THE CHANGING NATURE OF WARFARE – PART I

- Lt Gen (Dr) R S Panwar

Background
Over the centuries, warfare has undergone significant transformation, due to new discoveries
and innovative application of technologies. These inventions and discoveries have resulted in
dramatic changes in military doctrine as well as operational and organisational concepts, and
have altered the character and conduct of military operations.
The changing face of war was categorised as “generations of warfare” in 1989 by a team of US
analysts, led by William S Lind. As per this taxonomy, warfare has been classified into four
generations. While the first three generations were to do with conventional conflicts between
large armies, the fourth generation warfare (4GW) is characterised by the increasing role of non-
state actors in an asymmetrical conflict with conventional forces and the blurring of lines
between politics and military.
The changing nature of warfare is also reflected in the concept of Revolution in Military Affairs
(RMA). The genesis of this concept began in Russia in the early 1980s, and later evolved into
the “RMA” concept through the work of military thinkers primarily in the US. An “RMA” is deemed
to have occurred when, over some relatively brief period, the character of conflict changes
dramatically, requiring equally dramatic changes in military doctrine and organizations.
Let us take a brief look at these two aspects, and their relevance to the current Indian security
scenario.

Generations of Warfare
Over the centuries, warfare has undergone modernization, revitalization and adaptation, due to
new discoveries and innovative application of technologies. These inventions and discoveries
have resulted in dramatic changes in military doctrine as well as operational and organisational
concepts, and have altered the character and conduct of military operations. The changing face
of war was categorised as “generations of warfare” in 1989 by a team of US analysts, led by
William S Lind. As per this taxonomy, warfare has been classified into four generations, as
described in succeeding paragraphs [1] & [2].

First Generation War

First Generation Warfare is stated to the tactics of line and column. These tactics were
developed partially in response to technological factors – the line maximized firepower, rigid drill
was necessary to generate a high rate of fire, etc – and to some extent in response to social
conditions and ideas. Remnants of first generation tactics survive today, especially in the form
of rigid drills and the frequently felt need for linearity on the battlefield. In this era, operational
art did not exist as a concept, although it was practiced by many famous commanders, most
prominently Napoleon.

Second Generation War

Second Generation Warfare was a response to the rifled musket, the machinegun, and indirect
fire. Tactics were based on fire and movement, although these remained essentially linear. The
defender still attempted to block all penetrations, and in the attack a laterally dispersed line
advanced by rushes in small groups. Second generation tactics are adequately captured by the
French maxim, “the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies.” Massed firepower substituted
massed manpower.
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Third Generation War
Third Generation Warfare was also a result of increased battlefield firepower, with the driving
force being primarily ideas. As a consequence of their weaker industrial base in World War I,
the Germans developed radically new tactics. Based on manoeuver rather than attrition, third
generation tactics were truly nonlinear in nature. The tactics of attack relied on bypassing the
enemy’s combat forces rather than seeking to close with and destroy them. The defence was in
depth and often facilitated penetration, which set the enemy up for a counterattack.
Thus we see the major catalysts for change in previous generational shifts: technology and
ideas. When William S Lind categorised the first three generations as discussed above in 1989,
he also gazed into the future as to how Fourth Generation Warfare would develop. Many other
authors have delved on this subject and there is no universally accepted definition of Fourth
Generation Warfare. However, there does appear to be general agreement on the basic
concept, which is brought out in succeeding paragraphs.

Fourth Generation Warfare

Fourth Generation Warfare, or 4GW, is characterized by blurring of the lines between war and
politics, combatants and civilians. It signifies the nation states' loss of their near-monopoly on
combat forces, returning to modes of conflict prevalent in earlier times. In its simplest definition,
4GW would include any war in which one of the major participants is a violent non-state actor.
Guerrilla tactics resorted to in the Vietnam War would classify as an example of this type of
conflict.

From Order to Disorder

The First Generation battlefield was usually a battlefield of order, and it created a culture of
order in state militaries. Second Generation War also preserved the military culture of order.
Second Generation militaries focused inward on rules, processes and procedure, seeking to
achieve perfection of detail in execution. Third Generation War, as defined, diverges from the
military culture of order. Here the focus is external, to the situation, the enemy and the desired
result. Leaders at every level are expected to produce the results, even if this means deviating
from orders. Third Generation military culture values initiative over obedience, and it relies on
self-discipline rather than imposed discipline, because only self-discipline is compatible with
initiative. Given its complex nature, 4GW can be seen as a shift towards even greater disorder
in the battlespace.
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Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)
The genesis of the concept of revolution in military affairs began in Russia in the early 1980s,
when Soviet Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, the Soviet chief of staff at that time, wrote about a
"military technical revolution" that would dramatically improve the capabilities of conventional
weapons. His theorization about a military technology revolution were meant as a wake-up call
to his own country's political leaders. The US initially became interested in this concept
through Andrew W Marshall, the head of the Office of Net Assessment, a US Department of
Defence (DoD) think-tank. The concept gradually gained traction within official military circles,
and other nations also explored shifts in organization and technology [3].

Defining Characteristics of an RMA

An RMA involves a paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of military operations which either
renders obsolete or irrelevant one or more core competencies of a dominant player, or creates
one or more new core competencies, in some new dimensions of warfare, or both [4]. An “RMA”
is deemed to have occurred when, over some relatively brief period, the character of conflict
changes dramatically, requiring equally dramatic changes in military doctrine and organizations.

Taxonomy of RMAs
As per one classification by Krepinevich [5], there have been as many as ten military revolutions
since the fourteenth century, as follows: Infantry Revolution, Artillery Revolution, the Revolution
of Sail and Shot, Fortress Revolution, Gunpowder Revolution, Land Warfare Revolution, Naval
Revolution, Interwar Revolutions in Mechanization, Aviation & Information and finally the
Nuclear Revolution.

“System of Systems” RMA

The current RMA is often viewed as “a military revolution combining technical advances in
surveillance, C3I and precision munitions with new operational concepts, and continuous and
rapid joint operations, holding the entire theatre at risk.” Admiral William A Owens of the US
Navy and later Vice Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, US, was an advocate of the "system of
systems" RMA approach, in which an all-encompassing and all-knowing technological system
manned by commanders can deploy subsystems of force and "see" all the assets and
vulnerabilities of the enemy. As per Admiral Owens, the changes heralding the “Current RMA”
fall into three categories [6]: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), which
involves sensor and reporting technologies associated with intelligence collection, surveillance,
and reconnaissance; Command, Control, Communications, Computer applications and
Intelligence (C4I) processing, the realm in which sensor awareness is converted to dominant
understanding of a battlespace; and Precision Force, a broad concept, in which the knowledge
and orders generated from the first two areas are translated into action and results. These broad
system architectures and joint operational concepts lead to the creation of a new system-of-
systems, which in turn leads to Information Superiority.

“System of Systems” RMA vis-à-vis the OODA Loop

There is a clear correlation between the “system of systems” concept and Colonel James Boyd’s
OODA Loop. The “ISR” corresponds to the “Observe” part, the “C4I” to the “Orient-Decide” part
and the “Precision Systems” to the “Act” part of the Loop. The resulting Information Superiority
enables own forces to operate within the opponent's decision cycle.
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The Indian Security Scenario
Relevance of Lind’s “Generations” Paradigm
If one attempts to correlate Lind’s “generations” paradigm with the present battlefield scenarios
in the Indian context, one finds prominent glimpses of three out of the four generations of warfare
described above. The mechanics of mountain warfare in the Northern and Eastern Theatres
even today primarily employs the “fire and move” tactics which characterise the “second
generation” warfare, and the maxim “the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies” finds
significant resonance in this scenario. Next, operational art concepts with “ideas” as the driving
force and with tactics based on “manoeuvre” and “non-linearity” pretty much define the
mechanised warfare scenarios which are expected to unfold in the Western and Southern
theatres. Finally, the counter-insurgency operations being witnessed in Jammu & Kashmir and
elsewhere are a very good example of what Lind has referred to as 4GW.

Current RMA and Indian Warfighting Doctrines

The Indian Army (IA) Doctrine of 2004 had stated that Network Centric Warfare (NCW, a concept
elaborated upon in Part II of this write-up) is a new method of warfighting enabled by the ongoing
(system-of-systems) RMA, which itself is contingent upon robust and sophisticated C4I2SR
systems. The doctrine notes that RMA concepts can have a dramatic effect on the conduct of
warfare in a conventional (second and third generation warfare) scenario and, to a lesser extent,
even in a Low Intensity Conflict (LIC, akin to 4GW) scenario. The IA Doctrine of 2010, on the
other hand, while dropping the RMA terminology, endorses the concept of NCW.
Part II of this write-up takes this discussion forward and discusses modern warfighting concepts
with special focus on how the nature of warfare is being transformed at a breath-taking pace in
this Information Age.

References
[1] William S Lind et al, The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation, Marine
Corps Gazette, Oct 1989, pp. 22-26, Accessed 14 Oct 2020.
[2] Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Marine Corps, Fourth Generation War, Fleet
Marine Force Manual 1-A, 12 Aug 2008, pp. 29-30, Accessed 14 Oct 2020.
[3] Chapman, Gary, An Introduction to the Revolution in Military Affairs, Proc. XV Amaldi
Conference on Problems in Global Security, Helsinki, Finland, Sept. 2003, pp. 2, 10-14,
Accessed 14 Oct 2020.
[4] Hundley R O, Past Revolutions, Future Transformations, RAND publishers, Santa
Monica, CA and Washington, D C,1999, pp. xiii-xv, 8, Accessed 14 Oct 2020.
[5] Krepinevich, Andrew F, Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions, The
National Interest n37 (Fall 1994 n37): 30(13), University of Florida, 19 Nov 2006, Accessed 14
Oct 2020.
[6] Owens, Admiral W, Emerging System of Systems, NDU Strategic Forum, No 63, Feb
1996, Accessed 14 Oct 2020.