1. Union of Filipro Employees v. Benigno Vivar, Jr, et al.

G.R. No. 79255 January 20, 1992

We used to have ten (10) regular holidays. This is the reason for the 251 divisor, used by some companies
in computing the daily wage, which represents the 365 days of the year, less 52 Saturdays, 52 Sundays and
the 10 legal holidays. The new law added one more regular holiday – the Eid’l Fitr. We thus have eleven
(11) regular holidays under R.A. 9492:

New Year’s Day (January 1)

Maundy Thursday (Movable date)
Good Friday (Movable date)
Eid’l Fitr (Movable date)
Araw ng Kagitingan – Bataaan and Corregidor Day (Monday nearest April 9)
Labor Day (Monday nearest May 1)
Independence Day (Monday nearest June 12)
National Heroes Day (Last Monday of August)
Bonifacio Day (Monday nearest November 30)
Christmas Day (December 25)
Rizal Day (Monday nearest December 30)
The Labor Code provides that every worker shall be paid his daily wage during regular holidays. Employers
are now required to pay for an extra regular holiday.

Facts:

On November 8, 1985, respondent Filipro, Inc. (now Nestle Philippines, Inc.) filed with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) a petition for claims of its monthly paid employees for holiday pay.

Abitrator Vivar: Filipro to pay its monthly paid employees holiday pay pursuant to Art 94 of Labor Code,
subject to exclusions and limitations in Art 82.

Filipro filed a motion for clarification seeking (1) the limitation of the award to three years, (2) the
exclusion of salesmen, sales representatives, truck drivers, merchandisers and medical representatives
(hereinafter referred to as sales personnel) from the award of the holiday pay, and (3) deduction from the
holiday pay award of overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave benefits due to
the use of 251 divisor.

Petitioner UFE answered that the award should be made effective from the date of effectivity of the Labor
Code, that their sales personnel are not field personnel and are therefore entitled to holiday pay, and that
the use of 251 as divisor is an established employee benefit which cannot be diminished.

Arbitrator Vivar: On January 14, 1986, the respondent arbitrator issued an order declaring that the
effectivity of the holiday pay award shall retroact to November 1, 1974, the date of effectivity of the Labor
Code. He adjudged, however, that the company’s sales personnel are field personnel and, as such, are not
entitled to holiday pay. He likewise ruled that with the grant of 10 days’ holiday pay, the divisor should be
changed from 251 to 261 and ordered the reimbursement of overpayment for overtime, night differential,
vacation and sick leave pay due to the use of 251 days as divisor.

I'm just the pieces of the man I used to be Too many bitter tears are raining down on meI'm far away
from home And I've been facing this alone For much too long Oh, I feel like no-one ever told the truth to
me About growing up and what a struggle it would be In my tangled state of mind I've been looking back to
find Where I went wrong Too much love will kill you If you can't make up your mind Torn between the
lover And the love you leave behind You're headed for disaster 'Cause you never read the signs Too much
love will kill you - every time

Issues:

1) Whether or not Nestle’s sales personnel are entitled to holiday pay; and

2) Whether or not, concomitant with the award of holiday pay, the divisor should be changed from 251 to
261 days and whether or not the previous use of 251 as divisor resulted in overpayment for overtime,
night differential, vacation and sick leave pay.

Held:

1. Sales personnel are not entitled to holiday pay.

Under Article 82, field personnel are not entitled to holiday pay. Said article defines field personnel as
“non-agritultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business
or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with
reasonable certainty.”

The law requires that the actual hours of work in the field be reasonably ascertained. The company has no
way of determining whether or not these sales personnel, even if they report to the office before 8:00 a.m.
prior to field work and come back at 4:30 p.m, really spend the hours in between in actual field work.

Moreover, the requirement that “actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable
certainty” must be read in conjunction with Rule IV, Book III of the Implementing Rules which provides:

Rule IV Holidays with Pay

Sec. 1. Coverage — This rule shall apply to all employees except:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Field personnel and other employees whose time and performance is unsupervised by the
employer . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, in deciding whether or not an employee’s actual working hours in the field can be determined with
reasonable certainty, query must be made as to whether or not such employee’s time and performance
is constantly supervised by the employer.

2. The divisor in computing the award of holiday pay should still be 251 days.

While in that case the issue was whether or not salesmen were entitled to overtime pay, the same
rationale for their exclusion as field personnel from holiday pay benefits also applies.

The petitioner union also assails the respondent arbitrator’s ruling that, concomitant with the award of
holiday pay, the divisor should be changed from 251 to 261 days to include the additional 10 holidays and
the employees should reimburse the amounts overpaid by Filipro due to the use of 251 days’ divisor.
The 251 working days divisor is the result of subtracting all Saturdays, Sundays and the ten (10) legal
holidays from the total number of calendar days in a year. If the employees are already paid for all non-
working days, the divisor should be 365 and not 251.

In the petitioner’s case, its computation of daily ratio since September 1, 1980, is as follows:

monthly rate x 12 months / 251 days

The use of 251 days’ divisor by respondent Filipro indicates that holiday pay is not yet included in the
employee’s salary, otherwise the divisor should have been 261.

It must be stressed that the daily rate, assuming there are no intervening salary increases, is a constant
figure for the purpose of computing overtime and night differential pay and commutation of sick and
vacation leave credits. Necessarily, the daily rate should also be the same basis for computing the 10
unpaid holidays.

The respondent arbitrator’s order to change the divisor from 251 to 261 days would result in a lower
daily rate which is violative of the prohibition on non-diminution of benefits found in Article 100 of the
Labor Code. To maintain the same daily rate if the divisor is adjusted to 261 days, then the dividend, which
represents the employee’s annual salary, should correspondingly be increased to incorporate the holiday
pay.

To illustrate, if prior to the grant of holiday pay, the employee’s annual salary is P25,100, then dividing
such figure by 251 days, his daily rate is P100.00 After the payment of 10 days’ holiday pay, his annual
salary already includes holiday pay and totals P26,100 (P25,100 + 1,000). Dividing this by 261 days, the
daily rate is still P100.00. There is thus no merit in respondent Nestle’s claim of overpayment of overtime
and night differential pay and sick and vacation leave benefits, the computation of which are all based on
the daily rate, since the daily rate is still the same before and after the grant of holiday pay.

SC Decision:

The Court thereby resolves that the grant of holiday pay be effective, not from the date of promulgation of
the Chartered Bank case nor from the date of effectivity of the Labor Code, but from October 23, 1984, the
date of promulgation of the IBAA case (Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees’ Union (IBAAEU) v.
Inciong, where the court declared that Sec 2, Rule IV, Book III of IRR which excluded monthly paid
employees from holiday pay benefits, are null and void).

WHEREFORE, the order of the voluntary arbitrator in hereby MODIFIED. The divisor to be used in
computing holiday pay shall be 251 days. The holiday pay as above directed shall be computed from
October 23, 1984. In all other respects, the order of the respondent arbitrator is hereby AFFIRMED.

2. Rada vs NLRC

Facts:
Petitioner's initial employment with this Respondent was under a "Contract of Employment for a
Definite Period" dated July 7, 1977, copy of which is hereto attached and made an integral part hereof as
Annex A whereby Petitioner was hired as "Driver" for the construction supervision phase of the Manila
North Expressway Extension, Second Stage (hereinafter referred to as MNEE Stage 2) for a term of "about
24 months effective July 1, 1977.
Petitioner's first contract of employment expired on June 30, 1979. Meanwhile, the main project,
MNEE Stage 2, was not finished and the same was extended and remained in progress beyond the original
period of 2.3 years. Since Petitioner had the necessary experience and his performance under the first
contract of employment was found satisfactory, the position of Driver was offered to Petitioner, which he
accepted. Hence a second Contract of Employment for a Definite Period of 10 months. Accordingly, a third
contract of employment for a definite period was executed by and between the Petitioner and the
Respondent whereby the Petitioner was again employed as Driver for 19 months.
The last extension was not extended any further because Petitioner had no more work to do in the
project. This last extension was confirmed by a notice on November 28, 1985 duly acknowledged by the
Petitioner the very next day.

Petitioner filed before the NLRC, National Capital Region, Department of Labor and Employment, a
Complaint for non-payment of separation pay and overtime pay. He also filed an Amended Complaint
alleging that he was illegally dismissed and that he was not paid overtime pay although he was made to
render three hours overtime work form Monday to Saturday for a period of three years.

NLRC rendered its assailed decision dated November 19, 1990, setting aside the labor arbiter's
aforequoted decision and dismissing petitioner's complaint.

Ruling:
Petitioner postulates that as a regular employee, he is entitled to security of tenure, hence he cannot
be terminated without cause. Private respondent Philnor believes otherwise and asserts that petitioner is
merely a project employee who was terminated upon the completion of the project for which he was
employed.
NLRC declared that, as between the uncorroborated and unsupported assertions of petitioners and
those of private respondent which are supported by documents, greater credence should be given the
latter. It further held that:

Complainant was hired in a specific project or undertaking as driver. While such project was still
on-going he was hired several times with his employment period fixed every time his contract was
renewed. At the completion of the specific project or undertaking his employment contract was not
renewed.

We reiterate our ruling in the case of (Quiwa) vs. Philnor Consultants and Planners, Inc., NLRC RAB
III 5-1738-84, it is being applicable in this case, viz.:

. . . While it is true that the activities performed by him were necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the respondent as consultants, planners, contractor and while it is also true that
the duration of his employment was for a period of about seven years, these circumstances did not
make him a regular employee in contemplation of Article 281 of (the) Labor Code. . . .

We hold that private respondents were project employees whose work was coterminous with the
project or which they were hired. Project employees, as distinguished from regular or non-project
employees, are mentioned in section 281 of the Labor Code as those "where the employment has been
fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at
the time of the engagement of the employee."

Project employees are those employed in connection with a particular construction project.
Non-project (regular) employees are those employed by a construction company without
reference to any particular project.

Project employees are not entitled to termination pay if they are terminated as a result of
the completion of the project or any phase thereof in which they are employed, regardless of the
number of projects in which they have been employed by a particular construction company.
 Moreover, the company is not required to obtain clearance from the Secretary of Labor in
connection with such termination.

It must be stressed herein that although petitioner worked with Philnor as a driver for eight years, the
fact that his services were rendered only for a particular project which took that same period of time to
complete categorizes him as a project employee. Petitioner was employed for one specific project.

Anent the claim for overtime compensation, we hold that petitioner is entitled to the same. The fact that
he picks up employees of Philnor at certain specified points along EDSA in going to the project site and
drops them off at the same points on his way back from the field office going home to Marikina, Metro
Manila is not merely incidental to petitioner's job as a driver. On the contrary, said transportation
arrangement had been adopted, not so much for the convenience of the employees, but primarily for the
benefit of the employer, herein private respondent.

3. Arica vs NLRC

Facts:
After the submission by the parties of their respective position papers, Labor Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos
rendered a decision in favor of private respondent STANFILCO, holding that:

Given these facts and circumstances, we cannot but agree with respondent that the
pronouncement in that earlier case, i.e. the thirty-minute assembly time long practiced cannot be
considered waiting time or work time and, therefore, not compensable, has become the law of the
case which can no longer be disturbed without doing violence to the time- honored principle of
res-judicata.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the instant complaint should therefore
be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED.

On December 12, 1986, after considering the appeal memorandum of complainant and the opposition of
respondents, the First Division of public respondent NLRC composed of Acting Presiding Commissioner
Franklin Drilon, Commissioner Conrado Maglaya, Commissioner Rosario D. Encarnacion as Members,
promulgated its Resolution, upholding the Labor Arbiters' decision. Public respondent NLRC, on January 30,
1987, issued a resolution denying for lack of merit petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

Issues:
Whether or not the 30-minute activity of the petitioners before the scheduled working time is
compensable under the Labor Code.

Ruling:
Petitioners contend that the preliminary activities as workers of respondents STANFILCO in the assembly
area is compensable as working time (from 5:30 to 6:00 o'clock in the morning) since these preliminary
activities are necessarily and primarily for private respondent's benefit.

These preliminary activities of the workers are as follows:

(a) First there is the roll call. This is followed by getting their individual work assignments from the
foreman.

(b) Thereafter, they are individually required to accomplish the Laborer's Daily Accomplishment
Report during which they are often made to explain about their reported accomplishment the
following day.
 (c) Then they go to the stockroom to get the working materials, tools and equipment.

(d) Lastly, they travel to the field bringing with them their tools, equipment and materials.

All these activities take 30 minutes to accomplish

Noteworthy is the decision of the Minister of Labor, on May 12, 1978 in the aforecited case (Associated
Labor Union vs. Standard (Phil.) Fruit Corporation, NLRC Case No. 26-LS-XI-76 where significant findings of
facts and conclusions had already been made on the matter:
The thirty (30)-minute assembly time long practiced and institutionalized by mutual consent of the
parties under Article IV, Section 3, of the Collective Bargaining Agreement cannot be considered as
waiting time within the purview of Section 5, Rule I, Book III of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code. ...

Furthermore, the thirty (30)-minute assembly is a deeply- rooted, routinary practice of the
employees, and the proceedings attendant thereto are not infected with complexities as to deprive
the workers the time to attend to other personal pursuits. They are not new employees as to require
the company to deliver long briefings regarding their respective work assignments. Their houses are
situated right on the area where the farm are located, such that after the roll call, which does not
necessarily require the personal presence, they can go back to their houses to attend to some chores.
In short, they are not subject to the absolute control of the company during this period, otherwise,
their failure to report in the assembly time would justify the company to impose disciplinary measures.
The CBA does not contain any provision to this effect; the record is also bare of any proof on this point.
This, therefore, demonstrates the indubitable fact that the thirty (30)-minute assembly time was not
primarily intended for the interests of the employer, but ultimately for the employees to indicate their
availability or non-availability for work during every working day.

Thus, case dismissed.

4. PAN AM VSPAN AM Employees Association

Facts:
In this appeal, petitioner advances five proposition which, briefly, are as follows: (1) the Industrial
Court has no jurisdiction to order the payment of overtime compensation, it being a mere monetary
claim cognizable by regular courts; (2) the finding that the one-hour meal period should be considered
overtime work (deducting 15 minutes as time allotted for eating) is not supported by substantial
evidence; (3) the court below had no authority to delegate its judicial functions by ordering the Chief
of the Examining Division or his representative to compute the overtime pay; (4) the finding that there
was no agreement to withdraw Case No. 1055-V in consideration of the wage increases in the
Collective Bargaining Contract (Exh. "A") is not supported by substantial evidence; and (5) the court
below had no authority to order the company to adopt a straight 8-hour shift inclusive of meal period.

Ruling:
Petitioner herein claims that the one-hour meal period should not be considered as overtime work
(after deducting 15 minutes), because the evidence showed that complainants could rest completely, and
were not in any manner under the control of the company during that period. The court below found, on
the contrary, that during the so called meal period, the mechanics were required to stand by for
emergency work; that if they happened not to be available when called, they were reprimanded by the
leadman; that as in fact it happened on many occasions, the mechanics had been called from their meals
or told to hurry Employees Association up eating to perform work during this period. Far from being
unsupported by substantial evidence, the record clearly confirms the above factual findings of the
Industrial Court.

Similarly, this Court is satisfied with the finding that there was no agreement to withdraw Case No.
1055-V in consideration of the wage increases obtained by the, union and set forth in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement Exhibit "A". As reasoned out by the court below, such alleged agreement would
have been incorporated in the contract if it existed. The fact that the union filed a motion to dismiss
without prejudice, after the Collective Bargaining Contract had been signed, did not necessarily mean that
it had agreed to withdraw the case in consideration of the wage increases. The motion itself (Annex "B",
Petition for Certiorari) was expressly based on an understanding that the company would "formulate a
schedule of work which shall be in consonance with C. A. 444". All in all, there is substantial evidence in the
record to support the finding of the court below that no such agreement was made.

It is next contended that in ordering the Chief of the Examining Division or his representative to
compute the compensation due, the Industrial Court unduly delegated its judicial functions and thereby
rendered an incomplete decision. We do not believe so. Computation of the overtime pay involves a
mechanical function, at most. And the report would still have to be submitted to the Industrial Court for its
approval, by the very terms of the order itself. That there was no specification of the amount of overtime
pay in the decision did not make it incomplete, since this matter would necessarily be made clear enough
in the implementation of the decision (see Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc. vs. CIR, et al., L-8718, May 11,
1956).

The Industrial Court's order for permanent adoption of a straight 8-hour shift including the meal
period was but a consequence of its finding that the meal hour was not one of complete rest, but was
actually a work hour, since for its duration, the laborers had to be on ready call. Of course, if the
Company practices in this regard should be modified to afford the mechanics a real rest during that
hour (f. ex., by installing an entirely different emergency crew, or any similar arrangement), then the
modification of this part of the decision may be sought from the Court below. As things now stand, we
see no warrant for altering the decision.

5. Detective and protective bureau, inc vs Court of Industrial Relations

Review of an order of the Court of Industrial Relations awarding to members of the respondent association
a certain sum for back overtime wages.

The record discloses that upon petition properly submitted, said court made an investigation and found
that the members of the United Employees Welfare Association (hereafter called the Association) were in
the employ of the petitioner Detective and Protective Bureau Inc. (herein called the Bureau) which is
engaged in the business of furnishing security guards to commercial and industrial establishments, paying
to said members monthly salaries out of what he received from the establishments benefited by guard
service. The employment called for daily tours of duty for more than eight hours, in addition to work on
Sundays and holidays. Nonetheless the members performed their labors without receiving extra
compensation.

By order of the court, one of its officers in the Auditing Department examined petitioner's books, made a
computation of the additional payment for such overtime work, and reported that the amount owing to
the members or employees totalled eight thousand five hundred and forty-five pesos and forty-eight
centavos (P8,545.48) as itemized in Exhibit A. Consequently the respondent Bureau was required to
disgorge that sum for overtime wages.

It appears that the Bureau had been granting the members of the Association, every month, "two days
off"-days in which they rendered no service, although they received salary for the whole month. Said
Bureau contended below that the pay corresponding to said 2-day vacation corresponded to the wages
for extra work. The court rejected the contention, quite property we believe, because in the contract there
was no agreement to that effect; and such agreement, if any, would probably be contrary to the provisions
of the Eight-Hour Law (Act No. 444 sec. 6) and would be null and void ab initio.

It is argued here, in opposition to the payment, that until the commencement of this litigation the
members of the Association never claimed for overtime pay. That may be true. Nevertheless the law give
them the right to extra compensation. And they could not be held to have impliedly waived such extra
compensation, for the obvious reason that they could not have expressly waived it.

It is also argued that the respondent court has no jurisdiction to award overtime pay, which is a money
judgment. We believe that under Com. Act No. 103 the Court is empowered to make the order for the
purpose of setting disputes between employer and employee. 1 As a matter of fact this Court has
confirmed an order of the Court of Industrial Relations requiring the Elks' Club to pay to its employees a
certain sum of money as overtime back wages from June 3, 1939 to March 13, 1941. This, in spite of the
allegation of lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the said court. (45 O.G. 3829).

Again it is urged that no recovery may be had for work beyond the 8-hour daily period, because no
permit had been obtained from the Secretary of Labor. On this point we have to reiterate our ruling in
Gotamco Lumber Co. vs. CIR (85 PHIL., 291).

The petitioner maintains that as the overtime work had been performed without a permit from
the Department of Labor, no extra compensation should be authorized. Several decisions of this Court
are involved. But those decisions were based on the reasoning that as both the laborer and employer
were duty bound to secure the permit from the Department of Labor, both were in " pari delicto".
However the present law in effect imposed that duty upon the employer (C.A. No. 444). Such employer
may not therefore be heard to plead his own neglect as exemption or defense. The employee, in
rendering extra service at the request of his employer has a right to assume that the latter has
complied with requirement of the law, and therefore has obtained the required permission from the
Department of Labor. (Gotamco Lumber vs. CIR.)

Wherefore, inasmuch as the petitioner does not raise the question that the amount determined by the
Court does not accord the number of extra hour or holidays for which overpayment must be made, and
inasmuch as we find no error in the legal conclusions of the Court of Industrial Relations, the appealed
order is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

6. Cagampanan vs NLRC

Facts:
Presented before Us for review is the decision of public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission handed down on March 16, 1988 reversing the decision of the Philippine Oversees
Employment Administration and correspondingly dismissing the cases for lack of merit. The POEA decision
granted overtime pay to petitioners equivalent to 30% of their basic pay.

Petitioners collectively and/or individually filed complaints for non-payment of overtime pay, vacation
pay and terminal pay against private respondent. In addition, they claimed that they were made to sign
their contracts in blank. Likewise, petitioners averred that although they agreed to render services on
board the vessel Rio Colorado managed by Golden Light Ocean Transport, Ltd., the vessel they actually
boarded was MV "SOIC I" managed by Columbus Navigation. Two (2) petitioners, Jorge de Castro and
Juanito de Jesus, charged that although they were employed as ordinary seamen (OS), they actually
performed the work and duties of Able Seamen (AB).
 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) rendered a Decision dismissing petitioners'
claim for terminal pay but granted their prayer for leave pay and overtime pay. The appealed decision
was hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE by NLRC and another one entered dismissing these cases for lack of
merit.

Ruling:
On the issue of whether or not petitioners should be entitled to terminal pay, We sustain the finding of
respondent NLRC that petitioners were actually paid more than the amounts fixed in their employment
contracts. The pertinent portion of the NLRC decision reads as follows.

On this award for leave pay to the complainants (petitioners), the (private) respondent maintains
that the actually they were paid much more than what they were legally entitled to under their
contract. This fact has not been disputed by the complainants (petitioners.) Thus, as mentioned in
(private) respondent's Memorandum on Appeal dated 14 August 1987, their overpayment is more
than enough and sufficient to offset whatever claims for leave pay they filed in this case and for
which the POEA favorably considered in their favor. For complainant (petitioner) Aniceto Betana, it
appears that under the crew contract his monthly salary was US$400 while he was overpaid by US$100
as he actually received US$500. In fine, Betana had received at least US1,400 excess salary for a period
of fourteen (14) months which was the period of his employment. In the case of complainant
(petitioner) Jorge C. de Castro his stipulated monthly pay was US$160 but he actually received a
monthly pay of US$200 or an overpayment of US$560 for the same period of service. For complainant
(petitioner) Juanito R. de Jesus, his overpayment is US$1120. Complainant (petitioner) Arnold J.
Miranda has also the same amount of excess payment as de Jesus. Indeed, We cannot simply ignore
this material fact. It is our duty to prevent a miscarriage of justice for if We sustain the award for leave
pay in the face of undisputed facts that the complainants (petitioners) were even paid much more
than what they should receive by way of leave pay, then they would be enriching themselves at the
expense of others. Accordingly, justice and equity compel Us to deny this award.

Even as the denial of petitioners' terminal pay by the NLRC has been justified, such denial should not
have been applied to petitioners Julio Cagampan and Silvino Vicera. For, a deeper scrutiny of the records
by the Solicitor General has revealed that the fact of overpayment does not cover the aforenamed
petitioners since the amounts awarded them were equal only to the amounts stipulated in the crew
contracts. Since petitioners Cagampan and Vicera were not overpaid by the company, they should be paid
the amounts of US$583.33 and US$933.33, respectively. Further examination by the Solicitor General
shows that petitioner Maximo Rosello was also overpaid in the amount of US$420.00.

Petitioners have conveniently adopted the view that the "guaranteed or fixed overtime pay of 30% of
the basic salary per month" embodied in their employment contract should be awarded to them as part of
a "package benefit." They have theorized that even without sufficient evidence of actual rendition of
overtime work, they would automatically be entitled to overtime pay. Their theory is erroneous for being
illogical and unrealistic. Their thinking even runs counter to the intention behind the provision. The
contract provision means that the fixed overtime pay of 30% would be the basis for computing the
overtime pay if and when overtime work would be rendered. Simply, stated, the rendition of overtime
work and the submission of sufficient proof that said work was actually performed are conditions to be
satisfied before a seaman could be entitled to overtime pay which should be computed on the basis of 30%
of the basic monthly salary. In short, the contract provision guarantees the right to overtime pay but the
entitlement to such benefit must first be established. Realistically speaking, a seaman, by the very
nature of his job, stays on board a ship or vessel beyond the regular eight-hour work schedule . For the
employer to give him overtime pay for the extra hours when he might be sleeping or attending to his
personal chores or even just lulling away his time would be extremely unfair and unreasonable.
 Seamen are required to stay on board their vessels by the very nature of their duties, and it is for this
reason that, in addition to their regular compensation, they are given free living quarters and subsistence
allowances when required to be on board. It could not have been the purpose of our law to require their
employers to pay them overtime even when they are not actually working; otherwise, every sailor on
board a vessel would be entitled to overtime for sixteen hours each day, even if he spent all those hours
resting or sleeping in his bunk, after his regular tour of duty. The correct criterion in determining whether
or not sailors are entitled to overtime pay is not, therefore, whether they were on board and can not leave
ship beyond the regular eight working hours a day, but whether they actually rendered service in excess of
said number of hours. I'm just the pieces of the man I used to be Too many bitter tears are raining down on
meI'm far away from home And I've been facing this alone For much too long Oh, I feel like no-one ever
told the truth to me About growing up and what a struggle it would be In my tangled state of mind I've
been looking back to find Where I went wrong Too much love will kill you If you can't make up your mind
Torn between the lover And the love you leave behind You're headed for disaster 'Cause you never read
the signs Too much love will kill you - every time