DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versus- COURT OF

APPEALS, MYLO O. QUINTO and JESUSA CHRISTINE S. CHUPUICO,

Respondents.
DBP didn't procure legitimate title over the land in debate since it was public land when
sold by the Spouses Olidiana. In Visayan Realty, Inc. v. Meer, the Court decided that
the endorsement of a business application only approved the candidate to claim the
land so he could agree to the necessities recommended by law before a last patent
could be given in support of himself. In the interim, the administration actually remained
the proprietor thereof, as in reality the application could at present be dropped and the
land granted to another candidate should it be indicated that the lawful prerequisites
had not been followed. What strips the legislature of title to the land is the issuance of
the business patent and its ensuing enrollment with the Register of Deeds. It is the
enrollment and issuance of the testament of title that isolate public grounds from the
mass of public space and convert it into private property. Since the contested was as
yet the subject of a Free Patent Application when sold to DBP and no patent was
conceded to the Spouses Olidiana, the parcel remained part of the public space.

What strips the administration of title to the land is the issuance of the business patent
and its resulting enrollment with the Register of Deeds. It is the enrollment and issuance
of the testament of title that isolate public terrains from the mass of public area and
convert it into private property. Since the contested parcel was as yet the subject of a
Free Patent Application when sold to DBP and no patent was conceded to the Spouses
Olidiana, the part remained aspect of the public area.
 REY CASTIGADOR CATEDRILLA VS. MARIO AND MARGIE LAURON
Petitioner can record the activity for ejectment without impleading his co-proprietors. In Wee v.
De Castro, wherein candidate in that contended that the respondent can't keep up an activity for
ejectment against him, without joining all his co-proprietors, we administered in this shrewd:

Article 487 of the New Civil Code is unequivocal on this point:

Article. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. —

This article covers a wide range of activity for the recuperation of ownership, i.e., persuasive
passage and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recuperation of ownership (accion
publiciana), and recuperation of possession (accion de reivindicacion). As clarified by the
eminent civilest, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino:

A co-proprietor may bring such an activity, without the need of joining the various co-proprietors
as co-offended parties, on the grounds that the suit is considered to be established to help all.
On the off chance that the activity is to assist the offended party alone, with the end goal that he
asserts ownership for himself and not for the co-proprietorship, the activity won't succeed.

In the later instance of Carandang v. Beneficiaries of De Guzman, this Court pronounced that a
co-proprietor isn't so much as an important gathering to an activity for ejectment, for complete
alleviation can be managed even in his nonattendance, consequently:

In total, in suits to recoup properties, all co-proprietors are genuine gatherings in intrigue. In any
case, in accordance with Article 487 of the Civil Code and the applicable law, any of them may
bring an activity, any sort of activity for the recuperation of co-possessed properties.
Consequently, just one of the co-proprietors, to be specific the co-proprietor who documented
the suit for the recuperation of the co-claimed property, is an essential gathering thereto. The
other co-proprietors are not irreplaceable gatherings. They are not even essential gatherings,
for a total help can be managed in the suit even without their interest, since the suit is dared to
have been petitioned to assist all co-proprietors.

For this situation, in spite of the fact that candidate alone recorded the protest for unlawful
detainer, he expressed in the grievance that he is one of the beneficiaries of the late Lilia
Castigador, his mom, who acquired the subject parcel, from her folks. Solicitor didn't guarantee
elite responsibility for subject parcel, yet he recorded the protest to recoup its ownership which
would redound to the advantage of the co-proprietors. Since solicitor perceived the presence of
a co-possession, he, as a co-proprietor, can bring the activity without the need of joining the
various co-proprietors as co-offended parties.
 SPOUSES MANUEL and SALVACION DEL CAMPO, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and HEIRS OF JOSE REGALADO, SR.,
There can be no uncertainty that the exchange went into by Salome and Soledad could be
lawfully perceived completely since the object of the deal didn't surpass the ideal offers held
by the previous in the co-proprietorship. Truly, the deed of offer executed between the
gatherings explicitly specified that the segment of Lot 162 offered to Soledad would be taken
from Salomes 4/16 unified enthusiasm for said parcel, which the last could legitimately move
in entire or to some degree even without the assent of the other co-proprietors.

Salomes option to sell part of her unified enthusiasm for the co-possessed property is total
as per the very much settled principle that a co-proprietor has full responsibility for
indiviso share and has the privilege to distance, allot or contract it, and substitute someone
else in its delight. Since Salome's unmistakable aim was to sell simply part of her aliquot
offer in Lot 162, in our view no legitimate complaint can be made against it and the deal can
be offered impact to the full degree.

The Supreme Court is not uninformed of the rule that a co-proprietor can't legitimately
discard a specific bit of a co-claimed property preceding segment among all the co-
proprietors. In any case, this ought not mean that the vendee doesn't procure anything at all
in the event that a truly isolated region of the co-claimed parcel is in truth offered to him. The
vendee ventures into the shoes of the seller as co-proprietor and gains a proportionate
unique offer in the property held in like manner.

Resultantly, Soledad turned into a co-proprietor of Lot 162 when the deal was made in her
favor.  Consequently, Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo couldn't legitimately sell the offers
relating to Soledad since a co-proprietor can't estrange too much in the co-possession.

Regardless of whether a co-proprietor sells the entire property as his, the deal will influence
just his own offer yet not those of the other co-proprietors who didn't agree to the deal. Since
a co-proprietor is qualified for sell his unified offer, an offer of the whole property by one co-
proprietor will just exchange the privileges of said co-proprietor to the purchaser, accordingly
making the purchaser a co-proprietor of the property.

For this situation, Regalado simply turned into another co-proprietor of Lot 162 to the degree
of the offers which Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could legitimately pass on. Soledad held
her privileges as co-proprietor and could legitimately move her offer to applicants. The
coherent impact of the subsequent manner is to substitute applicants in the privileges of
Soledad as co-proprietor of the land. These rights are safeguarded despite the issuance of
TCT in Regalados name.

Nevertheless, we find that the region topic of this request had just been adequately isolated
from the mother parcel even before title was given for Regalado. During the mediating (36)
years, in no occasion during this time did respondents or Regalado, besides, question
solicitors directly over the land in contest.

Where the transferees of a unified part of the land permitted a co-proprietor of the property
to involve an unmistakable segment thereof and had not upset the equivalent for a really
long time to be overlooked, the holder is in a superior condition or right than said
 transferees. Such undisturbed belonging had the impact of a halfway parcel of the co-
claimed property which qualifies the holder for the distinct bit which he involves.
Comparably, applicants are qualified for the contested land, having delighted in continuous
belonging thereof for an aggregate of 49 years up to the present.

EXTRAORDINARY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, VS. HERMINIA F. SAMSON-

BICO AND ELY B. FLESTADO
Respondents are qualified for their offer since they had the option to demonstrate co-
possession. Herminia has effectively settled her successional rights over the subject
property through her unmistakable declaration (she was likewise ready to show birth,
immersion and marriage testaments). In addition, there was a confirmation of the co-
proprietorship made by the beneficiaries of Juan in their Answer to the Complaint.
During the conference, it was conceded that the beneficiaries of Juan knew that half of
the property has a place with the respondents and that they neglected to request the
last's signature in the deed of offer. The Answer presented by the beneficiaries of Juan,
just as the declaration of Juan comprise legal confirmations. Very much settled is the
standard that a legal confirmation decisively ties the gathering making it.

EDC was not an honest buyer in compliance with common decency. EDC was
guaranteeing that the legal confirmations were not restricting in light of the fact that they
purchased the property in accordance with some basic honesty. In an agreement of
offer, it is fundamental that the vender is the proprietor of the property he is selling.
Under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the foremost commitment of a merchant is to move
the responsibility for property sold. The execution by appellants Ballesteros of the Deed
of Absolute Sale over the subject property which they don't only possess however is
honestly co-owned by them along with the respondents, was legitimate just to the
degree of the previous' unified one-half offer thereof, as they had no title or enthusiasm
to move the other one-half bit which relates to the respondents without the last's assent.

It is a set up rule that nobody can give what one doesn't have — nemo dat quod non
habet. In like manner, one can sell just what one possesses or is approved to sell, and
the purchaser can procure close to what the merchant can move lawfully. In this way,
since appealing party EDC's privileges over the subject property began from sellers-
appellants Ballesteros, said partnership just ventured into the shoes of its merchants
and can't have a superior right than what its dealers have

Truly, the Deed of Absolute Sale is VALID however just concerning the privileges of the
beneficiaries of Juan over one-half of the property. This is in acknowledgment of the
beneficiary's privileges to discard their own offer. Article 493 of the Civil Code perceives
the privilege of each co-owner "to have the full responsibility for part of the products of
the soil relating thereto, and he may subsequently distance, allocate or contract it, and
even substitute someone else in its pleasure, aside from when individual rights are
included. Be that as it may, the impact of the distance or the home loan, concerning the
co-owners, will be restricted to the bit which might be assigned to him in the division
upon the end of the co proprietorship." The beneficiaries are likewise requested to
return the ½ price tag paid by EDC so as not to establish unreasonable advancement.
 VICENTE TORRES, ET. AL. –versus- LORENZO LAPINID AND JESUS VELEZ
Truly, Jesus offered a region of land to Lapinid on 9 November 1997. To disentangle,
the inquiry currently is whether Jesus, as a co-proprietor, can truly sell a part of the
property he co-claims for someone else. The Court answers in the confirmed.

A co-proprietor has an outright responsibility for unified and supportive of indiviso share
in the co-possessed property. He has the privilege to distance, relegate and contract it,
even to the degree of subbing a third individual in its pleasure given that no close to
home rights will be influenced. This is obvious from the arrangement of the Civil Code:

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.

A co-proprietor is a proprietor of the entire and over the entire he practices the privilege
of domain, yet he is simultaneously the proprietor of a segment which is really unique.
Henceforth, his co-proprietors reserve no privilege to order a co-proprietor who plans to
distance or substitute his theoretical part or substitute a third individual in its delight. For
this situation, Jesus can legitimately estrange his co-possessed property for Lapinid,
liberated from any resistance from the co-proprietors. Lapinid, as a transferee, truly
acquired similar privileges of Jesus from the date of the execution of a legitimate deal.
Missing any verification that the deal was not consummated, the legitimacy of offer
remains alive. Generally, Lapinid ventures into the shoes of Jesus as co-proprietor of an
ideal and proportionate offer in the property held in like manner. Subsequently, from the
flawlessness of agreement on 9 November 1997, Lapinid inevitably turned into a co-
proprietor of the property.

In any event, accepting that the solicitors are right in their claim that the manner for
Lapinid before segment was a solid or unmistakable part, the legitimacy of offer actually
wins. In a catena of choices, the Supreme Court had consistently held that no individual
can guarantee title to an unequivocal or solid segment before parcel of co-claimed
property. Every co-proprietor just has an option to sell or estrange his optimal offer after
segment. Notwithstanding, in the event that he arranges his offer before segment, such
attitude doesn't make the deal or estrangement invalid and void. What will be influenced
on the deal is just his proportionate offer, subject to the consequences of the segment.
The co-proprietors who didn't give their agree to the deal remain to be unaffected by the
estrangement.

NORMA C. MAGSANO, ET. AL. -versus- PANGASINAN SAVINGS AND LOAN

BANK, INC., ET. AL.
The REM is void concerning the portion of Roque however substantial regarding the
segment, which might be dispensed to respondent bank as Susan's replacement in-
enthusiasm for the occasion of segment. At the time the REM was established, Roque
was at that point perished. Upon his passing, the intimate association among him and
Susana was broken up according to Article 126 (1) of the Family Code, and a
suggested customary co-proprietorship emerged among Susana and different
beneficiaries of Roque concerning his offer in the benefits of the intimate organization
forthcoming liquidation. The resulting suggested customary co-possession is
administered by Article 493 of the Civil Code, indeed:

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership. (Emphasis supplied)

Subsequently, despite the fact that Susana is a co-proprietor with her kids as for
Roque's offer in the intimate organization, she couldn't yet attest or guarantee title to a
particular segment thereof without a real parcel of the property being first done either by
arrangement or by legal declaration. While she herself as co-proprietor reserved the
option to contract or even sell her unified enthusiasm for the subject property, she was
unable to contract or in any case discard the equivalent completely without the assent of
the other co-proprietors. Thusly, the legitimacy of the subject REM and the ensuing
dispossession procedures therefor directed for respondent bank ought to be restricted
distinctly to the bit which might be designated to it, as Susana's replacement in-
enthusiasm, in case of parcel, accordingly making it a co-proprietor with candidates
forthcoming segment

The way that respondent bank prevailing with regards to uniting responsibility for
subject property in its name didn't end the current co-possession among it and
candidates. If there should be an occurrence of dispossession, a deal would bring about
the transmission of title to the purchaser, which is doable just if the merchant can be in
a situation to pass on responsibility for things sold. Here, Sps. Manuel simply ventured
into the shoes of respondent bank and gained just the rights and commitments relating
thereto. Hence, while they have been given an authentication of title over the whole
property, they will: (a) just procure what truly relates to respondent bank as replacement
in-enthusiasm of Susana in case of parcel; and (b) hold the offers in that relating to the
co-proprietors who didn't agree to the home loan, i.e., applicants, in trust for the last
forthcoming allotment.
 VILMA QUINTOS, ET. AL. -versus- PELAGIA I. NICOLAS, et. Al.

The candidates couldn't demonstrate their possession.

For an action to calm title to succeed, two indispensable requisites must concur,
namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the
real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding
claimed to be casting cloud on the title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or efficacy. The main essential was not
followed. The Court focused on that this issue is generously a genuine issue that ill-
advised to dive into in a request for survey on certiorari under Rule 45.

Applicants' supposed open, persistent, elite, and continuous ownership of the subject
property is misrepresented by the way that respondents, in 2005, went into a Contract
of Lease with the Avico Lending Investor Co. over the subject part with no protest from
the applicants. Candidates' failure to offer proof having a tendency to demonstrate that
Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra moved the responsibility for property for applicants is
similarly deadly to the last's case. Unexpectedly, Escolastica Ibarra executed a Deed of
Sale covering half of the subject property for all her 10 youngsters, not for candidates
alone.

The Court decided that every one of the 10 kin acquired the subject property and after
the respondents offered their aliquot offer to the companions Candelario, candidates
and the life partners became co-proprietors of the equivalent.

Respondents' counterclaim for segment isn't banished by res judicata.

The convention of res judicata gives that the judgment in a first case is last regarding
the case or request in debate, between the gatherings and those privy with them, not
just concerning each issue which was offered and gotten to support or thrashing the
case or request, however with regards to some other permissible issue which probably
been offered for that reason and all issues that could have been pronounced all things
considered.

The respondents have conceded that their past request for parcel has been excused
and has achieved irrevocability. The subject property of said case and in the current
contention are indeed the very same, and that in the two cases, respondents raise a
similar activity for parcel. What's more, finally, albeit respondent mates Candelario were
not party-prosecutors in the previous case for segment, there is personality of
gatherings not just when the gatherings for the situation are the equivalent, yet in
addition between those in privity with them, for example, between their replacements in-
intrigue.

It tends to be gathered that the law for the most part doesn't support the maintenance of
co-possession as a property connection, and is intrigued rather in finding out the co-
proprietors' particular offers in order to forestall the designation of segments to remain
never-endingly in an in-between state. The Court held that that Art. 494 is an exemption
to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court such that regardless of whether the request for
excusal for inability to arraign is quiet on whether it is with bias, it will be considered to
be without bias.

Truly, the Court of Appeals failed in endorsing the proposition segment presented by
mates Candelario

Article 496 gives that segment will either be by understanding of the gatherings or as
per the Rules of Court. For this situation, the Agreement of Subdivision purportedly
executed by life partners Candelario and applicants can't fill in as reason for parcel, for,
as expressed in the pre-preliminary request, respondents conceded that the
understanding was a lie and that candidates never partook in setting up the equivalent.
The "understanding" was created with no interview at all or any endeavor to show up at
commonly adequate terms with candidates. It, in this manner, come up short on the
fundamental imperative of assent.