God and Natural Philosophy: The Late Middle Ages and Sir Isaac Newton

Author(s): Edward Grant

Source: Early Science and Medicine , 2000, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2000), pp. 279-298
Published by: Brill

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/4130187

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 GOD AND NATURAL PHILOSOPHY:
THE LATE MIDDLE AGES AND SIR ISAAC NEWTON

EDWARD GRANT
Indiana University

In reading Dr. Andrew Cunningham's forceful reply to my

I have great difficulty in recognizing myself. It seems that
kind of troglodyte, out of step and out of touch with the w
progressive historians, who have re-arranged the world a
Moreover, I find little connection between what I said and
am alleged to have said. And, finally, let me say that Dr. Cu
ham has skillfully turned this discussion into a debate on t
issues concerning the nature of history. So be it.
But Dr. Cunningham also feels aggrieved. He says that I h
nored "his substantive work" in which he believes that he has made

much of his case. For example, I did not "assess the arguments
the evidence" he adduced in his book, Before Science, "the only hi
torical book on the nature of natural philosophy yet produce
and equally the only book which deals with the origins of an
version of natural philosophy." Did he and his colleague Roge
French make their case for the Dominican and Franciscan versions
of natural philosophy? And "similarly, with respect to Isaac N
ton and his book The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosop
have I," Cunningham asks, "produced a satisfactory account, b
on his own words and intentions, of why he should have nam
his famous book in this way, and what he intended thereby?" "O
all these matters of empirical research on my part," laments
Cunningham, "Grant says not a word." Let me now say a word: N
I do not think Dr. Cunningham has made his case for either
Friars or Newton. But I plead guilty to the charges, with mitigat
circumstances. After all, I was writing an article, not a book,
could not possibly consider all these matters and still present
case I wished to make. I shall try to make amends here on th
two issues.

One major accusation against me is that I misinterpreted Dr.

Cunningham's intent. He says that "'natural philosophy was abou
God and His creation' can be interpreted in many ways, and Grant
explores some of them. But he does so while ignoring the sense in

? Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2000 Early Science and Medicine 5, 3

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 280 OPEN FORUM

which I obviously mean it. For

make perfectly clear the mea
ham does not specify any exam
ignorant of the examples he ha
only one citation as the basis o
a few more, so that readers c
nored the sense Dr. Cunningh
them in the order in which
Principia Got Its Name; or, Ta
In the first, he explains that
over and above any other defining
off from modern science. .. natu
God's universe. Indeed, this was the
both with respect to its subject-ma
functions it served. This is what,
from our modern science.2

In the second passage, Cunningham declares

If we were to start to take natural philosophy seriously, as the God-centred
study of nature that it was for the people who conducted it (rather than a
some study of nature which was struggling to be objective and to free itself
from the fetters of religion, or as some odd amalgam of 'science' and reli-
gion or of 'science' and theology) then certain consequences would follow
for us, and for the conduct of our historical research.3

And, finally, toward the end of his article, Cunningham elaborates

further that

The point is that natural philosophy as such was a discipline and subject-area
whose role and point was the study of God's creation and God's attributes.
Thus, no-one ever undertook the practice of natural philosophy without
having God in mind, and knowing that the study of God and God's crea-
tion-in a way different from that pursued by theology-was the point of
the whole exercise. All natural philosophy was always like this; when people
stopped having this understanding of their goal in their considerations of
nature then they necessarily stopped doing natural philosophy, and started
engaging in a discipline or enquiry which was, in this most fundamental of
ways, different in its identity from natural philosophy.'

Dr. Cunningham does not mince his words. He states his position
with vigor and seeming clarity. He tells us that "natural philoso-
phy was about God and about God's universe"; that we should "start

1 Andrew Cunningham, "How the Principia Got Its Name; or, Taking Natural
Philosophy Seriously," History of Science 29 (1991), 377-392.
2 Ibid., 381.
3 Ibid., 386.
4 Ibid., 388.

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 GOD AND NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 281

to take natural philosophy seriously, as the God

nature that it was for the people who conducte
The point is that natural philosophy as such was a discip
whose role and point was the study of God's creation an
Thus, no-one ever undertook the practice of natural
having God in mind, and knowing that the study of
tion-in a way different from that pursued by theolo
the whole exercise.5

Perhaps such remarks may apply to some authors in the seven

teenth century, but they simply will not do for the late Middle
Ages, as I have shown in my article. Dr. Cunningham says that
natural philosophy was not theology, but was "the study of God'
creation and God's attributes." It may have been the study of
God's creation, which is not very illuminating, but it was certainly
not the study of His attributes during the Middle Ages, when God's
attributes were exclusively under the jurisdiction of theology. And
while it may have been the study of God's creation, God played
virtually no role in natural philosophy except in the ways I have
described in my article.
Dr. Cunningham finds fault with my methods of determining
the role that religion played in natural philosophy. Although I
carefully analyzed 310 questions and found the role of religion
negligible, Cunningham ignores my analysis, neither accepting
nor refuting it. Instead, he attacks my methodology. I am criticized
for doing what he would not do, namely base my arguments on
what medieval natural philosophers actually said, or did not say,
about religion and faith in their commentaries and questions on
Aristotle's texts. Hence I declare that "When they write about God
and faith, then that segment of their writings is about God and the
faith. But when there is no mention of God and faith, or allusions
to them, then it is not about God and faith." I thought that this
was a far better method than Cunningham's, which was to ignore
the texts completely and generalize on the basis of intuition or
imagination. I sought to determine the real nature of medieval
texts in natural philosophy. But Cunningham says "this is not an
adequate way of assessing the matter, for it interprets the 'about'
question only in the narrowest sense." Although he allows that one
sense of the text is "content", "another is its wider meaning," and
so on, it is quite obvious from his reactions to my results that

I The passage that appears in my Festschrift article is cited below.

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 282 OPEN FORUM

Cunningham is not intereste

approach that "counting of m
cies is a very crude instrument
vague "wider meaning," whic
cific medieval discussions of
approach may be characteriz
even "context without text." P
relevant article and in his book
into a discussion of natural phi
Dr. Cunningham is also distur
not know what was in the min
ral philosophers as they wrot
ters are better left to psychoh
am a naive, narrow historian
premise here. We cannot know
give us some clear indication of
mation from some other source. In the scholastic literature of
natural philosophy, this rarely occurs. Nevertheless, Cunnin
accuses me of contradicting myself by the judgment I rendered
Jordanus de Nemore's treatise On the Theory of Weights, wh
categorize as a scientific treatise. In rendering this judgment, C
ningham feels that "it is not legitimate for us to label the s
ments or the treatise as 'science' and 'scientific' while at the same
time claiming that we are saying nothing about what was in Jorda
nus's mind. If we are (as Grant is doing) judging Jordanus's wor
to be scientific, then we are claiming that he was practisin
science." I made no such claim. I only concluded that Jordanus'
treatise deserved to be categorized as scientific solely on the bas
of its subject matter, external structure, and formalism. I com
pared it to a work of Einstein's, that all agree is a treatise in sc
ence, and judged that it was so structurally similar that it too de-
served to be considered a scientific treatise. It was I who labeled it
scientific, notJordanus. And I have no idea what was in Jordanus
mind when he wrote his treatise, or what he thought he w
practicing.
But I am confident that most scholars would regard the Jor
nian treatises on the science of weights as legitimate science.
1952, Ernest Moody and Marshall Clagett edited eight of these re
markable treatises under the title The Medieval Science of Weigh
(Scientia de ponderibus). Those who believe it is anachronistic,
whiggish, to speak of science in the Middle Ages, and who de

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 GOD AND NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 283

that we can speak of anything like a science with

would do well to read the introductions by Moo
this little known study. Moody and Clagett explai
Ernst Mach, in his Science of Mechanics, distinguishes
proper to statics: (1) the general lever principle; (2) the
ciple; (3) the principle of composition of forces; and
virtual displacements. The statics of Archimedes, which
entanglements with dynamics, attained only the first of t
other three, involving dynamical considerations, charac
ics. In the treatises ascribed to Jordanus de Nemore,
three principles appear, and provide a dynamical found
of the lever principle.6

Treatises in the medieval science of weights (scien

played a role in developments in statics in sixteen
where they were known to authors like Guido
Jerome Cardano, Niccolo Tartaglia, Benedetti, a
is simply no warrant for denying scientific status
which would constitute a legitimate part of any p
mathematical physics. Indeed, Euclid's Optics;
the Equilibrium of Planes; Ptolemy's Almagest; an
tises on statics reveal that the rigorous mathemat
exact sciences was laid down in antiquity and
(also see the section on Newton, below). If thes
meet Dr. Cunningham's criteria for science, the
us what does. Moreover, since the treatises just m
properly classifiable as natural philosophy, and
denies that they can be categorized as science, the
Thus I claim that we cannot know what was in the mind of a me-
dieval natural philosopher unless we are given some definite clues.
But if I do claim to know what was in the mind of an author, I will
give concrete evidence for my claim. I would not simply assert it,
as Cunningham does, when he declares that
natural philosophy was not just 'about God' and His creation at those mo-
ments when natural philosophers were explicitly talking or writing about
God in their natural philosophical works or activities. It was, by contrast,
'about God' and His creation the whole time.7

6 Ernest A. Moody and Marshall Clagett, eds. and transl. The Medieval Science
of Weights (Scientia de ponderibus), Treatises Ascribed to Euclid, Archimedes, Thabit ibn
Qurra, Jordanus de Nemore and Blasius of Parma (Madison, 1952), 15.
v Cunningham, "How the Principia Got Its Name, 388. I cited this passage in
the first paragraph of my John D. North Festschrift article.

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 284 OPEN FORUM

There is no justification for C

losophers were really thinki
they make no mention of r
content of their discussions
able other thoughts that m
caught their attention. But ev
God, we must then ponder w
of the 310 questions I examine
the remaining 30%.8
It is important to take a clos
in treatises on natural philos
the creator of the world fro
all natural effects, stating th
was unilluminating and rat
argue for it or offer evidence
these formulaic statements so
ers did not. But they had no
tent of the natural philosophy
"In the Name of God the Co
lar sentiments, customarily
beginning of a treatise, or a
books within a treatise.

Adopting the "context over text" approach, which is clearly Dr.

Cunningham's preferred tool of historical interpretation, w
should place assertions by Christian natural philosophers that God
is the creator of the world from nothing, and is the ultimate cau
of all effects, within the context of the whole treatise. We would
then readily observe that the impact of such assertions on the su
stantive content of the entire treatise is virtually nil.
In the third quotation cited above, Cunningham seems to co
tradict himself. "Thus, no-one ever undertook the practice of nat
ral philosophy," he declares, "without having God in mind, a
knowing that the study of God and God's creation-in a way d
ferent from that pursued by theology-was the point of the whol
exercise." Here he says that natural philosophy studied God i
ways that are different than the ways pursued in theology. B
earlier, in the same article, he says that it is pointless to discuss t

8 See p. 258 of my John D. North Festschrift article.

9 For an example, see A. I. Sabra, The "Optics" of Ibn al-Haytham, 2 vols. (Lo
don, 1989), 1: 3.

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 GOD AND NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 285

mutual relations of religion, or theology, and

because they depend for their validity on religion an
having been seen as separate from each other in the
science are seen as being today."1

Here Cunningham obviously means to say that w

view religion and natural philosophy as having
the past, as they are in the present. Which op
Was the study of God in the past pursued diff
philosophy and theology; or were theology and n
inseparable?
Cunningham has a simple approach: In the M
gion, or theology, and natural philosophy were n
rate, in contrast to the modern world where r
(the latter viewed as the replacement of, and suc
philosophy) are seen as distinct. But as I have arg
and in many places, theology and natural philoso
disciplines and, contrary to Cunningham's cla
"seen as separate" throughout the Middle Ages. B
between them had already occurred a few cent
lam. We see it in the struggle between the phi
who followed Aristotle, and their rivals, the mutakallimun. The
mutakallimun and the philosophers made much use of Greek
philosophy. The mutakallimun, however, were primarily con-
cerned with the Kalam, which, according to A. I. Sabra, is "an in-
quiry into God, and into the world as God's creation, and into man
as the special creature placed by God in the world under obliga-
tion to his creator."" Thus Kalam is a theology that used Greek
philosophical ideas to explicate and defend the Islamic faith. By
contrast, Islamic natural philosophers followed rational Greek
thought, especially the thought of Aristotle. They placed greatest
reliance on reasoned argument while downplaying revelation. The
philosophers sought to develop natural philosophy in an Islamic
environment-and did so, "often in the face of suspicion and
opposition from certain quarters in Islamic society""'-just as
Christian natural philosophers developed Aristotelian natural phi-
losophy in a Christian environment.

10 Cunningham, "How the Principia Got its Name," 382.

" A.. I. Sabra, "Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islamic Theology," in
Zeitschriftfifr Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften, 9 (1994), 5.
12 Ibid., 3.

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 286 OPEN FORUM

Before I move on to the tw

should like to reply briefly t
ity problem, which Cunningh
continuity," he regards as "a
fighting any longer;" it is "
rians reject the concept. It
battle. For if history, includ
garded as continuous, then
quence of incommensurable,
ets. Instead of regarding a shi
years ago as a precursor of
would foolishly conclude th
instead of regarding the in
thousand years ago as the m
messages sent round the w
internet, we would offer ar
unrelated. History is akin to
embryo and the full-blow
former by a complex, lengt
deduce that from their appe
to distinguish things, but the
frequently deceiving. New
time, but they are connecte
spring into being like Athen
these innumerable connecti
clastic, at our peril.
Dr. Cunningham is disturbe
cussion about "the Inventio
and also ignored his discussion
of Natural Philosophy. As for
natural philosophy, or even
scholars in the Middle Ages
vinced that Aristotle's natural books constituted the essence and

core of natural philosophy. Why did they think they were

natural philosophy when they wrote questiones and commen
on Aristotle's natural books? Obviously, because they though
istotle was doing natural philosophy. And what do French
Cunningham think Averroes was doing when, in the twelft
tury, prior to the Friars, he wrote his extensive commentaries
Aristotle's natural books? Do they wish to argue that none o
was natural philosophy? How could anyone, or any group, i

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 GOD AND NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 287

thirteenth century, invent what had already been

been around for at least 1500 years? It follows the
using Aristotle's natural philosophy to defeat the Cat
ars could not have created natural philosophy,
Cunningham say (see p.141). They were simply usi
substantively unaltered natural philosophy in defense
But even in this, the Friars did not invent a new a
they were anticipated by the Islamic mutakallimu
among whom the Mu'tazilites, in the ninth centur
used Greek logic and natural philosophy-that is, r
front non-Muslims and heretics in the service of the
ligion.13
The appropriation of Aristotelian natural philosophy by the
Friars to combat heresy had no detectable influence on the con-
tent or methodology of natural philosophy. The fact that the Friars
viewed the world as created and Aristotle did not had little impact
on the doing of Aristotelian natural philosophy; nor was Aristotle's
physis, or natural philosophy, Christianized, as French and Cun-
ningham claim (Before Science, p. 140). In short, the way the Friars
did natural philosophy failed to influence the way that discipline
was taught and written about in the arts faculties of the late Middle
Ages.
In support of their argument for a Friars' natural philosophy,
French and Cunningham make much of such great thirteenth-
century figures as Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Roger Ba-
con, and John Pecham. But they ignore the specific treatises,
which Albertus, Aquinas, and Bacon wrote on Aristotle's natural
books. In my article in the North Festschrift (pp. 250-257), I care-
fully examined their treatises on natural philosophy and found
that they had virtually nothing about God and the faith in those
works. And, despite the alleged importance of the works on per-
spective by Bacon and Pecham in the Friars' natural philosophy, I
found that religion and faith were virtually excluded from those
works. Moreover, I also quoted passages from Albertus Magnus to
the effect that theological issues were to be treated in theological
treatises and not in treatises dealing with Aristotle's natural phi-
losophy. A similar sentiment was uttered by Thomas Aquinas when
he proclaimed: "I don't see what one's interpretation of the text
"1 See W. Montgomery Watt, Muslim Intellectual: A Study of Al-Ghazali (Edin-
burgh, 1963), 28-29; and Joseph Schacht with C. E. Bosworth, eds., The Legacy of
Islam, 2nd ed., (Oxford, 1974), 354.

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 288 OPEN FORUM

of Aristotle has to do with th

readily understand why Dr.
pages of my article.
We should keep in mind an im
ture of natural philosophy, nam
ology into explanations of na
logical explanation is given in n
should have been a natural ex
nation and, consequently, defea
natural philosophy, which is
causes. If this were done to a
in question would no longer b
would have been converted to
theology, or perhaps a treatis
the more natural philosophy yo
concerned with the supernat
curred in late medieval theolo
itly recognized this in the Mid
criticized the theologians for
favor of philosophical problem
teenth century, could declare,
of Peter Lombard, that "for s
have not feared to work into
purely physical, metaphysical
cal."'5 The boundaries betwee
were, however, rarely blurre
said here bears on what I shal
turn in order to consider Dr. C
his great work, The Mathematic
his study, Dr. Cunningham s
choice of that title affects ou
phy and its relation, if any, to
By the seventeenth century, t
theology and natural philos
indeed discourse about God in
discoursing about God advanc
and could not. When Sir Isaac Newton, a devout individual who

14 See my North article, pp. 252 and 257 and n.53.

'5 For these claims, see Edward Grant, The Foundations of Modern Science in the
Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1996), 152, and 212 n.22.

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 GOD AND NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 289

was immersed in religious thought, wrote his mo

in mathematical physics, The Mathematical Princip
losophy, first published in 1687, he found occasio
only once in the entire work, in book three. And
declares that Newton's "natural philosophy wa
God."'16 What a strange obsession, where the obse
tually no symptoms of his obsession!
Apparently regretting even this action, Newton
of God from that passage in subsequent editions."
ment of that passage, Newton added his famous
to the end of the second edition (1713). In a w
Newton saw fit to discourse upon God only in the
where he praises the deity as the Universal Ru
God, and enunciates some of God's attributes. C
of his encomium on the deity, Newton declares
concerning God; to discourse of whom from th
things, does certainly belong to Natural Philosoph
dle Ages, when theology and natural philosop
disciplines, it was the responsibility of theology
losophy, to discourse about God. But the Protes
and much else had destroyed the jurisdictiona
tween theology and natural philosophy. When
was regarded as wholly appropriate for a natur
discourse about God. And yet Newton found fe
could do so substantively and effectively. Other
praises of the deity, Newton found very little
Indeed, even the General Scholium was introduc
criticisms leveled against Newton's use of at
repulsions, which made his system seem mech
that of Descartes.'9

16 Cunningham, "How the Principia Got Its Name," 381.

17 On this, see I. Bernard Cohen, Introduction to Newton's 'Principia' (Cam
bridge, 1971), 155.
is The translation is from Sir Isaac Newton's Mathematical Principles of Natur
Philosophy and His System of the World, translated into English by Andrew Motte
1729. The translations revised, and supplied with an historical and explanato
appendix, by Florian Cajori (Berkeley, 1947), 543-547 for the Scholium and 5
for the lines quoted above.
19 See Richard S. Westfall, Never at Rest: A Biography of Isaac Newton (Cambridg
1980), 744, where Westfall explains that Newton wrote the General Scholium, b
cause "Newton and Newtonians were highly aware of the mounting tide of cri
cism of his natural philosophy and its concepts of attractions and replusions. .

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290 OPEN FORUM

In the General Scholium, Newt

have produced the cosmos. "B
is certainly the same always
variety of things."20 But after
ute to God, Newton, in the fin
admits that he has not yet fou
for us, he says, "that gravity d
the laws which we have expl
count for all the motions of th
Why did Newton not attribute
almost have followed from th
discourse on God's power and
pher, Richard S. Westfall, recog
Why not? Probably because h
nation would have been to no
ing. If you believe, as Newton d
and all of its operations, then
as an explanation for the caus
assume that God provided a nat
the task of the natural philosop
natural philosophers, many o
natural philosopher, recogniz
philosophy. It explains why, f
ral philosophy remained relat
ments. And it also makes it q
philosophy is the real precur
were rational and systematic by
Theology and faith could not
because to do so would transf
natural philosophy, natural th
Before leaving this section. L
statement in his General Sch
paragraph, namely his assertion
which is certainly the same alw
no variety of things." Only G
metaphysical necessity." Alon
clared that scientists can only m

20 General Scholium, p. 546 (Cajori t

21 General Scholium, p. 547 (Cajori t
22 Westfall, Never at Rest, 748.

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 GOD AND NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 291

the harmony of natural law, which reveals an intelligen

ity that, compared with it, all the systematic thinking
beings is utterly insignificant. This feeling is the guiding
and work, in so far as he succeeds in keeping himself f
selfish desire.2s

Cunningham would have us believe that when N

remarks, they reveal that he, and all other nat
indicate unambiguously that their natural philoso
and that "no-one ever undertook the practice o
phy without having God in mind," which, after a
of the whole exercise" (p. 388). But Cunningham
exact opposite is true about modern science,
"modern science does not deal with God or with the universe as
God's creation," and this "is so basic to our understandin
modern science that it only needs to be mentioned if someo
transgresses this understanding" (pp. 382-383). But Einstein's
laration, cited a few lines earlier, says that our harmonious natu
laws reveal a superior intelligence, God, who is the guiding princ
ple of a scientist's life and work, and therefore of Einstein's
and work. Are we not, then, entitled to infer-contrary to C
ningham's claim that religious beliefs for scientists "are supp
to be irrelevant to their science"-that God played as much o
role in Einstein's modern scientific achievements, as He did in
Newton's achievements in natural philosophy? Einstein does not
have to mention God in his actual work, no more than did
Jordanus de Nemore, or Newton himself in the actual scientific
parts of the Principia. For all these individuals, God may lie in the
background as Creator, or perhaps simply as inspiration, but He
does not enter into the content of their works, or affect it, becaus
that would have proved futile. But, I suspect, this is an unwelcome
and inconvenient inference for Dr. Cunningham, because i
breaks down his rigid separation of natural philosophy and mod
ern science, and destroys the opposite, absolutist symmetry h
wishes to create: God wholly in for natural philosophy; God wholly
out for modern science.

But now we must inquire about Newton's objective in his g

work. In judging what Newton was really doing in his Mathema
Principles of Natural Philosophy, we must not be misled by the t
Newton might have used one of two medieval and early mod
synonyms for natural philosophy, say "natural science" (scie
23 Cited in my article in the North Festschrift, p. 245.

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 292 OPEN FORUM

naturalis), or "physics" (physic

"Mathematical Principles of
Principles of Physics." Would
ton ipsofacto from a natural p
a "physicist"? Of course not.
mathematical principles to na
sciously mathematizing natural
thing else?
In the Middle Ages, it was a
natural philosophy and math
that when mathematics was ap
phy, a different kind of the
"middle science" (media scien
exact science. The exact scienc
were middle sciences. The term "middle science" was not custom-
arily used to categorize a science; and the term "scientist," as
Cunningham observes, was, apparently, not invented or coin
until 1833.24 What Newton was really doing, however, should n
be obscured by the choice of any of these terms. A glance at t
530 pages of the Principia instantly reveals that Newton is doi
physics, mathematical physics. One does not have to resort t
mental gymnastics about the real meaning of the expression "natu
ral philosophy." And surely we ought not to believe that beca
the term "science" did not come into common use until the nine-

teenth century, any activity we would want to call science could

have occurred prior to that date.
But we need not rely on speculative debates about what New
was really doing. He enlightens us himself, though not as much
we would like. In a letter to Halley on 20 June 1686, Newton
forms Halley that he will suppress the third book, in which
applied mathematics and dynamics to celestial bodies, inclu
comets. He was fearful that book three would involve him in con-
troversy. For as he explains: "Philosophy is such an impertine
litigious Lady that a man had as good be engaged in Law suit
have to do with her. I found it so formerly & now I no soo
come near her again but she gives me warning." And then i
revealing passage, Newton explains that

24 See Cunningham, "How the Principia Got Its Name," 390, n. 10. The int
duction of the term "scientist" is discussed by Sidney Ross, "Scientist: the sto
a word," Annals of Science, 18 (1962), 65-85.

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 GOD AND NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 293

The first two books without the third will not so well bear the title of
Philosophiae naturalis Principia Mathematica & therefore I had alt
this De motu corporum libri duo: but upon second thoughts I r
former title. Twill help the sale of the book which I ought not to
now tis yours.25

In this remarkable letter, Newton acknowledges that t

Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, was not really
ate for the first two books without the third, and so was p
to call it Two Books on the Motion of Bodies. Newton was w
that the first two books were simply too mathematical to
natural philosophy, and hence could not be titled: Two
Natural Philosophy. But Newton was willing to retain the t
cause the book would sell better! Thus it was not because he

thought he was doing natural philosophy that Newton reta

title, as Cunningham would have it, but because book sa
undoubtedly be better than if the book were titled Two
the Motion of Bodies.
But Halley was unhappy about Newton's decision and u
convinced Newton to retain the third book. What was H
cerned about? He was fearful that without Book III, on
ematically competent individuals would be able to read
book, but "those that will call themselves philosopher
Mathematicks, which are by far the greater number,"26
unable to do so. Newton's third book is also heavily mat
and hardly qualifies as natural philosophy, although it mor
does, as Newton rightly saw, than the first two books.
book concerns celestial mechanics and cosmology and w
tainly, as Halley foresaw, have had more appeal to interest
ers than the first two forbiddingly mathematical books. Bu
too mathematical and dynamical to qualify as tradition
philosophy. Thus the argument that Newton was not do
ral philosophy in the Principia gains credence from New
self. It is obvious from the letter that Newton thought the
books did not qualify as natural philosophy and gave them
De motu corporum libri duo. He then explains to Halley th
second thoughts I retain the former title. Twill help the s

25 Cited from I. Bernard Cohen, Introduction to Newton's 'Principia', 1

cites the passage from H. W. Turnbull, ed., The Correspondence of Isaa
1676-87 (Cambridge, 1960), 437. The full relevant passage is also
Cunningham, "How the Principia Got Its Name," 378.
26 Cohen, ibid.

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294 OPEN FORUM

book which I ought not to di

rightly infer, from his own e
ton went along with the tit
Mathematica, he did so only
books. He plainly did not reg
three-book treatise, since th
natural philosophy. Dr. Cunn
his article that I have cited a
379), but he overlooked, or ch
of Newton's remarks with reg
this instance, Dr. Cunningha
follow his instincts and emp
mistakenly upholding the li
Newton's clear and unambig
about that title. But rather t
"context over text," one migh
battle of two texts, one clear
Newton's statement to Halle
mately chose for his great wor
When Newton temporarily
natural philosophy, the only n
Motion of Bodies. He did not s
because that would have sounded too much Like Galileo's Two
New Sciences, or Two Books on Physics, or Two Books on Mat
Physics, or Two Books on Physical Science, or Two Books on
Science, and so on. Why not? Because they may not have
to him, probably because such titles were not customaril
describe what he was doing. Hence he saw his choices e
natural philosophy, a generic title that was in common
would be recognized by everyone as applicable to the p
world, or he would have to devise a specifically descriptive
Two Books on the Motion of Bodies, which, although it was an
depiction of the content of the books, would be difficult
Despite the title of his treatise, Newton knew that he was
something different from natural philosophy in the f
books. And speaking of titles, what was Galileo doing in
he called Two New Sciences (Due nuove scienze)? From when
get the term science? Does this make the Two New Sciences
tific treatise? Should we infer that, by virtue of the titles
respective treatises, Galileo was a "scientist" and Newton
ral philosopher"? And if Galileo is to be regarded as a s

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 GOD AND NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 295

ought we to classify him as a "modern" scientist,

scientist?

However Newton may have titled his great work, we must get be-
hind the terms he used and see what he was actually doing. We
should not be confused or misled by names and titles. They are
important, but they must not be taken so rigidly as to obscure the
real significance of what is being done. Whether Newton was do-
ing things that are truly representable by the terms science or phys-
ics is analogous to that of Aristotle and the term logic. No one re-
ally contests the claim that Aristotle is the founder, and even in-
ventor, of formal syllogistic logic. But Aristotle did not use the
name "logic." He called what he was doing "analytics." It was five
centuries later that Alexander of Aphrodisias applied the term
logic to what Aristotle did.27 Does this mean that by using the term
"analytics" instead of logic, Aristotle was not really doing logic, but
something called "analytics"? Of course not. And just as Aristotle's
analytics and logic are identical, so also is the content of Newton's
Principia the same as physics, perhaps even modern physics-de-
spite being called natural philosophy. Similarly, Aristotle did not
use the term biology, which was not invented until the nineteenth
century, but does anyone doubt that Aristotle was doing biology
when he wrote On the Parts of Animals, The Generation of Animals,
and the History of Animals?
The terms that are used to describe activities must be treated
with great caution, because they sometimes mask and obscure
what lies beneath. On this matter, perhaps it is well to be guide
by the wise words of Juliet (Romeo and Juliet [2.1]), who rightl
inquires
What's in a name? that which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet.

Cunningham, unfortunately, falls into the name trap. Indeed,

mistakenly believes that natural philosophy is an amorphous disci
pline by comparison with modern science. To show this, he d
clares that "From a modern point of view... there is indeed som
thing remarkable about a discipline (natural philosophy) whi
included both physics and the soul-and everything in betwee
Such an extension is not shared by any modern division of knowl

27 See W. D.Ross, Aristotle, Fifth edition revised (London: Methuen & Co

1949), p.20.

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 296 OPEN FORUM

edge."28 May I suggest that Dr

science. Under that term we
biology with all its subdivision
ogy, medicine, including psy
totle's De anima and its treat
physics with all its subdivision
ogy, perhaps chiropractic, an
dubious credentials. If natura
from the soul to physics, mod
lies between the human mind and the outermost reaches of our
universe. The range of disciplines to which the term science
plies greatly exceeds the number encompassed by natural phil
phy. Science is plainly more amorphous than natural philosop
But if Newton was doing natural philosophy it was in a spe
way. If Dr. Cunningham had pursued the use of the term nat
philosophy beyond Newton and into the nineteenth century,
might have found some startling usages that subvert his thesis.
example, in 1845-1846, Dickinson College issued a catalo
which explained that
Natural philosophy may be considered as the science which examines
general and permanent properties of bodies; the laws which govern th
and the reciprocal action which these bodies are capable of exerting u
each other, at greater or less distances, without changing their matter.2"

And under the rubric of natural philosophy we find quite an arr

of sciences. At Dickinson College and elsewhere in the mid-n
teenth century, natural philosophy included mechanics, hydrost
ics, hydrodynamics, hydraulics, pneumatics, acoustics, optics
tronomy, electricity, galvanism, magnetism, and chromatics.30 A
if we turn to John William Frederick Herschel's Preliminary
course on the Study of Natural Philosophy, first published in 1830
can add crystallography and chemistry.3' In the early 18
William Thomson (Lord Kelvin) (1824-1907) and Peter Guthr
Tait published a work under the title Treatise on Natural Philosop

28 Cunningham, "How the Principia Got Its Name," 381-382.

29 Quoted from Stanley Guralnick, Science and the Ante-Bellum American Co
(Philadelphia, 1975), Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society 109, p
Also cited in Grant, Foundations, 193.
30 Guralnick, ibid., 61.
31 John William Frederick Herschel, Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Na
ral Philosophy. A Facsimile of the 1830 edition with a new Introduction by Mi
Partridge. (= The Sources of Science 17) (New York, 1966), 7.

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 GOD AND NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 297

which consisted of two volumes on kinematics and

Jed Buchwald explains, in this Treatise on Natura
"Thomson and Tait presented in full the kinematic
ticles and the dynamics of motion under force; they
emphasis upon the dynamics of material media; a
detailed use both of Lagrangean mechanics and the
of energy." Buchwald concludes that "The Treatise on
losophy introduced a new generation of British and Am
cal scientists to the details and concepts of mechanics
Maxwell's later Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism
gards it as the most influential physical text of the s
the nineteenth century. How would Andrew Cunni
the fact that Thomson and Tait were doing modern
therefore modern science, under the rubric of natur
The obvious explanation is that throughout the ni
tury, modern physical science was at least occasion
haps even frequently, called by the name of "natural
or subsumed under it. Indeed, it is not implausible to
Thomson and Tait called their book Treatise on Natur
because Isaac Newton had called his work The Mathematical Princi-
ples of Natural Philosophy. But it is a certainty that none of them-
Newton, Thomson, or Tait-was doing traditional natural philoso-
phy.
It is obvious from what I have just reported that by the nine-
teenth century, natural philosophy had become synonymous with
science, despite Cunningham's claim that "science" succeeds natu-
ral philosophy, the two being radically different disciplines. The
distinction that natural philosophy is about God and His creation
and that modern science excludes God becomes untenable when

the two terms natural philosophy and science are often used sy
mously, until natural philosophy fades away and only the
science remains. In the nineteenth century the term natur
losophy seems to have become the general, or umbrella, ter
all of the particular sciences. The new sciences that prolif
in the nineteenth century lend credence to the view that n
philosophy is the Mother of all Sciences. Moreover, the totalit
all the particular sciences was referred to by the general all-e
passing term science, which is understood to be equivalent

32 See Jed Buchwald, "Thomson, Sir William," in Dictionary of Scientific

phy, 13: 386 (1976).

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 298 OPEN FORUM

term natural philosophy. The

affairs may have begun in t
and his predecessors. If so, p
famous title as the first inst
term natural philosophy is us
the science of mechanics, o
appropriate term such as ph
take the long view-we might
ences of the Middle Ages, w
nor mathematics, were gra
natural philosophy and, whe
natural philosophy, were ab
The stark differences that
philosophy and modern scien
and probably much earlier.
terms natural philosophy and
tach to things may make th
Old names and terms may l
thing has altered substantia
that "a rose by any name is st
ever the title of his treatise,
dynamics, or, if you wish, m
brought to climactic fruition
that had masqueraded unde
Although what Newton did in
cepted name, the reality of h
that upon the completion of h
birth to a daughter, who wou
dynamics, and would ultimate
mathematical physics and th
and statics, who, under different names, had been around since
Greek antiquity.

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