1. Heirs of Alberto Suguitan v.

City of Mandaluyong, March 14, 2000

FACTS: On Oct. 13, 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong City issued Resolution No. 396, S-1994
authorizing then Mayor Benjamin B. Abalos to institute expropriation proceedings over the property of
Alberto Suguitan located at Boni Avenue and Sto. Rosario streets in Mandaluyong. Said property is intended to
be utilized for the expansion of the Mandaluyong Medical Center. Mayor Abalos wrote Suguitan a letter dated
January 20, 1995 offering to buy his property, but Suguitan refused to sell.
Consequently, on March 13, 1995, Mandaluyong filed a complaintfor expropriation with the RTC of Pasig
which eventually issued an order for expropriation in favor of Mandaluyong. Petitioners assert that
Mandaluyong may only exercise its delegated power of eminent domain by means of an ordinance as required
by Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), and not by means of a mere resolution.
Respondent contends, however, that it validly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain; that
pursuant to article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the LGC, a resolution is a
sufficient antecedent for the filing of expropriation proceedings with the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioners refute respondent's contention that only a resolution is necessary upon the initiation of
expropriation proceedings and that an ordinance is required only in order to appropriate the funds for the
payment of just compensation, explaining that the resolution mentioned in Article 36 of the IRR is for
purposes of granting administrative authority to the local chief executive to file the expropriation case in court
and to represent the local government unit in such case, but does not dispense with the necessity of an
ordinance for the exercise of the power of eminent domain under Section 19 of the LGC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Mandaluyong can exercise its power of eminent domain by expropriating
petitioner’s lands through a mere resolution and through an ordinance as mandated by the Local
Government Code of 1991.
RULING: NO. The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized
agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be
strictly construed.
It has been held that of two reasonably possible constructions, one which would diminish or restrict
fundamental right of the people and the other of which would not do so, the latter construction must be
adopted so as to allow full enjoyment of such fundamental right.

2. NHA vs. Heirs of Guivelondo

Facts: NHA filed with RTC of Cebu Branch 11 a complaint as amended regarding the eminent domain against
Heirs of Guivelondo docketed as civil case. The petitioner alleged that defendant heirs et. al were the rightful
private owners of the land which the petitioner intends to develop a socialized housing project.

The respondent heirs filed a manifestation of waiving their objections to petitioners power to expropriate
their properties, thereafter trial court declares plaintiff has a right to expropriate the properties of the
defendant heirs and appointed 3 commissioners who ascertain the just compensation of the said properties
be fixed at 11, 200.00 php. per square meter.
Petitioner NHA filed 2 motion for reconsideration that assails inclusion of lots 12, 13 and 19 as well as the
amount of just compensation, however the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial courts
partial judgment but the trial court issued an omnibus order to deny the motion of respondent granting the
petitioner’s motion and of just compensation.

Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. Thereafter, heirs filed a motion for execution
since the trial court move for the entry of the partial judgment as modified by the omnibus order.

The Court of Appeals rendered dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the ground of partial judgment and
omnibus order became a final and executory when petitioner failed to appeal. The petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but then it was denied by the court. The courts of appeals serve on petitioner for a notice of
levy pursuant to writ of Execution and a Notice of third garnishment from the Land bank of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state can be compelled and coerced by the courts to continue with its inherent
power of eminent domain.

Ruling: Yes.
The state as represented by the NHA for housing project can continue its inherent power of eminent
domain provided that the just compensation for the property sought is taken. After the rendition of such
order the plaintiff shouldn’t be permitted to dismiss or discontinue such proceedings except on such terms
of the court be equitable.

The order was final after the non-appealing of the petitioner as the lawful right to expropriate the properties
of respondent heirs of Guivelondo.

3. Mactan v. Lozada, 613 SCRA 618 (Reversion)

FACTS: Subject of this case is a lot (Lot No. 88) located in Lahug, Cebu City. Its original owner was Anastacio
Deiparine when the same was subject to expropriation proceedings, initiated by Republic, represented by the
then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), for the expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport. During
the pendency of the expropriation proceedings, respondent Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr. acquired Lot No. 88 from
Deiparine. The trial court ruled for the Republic and ordered the latter to pay Lozada the fair market value of
the lot.
The CAA assured the previous owners that should the expansion be abandoned, they will be
prioritized in repurchasing the lot. However, the projected improvement and expansion plan of the old Lahug
Airport, however, was not pursued. It was sold to the petitioner and have been used for commercial purposes.
The plaintiff-respondents initiated a complaint for the recovery of possession and reconveyance of ownership
the subject lot since the lot, which was expropriated for the Lahug Airport’s improvement, was abandoned
and have NOT been sold to them.
 On the other hand, the petitioners asked for the immediate dismissal of the complaint. They
specifically denied that the Government had made assurances to reconvey Lot No. 88 to respondents in the
event that the property would no longer be needed for airport operations.
Petitioners instead asserted that the judgment of condemnation was unconditional, and respondents
were, therefore, not entitled to recover the expropriated property notwithstanding non-use or abandonment
thereof.
Petitioners’ argument in SC: argued that the judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881 was absolute and
unconditional, giving title in fee simple to the Republic.
ISSUE: WON Lozada has the right to repurchase their expropriated property.
HELD: YES. It is well settled that the taking of private property by the Government’s power of eminent domain
is subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just
compensation be paid to the property owner.
These requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the
condemnor to keep the property expropriated. If this particular purpose or intent is NOT initiated or NOT at all
pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion
of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the
exercise of the power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required factual justification.

4. Vda. de Ouano vs. Republic

G.R. NO. 168770, 9 FEBRUARY 2011

FACTS:

In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAA’s predecessor agency pursued a program to
expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu City.

As an assurance from the government, there is a promise of reconveyance or repurchase of said property so
long as Lahug ceases its operation or transfer its operation to Mactan – Cebu Airport.

Some owners refused to sell, and that the Civil Aeronautics Administration filed a complaint for the
expropriation of said properties for the expansion of the Lahug Airport.

The trial court then declared said properties to be used upon the expansion of said projects and order for just
compensation to the land owners, at the same time directed the latter to transfer certificate or ownership or
title in the name of the plaintiff.

At the end of 1991, Lahug Airport completely ceased its operation while the Mactan-Cebu airport opened to
accommodate incoming and outgoing commercial flights.
This then prompted the land owners to demand for the reconveynace of said properties being expropriated by
the trial court under the power of eminent domain. Hence these two consolidated cases arise.

In G.R. No. 168812 MCIAA is hereby ordered by court to reconvey said properties to the land owners plus
attorney’s fee and cost of suit, while in G.R. No. 168770, the RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners Oaunos
and against the MCIAA for the reconveynace of their properties but was appealed by the latter and the
earlier decision was reversed, the case went up to the CA but the CA affirmed the reversed decision of the
RTC.

ISSUE:
Should MCIAA reconvey the lands to petitioners?

HELD: YES

The notion that the government via expropriation proceedings acquires unrestricted ownership over or a fee
simple title to the covered land is no longer tenable. Expropriated lands should be differentiated from a piece
of land, ownership of which was absolutely transferred by way of an unconditional purchase and sale contract
freely entered by two parties, one without obligation to buy and the other without the duty to sell. In that
case, the fee simple concept really comes into play. There is really no occasion to apply the “fee simple
concept” if the transfer is conditional.

The taking of a private land in expropriation proceedings is always conditioned on its continued devotion to its
public purpose. Once the purpose is terminated or peremptorily abandoned, then the former owner, if he so
desires, may seek its reversion subject of course to the return at the very least of the just compensation
received.

In expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property against his will. The mandatory requirement of
due process ought to be strictly followed such that the state must show, at the minimum, a genuine need,
an exacting public purpose to take private property, the purpose to be specifically alleged or least
reasonably deducible from the complaint.

Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning to include any use that is
of “usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit [of the public].” If the genuine
public necessity—the very reason or condition as it were—allowing, at the first instance, the expropriation of a
private land ceases or disappears, then there is no more cogent point for the government’s retention of the
expropriated land. The same legal situation should hold if the government devotes the property to another
public use very much different from the original or deviates from the declared purpose to benefit another
private person. It has been said that the direct use by the state of its power to oblige landowners to renounce
their productive possession to another citizen, who will use it predominantly for that citizen’s own private
gain, is offensive to our laws.

The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it pleases and in the
process dishonor the judgment of expropriation. A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant
to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the
new purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if the
latter so desires.

Hence, equity and justice demand the reconveyance by MCIAA of the litigated lands in question to the Ouanos
and Inocians. In the same token, justice and fair play also dictate that the Ouanos and Inocian return to MCIAA
what they received as just compensation for the expropriation of their respective properties plus legal interest
to be computed from default, which in this case should run from the time MCIAA complies with the
reconveyance obligation.

5. Iron and Steel Authority v. CA, 249 SCRA 538

FACTS: Petitioner ISA was created by PD No. 272 in order, generally, to develop and promote the iron and
steel industry.

PD No. 272 initially created ISA for a term of 5 years counting from August 9, 1973. When ISA’s original term
expired on October 10, 1978, its term was extended for another 10 years by EO No. 555 dated August 31,
1979.

The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Development
Corporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by the National Government, embarked on an expansion
program embracing, among other things, the construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. The
construction of such steel mill was considered a priority and major industrial project of the government.
Pursuant to the expansion program of the NSC, Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President of the
Philippines on November 16, 1982 withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public land located in
Iligan City, and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of NSC.
Since certain portions of the aforesaid public land were occupied by a non-operational chemical fertilizer plant
and related facilities owned by Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), LOI No. 1277, also dated
November 16, 1982, was issued directing the NSC to “negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of
the Government, for the compensation of MCFC’s present occupancy rights on the subject land.

ISSUE: WON the Government is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA’s term.

RULING: Yes.
Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributed normally associated with juridical personality.
There is, however, no provision in PD No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing general or comprehensive juridical
personality separate and distinct from that of the government. The ISA in fact appears to the Court to be a
non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the RP, or more precisely of the Government of the Philippines.
It is common knowledge that other agencies or instrumentalities of the Government of the Republic are cast
in corporate form, that is to say, are incorporated agencies or instrumentalities, sometimes with and at other
times without capital stock, and accordingly vested with a juridical personality distinct from the personality of
the Republic.

When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequence of such expiry must be looked for, in the
first instance, in the charters and, by way of supplementation, the provisions of the Corporation Code. Since in
the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties and
functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into the Government and hence assumed
once again by the Republic, no special statutory provision having been shown to have mandated succession
thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic.

In the instant case, ISA substituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as an agent or delegate or
representative of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its authority under PD 272.
The principal or the real party in interest is thus the Republic of the Philippines and not the NSC, even
though the latter may be an ultimate user of the properties involved.

From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation
proceedings in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of
ISA’s statutory term did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.

6. PPI vs COMELEC, GR L-119694 (En Banc) 22 May 1995

FACTS: COMELEC issued resolution 2772 directing newspapers to provide provide free print space of not less
than one half (1/2) page for use as “Comelec Space” which shall be allocated by the Commission, free of
charge, among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to
enable the candidates to make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and
programs of government. Philippine Press Institute, a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and
magazine publishers asks the Court to declare said resolution unconstitutional and void on the ground that it
violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the
taking of private property for public use without just compensation.

The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of Comelec alleged that the resolution does not impose upon the
publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers. It merely established guidelines to be
followed in connection with the procurement of “Comelec space”. And if it is viewed as mandatory, the same
would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State- a permissible exercise of the
power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of
print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible
election.

ISSUE: Whether the resolution was a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain?

HELD: No. The court held that the resolution does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain. To compel print media companies to donate “Comelec-space” amounts to “taking” of private
personal property for public use or purposes without the requisite just compensation. The extent of the
taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint
upon the use of private property. The monetary value of the compulsory “donation,” measured by the
advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may
be very substantial indeed.

The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use are the necessity for the taking
and the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by
respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at
their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to
buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated,
that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative
authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and administration of election
laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed.

The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without
payment of “just compensation” (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying
compensation for “Comelec space” is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission.

7. Telebap v. COMELEC – 289 SCRA 337

FACTS: Section 92 of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 881, as amended, reads as follows:

Sec. 92. Comelec time. — The commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as “Comelec
Time” which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all
radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations
are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of the
campaign.
Petitioners contend that §92 of BP Blg. 881 violates the due process clause and the eminent domain provision
of the Constitution by taking airtime from radio and television broadcasting stations without payment of just
compensation. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the
sale of airtime to advertisers and that to require these stations to provide free airtime is to authorize a taking
which is not “a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property.” According to
petitioners, in 1992, the GMA Network, Inc. lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free airtime of one (1) hour every
morning from Mondays to Fridays and one (1) hour on Tuesdays and Thursdays from 7:00 to 8:00 p.m. (prime
time) and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lose P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that
radio and television stations provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for the COMELEC Time.

ISSUE: Is Section 92 of BP. Blg. 881 violative of the due process clause and unlawful taking of private property
for public use without just compensation?

HELD: NO.

Petitioners’ argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is
licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who
want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other
things, to amendment by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that “any such franchise
or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common
good so requires.”

8. Heirs of the Estate of JBL Reyes vs City of Manila

February 13, 2004

FACTS:
Petitioners acquired a favorable judgment of eviction against respondents Abiog and Maglonso. In 1998, the
said judgments became final and executory. Consequently, writs of execution were issued.

During the pendency of the complaints for unlawful detainer, respondent City filed a case for the
expropriation of the same properties involved in the ejectment cases.

The trial court allowed respondent City to take possession of the property; it denied the motions for
intervention and injunction, and, after allowing respondent City to oppose the motion to dismiss, dismissed
the complaint for expropriation.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and found that respondent City properly exercised its
right to expropriate the subject properties.
Petitioners appealed the CA decision to this Court. Thereafter, on motion of respondent occupants, the Court
of Appeals issued protective orders that required the parties to maintain the status quo (prohibiting any
ejectment) pending this Court’s resolution of the appeal.

Petitioner now questions the legality of the CA’s expropriation order and the propriety of its act enjoining the
execution of the final judgments in the ejectment cases.

Issue: whether or not the intended expropriation by the City of Cebu of a 4,048-square-meter parcel of land
owned by petitioners contravenes the Constitution and applicable laws.

Held: Yes. The SC have found nothing in the records indicating that the City of Cebu complied strictly with
Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate petitioners property without any
attempt to first acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of Section 9 of RA 7279. Likewise, Cebu City failed to
establish that the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of RA 7279 were first exhausted. Moreover, prior to
the passage of Ordinance No. 1843, there was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy petitioners
property as required by Section 19 of RA 7160.[20] We therefore find Ordinance No. 1843 to be
constitutionally infirm for being violative of the petitioners right to due process.

9. DIOSDADO LAGCAO, vs. JUDGE GENEROSA G. LABRA and CITY OF CEBU

G.R. No. 155746, October 13, 2004

Facts:
The Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. But then, in late 1965, the 210 lots, including Lot
1029, reverted to the Province of Cebu. Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of Lot 1029 by the
City of Cebu to the petitioners. This prompted the latter to sue the province for specific performance and
damages in the then Court of First Instance.

The court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the Province of Cebu to execute the final deed of sale
in favor of petitioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that it was already occupied
by squatters. Thus petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters. The Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCC’s
decision and issued a writ of execution and order of demolition.
However, when the demolition order was about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two
lettersto the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the ground that the City was still looking
for a relocation site for the squatters. Acting on the mayor’s request, the MTCC issued two orders suspending
the demolition. Unfortunately for petitioners, during the suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP)
of Cebu City passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279.
Petitioners filed with the RTC an action for declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 1843 for being
unconstitutional.
Issue:
WON the Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation of their property for the
purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the concept of “public use” contemplated in the
Constitution.

Ruling: Yes.

Under Section 48 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, local legislative power
shall be exercised by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the city. The legislative acts of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod in the exercise of its lawmaking authority are denominated ordinances.

Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly
authorized by the legislature. By virtue of RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local government units the
power to expropriate.

Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of petitioners’ lot was enacted by the SP of Cebu City
to provide socialized housing for the homeless and low-income residents of the City.

However, while we recognize that housing is one of the most serious social problems of the country, local
government units do not possess unbridled authority to exercise their power of eminent domain in seeking
solutions to this problem.

There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1) no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws; and (2) private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Thus, the
exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain is not absolute. In fact, Section 19 of RA
7160 itself explicitly states that such exercise must comply with the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws.

10. Greater Balanga v. Municipality of Balanga, 239 SCRA 436

This case involves a parcel of land, situated in Barrio San Jose, Municipality of Balanga, Province of Bataan.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation owned and controlled by the Camacho family, which donated the present
site of Balanga Public Market to the Municipality. The lot in dispute is behind the said market.
Petitioner discovered portions of the property had been “unlawfully usurped and invaded” by the
Municipality, which “allowed/tolerated/abetted” construction of shanties and market stalls, while charging
market fees and entrance fees from occupant and users of the area.

Petitioner applied for a permit to operate a business, which was revoked soon by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Balanga. Petitioner then filed a case, praying for the reinstatement of the permit, or a prohibitory injunction
on the revoking of the said permit.

Respondents argued that the Mayor may issue, deny or revoke municipal licenses and permits. The revoking
of the permit was a legitimate xcercise of local legislative authority, therefore making it not tainted with any
grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioner argued that since it had not violated any law or ordinance, there was no reason to revoke the
Mayor’s permit. Petitioner alleged that the respondent violated due process in revoking the permit, and
challenged the legality of the collection of market and entrance fees.

The revoking of the permit was based on a Civil Case, pertaining to the subdivision of the property into nine
lots. The property was originally owned by Camacho, donated the land to her daughter Aurora, which
donation was canceled and was transferred to the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is the owner of the property

RULING: YES. The case involving ownership of the property had already been settled with finality by the
Supreme Court. When the Mayor’s permit was revoked, five years had elapsed since the case was decided.
Petition was able to survey the land and have the survey approved. Petitioner even obtained a title in its name
for the property. Clearly, for all intents and purposes, petitioner appeared to be the true owned of the
property when respondents revoked its permit to engage business in its own land.

Until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court, the landowner cannot be deprived of its right over
the land. Of course, the Sangguniang Bayan has the duty in the exercise of its police powers to regulate any
business subject to municipal license fees and prescribe the conditions under which a municipal license
already issued may be revoked.

But the "anxiety, uncertainty, restiveness" among the stallholders and traders cannot be a valid ground for
revoking the permit of petitioner. After all, the stallholders and traders were doing business on property not
belonging to the Municipal government. Indeed, the claim that the executive order and resolution were
measures "designed to promote peace and order and protect the general welfare of the people of Balanga" is
too amorphous and convenient an excuse to justify respondents' acts.
Since respondent Municipality is not the owner of the disputed property, there is no legal basis for it to
impose and collect market fees and market entrance fees. Only the owner as the right to do so.

11. Velarma v. CA, 252 SCRA 406 – cannot be found

12. SOLANDA ENTERPRISES, INC. VS COURT OF APPEALS AND LUIS MANLUTAC

FACTS:
Private Respondent Luis Manlutac living for 40 years in his residence and as tenants/lessees from land of the
Quijanos situated in Tondo, Manila.

Original owners, Quijanos sold thru a Deed of Absolute Sale the realty to Solanda Enterprises Inc without
giving the the private respondent and other tenants the chance to exercise their pre-emptive rights as
accorded to them by PD No. 1517, subject lots being declared urbanized lands.

Cerefina Quijano made an offer to private respondent and the other tenants for the sale of the subject estate.
Tenants including private respondents agreed and send a letter to Quijano informing her their acceptance of
proposed sale for PhP2,000 per square meter. Quijano advice tenants and private respondents the Petitioner
is the new owner of the property and payment of monthly rental should be made to Solanda Enterprises Inc
starting July 1, 1991.

Tenants and private respondents filed with the RTC complaint against Quijano and Solanda for annulment of
sale, reconveyance and damages. RTC rendered decisionunnulling the deed of sale.

Solanda Enterprises Inc filed with Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila a complaint of ejectmentagainst private
respondent. Manlutac incurred rental arrearages amounting to PhP1,368.
Judgement rendered in favor of Solanda Enterprises Inc. And ordering private respondent and all persons
claiming right and title under him to vacate the property.

ISSUES:
W/N THERE IS EXPROPRIATION IN THIS CASE

RULING: NO. Ordinance No. 7806 of the City of Manila, "Authorizing the Honorable City Mayor to Work for
the Acquisition, Either by Negotiation or Expropriation, of a Parcel of Land . . . Owned by Juan O.
Quijano . . .," expresses merely an intent to expropriate the land in dispute. Said Ordinance does not show
that the disputed land, when expropriated, will be awarded or sold to the private Respondent. It does not
demonstrate or touch upon private respondent’s right of possession over the disputed land. It is, at best,
speculative and not a bar to an action for ejectment.
13. Republic of the Philippines v. salem investment corporation

Facts:

On February 17, 1983, BP 340 passed authorizing expropriation of parcels of land in the names of defendants
in this case, including a portion of land consisting of 1, 380 sq. m. that belonged to Milagros and De la Rama.
On December 14, 1988, Milagros and De la Rama entered into a contract with Guerrero to sell the entire
property consisting of 4, 075 sq. m. for P11, 800, 000.00. The De la Ramas received P2, 200, 000.00 as partial
payment. Nov. 3, 1989, Guerrero filed with RTC a complaint for specific performance to proceed with the sale.

While the specific performance case was pending, the Republic filed a case for expropriation pursuant to BP
Blg 340. Guerrero filed motion for intervention stating that the De la Ramas had already agreed to sell him the
entire Lot 834. Trial court ruled in favor of Guerrero as the rightful owner of 920 sq. m. property and ordered
payment to him of just compensation. Decision affirmed by CA.

De la Rama Contention: They should receive the amount of just compensation because when they agreed to
sell Lot 834 to Guerrero, it did not include the property expropriated by the Republic. At the time, the portion
had been expropriated by the government via B.P. Blg. 340 on February 17, 1983.

Guerrero Contention: The title to the expropriated portion did not immediately pass to the government upon
B.P. Blg. 340 since the payment of just compensation was not yet made. Petitioners still owned the land when
they sold it to Guerrero. Being the owner, he has the right to receive just compensation.

ISSUE: Who between the De la Ramas and Guerrero is/are entitled to receive payment of just compensation
for the taking of 920 square meters of land in question?

RULING: GUERRERO
Guerrero should receive payment for just compensation. Completion of expropriation is only after the
completion of the two stages (Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia). First stage – determination of authority and
propriety of its exercise; second stage – determination by court of just compensation for the property
sought to be taken.

The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. It is settled that although the right to
expropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry, title to the property taken
remains in the owner until payment is actually made.
Application: first stage of expropriation completed when B.P. Blg. 340 was enacted to provide the
expropriation of 1, 380 sq. m. of land. Constitutionality upheld by Republic v. De Knecht. 1990, commenced
second stage of expropriation through the filing of a petition for the determination of just compensation.
Second stage was not completed because of the intervention of Guerrero. The title at that point did not pass
to the government.

Argument of De la Ramas that the two stages only apply to judicial expropriation, not to legislative
expropriation is untenable. Congress cannot arbitrarily take land. No need to distinguish between judicial
and legislative expropriation as far as the two stages mentioned are concerned.

Regarding the exclusion of the expropriated property from the deed and the contract, the argument is
untenable. The land described in the Contract to Sell included the land expropriated under BP Blg. 340.
According to the Deed of Absolute Sale, the deed states that the entire property consisting of 4, 075 sq. m.
was being sold free from all liens and encumbrances except the lien in favor of the government over the
portion it is expropriating – Guerrero bought the entire property that was free from claims of other parties,
except the government.

De la Rama contention that the ownership of the land was transferred to government because the equitable
and beneficial title was already acquired in 1983 is not meritorious because in Association of Small
Landowners in the Phil. Inc v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, title of property taken remains in the owner
until payment is actually made.

14. REPUBLIC VS. VDA. DE CASTELLVI

GR # L-20620 August 15, 1974 (Constitutional Law – Eminent Domain, Elements of Taking)

FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government in 1947
refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the assessment
of just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease
commenced and not when the proceedings begun.

The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government commenced to occupy the
said land as lessee because the essential elements of the “taking” of property under the power of eminent
domain, namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a
momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.

ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has entered and occupied
the property as lessee.
HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959.

The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for more than a
momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise
informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.

In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied the
property under a contract of lease.

15. Garcia v. CA – 102 SCRA 597

FACTS:National Power Corporation occupied portions of two lots for construction of steel towers and lies. The
lots were designated as Block 19 in the sketch plan, and NPC had not paid anything for the portion occupied,
either as rental or purchase price.

The two lots were surveyed for conversion into a subdivision for residential purposes. Block 19, as was
occupied by the NPC, as not subdivided due to the steel towers and power lines of the NPC, which made it
dangerous for residential purposes.

The NPC instituted an action for expropriation of a ‘right-of-way easement’ over a portion of the two lots. The
entire area to be expropriated was adjacent to Block 19. The area was to be used for construction and
maintenance of the power lines that were made in Block 19. They offered to pay them easement fees for such.

ISSUE: Whether or not Block 19 was subjected to expropriation;

RULING:NO.

To constitute "taking for purposes of eminent domain the ff: circumstances must concur:
1) the expropriator must enter upon the private property;
2) the entrance must not be for a momentary period, that is, the entrance must be permanent;
3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected;
and
5) the utilization of the property must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property;
In respondent’s answer, it was alleged that the construction of the lines were with permission of petitioner’s
father. The title of the document was “PERMISSION TO OCCUPY LAND” which grants privilege to respondent,
subject to the terms and conditions in the document.

As respondent’s entry was gained through permission, there was no intention to acquire ownership by
voluntary purchase nor eminent domain. Respondent had not even completed negotiation, yet it still
constructed another line without defendant’s permission nor court authorization. These prove that
respondent did not seek to expropriate nor even have to intention to do so on Block 19.

Consequently, since the areas covered by Block 19 were never entered into or possessed for purposes of
eminent domain, nor did they become the subject of an action for eminent domain, neither the date of entry
nor the filing of the action by private respondent for expropriation of a "right-of-way" easement on December
8, 1969 could be reckoned with as the basis for the determination of just compensation.

In the peculiar circumstances of the case at bar, there being no taking of the property in question for
purposes of eminent domain nor condemnation proceedings instituted over the same to speak of, the
market value should be fixed at the time the trial court made the order of expropriation.

16. City Government of Quezon vs. Judge Ericta GR No. L-34915 June 24, 1983

Facts: An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the the regulation ofestablishment of
private cemeteries in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of the total area of the private memorial
park shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of QC.

Himlayang Pilipino, a private memorial park, contends that the taking or confiscation of property restricts the
use of property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all
beneficial use of his property. It also contends that the taking is not a valid exercise of police power, since the
properties taken in the exercise of police power are destroyed and not for the benefit of the public.

Issue: Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private property

Ruling: No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property. The ordinace is
actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who
are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaing a public cemeteries. State's
exercise of the power of expropriation requires payment of just compensation. Passing the ordinance without
benefiting the owner of the property with just compensation or due process, would amount to unjust taking of
a real property. Since the property that is needed to be taken will be used for the public's benefit, then the
power of the state to expropriate will come forward and not the police power of the state.
17. United States v. Causby
328 U.S. 256
Eminent Domain – Navigable Airspace

FACTS:
Respondent Thomas Lee Causby owned a property, wherein he resided and invested in a chicken farm, near a
municipal airport in Greensboro, North Carolina. The airport was used regularly by the United States military.
The safe path of glide to one of the runways of the airport passed directly over respondents' property at 83
feet, which was 67 feet above the house, 63 feet above the barn and 18 feet above the highest tree. It was
used 4% of the time in taking off and 7% of the time in landing. The Government leased the use of the airport
for a term of one month commencing June 1, 1942, with a provision for renewals until June 30, 1967, or six
months after the end of the national emergency, whichever was earlier. Various military aircraft of the United
States used the airport.

They frequently came so close to respondents' property that they barely missed the tops of trees, the noise
was startling, and the glare from their landing lights lighted the place up brightly at night. This destroyed the
use of the property as a chicken farm, according to Causby, noise from the airport regularly frightened the
animals on his farm, resulting in the deaths of several chickens. The problem became so severe that Causby
was forced to abandon his business. Furthermore, respondent also claim that it caused loss of sleep,
nervousness, and fright on the part of respondents. Under an ancient doctrine of the common law, land
ownership extended to the space above and below the earth.

Using this doctrine as a basis, Causby sued the United States, arguing that he owned the airspace above his
farm. By flying planes in this airspace, he argued, the government had confiscated his property without
compensation. The United States Court of Claims accepted Causby's argument, and ordered the government
to pay compensation.

ISSUES:

Whether respondent’s chicken farm had been taken without compensation

HELD:
YES. Yes. But the case is remanded for a determination of the value of the easement and whether the
easement was permanent or temporary.

The court noted the common law doctrine of ownership of land extending to the sky above the land. However,
the court notes that an act of Congress had given the United States exclusive national sovereignty over the air
space. The court noted that common sense made the common law doctrine inapplicable.
However, the court found that the common law doctrine did not control the present case. The United States
had conceded in oral argument that if flights over the Respondents’ property rendered it uninhabitable then
there would be a taking compensable under the Fifth Amendment. The measure of the value of the property
taken is the owner’s loss, not the taker’s gain.

The airspace is a public highway. But it is obvious that if the landowner is to have the full enjoyment of his
land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. If this were not
true then landowners could not build buildings, plant trees or run fences.

The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain. The court does
not set the precise limits of the line of demarcation. Flights over private land are not a taking, unless, like here,
they are so low and frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment of the land. The
Court of Claims must, upon remand, determine the value of the easement and whether it is a temporary or
permanent easement.

General Rule
The airspace is a public highway,

Exception
But if the landowner is to have the full enjoyment of his land, he must have exclusive control over the
immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere.

18. PEOPLE V. FAJARDO

FACTS: Fajardo and Babilonia (son-in law) are charged with violation of Ordinance 7 Series of 1950 of the
Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur which penalizes a person who constructs a building without permit from
the mayor.

After his incumbency, Fajardo applied for a permit to build a building beside the gasoline station near the
town plaza. His request was repeatedly denied due to the reason that it “hinders the view of travelers from
the National Highway to the public plaza”.

Appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of
residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been
living on leased property.

Appellants were charged and convicted by peace court of Baoo for violating such ordinance.

ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 7 is a valid exercise police power in its regulation of property.
HELD: NO. The ordinance doesn’t state any standard that limits the grant of power to the mayor. It is an
arbitrary and unlimited conferment.

The subject ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor’s action.
The standards of the ordinance are entirely lacking making it unreasonable and oppressive, hence, not a
valid ordinance. While property may be regulated to the interest of the general welfare, and the state may
eliminate structures offensive to the sight, the state may not permanently divest owners of the beneficial
use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance
of the community.

Fajardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be used for urban purposes. To do this legally,
there must be just compensation and they must be given an opportunity to be heard.

An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable
purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property.

Hence, the conviction of herein appellants is reversed, and said accused are acquitted, with costs de oficio.

19. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PLDT,

26 SCRA 620 (1969)

FACTS: Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right of the Bureau of
Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the Government Telephone System and that of
PLDT, so that the Government Telephone System could make use of the lines and facilities of the PLDT. Private
respondent contends that it cannot be compelled to enter into a contract where no agreement is had
between them.

ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can be a valid
object for expropriation.

HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may require the
telephone company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require, subject
to the payment of just compensation. The use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection
between the both telephone systems, through expropriation can be a subject to an easement of right of
way.

20. National Power Corporation v Judge Jocson 206 SCRA 520 (1992)
MP: “expropriation case – amt. for just compensation in dispute – judge held in abeyance the write of
possession order due to petitioner while increasing outright provisional value of land without hearing.”

Facts: The petitioner files a special civil action for certiorari to annul the order issued by respondent judge in
violation of deprivation of the right of the petitioner for due process. The petitioner filed 7 eminent domain
cases in the acquisition of right of way easement over 7 parcels of land in relation to the necessity of building
towers and transmission line for the common good with the offer of corresponding compensation to
landowners affected with the expropriation process. However, both parties did not come to an agreement on
just compensation thereby prompting petitioner to bring the eminent domain case. Respondent judge found
existing paramount public interest for the expropriation and thereby issued an order determining the
provisional market value of the subject areas based on tax declaration of the properties. The petitioner, in
compliance to the order of respondent judge, deposited corresponding amount of the assessed value of said
lands in the amount of P23,180,828.00 with the Philippine National Bank.

Respondents land owners filed motion for reconsideration asserting that the assessed value is way too low
and that just compensation due them is estimated as P29,970,000.00. Immediately the following day,
respondent judge increased the provisional value to that stated in the motion for reconsideration and ordered
petitioner to deposit the differential amount within 24 hours from receipt of order while holding in abeyance
the writ of possession order pending compliance to said order which the petitioner immediately complied.
Thereafter, respondent judge ordered petitioner to pay in full amount the defendants for their expropriated
property. Petitioner assailed such order to be in violation of due process and abuse of discretion on the part of
the respondent judge hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion and whether or not the
petitioner was deprived of due process of law.

Held: YES. The court ruled that PD No. 42 provides that upon filing in court complaints on eminent domain
proceeding and after due notice to the defendants, plaintiff will have the right to take possession of the real
property upon deposit of the amount of the assessed value with PNB to be held by the bank subject to orders
and final disposition of the court. The respondent judge failed to observe this procedure by failure to issue
the writ of possession to the petitioner despite its effort to deposit the amount in compliance to the
mandate of law. Furthermore, the respondent judge erred in increasing the provisional value of properties
without holding any hearing for both parties. The instant petition was granted by the court setting aside the
temporary restraining order and directing respondent judge to cease and desist from enforcing his orders.

There are 2 stages in the action of expropriation:

1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety
of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit.
2. Eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of the "just compensation for
the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners whose findings are deemed to be final.

21. Penn Central Transportation v. NY City 438 US 104

FACTS: In 1968, the PCT Co, applied to the New York Landmarks Preservation Commission for a certificate of
appropriateness in order to construct a 50-storey office building over the Grand Central Terminal. The
Commission denied the application on Grounds that the proposed office building would overwhelm and
otherwise interfere with the historic and aesthetic integrity of the landmark-designated terminal building. The
plaintiffs filed suit against the Commission alleging that its application of NYC Landmark preservation law had
effected a taking of property without just compensation and deprived owners of their property without due
process

Issue: W/n the commission’s application violated petitioner’s right to the fifth amendment, for just
compensation?

Ruling: No. In federal US Law, A city can restrict property development near a landmark in order to preserve it
without needing to pay compensation to the property owners.

22. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. - 467 U.S. 986, 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984)
Respondent pesticide manufacturer applied for a license to sell and distribute various insecticides with
petitioner U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. As part of the application process, respondent submitted
various data and trade secrets, on which petitioner relied when considering other manufacturer's applications.
Petitioner enacted regulations that would make respondent's trade secrets public and respondent filed suit,
arguing that publishing its trade secrets would constitute a "taking," and it was entitled to just compensation.
The lower court held that respondent was entitled to file suit for compensation under the Tucker Act. On
appeal, the court reversed holding that a suit could be filed for only the portion of its trade secrets in which it
had a "reasonable investment-backed expectation."
ISSUE: Are trade-secrets property rights protected by the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

RULING: YES. The Court held that trade secrets were property that was protectable under the U.S. Const.
amend. V, Taking Clause. The Court determined, however, that trade secrets were entitled to compensation
only when there was a "reasonable investment-backed expectation," and found that only a portion of the data
submitted was entitled to protection. The Court concluded by stating that petitioner was able to file suit under
the Tucker Act for compensation, and therefore, refused to order just compensation under the U.S. Const.
amend. V, Taking Clause.
23. NPC v. Manubay – 437 SCRA 60

In 1996, [Petitioner] NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, a government-owned and controlled corporation

created for the purpose of undertaking the development and generation of hydroelectric power, commenced
its 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project. The project aims to transmit the excess electrical
generating capacity coming from Leyte Geothermal Plant to Luzon and various load centers to interconnect
the entire country into a single power grid. Apparently, the project is for a public purpose. "In order to carry
out this project, it is imperative for the transmission lines to cross over certain lands owned by private
individualsand entities.
One of these lands, only a portion will be traversed by the transmission lines, is owned by MANUBAY AGRO-
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION." Hence, on 03 December 1996, filed a complaint for expropriation
before the Regional Trial Court of Naga City against in order to acquire an easement of right of way over the
land which the latter owns. The said land is situated at Km. 8, Barangay Pacol, Naga City, Camarines Sur and
described with more particularity, as follows: "On 02 January 1997, [respondent] filed its answer.

Thereafter, the court a quo issued an order dated 20 January 1997 authorizing the immediate issuance of a
writ of possession and directing Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff to immediately place in possession of the subject
land. Likewise, for the purpose of determining the fair and just compensation due to [respondent], the court
appointed three commissioners. "Accordingly, the commissioners submitted their individual
appraisal/valuation reports recommended the price of P115.00 per
square meter. On the other hand, Commissioner Bulao, recommended the price of P550.00 per square meter.
the total amount of P12,628,940.50 for the entire area affected

ISSUE: W/N NPC may acquire an easement over the land.

Ruling: YES. An action for a right of way filed by an electric power company for the construction of
transmission lines falls within the scope of the power of eminent domain.

24. NPC v. San Pedro – 503 SCRA 333

Facts: Petitioner for the construction of its Transmission Line and Tower negotiated with respondent for an
easement of right of way over her property. respondent executed a Right of Way Grant in favor of NPC. The
payment voucher for the residential portion of the lot valued was then processed. However, the NPC Board of
Directors approved Board Resolution stating that it would pay only for easement over agricultural lands, adopt
median or average if there are several amounts involved. NPC filed a complaint for eminent domain in the RTC
against Maria and other landowners. According to NPC, in order to construct and maintain its Northwestern
Luzon Transmission Line Project it was necessary to acquire several lots for an easement of right of way. The
RTC rendered judgment, declaring as well-grounded, fair and reasonable the compensation for the property.
NPC appealed the amended decision to the CA, asserting that the lower court gravely erred in fixing the just
compensation for Respondents. the CA rendered judgment dismissing the appeal, NPC filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which the CA denied, Hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether the Right of way easement resulting to the deprivation of use of the property is considered a
taking.

Held: Yes, The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land
traversed by transmission lines, as in the present case, also falls within the ambit of the term
“expropriation.” While it is true that petitioner only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless
perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff
upon defendants that below said transmission lines. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain
results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent
reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned
property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through
expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right-of-way.”

25. NPC v. Tianco – 514 SCRA 674

Facts: Herein respondents are the owners of a parcel of land in Barangay Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal and
registered in their names. petitioner NPC requires the respondents’ aforementioned property, across which its
500Kv Kalayaan-San Jose Transmission Line Project will traverse. NPC’s Segregation Plan for the purpose
shows that the desired right-of-way will cut through the respondents’ land. After repeated unsuccessful
negotiations with the respondents, NPC filed with the RTC a complaint for expropriation against them which
the RTC issued Condemnation Order, granting NPC the right to take possession of the area sought to be
expropriated.

Which RTC subsequently ordered directing NPC to pay and deposit with the Rizal Provincial Treasurer an
amount representing the temporary provisional value of the area subject of the expropriation prior to the
possession. The RTC rendered judgment expropriating in favor of [NPC] a parcel of land covering a total area
and ordered the amount of P40,594.07 as just compensation for the 19,423 square meters of land affected by
the expropriations; and the amount of P324,750.00 as reasonable compensation for the improvements on the
land expropriated.

The respondents moved for reconsideration, presenting for the first time a document entitled “BIR Circular of
Appraisal,” which shows that for the year 1985, 1992, 1994 that the lands valued at ₱30.00, ₱80.00, ₱100.00
per square meter respectively. NPC and the respondents went on appeal to the CA whereat the separate
appeals who modified the decision of the RTC that the compensation awarded for the 19,423 square meters
of land affected is increased to ₱116,538.00, and the reasonable compensation for the improvements thereon
is likewise increased to P325,025.00.
Issue: Whether the Just Compensation Is it to be based on the 1984 or the 1993 valuation?

Held: No. Neither of the two determinations made by the the CA and RTC is therefore correct. A new one
must be arrived at, taking into consideration the foregoing pronouncements.

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. In this case, this simply means the property’s fair market value at the time of the filing of the
complaint, or “that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing
but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor.” The measure is not
the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss.

In the determination of such value, the court is not limited to the assessed value of the property or to the
schedule of market values determined by the provincial or city appraisal committee; these values consist
but one factor in the judicial valuation of the property. The nature and character of the land at the time of
its taking is the principal criterion for determining how much just compensation should be given to the
landowner All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, as well as its improvements
and capabilities, should be considered.

26. LBP v. Imperial – 515 SCRA 449

FACTS: Respondent Juan H. Imperial owned five parcels of land with a total area of 156.1000 hectares, located
in Barangay Pawa, Manito, Albay. Pursuant to the Land Reform Program under Presidential Decree No. 27 and
Executive Order No. 228, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed these lands under its Operation
Land Transfer (OLT). On October 21, 1972, the lands were distributed to deserving farmer beneficiaries.

On July 20, 1994, Imperial filed a complaint for determination and payment of just compensation against
petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines, the DAR, and the farmer beneficiaries. The case was docketed as
Agrarian Case No. 94-01 and raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 3, as Special Agrarian
Court.

During the course of the trial, the court created a commission to examine, investigate and ascertain facts
relevant to the dispute including the lands' valuation. On June 21, 1996, the commission submitted a report8
containing the following findings: (1) the lands were not first-class riceland; (2) the irrigation came from a
creek which depended on rains; (3) the harvest was once a year; (4) about fifteen hectares were devoted to
non-fruit bearing coconut trees; (5) approximately five hectares were upland rice while the rest of the area
was uncultivated; and (6) the lands were rolling hills, the commission fixed the just compensation at
P2,012.50/hectare, for a total of P314,151.25. Imperial vigorously objected to the valuation.
ISSUE: whether a 6% annual interest should be included in computing the just compensation; and (2) whether
the areas used as feeder road, right of way, and barrio site should be considered as compensable.

RULING:

(1) NO. since just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be
paid to the owners of the land, but also its payment within a reasonable time from the taking of the
land, The SC thinks that the appellate court correctly imposed an interest in the nature of damages
for the delay. In line with current jurisprudence, it shall set the legal interest at 12% per annum.

(2) YES. In this case, we are not unaware that the areas used as feeder road, right of way, and barrio site,
effectively deprived respondent of the ordinary and beneficial use of his property or of its value. Although
such areas were not strictly used for agricultural purposes, the same were diverted to public use. For this
reason, we are of the view that respondent should be compensated for what he actually lost and that should
include not only the areas distributed directly to the tenant beneficiaries but also those areas used as feeder
road, right of way, and barrio site, which were undoubtedly diverted to the use of the public. The only area
that ought to be excluded is the portion or portions retained by the respondent as owner-cultivator for his
own use.

27. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, vs. DR. ANTERO BONGBONG And ROSARIO BONGBONG,
G.R. No. 164079, April 4, 2007

Facts:
Spouses Antero and Rosario Bongbong are the registered owners parcel of land situated at Barangay
Sambulawan, Villaba, Leyte. As early as 1996, the National Power Corporation (NPC) negotiated with the
spouses Bongbong to use a portion of the property for the construction of a 230 KV LCIP Malitbog-Tabango
CETL TWR SITE 1046 for the Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project. When the spouses Bongbong agreed, NPC
occupied a 25,100-sq-m portion of the property.

NPC paid the spouses Bongbong representing the value of the improvements that were damaged by the
construction of the project. The voucher for the payment of easement fee was prepared. However, when NPC
offered a check representing 10% of the total market value of the area affected as payment for the easement
fee, Antero refused to accept the amount and demanded that NPC pay the full value of the 25,100-sq-m
portion it had occupied.

The spouses Bongbong demanded that the NPC pay P8,748,448.00 which they alleged to be the just and
reasonable value for their land and improvements. The refusal of NPC to heed their demands prompted the
spouses Bongbong to file a complaint for just compensation before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Palompon, Leyte.

Issue:
Whether petitioner is obliged to pay the full value of the property taken or easement fee only

Ruling: Yes.

Just compensation is the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to
sell, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. This rule holds true when the property is
taken before the filing of an expropriation suit, and even if it is the property owner who brings the action
for compensation. The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion for
determining how much just compensation should be given to the landowner. In determining just
compensation, all the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and
capabilities, should be considered.

In the present case, the trial court determined just compensation without considering the differences in the
nature and character or condition of the property compared to the other properties in the province which
petitioner had purchased. It simply relied on the fact that petitioner paid P300.00 per sq m to the other
landowners whose lands had been taken as a result of the construction of transmission lines. But a perusal
of the Deeds of Sale shows that the properties covered by the transmission lines are located in the
municipalities of Kananga, Leyte or Tabango, Leyte, while the subject property is located in Villaba, Leyte; the
Deeds of Sale describe the properties as industrial, residential/commercial, while the tax declaration of the
subject property describes it as "agricultural." Petitioner consistently pointed out these differences and the
trial court should not have ignored them. It must be stressed that although the determination of the amount
of just compensation is within the court’s discretion, it should not be done arbitrarily or capriciously. It must
be based on all established rules, upon correct legal principles and competent evidence.

28. Tan v. Republic - 423 SCRA 203

FACTS: Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Pulang Lupa, Las Piñas City. She
acquired this property from the San Antonio Development Corporation (SADC) as shown by a document
whereby she assumed SADC’s “obligation of paying all imposable taxes due said land.” In consideration of such
assumption and “for value” she “stepped into the shoes” of SADC “free to exercise such rights and
prerogatives as owner of the subject property, including the right to collect and demand payment for the sale
and/or use of the subject land or any portion thereof, by and from any person or entity.”

The Public Estates Authority (PEA), a government-owned and controlled corporation, is representing in this
case the Republic of the Philippines.
Prior to the transfer of the property, PEA wrote SADC requesting permission to enter the latter’s property for
the purpose of constructing thereon the southern abutment of the Zapote Bridge at the Coastal Road. PEA
also proposed to SADC to start their negotiation for its acquisition of the latter’s property.

ISSUE: WON PEA can expropriate the property.

RULING: No.

In City of Manila v. Estrada, we held that “compensation” means “an equivalent for the value of land
(property) taken.” The use of the word “just” is “to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the
property taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample.”

The CA, in its challenged Decision, held that PEA’s taking of petitioner’s property occurred in 1985.

The CA is wrong. PEA’s entry into the property with the permission of SADC, its previous owner, was not for
the purpose of expropriating the property.

Since 1985 up to the present, no agreement has been reached between PEA and SADC or herein petitioner
who acquired the property from the latter.

While PEA has been earning huge toll fees, it has refused to pay petitioner any compensation for the use of
her property in violation of her right as an owner.

The above circumstances clearly show that when PEA entered petitioner’s land in 1985, it was not for the
purpose of expropriating it.

Section 2, Rule 67 (on Expropriation) of the same Rules provides, among others, that upon the filing of the
complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to
take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government
depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property. It bears reiterating that in Republic v.
Vda. de Castellvi,17 we ruled that just compensation is determined as of the date of the taking of the property
or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first.

29. NPC v. Ibrahim, et al., - Eminent Domain

G.R. No. 168732, June 29, 2007
FACTS: The NPC constructed underground tunnels on the property of the respondents without their
knowledge and consent and without any expropriation proceeding. It contended that it constructed an
easement on the property.

ISSUE: Was there taking of the property considering that the owners were deprived of their beneficial use and
enjoyment of the same, hence, entitled to just compensation?

RULING: Yes. The manner in which the easement was created by the NPC, violated the due process rights of
the owners as it was without notice and indemnity to them and did not go through proper expropriation
proceedings. NPC could have, at any time, validly exercised the power of eminent domain to acquire the
easement over the property as this power encompasses not only the taking or appropriation of title to and
possession of the expropriated property but likewise covers even the imposition of a mere burden upon the
owner of the condemned property. (Rep. v. PLDT, 136 Phil. 20 (1969)). Significantly, though, landowners
cannot be deprived of their right over their land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. The
court must then see to it that the taking is for pubic use, that there is payment of just compensation and that
there is due process of law.

30. NPC v. Purefoods – 565 SCRa 17

Facts: Petitioner is a government-owned and controlled corporation created by virtue of RA 6395, empowered
to acquire property incident to or necessary, convenient or proper to carry out the purposes for which it was
created, enter private property in the lawful performance of its business purposes provided that the owners of
such private property shall be indemnified for any damage that may be caused thereby, and exercise the right
of eminent domain.

To construct and maintain its Northwestern Luzon Project, NAPOCOR had to acquire an easement of right-of-
way over certain parcels of land. NAPOCOR filed a civil action for eminent domain of which respondent herein
were the vendors and vendees of the affected parcels of land. NAPOCOR contends that only an easement of
right-of-way for the construction of the transmission line project is being claimed, thus, only an easement fee
equivalent to 10% of the fair market value of the properties should be paid to the affected property owners.
NAPOCOR cites Section 3A, R.A. 6395, as amended and the implementing regulation of R.A. No. 8974 in
support of this argument.

Issue: Whether or not only an easement fee of 10% of the market value of the expropriated properties should
be paid to the affected owners affecting just compensation for an easement of right-of-way.

Ruling: No. While Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, and the implementing rule of R.A. No. 8974
indeed state that only 10% of the market value of the property is due to the owner of the property subject to
an easement of right-of-way, said rule is not binding on the Court. Well-settled is the rule that the
determination of “just compensation” in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. T
he court reiterated its ruling in Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, that any valuation for just
compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as guiding principle or one of the factors in
determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should
be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The executive department or the legislature may make the
initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private
property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order
can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the “just-ness” of the decreed compensation. Hence, herein petition is denied.

31. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs SANTA LORO VDA. DE CAPIN and SPS. JULITO QUIMCO and GLORIA
CAPIN
G.R. No. 175176 October 17, 2008

 FACTS

          Pursuant to NAPOCOR’s KV Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project, they expropriated several parcels of

land which will be traversed by their transmission towers and lines in the Municipality of Carmen and City
of Danao in the Province of Cebu.

Among these lots were those owned by the respondent Santa Loro Vda. De Capin and respondent-
Spouses Quimco.  To be able to enter the said properties, NAPOCOR obtained from them a “Permission to
Enter for Construction of Transmission Line Project” in exchange for their promise to pay just compensation.

Petitioner began the construction in 1996. Upon its completion, NAPOCOR imposed several restrictions
on the use of respondents’ land such as prohibition against planting or building anything higher than three
meters below the area traversed by its transmission lines. They were also prohibited from continuing their
quarry business near petitioner’s transmission towers. Respondents lost substantial amount of income due to
the restriction imposed on their properties by the petitioner.   The respondents later learned that they were
paid measly sums by NAPOCOR compared to the other land owners who resisted the expropriation.

NAPOCOR claims that they are not required to pay for the full value of the property traversed as its
Charter provides that they are only obligated only to pay the easement fee equivalent to 10% of the market
value of the land as just compensation, plus the cost of damaged improvements.   

  The RTC ruled in favour of the respondents and ordered petitioner to pay 448.33 per sqm for the entire
lot taken by the petitioner NAPOCOR. On its motion for reconsideration and appeal, the RTC ruling was
affirmed except for the interest rates imposed.
 
ISSUE

       Whether or not NAPOCOR should pay for the full value of the land or the simple easement fees as
provided in its charter

RULING: Yes.

Petitioners contention that respondents’ complaint is actually for “reversed eminent domain” which
requires the appointment of commissioners for the determination of just compensation has no merit.The case
filed by the respondents was an ordinary civil action for failure of petitioner to comply with its obligation to
pay just compensation for the respondents’ properties. Petitioner cannot insist that it only acquired an
easement of right of way on the properties of the respondents.  Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition
of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in
a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines also falls within
the ambit of the term “expropriation.”

          NAPOCOR’s prohibition regarding the use of respondents’ land amounted to an expropriation of the
portions of the latter’s properties and perpetually deprived the respondents of their proprietary rights thereon
and for which they are entitled to a reasonable and just compensation.  Having established that petitioner’s
acquisition of right-of-way easement over the portions of respondents’ lots was definitely a taking under the
power of eminent domain, petitioner then is liable to pay respondents just compensation and not merely an
easement fee.  
 
The acquisition of the right-of-way easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent
domain when it perpetually deprives owners of their proprietary rights. Such cases of easement of right-of-
way has been held by the Supreme Court to merit awards of just compensation for private property
condemned for public use

32. PNOC VS MAGLASANG

Facts: Petitioner insists that contrary to the findings of the two courts below, the determination of just
compensation should be reckoned prior to the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation. According
to petitioner in Civil Case No. 3267-O, petitioner took possession of the land on January 1, 1992 when PNOC
leased the same from its administrator as evidenced by a Lease Agreement for the period of January 1, 1992
to December 31, 1992.Thus, taking, for purposes of computing just compensation, should have been reckoned
from January 1, 1992.
ISSUE: WON lease is a basis for taking?
Ruling: No.
The Court rejected the State’s contention that a lease on a year to year basis can give rise to a
permanent right to occupy, since by express legal provision a lease made for a determinate time, ceases
upon the day fixed, without need of a demand. Neither can it be said that the right of eminent domain may
be exercised by simply leasing the premises to be expropriated. Where, as here, the owner was
compensated and not deprived of the ordinary and beneficial use of his property by its being diverted to
public use, there is no taking within the constitutional sense.
The time of the taking may be reckoned in 1994.For Lot 11900, on October 24, 1994, the date of the filing of
the complaint although the plaintiff took possession of the property in 1991 due to a lease contract executed
between plaintiff and defendant yet the intention to expropriate was manifested only upon the filing of the
complaint

33. NPC v. CO – 578 SCRa 243 – cannot be found

34. NPC v Villamor

590 SCRA 11 | June 19, 2009
Carpio, J.
FACTS
NPC is a government-owned and controlled corporation whose objective is the production of power from any
other source.
NPC’s charter grants NPC the power to exercise the right of eminent domain.
Because of its Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project, transmission lines and towers have to pass parcels of land
in the City of Danao and Municipality of Carmen, both situated in the province of Cebu. Villamor owns two of
these lands situated in Cebu.
The trial court rendered a decision for NPC to pay the fair market value of the portions of the lots condemned
by this expropriation proceedings at P450.00 per square meter. However, Villamor stated that the it should
also consider the small portion of Lot 4 which had been separated from the remaining unaffected portion and
would not be used by Villamor for any productive purposes.
ISSUES:
Whether the fair market value awarded by the trial court may be reduced taking into account that petitioner is
allegedly acquiring only an easement of right of way and that the lands affected are classified as agricultural.
Ruling: NO.
There is a permanent limitation that is imposed by NPC against the use of the lands for an indefinite period. It
therefore deprives Villamor of the normal use of the lands.
As shown in the records of the case, petitioner freely and voluntarily entered into several deeds of absolute
sale with other landowners affected by the Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project for a P450 per square meter
selling price from the years 1996 to 1997.
Villamor is entitled to just compensation or the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of
the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. The determination of just compensation
in expropriation proceedings is essentially a judicial function.
35. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION- versus – MARUHOM
609 SCRA 198
FACTS:
Lucman G. Ibrahim and his co-heirs Omar G. Maruhom, et al (respondents) are owners of a 70,000-
square meter lot in Saduc, Marawi City. In 1978, NPC, without respondents’ knowledge and consent, took
possession of the subterranean area of the land and constructed therein underground tunnels used by NPC in
siphoning the water of Lake Lanao and in the operation of NPC’s projects located in Saguiran, Lanao del Sur;
Nangca and Balo-i in Lanao del Norte; and Ditucalan and Fuentes in Iligan City. Respondents only discovered
the existence of the tunnels sometime in July 199 ad further demanded that NPC to pay damages and vacate
the subterranean portion of the land, but the demand was not heeded.

Respondents instituted an action for recovery of possession of land and damages against NPC with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur. RTC ruled in favor of respondents. NPC insisted that the payment
of just compensation for the land carries with it the correlative right to obtain title or ownership of the land
taken.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents are entitled to reasonable and just compensation.

RULING:
Yes. NPC’s acquisition of an easement of right-of-way on the lands of respondents amounted to
expropriation of the portions of the respondent’s property for which they are entitled to a reasonable and just
compensation. Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of
title or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over
the land traversed by transmission lines also falls within the ambit of the term expropriation.

The underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents use of the property for an indefinite
period and deprive them of its ordinary use. Respondents are clearly entitled to the payment of just
compensation. Notwithstanding the fact that NPC only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay not
merely an easement but rather the full compensation for land. This is so because in this case, the nature of the
easement practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use. Respondents, as the owners of the
property thus expropriated, are entitled to a just compensation which should be neither more nor less,
whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property.

36. THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, Petitioner,

vs. AYALA LAND INC., ROBINSON’S LAND CORPORATION, SHANGRI-LA PLAZA CORPORATION and SM PRIME
HOLDINGS, INC., Respondents.
600 SCRA 617
FACTS:
 This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed by
petitioner seeking the reversal and setting aside of the decision of CA which affirmed the decision of RTC,
which denied the Motion for Reconsideration of OSG. The RTC adjudged that respondents Ayala Land
Incorporated (Ayala Land), Robinsons Land Corporation (Robinsons), Shangri-la Plaza Corporation (Shangri-la),
and SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (SM Prime) could not be obliged to provide free parking spaces in their malls to
their patrons and the general public.
The Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce found that the collection of parking fees by shopping
malls is contrary to National Building Code and figuratively speaking, the Code has “expropriated” the land for
parking. Also, Committee stated that the collection of parking fees would be against Article II of RA 9734
(Consumer Act of the Philippines) as to the State’s policy of protecting the interest of consumers.
The Senate Committee recommended that Office of Solicitor General should institute the action to
enjoin the collection of parking fees and enforce the sanctions for violation of National Building Code.
Respondent SM Prime assailed the recommendation of the Committee and filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief contending that respondent has the legal right to lease parking spaces. OSG then filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief and Injunction to the RTC against respondents, prohibiting them from collecting parking
fees and contending that their practice of charging parking fees is violative of National Building Code.
The RTC held that the Building Code with its IRR does not necessarily impose that parking spaces shall
be free of charge and providing parking spaces for free can be considered as unlawful taking of property right
without just compensation. They deemed that the respondents are not obligated to provide parking spaces
free of charge.
Issues: Whether the CA erred in affirming the ruling of RTC that respondents are not obliged to provide free
parking spaces to their customers or the public.
Ruling: No. The CA was correct in affirming the ruling of RTC, and the respondents are not obliged to provide
free parking spaces. The OSG cannot rely on Section 102 of the National Building Code to expand the coverage
of Section 803 of the same Code and Rule XIX of the IRR, so as to include the regulation of parking fees. The
OSG limits its citation to the first part of Section 102 of the National Building Code declaring the policy of the
State “to safeguard life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound
environmental management and control”; but totally ignores the second part of said provision, which reads,
“and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to provide for all buildings and structures, a framework of
minimum standards and requirements to regulate and control their location, site, design, quality of materials,
construction, use, occupancy, and maintenance.” While the first part of Section 102 of the National Building
Code lays down the State policy, it is the second part thereof that explains how said policy shall be carried out
in the Code.
In conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons
who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in the National Building Code or its IRR. The State also cannot
impose the same prohibition by generally invoking police power, since said prohibition amounts to a taking of
respondents’ property without payment of just compensation.
37. NPC v Tuazon
Facts:
 On October 27, 1994, plaintiff-appellant National Power Corporation filed a complaint for Eminent
Domain against defendants-appellees Sps. R. Zabala et al before the Regional Trial Court, Balanga City, Bataan,
alleging that: defendants-appellees own parcels of land located in Balanga City, Bataan; which is urgently
needed an easement of right of way over the affected areas for its 230 KV Limay-Hermosa Transmission
Line[s]. After due notice to defendants-appellees, and upon deposit with the Philippine National Bank of the
amount equal to the assessed value (₱1,636.89 ) of the subject properties, it prayed for the issuance of a writ
of possession authorizing it to enter and take possession of the subject property.
On January 11, 1995, defendant-appellee Spouses Zabala moved to dismiss the complaint averring
that: they incurred a considerable expense in their property to serve the interest and well being of the
growing population of Balanga and that the just compensation would be higher if the proposed transmission
lines of plaintiff-appellant Napocor, is installed through their property. On their part, defendants-appellees
Spouses Zabala prayed for the fixing of the just compensation at ₱250.00 per square meter.
RTC rendered its Partial Decision, ruling that Napocor has the lawful authority to take for public
purpose and upon payment of just compensation a portion of spouses Zabala’s property. The RTC likewise
ruled that since the spouses Zabala were deprived of the beneficial use of their property, they are entitled to
the actual or basic value of their property. On July 10, 2006, the CA rendered the assailed Decision affirming
the RTC’s Partial Decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the taking of a portion of defendant’s property is lawful for purposes of eminent
domain
Ruling:
Yes. Because it has the elements of taking for purposes of eminent domain, i.e. expropriation must
enter upon the private property, it is devoted to public use and the utilization of the property will oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. In the case at bar the acquiring of property
through expropriation proceedings where the land or portion thereof will be traversed by the transmission
lines was a private property. Such property will be needed for the projects or works, such land or portion
thereof as necessary for public use. Also, since the high-tension electric current passing through the
transmission lines will perpetually deprive the property owners of the normal use of their land, it is only just
and proper to require Napocor to recompense them for the full market value of their property.
38. Sumulong v Guerrero
Facts:
On December 5, 1977 the National Housing Authority (NIIA) filed a complaint for expropriation of
parcels of land covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares, (in Antipolo, Rizal) including the lots of
petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing. Together with the complaint was a motion for
immediate possession of the properties. The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine
National Bank, representing the "total market value" of the subject twenty five hectares of land, pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1224 which defines "the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized
housing upon payment of just compensation." Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground
that they had been deprived of the possession of their property without due process of law and they further
contend that "socialized housing" as defined in Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended, for the purpose of
condemnation proceedings is not "public use" since it will benefit only "a handful of people, bereft of public
character."
Issue:
Whether or not the private property to be taken in this case will be for public use (Socialized Housing)
and makes such taking valid.

Ruling:
Yes. Art.3 sec 9 says that Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
This Court is satisfied that "socialized housing" fans within the confines of "public use". It is, particularly
important to draw attention to paragraph (d) of Pres. Dec. No. 1224 which opportunities inextricably linked
with low-cost housing, or slum clearance, relocation and resettlement, or slum improvement emphasize the
public purpose of the project. In the case at bar, the use to which it is proposed to put the subject parcels of
land meets the requisites of "public use". The lands in question are being expropriated by the NHA for the
expansion of Bagong Nayon Housing Project to provide housing facilities to low-salaried government
employees. Thus the taking here in this case which is for the purpose of public use is valid.

39.Phil. Columbian Assn. v Hon. Panis

Facts:
Philippine Columbian Association, petitioner herein, is a non-stock, non-profit domestic corporation
and is engaged in the business of providing sports and recreational facilities for its members. Petitioner's office
and facilities are located in the District of Paco, Manila, and adjacent thereto, is a parcel of land consisting of
4,842.90 square meters owned by petitioner. Private respondents are the actual occupants of the said parcel
of land, while respondents Antonio Gonzales, Jr. and Karlo Butiong were duly-elected councilors of the City of
Manila. In 1982, petitioner instituted ejectment proceedings against herein private respondents before the
metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. Judgment was rendered against the said occupants, ordering them to
vacate the lot and pay reasonable compensation therefor. This judgment was affirmed by the Regional Trial
Court, the Court of Appeals and subsequently by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 85262.
As a result of the favorable decision, petitioner filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, a
motion for execution of judgment. On June 8, 1990, private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 27, Manila, a petition for injunction and prohibition with preliminary injunction and restraining order
against the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila and petitioner, to enjoin their ejectment from and the
demolition of their houses on the premises in question. Petitioner, in turn, filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint, alleging, inter alia, that the City of Manila had no power to expropriate private land; that the
expropriation is not for public use and welfare; that the expropriation is politically motivated.
Issue:
Whether or not the city of Manila has the power to expropriate a private property and did it meet the
standard of public use principle
Ruling:
Yes. The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power to acquire private
lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to bona fide tenants or occupants thereof,
and to laborers and low-salaried employees of the city. That only a few could actually benefit from the
expropriation of the property does not diminish its public use character. It is simply not possible to provide all
at once land and shelter for all who need them. Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent
domain has evolved into a flexible concept, influenced by changing conditions Public use now includes the
broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including in particular, urban land reform and housing.
Thus the act here of city of Manila was pursuant to Art. 3 section 9 for the purpose of such expropriation was
for public use, thus it was valid.
40.Alejandro Manosca v. CA
G.R. No. 106440
January 29, 1996

FACTS: Alejandro, Asuncion and Leonica Manosca inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street,
Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of about 492 square meters. When the parcel was ascertained by
the National Historical Institute (NHI) to have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni
Cristo, it passed Resolution 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree 260, declaring the
land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was, on 6 January 1986, approved by the Minister of
Education, Culture and Sports (MECS).
Later, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality of the measure. In his opinion 133,
Series of 1987, the Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative. Accordingly, the Republic, through the office
of the Solicitor-General, instituted a complaint for expropriation before the RTC of Pasig for and in behalf of
the NHI. At the same time, the Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order to permit it to take
immediate possession of the property.
The motion was opposed by the Manoscas. The Manoscas moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis
that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute
an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a
religious entity. The trial court issued its denial of said motion to dismiss. The Manoscas moved for
reconsideration thereafter but were denied.
ISSUE: W/N the taking of the parcel of land was for public use.
RULING: YES. Petitioners ask what is the so-called unusual interest that the expropriation of Felix Manalo’s
birthplace become so vital as to be a public use appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminent domain
when only members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit? This attempt to give some religious perspective to
the case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual
consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the marker is
essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines,
rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that
greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but
such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a
few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and
character of public use.
41.Province of Camarines Sur v. CA
222 SCRA 173
May 17, 1993

FACTS: Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur authorized the provincial governor to purchase or
expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food
and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees.
Pursuant to the resolution, Gov. Villafuerte filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto San
Joaquin and Efren San Joaquin. Upon motion for the issuance of writ or possession, the San Joaquins failed to
appear at the hearing.
The San Joaquins later moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for
their property. The court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the province to take possession of the
properties.
The San Joaquins filed for motion for relief, but denied as well. In their petition. Asked by the CA, Solicitor
General stated that there is no need for the approval of the president for the province to expropriate
properties, however, the approval of the DAR is needed to convert the property from agricultural to non-
agricultural (housing purpose).
CA set aside the decision of the trial court suspending the possession and expropriation of the property until
the province has acquired the approval of DAR. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the expropriation is for a public purpose.
RULING: YES. The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public
purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of
the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to the
community invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately,
the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies
the public purpose requirement of the Constitution.
42. DIOSDADO LAGCAO v. JUDGE GENEROSA G. LABRA
G.R. No. 155746
October 13, 2004

FACTS: The Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. But then, in late 1965, the 210 lots,
including Lot 1029, reverted to the Province of Cebu. Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of Lot
1029 by the City of Cebu to the petitioners. This prompted the latter to sue the province for specific
performance and damages in the then Court of First Instance. The court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and
ordered the Province of Cebu to execute the final deed of sale in favor of petitioners. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that it was already occupied
by squatters. Thus petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters. The Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCC’s
decision and issued a writ of execution and order of demolition. However, when the demolition order was
about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters to the MTCC, requesting the
deferment of the demolition on the ground that the City was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters.
Acting on the mayor’s request, the MTCC issued two orders suspending the demolition.
Unfortunately for petitioners, during the suspension period, Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City to provide socialized housing for the homeless and low-income
residents of the City, and which identified Lot 1029 (petitioners’ lot) as a socialized housing site. Petitioners
filed with the RTC an action for declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 1843 for being unconstitutional.
ISSUE: W/N, by virtue of Ord. No. 1843, the expropriation of petitioners’ property for public use.
RULING: NO. First of all, the ordinance was unlawful or invalid. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only
be within the corporate powers of the city or municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law. It must be in accordance with certain well-established basic principles of a
substantive nature.
Ordinance No. 1843 failed to comply with the foregoing substantive requirements. A clear case of
constitutional infirmity having been thus established, this Court is constrained to nullify the subject ordinance.
We recapitulate:
First, as earlier discussed, the questioned ordinance is repugnant to the pertinent provisions of the
Constitution, RA 7279 and RA 7160;
Second, the precipitate manner in which it was enacted was plain oppression masquerading as a pro-
poor ordinance;
Third, the fact that petitioners small property was singled out for expropriation for the purpose of
awarding it to no more than a few squatters indicated manifest partiality against petitioners, and
Fourth, the ordinance failed to show that there was a reasonable relation between the end sought and
the means adopted. While the objective of the City of Cebu was to provide adequate housing to slum
dwellers, the means it employed in pursuit of such objective fell short of what was legal, sensible and
called for by the circumstances.

Nota Bene: RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation of property for purposes of urban land
reform and housing.
RA 7160 is the law wherein Congress conferred upon local government units the power to expropriate.
43. Reyes vs. NHA

Facts: Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane lands
belonging to the petitioners. The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the
Dasmariñas Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were relocated from the Metropolitan
Manila area. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots and the payment of
just compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

A few years later, petitioners contended that respondent NHA violated the stated public purpose for the
expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project when it failed to relocate the squatters from the Metro
Manila area, as borne out by the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court which showed that most of the
expropriated properties remain unoccupied. Petitioners likewise question the public nature of the use by
respondent NHA when it entered into a contract for the construction of low cost housing units, which is
allegedly different from the stated public purpose in the expropriation proceedings. Hence, it is claimed that
respondent NHA has forfeited its rights and interests by virtue of the expropriation judgment and the
expropriated properties should now be returned to herein petitioners.

Issue: W/N the judgment of expropriation was forfeited in the light of the failure of respondent NHA to use
the expropriated property for the intended purpose but for a totally different purpose.

Held: No.
The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent NHA. Accordingly, petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive
view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the contract for low cost housing
is a deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer
limited to traditional purposes. The term "public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public
interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience." Thus, whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use."

In addition, the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public
purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment
and service companies, and other private concerns. Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to
undertake, for the common good and in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban
land reform and housing which will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to
underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. The expropriation of private
property for the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in furtherance of social justice.

44. Masikip vs Pasig

FACTS: Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Pag-Asa,
Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila. The City of Pasig notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500
square meter portion of her property to be used for the “sports development and recreational activities” of
the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993 enacted by the
then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig.

Petitioner replied stating that the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and
oppressive.

Respondent reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of petitioner’s property is “to provide sports and
recreational facilities to its poor residents” and subsequently filed with the trial court a complaint for
expropriation,

ISSUE: W/N the City of Pasig able to establish “genuine necessity”?

RULING: No.
The Court holds that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to
expropriate petitioner’s property. A scrutiny of the records shows that the Certification issued by the Caniogan
Barangay Council, the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993 authorizing the expropriation,
indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private,
non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. Petitioner’s lot is the nearest vacant space available.
The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not been shown, especially
considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the
area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.

Constitution attaches to the property of the individual requires not only that the purpose for the taking of
private property be specified. The genuine necessity for the taking, which must be of a public character, must
also be shown to exist.

45. Didipio vs. Earthsavers vs. Gozun

Facts: In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign companies when it
comes to either technical or financial large scale exploration or mining. In 1995, Ramos signed into law RA
7942 or the Philippine Mining Act. In 1994, Ramos already signed an FTAA with Arimco Mining Co, an
Australian company. The FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore 37,000 ha of land in Quirino and N.
Vizcaya including Brgy Didipio. After the passage of the law, DENR rolled out its implementing RRs. Didipio
petitioned to have the law and the RR to be annulled as it is unconstitutional and it constitutes unlawful taking
of property. In seeking to nullify Rep. Act No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional,
petitioners set their sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 which they claim
allow the unlawful and unjust “taking” of private property for private purpose in contradiction with Section 9,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandating that private property shall not be taken except for public use and
the corresponding payment of just compensation. They assert that public respondent DENR, through the
Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private
property and allow taking of land without payment of just compensation.

Traversing petitioners’ assertion, public respondents argue that Section 76 is not a taking provision but a valid
exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, the state may prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. This government
regulation involves the adjustment of rights for the public good and that this adjustment curtails some
potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. Public respondents concluded that “to
require compensation in all such circumstances would compel the government to regulate by purchase.”

ISSUE: W/N RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid.

Ruling: Yes.
The taking to be valid must be for public use. Public use as a requirement for the valid exercise of the power of
eminent domain is now synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare and public
convenience. It includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. Public use as traditionally
understood as “actual use by the public” has already been abandoned.

Mining industry plays a pivotal role in the economic development of the country and is a vital tool in the
government’s thrust of accelerated recovery. The importance of the mining industry for national development
is expressed in Presidential Decree No. 463:

WHEREAS, mineral production is a major support of the national economy, and therefore the intensified
discovery, exploration, development and wise utilization of the country’s mineral resources are urgently
needed for national development.

Irrefragably, mining is an industry which is of public benefit.

That public use is negated by the fact that the state would be taking private properties for the benefit of
private mining firms or mining contractors is not at all true.
GR. 150640 Mar. 22, 2007
46. Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando Pampanga v. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner sought to convert a portion of respondents’ land into Barangay Sindalan’s feeder road. Petitioner
claimed that respondents’ property was the most practical and nearest way to the municipal road. Pending
the resolution of the case at the trial court, petitioner deposited an amount equivalent to the fair market value
of the property.
Respondents alleged that that their lot is adjacent to Davsan II Subdivision privately owned by Dr. Felix David
and his wife, and that the expropriation of their property was for the benefit of the homeowners of Davsan II
Subdivision. They contended that petitioner deliberately omitted the name of Davsan II Subdivision and,
instead, stated that the expropriation was for the benefit of the residents of Sitio Paraiso in order to conceal
the fact that the access road being proposed to be built across the respondents’ land was to serve a privately-
owned subdivision and those who would purchase the lots of said subdivision.
They also pointed out that under PD No. (PD) 957, it is the subdivision owner who is obliged to provide a
feeder road to the subdivision residents. CA ruled in favor of respondents, stating that petitioners spent public
funds for a private purpose and deprived herein defendants-appellants of their property for an ostensible
public purpose. Petitioner contested this decision, hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON the proposed exercise of the power of eminent domain would be for a public purpose.
HELD: No. The intended expropriation of private property for the benefit of a private individual is clearly
proscribed by the Constitution, declaring that it should be for public use or purpose. Considering that the
residents who need a feeder road are all subdivision lot owners, it is the obligation of the Davsan II Subdivision
owner to acquire a right-of-way for them. 
However, the failure of the subdivision owner to provide an access road does not shift the burden to
petitioner. To deprive respondents of their property instead of compelling the subdivision owner to comply
with his obligation under the law is an abuse of the power of eminent domain and is patently illegal. Without
doubt, expropriation cannot be justified on the basis of an unlawful purpose. The court affirmed CA’s decision.
MP: The power of eminent domain can only be exercised for public use and with just compensation.  Taking an
individual’s private property is a deprivation which can only be justified by a higher good which is public use
and can only be counterbalanced by just compensation. Without these safeguards, the taking of property
would not only be unlawful, immoral, and null and void, but would also constitute a gross and condemnable
transgression of an individuals basic right to property as well.
NOTES:
Feeder Road - A secondary road which "feeds" traffic to main highways and freeways.
GR. 110478 Oct. 15, 2007
47. Fermin Manapat v. CA
FACTS:
Sometime in the 1960s, the RCAM allowed a number of individuals to occupy the Grace Park property on
condition that they would vacate the premises should the former push through with the plan to construct a
school in the area. However, the plan did not materialize, so the occupants offered to purchase the portions
they occupied. Since the occupants could not afford RCAM’s proposed price, they organized themselves as
exclusive members of the Eulogio Rodriguez, Jr. Tenants Association, Inc., petitioned the Government for the
acquisition of the said property, its subdivision into home lots, and the resale of the subdivided lots to them at
a low price.
Acting on this petition, the Government, acting through the LTA, later succeeded by PHHC, negotiated for the
acquisition of the property from the RCAM/PRC. However, due to the high asking price of RCAM and the
budgetary constraints of the Government, the latter’s effort for expropriation was discontinued. RCAM then
decided to effect, on its own, the subdivision of the property and the sale of the individual subdivided lots to
the public. Petitioner was among those who purchased individual subdivided lots of Grace Park directly from
RCAM/PRC.
In 1977, Pres. Ferdinand Marcos issued PD 1072, appropriating P1.2m out of the President’s Special
Operations Funds to cover the additional amount needed for the appropriation of Grace Park. The NHA,
PHHC’s successor, then filed several expropriation proceedings over the already subdivided lots for the
purpose of developing Grace Park under the ZIP and subdividing it into small lots for distribution and resale at
a low cost to the residents of the area.
Manapat argued that since he is also a member of the tenant association, it would be absurd to take the land
away from him only to give it back to him as an intended beneficiary.
ISSUE: WON the NHA may validly expropriate the subject parcels of land.
HELD: Yes. NHA justified the taking of the subject property for the purpose of improving and upgrading the
area by constructing roads and installing facilities thereon under the Governments ZIP and subdividing them
into much smaller lots for distribution and sale at a low cost to qualified beneficiaries, mostly underprivileged
long-time occupants of Grace Park. Around 510 families with approximately 5 members each will be benefited
by the project. The only remaining obstacle in the completion of this project is the lots subject of these
consolidated petitions as the other lots in Grace Park have already been expropriated.
Manapat’s contention fails to comprehend the public purpose for the taking under the socialized housing
program. The parcels of land subject of the expropriation are being taken so that they can be subdivided into
much smaller lots for distribution to deserving dwellers in the area. Upon the completion of the project,
Manapat, and those similarly situated as he, cannot assert any right to be awarded the very same lots they
currently occupy, nor be entitled to the same area of the land they now have.
It is clear that public use, as a requisite for the exercise of eminent domain in the instant cases, has been
adequately fulfilled.
NOTES:
This is a consolidated case, I only focused on Manapat.
RCAM – Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila
LTA – Land Tenure Administration
PHHC – People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation
PRC – Philippine Realty Corporation
NHA – National Housing Authority
ZIP – Zonal Improvement Program

48. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority(MCIAA) v. Benjamin Tudtud, et al.

FACTS: National Airports Corporation (NAC) embarked on a program to expand Cebu Lahug Airport. It sought
to acquire, by negotiated expropriation, several lots adjoining the then existing airport for this purpose. The
NAC acquired Lot 988 among other lots, but was thus cancelled and issued in its stead in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines. Later Lot 988 was transferred to the Air Transport Office, and later, to the MCIAA.
When the Mactan-Cebu International Airport opened for commercial flights, the Cebu Lahug Airport was
closed and abandoned.
The general manager of the MCIAA, Lydia Adlawan, acting as attorney-in-fact of the original owners of Lot 988,
demanded to repurchase the lot at the same price paid at the time of the taking, without interest, no
structures or improvements having been erected thereon and the Cebu Lahug Airport having been closed and
abandoned, hence, the purpose for which the lot was acquired no longer existed.
Respondents alleged that the original owners or their successors-in-interest would be entitled to repurchase
the lot in the event that it was no longer used for airport purposes. MCIAA responded that the decision
granting them ownership of Lot 988 did not contain any condition that the subject lots of the expropriation
would revert to their owners in case the expansion of the Cebu Lahug Airport would not materialize.
ISSUE: WON MCIAA should revert the subject lot to the original owners even without condition.
HELD: Yes. The MCIAA is obliged to reconvey Lot 988 to respondents with or without condition. However,
respondents must return to the MCIAA what they received as compensation for the expropriation of Lot 988
plus legal interest to be computed from default, which in this case runs from the time the MCIAA complies
with its obligations to the respondents.
Respondents must likewise pay the MCIAA the necessary expenses it may have incurred in sustaining Lot No.
988 and the monetary value of its services in managing it to the extent that respondents were benefited
thereby.
49. CITY OF MANILA, vs. MELBA TAN TE
FACTS: Manila City Mayor Joselito L. Atienza approved approved Ordinance No. 7951 an expropriation
measure authorizing him to acquire by negotiation or expropriation certain pieces of real property along Maria
Clara and Governor Forbes Streets where low-cost housing units could be built and then awarded to bona
fide residents therein. The records bear that respondent had acquired the property in 1996, and back then it
was being occupied by a number of families. In 1998, respondent had sought the ejectment of these
occupants from the premises. The favorable ruling in that case evaded execution; hence, the court, despite
opposition of the City of Manila, issued a Writ of Demolition at respondent’s instance. It appears that in the
interim between the issuance of the writ of execution and the order of demolition, the City of Manila had
instituted an expropriation case affecting the same property. Respondent had moved for the dismissal of that
first expropriation case for lack of cause of action, lack of showing of an ordinance authorizing the
expropriation, and non-compliance with the provisions R.A. No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992. 

Petitioner filed this second Complaint for expropriation and this time, it attached a copy of Ordinance
No. 7951 and alleged that pursuant thereto, it had previously offered to purchase the subject property from
respondent but respondent allegedly failed to retrieve it despite repeated notices, thereby compelling
petitioner to institute the present expropriation proceedings after depositing in trust with the Land Bank of
the Philippines ₱1,000,000.00 cash, representing the just compensation required by law to be paid to
respondent. Respondent did not file an answer and in lieu of that, she submitted a Motion to Dismiss 18 and
raised the following grounds: that Ordinance No. 7951 was an invalid expropriation measure because it
violated the rule against taking private property without just compensation; that petitioner did not comply
with the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No. 7279; and that she qualified as a small property owner
and, hence, exempt from the operation of R.A. No. 7279, the subject lot being the only piece of realty that she
owned.

ISSUE: WON socialized housing falls within the confines of public use?

HELD: Yes. The concept of socialized housing, whereby housing units are distributed and/or sold to qualified
beneficiaries on much easier terms, has already been included in the expanded definition of "public use or
purpose" in the context of the State’s exercise of the power of eminent domain. The public use requirement
for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing
conditions. The taking to be valid must be for public use. Specifically, urban renewal or development and the
construction of low-cost housing are recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded
concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. Housing is a basic human
need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health,
safety, the environment and in sum, the general welfare. The public character of housing measures does not
change because units in housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only by those who satisfy prescribed
qualifications.

Congress passed R.A. No. 7279, to provide a comprehensive and continuing urban development and
housing program as well as access to land and housing by the underprivileged and homeless citizens; uplift the
conditions of the underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban areas by making available decent housing at
affordable cost; optimize the use and productivity of land and urban resources among others. Accordingly, all
city and municipal governments are mandated to inventory all lands and improvements within their respective
locality and identify lands which may be utilized for socialized housing and as resettlement sites for acquisition
and disposition to qualified beneficiaries. Section 10 thereof authorizes local government units to exercise the
power of eminent domain to carry out the objectives of the law, but subject to the conditions stated therein
and in Section 9. In light of the foregoing, the Court is satisfied that "socialized housing" falls within the
confines of "public use.

50. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON

FACTS: NAPOCOR entered a property in order to construct and maintain transmission lines for a transmission
project. Respondents heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon owned the subject property. NAPOCOR filed a complaint
for expropriation seeking the acquisition of an easement of right of way over a portion of the property alleging
that it had negotiated with the respondents for the acquisition of the easement but they had failed to reach
any agreement; and that, nonetheless, it was willing to deposit an amount representing the assessed value of
the portion sought to be expropriated. It prayed for the issuance of a writ of possession upon deposit to
enable it to enter and take possession and control of the affected portion of the property; to demolish all
improvements existing thereon; and to commence construction of the transmission line project. It likewise
prayed for the appointment of three commissioners to determine the just compensation to be paid.
 The respondents staunchly maintained that NAPOCOR had not negotiated with them before entering
the property and that the entry was done without their consent; nonetheless, they tendered no objection to
NAPOCOR’s entry provided it would pay just compensation not only for the portion sought to be expropriated
but for the entire property whose potential was greatly diminished, if not totally lost, due to the project.
NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion to Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings informing that the
parties failed to reach an amicable agreement; that the property sought to be expropriated was no longer
necessary for public purpose because of the intervening retirement of the transmission lines installed on the
respondents’ property; that because the public purpose for which such property would be used thereby
ceased to exist, the proceedings for expropriation should no longer continue, and the State was now duty-
bound to return the property to its owners.

ISSUE: WON the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or dismissed pending appeal

HELD: Yes, the dismissal is proper. The right of eminent domain is "the ultimate right of the sovereign power
to appropriate, not only the public but the private property of all citizens within the territorial sovereignty, to
public purpose." But the exercise of such right is not unlimited, for two mandatory requirements should
underlie the Government’s exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that it is for a particular
public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner. To be valid, the taking must be
for public use. "Public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," and
"public convenience."

It is essential that the element of public use of the property be maintained throughout the proceedings
for expropriation. There is no question raised concerning the right of the plaintiff here to acquire the land
under the power of eminent domain. That power was expressly granted it by its charter. Indeed, public use is
the fundamental basis for the action for expropriation; hence, NAPOCOR’s motion to discontinue the
proceedings is warranted and should be granted.

In the present case the petitioner admits that the expropriation of the land in question is no longer
necessary for public use. Had that admission been made in the trial court the case should have been dismissed
there. It now appearing positively, by resolution of the plaintiff, that the expropriation is not necessary for
public use, the action should be dismissed even without a motion on the part of the plaintiff. The moment it
appears in whatever stage of the proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use the complaint
should be dismissed and all the parties thereto should be relieved from further annoyance or litigation.

b. Just Compensation

51. THE CITY OF MANILA vs. BALBINA & ARISTON ESTRADA

FACTS: George C. Sellner, a real estate agent, stated that the land in question, fronting as it did on Calles
Herran and Looban and the Paco Estero, was worth 60 per cent more than other land near by, and placed its
value at P10 per square meter. He stated that he had carried on negotiations with regard to a parcel of land
situated on the opposite side of the estero and fronting Herran; that he was offering this land for sale at P5.50
per square meter, but that the owner succeeded in obtaining P6 per square meter, and that the sale had been
consummated only about thirty days prior to the date of the hearing. The witness stated that this land was of
about the same elevation as the parcel sought to be expropriated, but that it had no improvements, being
used for the storage of coal.

Enrique Brias, another real estate man, testified that P10 was a good price for the land. He stated that
he was the owner of the land on the opposite side of the estero which had been sold for P6 per square meter
about one month prior to the hearing, but that this land was not in such a good commercial location. The
president of the Municipal Board of the city of Manila testified that a parcel of land on the opposite side of
Calle Herran but on the same side of the Paco Estero, owned by one Clarke, had been expropriated by the city
in 1908. He stated that commissioners were appointed who duly rendered their report to the court, but as it
was accepted by both parties, no further litigation was necessary. In this case it seems that the land desired by
the city was part of a parcel fronting on Calle Herran, whose other boundaries were the Paco Estero, some
private property, and a small callejon. The portion desired by the city compromised the entire Herran frontage
of the owner.

ISSUE: WON the just compensation decided by the court is proper?

HELD: Yes. After a careful examination of the entire record in this case and the law applicable to the questions
raised therein, we are of the opinion that P10 per square meter is a just compensation for the land taken.
Without prejudice to filing a more extended opinion in which our reasons will be set forth in full, judgment will
be entered accordingly, without costs. So ordered. The city of Manila sought to expropriate an  entire parcel of
land with its improvements for use in connection with a new market at that time being erected in the district
of Paco. A complaint was filed setting forth the necessary allegations, answer joined, and commissioners were
appointed, who, after viewing the premises and receiving evidence, and being unable to agree, submitted two
reports to the court. The court duly rendered its decision, confirming the majority report as to the
improvements, but reducing the price of the land from P20 per square meter, as fixed by the majority report,
to P15 per square meter. Motions for a new trial having been made by both parties and denied by the court,
both parties appealed from that part of the decision fixing the value of the land at P15 per square meter. This
court held that P10 per square meter was just compensation for the land, and rendered its decision
accordingly.

The court justifies such action, first, upon the ground that the great preponderance of the evidence
submitted to the commissioners showed that P10 per square meter was just compensation for the land taken,
and, second, upon the power of the court to revise the report of the commissioners when the amount
awarded is grossly inadequate or grossly excessive. The price of P10 per square meter is 66 per cent greater
than that obtained for land on the opposite side of the estero, and this difference would seem amply sufficient
to compensate for the more favored location of the condemned land. That P10 per square meter is a just
compensation is shown by a great preponderance of the evidence. "Compensation" means an equivalent for
the value of the land (property) taken. Anything beyond that is more and anything short of that is less than
compensation. To compensate is to render something which is equal to that taken or received. The word
"just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation;" to convey the idea that the equivalent to
be rendered for the property taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample. "Just compensation," means a fair
and full equivalent for the loss sustained."

52. MANILA RAILROAD vs PAREDES

FACTS: The plaintiff is a railroad corporation organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands and has the
power of eminent domain. In conformity with its charter it constructed and is now operating a branch line
from Manila to Gumaca, Province of Tayabas. It claims that it took possession of this strip of land with the
consent of the various owners and occupants claiming title thereto, and with the understanding that it would
pay the owners of all the lands thus taken a price to be agreed upon thereafter, or to be fixed in
condemnation proceedings; and that, not having been able to agree upon a price with the owners of the land,
it was later compelled to institute proceedings for the condemnation of the land thus taken.
The applicant alleged that in the course of those proceedings the respondent judge issued an order
directing the Railroad Company to increase an amount of a certain deposit, therefore made by the company to
secure final payment of the value of certain lands which it sought to have condemned for its use.
ISSUE: W/N private property for a public use without just compensation does require that compensation shall
be actually paid in advance for the occupancy of the land taken
RULING:
NO. In this jurisdiction the constitutional prohibition against the taking of property without just
compensation contains no express provision requiring prepayment and, following the weight of authority, the
court said that there is no prohibition against the legislative enactment of a form of procedure whereby
immediate possession of lands involved in expropriation proceedings may be taken, provided always that due
provision is made to secure the prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation to the owners.
53. SANTOS vs LAND BANK
FACTS: Edgar Santos, herein petitioner filed a case before the RTC for the determination of the of just
compensation for the properties taken by DAR under PD 27 in 1972. The RTC fixed the amount of P49, 241,
876 to be the just compensation for the 36.4152 hectares and 40.7874 hectares irrigated and unirrigated
ricelands respectively. Further, the court ordered Land Bank to pay Santos P45, 698, 805 in the manner
provided by RA No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law). Prior to this decision, Land Bank already
released P3, 543,070 to be paid to Santos in cash and bond; thus deducting from the total amount. Land Bank
complied with this decision and released the amount of P3, 621, 023 in cash and P41, 128,024.81 in Land Bank
Bond.
 However, petitioner filed a motion before the RTC and insisted that he be paid in cash or certified
check instead of the bond. RTC as a consequence, order Land Bank to pay the balance in cash or certified
check instead of a bond. Land Bank moved for reconsideration. Through a new judge, the RTC ordered Land
Bank to pay Santos P5, 792,084.37 in cash and P35, 336,840.16 in bonds. The CA affirmed the decision of the
trial court.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner is correct in asserting that he be paid in cash for the just compensation
RULING: No. It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional method for the payment of just
compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past solely
in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent
domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought
to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is
a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
While the Court understand the desire of the petitioner to be paid in cash; after all his compensation
was long overdue. The Court cannot grant his petition because it is not sustained by the law.
54. MUNICIPAL OF DAET vs CA
FACTS: The judgment of the respondent Court of Appeals, subject of the instant petition to review on
certiorari, "fixing the fair market value of the property sought to be expropriated at P200.00 per square meter
or of Five Hundred Forty three thousand Four hundred (P543,400.00) pesos, and the value of the
improvement thereon at Thirty six thousand five hundred (P36,500.00) PESOS, both amounts to bear legal
interest from and after the date of the actual taking of possession by the Municipality of Daet, Camarines
Norte until the full amount is paid.
With costs against plaintiff-appellant," it must be affirmed in the light of the unusual, unique and
abnormal circumstances obtaining in this case where the complaint for condemnation was filed on August 9,
1962 or seventeen (17) years ago but up to the present, the petitioner Municipality of Daet has failed to make
the deposit required to take possession of the property sought to be expropriated.

ISSUE: W/N the valuation is just, fair and reasonable

RULING: Yes. For purposes of just compensation in cases of private property acquired by the government
for public use, the basis shall be the current and fair market value as declared by the owner or administrator
or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
The provisional value of the property in this case having already been fixed, the deposit on February 9,
1973 of the amount of P54,370.00 representing the assessed value of the land and the deposit on October 21,
1977 of the amount of P25,830.00 representing the assessed value of the improvement, both pursuant to the
said decree, are not sufficient. Nevertheless, said amounts should be deducted from the total amount due to
private respondent. To explain and clarify the judgment of the Court in affirming the decision appealed, the
demolition of the building of private respondent standing on the land by the Municipal Mayor, Engr. Jose P.
Timoner on February 14, 1978 constituted the actual taking of possession of the property sought to be
expropriated by the Municipality of Daet. And from said date, February 14, 1978, interest at the legal rate shall
be paid by the municipality until the full amount is paid.
55. NAPOCOR vs. CA
Facts: National Power Corporation a GOCC vested with Eminent Domain power initiated negotiations for right
of easement to construct transmission lines to the land belonging to Matias Cruz.
For the purpose of determining the fair and just compensation due the defendants, the court
appointed three commissioners, comprised of one representative of the plaintiff, one for the defendants and
the other from the court
The commissioner for the plaintiff recommended P1.00/sqm easement fee for Matias lot. This was
countered by the commissioner of Matias with P10.00/sqm as disturbance compensation. The court’s
countered with P5.00/sqm.
The lower court granted P10.00/sqm but this was appealed and was reduced to P5.00/sqm. Still not
satisfied NPC appealed to CA. CA sustained the decision of the lower court.
NPC contend that full ownership is retained by the private respondents and they are not totally
deprived of the use of the land. They can continue planting the same agricultural crops, except those that
would result in contact with the wires. On this premise, petitioner submits that if full market value is required,
then full transfer of ownership is only the logical equivalent.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner should be made to pay full compensation for the land traversed by its
transmission lines.
Ruling: YES.
While it is true that plaintiff are only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives
defendants of their proprietary rights.
In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain.
Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the
limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period such no plant higher than three
(3) meters is allowed and the danger to life and limbs because of the high tension current deprives private
respondents of its ordinary use. For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just
compensation.
56. EPZA v. DULAY
Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export Processing Zone
Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation, in
which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without
them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the
appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was later found out that the
payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the
latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair
market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever
is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for
the reception of the commissioner’s report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus
enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case.
Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 is
unconstitutional.
Ruling: YES.
The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial
prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it
for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the
factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what
amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a
judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a
party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public
use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into
the justness of the decreed compensation.
57. MADDUMBA v. GSIS
Facts: Respondent GSIS conducted a public bidding of several foreclosed properties. Petitioner Domingo B.
Maddumba participated in the public bidding and submitted his sealed bid in the amount of P98,000.00 in
Philippine currency. The bid was subject to the condition that there should be a down payment of 35% of the
amount thereof, the 10% constituting the proposal bond with the remaining 25% to be paid after the receipt
of the notice of award or acceptance of the bid. Accordingly, petitioner enclosed with his sealed bid a
manager's check in the amount of P9, 500.00 and cash in the amount of P300.00 to complete the P9, 800.00
proposal bond.
Upon the receipt of the notice of award, petitioner offered to pay the additional 25% in Land Bank bonds at
their face value. However, the GSIS rejected the offer. The board "resolved to reiterate the policy that Land
Bank bonds shall be accepted as payment only at a discounted rate to yield the System 18% at maturity.
Issue: WON LBP bonds shall be accepted as payment of pre-existing obligations to government financial
institutions at their face value and not at discounted value.
Ruling: YES.
Acceptance of Land Bank bonds, instead of money, undoubtedly involves a certain degree of sacrifice for the
landowner. This, of course, is in addition to the fact that, in case of expropriation of land covered by land
reform, the landowner will seldom get the compensation he desires. Thus, discounting the Land Banks bonds,
and thereby reducing their effective value, entails and imposes an additional burden on his
part.  Respondent Government Service Insurance System is ordered to accept the bonds issued by the Land
Bank of the Philippines at their par or face value.
58. Berkenkotter vs. CA
Facts: The property has an area of 10,640 square meters and belongs to B. H. Berkenkotter & Co., the herein
petitioner. Vicente Viray, president of the said school, sent the owner a written offer to buy the land in line
with the 5-year expansion program of ARASOF. In reply, Berkenkotter expressed its willingness to sell at
P50.00 per square meter payable in cash. At Viray's request, the Provincial Appraisal Committee, Office of the
Provincial Assessor, Batangas City, appraised the land and fixed its market value at P32.00 per square meter.
Viray then wrote Berkenkotter another letter and offered to buy the property at the said price. The latter stuck
to its original valuation; later it said that the property had in fact appreciated to as much as P100.00 per
square meter. Further negotiations failed to resolve the impasse between ARASOF and the petitioner. In the
end, expropriation proceedings were commenced against the petitioner by the Republic of the Philippines on
behalf of ARASOF.
In its complaint the Republic invoked the assessment made by the Provincial Appraisal Committee at P32.00
per square meter and sought possession of the property upon payment of the 10% deposit required by P.D.
48. Berkenkotter originally questioned the purpose of the expropriation but later abandoned this objection
and concentrated only on what it called the under-appraisal of the subject land. Later the Regional Trial Court
of Batangas issued an order of condemnation and, pursuant to Rule 67, Section 5, of the Rules of Court,
appointed a panel of commissioners to determine the just compensation to be paid for the land.
The panel of commissioners submitted its report to the trial court and recommended that the property
be appraised at the unit price of P85.00. The Republic objected and pointed to three contracts of sale the
petitioner had concluded in 1985 whereby it sold three tracts of land similar in topography and adjacent to the
property in question for the unit price of only P19.18. The trial court directed the commissioners to convene
anew and receive additional evidence. It did and conducted more interviews. In its second report dated April
1, 1987, however, the panel reiterated its original recommendation for the valuation of the property at P85.00
per square meter.
Issue: Whether or not the parcels of land should be rated at P19.18 per square meter?
Held: Yes. The Republic should not pay more simply because it is the Republic, as if it were a milking cow with
unlimited resource to abuse.
It may be asked why the petitioner should not be paid at the rate at least of P32.00, which was the price
offered by Viray and in the complaint for expropriation later filled by the Republic. The Republic had no choice
then because P.D. 1533 fixed the just compensation at the valuation given by the owner of the government,
whichever was lower.
59. Mercalco vs Pineda
Facts: Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of Philippines. Respondent Honorable Judge Gregorio G. Pineda is impleaded in his official
capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXI,
Pasig, Metro Manila. While private respondents Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Gil de Guzman, Lucito Santiago and Teresa
Bautista are owners in fee simple of the expropriated property situated at Malaya, Pililla, Rizal.
On October 29, 1974, a complaint for eminent domain was filed by petitioner MERALCO against forty-
two (42) defendants with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXII, Pasig,
Metro Manila. The complaint alleges that for the purpose of constructing a 230 KV Transmission line from
Barrio Malaya to Tower No. 220 at Pililla, Rizal, petitioner needs portions of the land of the private
respondents consisting of an aggregate area of 237,321 square meters. Despite petitioner's offers to pay
compensation and attempts to negotiate with the respondents', the parties failed to reach an agreement.
 The petitioner strongly maintains that the respondent court's act of determining and ordering the
payment of just compensation to private respondents without formal presentation of evidence by the parties
on the reasonable value of the property constitutes a flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional right to
due process. It stressed that respondent court ignored the procedure laid down by the law in determining just
compensation because it formulated an opinion of its own as to the value of the land in question without
allowing the Board of Commissioners to hold hearings for the reception of evidence.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent court can dispense with the assistance of a Board of Commissioners in
an expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the just compensation.
Held: NO. In an expropriation case where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial
before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just
compensation. Under the Revised Rules of Court, the determination by the Court of "the just compensation
for the property sought to be taken" is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. In the case at bar, respondent judge arrived at the amount of just compensation on its own,
without the proper reception of evidence before the Board of Commissioners. Hence, the appointment of at
least three (3) competent persons as commissioners to ascertain just compensation is a mandatory
requirement.  
60. National Corporation vs. CA
Facts: In 1978, National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), took possession of a 21,995 square meter land which
is a portion of Lot 1 of the subdivision plan situated in Marawi City, owned by Mangondato, that was covered
by Transfer Certificate Title under the mistaken belief that it forms part of the public land reserved for use by
NAPOCOR for hydroelectric power.
NAPOCOR alleged that the subject land was until then possessed and administered by Marawi City so that in
exchange for the city's waiver and quitclaim of any right over the property, NAPOCOR had paid the city a
financial assistance instead.
Mangondato claimed that the subject land is his duly registered private property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-378-A in his name, and that he is not privy to any agreement between NAPOCOR and
Marawi City and that any payment made to said city cannot be considered as payment to him.
More than a decade later NAPOCOR acceded to the fact that the property belongs to Mangondato.
NAPOCOR's National Power Board resolved to pay Mangondato P100.00 per square meter for only a 12,132
square meter portion of the subject property plus 12% interest per annum from 1978. However, in the August
7, 1990 board meeting, confirmation of said resolution was deferred to allow NAPOCOR's regional legal
counsel to determine whether P100.00 per square meter is the fair market value.
Mangondato disagreed with the NAPOCOR board's pegging the compensation for his land at P100.000 per
square meter without interest from 1978 when NAPOCOR reassessed the fair market value of the land.
Mangondato submitted that the fair market value of his land is even more than the P300.00 (per) square
meter stated in the City Appraisal Report but that for expediency, he is willing to settle for P300.00 per square
meter plus 12% interest per annum from 1978.
The petitioner assigned the error that the lower courts erred in affirming that the just compensation of his
property was based on it’s value in 1992 when the complaint was filed and not in 1978 when the property was
taken by petition and erred in fixing it’s total value.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent court was justified in ruling that just compensation is the equivalent of
the value of the property when the complaint was filed and not during taking?
Ruling: Yes.
The general rule in determining "just compensation" in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the
date of the filing of complaint, as follows :
Sec. 4. Order of Condemnation. When such a motion is overruled or when any party fails to defend as
required by this rule, the court may enter an order of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful
right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint,
upon the payment of just compensation to, be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. . . .
In the instant case, however, it is difficult to conceive of how there could have been an extra-ordinary increase
in the value of the owner's land arising from the expropriation, as indeed the records do not show any
evidence that the valuation of P1,000.00 reached in 1992 was due to increments directly caused by
petitioner's use of the land. Since the petitioner is claiming an exception to Rule 67, Section 4, 17 it has the
burden of proving its claim that its occupancy and use — not ordinary inflation and increase in land values —
was the direct cause of the increase in valuation from 1978 to 1992. Simply stated, the exception finds
application where the owner would be given undue incremental advantages arising from the use to which the
government devotes the property expropriated.
In sum, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner has failed to show why it should be granted an
exemption from the general rule in determining just compensation provided under Section 4 of Rule 67. On
the contrary, private respondent has convinced us that, indeed, such general rule should in fact be observed in
this case
61. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Yap and Santiago are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR, subjecting it for
transfer to qualified CARP beneficiaries. Aggrieved by the compensation valuation of DAR and LBP,
respondents filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with a preliminary mandatory injunction. The case
was referred to CA for proper determination and disposition.
Respondents argued that DAR and LBP committed grave abuse of discretion and acted without jurisdiction
when they opened trusts accounts in lieu of the depositing in cash or bonds, before the lands was taken and
the titles are cancelled. Respondents claim that before the taking of the property, the compensation must be
deposited in cash or bonds.
DAR, maintained that the certificate of deposit was a substantial compliance with the rule on taking and
compensation. LBP confirms that the certificate of deposit expresses "reserved/deposited".
CA ruled in favor of Yap and Santiago. DAR filed a petition. DAR, maintain that the word "deposit" referred
merely to the act of depositing and in no way excluded the opening of a trust account as form of deposit.
ISSUE: Whether or not without prompt payment, compensation can be considered just.
RULING: NO, because the owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land
while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with
his loss.
Obviously, this would render the right to seek a fair and just compensation illusory as it would discourage
owners of private lands from contesting the offered valuation of the DAR even if they find it unacceptable, for
fear of the hardships that could result from long delays in the resolution of their cases.
This is contrary to the rules of fair play because the concept of just compensation embraces not only the
correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land
within a reasonable time from its taking.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just for the property owner is made to suffer
the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more
before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.
62. PANES vs VISAYAN STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE
FACTS: Pres. Marcos issued PD 1107 establishing the Root Crops Center in the Visayas State College of
Agriculture (hereafter VISCA) located at Baybay, Leyte. Pursuant to the purposes of the Root Crops Center,
VISCA was authorized under P.D. No. 1107 to acquire by negotiated sale or expropriation, private agricultural
properties in Barrios Pangasugan and in Guadalupe, Baybay, Leyte.
Clothed by P.D. No. 1107 with the power to expropriate lands situated within the aforecited barrios,
respondent VISCA filed a complaint for expropriation against petitioners. The public purposes cited therefor
were the following: (1) to establish experimental fields; (2) to construct buildings, laboratories and housing
facilities for the personnel of the Root Crops Center; and (3) to integrate and conduct country-wide researches
on root crops.
Respondent VISCA deposited the amount of P74,050.00 with the PNB representing the assessed value of the
lands for taxation purposes. 
PD 1533 determined the just compensation in expropriation cases to be the fair and current market value
declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated or such market value as determined by the
assessor, whichever is lower.
Petitioners filed their answer. They alleged that their lands sought to be expropriated were not within the area
specified under P.D. No. 1107; that the amount of P74,050.00 did not constitute just compensation; and P.D.
1533 was unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not PD 1533 is unconstitutional for determining just compensation.
RULING: YES, the determination of just compensation under P.D. 1533, was converted from being a judicial
prerogative to an executive decision. The executive determination of just compensation in eminent domain
proceedings renders the courts inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to them for final
determination. (separation of powers)
63. REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Private respondent Acil Corporation owned several hectares of land in Davao del Norte, which the
government took pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private respondent's certificates of
title were cancelled and new ones were issued and distributed to farmer-beneficiaries.
The lands were valued by the Land Bank of the PH at P19,312.24 per hectare for the riceland and P4,267.68
per hectare for brushland, or for a total of P439,105.39. It appears, however, that in the Statement of
Agricultural Landholdings which private respondent had earlier filed with the DAR, a lower "Fair Value
Acceptable to Landowner" was stated and that based on this statement, the Land Bank of the Philippines
valued private respondent's lands uniformly at P15,311.79 per hectare and fixed the amount of P390,557.84
as the total compensation to be paid for the lands.
Private respondent rejected the government's offer, pointing out that nearby lands planted to the same crops
were valued at the higher price of P24,717.40 per hectare. The matter was brought before the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator who sustained the initial valuation made by the LBP.
Private respondent then filed a Petition for Just Compensation in the RTC of Tagum, Davao del Norte, sitting as
a Special Agrarian Court. Private respondent prayed that DAR be ordered to pay P24,717.40 per hectare.
However, the RTC dismissed its petition on the ground that private respondent should have appealed to the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board.
Private respondent moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.
Private respondent therefore filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, contending that a
petition for just compensation falls under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC. His contention was
sustained by the Court of Appeals.
In turn the government, represented by DAR, filed this petition for review on certiorari, raising as the issue
whether in cases involving claims for just compensation, an appeal from the decision of the provincial
adjudicator to the DARAB must first be made before a landowner can resort to the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not appeal from to the DARAB must first be made before a landowner can resort to the
RTC.
RULING: NO. Although the law speaks of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as
Special Agrarian Courts, the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any
effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into
appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to law and therefore would be void. What adjudicators are
empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to
landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this question.
64. NAPOCOR v Henson G.R. No. 129998. December 29, 1998

Facts: NPC originally instituted with RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga a complaint for eminent domain for
taking of five parcels of land for public use which was owned by respondents to pave way for the expansion of
NPC Mexico Power Substation.
There was no declaration of the court with regard to the lawful right of petitioner to expropriate but fixed a
provisional fair market value per square meter at P100. Trial Court then appointed commissioners to assess
the values of the lands and fixed the amount of P400 as just compensation for the taking of the parcels of
land. CA affirmed the decision of RTC.
ISSUE: W/N RTC is correct in fixing the fair market value of the parcels of land
Ruling: NO. The land in question, was undeveloped, idle land, principally agricultural in character, though re-
classified as residential. The recommendation of the board of commissioners to appraise the land must
conduct a hearing on the report of the commissioners. The determination of the fixed fair market value must
have corresponding support in evidence to satisfy just compensation of the land.

65. EDGARDO SANTOS, vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Petitioner Edgardo Santos is the plaintiff in Agrarian Case for the determination of just compensation
regarding properties which were taken by DAR under P.D. No. 27 A preliminary valuation of the amount had in
fact been previously released by the Land Bank in cash and bond; thus deducting it from the total amount
adjudged, the balance unpaid amounted to P45,698,805.34 which was ordered by the Regional Trial Court to
be paid in accordance with RA 6657.
The Land Bank elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, which eventually dismissed the appeal.
Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued by the RTC declaring that the Land Bank had complied with the
writ of execution and ordered the same to release the amount to petitioner and the made payment to the
Clerk of Court as commission fees for execution of judgment.
Petitioner claimed that the payment of Land Bank Bonds was not acceptable to him and that the said
amount should be paid in cash or certified check. The respondent Land Bank, on the other hand, opposed the
motion, contending that the judgment amount had already been satisfied.
To summarize, the very issue to be resolved in the instant case is to determine how much should be
paid in cash and how much also should be paid in bonds, to fully satisfy the judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the compensation can be payable with bonds

RULING: YES. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657) provides that just compensation to
landowners shall be paid in cash and bonds. Hence, a trial court decision directing the payment of such
compensation "in the manner provided by R.A. 6657" is not illegally amended but is merely clarified by an
order, issued during the execution proceedings, that such amount shall be paid in cash and bonds.

MP EMPHASIZED

66. Sigre v CA

FACTS: Private respondents filed with the CA a petition for prohibition and madamus and sought to prohibit
Land Bank from accepting the leasehold rentals from Ernesto Sigre, and for LB to turn over to private
respondent the rentals previously remitted. This is in accordance to DAR Memorandum circular no. 6 which
set the guidelines of the land transfer program under PD 27. Private respondent stated that there was no
notice on the fixing of the production and the land valuation, assailing the validity of the circular and the PD.
The appellate court favored the private respondent stating that due to the enactment of RA 6657 (CARP LAW)
PD 27 is no longer applicable.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred that the PD 27 fixing the just compensation of the land has been repealed by
CARP LAW

RULING: YES. The CARP LAW operates distinctly from PD27. RA 6657 covers all public and private agricultural
land including other lands of the public domain suitable. While PD 27 covers rice and corn lands.

67. National Housing Authority v. Heirs of Isidro

FACTS: Petitioner National Housing Authority intends to develop lands within a blighted urban center as a
socialized housing project. The Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo were the claimants/owners of Cadastral Lot No.
1613-D located at Carreta, Mabolo, Cebu City.
The Heirs waived their right to object petitioner’s power to expropriate properties. The RTC declared
that NHA has a lawful right to expropriate the properties of respondents, and ordered the payment, and that
commissioners be appointed to ascertain just compensation.
The amount was fixed at P11,200/sqm. Petitioner appealed and while it was pending, they filed with
the trial court a Motion to Dismiss the complaint for eminent domain. It alleged that the implementation of its
socialized housing project was rendered impossible by the unconscionable value of the land sought to be
expropriated, which the intended beneficiaries cannot afford.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners may discontinue the expropriation proceedings when they find the just
compensation fixed by the court as unacceptpable
RULING: No. Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is
determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the determination of just
compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not
more than three commissioners.
The outcome of the first phase of expropriation proceedings, which is either an order of expropriation
or an order of dismissal, is final since it finally disposes of the case. On the other hand, the second phase ends
with an order fixing the amount of just compensation. Both orders, being final, are appealable.
Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its
public use can no longer be questioned.
Respondent landowners had already been prejudiced by the expropriation case. Petitioner cannot be
permitted to institute condemnation proceedings against respondents only to abandon it later when it finds
the amount of just compensation unacceptable.
68. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, DPWH, and ATO v. Milagros Urgello

FACTS: The Civil Aeronautics Administration filed a complaint for expropriation of Lot No. 913-E-3, owned by
respondent Milagros Urgello for the projected expansion of the Lahug Airport. The CAA agreed to purchase
the Lot for P3,105 subject to the resolutory condition that in the event the Republic of the Philippines would
no longer use it as an airport, its title or ownership would revert to respondent or her heirs upon
reimbursement of the purchase price of P3,105.00. Urgello executed a Conditional Deed of Sale to that effect.
When Mactan Airport commenced its operations, PAL stopped using Lahug Airport. Soon enough,
Filipinas Airways and Air Manila also stopped.
The Bureau of Air Transportation (previously CAA) and the Bureau of Equipment of the then Ministry of
Public Works and Highways (MPWH), entered into a Memorandum of Agreement whereby the BAT was to
lease several parcels of land, including Lot No. 913-E-3, to MPWH for 25 years to be used as the site of the
latter’s Seventh Regional Base Shop Complex.
The MPWH soon started building fences along the perimeters of Lot No. 913-E-3
Respondent requested the BAT for reconveyance and tendered Demand Draft to BAT which received it but did
not reconvey the lot.
ISSUE: WON BAT lawfully fenced Lot 913-E-3 despite its not being used as an airport, without paying any just
compensation
RULING: No. Contrary to petitioners DPWHs and ATOs undertakings in the Compromise Agreement, they
failed to reconvey Lot No. 913-E-3 to respondent despite her return of the purchase price therefor. Such
failure amounts to expropriation without just compensation. These lots, without the plaintiffs consent, were
unilaterally taken by the government when BAT fenced the same. Such an act violates the constitutional
mandate that Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
69. San Roque Realty and Development Corporation v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: The subject parcels of land are located at Lahug, Cebu City and were part of Lot No. 933. Lot No. 933
was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11946. It was originally owned by Ismael D. Rosales, Pantaleon
Cabrera and Francisco Racaza.
October 19, 1938, plaintiff (then Commonwealth now Republic of the Philippines) instituted
condemnation proceeding against the owners of Lot 933 in Banilad Estate Lahug before the Court of First for
the purpose of carrying out the development program of the Philippine Army. Judge Felix Martinez ordered
plaintiff to make an initial deposit of P9,500.00 payable to the Provincial Treasurer as pre-condition for the
entry on the lands sought to be expropriated.
The Republic admits that the initial deposit was disbursed in full to the owners of the 18 lots subject of
expropriation it made records of payment were destroyed by fire during World War II, and it cannot be
ascertained who received the money.
San Roque alleged that subject land have been covered by the Torrens System for decades and any
transaction including the alleged expropriation should have been registered and annotated on the Transfer
Certificates of Title; that there has been no registration much less annotation of said expropriation on TCTs
issued to defendant San Roque nor any of its predecessors-in-interest.
RTC ruled in favour of SRRDC, and the CA revesed such ruling, finding that appeal from the CFI Decision
in the expropriation case was never made by the original owners of the subject properties, and thus, the
expropriation became final and binding on the them, and SRRDC, which merely stepped into the latter's shoes.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a compliance with the constitutional mandate that Private Property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation
RULING: No. Without full payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the landowner
to the expropriator. The Republic’s failure to pay just compensation precluded the perfection of its title over
Lot No. 932. The payment of just compensation for private property taken for public use is an indispensable
requisite for the exercise of the States sovereign power of eminent domain.
Republic manifestly failed to present clear and convincing evidence of full payment of just
compensation and receipt thereof by the property owners. The CFI Decision makes no mention of the initial
deposit allegedly made by the Republic. Based on the CFI Decision fixing the amount of just compensation for
some of the lots, the initial deposit, if it was indeed disbursed, would still not adequately recompense all the
owners of the 18 expropriated lots. If the Republic had actually made full payment of just compensation, in
the ordinary course of things, it would have led to the cancellation of title, or at least, the annotation of the
lien in favor of the government on the certificate of title covering Lot No. 933.
The CA Decision is reversed.
70. Land Bank v. Peralta

Facts: Victorino Peralta is the registered owner of two parcels of agricultural land located at Sinangguyan,
Bukidnon. Of the total area of more than 8 hectares, 2.73 hectares were placed under the Operation Land
Transfer (OLT) program and distributed to tenant-beneficiaries pursuant to PD No. 27. On 2000, respondent
filed with the RTC, acting as special agrarian court (SAC), a petition for judicial determination of just
compensation for his landholding, alleging that the true valuation of lands sold within the vicinity is
200,000/hectare, while the price made by the petitioner was fixed at 6,315php only/ 63 centavos per sqm.
Petitioner stated that the subject land was valued way back in 1981 as evidenced by the Landowner-Tenant
Production Agreement (LTPA). It maintained that having agreed to the stipulated price in the LTPA,
respondent had waived his claim for a higher compensation.

The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) conducted an inspection of the subject land
and recommended the amount of P17,240php, pursuant to the formula under PD 27. While the Municipal
Assessor reported that the value is 200,000/hectare. The SAC rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiffs,
and the petitioners appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the judgement of SAC finding that petitioner has not
shown that it complied with the requirement of full payment of the cost of respondent’s landholding. While it
is true that petitioner had made a valuation of the property as stated in the LTPA, using the formula provided
under P.D. No. 27, the effort has not gone beyond that point as no just compensation, as thus evaluated, had
ever been made to the respondent prompting the latter to file a summary proceeding before the DARAB, and
eventually a petition with the SAC praying for the fixing of just compensation pursuant to Republic Act No.
6657. The CA thus ruled that since the application of the process of agrarian reform to the subject land has
remained incomplete as of the advent of R.A. 6657, actual title remains with respondent and the completion
of the agrarian reform process should now be undertaken under R.A. 6657.
Issue: WON the CARP LAW (R.A. 6657) should apply in determining just compensation.

Ruling: Yes. If the issue of just compensation is not settled prior to the passage of R.A. No. 6657, it should be
computed in accordance with the said law, although the property was acquired under P.D. No. 27. Considering
that respondents land had been previously acquired under P.D. No. 27 but the valuation has been the subject
of his challenge before the SAC, the completion and final resolution of just compensation should therefore be
computed in accordance with Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657.

It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27
and EO 228 considering the DAR’s failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of
time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is
especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample. Since the
acquisition process under P.D. No. 27 remains incomplete and is overtaken by R.A. No. 6657, the process
should be completed under R.A. No. 6657, with P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 having suppletory effect only.

71. Land Bank of the Philippines vs Eusebio

Facts: Benecio Eusebio, Jr. was the owner of a 790.4-hectare parcel of land situated in Corba, Masbate,
registered in the name of Ricardo Tañada. Eusebio purchased this parcel of land from Tañada in 1980. On
1988, Eusebio voluntarily offered to sell the entire 790.4-hectare parcel of land to the government, through
the DAR, pursuant to R.A. No. 6657 for ₱19,500,000.00. DAR chose to acquire only 783.37 hectares and
initially offered to purchase it at ₱2.3M, then increasing it to ₱3.1M. Eusebio rejected both amounts. On 1993,
petitioner revalued the acquirable portion at ₱3.9M, pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 6. Eusebio
likewise rejected this valuation. Meanwhile, the LBP opened a trust account in the amount of ₱3.1M in favor
of Eusebio and Tañada for the covered portion. The DAR then took physical possession of the property, had its
transfer certificate cancelled in favor of the Republic, and distributed the property at cost to the recognized
farmer-beneficiaries.
The parties referred the matter to the DARAB for summary determination of just compensation, who fixed the
property at 4M, which Eusebio did not accept. Eusebio and Tañada filed before the RTC-SAC an action for
determination and payment of just compensation against the DAR & LBP. The RTC ruled in favor of Eusebio
and fixed the price at 25M. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision pointing out that DAR/LBP merely
confined its determination to factors under RA 6657 and the DAR admin orders and disregarding, in effect, the
other factors relevant to the determination of what the CA considered as the full and fair equivalent of
Eusebio’s property. The CA considered as fair and equitable the amount the RTC-SAC fixed as just
compensation, given the four-year time lapse between 1988, when Eusebio offered to sell the property and
1992, when the government actually deprived Eusebio of his property.
Issue: WON the RTC-SAC’s determination of just compensation for the property at ₱25,000,000.00 is proper.
Ruling: No. Section 57 of R.A. 6657 explicitly vests in the RTC-SAC the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine just compensation for lands taken pursuant to the State’s agrarian reform program. To guide the
RTC-SAC in the exercise of its function, Section 17 of R.A. 6657 enumerates the factors that the RTC-SAC must
take into account in its determination. To ensure the agrarian reform law’s proper implementation, Section 49
of R.A. 6657 empowers the DAR to issue such rules and regulations necessary for the purpose. In this case,
DAR AO 5-98, that incorporated, into a basic formula, Section 17’s enumerated factors providing the details by
which "just compensation" is to be properly approximated. RT-SAC has the duty to consider the factors
enumerated under Section 17 of R.A. 6657 and the DAR formula that embodies these factors in determining
just compensation.
In other words, in the exercise of the essentially judicial function of determining just compensation, the RTC-
SAC is not granted unlimited discretion. It must consider and apply the R.A. No. 6657-enumerated factors and
the DAR formula (that reflects these factors) as they provide the uniform framework or structure by which just
compensation for property subject to agrarian reform should be determined.

72. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM vs SPOUSES DIOSDADO STA. ROMANA

Facts: Spouses Diosdado Sta. Roman, et al. are the owners of a 27.5307-ha. agricultural land situated in San
Jose City, Nueva Ecija. Petitioner DAR compulsorily acquired a 21.2192-ha. portion (subject land) of
respondents’ property pursuant to the government’s Operation Land Transfer Program under PD 27. On 1995,
the DAR caused the generation of emancipation patents (EPs) in favor of the farmer-beneficiaries, and, in
1996, the LBP fixed the value of the subject land at ₱361,181.87 using the formula under EO 228 and DAR
Administrative Order No. 13, series of 1994.
Dissatisfied with the LBP valuation, respondents filed a Petition for Approval and Appraisal of Just
Compensation before the RTC, averring that: (a) the LBP valuation was inadequate considering the subject
land’s proximity to subdivision lots and commercial establishments; and (b) the fair market value of the
subject land should be fixed in the amount of at least ₱300,000.00/ha. as some beneficiaries were even selling
their lands to subdivision developers at the price of ₱1,000,000.00/ha.
LBP insisted on the correctness of the valuation, having been computed in accordance with the formula under
EO 228 which governs the determination of just compensation due a landowner whose property was seized
under PD 27. The RTC appointed 2 commissioners for the purpose, who recommended the amount of
₱300,000.00/ha. as reasonable compensation for the subject land. RTC rendered a Decision rejecting the LBP
valuation and fixing the just compensation of the subject land at ₱2,576,829.94 or ₱121,438.60/ha. It
explained that while respondents’ land was acquired pursuant to PD 27, the same is covered by Republic Act
No. (RA) 6657, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988," which provides that in
determining just compensation, the factors under Section 17 of RA 6657 should be considered.
Issue: WON the subject land was properly valued in accordance with the factors set forth in Section 17 of RA
6657, as amended.
Ruling: No. Settled is the rule that when the agrarian reform process is still incomplete, as in this case where
the just compensation for the subject land acquired under PD 27 has yet to be paid, just compensation should
be determined and the process concluded under RA 6657, with PD 27 and EO 228 having mere suppletory
effects.
The Court has gone over the records and observed that the only factors considered by the RTC in determining
the just compensation for the subject land were (a) the acquisition price of a 5.5825-ha. landholding situated
in the same locality paid to the owner on November 17, 1997, and (b) the market value of the subject land
declared by the respondents, without a showing that the other factors under Section 17 of RA 6657, were
even taken into account or, otherwise, found to be inapplicable, contrary to what the law requires.
73. DAR vs. Berina (Procedural)
FACTS Respondents are owners of agricultural lands that were placed under the government’s ownership
under PD 27. Respondents filed a Complaint for Determination of Just Compensation before the RTC, averring
that the initial DAR valuation was unconscionably low, considering that every hectare of rice land has an
average produce of 120 sacks of palay every harvest season. In its answer, the DAR maintained that the
subject portion had already been valued under PD 27 and EO 228, and, thus, prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint. On the other hand, the LBP averred that respondents had no cause of action against it for the
reason that the DAR had not forwarded any claim folder over the subject portion for processing and payment.
CA ordered LBP the payment as just compensation despite the lack of claim folder
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in directing the LBP to pay the amount of
₱735,562.05 as just compensation for the subject portion despite the absence of the land transfer claim/claim
folder for processing and payment
RULING: No. In the present case, the LBP avers that the DAR has not forwarded to it the corresponding claim
folder which is purportedly a mandatory requirement in order that the payment for the acquired lands may be
disbursed Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that the subject portion had already been expropriated
Respondents’ entitlement to just compensation for the taking of their property cannot be disregarded by the
mere absence of the claim folders asserted in this case, as otherwise, the Court would be abetting the
perpetration of a grave injustice against them.
MAIN POINT
The procedure for the determination of just compensation under RA 6657 commences with the LBP
determining the value of the lands under the land reform program. Using the LBP’s valuation, the DAR makes
an offer to the landowner through a notice of coverage and acquisition pursuant to RA 6657. If the landowner
accepts the offer, the LBP shall pay him the purchase price of the land after he executes and delivers a deed of
transfer and surrenders the certificate of title infavor of the government. In case the landowner rejects the
offer, the DARadjudicator conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for
the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP, and other interested parties to submit evidence in this relation.
A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the Regional Trial
Court designated as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC) for final determination of just compensation.
74. DAR vs Susie Irene Galle
FACTS Respondent owned two contiguous parcels of land known as the Patalon Coconut Estate. LBP (In lieu
with DAR) valued 356.2257 hectares of the estate at ₱6,083,545.26, which valuation was rejected by Galle.
The rejected amount was supposedly deposited in the name of Galle, in the form of cash and bonds.
Zamboanga City Registry of Deeds cancelled Galle’s titles and transferred the entire estate to the State In her
complaint, she alleged that the fair market value of her property at the time of its taking was at least ₱100 per
sqm. However, LBP stuck to its position that the amount of compensation for plaintiff should be
₱7,534,063.92, or ₱2.10 per sqm.
ISSUE: Whether or not the amount of just compensation proposed to Galle was correct
RULING: Yes. In its determination of the land value, LBP has used the valuation factors on Capitalized Net
Income (CNI) and Market Value per Tax Declaration (MV/TD) multiplied by ninety percent (90%) and ten
percent (10%) respectively. In using such valuation factors, it has come up with a total land value of
₱7,534,063.92. RTC-SAC did not point to any specific evidence or cite the values and amounts it used in
arriving at the ₱100.00 per square meter valuation. It did not even consider the property’s market value based
on the current tax declaration.
MAIN POINT
In the exercise of the Court’s essentially judicial function of determining just compensation, the RTC-
SACs are not granted unlimited discretion and must consider and apply the R.A. No. 6657-enumerated factors
and the DAR formula that reflect these factors. These factors and formula provide the uniform framework or
structure for the computation of the just compensation for a property subject to agrarian reform. This uniform
system will ensure that they do not arbitrarily fix an amount that is absurd, baseless and even contradictory to
the objectives of our agrarian reform laws as just compensation. This system will likewise ensure that the just
compensation fixed represents, at the very least, a close approximation of the full and real value of the
property taken that is fair and equitable for both the farmer-beneficiaries and the landowner.

75. De Knecht vs. Bautista 100 SCRA 660 ; GR L-51078, October 30, 1980

FACTS: There was a plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be ultimately linked to the Cavite Coastal Road
Project, originally called for the expropriation of properties along Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City. Later on,
however, the Ministry of Public Highways decided to make the proposed extension pass through Fernando
Rein and Del Pan Streets. Residents of the latter protested and claimed that the choice is arbitrary, hence, the
Commission on Human Settlements recommended the reversion to the original plan, but the Ministry argued
the new route will save the government P2 million. The government filed expropriation proceedings against
the owners of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, among whom was petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proposed extension passing through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets is arbitrary.

RULING: YES.
From all the foregoing, the facts of record and recommendations of the Human Settlements Commission, it is
clear that the choice of Fernando Rein—Del Pan Streets as the line through which the Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue should be extended to Roxas Boulevard is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval.
MAIN POINT: There is no question as to the right of the Republic of the Philippines to take private property for
public use upon the payment of just compensation. It is recognized, however, that the government may not
capriciously of arbitrarily choose what private property should be taken.

76. Manotoc vs. NHA 150 SCRA 89 ; GR L-55166, May 21, 1987

FACTS: Petitioners are the owners of two large estates known as the Tambunting Estate and Sunog-Apog in
Tondo, Manila, both of which were declared expropriated in two decrees issued by President Marcos, PD 1669
and PD 1670. The petitioners contend that the decrees violate their constitutional right to due process and
equal protection since by their mere passage their properties were automatically expropriated and they were
immediately deprived of the ownership and possession thereof without being given the chance to oppose
such expropriation. The government on the other hand contends that the power of eminent domain is
inherent in the State and when the legislature or the President through his law-making powers exercises this
power, the public use and public necessity of the expropriation and the fixing of the just compensation
become political in nature and the courts must respect the decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not PD 1669 and PD 1670 are unconstitutional for automatically expropriating the property
of the petitioners.

RULING: YES.
The expropriation is instant and automatic to take effect immediately upon the signing of the decree. No
deposit before the taking is required. There is not provision for any interest to be paid upon unpaid
installments. Not only are the owners given absolutely no opportunity to contest the expropriation, or
question the amount of payments fixed by the decree, but the decision of the NHA are expressly declared
beyond judicial review.

MAIN POINT: The decrees, do not by themselves, provide for any form of hearing or procedure by which the
petitioners can question the propriety of the expropriation of their properties or the reasonableness of the
just compensation.

77. Republic vs. De Knecht

FACTS: In 1980, Republic filed an expropriation proceeding against Respondent who is the owners of the
houses standing along Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets, which will be used as the line through which the EDSA
should be extended to Roxas Boulevard. SC ruled that the expropriation was arbitrary based on the
recommendation of the Human Settlements Commission that the choice of Cuneta street as the line of the
extension is better as it will minimize the social impact factor, so the case was remanded to the lower court.
No further action was taken despite the SC decision until two years later, in 1983, when the Government
moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the Legislature has enacted BP P 340 expropriating the
same properties for the same purpose.

ISSUES: WON an expropriation proceeding that was determined by a final judgment of the Supreme Court
may be the subject of a subsequent legislation for expropriation.

RULING: YES. While it is true that said final judgment of this Court in Knecht vs. Bautista becomes the law of
the case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of the petitioner to take private properties for
public use upon the payment of the just compensation is so provided in the Constitution and our laws. The
social impact factor which persuaded this Court to consider this extension to be arbitrary had disappeared.
The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enacting BP 340 as it will solve not only the drainage and
flood control problem but also minimize the traffic bottleneck in the area, wherein the houses of Respondents
becomes an obstacle of this objective. Thus the anterior decision of this Court must yield to subsequent
legislative act.

MAINPOINT: Such expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the petitioner not only by voluntary
negotiation with the land owners but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation.

78. Militante vs. CA

FACTS: In 1975, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1315 was issued expropriating forty (40) hectares of land, this
includes the land owned by petitioner. The land expropriated was identified in the decree as a slum area that
required the upgrading of basic facilities and services. In 1987, NHA started negotiations with petitioner and
informed petitioner that NHAs maximum offer was P500.00 per square meter. This was rejected by petitioner,
through his lawyer, in a letter. So he questions the constitutionality of PD No. 1315.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner can question the constitutionality of PD no. 1315

RULING: No. Petitioner did not question its constitutionality when it was decreed in 1975. In 1987, he even
negotiated with NHA for the price of his land. Implicitly but clearly, he recognized the validity of the decree.
The negotiation unfortunately fell and the government did not take any further step to expropriate his land. In
the case at bar, the landowners concerned may not opt for the right to be paid just compensation. The
process is not an easy one and may take years especially in light of the budget difficulties of the government.
We take judicial notice of the fact that the current budget deficit of the government amounts to P8.9 billion.

MAINPOINT: A well-recognized rule in constitutional law is that estoppel may operate to prevent a party from
asserting that an act is unconstitutional. Estoppel is the principle that precludes a person from asserting
something contrary to what is implied by a previous action or statement of that person or by a previous
pertinent judicial determination.
79. Imbong vs. Ochoa

FACTS: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. Challengers from various
sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the ground of whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over
the controversy.

ISSUE: WON the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

RULING: YES. The rule is that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, (a) there must
be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
lis mota of the case. All this requisites are present in the case.

MAINPOINT: Judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers
and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and
maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them.