in Quezon City.[22] It was
he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another woman.[23]
Celerina referred to a joint... affidavit executed by their children to support her contention
that Ricardo made false allegations in his petition.[2
Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition
because it had never been published in a newspaper.[25] She added that the Office of
the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not furnished... copies
of Ricardo's petition.
he Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008, dismissing
Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy.[27]
According to the Court of Appeals, the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement
before the... civil registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of
the Family Code.[28]
Issues:
The issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's
petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained
judgment declaring presumptive death.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for determination of the
existence of extrinsic fraud, grounds for nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the
merits of the petition
Principles:
Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family
Code is appropriate only when the spouse is actually absent and the spouse seeking the
declaration of presumptive death actually has a well-founded belief of the spouse's
death.[31] She added that it would be inappropriate to file an affidavit of reappearance if
she did not disappear in the first place.[32] She insisted that an action for annulment of
judgment is proper when the declaration of presumptive death is... obtained fraudulently.
[33]
Celerina further argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the
Family Code would not be a sufficient remedy because it would not nullify the legal
effects of the judgment declaring her presumptive death.[
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order,
or resolution has become final, and the "remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
(or other appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the...
petitioner."[36]
The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
It is... extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which
prevents a parly from having a real contest, or from presenting all of his case, such that
there is no fair submission of the controversy
Celerina claimed that because of these, she was deprived of notice and opportunity to
oppose Ricardo's petition to declare her presumptively... dead.
elerina further claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Provincial
Prosecutor's Office were not given copies of Ricardo's petition.[44]
Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment[45] on November 17, 2008. This
was less than two years from the July 27, 2007 decision declaring her presumptively
dead and about a month from her discovery of the decision in October 2008. The
petition... was, therefore, filed within the four-year period allowed by law in case of
extrinsic fraud, and before the action is barred by laches, which is the period allowed in
case of lack of jurisdiction
The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain
admissions, presumptions, and conditions.
The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse
that his or her marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he or she was
declared absent or presumptively dead
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists.  However, a bigamous
subsequent marriage may be considered valid when the following are present:

1.

The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;

2.

The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead;

3.

There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absent spouse; and

4.

There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.[55]

Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally
considered bigamous and void.
If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed his petition to declare
her presumptively dead and when he contracted the subsequent marriage, such
marriage would be considered void for being bigamous under Article 35(4) of the Family
Code.
Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the termination
of the subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its effects. She contends that
reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the subsequent
marriage but not... nullify the effects of the declaration of her presumptive death and the
subsequent marriage.
Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the
Family Code is valid until terminated, the "children of such marriage shall be considered
legitimate, and the property relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same
as in valid... marriages."[61] If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the
subsequent marriage conceived before the termination shall still be considered
legitimate.[62] Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is a defense... against
prosecution for bigamy
Tadeo- Matias vs. Republic, G.R. # 230751, Apr. 25, 2018

G.R. No. 230751

ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner
vs
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
 DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is an appeal  assailing the Decision  dated November 28, 2016 and Resolution  dated March
1 2 3

20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467.

The facts are as follows:

On April 10, 2012, petitioner Estrellita Tadco-Matias filed before the Regional Trail Court (RTC)
of Tarlac City a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Wifredo N.
Matias (Wilfredo).  The allegations of the petition read:
4

1. [Petitioner] is of legal age, married to [Wilfredo], Filipino and curr[e]ntly a residnet of 106
Molave street, Zone B. San Miguel Tarlac City;

2. [Wifredo] is of legal age, a member of the Philippine Constabulary and was assigned in Araya,
Pampanga since August 24, 1967[;]

3. The[p]etitioner and [Wilfredo] entered into a lawful marriage on January 7, 1968 in Imbo, Anda,
Pangasinan x x x;

4. After the solemnization of their marriage vows, the couple put up their conjugal home at 106
Molave street, Zone B. San Miguel, Tarlac City;

5. [Wilfredo] continued to serve the Philippines and on September 15, 1979, he set out from their
conjugal home to again serve as a member of the Philippine Constabulary;

6. [Wilfredo] never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga since 1979 and he
never made contact or communicated with the [p]etitioner nor to his relatives;

7. That according to the service record of [Wilfredo] issued by the National Police Commission,
[Wilfredo] was already declared missing since 1979 x x x;

8. Petitioner constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary for any news regarding [her]
beloved husband [Wilfredo], but the Philippine Constabulary had no answer to his whereabouts,
[neither] did they have any news of him going AWOL, all they know was he was assigned to a
place frequented by the New People's Army;

9. [W]eeks became years and years became decades, but the [p]etitioner never gave up hope,
and after more than three (3) decades of awaiting, the [p]etitioner is still hopeful, but the times
had been tough on her, specially with a meager source of income coupled with her age, it is now
necessary for her to request for the benefits that rightfully belong to her in order to survive;

10. [T]hat one of the requirements to attain the claim of benefits is for a proof of death or at least
declaration of presumptive death by the Honorable Court;

11. That this petition is being filed not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit
under P.D. No. 1638 as amended.

The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 4850 and was raffled to Branch 65 of the Tarlac
City RTC. A copy of the petition was then furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)_.

Subsequently, the OSG filed its notice of appearance on behalf of herein respondent Republic of
the Philippines (Republic). 5
On January 15, 2012, the RTC issued a Decision  in Spec. Proc. No. 4850 granting the petition.
6

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:7

WHEREFORE in view of the foregoing the Court hereby declared (sic) WILFREDO N. MATIAS
absent or presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines for
purpose of claiming financial benefits due to him as former military officer.

xxxx

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

The Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via a petition for certiotrari.

8

On November 28, 2012, the CA rendered a decision granting the certiorari petition of the

Republic and setting aside the decision of the RTC. It accordingly disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated
January 15, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, branch 65, Tarlac City, in Special Proceeding no.
4850 is ANNULED and SET ASIDE, and the petition is DISMISSED.

The CA premised its decision on the following ratiocinations:

1. The RTC erred when it declared Wilfredo presumptively dead on the basis of Article 41 of the
Family Code (FC). Article 41 of the FC does not seek to remarry. If anything, the petition was
invoking the presumption of death established under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code, and
not that provided for under Article 41 of the FC.

2. Be that it may, the petition to declare Wilfredo presumptively dead should have been
dismissed by the RTC. The RTC is without authority to take cognizance of a petition whose sole
purpose is to have a person declared presumptively dead under either Article 390 or Article 391
of the Civil Code. As been held by jurisprudence, Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely
express rules of evidence that allow a court or a tribunal to presume that a person is dead-which
presumption may be invoked in any action or proceeding, but itself cannot be the subject of an
independent action or proceeding.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA remained steadfast. Hence,this appeal.

Our Ruling

We deny the appeal

The CA was correct. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by the petitioner is
not an authorized suit and should have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC's decision must,
therefore, be set aside.

RTC Erred I Declaring the

Presumptive Death of Wilfredo under
Article 41 of the FC; Petitioner's
Petition for the Declaration of
Presumptive Death is Not Based on
Article 41 of the FC, but on the Civil
Code
A conspicuous error in the decision of the RTC must first be addressed.

It can be recalled that the RTC, in fallo of its January 15, 2012 Decision, granted the petitioner's
petition by declaring Wilfredo presumptively dead "under Article 41 of the FC." By doing so, RTC
gave the impression that the petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner
was likewise filed pursuant to Article 41 of the FC.  This is wrong.
9

The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an action that would
have warranted the application of Article 41 of the FC shows that the presumption of death
established therein is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent
marriage under the said law. Thus:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of
only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse.

Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive death
Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of presumptive death,
petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed "not for any other purpose but solely to
claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 a amended. 10

Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the purpose of
remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption of death under either Article
390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code  as the basis of her petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the
11

Civil Code express the general rule regarding presumption s of death for any civil purpose, to wit:

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absence still
lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the
estate among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who
has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;

(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;

(3) a person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has
not been known for four years.

Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the presumptive death of
Wilfredo was misleading and grossly improper.The petition for the declaration of presumptive
death filed by the petitioner was based on the Civil Code, and not on Article 41 of the FC.
Petitioner's Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death Ought to Have Been
Dismissed; A Petition Whose Sole Objective is
To Declare a Person Presumptively Dead Under
the CivilCode, Like that Filed by the Petitioner
Before the RTC, Is Not a Viable Suit in Our
Jurisdiction

The true fault in the RTC's decision, however, goes beyond its misleading fallo. The
decision itself is objectionable.

Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration of presumptive death of
Wilfredo under the Civil Code, the RTC should have dismissed such petition outright. This is
because, in our jurisdiction, a petition whose sole objective is to have a person declared
presumptively dead under the Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit and no court has any
authority to take cognizance of the same.

The above norm had its conceptual roots in the 1948 case of In re: Petition for the Presumption
of Death of Nicolai Szatraw.  In the said case, we held that a rule creating a presumption of
12

death  is merely one of the evidence that-while may be invoked in any action or proceeding-
13

cannot be the lone subject of an independent action or proceeding. Szatraw explained:

The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of the evidence which permits the court to presume
that a person had been unheard from in seven years had been established. This presumption
may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a special proceeding,
which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent court. Independently of
such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor
can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding. In this case, there is no right
ti be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against her absent
husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of his right or status or for the
ascertainment of particular fact, for the petition does not pray for the declaration that the
petitioner 's husband us dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead
because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is any pretense at securing a
declaration that the petitioner's husband os dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because
it is unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration, even if judicially made, would not
improve the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is already established by
law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would be a prima
facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the
subject of judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is tha only question or matter
involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. The latter must decide
finally the controversy between the parties, or determine finally the right or status of a party or
establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise or may arise;
and once such controversy is decided by a final decree, then the judgement on the subject of the
controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a party or upon the existence of a particular
fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare instances
especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that judicial declaration that a person is
presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or
become final. (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)

The above ruling in Szatraw has since been ussed by the subsequent cases of Lukban v.
Republic  and Gue v. Republic  in disallowing petitions for declaration of presumptive death
14 15

based on Article 390 of the Civil Code (and, implicity, also those based on the Civil based on
Article 391 of the Civil Code).
Dissecting the rulings of Szatraw, Gue and Lukban collectively, we are able to ascertain the
considerations why a petition for declaration of presumptive death based on the Civil Code was
disallowed in our jurisdiction, viz:
16

1. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence that only allow a court
or a tribunal to presume that a person is dead upon the establishment of certain facts.

2. Since Articles 390 an d 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence, an action
brought exclusively to declare a person presumptively dead under either of the said
articles actually presents

no actual controversy that a court could decide. In such action, there would be no actual
rights to be enforces, no wrong to be remedied nor any status to be established.

3. A judicial pronouncement declaring a person presumptively dead under Article 390 or Article
391 of the Civil Code, in an action exclusively based thereon, would never really become
"final" as the same only confirms tha existence of a prima facie or disputable presumption. The
function of a court to render decisions that is supposed to be final and binding between litigants
is thereby compromised.

4. Moreove, a court action to declare a person presumptively dead under Articles 390 and 391 of
the Civil Code would be unnecessary. The presumption in the said articles is already
established by law.

Verily, under prevailing case law, courts are without any authority to take cognizance of a petition
that-like the one filed by the petitioner in the case at bench-only seeks to have a person declared
presumptively dead under the Civil Code. Such a petition is not authorized by law.  Hence, by
17

acting upon and eventually granting the petitioner's petition for the declaration of presumptive
death, the RTC violated prevailing jurisprudence and thereby committed grave abuse of
discretion. The CA, therefore, was only correct in setting aside the RTC's decision.

II

Before bringing this case to its logical conclusion, however, there are a few points the Court is
minded to make.

It is not lost on this Court that much of the present controversy stemmed from the misconception
that a court declaration is required in order to establish a person is presumptively dead for
purposes of claiming his death benefits as a military serviceman under pertinent laws.  This
18

misconception is what moved petitioner to file her misguided petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of Wilfredo and what ultimately exposed her to unnecessary difficulties in
prosecuting an otherwise simple claim for death benefits either before the Philippine Veterans'
Affair Office (PVAO) of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

What the Court finds deeply disconnecting, however, is the possibility that such misconception
may have been peddles by no less than the PVAO and the AFP themselves; that such agencies,
as a matter of practice, had been requiring claimants, such as the petitioner, to first secure a
court declaration of presumptive death before processing the death before processing the death
benefits of missing serviceman.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Court deems it necessary to issue the following
guidelines-culled from relevant law and jurisprudential pronouncements-to aid the public, PVAO
and the AFP in making or dealing with claims of death benefits which are similar to that of the
petitioner:
1. The PVAO and the AFP can decide claims of death benefits of a missing soldier without
requiring the claimant to first produce a court declaration of the presumptive death of
such soldier. In such claims, the PVAO and the AFP can make their own determination, on the
basis of the evidence presented by the claimant, whether the presumption of death under Articles
390 and 391 of the Civil Code may be applied or not.

It must be stressed that the presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code
arises by operation of law, without need of a court declaration, once the factual conditions
mentioned in the said articles are established.  Hence, requiring the claimant to further secure a
19

court declaration in order to establish the presumptive death of a missing soldier is not proper
and contravenes established jurisprudence on the matter. 20

2. In order to avail of the presumption, therefore, the claimant need only present before the
PVAO or the appropriate office of the AFP, as the case may be, any "evidence"  which shows
21

that the concerned soldier had been missing for such number of years and or under the
circumstances prescribed under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. Obviously,
the "evidence" referred to here excludes a court declaration of presumptive death.

3. The PVAO or the AFP, as the case may be, may then weigh the evidence submitted by the
claimant and determine their sufficiency to establish the requisite factual conditions specified
under Article 390 or 391 of the Civil Code in order for the presumption of death to arise. If the
PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is sufficient,
they should not hesitate to apply the presumption of death and pay the latter's claim.

4. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is not
sufficient to invoke the presumption of death under the Civil Code and denies the latter's claim by
reason thereof, the claimant may file an appeal with the Office of the President (OP) pursuant to
the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

If the OP denies the appeal, the claimant may next seek recourse via a petition for review with
the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of the Court.  And finally, shold such recourse still fail, the
1avvphi1

claimant may file an appeal by certiorari with the Supreme Court.

While we are constrained by case law to deny the instant petition, the Court is hopeful that, by
the foregoing guidelines, the unfortunate experience of the petitioner would no longer be
replicated in the future.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated November 28, 2016 and
Resolution dated March 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467
are AFFIRMED. The Court declares that a judicial decision of a court of law that a person is
presumptively dead is not requirement before the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office and the
Armed Forces of the Philippines for their consideration.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

I dissent. See separate opinion SAMUEL R. MARTIRES

 MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decisionhad been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

 Rollo, pp. 29-36. The decision was penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A.
2

Paredes with Associate Justices Magdangal M. De Leon and Elihu A. Ybañez.

Concurring.

3
 Id. at 38-39.

4
 Id. at 46-48.

5
 Id. at 78.

6
 Id. at 78-80. The decision was penned by Judge Ma. Magdalena A. Balderama.

 This is actually the corrected version of the dispositve portion of the RTC decision.

7

Originally the dispositve portion of the said dedision read:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declared (sic)

WILFREDO N. MATIAS absent or presumptively dead under Article 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines for the purpose of remarriage.

xxxx

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

 The RTC issued the corrected version of the dispositive portion on the same day
it issued the decision.

8
 Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

9
 Executive Order No. 209, s. 1987.

10
 Rollo, p. 47.

11
 Republic Act No. 386.

12
 No. L-1780, August 31, 1948.

 The rule expressing the presumption of death referred to in the case of Szatraw is
13

found under Section 334 (24) of Act No. 190 or the Code of the Civil Procedure of the
Philippines. The section reads:

Section 334. Disputable Presumptions. - The following presumptions are

satisfactorily, if uncontradicted but they are disputable, and may be contradicted
by other evidence:

xxxx

24. That a person not heard from in seven years is dead.

14
 89 Phil. 574 (1956).

15
 107 Phil. 381 (1960).

 In re: Petition for the Presumption of Death of Nicolai Szatraw, supra note 12, in relation
16

to Lukban v. Republic, supra note 14 and Gue v. Republic, supra note 15.

 Valdez v. Republic of the Philippines. G.R. No 180863, September 8, 2009, citing Gue

17

v. Republic, supra note 15.

18
 Rollo, p. 47.

 Manuelv. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005 citing
19

TOLENTINO, THE NEW CIVIL CODE, VOL. I, 690. See also Valdez v. Republic, supra
note 17.

 In re: Petition for the Presumption of Death of Nicolai Szatraw, supra note 12, in
20

relation to Lukban v. Republic, supra note 14 and Gue v. Republic, supra note 15.

 The "evidence" referred to include, but are not limited to the official service records of
21

the missing soldier showing for how long he had been missing and his last assignments
and affidavits of persons who knew the circumstances of the missing soldiers'
disappearance.

ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES (Arts. 45- 54)

Almelor vs. RTC of Las Piñas, G.R. # 79620, Aug. 26, 2008

G.R. No. 179620             August 26, 2008

MANUEL G. ALMELOR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, BRANCH 254, and LEONIDA T.
ALMELOR, respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses' right to the community of their whole lives. It likewise
involves a true intertwining of personalities.1

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the
petition for annulment of judgment and affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Las Piñas, Branch 254. The CA dismissed outright the Rule 47 petition for being the wrong remedy.

The Facts

Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married on
January 29, 1989 at the Manila Cathedral.3 Their union bore three children: (1) Maria Paulina Corinne,
born on October 20, 1989; (2) Napoleon Manuel, born on August 9, 1991; and (3) Manuel Homer,
born on July 4, 1994.4 Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a
pediatrician, respectively.5

After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Piñas City to annul
their marriage on the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations. The case, docketed as LP-00-0132 was raffled off to Branch 254.

During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in 1981 at the San Lazaro Hospital where
they worked as medical student clerks. At that time, she regarded Manuel as a very thoughtful person
who got along well with other people. They soon became sweethearts. Three years after, they got
married.6

Leonida averred that Manuel's kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. In the public eye, Manuel
was the picture of a perfect husband and father. This was not the case in his private life. At home,
Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered.
Manuel's unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their frequent
fights as a couple.7 Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection
Manuel has for his mother. Manuel's deep attachment to his mother and his dependence on her
decision-making were incomprehensible to Leonida.8

Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his homosexuality. Her suspicions were first
aroused when she noticed Manuel's peculiar closeness to his male companions. For instance, she
caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller. 9 She
also found several pornographic homosexual materials in his possession. 10 Her worse fears were
confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr.
Nogales.11 When she confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took her
children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their children. 12

Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonida's claim. Dr.
del Fonso Garcia testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests
on Leonida. She also had a one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face interviews with Ma.
Paulina Corrinne (the eldest child).13 She concluded that Manuel is psychologically
incapacitated.14 Such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even before the marriage and
appeared to be incurable.
Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some petty arguments here and there. He,
however, maintained that their marital relationship was generally harmonious. The petition for
annulment filed by Leonida came as a surprise to him.

Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida's hostility against him was their professional rivalry.
It began when he refused to heed the memorandum 15 released by Christ the King Hospital. The
memorandum ordered him to desist from converting his own lying-in clinic to a primary or secondary
hospital.16 Leonida's family owns Christ the King Hospital which is situated in the same subdivision as
Manuel's clinic and residence.17 In other words, he and her family have competing or rival hospitals in
the same vicinity.

Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father to their children. He denied maltreating them.
At most, he only imposed the necessary discipline on the children.

He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He said there was nothing wrong for him to
return the love and affection of the person who reared and looked after him and his siblings. This is
especially apt now that his mother is in her twilight years. 18 Manuel pointed out that Leonida found
fault in this otherwise healthy relationship because of her very jealous and possessive nature. 19

This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel to avoid the company of female friends.
He wanted to avoid any further misunderstanding with his wife. But, Leonida instead conjured up
stories about his sexual preference. She also fabricated tales about pornographic materials found in
his possession to cast doubt on his masculinity.20

To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G. Almelor. Jesus narrated that he usually
stayed at Manuel's house during his weekly trips to Manila from Iriga City. He was a witness to the
generally harmonious relationship between his brother Manuel and sister-in-law, Leonida. True, they
had some quarrels typical of a husband and wife relationship. But there was nothing similar to what
Leonida described in her testimony.21

Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day Leonida allegedly saw Manuel kissed
another man. He denied that such an incident occurred. On that particular date, 22 he and Manuel went
straight home from a trip to Bicol. There was no other person with them at that time, except their
driver.23

Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcia's findings by presenting his own expert
witness. However, no psychiatrist was presented.

RTC Disposition

By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the petition for annulment, with the following
disposition:

WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the marriage contracted by herein parties on 29 January 1989 and all its effects
under the law null and void from the beginning;

2. Dissolving the regime of community property between the same parties with forfeiture of
defendant's share thereon in favor of the same parties' children whose legal custody is
awarded to plaintiff with visitorial right afforded to defendant;

3. Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to all the children; and

4. Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:

 a. Directing the Branch Clerk of this Court to enter this Judgment upon its finality in
the Book of Entry of Judgment and to issue an Entry of Judgment in accordance
thereto; and

b. Directing the Local Civil Registrars of Las Piñas City and Manila City to cause the
registration of the said Entry of Judgment in their respective Books of Marriages.

Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued.

SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis supplied)

The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code.
It ratiocinated:

x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the

allegations in the complaint and of the evidence presented in support thereof (sic) reveals that
in this case (sic) there is more than meets the eyes (sic).

Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed, generally incompatible with
hetero sexual marriage. This is reason enough that in this jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes
marriage as a special contract exclusively only between a man and a woman x x x and thus
when homosexuality has trespassed into marriage, the same law provides ample remedies to
correct the situation [Article 45(3) in relation to Article 46(4) or Article 55, par. 6, Family Code].
This is of course in recognition of the biological fact that no matter how a man cheats himself
that he is not a homosexual and forces himself to live a normal heterosexual life, there will
surely come a time when his true sexual preference as a homosexual shall prevail in haunting
him and thus jeopardizing the solidity, honor, and welfare of his own family. 25

Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due course. Undaunted, he filed a petition
for annulment of judgment with the CA.26

Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in excess of the lower court's jurisdiction;
that it had no jurisdiction to dissolve the absolute community of property and forfeit his conjugal share
in favor of his children.

CA Disposition

On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DENIED. The Court
AFFIRMS in toto the Decision (dated November 25, 2005) of the Regional Trial Court
(Branch 254), in Las Piñas City, in Civil Case No. LP-00-0132. No costs. 27

The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing the extraordinary remedy of petition
for annulment of judgment. Said the appellate court:

It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of the decision rendered by the
lower Court. But the remedy assuming there was a mistake is not a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment but an ordinary appeal. An error of judgment may be reversed or corrected only by
appeal.

What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction, which is properly the
subject of an ordinary appeal.

In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but he claims excess in the
exercise thereof. "Excess" assuming there was is not covered by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. The Rule refers the lack of jurisdiction and not the exercise thereof. 28
 Issues

Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule 45, assigning to the CA the following errors:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TREATING THE PETITION FOR
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A PETITION FOR REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE;

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE

TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER DECLARING THE MARRIAGE AS NULL AND
VOID ON THE GROUND OF PETITIONER'S PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE

TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER TO FORFEIT THE SHARE OF PETITIONER IN
HIS SHARE OF THE CONJUGAL ASSETS.29

Our Ruling

I. The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial
justice and in the Court's exercise of equity jurisdiction.

Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA by the wrong or inappropriate mode
shall be dismissed.30 This is to prevent the party from benefiting from one's neglect and
mistakes. However, like most rules, it carries certain exceptions. After all, the ultimate purpose of
all rules of procedures is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. 31

Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It can not be resorted to if the ordinary
remedies are available or no longer available through no fault of petitioner. 32 However, in Buenaflor v.
Court of Appeals,33 this Court clarified the proper appreciation for technical rules of procedure, in this
wise:

Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and,
therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The exception
is that while the Rules are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules
on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied. As an exception
to the exception, these rules have sometimes been relaxed on equitable
considerations. Also, in some cases the Supreme Court has given due course to an appeal
perfected out of time where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but only
when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of equity
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed exceptions to the stringent rules governing
appeals.35 It has, in the past, refused to sacrifice justice for technicality. 36

After discovering the palpable error of his petition, Manuel seeks the indulgence of this Court to
consider his petition before the CA instead as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed grave abuse of discretion to the lower court
for annulling his marriage on account of his alleged homosexuality. This is not the first time that this
Court is faced with a similar situation. In Nerves v. Civil Service Commission,37 petitioner Delia R.
Nerves elevated to the CA a Civil Service Commission (CSC) decision suspending her for six (6)
months. The CSC ruled Nerves, a public school teacher, is deemed to have already served her six-
month suspension during the pendency of the case. Nevertheless, she is ordered reinstated without
back wages. On appeal, Nerves stated in her petition, inter alia:

1. This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution of

the Philippines and under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

2. But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (Revised Circular No. 1-
91) petitioner is filing the instant petition with this Honorable Court instead of the Supreme
Court.38 (Underscoring supplied)

The CA dismissed Nerves' petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy or the inappropriate mode
of appeal.39 The CA opined that "under the Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 x
x x appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of CSC is by a petition for review." 40

This Court granted Nerves petition and held that she had substantially complied with the
Administrative Circular. The Court stated:

That it was erroneously labeled as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
is only a minor procedural lapse, not fatal to the appeal. x x x

More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be impressed with merit. Hence, the Court
of Appeals should have overlooked the insubstantial defects of the petition x x x in order to do
justice to the parties concerned. There is, indeed, nothing sacrosanct about procedural rules,
which should be liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. As it has
been said, where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate substantial justice, or bar
the vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a particular case
from the operation of the rules.41 (Underscoring supplied)

Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,42 petitioner Joy G. Tan availed of a wrong
remedy by filing a petition for review on certiorari instead of a motion for new trial or an ordinary
appeal. In the interest of justice, this Court considered the petition, pro hac vice, as a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.

This Court found that based on Tan's allegations, the trial court prima facie committed grave abuse of
discretion in rendering a judgment by default. If uncorrected, it will cause petitioner great injustice. The
Court elucidated in this wise:

Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would
result from the strict application of the Rules, we will not hesitate to relax the same in the
interest of substantial justice.43 (Underscoring supplied)

Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served by giving due course to the present
petition and treating petitioner's CA petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, considering that what
is at stake is the validity or non-validity of a marriage.

In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,44 citing Labad v. University of Southeastern Philippines, this Court

reiterated:

x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. While the right to
appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial
system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to
appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. 45
Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties
a review of the case on the merits to attain the ends of justice. 46

Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of Manuel's counsel that prejudiced his right to
appeal. His counsel, Atty. Christine Dugenio, repeatedly availed of inappropriate remedies. After the
denial of her notice of appeal, she failed to move for reconsideration or new trial at the first instance.
She also erroneously filed a petition for annulment of judgment rather than pursue an ordinary appeal.

These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsel's incompetence. These gravely worked to the
detriment of Manuel's appeal. True it is that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Still, this Court
has recognized certain exceptions: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client's
liberty and property; or (3) where the interest of justice so require. 47

The negligence of Manuel's counsel falls under the exceptions. Ultimately, the reckless or gross
negligence of petitioner's former counsel led to the loss of his right to appeal. He should not be made
to suffer for his counsel's grave mistakes. Higher interests of justice and equity demand that he be
allowed to ventilate his case in a higher court.

In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,48 this Court explained thus:

It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any
act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as
an act of his client. However, where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and
dereliction of duty, which resulted in the client's being held liable for damages in a damage
suit, the client is deprived of his day in court and the judgment may be set aside on such
ground. In the instant case, higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioners be
allowed to present evidence on their defense. Petitioners may not be made to suffer for the
lawyer's mistakes. This Court will always be disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved
by perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and downright incompetence of lawyers, which
has the consequence of depriving their clients, of their day in court.49 (Emphasis
supplied)

Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever
the demands of justice require it. With more conviction should it wield such power in a case involving
the sacrosanct institution of marriage. This Court is guided with the thrust of giving a party the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of one's action.50

The client was likewise spared from counsel's negligence in Government Service Insurance System
v. Bengson Commercial Buildings, Inc.51 and Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon.52 Said the Court in
Bengson:

But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office as an aid to
justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit
exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In other words, the court has the
power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of
justice require it.53

II. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not homosexuality
per se.

Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his marriage. Persistent in his
quest, he fought back all the heavy accusations of incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity thrown
at him.

The trial court declared that Leonida's petition for nullity had "no basis at all because the supporting
grounds relied upon can not legally make a case under Article 36 of the Family Code." It went
further by citing Republic v. Molina:54
 Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable differences, incessant
quarrels and/or beatings, unpredictable mood swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and
difficulty, neglect, or failure in the performance of some marital obligations do not suffice to
establish psychological incapacity.55

If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not meeting the guidelines set in
Molina. What Leonida attempted to demonstrate were Manuel's homosexual tendencies by citing
overt acts generally predominant among homosexual individuals. 56 She wanted to prove that the
perceived homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable of fulfilling the essential marital obligations.

But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the marriage between Manuel and
Leonida on the ground of vitiated consent by virtue of fraud. In support of its conclusion, the lower
court reasoned out:

As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003), when there is smoke surely
there is fire. Although vehemently denied by defendant, there is preponderant evidence
enough to establish with certainty that defendant is really a homosexual. This is the fact that
can be deduced from the totality of the marriage life scenario of herein parties.

Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people around him even including his own
close friends doubted his true sexual preference (TSN, pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000; pp.
73-75, 15 December 2003). After receiving many forewarnings, plaintiff told defendant about
the rumor she heard but defendant did not do anything to prove to the whole world once and
for all the truth of all his denials. Defendant threatened to sue those people but nothing
happened after that. There may have been more important matters to attend to than to waste
time and effort filing cases against and be effected by these people and so, putting more
premiums on defendant's denials, plaintiff just the same married him. Reasons upon reasons
may be advanced to either exculpate or nail to the cross defendant for his act of initially
concealing his homosexuality to plaintiff, but in the end, only one thing is certain - even during
his marriage with plaintiff, the smoke of doubt about his real preference continued and even
got thicker, reason why obviously defendant failed to establish a happy and solid family; and
in so failing, plaintiff and their children became his innocent and unwilling victims.

Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein defendant, he is meticulous over even
small details in the house (sic) like wrongly folded bed sheets, etc. or if a man is more
authoritative in knowing what clothes or jewelry shall fit his wife (pp. 77-81, TSN, 15
December 2003); but these admissions of defendant taken in the light of evidence presented
apparently showing that he had extra fondness of his male friends (sic) to the extent that
twice on separate occasions (pp. 4-7, TSN, 14 February 2001) he was allegedly seen by
plaintiff kissing another man lips-to-lips plus the homosexual magazines and tapes likewise
allegedly discovered underneath his bed (Exhibits "L" and "M"), the doubt as to his real sex
identity becomes stronger. The accusation of plaintiff versus thereof of defendant may be the
name of the game in this case; but the simple reason of professional rivalry advanced by the
defendant is certainly not enough to justify and obscure the question why plaintiff should
accuse him of such a very untoward infidelity at the expense and humiliation of their children
and family as a whole.57

Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a
homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court
considered the public perception of Manuel's sexual preference without the corroboration of
witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuel's peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality.

Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate
it as a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear - a marriage may be annulled when
the consent of either party was obtained by fraud,58 such as concealment of
homosexuality.59 Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by preponderance of evidence that
Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his
wife.60 It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent
of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party
in giving consent to the marriage.

Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be freely given by both
parties. An allegation of vitiated consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The Family
Code has enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances61 constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is
not among those cited, but its concealment.

This distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the deliberations 62 of the Committees on
the Civil Code and Family Law, to wit:

Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be eliminated in the provision on the
grounds for legal separation. Dean Gupit, however, pointed out that in Article 46, they are
talking only of "concealment," while in the article on legal separation, there is actuality. Judge
Diy added that in legal separation, the ground existed after the marriage, while in Article 46,
the ground existed at the time of the marriage. Justice Reyes suggested that, for clarity, they
add the phrase "existing at the time of the marriage" at the end of subparagraph (4). The
Committee approved the suggestion.63

To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its concealment that
serves as a valid ground to annul a marriage.64 Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket
denial, but one that is constitutive of fraud. It is this fundamental element that respondent failed to
prove.

In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a basis for divorce. It indicates that
questions of sexual identity strike so deeply at one of the basic elements of marriage, which is the
exclusive sexual bond between the spouses.65 In Crutcher v. Crutcher,66 the Court held:

Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous indignity to the wife, and which
would make the marriage relation so revolting to her that it would become impossible for her
to discharge the duties of a wife, and would defeat the whole purpose of the relation. In the
natural course of things, they would cause mental suffering to the extent of affecting her
health.67

However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the Philippines, the legal overtones are
significantly different. Divorce is not recognized in the country. Homosexuality and its alleged
incompatibility to a healthy heterosexual life are not sanctioned as grounds to sever the marriage
bond in our jurisdiction. At most, it is only a ground to separate from bed and board.

What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful marital union for more than eleven
(11) years, which produced three (3) children. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
rests on Leonida. Sadly, she failed to discharge this onus.

The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to a vitiated marital consent was found
in Villanueva v. Court of Appeals.68 In Villanueva, instead of proving vitiation of consent, appellant
resorted to baseless portrayals of his wife as a perpetrator of fraudulent schemes. Said the Court:

Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial
court, as in the instant case, are generally binding on this Court. We affirm the findings of the
Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily married private respondent and that no
threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so, thus -

Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not
freely consent to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his
mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and
safety. x x x
 The Court is not convinced that appellant's apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is
not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security
guard in a bank. Given the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to
keep himself out of harm's way. x x x

Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee
that the latter was pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellant's excuse that he
could not have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during their
tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to
his inability to copulate with the appellee. x x x

xxxx

x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of
any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity,
fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to
cohabit with the appellee on any of these grounds, the validity of his marriage must be
upheld.69

Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not only by solely taking into account
petitioner's homosexuality per se and not its concealment, but by declaring the marriage void from its
existence.

This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. 70 The State and the
public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against
desecration by fabricated evidence.71 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of
marriage.

III. In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer and enjoy their community or
conjugal property.

Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute community property, provides:

Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five
years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
without the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and
the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors.

A similar provision, Article 12472 prescribes joint administration and enjoyment in a regime of conjugal
partnership. In a valid marriage, both spouses exercise administration and enjoyment of the property
regime, jointly.

In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the community property of Manuel and
Leonida. In the same breath, the trial court forfeited Manuel's share in favor of the children.
Considering that the marriage is upheld valid and subsisting, the dissolution and forfeiture of Manuel's
share in the property regime is unwarranted. They remain the joint administrators of the community
property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET

ASIDE and the petition in the trial court to annul the marriage is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Almelor v. RTC-Las Pinas, G.R. No. 179620, Aug. 26, 2008

FACTS: Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad
(Leonida) were married on January 29, 1989 and had three children. Manuel and
Leonida are both medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician,
respectively. After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the
RTC in Las Piñas City to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. Leonida that in the
public eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and father but this was not
the case in his private life.  At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh
disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered.  Manuel’s unreasonable
way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their frequent fights as
a couple. Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish
affection Manuel has for his mother. She also alleged that her husband has
concealed from her his homosexuality. She caught him in an indiscreet telephone
conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller. She also found several
pornographic homosexual materials in his possession. And she saw Manuel kissed
another man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales. When she confronted
Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took her children and left their
conjugal abode.  Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their children. Dr.
Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove
Leonida’s claim.  She testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery
of psychiatric tests on Leonida.  She also had a one-time interview with Manuel and
face-to-face. She concluded that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated and such
incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even before the marriage and
appeared to be incurable. Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida’s hostility
against him was their professional rivalry. The trial court nullified the marriage, not on
the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. CA denied the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and
void due to fraud by reason of Manuel’s concealment of his homosexuality.

HELD: Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not

homosexuality per se. Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate
the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at
the time of their marriage.  The lower court considered the public perception of
Manuel’s sexual preference without the corroboration of witnesses.  Also, it took
cognizance of Manuel’s peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality. Even
granting that Manuel is indeed a homosexual, there was nothing in the complaint or
anywhere in the case was it alleged and proven that Manuel hid such sexuality from
Leonida and that Leonida’s consent had been vitiated by such.