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Education or Pedagogy?
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Education or Pedagogy?
GEOFFREY HINCHLIFFE
INTRODUCTION
Ever since antiquity, there have always been two traditions in teaching
and learning. The firstÐinstrumental learning, or, in a sense to be
explained, pedagogyÐplaces learning at the service of government,
political power and the economy. The secondÐeducationÐrepresents
that more disinterested endeavour in which teacher and pupil engage in
a form of enquiry. Whereas the former has specific objectives, the
latterÐthough it indeed must provide certain skills and knowledgeÐis
underpinned by the idea that the outcome of education is essentially
open. Just as we cannot predict the outcome of good conversation, this
inability being one of the prime reasons for engaging in the pursuit,
so the outcome of an educative experience must be left, in part, to
the interaction between learners and teacher. Construed as education,
the results of learning can never be measured according to a common
standard. But construed as a pedagogy, those results must be measur-
able because the whole point of learning is to equip people for specified
social, political and economic requirements. The implication is clear:
those interested in education have always had to fight their corner
against the proponents of pedagogy. Free spirits usually have a hard
time of it: but now, more than ever, is the time to recover and re-state
those ideals associated with the tradition of education against the time-
servers of pedagogy.
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Does the distinction between education and pedagogy make any sense
from a political perspective? This may seem promising for it might be
that the distinction, if embedded in wider concepts, may both give those
concepts an extra content and take on a wider meaning as a result. Take,
for example, Louis Althusser's idea of the ISAÐ`Ideological State
Apparatus'Ðwhich he introduced in order to specify the `relative
autonomy' of the Marxian concept of the superstructure (Althusser,
1971, pp. 151±152). Undoubtedly, pedagogy fits squarely into an ISA,
but where does this leave education? Are we to conclude that education
is that form of politics, in the Althusserian scheme of things, which
conducts revolutionary struggle against the ruling class? Or do we
conclude that education exists in a misty world over and beyond the
reality of the ISAÐnot to mention the RSA (Repressive State
Apparatus)? Althusser might have replied that `education' is merely
pedagogy trying to convince itself that it is free from all those
determinants which produce pedagogy; a delusional pedagogy which
thinks of itself as soaring in the sky whilst only succeeding in affirming
the very power of ideology.
But could we, nevertheless, view pedagogy's relation to truth as
essentially strategic? Consider, for example, Oswyn Murray's statement
that `Isocratean pedagogy is incompatible with freedom, whereas
Platonic philosophy, with its emphasis on truth wherever it may lead,
is indeed the path to freedom'. Leaving aside the questionable relation
between truth and freedom in Plato (for whom, surely more than
for any other philosopher, the path to truth had its own imperatives
and requirements compared to which the demands of freedom were
irrelevant) could we say, then, that education (but not pedagogy) enables
us to pursue truth wherever it may lead? But such truths can only be
recognised and acknowledged in terms of the practices governing
activity in the classroom or seminar room: and this amounts to subject-
ing truth to a pedagogic interrogation. It is difficult, that is, to see how
such practices are likely to generate `truths' which somehow surmount
the very conditions in which they arise. On this argument, therefore, the
distinction amounts to very little, perhaps little more than one of style.
Perhaps, then, the distinction could be defended along the following
lines. Pedagogy relates to those social, economic and political require-
ments which a state requires from its education system; pedagogy
addresses those skills which society needs. But an element of education is
needed to complement all this; and what education does is to focus on
the needs and development of the individual. Education, then, is
`person-centred', and focuses on the personal development of the
individual, whilst pedagogy sees to the social and economic role which
that individual might play. (I have in mind the ideas of Carl Rogers (see
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males. Moreover, Aristotle himself concedes that not all menial work
makes a person's character menial and even grants that such work is
permissible when it is for a `fine end', for example, when one performs a
service for a friend (see Politics, pp. 371, 393). There seems no reason
why this could not be generalised to include any kind of `menial' task
which provides for the comforts of citizens. Nor is it clear that the
performer of such tasks could not be included within the ambit of
citizenship providing he or she had enough time to devote to leisure
(Irwin, 1988, pp. 414±416).
The key point is that, once we make allowance for all these local
historical features it looks as though there is a real argument here for
a distinction between the kind of education which is for its own sake
and the kind of education which is not. And the argument is that
educationÐ`cultivation of the mind'Ðis the kind of activity which
brings about and sustains rational activity and which, indeed, can be
considered as one facet of rational activity. The argument takes on depth
once we are aware of the connotations of `rational activity' in the
Aristotelian scheme of things. For it is the kind of activity which needs
other rational agents in order to complete it, which needs the political
space afforded by the polis for it to exhibit its public dimension and
which requires a shared acknowledgement of those values which sustain
the common good of a shared life. By contrast with this, then, we get an
educationÐor rather pedagogyÐgoverned by narrow ends and driven
by a conception of humankind as precisely not destined to a live a
public, shared life amongst equals. This kind of contrast is, of course,
the kernel of the version of Aristotelianism which was developed by
Hannah Arendt, amongst others.
One possible objection to this viewpoint is that it does not give
enough weight to those occupation-related activities of which Aristotle
was so dismissive. It might be urged that working with modern
technology, for example, transforms lives and yields the kind of satis-
factions, both personal and social, of which Aristotle could not have
possibly known. But this objection cannot, I think, be sustained. For the
Aristotelian argument precisely puts all this into question by asking
what kind of worth these satisfactions could possibly have. If they are
the kind of satisfactions associated with work or privacy then they
cannot possibly be accorded a high valuation, because they are not
expressions of full rational activity in the Aristotelian sense. On this line
of reasoning, then, the knowledge associated with technology belongs to
the public domain (in exactly the same way as scientific knowledge) but
technology-related occupations are still essentially instrumental in
nature. Therefore the mere assertion of the value of occupations does
nothing to alter their secondary status with regard to the public realm.
Another objection is more serious and addresses the way in which
rational activity is seen by Aristotle in terms of its finality as far as
human ends are concerned. Rational activity is seen as a natural feature
of human kind. This emerges clearly in the Nicomachean Ethics
(Aristotle, 1980, 1097b22±1098a18) when Aristotle asks what the
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Education or Pedagogy 37
`function' of man is, declaring that there must be one in just the same
way that the eye's function is that of seeing. His conclusion that man's
function is that of rational activity implies that it is a natural, non-
negotiable end of human kind. We discover what our ends and purposes
are as human beings and through this discovery we can then realise our
own true natures. Those whose powers of discovery are deficient are not
complete human beings. This is why slaves deserved their fate, a fate of
enslavement being fitting for humans lacking self-mastery.
The point to these observations lies in the suspicion that all learning,
including the learning of citizens, may end up being pedagogic rather
than educative. Is this simply because the kind of learning Aristotle has
in mind is simply a means to an end, the end here being citizenship? This
thought, I believe, accounts for part of the suspicion. For though it is
true that the life of a citizen involves wider and more varied concerns
than a life solely concerned with business occupations, one still needs to
be trained and fashioned for citizenship. The fact that one's horizon's
are much wider qua citizen need not, of itself, prevent the kind of
learning at issue being pedagogic in character. We observed earlier on
that pedagogy can be seen as learning which serves political ends. On
this definition, it does not matter if those ends are of an impeccably
democratic kind: what we have is still pedagogy rather than education.
But there are further considerations which strengthen the suspicion
that what we are dealing with here is, after all, a species of pedagogy.
These arise from the observations made with respect to the way in which
rational activity is made a natural, functional quality of human kind.
For what is striking about Aristotle is the way in which he advocates the
development of rational powers but not really a critique of those powers.
There is lacking in Aristotle the element of reflexivity, of reason's
awareness of itself and of its willingness to put itself into question. And
maybe it is just this that differentiates pedagogy from education.
Pedagogy is always sure of itself, it always knows where it is going and it
takes for granted that what it takes to be knowledge really is knowledge.
Pedagogy, by its very nature, can never be self-critical. Of course,
pedagogy willÐespecially these daysÐemphasise the need for students
and learners to develop critical powers. But these powers of critique are
ultimately concerned with developing the learner in a certain direction so
as to develop the appropriate personal qualities of creativity, adapt-
ability and flexibility. What pedagogy can never do is develop a radical
critique of itself and its aims.
I want to suggest that what can be said of pedagogy can be said in the
same way of an Aristotelian concept of education. It too does not carry
within itself a critique of its own aims. It too is oriented towards the
production of a certain type of individual whose character and comport-
ment serve ends of a socio-political nature. Of course, we might well
prefer the ends that such an education serves, compared with those of
pedagogy. For example, it seems indubitable that education is more
likely to produce a type of character with a broader range of concerns
and sensibilities than pedagogy ever could. If one accepts the
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But whatever form the enterprise association takes, agents are related in
terms of a common substantive purpose. However, we must not suppose
that the decisions and actions of particular persons in an enterprise
association are anything more than only contingently connected with the
common purpose of the association. Oakeshott does not suppose that
each individual has permanently within his or her sights the common
purpose of the association. Hence there is a need for some kind of
managerial engagement which attempts, either well or badly, to relate
individual decisions to the overall purpose and well-being of the
association. It need scarcely be added that the precise character of this
management is not dictated by the concept of the enterprise association
itself, and therefore the managerial role can take many different forms,
including a democratic one.
But the type of practice which most interests Oakeshott (though he
freely conceded the importance of enterprise associations) is the kind
where there is not an extrinsic substantial purpose to the practice. This
type of practice is typified above all by what is termed as ars artium,
namely a morality. Because a morality is not governed by a substantive
purpose, it cannot prescribe performances. Nevertheless, it is by means
of a practice that agents can undertake certain performances in certain
circumstances, and can devise for themselves rules of conduct. Oakeshott
says that a practice must be understood as a series of adverbial quali-
fications of conduct; and action may be said to be done considerately,
kindly, gracefully or charmlessly. And he defines a moral relationship as
one `solely in respect of conditions to be subscribed to in seeking the
satisfaction of any want' (ibid., p. 62). These conditions could be
thought of as meanings and interpretations which may be shared or
contested but which are nonetheless understood. For Oakeshott, it is
precisely the lack of a common substantive purpose which enables a
practice to be used and explored by persons. It is through a practice that
we become agents.
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A SELF-CRITICAL PRACTICE
Oakeshott's account of a practice helps us to get to a position where we
can understand the pedagogy/education contrast rather more deeply.
It seems superior to the account of the contrast provided by the
Aristotelian interpretation because it is less dependent on local historical
factors (such as the structure of the Greek polis, the position of the
aristocracy, the cultural status of skilled work). But how does the idea of
an open practice help us to go beyond the Aristotelian idea of rational
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open practice are not like architects and they do not have a blueprint of
a new building in front of them as they set about demolishing the old
one. It would be better to think of a practice as having no internal
structure and no centre. Thus the questioning of terms should not imply
that agents are unduly motivated to build up an entirely new set of
terms. They are not inspired to build an even bigger and better practice.
Since the `end' of this practice is nothing more than the critique of its
terms, such a `new' or `superior' practice would itself be immediately
subject to the most searching interrogation.
Since we are dealing here with the recycling of interpretations and the
creation of new meanings, it must not be thought that proposed under-
standings must submit immediately to the full rigour of evidential
requirements. For whilst, in the course of certain activities, evidence is
required in order to help us decide what it is that counts as knowledge,
this requirement must be handled with care lest interesting and (who
knows) fruitful lines of enquiry are suppressed at birth. The use of
evidence can also have a controlling and even policing function which
though entirely appropriate in the sphere of pedagogy (because of the
way in which learning must be demonstrated to be fit or adequate to
some purpose) may easily have an inhibiting effect when misapplied in
the context of an open practice.
Oakeshott also draws our attention to the emancipatory possibilities
of an open practice in the following way:
CONCLUSION
Oakeshott's emphasis tended to be placed on the opening up and
recovery of existing or past understandings. Yet if an open practice is to
have within itself that element of self-criticism, as I have suggested, then
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44 G. Hinchlie
it also needs to create and invent different kinds of learning. The idea of
the bricoleur evokes something of what is meant here. It will be recalled
that Claude LeÂvi-Strauss explained how myths were formed through the
bricolage metaphor, in which the mythmaker gathers up elements of
existing myths, combining them in new and different ways. Of course,
the bricoleur is constrained by the signs which lie to hand, and LeÂvi-
Strauss makes it clear that the activities of the mythmaker are not to be
confused with that of the `engineer' who, by dint of the concepts he uses,
`is always trying to go beyond the constraints imposed by a particular
state of civilisation' (LeÂvi-Strauss, 1972, p. 19). But, says LeÂvi-Strauss
(ibid., p. 22), there are some advantages to the bricoleur approach:
Mythical thought for its part is imprisoned in the events and experiences
which it never tires of ordering and re-ordering in its search to ®nd them a
meaning. But it also acts as a liberator by its protest against the idea that
anything can be meaningless with which science at ®rst resigned itself to a
compromise.
In this spirit, in which both the engineer and the bricoleur have a role, I
propose the following:
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Education or Pedagogy 45
classics one hundred years ago with that played today). What Oakeshott
never seemed to countenance was that instrumental and open practices
could both be embedded within certain institutional settings. He was
unable to see this since he held that education, considered as an open
practice, must be pursued in its own locationÐ`School'Ðset apart from
the pressures and cares of economic life. Whether this was ever
historically the case is a difficult question which I cannot pursue here.
But the suggestion that instrumental and open practices can be pursued
together in the same institutionalÐeven departmental settingÐdoes not
seem far-fetched.
Moreover, it seems inevitable that the profile of pedagogy will be
raised in proportion as the number of students in higher education
increases. The way to deal with this, I have suggested, is not to defend a
retrenched position of liberal learning but to adopt an openly self-critical
position as to what counts as knowledge and learning. In this way,
attempts to formulate sets of expectations and outcomes in the pedagogic
endeavour of ensuring a `fitness for purpose' will never be complete. If
education is to survive, it must keep ahead of the game.
REFERENCES
Althusser, L. (1971) Lenin and Philosophy, trans. Ben Brewster (London, New Left Books)
Aristotle (1948) Politics, trans. Sir Ernest Barker (Oxford, Clarendon Press)
Aristotle (1980) Nicomachean Ethics, trans. D. Ross (Oxford, Oxford University Press)
Foucault, M. (1988) Care of the Self (Harmondsworth, Penguin)
Fuller, T. (ed.) (1989) The Voice of Liberal Learning: Michael Oakeshott on Education (Princeton,
NJ, Yale University Press)
Irwin, T. H. (1988) Aristotle's First Principles (Oxford, Clarendon Press)
LeÂvi-Strauss, Claude (1972) The Savage Mind (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson)
Murray, O. (1999) The voice of Isocrates, Times Literary Supplement, August 6th, pp. 3±4
Oakeshott, M. (1967) Learning and teaching, in: R. S. Peters (ed.) The Concept of Education
(London, Routledge & Kegan Paul)
Oakeshott, M. (1975) On Human Conduct (Oxford, Clarendon Press)
Rogers, Carl (1983) Freedom to Learn (Columbus, OH, Merrill)
Too, Yun Lee and Livingston, N. (1998) Pedagogy and Power (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press)
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