Best Evidence Rule:

1. MCMP vs. Monark

- petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit with the MODIFICATION that the
dispositive portion of the RTC’s Decision
- The Best Evidence Rule, a basic postulate requiring the production of the original
document whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry, is contained in Section 3
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides: “Section 3. Original document
must be produced; exceptions.—When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases: (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror; (b)
When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and (d) When the
original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office.”
2. Loon vs Power Master
- the respondents failed to sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven.
- Why the respondents’ photocopied and computerized copies of documentary
evidence were not presented at the earliest opportunity is a serious question that
lends credence to the petitioners’ claim that the respondents fabricated the
evidence for purposes of appeal. While we generally admit in evidence and give
probative value to photocopied documents in administrative proceedings,
allegations of forgery and fabrication should prompt the adverse party to present
the original documents for inspection. It was incumbent upon the respondents to
present the originals, especially in this case where the petitioners had submitted
their specimen signatures. Instead, the respondents effectively deprived the
petitioners of the opportunity to examine and controvert the alleged spurious
evidence by not adducing the originals. This Court is thus left with no option but to
rule that the respondents’ failure to present the originals raises the presumption
that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.
- It was also gross error for the CA to affirm the NLRC’s proposition that "[i]t is of
common knowledge that there are many people who use at least two or more
different signatures. "The NLRC cannot take judicial notice that many people use at
least two signatures, especially in this case where the petitioners themselves disown
the signatures in the respondents’ assailed documentary evidence. The NLRC’s
position is unwarranted and is patently unsupported by the law and jurisprudence.
- Viewed in these lights, the scales of justice must tilt in favor of the employees. This
conclusion is consistent with the rule that the employer’s cause can only succeed on
the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the employee’s
evidence.
3. Dimaguila vs. Monteiro
- W/N a certified true copy of the cadastral map is inadmissible in evidence on the
ground that it violates the best evidence rule?
- HELD: No, a certified true copy of the cadastral map is not inadmissible in evidence
as it falls under the exception to the best evidence rule.
- Anent violation of Best Evidence Rule, Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except when
the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its
contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may be
evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody or the record.
- In the case, certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding
list of claimants of the area covered by the map were presented by two public
officers. The first was Crisostomo Arves, Clerk III of the Municipal Assessor's Office, a
repository of such documents. The second was Dominga Tolentino, a DENR
employee, who, as a record officer, certifies and safekeeps records of surveyed land
involving cadastral maps. The cadastral maps and the list of claimants, as certified
true copies of original public records, fall under the exception to the best evidence
rule.
4. Republic vs. Mupas
- Whether the Court may accord probative value to the summary report prepared by
Reyes Tacandong & Co., which validated PIATCO's computation of
attendant costs
- Ruling: No. The Supreme Court held that under the best evidence rule, when the
subject of inquiry relates to the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself. In proving the terms of a written
document, the original of the document must be produced in court.
- As exceptions to the best evidence rule, Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides that non-original documents may be produced in court in the following
cases:
- (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
- (b) When the original is in the custody or under control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
- (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
- (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
- The Court agreed with PIATCO that it need not submit numerous and voluminous
invoices, official receipts, and other relevant documents before the trial court to
 prove the attendant costs that it incurred in the construction of the NAIA-IPT III. The
trial court may admit a summary of voluminous original documents, in lieu of
original documents, if the party has shown that the underlying writings are
numerous and that an in-court examination of these documents would be
inconvenient. In other words, Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court does away
with the item-by-item court identification and authentication of voluminous exhibits
which would only be burdensome and tedious for the parties and the court.
- However, as a condition precedent to the admission of a summary of numerous
documents, the proponent must lay a proper foundation for the admission of the
original documents on which the summary is based. The proponent must prove
that the source documents being summarized are also admissible if presented in
court.
- In concrete terms, the source documents must be shown to be original, and not
secondary. Furthermore, the source documents must likewise be accessible to the
opposing party so that the correctness of the summary of the voluminous records
may be tested on cross-examination and/or may be refuted in pleadings. In ordinary
trial-type proceedings, a proper foundation for the introduction of a summary may
be established through the "testimony of the person who is responsible for
the summary's preparation, or the person who supervised the preparation of
the summary”.
5. Robinol vs. Bassig
- Whether the photocopy receipt and PN presented is admissible
- No.
- Here, Robiñol failed to discharge the burden of proof. For one, the evidence
submitted were inadmissible. It must be noted that the receipts showing payment of
Atty. Bassig to Robiñol and the promissory note executed and signed by Atty. Bassig
were photocopies of the original. A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is
not admissible unless it is shown that the original is unavailable. Section 5, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court states:
- SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable.— When the original document has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his
part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated
- Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of
the original, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due
execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason
for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of
bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. x x x20
- In this case, nowhere in the record shows that Robiñol laid down the predicate for
the admission of said photocopies. Thus, aside from the bare allegations in her
complaint, Robiñol was not able to present any evidence to prove that Atty. Bassig
failed to pay his rent and that he had in fact leased a house from Robiñol.
Parole Evidence:

1. Leoveras vs. Valdez

- Whether CA erred in nullifying the petitioner’s titles.
- (CA should not have ordered the reconveyance of both parcels of land covered by
the TCTs in question since the respondent only seeks the reconveyance of the
disputed property )
- Partially granted
- An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful
landowner, whose land was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of
another, to compel the registered owner to transfer or reconvey the land to him.33
The plaintiff in this action must allege and prove his ownership of the land in dispute
and the defendant’s erroneous, fraudulent or wrongful registration of the property.
- We rule that the respondent adequately proved his ownership of the disputed
property by virtue of the (i) Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Josefa in favor of the
parties; (ii) the parties’ Affidavit of Adverse Claim; and (iii) the parties’ Agreement,
which cover the subject property.
- The petitioner does not dispute the due execution and the authenticity of these
documents, particularly the Agreement. However, he claims that since the
Agreement does not reflect the true intention of the parties, the Affidavit was
subsequently executed in order to reflect the parties’ true intention.
- The petitioner’s argument calls to fore the application of the parol evidence rule,
i.e., when the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, the written agreement
is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of these terms can
be admitted other than what is contained in the written agreement.36 Whatever is
not found in the writing is understood to have been waived and abandoned.37
- To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of Court allows a party
to present evidence modifying, explaining or adding to the terms of the written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading, as in this case, the failure of the written
agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. The failure of
the written agreement to express the true intention of the parties is either by reason
of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, which nevertheless did not
prevent a meeting of the minds of the parties.
2. Paras vs. Kimwa
- Whether Spouses Paras were able to establish that Kimwa was obliged to haul a
total of 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates on or before May 15, 1995.
- Held: Yes, Kimwa is liable for failing to haul the remainder of the quantity which it
was obliged to acquire from Lucia.
- Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the Parol Evidence
Rule, the rule on admissibility of documentary evidence when the terms of an
agreement have been reduced into writing:
- Section 10. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an agreement
have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed
 upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
- However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
o (a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
o (b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;
o (c) The validity of the written agreement; or
o (d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors
in interest after the execution of the written agreement.
- The term includes wills.
- Per this rule, reduction to written form, regardless of the formalities observed,
forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a written agreement by
testimony or other evidence purporting to show that different terms were agreed
upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract.
- Apart from pleading these exceptions, it is equally imperative that the parol
evidence sought to be introduced points to the conclusion proposed by the party
presenting it. That is, it must be relevant, tending to belief in the existence of the
flaw, true intent, or subsequent extraneous terms averred by the party seeking to
introduce parol evidence.
- In sum, two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted: first,
that the existence of any of the four (4) exceptions has been put in issue in a party’s
pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse party; and second, that the
parol evidence sought to be presented serves to form the basis of the conclusion
proposed by the presenting party.
- At the onset, two (2) flaws in the Court of Appeals’ reasoning must be emphasized.
First, it is inconsistent to say, on one hand, that the trial court erred on the basis of
evidence presented (albeit supposedly in violation of the Parol Evidence Rule),and,
on the other, that petitioners Spouses Paras showed no proof.; Second, without
even accounting for the exceptions provided by Rule 130, Section 9, the Court of
- Appeals immediately concluded that whatever evidence petitioners Spouses Paras
presented was in violation of the Parol Evidence Rule.
- Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s conclusion, petitioners Spouses Paras pleaded in
the Complaint they filed before the trial court a mistake or imperfection in the
Agreement, as well as the Agreement’s failure to express the true intent of the
parties. Further, respondent Kimwa, through its Answer, also responded to
petitioners Spouses Paras’ pleading of these issues. This is, thus, an exceptional case
allowing admission of parol evidence.
- Having been admittedly furnished a copy of this Special Permit, respondent Kimwa
was well aware that a total of only about 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates may be
extracted by petitioner Lucia from the permitted area, and that petitioner Lucia
Paras’ operations cannot extend beyond May 15, 1995, when the
- Special Permit expires. The Special Permit’s condition that a total of only about
40,000 cubic meters of aggregates may be extracted by petitioner Lucia Paras from
 the permitted area lends credence to the position that the aggregates to respondent
Kimwa was in consideration of its corresponding commitment to haul all 40,000
cubic meters. This is so, especially in light of the Agreement’s own statement that
the said Aggregates is for the exclusive use of Kimwa. By allotting the entire 40,000
cubic meters, petitioner Lucia Paras bound her entire business to respondent
Kimwa. Rational human behavior dictates that she must have done so with the
corresponding assurances from it. It would have been irrational, if not ridiculous, of
her to oblige herself to make this allotment without respondent Kimwa’s
concomitant undertaking that it would obtain the entire amount allotted.
3. PNB vs. Pasimio
- Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision in favor of Pasimio (RTC:
Pasimio had proven by convincing evidence that she did not obtain any loan
accommodation from PNB. Transaction documents were highly questionable)
- HELD: NO. Petition is granted. Decision of the CA is reversed and set aside.
-  Pasimio failed to prove her claim by preponderance of evidence
o The lower courts chose to disregard all of PNB’s documentary evidence and ruled
in favor of Pasimio. All Pasimio put forward against PNB’s evidence were
unsubstantiated denials and bare, self-serving assertions.
o Pasimio never put in issue the due execution and authenticity of the loan
documents.
-  Dismissal of PNB’s petition is based on mere speculations and surmises
o The promissory note is the best evidence of thr transaction embodied therein. It
represents a solemn acknowledgement of a debt and a formal commitment to repay
it.
-  Parol Evidence Rule applied
o When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be
considered as containing all such terms, and, therefore, there can be no evidence of
the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing.
o No evidence of (a) intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement; (b) failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of parties; (c) validity of the written agreement; or (d) existence of other
terms agreed to by the parties after the execution of the written agreement has
been presented.
o As such, the documents embodying the loan agreement of the parties should be
upheld.
4. Mancol vs. DBP
- whether or not the testimonies of petitioner's witnesses, Villanueva and Mancol, Sr.,
should be given probative value to establish the alleged contemporaneous verbal
agreement in the sale contract, i.e., that DBP bound itself to arrange and effect the
transfer of title of the lot in petitioner's name; and, get rid of the occupants of the
subject property.
- NO
- “The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a
written agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that different
 terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract.”
This, however, is merely a general rule. Provided, that a party puts in issue in its
pleading any of the exceptions in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add
to the terms of the agreement. Moreover, as with all possible objections to the
admission of evidence, a party’s failure to timely object is deemed a waiver, and
parol evidence may then be entertained.
- We stress that the admissibility of the testimonial evidence as an exception to the
parol evidence rule does not necessarily mean that it has weight. Admissibility of
evidence should not be confounded with its probative value. “The admissibility of
evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence
pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and
persuade.” The admissibility of a particular item of evidence has to do with whether
it meets various tests by which its reliability is to be determined, so as to be
considered with other evidence admitted in the case in arriving at a decision as to
the truth. The weight of evidence is not determined mathematically by the
numerical superiority of the witnesses testifying to a given fact, but depends upon
its practical effect in inducing belief on the part of the judge trying the case.
“Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be
considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the
admitted evidence proves an issue.” “Thus, a particular item of evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.”

Electronic Evidence:

1. Heirs of Sabanpan vs. Comorposa

- Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and err in sustaining the
Regional Trial Court ruling giving weight to the CENR Officer Certification, which only
bears the facsimile of the alleged signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda?
- HELD:
- Petitioners contend that the CENR Certification dated July 22, 1997 is a sham
document, because the signature of the CENR officer is a mere facsimile.
- A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and
reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one
elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a
specified amount of electric current. Pleadings filed via fax machines are not
considered originals and are at best exact copies. As such, they are not admissible
in evidence, as there is no way of determining whether they are genuine or
authentic.
- Neither the rules of procedure nor jurisprudence would sanction the admission of
evidence that has not been formally offered during the trial. But this evidentiary
 rule is applicable only to ordinary trials, not to cases covered by the rule on
summary procedure—cases in which no full-blown trial is held.
- The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the
signature of CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same
as that which is alluded to in Garvida. The one mentioned here refers to a facsimile
signature which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical means but
recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business transactions.
- Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In fact, the DENR
regional director has acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order
- If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional director
would not have used it as reference in his Order. Instead, he would have either
verified it or directed the CENR officer to take the appropriate action, as the latter
was under the former direct control and supervision.
2. Torres vs. PAGCOR
- Pleadings and Practice; Evidence; Electronic Commerce Act; A facsimile is not a
genuine and authentic pleading; It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks
of an original.—In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., 271 SCRA 767 (1997), we found inadmissible
in evidence the filing of pleadings through fax machines and ruled that: x x x x x x A
facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy
preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of
determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and
was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham
pleading.
- Same; Same; Same; A facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic
evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act; The terms “electronic data message”
and  “electronic document” as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000,
do not include a facsimile transmission.—A facsimile transmission is not considered
as an electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act. In MCC Industrial
Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, 536 SCRA 408 (2007), We determined
the question of whether the original facsimile transmissions are “electronic data
messages” or “electronic documents” within the context of the Electronic
Commerce Act, and We said: We, therefore, conclude that the terms “electronic
data message” and “electronic document,” as defined under the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a
facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the
functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not
admissible as electronic evidence.

3. Ang vs. Republic

- Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture
presented in the case?
- Held: Yes, the Supreme Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.
- Rustan claim that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message
constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an
 electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
- The Supreme Court held here that, Rustan is raising this objection to the
admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before it. The
objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on
such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have
already waived such ground for objection. Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to
the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil
actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
- In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every
element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
4. People vs Enojas
- As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the
Court’s earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal
actions. [A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, Re: Expansion of the Coverage of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence, September 24, 2002.]  Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person
who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. [Id., Rule 11, Section 2] Here,
PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in
order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile
phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was
competent to testify on them.  (Emphasis mine)
- The latter case does not confront directly the obiter in Ang v. Court of Appeals, but the
recognition of the 2002 resolution expanding the coverage of the rules on electronic
evidence in People v. Enojas is clear.
- The Rules on Electronic Evidence apply to criminal cases

5. Syhunliong vs. Rivera

- Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the facts charged in the information do
not constitute the offense of libel? Whether or not the CA committed reversible
error in ordering the outright dismissal of the complaint of Syhunliong on the
putative ground that the allegedly libelous text messages were privileged
communication?
- Held:
- There is no merit in the instant petition. Prescription had set in. Well settled rule in
statutory construction that the liberal construction of prescriptive laws on criminal
statutes emanates from the liberality of the State, any doubt on this matter must be
resolved in favor of the grantee thereof, the accused. As prescription of the crime is
the loss by the State of the right to prosecute and punish the same. In the case at
bar, it is extant in the records that Syhunliong filed his complaint against Rivera
more than one year after the allegedly libelous message was sent to Lumapas.
Whether the date of the filing of the complaint is April 16, 2007 or August 18, 2007,
it would not alter the fact that its institution was made beyond the prescriptive
period provided for in Article 90 of the RPC. In relation thereto, Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that the prescription of crime has the effect of totally
extinguishing the criminal liability. Prescription of the crime is already a compelling
 reason for this Court to order the dismissal of the libel information, but the Court
still stresses that the text message which Rivera sent to Lumapas falls within the
purview of a qualified privileged communication. The rule on privileged
communication means that a communication made in good faith on any subject
matter in which the communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a
duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding duty. In order to prove
that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication
under Article 354, No. 1, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who
made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the
communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be
his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an
officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who
has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the
communication are made in good faith and without malice. Presiding from the
above, the Court thus finds no error in the CA' s declaration that Rivera's text
message falls within the ambit of a qualified privileged communication since she was
speaking in response to duty, to protect her own interest, and not out of an intent to
injure the reputation of Syhunliong. Besides, there was no unnecessary publicity of
the message beyond that of conveying it to the party concerned.
6. Bartolome vs. Maranan
- Whether or not the pieces of evidence she submitted are sufficient to prove the
respondent’s anomalous activities, and prayed for the immediate resolution of her
complaint.
- HELD: Yes. Ephemeral electronic communications are now admissible evidence,
subject to certain conditions. Ephemeral electronic communication refers to
telephone conversations, text messages, chat room sessions, streaming audio,
streaming video, and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of
which is not recorded or retained. It may be proven by the testimony of a person
who was a party to the communications or has personal knowledge thereof. Under
Section 1, Rule 11 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, audio, photographic and video evidence
of events, acts or transactions shall be admissible provided it shall be shown,
presented or displayed to the court and shall be identified, explained or
authenticated by the person who made the recording or by some other person
competent to testify on the accuracy thereof. In the present case, there is no doubt
regarding the probative value of the text messages as evidence in considering the
present case. The complainant, who was the recipient of the text messages and who
therefore has personal knowledge of these text messages, identified the respondent
as the sender through cellphone number 09175775982. The respondent herself
admitted that her conversations with the complainant had been thru SMS messaging
and that the cellphone number reflected in the complainant’s cellphone from which
the text messages originated was hers. She confirmed that it was her cellphone
number during the entrapment operation conducted by the Imus Cavite Police.

7. BBB vs. AAA

Whether CA and the RTC correctly admitted into evidence the unauthenticated text messages
adduced by AAA

HELD: No. It is stated that any question as to the admissibility of text messages as evidence is
rendered moot and academic, if the party raising such issue admits authorship of the subject
messages. BBB argues that the RTC and the CA erred in admitting as evidence the text
messages which were sent by him and FFF to AAA since they were unauthenticated. However,
BBB himself effectively admitted in the pleadings filed with this Court and the CA that he indeed
sent the text messages attributed to him by AAA.

In his pleadings, BBB attempted to justify why he sent the messages to AAA. However, in doing
so, he, in effect, admitted authorship of the messages which AAA adduced as evidence. It is
likewise noted that BBB did not deny ownership of the cell phone number from which the text
messages were sent.

Hence, while at first glance, it would seem that the issue of admissibility of the text messages
requires an interpretation of the rules of evidence, this Court does not find the same to be
necessary. While BBB had admitted authorship of the text messages, he pleads for this Court to
consider those messages as inadmissible for allegedly being unauthenticated. BBB’s arguments
are unbearably self-contradictory and he cannot be allowed to take refuge under technical rules
of procedure to assail what is already apparent.

8. Astorga vs. Villanueva

-