Flores v Drilon

Facts:
RA 7227 appointed Respondent mayor Gordon as chairman and chief executive officer of
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SMBA) for the first year of its operations from the effectivity
of the Act. This appointment is challenged by the petitioners as infringing the constitutional and
statutory provisions which states that no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. The Respondent
argued that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code (LGC) permits the appointment of a local
elective official to another post if so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office.
Issue:
whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states, "Provided, however,
That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of
Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority,"
violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to
other government posts.
Ruling:
Yes. The provision is unconstitutional. The subject proviso directs the President to
appoint an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts. Since
this is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the
imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first part., Art. IX-B, of the
Constitution. Here, the fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to the
higher interest of the body politic is of no moment. Section 94 of the LGC is not determinative of
the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, for no legislative act can prevail over the
fundamental law of the land. Since an incumbent elective official is not eligible to the appointive
position, his appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid in view of his disqualification or
lack of eligibility.
Where the constitution or statutes declare that persons holding one office shall be
ineligible for election or appointment to another office, either generally or of a certain kind, the
prohibition has been held to incapacitate the incumbent of the first office to hold the second so
that any attempt to hold the second is void.

Galido v COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Galido and private respondent were candidates during the local elections for
the position of mayor. Petitioner was proclaimed duly-elected Mayor. Private respondent
Saturnino R. Galeon filed an election protest before the RTC which upheld the proclamation of
the petitioner. The respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC which then reversed the
RTC. The COMELEC found that the fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct containing the
initial "C" after the name "Galido" were marked ballots and, therefore, invalid. Hence, the
petitioner filed this present case. In several cases decided by this Court, according to petitioner, it
was held that in the appreciation of ballots where there is no evidence aliunde of a purpose to
identify the ballots, the same should not be invalidated as marked ballots. The COMELEC thus
committed grave abuse of discretion when it disregarded the cited decisions of this Court and
declared that the suffix "C" after the name Galido was in reality a countersign nd not a mere
erroneous initial.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in rendering the questioned decision.
Ruling:
No. It is settled that the function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court or
tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial,
and city officials and has appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
COMELEC has the inherent power to decide an election contest on physical evidence,
equity, law and justice, and apply established jurisprudence in support of its findings and
conclusions; and that the extent to which such precedents apply rests on its discretion, the
exercise of which should not be controlled unless such discretion has been abused to the
prejudice of either party.

Rivera v COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Juan Garcia Rivera and private respondent Juan Mitre Garcia II were
candidates for the position of Mayor. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Rivera as
the duly elected Mayor by a majority of ten (10) votes.. Garcia filed an election protest with the
Regional Trial Court. After due hearing, and upon considering the report of a Revision
Committee it had earlier created, the trial court rendered its verdict finding Garcia to have
obtained 6,376 votes as against Rivera's 6,222. Rivera appealed to the COMELEC. COMELEC
sustained with modification the appealed judgment of the Regional Trial Court Declaring Garcia
as the duly elected Municipal Mayor, by a majority of 153 votes over Rivera instead of a
plurality of 154 votes. A motion for reconsideration was filed but COMELEC denied and issued
a writ of execution, thus, Garcia commenced to discharge the duties and functions of Mayor.
Petitioner filed the present case. The supplemental ground raised by petitioner Rivera that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion "by not excluding from the total votes of
Garcia at least ten (10) votes which were misappreciated in Garcia's favor, outside of those
objected votes already ruled upon by the COMELEC" does not deserve any consideration. If
true, it is an error in judgment, correctible by appeal, not by a petition for certiorari pursuant to
Rule 65, Section 1, of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling:
 No. We have closely scrutinized the challenged COMELEC decision and find that the
said decision was not arrived at capriciously or whimsically by respondent COMELEC. A
painstaking re-evaluation of the questioned 67 ballots was made by the COMELEC en banc. In
fact, fourteen (14) ballots originally adjudicated in Garcia's favor were overruled by the
Commission en banc, thus reducing the number of votes in his favor to 894 votes out of the
2,445 contested ballots. On the other hand, 16 ballots were added in Rivera's favor, thus
increasing the votes in his favor to 1,087 votes.
Moreover, the appreciation and re-evaluation of ballots are factual determinations. It is
settled that in a petition for certiorari, findings of fact of administrative bodies are final unless
grave abuse of discretion has marred such factual determinations. We find none in this case.
Borja v COMELEC – ADMIN CASE

Adormeo v COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent were the only candidates who filed their certificates of
candidacy for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections. Private respondent was
elected mayor in May 1992. He served the full term. Again, he was re-elected in 1995-1998. In
the election of 1998 he lost to Bernard Tagarao. In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again
won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001.
Petitioner filed a petition to disqualify Talaga from running for Mayor for the May 14,
2001 elections on the ground that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for three (3)
consecutive terms.
Issue:
Whether or not Talaga is qualified to run for mayor for the 2001 elections
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive
terms. For nearly two years he was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was
disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. Neither can respondent's victory in the recall
election be deemed a violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as "voluntary
renunciation" for clearly it was not. Hence, private respondent was not disqualified to run for
mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections.
The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the
three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people's
choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three-term
limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his
post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in
compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect.
Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the
petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
Socrates vs COMELEC
FACTS:

Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City for three consecutive
terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-2001. Obviously aware of the three-term limit
principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie for the same mayoralty position in the 2001 elections, in
which Socrates ran and eventually won. However, midway into his term, Socrates faced recall
proceedings and in the recall election held, Hagedorn run for the former’s unexpired term as
mayor. Socrates sought Hagedorn’s disqualification under the three-term limit rule.

ISSUE:

WON Hagedorn is disqualified to run under the three-term limit rule

HELD:

These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an
elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that
only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that
voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of
service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time
interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from
being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective official cannot immediate re-election for a fourth term,
The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for a fourth term. The prohibited
election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the same office
following the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer
covered by the prohibition for two reasons: 1) A subsequent election like a recall election, is no
longer an immediate reelection after the three consecutive terms; and 2) The intervening period
constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall
election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.

From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto
Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This
period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn’s service as mayor, not because of
his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition. (Socrates vs. Comelec, G.R. No.
154512. November 12, 2002)
Mendoza vs COMELEC
Facts:

Respondent Leonardo B. Roman held the post of Governor of Bataan province a number of
times:

a) 1986 – 1988 Appointed OIC Governor of Bataan by former Pres. Aquino and served up to
1988
b) 1988 – 1992 Elected Governor and served up to 1992
c) 1994 – 1995 Elected Governor during the recall election in 1993, assumed office on 28 June
1994 and served up to 1995
d) 1995 – 1998 Elected Governor and served up to 1998
e) 1998 – 2001 Elected Governor and served up to 2001.

In 2001, private respondent Roman again filed a certificate of candidacy for the same post in the
May 2001 regular elections. On 16 May 2001, Leonardo Roman was proclaimed by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Bataan.

Petitioners Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra seek to declare respondent Roman’s
election as governor of Bataan as null and void for allegedly being contrary to Art. X, §8 of the
Constitution.

Issue:

Should Roman's incumbency to the post of Governor following the recall elections be included
in determining the three-consecutive term limit fixed by law?

Held:

No. A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent elective local official merely
serves the balance of the latter's term of office; it is not a full three-year term.

The law contemplates a continuous full three-year term before the proscription can apply,
providing for only one exception, i.e., when an incumbent voluntarily gives up the office. If
involuntary severance from the service which results in the incumbent’s being unable to finish
his term of office because of his ouster through valid recall proceedings negates “one term” for
purposes of applying the three-term limit, it stands to reason that the balance of the term assumed
by the newly elected local official in a recall election should not also be held to be one term in
reckoning the three-term limit.

In both situations, neither the elective local official who is unable to finish his term nor the
elected local official who only assumes the balance of the term of the ousted local official
following the recall election could be considered to have served a full three-year term set by the
Constitution.

The Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for more than three
consecutive terms because, in fact, it excludes from the three-term limit interruptions in the
continuity of service, so long as such interruptions are not due to the voluntary renunciation of
the office by an incumbent. Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during
which respondent Leonardo B. Roman served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election
held in 1993, should not be counted. Since on May 14, 2001 respondent had previously served
as governor of Bataan for only two consecutive terms (1995-1998 and 1998-2001), his election
on that day was actually only his third term for the same position.

A recall term should not be considered as one full term, because a contrary interpretation would
in effect cut short the elected official’s service to less than nine years and shortchange his
constituents. The desire to prevent monopoly of political power should be balanced against the
need to uphold the voters’ obvious preference who, in the present case, is Roman who received
97 percent of the votes cast.

Osmena v COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioners argue that RA 7056, in providing for desynchronized elections violates the
Constitution:

1. Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of synchronized
national and local elections on the second Monday of May 1992;

2. Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof, providing that all
incumbent provincial, city and municipal officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and
shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified violates Section 2,
Article XVIII (Transitory Provision) of the Constitution;

3. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in effect, shortens the term or
tenure of office of local officials to be elected on the 2nd Monday of November, 1992 violates
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution;

4. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for Presidential, Vice-
Presidential and Senatorial elections, violates the provision of Section 9, Article IX under the
title “Commission on Elections” of the Constitution;

5. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in Republic Act 7056
to synchronized national and local elections set by the Constitution on the second Monday of
May, 1992, are not sufficient, much less, valid justification for postponing the local elections to
the second Monday of November 1992, and in the process violating the Constitution itself. If, at
all, Congress can devise ways and means, within the parameters of the Constitution, to eliminate
or at least minimize these problems and if this, still, is not feasible, resort can be made to the
self-correcting mechanism built in the Constitution for its amendment or revision.

On the other hand, the SolGen, counsel for COMELEC, prays for the denial of this petition
arguing that the question is political in nature and that the petitioners lack legal standing to file
the petition and what they are asking for is an advisory opinion from the court, there being no
justiciable controversy to resolve. On the merits, the SolGen contends that Republic Act 7056 is
a valid exercise of legislative power by Congress and that the regular amending process
prescribed by the Constitution does not apply to its transitory provisions.

PROCEDURAL ISSUE: WON the Court has competence to take cognizance of the instant
petition?

HELD: Yes.

What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom of RA 7056. Hence, contrary to SolGen’s
contention, the issue in this case is justiciable rather than political. And even if the question were
political in nature, it would still come within the Court’s power considering the expanded
jurisdiction conferred by Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which includes the
authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. Regarding
the challenge to the petitioner’s standing, the Supreme Court held that even if the petitioners
have no legal standing, the Court has the power to brush aside technicalities considered the
“transcendental importance” of the issue being raised herein.

MAIN ISSUE: WON RA 7056 is unconstitutional?

HELD: Yes. It is unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court held that the law contravenes Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987
Constitution which provides for the synchronization of national and local elections. The said law,
on the other hand, provides for the de-synchronization of election by mandating that there be two
separate elections in 1992. The term of “synchronization” in the mentioned constitutional
provision was used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise
intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common termination
date will synchronize future elections to once every three years.

R.A. No. 7056 also violated Sec. 2, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the
local official first elected under the Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. But
under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these incumbent local officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992
and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. The Supreme
Court, quoting Corpus Juris Secundum, states that “it is not competent for the legislature to
extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are
elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the
term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no
legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to
qualify within the time”.

R.A. No. 7056 also violated the clear mandate of Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987 Constitution which fixed
the term of office of all elective local officials, except barangay officials, to three (3) years. If the
local election will be held on the second Monday of November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be
elected will be serving for only two years and seven months, that is, from November 30, 1992 to
June 30, 1995, not three years.

The law was also held violative of Sec. 9, Article IX of the Constitution by changing the
campaign period. RA 7056 provides for a different campaign period, as follows:

a) For President arid Vice-Presidential elections one hundred thirty (130) days before the day of
election.
b) For Senatorial elections, ninety (90) days before the day of the election, and
c) For the election of Members of the House of Representatives and local elective provincial, city
and municipal officials forty-five (45) days before the day of the elections.

Mezon v Petilla
DOCENA V. SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF EASTERN SAMAR

FACTS:

The case arose when Luis B. Capito, who had been elected to and was serving as a member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar (SPES) died in office and petitioner Agustin B.
Docena was appointed to succeed him. The appointment was issued on November 19, 1990, by
Secretary Luis T. Santos of the Department of Local Government. Docena took his oath of office
before Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives on November 22, 1990, and
assumed office as member of the SPES on November 26, 1990. On November 27, 1990, private
respondent Socrates B. Alar was appointed, also by Secretary Luis T. Santos, to the position
already occupied by Docena. On December 18, 990, the SPES passed Resolution No. 75
recognizing Alar rather than Docena as the legitimate successor of the late Board Member
Capito. The following day, the SPES was reversed by Secretary Santos. On January 8, 1991,
SPES passed a resolution reiterating the appointment of Alar and declaring void the recall issued
by Secretary Santos. Docena filed a petition for mandamus to compel the respondents (SPES) to
recognize and admit him as a lawfully appointed member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Eastern Samar.

ISSUE:

Whether Docena’s appointment was already complete?

HELD

YES. The said appointment had been accepted by Docena, who had in fact already assumed
office as member of the SPES as per certification of the Provincial Secretary. For all legal intents
and purposes, the petitioner’s appointment had already become complete and enforceable at the
time it was supposed to have been “superseded” by the appointment in favor of Alar. Docena’s
appointment having been issued and accepted earlier, and the petitioner having already assumed
office, he could not thereafter be just recalled and replaced to accommodate Alar. The
appointment was permanent in nature, and for the unexpired portion of the deceased
predecessor’s term. Docena had already acquired security of tenure in the position and could be
removed therefrom only for any of the causes, and conformably to the procedure, prescribed by
the Local Government Code. These requirements could not be circumvented by the simple
process of recalling his appointment.

De Rama vs. CA G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitoner Conrado De
Rama wrote a letter to the CSC seeking the recall of the appointments of 14 municipal
employees. Petitioner justified his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of said
employees were “midnight” appointments of the former mayor, done in violation of Art. VII,
Sec. 15 of the Constitution. The CSC denied petitioner’s request for the recall of the
appointments of the 14 employees for lack of merit. The CSC dismissed petitioner’s allegation
that these were “midnight” appointments, pointing out that the constitutional provision relied
upon by petitioner prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing President and cannot
be made to apply to local elective officials. The CSC opined that the appointing authority can
validly issue appointments until his term has expired, as long as the appointee meets the
qualification standards for the position.

Issue: Whether or not the appointments made by the outgoing Mayor are forbidden under Art.
VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution
Held: The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional prohibition on so-called “midnight
appointments,” specifically those made within 2 months immediately prior to the next
presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President. There is no law that
prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her
tenure.