AN ACTION FOR PARTITION DOES NOT PRESCRIBE.

UNTIL NO PHYSICAL DIVISION

IS EFFECTED, SHARES OF CO-OWNERS REMAIN IDEAL

Del Blanco v. Iintermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. L-72694, December 1, 1987

FACTS:
In a document executed in the Municipality of San Rafael, Bulacan, three brothers,
Benedicto, Jose and Manuel Pansacola, entered into an agreement which provided, among
others: (1) That they will purchase from the Spanish Government the lands comprising the
Island of Cagbalite which is located within the boundaries of the Municipality of Mauban,
Province of Tayabas (now Quezon) and has an approximate area of 1,600 hectares; (2)
That the lands shall be considered after the purchase as their common property; (3) That
the co-ownership includes Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo, minors at that time
represented by their father, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Peña) who will contribute for
them in the proposed purchase of the Cagbalite Island; (4) That whatever benefits may be
derived from the Island shall be shared equally by the co-owners in the following proportion:
Benedicto Pansacola — ¼ share; Jose Pansacola — ¼ share; and, Domingo Arce and
Baldomera Angulo — 2/4 shares which shall be placed under the care of their father,
Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Peña).

The co-owners entered into the actual possession and enjoyment of the Island purchased
by them from the Spanish Government. On 1868 they agreed to modify the terms and
conditions of the agreement wherein the new agreement provided for a new sharing and
distribution of the lands, comprising the Island of Cagbalite and whatever benefits may be
derived therefrom, as follows: "(a) The first one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to Don
Benedicto Pansacola; (b) The second one fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to Don Jose
Pansacola; (c) The third one-fourth (1/4) portion shall henceforth belong to the children of
their deceased brother, Don Eustaquio Pansacola, namely: Don Mariano Pansacola, Maria
Pansacola and Don Hipolito Pansacola; (d) The fourth and last one-fourth (1/4) portion shall
belong to their nephews and nieces (1) Domingo Arce, (2) Baldomera Angulo, (3) Marcelina
Flores, (4) Francisca Flores, (5) Candelaria dela Cruz, and (6) Gervasio Pansacola who,
being all minors, are still under the care of their brother, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel
Peña). The latter is the real father of said minors."

About one hundred years later, on November 18, 1968, private respondents brought a
special action for partition in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, under the provisions of
Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, including as parties the heirs and successors-in-interest of
the co-owners of the Cagbalite Island in the second contract of co-ownership dated April 11,
1968.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Is the Cagbalite Island is still undivided property owned in common by the heirs and
successors-in-interest of the brothers, Benedicto, Jose and Manuel Pansacola?
(2) Does an action for partition prescribe?

HELD:
(1) Yes, the property is still undivided. There is nothing in all agreements that suggests that
actual or physical partition of the Island had really been made by either the original owners
or their heirs or successors-in-interest. The agreement entered into in 1859 simply provides
for the sharing of whatever benefits can be derived from the island.
(2) An action for partition does not prescribe. Under Article 403 of the Old Civil Code, now
Article 497, provides that the assignees of the co-owners may take part in the partition of
the common property, and Article 400 of the Old Code, now Article 494 provides that each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property, a provision which
implies that the action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches
(Budlong vs. Pondoc, 79 SCRA 24 [1977]). An action for partition does not lie except when
the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA
532 [1982]).
A CO-OWNER HAS THE RIGHT TO ALIENATE HIS PRO-INDIVISO SHARE IN THE CO-
OWNED PROPERTY EVEN WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF HIS CO-OWNERS

Heirs of Dela Rosa v. Batongbacal

G.R. No. 179205, July 30, 2014

FACTS:
The subject property consists of a 3,750 square meter-portion of the 15,001 square meters
parcel of land situated in Barrio Saog, Marilao, Bulacan denominated as Lot No. 1, and
registered under the names of Reynaldo Dela Rosa, Eduardo Dela Rosa, Araceli Dela Rosa
and Zenaida Dela Rosa.

Sometime in 1984, Reynaldo offered to sell the subject property to Guillermo Batongbacal
and Mario Batongbacal for P50.00 per square meter or for a total of P187,500.00. Pursuant
to the agreement, Reynaldo received an advance payment of ₱31,500.00 leaving a balance
of ₱156,000.00. As shown in the document denominated as Resibo and signed by
Reynaldo on 18 February 1987, the parties agreed that the amount of ₱20,000.00 as part of
the advance payment shall be paid upon the delivery of the Special Power-of-Attorney
which would authorize Reynaldo to alienate the subject property on behalf of his co-owners
and siblings namely, Eduardo, Araceli and Zenaida. The balance thereon shall be paid in
₱10,000.00 monthly installments until the purchase price is fully settled

Consequently, Guillermo and Mario initiated an action for Specific Performance or

Rescission and Damages before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, seeking to
enforce their Contract to Sell dated 18 February 1987. Mario and Guillermo asserted that
they have a better right over the subject property and alleged that the subsequent sale
thereof effected by Reynaldo to third persons is void as it was done in bad faith. It was
prayed in the Complaint that Reynaldo be directed to deliver the SPA and, in case of its
impossibility, to return the amount of ₱31,500.00 with legal interest and with damages in
either case.

Reynaldo in his Answer countered that the purported Contract to Sell is void, because he
never gave his consent thereto. Reynaldo insisted that he was made to understand that the
contract between him and the Batongbacals was merely an equitable mortgage whereby it
was agreed that the latter will loan to him the amount of ₱3 l ,500.00 payable once he
receives his share in the proceeds of the sale of the land registered under TCT No. T-
107449.

Following the pre-trial conference without the parties reaching an amicable settlement, trial
on the merits ensued. The RTC dismissed the case and ordered Reynaldo to return to the
former the sum of ₱28,000.00 with 12% annual interest. Reynaldo failed to convince the
court a quo that the contract he entered into with Mario was an equitable mortgage.

ISSUE:
Is the sale of Reynaldo of his undivided share in the property valid and enforceable?

HELD:
Yes, the subject of the Contract to Sell was limited only to '14 pro-indiviso share of
Reynaldo consisting an area of 3,750 square meter and not the entire 15,001-square meter
parcel of land. As a co-owner of the subject property, Reynaldo's right to sell, assign or
mortgage his ideal share in the property held in common is sanctioned by law.
Pursuant to Aricle 493, a co-owner has the right to alienate his pro-indiviso share in the co-
owned property even without the consent of his co-owners. This right is absolute and in
accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has a full ownership of his pro-
indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another
person for its enjoyment. In other words, the law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling,
alienating, mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in common.
A CO-OWNER EVEN THROUGH THE COURT CANNOT COMPEL OTHER CO-OWNERS
TO SELL THEIR RESPECTIVE SHARES

Arambulo v. Nolasco
G.R. No. 189420, March 16, 2014

FACTS:
Petitioners Raul V. Arambulo and Teresita A. Dela Cruz, along with their mother Rosita Vda.
de Arambulo, and siblings Primo V. Arambulo, Ma. Lorenza A. Lopez, Ana Maria V.
Arambulo, Maximiano V. Arambulo, Julio V. Arambulo and Iraida Arambulo Nolasco (Iraida)
are co-owners of two (2) parcels of land located in Tondo, Manila, with an aggregate size of
233 square meters.

When Iraida passed away, she was succeeded by her husband, respondent Genaro
Nolasco and their children, Iris Abegail Nolasco, Ingrid Aileen Arambulo and respondent
Jeremy Spencer Nolasco.

On 8 January 1999, petitioners filed a petition for relief under Article 491 of the Civil Code
with the RTC of Manila, alleging that all of the co-owners, except for respondents, have
authorized petitioners to sell their respective shares to the subject properties; that only
respondents are withholding their consent to the sale of their shares.

ISSUE:
Can the respondents as co-owners be compelled by the court to give their consent to the
sale of their shares in the co-owned properties?

HELD:
No, Under Art. 493. “Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership”

The Court henceforth, cannot compel the respondents to give their consent to the sale of
their shares. Pertinent to this case, Article 493 dictates that each one of the parties herein
as co-owners with full ownership of their parts can sell their fully owned part. The sale by
the petitioners of their parts shall not affect the full ownership by the respondents of the part
that belongs to them. Their part which petitioners will sell shall be that which may be
apportioned to them in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. With the full
ownership of the respondents remaining unaffected by petitioners' sale of their parts, the
nature of the property, as co-owned, likewise stays. In lieu of the petitioners, their vendees
shall be co-owners with the respondents.
BETWEEN DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE UNDER RULE 17, SECTION 3 AND THE
RIGHT GRANTED TO CO-OWNERS UNDER ARTICLE 494 OF THE CIVIL CODE, THE
LATTER MUST PREVAIL

Quintos v. Nicolas
G.R. No. 210252, June 16, 2014

FACTS:
Petitioners ar siblings, heir parents, Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, were the owners of
the subject property, a 281 sq.m.parcel of land situated along Quezon Ave in Tarlac. By
1999, both Bienvenido and Escolastica had already passed away, leaving to their ten
children ownership over the subject property. Subsequently, sometime in 2002, respondent
siblings brought an action for partition against petitioners. The RTC dismissed the action
due to failure of the parties to appear despite due notice.

Having failed to secure a favorable decision for partition, respondent siblings instead
resorted to executing a Deed of Adjudication to transfer the property in favor of the ten
siblings. As a result, TCT No. 318717 was canceled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 390484
was issued in its place by the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac in the names of the ten heirs of
the Ibarra spouses.

Subsequently, respondent siblings sold their 7/10 undivided share over the property in favor
of their co-respondents, the spouses Recto and Rosemarie Candelario. By virtue of a Deed
of Absolute Sale executed in favor of the spouses Candelario and an Agreement of
Subdivision purportedly executed by them and petitioners, TCT No. 390484 was partially
canceled and TCT No. 434304 was issued in the name of the Candelarios, covering the
7/10 portion.

Petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against respondents wherein
they alleged that during their parents' lifetime, the couple distributed their real and personal
properties in favor of their ten children. Upon distribution, petitioners alleged that they
received the subject property and the house constructed thereon as their share. They
likewise averred that they have been in adverse, open, continuous, and uninterrupted
possession of the property for over four decades and are, thus, entitled to equitable title
thereto. They also deny any participation in the execution of the aforementioned Deed of
Adjudication dated September 21, 2004 and the Agreement of Subdivision. |||

ISSUE:
Is the respondents' counterclaim for partition is already barred by laches or res judicata?
HELD:
No, the law generally does not favor the retention of co-ownership as a property relation,
and is interested instead in ascertaining the co-owners' specific shares so as to prevent the
allocation of portions to remain perpetually in limbo. Thus, the law provides that each co-
owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common.

Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted to co-owners
under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise would
diminish the substantive right of a co-owner through the promulgation of procedural rules.
Such a construction is not sanctioned by the principle, which is too well settled to require
citation, that a substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. The counterclaim
for partition is not barred by laches. As an equitable defense, laches does not concern itself
with the character of the petitioners' title, but only with whether or not by reason of the
respondents' long inaction or inexcusable neglect, they should be barred from asserting this
claim at all, because to allow them to do so would be inequitable and unjust to petitioners.
As correctly appreciated by the lower courts, respondents cannot be said to have neglected
to assert their right over the subject property. They cannot be considered to have
abandoned their right given that they filed an action for partition sometime in 2002, even
though it was later dismissed.
DEPOSITORS IN A JOINT ACCOUNT ARE CO-OWNERS AS FAR AS THE BANK IN
CONCERNED, AS BETWEEN THE ACCOUNT HOLDERS, THEIR RIGHT AGAINST
EACH OTHER MAY DEPEND ON WHAT THEY HAVE AGREED UPON

Apique v. Fahnestich
G.R. No. 205705, August 5, 2015

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari which ordered petitioner Dominador M. Apique (Dominador) to
return to respondent Evangeline Apique Fahnenstich (Evangeline) the amount of
P980,000.00, plus 6% interest per annum reckoned from the filing of the complaint up to the
finality of the decision and, thereafter, 12% interest on the total amount demanded until its
full satisfaction.

Dominador and Evangeline are siblings who used to live with their parents until Evangeline
left for Germany to work sometime in 1979. On 1995, Evangeline executed a General and
Special Powers of Attorney constituting Dominador as her attorney-in-fact to purchase real
property for her, and to manage or supervise her business affairs in the Philippines. As
Evangeline was always in Germany, she opened a joint savings account on January 18,
1999 with Dominador at the Claveria Branch of the Philippine Commercial International
Bank in Davao City, which later became Equitable PCI Bank,and now Banco de Oro, under
Savings Account No. 1189-02819-5 (subject account).

On February 11, 2002, Dominador withdrew the amount of P980,000.00 from the subject
account and, thereafter, deposited the money to his own savings account with the same
bank, under Savings Account No. 1189-00781-3. Evangeline demanded the return of the
amount withdrawn from the joint account, but to no avail.

ISSUE:
Is Evangeline entitled to the return of the amount of P980,000.00 Dominador withdrew from
their joint savings account with EPCIB, plus legal interest thereon?

HELD:
Yes, there is no dispute that the account opened by Evangeline and Dominador under
Savings Account No. 1189-02819-5 with EPCIB was a joint "OR" account. It is also admitted
that: (a) the account was opened for a specific purpose,i.e., to facilitate the transfer of
needed funds for Evangeline's business projects; and (b) Dominador may withdraw funds
therefrom "if" there is a need to meet Evangeline's financial obligations arising from said
projects. Hence, while Dominador is a co-owner of the subject account as far as the bank is
concerned — and may, thus, validly deposit and/or withdraw funds without the consent of
his co-depositor, Evangeline — as between him and Evangeline,his authority to withdraw,
as well as the amount to be withdrawn, is circumscribed by the purpose for which the
subject account was opened.

Under Article 485 of the Civil Code, q joint account is one that is held jointly by two or more
natural persons, or by two or more juridical persons or entities. Under such setup, the
depositors are joint owners or co-owners of the said account, and their share in the deposits
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved,

The common banking practice is that regardless of who puts the money into the account,
each of the named account holder has an undivided right to the entire balance, and any of
them may deposit and/or withdraw, partially or wholly, the funds without the need or consent
of the other, during their lifetime. Nevertheless, as between the account holders, their right
against each other may depend on what they have agreed upon, and the purpose for which
the account was opened and how it will be operated.

Under the foregoing circumstances, Dominador's right to obtain funds from the subject
account was, thus, conditioned on the necessity of funds for Evangeline's projects.
Admittedly, at the time he withdrew the amount of P980,000.00 from the subject account,
there was no project being undertaken for Evangeline. Moreover, his claim that the said
amount belonged to him, as part of the compensation promised by Holgar for his services
as administrator of the business affairs of Evangeline, was correctly rejected by the CA,
considering the dearth of competent evidence showing that Holgar: (a) undertook to pay
Dominador the amount of P1,000,000.00 for his services as administrator of Evangeline's
various projects; and (b) remitted such amount to the subject account for the benefit of
Dominador. Having failed to justify his right over the amount withdrawn, Dominador is liable
for its return, as correctly adjudged by the CA.
ANY ONE OF THE CO-OWNERS MAY BRING AN ACTION IN EJECTMENT

Catedrilla v. Lauron
G.R. No. 179011, April 15, 2013

FACTS:
On February 12, 2003, petitioner Rey Castigador Catedrilla filed with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Lambunao, Iloilo a Complaint for ejectment against the spouses Mario and
Margie Lauron. Respondents Mario and Margie Lauron, through the tolerance of the heirs of
Lilia, constructed a residential building of strong materials on the northwest portion of Lot
No. 5 covering an area of one hundred square meters; that the heirs of Lilia made various
demands for respondents to vacate the premises and even exerted earnest efforts to
compromise with them but the same was unavailing; and that petitioner reiterated the
demand on respondents to vacate the subject lot on January 15, 2003, but respondents
continued to unlawfully withhold such possession.

In their Answer, respondents claimed that petitioner had no cause of action against them,
since they are not the owners of the residential building standing on petitioner's lot, but
Mildred Kascher (Mildred), sister of respondent Margie, as shown by the tax declaration in
Mildred's name.

The MTC rendered its Decision, in favor of the plaintiff ordering the defendants to vacate the
lot in question and restore possession. Respondents filed their appeal with the RTC which
merely affirmed the lower court’s decision. However, the CA reversed and set aside the said
decision. The CA found that petitioner's co-heirs to the subject lot should have been
impleaded as co-plaintiffs in the ejectment case against respondents, since without their
presence, the trial court could not validly render judgment and grant relief in favor of
petitioner.

ISSUE:
Did the non-inclusion of the co-heirs as indispensable parties made the complaint fatally
defective?

HELD:
No, petitioner can file the action for ejectment without impleading his co-owners. In Wee v.
De Castro, petitioner therein argued that the respondent cannot maintain an action for
ejectment against him, without joining all his co-owners. Article 487 of the New Civil Code is
explicit on this point: “Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.”
This article covers all kinds of action for the recovery of possession, i.e., forcible entry and
unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and
recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion). As explained by the renowned civilest,
Professor Arturo M. Tolentino: A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity
of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted
for the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims
possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper.
 Clemente v. Republic
G.R. No. 220008, February 20, 2019

FACTS:
Municipal Mayor Amado A. Clemente (Mayor Clemente), Dr. Vicente A. Clemente, Judge
Ramon A. Clemente, and Milagros A. Clemente (Clemente Siblings) were the owners of a
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-50896. During their
lifetime, they executed a Deed of Donation 8 dated 16 March 1963 over a one-hectare
portion of their property (Subject Property) in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.

In the same Deed of Donation, District Engineer II Ciceron A. Guerrero of DPWH Region IV-
A accepted said donation. On 29 March 1963, TCT No. T-50896 was partially cancelled by
TCT No. T-51745 covering the Subject Property and issued in the name of the Province of
Quezon.

In accordance with the Deed of Donation, the construction of a building for a hospital was
started in the following year. However, for reasons unknown, the construction was never
completed and only its foundation remains today.

In a letter dated 23 August 2003, Socorro and Rosario P. Clemente wrote to the District
Engineer of Quezon asking for information on the development of the government hospital,
as they were aware that the construction of the foundation of the hospital structure had
already been started. In a subsequent letter dated 24 November 2003, Socorro wrote to the
District Engineer restating their inquiry and consultation on 20 November 2003, when the
District Engineer informed her that the DPWH no longer had a plan to construct a hospital at
the site and that the DPWH had no budget for the hospital construction. 11 CAIHTE

In 2004, almost forty-one (41) years after the Deed of Donation was executed, Socorro, as
heir and successor-in-interest of Mayor Clemente, filed a Complaint, and subsequently an
Amended Complaint, for Revocation of Donation, Reconveyance and Recovery of
Possession alleging that the Republic of the Philippines failed to comply with the condition
imposed on the Deed of Donation, which was to use the property "solely for hospital site
only and for no other else, where a [g]overnment [h]ospital shall be constructed."

ISSUES:
WHETHER OR NOT THE "SETTLEMENT OF AN ESTATE" OR THE "DETERMINATION
OF HEIRS, FULL LIQUIDATION OF THE ESTATE AND PAYMENT OF ESTATE DEBTS"
OF THE CO-OWNERS IS A NECESSARY REQUIREMENT BEFORE THE PETITIONER
(THE ONLY SURVIVING SPOUSE OF ONE OF THE CO-OWNERS) MAY FILE THIS
ACTION FOR REVOCATION OF DONATION, RECONVEYANCE AND RECOVERY OF
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY WHICH THEY DONATED ON MARCH 16, 1963 OR
52 YEARS AGO, SINCE ANYWAY THE ACTION SHALL INDISPUTABLY BENEFIT ALL
CO-HEIRS?

WHETHER OR NOT THE FAILURE OF THE OTHER CO-HEIRS TO JOIN PETITIONER IN

THIS ACTION IS A GROUND FOR ITS DISMISSAL ALTHOUGH THE ACTION IS FOR
THE BENEFIT OF ALL THE CO-HEIRS AS BENEFICIAL OWNERS AND ALTHOUGH
THIS KIND OF LEGAL ACTION COVERS ALL KINDS OF ACTION FOR THE RECOVERY
OF POSSESSION, I.E., FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER (ACCION
INTERDICTAL), RECOVERY OF POSSESSION (ACCION PUBLICIANA) AND
RECOVERY OF OWNERSHIP (ACCION [REIVINDICATORIA])?

HELD:
The petition is meritorious.

The nature of the donation made by the Clemente Siblings is a donation subject to a
condition — the condition being the construction of a government hospital and the use of
the Subject Property solely for hospital purposes. Upon the non-fulfillment of the condition,
the donation may be revoked and all the rights already acquired by the donee shall be
deemed lost and extinguished. This is a resolutory condition because it is demandable at
once by the done but the non-fulfillment of the condition gives the donor the right to revoke
the donation.

In this case, upon the execution of the Deed of Donation and the acceptance of such
donation in the same instrument, ownership was transferred to the Republic, as evidenced
by the new certificate of title issued in the name of the Province of Quezon. Because the
condition in the Deed of Donation is a resolutory condition, until the donation is revoked, it
remains valid. However, for the donation to remain valid, the donee must comply with its
obligation to construct a government hospital and use the Subject Property as a hospital
site. The failure to do so gives the donor the right to revoke the donation. Article 764 of the
Civil Code provides:

Art. 764. The donation shall be revoked at the instance of the donor, when the
donee fails to comply with any of the conditions which the former imposed upon the
latter.

In this case, the property donated shall be returned to the donor, the alienations made by
the donee and the mortgages imposed thereon by him being void, with the limitations
established, with regard to third persons, by the Mortgage Law and the Land Registration
Laws.

This action shall prescribe after four years from the non-compliance with the condition, may
be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and may be exercised against the donee's heirs.

When the parties provided in the Deed of Donation that the donee should construct a
government hospital, their intention was to have such hospital built and completed, and to
have a functioning hospital on the Subject Property. This can be evidenced by the
accompanying words in the Deed of Donation — "solely for hospital site only and for no
other else, where a [g]overnment [h]ospital shall be constructed." The condition imposed
upon the donee has two parts — first, to construct a government hospital, and second, to
use the Subject Property solely as a hospital site. The argument of respondent that the
mere construction of the foundation of a building complies with the condition that a
government hospital be constructed on the Subject Property is specious. A foundation of a
building is obviously not a government hospital. The other condition in the Deed of
Donation, which is to use the Subject Property solely as a hospital site, is also not complied
with when the Subject Property is left idle, which means the Subject Property is not being
used as a hospital site. The foundation of a building cannot function as a hospital site. Thus,
even if we are to consider, for the sake of argument, that the construction of the foundation
of a hospital building is enough to comply with the obligation to construct a government
hospital, the subsequent abandonment of the construction results in the non-compliance
with the second part of the donee's obligation — which is to use the Subject Property solely
as a hospital site.

Based on the foregoing, we find that the donee failed to comply with the resolutory condition
imposed in the Deed of Donation.

Determination of Heirs

Petitioner also argues that there is no need for a settlement of the estate before an action
for revocation of donation, reconveyance, and recovery of possession of property may be
filed by an heir of a co-owner.

We agree.

It has been settled that a co-heir or co-owner may bring suit without impleading all the other
co-owners if the suit is for the benefit of all. In Spouses Mendoza v. Coronel, we held:
[T]he law now allows a co-owner to bring an action for ejectment, which covers all kinds of
actions for the recovery of possession, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer,
without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.

In subsequent cases, this Court has consistently held that as long as the co-owner
recognizes the co-ownership, there is no need to implead all the co-owners in all kinds of
action for recovery of possession. In Catedrilla v. Lauron, we held:

Petitioner can file the action for ejectment without impleading his co-owners. In Wee v. De
Castro, wherein petitioner therein argued that the respondent cannot maintain an action for
ejectment against him, without joining all his co-owners, we ruled in this wise:

Article 487 of the New Civil Code is explicit on this point:

ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.

This article covers all kinds of action for the recovery of possession, i.e., forcible entry and
unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and
recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion). As explained by the renowned civil[i]st,
Professor Arturo M. Tolentino:

A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-
owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If
the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself
and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper.

In the more recent case of Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman, this Court declared that a co-
owner is not even a necessary party to an action for ejectment, for complete relief can be
afforded even in his absence, thus:

In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However,
pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and the relevant jurisprudence, any one of them
may bring an action, any kind of action for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore,
only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-
owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not
indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be
afforded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been
filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
In this case, although petitioner alone filed the complaint for unlawful detainer, he stated in
the complaint that he is one of the heirs of the late Lilia Castigador, his mother, who
inherited the subject lot, from her parents. Petitioner did not claim exclusive ownership of
the subject lot, but he filed the complaint for the purpose of recovering its possession which
would redound to the benefit of the co-owners. Since petitioner recognized the existence of
a co-ownership, he, as a co-owner, can bring the action without the necessity of joining all
the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs.

In this case, it is not disputed that Socorro is an heir of one of the donors. Moreover, her
prayer in her action was to revoke the Deed of Donation and to cancel the TCT issued in the
name of the Province of Quezon, and to issue a new certificate in the names of the heirs of
the Clemente Siblings, pro-indiviso, and to direct the Republic to surrender or reconvey
possession over the property to the heirs of the Clemente Siblings. It is clear, therefore, that
Socorro acknowledges and continues to recognize her co-heirs as co-owners of the Subject
Property. Further, based on the Complaint and Amended Complaint of Socorro, it is clear
that the suit was intended for the benefit of all the co-heirs of the Clemente Siblings. Thus,
there is no need to implead the other co-heirs for the action to proceed as it is for the benefit
of the co-ownership.

Moreover, there is no need for the settlement of the estate before one of the heirs can
institute an action on behalf of the other co-heirs. Although an heir's right in the estate of the
decedent which has not been fully settled and partitioned is merely inchoate, Article 493 of
the Civil Code gives the heir the right to exercise acts of ownership. Thus, even before the
settlement of the estate, an heir may file an action for reconveyance of possession as a co-
owner thereof, provided that such heir recognizes and acknowledges the other co-heirs as
co-owners of the property as it will be assumed that the heir is acting on behalf of all the co-
heirs for the benefit of the co-ownership.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 17 October 2014 Decision and the 14 August
2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 91522 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Mauban, Quezon, Branch 64, is ORDERED to
cause the cancellation by the Register of Deeds of Quezon of TCT No. T-51745 and the
issuance, in lieu thereof, of the corresponding certificate of title in the name of the heirs of
Amado A. Clemente, Dr. Vicente A. Clemente, Judge Ramon A. Clemente, and Milagros A.
Clemente.

SO ORDERED.
EACH COOWNER OR TENANT IN COMMON OF UNDIVIDED REALTY HAS THE SAME
RIGHTS THEREIN AS THE OTHERS; HE MAY USE AND ENJOY THE SAME WITHOUT
OTHER LIMITATION EXCEPT THAT HE MUST NOT PREJUDICE THE RIGHTS OF HIS
CO-OWNERS

Pardell v. Bartolome
G.R. No. L-4656, November 18, 1912

FACTS:
Petitioner Vicenta Ortiz y Felin de Pardell and respondent Matilde Ortiz y Felin Bartolome
were the existing heirs of the late Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin. On 1888, Matilde and co-
defendant Gaspar de Bartolome y Escribano took it upon themselves without an judicial
authorization or even extra judicial agreement the administration of the properties of the late
Calixta and Miguel. These properties included a house in Escolta Street,Vigan, Ilocos Sur; a
house in Washington Street, Vigan,Ilocos Sur; a lot in Magallanes Street, Vigan, IlocosSur;
parcels of rice land in San Julian and Sta. Lucia;and parcels of land in Candon, Ilocos Sur,
they took upon themselves the administration and enjoyment of the properties left by Calixta
and collected the rents, fruits, and products thereof, to the serious detriment of Vicenta’s
interest. Despite repeated demands to divide the properties and the fruits accruing
therefrom, Sps Gaspar and Matilde had been delaying the partition and delivery of the said
properties by means of unkempt promises and other excuses.

Vicenta filed a petition for partition with damages in the RTC. The RTC absolved Matilde
from payment of damages. It held that the revenues and the expenses were compensated
by the residence enjoyed by the defendant party, that no losses or damages were either
caused or suffered, nor likewise any other expense besides those aforementioned. Counsel
for Matilde took an exception to the judgment and moved for a new trial on the grounds that
the evidence presented did not warrant the judgment rendered and that the latter was
contrary to law. That motion was denied by the lower court. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE:
Is a co-owner is required to pay for rent in exclusively using the co-owned property?

HELD:
No, Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes: “Each co-owner may use the things owned in
common, provided he uses them in accordance with their object and in such manner as not
to injure the interests of the community nor prevent the co-owners from utilizing them
according to their rights.”
Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a dwelling, in
the house of joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so doing, the said
Matilde occasioned any detriment to the interests of the community property, nor that she
prevented her sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story according to her rights. It is
to be noted that the stores of the lower floor were rented and an accounting of the rents was
duly made to the plaintiffs.

Each co-owner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and
may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the
interests of his co-owners, for the reason that, until a division be made, the respective part
of each holder cannot be determined and every one of the co-owners exercises together
with his other coparticipants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his
use and enjoyment of the same.

As the hereditary properties of the joint ownership of the two sisters, Vicenta Ortiz, plaintiff,
and Matilde Ortiz, defendant, were situated in the Province of Ilocos Sur, and were in the
care of the last named, assisted by her husband, while the plaintiff Vicenta with her husband
was residing outside of the said province the greater part of the time between 1885 and
1905, when she left these Islands for Spain, it is not at all strange that delays and difficulties
should have attended the efforts made to collect the rents and proceeds from the property
held in common and to obtain a partition of the latter, especially during several years when,
owing to the insurrection, the country was in a turmoil; and for this reason, aside from that
founded on the right of co-ownership of the defendants, who took upon themselves the
administration and care of the property of joint tenancy for purposes of their preservation
and improvement, these latter are not obliged to pay to the plaintiff Vicenta one-half of the
rents which might have been derived from the upper story of the said house on Calle
Escolta, and, much less, because one of the living rooms and the storeroom thereof were
used for the storage of some belongings and effects of common ownership between the
litigants. The defendant Matilde, therefore, in occupying with her husband the upper floor of
the said house, did not injure the interests of her co-owner, her sister Vicenta, nor did she
prevent the latter from living therein, but merely exercised a legitimate right pertaining to her
as a co-owner of the property.
RIGHT OF REDEMPTION MAY BE EXERCISED BY A CO-OWNER OR HIS
SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST ONLY BEFORE PARTITION, OR BEFORE THE
COMMUNITY IS TERMINATED

Caro v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-46001, March 25, 1982

FACTS:
Alfredo Benito, Benjamin Benito and Mario Benito were the original co-owners of two
parcels of land.

Sometime in January 1957, Mario died. His surviving wife, Basilia Lahorra and his father,
Saturnino Benito had thereafter been appointed as joint administrators of Mario's estate.
Sometime in 1959, Benjamin Benito, one of the co-owners, executed a deed of absolute
sale of his one-third undivided portion over said parcels of land in favor of herein petitioner,
Luz Caro.

In 1960, Alfredo, Luz, Saturnino and Basilia orally agreed to subdivide the property. A
petition for subdivision was then filed for the purpose, accompanied by the affidavits of
Alfredo and Saturnino stating they agree to the segregation of the parcel of land.
Pursuant thereto, a subdivision plan was then made, wherein they allocated Lot I-C to Luz.
A TCT over the same lot was then finally issued to her.

Nevertheless, Basilia alleged that it was only sometime in May 1966, did she learn about
the transfer of Lot I-C by Benjamin to Luz, when she received a special proceeding-related
pleading containing an allegation to that effect. Basilia then sent a written offer to redeem to
Luz in August 1966, allegedly pursuant to a right of legal redemption under the Civil Code.

ISSUES:
1) Is the subdivision made by the parties in 1960 valid?
2) Assuming that aforementioned subdivision is valid, can the right of redemption still be
exercised?

HELD:
1) YES. Citing Hernandez vs. Andal, the Court held that an agreement of partition, though
oral, is valid and consequently binding upon the parties; hence, the subdivision made in
1960 is valid and must be respected.
2) NO. The Court then remarked that such partition or subdivision being valid, the
community is likewise terminated and according to Caram v. CA, there is no longer reason
to sustain any right of legal redemption.

Moreover, citing Saturnino v. Paulino, the right of redemption under the Civil Code may be
exercised by a co-owner only before partition. In this case, the right was asserted not only
after partition, but after the property inherited has already been subdivided into several
parcels, which were assigned by lot.

Thus, it may be concluded that right of redemption may no longer be exercised after a co-
owned land has already been subdivided.
THE PROPER REMEDY AGAINST A BUYER WHO SUBSTITUTED A CO-OWNER BY
VIRTUE OF A SALE OF THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY, IS NOT AN ACTION FOR
NULLIFICATION OF SUCH SALE BUT AN ACTION FOR DIVISION OF THE COMMUNITY
PROPERTY

Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 78178, April 15, 1988

FACTS:
In this case, there was a parcel of land co-owned by 6 Bailon siblings—each owning a 1/6
share. Two of the siblings, Rosalia and Gaudencio, sold a portion of the lot to Donato
Delgado. Rosalia then sold the remainder of the land to Ponciana de Lanuza.

Ponciana eventually also acquired the portion acquired by Donato, as a separately titled lot,
in a subsequent and separate transaction with the latter. The husband of Ponciana, by
virtue of an SPA then managed to sell the entire property as two separate lots, to Celestino
Afable Sr., herein respondent.

The other co-owners, Delia and heirs of Nenita, herein petitioners then filed a case for
recovery of the property with damages against Celestino.

ISSUES:
1) Is the sale made by the two co-owners, Rosalia and Gaudencio, as well as the
subsequent transactions thereto, valid?
2) Is the action for recovery of property the proper remedy in the present case?

HELD:
1) YES. The Court held that as a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share under Art.
493 of the Civil Code, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of
the other co-owners is valid. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller may be
transferred; thus, the effect of the sale, although valid, is that the buyer merely substitutes
the seller co-owner.

2) NO. The proper action in case of sale or of the thing owned in common by one or some
of the co-owners to a third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners, is not an
action for nullification of the sale but an action for division of the common property. The
Court held that as a buyer substitutes the seller or sellers as a co-owner of the latter’s
proportionate share, he is a legitimate proprietor and possessor in joint ownership of the
common property claimed. Hence, an action for division of the common property, thereby
terminating co-ownership thereof, is the proper remedy in the present case.
IF DEFENDANT IN AN ACTION FOR PARTITION ASSERTS ADVERSE AND EXCLUSIVE
TITLE, THE COURT SHOULD NOT DISMISS THE ACTION BUT SHOULD INSTEAD
DETERMINE IF THE PLAINTIFF IS A CO-OWNER OR NOT

Roque v. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 75886, August 30, 1988

FACTS:
On September 21, 1959, the intestate heirs of Januario Avendafio executed a document for
extrajudicial settlement, allocating 1/4 shares each to the heirs or their representatives.
On September 28, 1959, co-owners Illuminada, Gregorio, Miguel, Bernardino, Bienvenido,
Numeriano and Rufina, all surnamed Avendaño, in consideration of the aggregate amount
of P500.00, transferred their collective and undivided 3/4 share in the parcel of land, to
respondents Ernesto Roque and Victor Roque.

Emesto and Victor then purportedly sold a three-fourths (3/4) undivided portion of Lot No.
1549 to their half-sister, petitioner Concepcion Roque, for the same amount. When
Concepcion sought a subdivision plan to claim her 3/4 undivided share however, the heirs
of Ernesto and Victor, herein respondents instead asserted their title over the same and
rejected her plan to divide the land.

Attempts at amicable settlement having fallen through, petitioner Concepcion, on December

6, 1977, filed a Complaint for "Partition with Specific Performance", claiming legal ownership
of an undivided threefourths (3/4) portion of lot in controversy.

The RTC ruled in favour of herein petitioner, however the IAC reversed the decision and
ruled for the dismissal of the complaint. The IAC reasoned that from the moment an alleged
co-owner asserts an adverse title, the proper remedy of an aggrieved co-owner may only be
accion reivindicatoria or action for recovery of title and possession, not an action for
partition.

ISSUE:
Is the IAC correct in ruling for the dismissal for the action for partition?

HELD:
NO. The Court held that in case defendants in an action for partition assert exclusive title in
themselves adversely to the plaintiff, the court should not dismiss the action but resolve the
question of whether the plaintiff is co-owner or not.
Should the trial court find that the plaintiff was unable to sustain his claimed status as co-
owner, or that the defendants are or have become the sole and exclusive owners of the
property involved, the court will necessarily have to dismiss the action for partition. This
result would be reached, not because the wrong action was commenced by the plaintiff, but
rather because the plaintiff having been unable to show co-ownership rights in himself, no
basis exists for requiring the defendants to submit to partition the property at stake.

If, upon the other hand, the court after trial should find the existence of co-ownership among
the parties litigant, the court may and should order the partition of the property in the same
action.
RIGHT TO PARTITION MAY BE BARRED WHEN A CO-OWNER SUCCESSFULLY
ACQUIRES EXCLUSIVE TITLE OVER THE PROPERTY BY PRESCRIPTION

Delima v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-46296, September 24, 1991

FACTS: Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate in
Cebu by sale on installments from the government. He later died in 1921, leaving as his
only heirs three brothers and a sister namely: Eulalio Delima, Juanita Delima, Galileo
Delima and Vicente Delima. After his death, TCT No. 2744 of the property in question was
issued on August 3, 1953 in the name of the Legal Heirs of Lino Delima, deceased,
represented by Galileo Delima. On September 22, 1953, Galileo Delima, now substituted by
respondents, executed an affidavit of "Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs."

Based on this affidavit, TCT No. 2744 was cancelled and TCT No. 3009 was issued on
February 4,1954 in the name of Galileo Delima alone to the exclusion of the other
heirs.Galileo Delima declared the lot in his name for taxation purposes and paid the taxes
thereon from 1954 to 1965. On February 29, 1968, petitioners, who are the surviving heirs
of Eulalio and Juanita Delima, filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu an action for
reconveyance and/or partition of property and for the annulment of TCT No. 3009 with
damages against their uncles Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima,. Vicente Delima was
joined as party defendant by the petitioners for his refusal to join the latter in their action.

ISSUE:
Did the respondent acquire title over the lot by prescription, to the exclusion of the other
sibling co-owners?

HELD:
YES. The Court held that the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute
and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein, the question
involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership. I

n such case, the imprescriptibly of the action for partition can no longer be invoked or
applied when one of the co-owners has adversely possessed the property as exclusive
owner for a period sufficient to vest ownership by prescription.

Since an action for reconveyance of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes
after 10 years, it is from the date of the issuance of such title that the effective assertion of
adverse title for purposes of the statute of limitations is counted. Evidence shows that TCT
No. 2744 in the name of the legal heirs of Lino Delima, represented by Galileo Delima, was
cancelled by virtue of an affidavit executed by Galileo Delima and that on February 4, 1954,
Galileo Delima obtained the issuance of a new title in Ms name numbered TCT No. 3009 to
the exclusion of his co-heirs.

The issuance of this new title constituted an open and clear repudiation of the trust or co-
ownership, and the lapse of 10 years of adverse possession by Galileo Delima from
February 4, 1954 was sufficient to vest title in him by prescription. As the certificate of title
was notice to the whole world of his exclusive title to the land, such rejection was binding on
the other heirs and started as against them the period of prescription.

Hence, when petitioners filed their action for reconveyance and/or to compel partition on
February 29, 1968, such action was already barred by prescription. Whatever claims the
other co-heirs could have validly asserted before can no longer be invoked by them at this
time.
WHEN AN ACTION TO COMPEL SALE OF PROPERTY UNDER ARTICLE 498 IS FILED
AND THEREAFTER GRANTED, THE CO-OWNERSHIP IS DEEMED TERMINATED

Aguilar v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 76351, October 29, 1993

FACTS:
Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen are brothers. Virgilio is the youngest of seven
children of the late Maximiano Aguilar, while Senen is the fifth. On October 28, 1969, the
two brothers purchased a house and lot in Parañaque where their father could spend and
enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood.

Initially, the brothers agreed that Virgilio's share in the co-ownership was two-thirds while
that of Senen was one-third. By virtue of a written memorandum dated February 23, 1970,
Virgilio and Senen agreed that henceforth their interests in the house and lot should be
equal. The brothers agreed that the deed of sale would be executed and the title registered
in the meantime in the name of Senen.

It was further agreed that Senen would take care of their father and his needs since Virgilio
and his family were staying in Cebu. After Maximiano Aguilar died in 1974, petitioner
demanded from private respondent that the latter vacate the house and that the property be
sold and proceeds thereof divided among them. Because of the Senen’s refusal, Virgilio
filed an action to compel the sale.

ISSUE:
Was the co-ownership terminated upon the filing and the granting of the action to compel
sale of the property and ejectment of a co-owner?

HELD:
Yes. Art. 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the
co-ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned
in common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code
states that whenever the thing is essentially, indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that
it be, allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds
accordingly distributed.

This is resorted to: (1) when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co-
owners but because of the nature of the property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision
would prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and (2) the co-owners are not in agreement
as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper
reimbursement of the co-owners. In one case, the Court upheld the order of the trial court
directing the holding of a public sale of the properties owned in common pursuant to Art.
498 of the Civil Code.

Hence, hen petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court
granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was
deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased. Thereafter, the
continued stay of respondent and his family in the house prejudiced the interest of petitioner
as the property should have been sold and the proceeds divided equally between them. To
this extent and from then on, respondent should be held liable for monthly rentals until he
and his family vacate.
FOLLOWING THE PRINCIPLE UNDER ARTICLE 494, AN ACTION FOR PARTITION
DOES NOT PRESCRIBE

Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 124262 October 12, 1999

FACTS:
On December 13, 1993, private respondents filed an action for Partition before the Regional
Trial Court of Morong, Rizal. They alleged that their predecessor-in-interest, Juan De
Castro, died intestate in 1993 and they are his only surviving and legitimate heirs.

They also alleged that their father owned a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 3010
located at Barrio San Juan, Morong, Rizal. They further claim that in 1979, without their
knowledge and consent, said lot was sold by their brother Mariano to petitioner. The sale
was made possible when Mariano represented himself as the sole heir to the property.

Private respondents filed an action for partition, contending that the sale made by Mariano
affected only his undivided share to the lot in question but not the shares of the other co-
owners equivalent to 4/5 of the property. Petitioner refuted that their right to partition of the
property has already prescribed

ISSUE:
Did the action for partition prescribe?

HELD:
NO.

Firstly, the Court remarked that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale
will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to
the sale; hence, the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantor's share in the
partition of the property owned in common, thereby making him a co-owner of the property.

In the light of the foregoing, the Court then held that petitioner's defense of prescription
against an action for partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code,
no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at
any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

Moreoever, citing Budlong vs. Bondoc, the Court interpreted Art. 494 to mean that the
action for partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription, for the law
provides, no prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly
or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
ENTERING INTO A MORTGAGE CONTRACT OR PAYING LAND TAXES IN ONE’S OWN
NAME WITHOUT OUSTING OTHER CO-OWNERS, NOT REPUDIATION OF CO-
OWNERSHIP

Robles v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 123509, March 14, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioners were the children of Silvino, and Hilario Robles is their half-brother. The task of
cultivating their inherited land was assigned to Lucio, while the payment of the land taxes
was entrusted to Hilario. For unknown reasons, the tax declaration of the parcel of land in
the name of Silvino was cancelled and transferred to Exequiel Ballena.

Exequiel then secured a loan from Antipolo Rural Bank using the tax declaration as security.
Somehow, the tax declaration was then transferred to the name of Antipolo Rural Bank and
later, to the name of respondent spouses, Hilario and Andrea Robles. Andrea then secured
a loan from Cardona Rural Bank using the tax declaration for the lot in question as security.
For failure to pay the mortgage debt, the property was foreclosed with Cardona Rural Bank
emerging as the highest bidder. The bank sold the property to spouses Vergel and Ruth
Santos.

In September 1987, petitioners discovered the mortgage and attempted to redeem the
property but were unsuccessful. In 1988, the spouses Santos took possession of the
property and were able to secure a Free Patent therefor. Petitioners then filed an action for
quieting of title. Respondents questioned their standing to sue for quieting of title,
contending that petitioners no longer have any interest to the property in question due to the
mortgage executed thereon by Hilario, and the consequent foreclosure thereof by the Bank.

ISSUE:
Did respondent Hilario acquire exclusive title to the property by prescription, to the exclusion
of his sibling co-owners?

HELD:
NO. The Court held that in order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is
clear and convincing.
In the present case, Hilario did not have possession of the subject property; neither did he
exclude the petitioners from the use and the enjoyment thereof, as they had indisputably
shared in its fruits. Likewise, his act of entering into a mortgage contract with the bank
cannot be construed to be a repudiation of the co-ownership. Neither should his payment of
land taxes in his name, as agreed upon by the co-owners, be construed as a repudiation of
the co-ownership.
OWNERSHIP OF UNIT INCLUDES ONLY THE FOUR WALLS, CEILINGS, WINDOWS
AND DOORS THEREOF, NOT ROOF OR “AIR SPACE” ABOVE IT; RULES ON BUILDER
IN GOOD FAITH DO NOT APPLY TO PROPERTIES RECORDED UNDER AND
GOVERNED BY THE CONDOMINIUM ACT

Leviste Management System, Inc. v. Legaspi Towers 200, Inc.

G.R. No. 199353, April 4, 2018

FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions under Rule 45 filed by Leviste Management System, Inc.
(LEMANS) and Legaspi Towers 200, Inc. (Legaspi Towers), both assailing the of the CA of
affirming the Decision of the RTC.

Legaspi Towers is a condominium building with 7 floors, a unit on the roof deck and two
levels above said unit called Concession 2 and Concession 3. The use and occupancy of
the condominium building is governed by the Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions
of Legaspi Towers (hereafter "Master Deed") annotated on the transfer certificate of title of
the developer, Legaspi Towers Development Corporation. In 1989, LEMANS decided to
build another unit (hereafter "Concession 4") on the roof deck of Concession 3. LEMANS
was able to secure the building permit and commenced the construction thereof. Despite
Legaspi Corporation's notice that the construction of Concession 4 was illegal, LEMANS
refused to stop its construction. Legaspi Towers also argues that Concession 4 is an illegal
construction, for being in violation of the Condominium Act and the By Laws of Legaspi
Towers. Legaspi Towers stresses that LEMANS failed to comply with the Condominium Act,
which requires the consent of the registered owners of the condominium project for the
amendment of the Master Deed. LEMANS contends that its construction of another floor
was in the exercise of its rights. The trial court held that the air space which LEMANS claims
is not on top of its unit but also on top of the condominium itself, owned and operated by
defendant Legaspi Towers.

As regards the appeal of Legaspi Towers, the CA held that while Concession 4 is indeed a
nuisance, LEMANS has been declared a builder in good faith and Concession 4 was built in
good faith, thus it cannot be demolished.

ISSUES:
1) Does LEMANS own the air space above Concession 3 and thus have the right to build
Concession 4?
2) Is LEMANS a builder in good faith and thus Legaspi Towers does not have the right to
demolish Concession 4?
HELD:
1) NO—As correctly pointed out by the private respondent Legaspi, the air space wherein
Concession 4 was built is not only above Concession 3, but above the entire condominium
building. The petitioner's [LEMANS'] ownership of Concession 3 does not necessarily
extend to the area above the same, which is actually the "air space" of the entire
condominium building. The ownership of the air space above Concession 3 is not a
necessary incident of the ownership of Concession 3. Pursuant to Secs. 2, 3(d) and 6 of
R.A. No. 4726, otherwise known as The Condominium Act, what a unit includes is only the
four walls, ceilings, windows and doors thereof. It certainly does not include the roof or the
areas above it.

2) NO—Arts. 448 and 546 of the Civil Code on builders in good faith are inapplicable in
cases covered by the Condominium Act where the owner of the land and the builder are
already bound by specific legislation on the subject property (the Condominium Act), and by
contract (the Master Deed and the By-Laws of the condominium corporation).

It is recognized in jurisprudence that, as a general rule, Art. 448 on builders in good faith
does not apply where there is a contractual relation between the parties. The construction
by LEMANS of Concession 4 contravenes the Master Deed by adding a third level above
the roof deck.

As pointed out by Legaspi Towers and shown in the records, the Master Deed was never
amended to reflect the building of Concession 4. Furthermore, LEMANS failed to procure
the consent of the registered owners of the condominium project as required in the last
paragraph of Section 4 of the Condominium Act. The By-Laws of Legaspi Towers
specifically provides that extraordinary improvements or additions must be approved by the
members in a regular or special meeting called for the purpose prior to the construction.
Instead of procuring the required consent by the registered owners of the condominium
project pursuant to the Condominium Act, or having Concession 4 approved by the
members in a regular or special meeting called for the purpose pursuant to the By-Laws,
LEMANS merely had an internal arrangement with the then president of Legaspi Towers.
The same, however, cannot bind corporations, which includes condominium corporations
such as Legaspi Towers, as they can act only through their Board of Directors.
OWNER-DEVELOPER MAY BE A MEMBER OF A CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION;
OWNERSHIP OF UNIT NEED NOT BE THROUGH SALE OR PURCHASE, IN ORDER TO
BE ENTITLED TO SUCH MEMBERSHIP IN CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION

Lim v. Moldex Land, Inc.

G.R. No. 206038, January 25, 2017

FACTS:
Lim is a registered unit owner of Golden Empire Tower, a condominium project of Moldex, a
real estate company engaged in the construction and development of high-end
condominium projects and in the marketing and sale of the units thereof to the general
public.

Condocor, a non-stock, non-profit corporation, is the registered condominium corporation for

the Golden Empire Tower. Lim, as a unit owner of Golden Empire Tower, is a member of
Condocor. Moldex became a member of Condocor on the basis of its ownership of the 220
unsold units in the Golden Empire Tower. Lim claimed that the individual respondents (who
are representatives of Moldex) are non-unit buyers, but all are members of the Board of
Directors of Condocor, having been elected during its organizational meeting in 2008 and
re-elected in 2012. Lim asserted that only unit buyers are entitled to become members of
Condocor. She insisted that under P.D. No. 957, a condominium corporation is an
association of homeowners for the purpose of managing the condominium project, among
others. Thus, it must be composed of actual unit buyers or residents of the condominium
project.

Lim further averred that the ownership contemplated by law must result from a sale
transaction between the owner-developer and the purchaser. She advanced the view that
the ownership of Moldex was only in the nature of an owner-developer and only for the sole
purpose of selling the units.

ISSUE:
May an owner-developer such as Moldex be a member of a condominium corporation such
as Condocor?

HELD:
YES— Lim's reliance of P.D. No. 957 is misplaced. There is no provision in P.D. No. 957
which states that an owner-developer of a condominium project cannot be a member of a
condominium corporation.
It is erroneous to argue that the ownership must result from a sale transaction between the
owner-developer and the purchaser. Such interpretation would mean that persons who
inherited a unit, or have been donated one, and properly transferred title in their names
cannot become members of a condominium corporation.

Moreover, although the Condominium Act provides for the minimum requirement for
membership in a condominium corporation, a corporation's articles of incorporation or by-
laws may provide for other terms of membership, so long as they are not inconsistent with
the provisions of the law, the enabling or master deed, or the declaration of restrictions of
the condominium project. Here, pursuant to Secs. 2 and 10 of the Condominium Act, the
Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions, as well as the By-Laws of Condocor, Moldex,
as the owner of 220 unsold units and the parking slots and storage areas attached thereto,
has automatically become a member of Condocor upon the latter's creation.

It is noted that a condominium corporation is not just a management body of the

condominium project. It also holds title to the common areas, including the land, or the
appurtenant interests in such areas. Clearly, a homeowners association is different from a
condominium corporation.
COMMON SPACES DO NOT FORM PART OF A CONDOMINIUM UNIT

Poole-Blunden v. Union Bank of the Philippines

G.R. No. 205838, November 29, 2017

FACTS:
In March 2001, Poole-Blunden came across a public auction advertisement placed by Union
Bank in the Manila Bulletin of several properties including subject condominium unit,
identified as Unit 2-C of T-Tower Condominium (the "Unit").

The Unit was advertised to have an area of 95 square meters. Thinking that it was sufficient
and spacious enough for his residential needs, Poole-Blunden decided to register for the
sale and bid on the unit. About a week prior to the auction, Poole-Blunden, accompanied by
a representative of Union Bank visited the unit for inspection. Poole-Blunden did not doubt
the unit's area as advertised.

After placing the winning bid, Poole-Blunden entered into a Contract to Sell with Union
Bank. Eventually, Poole-Blunden occupied the unit after fully paying the bid price. He took
rough measurements of the Unit, which indicated that its floor area was just about 70
square meters, not 95 square meters, as advertised by Union Bank. Poole-Blunden got in
touch with an officer of Union Bank to raise the matter, but no action was taken. He then
asked for a rescission of the Contract to Sell, along with a refund of the amounts he had
paid, in the event that it was conclusively established that the area of the unit was less than
95 square meters. In a letter, Union Bank informed Poole-Blunden that after inquiring with
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), the Homeowners' Association of T-
Tower Condominium, and its appraisers, the Unit was confirmed to be 95 square meters,
inclusive of the terrace and the common areas surrounding it.

ISSUE:
Are outside spaces such as a terrace, and common areas part of a condominium unit’s total
area?

HELD:
No. Section 6(a) of the Condominium Act specifies the reckoning of a condominium unit's
bounds. It also specifies that areas of common use "are not part of the unit": Section 6.
Unless otherwise expressly provided in the enabling or master deed or the declaration of
restrictions, the incidents of a condominium grant are as follows: (a) The boundary of the
unit granted are the interior surfaces of the perimeter walls, floors, ceilings, windows and
doors thereof. The following are not part of the unit bearing walls, columns, floors, roofs,
foundations and other common structural elements of the building; lobbies, stairways,
hallways, and other areas of common use, elevator equipment and shafts, central heating,
central refrigeration and central air-conditioning equipment, reservoirs, tanks, pumps and
other central services and facilities, pipes, ducts, flues, chutes, conduits, wires and other
utility installations, wherever located, except the outlets thereof when located within the unit.
Thus, the unit sold to petitioner was deficient in relation to its advertised area.