A.

Notarial Law

1. 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice

HEIRS OF PEDRO ALILANO REPRESENTED BY DAVID ALILANO, Complainants, v. ATTY. ROBERTO E.

EXAMEN, Respondent.

A.C. No. 10132, March 24, 2015, VILLARAMA, JR., J.

FACTS:

Pedro Alilano and his wife, Florentina, were the holders of an OCT covering a parcel of land in in Sultan
Kudarat.

Absolute Deeds of Sale were executed by the spouses in favor of Ramon Examen and his wife Edna. The
documents were notarized by Atty. Roberto Examen, brother of the vendee.

The heirs of Alilano filed a suit for recovery of possession against Edna Examen and Atty. Roberto
Examen. During the proceeding, Atty. Examen introduced into evidence the Absolute Deeds of Sale.

The heirs filed this complaint alleging that Atty. Examen violated the notarial law when he notarized the
absolute deeds of sale since a notary public is prohibited from notarizing a document when one of the
parties is a relative by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree or affinity within the second civil
degree. They also alleged that the documents were notarized even though the cedula or residence
certificate number used by Ramon Examen was not actually his but that of Florentina. Atty. Examen
pointed out that there was no longer any prohibition under the Revised Administrative Code for a notary
public to notarize a document where one of the parties is related to him by consanguinity and affinity.
With regard to the use of Florentina’s residence certificate as Ramon’s, Atty. Examen reasoned that the
use of another’s residence certificate is not a ground for disbarment and is barred by prescription based
on IBP Resolution No. XVI-2004-13 where it was proposed that the prescription period for professional
misconduct is within two years from the date of the act.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty Examen liable for breach of the Notarial Law and
introducing false Absolute Deeds of Sale before court proceedings. It recommended the penalty of
disbarment. The IBP Board of Governors adopted the IBP CBD’s report but modified the penalty imposed
to suspension from the practice of law for a period of one year and disqualification from re-appointment
as Notary Public for a period of two years.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the administrative case against Atty Examen has already presctibed prescribed
2.Whether or not Atty Examen was prohibited to notarize the absolute deeds of sale. (NO)
3. Whether or not Atty Examen’s notarial commission must be revoked. (YES)

RULING:

1. No. There is no prescription of actions for actions of erring members of the bar.

In the case of Bengco v. Bernardo, the Court stated that putting a prescriptive period on administrative
cases involving members of the bar would only serve to embolden them to disregard the very oath they
took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately
come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability
they ought to answer for.

Atty. Examen’s defense of prescription therefore is of no moment and deserves scant consideration.
2. No. Prior to 1917, governing law for notaries public in the Philippines was the Spanish Notarial Law of
1889.  However, the law governing Notarial Practice is changed with the passage of the January 3, 1916
Revised Administrative Code, which took effect in 1917.  In 2004, the Revised Rules on Notarial
Practice27 was passed by the Supreme Court.

In Kapunan, et al. v. Casilan and Court of Appeals, the Court had the opportunity to state that enactment of
the Revised Administrative Code repealed the Spanish Notarial Law of 1889.

In this case, the heirs of Alilano stated that Atty. Examen was prohibited to notarize the absolute deeds of
sale since he was related by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree with the vendee, Ramon. The
prohibition might have still applied had the applicable rule been the Spanish Notarial Law. However,
following the Court’s ruling in Kapunan, the law in force at the time of signing was the Revised
Administrative Code, thus, the prohibition was removed.  Atty. Examen was not incompetent to notarize
the document even if one of the parties to the deed was a relative, his brother. 

Note must be taken that under 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule IV, Section 3(c), a notary public is
disqualified among others to perform the notarial act if he is related by affinity or consanguinity to a
principal within the fourth civil degree, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlib

SEC. 3. Disqualifications. – A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:

(c)  is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of the
principal within the fourth civil degree.cralawlawlibrary

That Atty. Examen was not incompetent to act as a notary public in the present case does not mean that
he can evade administrative liability under the CPR in conjunction with the provisions of the Notarial
Law.

3. Yes. A notary public must perform their duties diligently and with utmost care.

In Nunga v. Atty. Viray, this Court stated that Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act.
It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized
may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or
authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative
offices in general. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public document making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of
the authenticity thereof. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For
this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties.

In Soriano v. Atty. Basco, the Court stated that the Notarial Law requires notaries public to certify that a
party to the instrument acknowledged before him has presented the proper residence certificate and to
enter its number, place of issue and date as part of the certification. Failure to perform his duties results
in the revocation of a notary’s commission.

Here, based on the submission of the complainants, it is clear that the residence certificate number used
by Ramon Examen and as notarized by Atty. Examen in both Absolute Deeds of Sale was not in fact the
residence certificate of Ramon but Florentina’s residence certificate number. Atty. Examen interposes that
he was in good faith in that it was office practice to have his secretary type up the details of the
documents and requirements without him checking the correctness of same.

A notary public must discharge his powers and duties, which are impressed with public interest, with
accuracy and fidelity.
Good faith cannot be a mitigating circumstance in situations since the duty to function as a notary public
is personal. We note that the error could have been prevented had Atty. Examen diligently performed his
functions: personally checked the correctness of the documents.  To say that it was his secretary’s fault
reflects disregard and unfitness to discharge the functions of a notary public for it is he who personally
acknowledges the document.  He was behooved under Section 251, Chapter 11 of the Revised
Administrative Code to check if the proper cedulas were presented and inspect if the documents to be
acknowledged by him reflected the correct details.  This Court cannot stress enough that notarization is
not a routinary act.  It is imbued with substantive public interest owing to the public character of his
duties

In violating the provisions of the Notarial Law, Atty. Examen also transgressed his oath as a lawyer,
provisions of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. By his negligent act of not checking
the work of his secretary and merely perfunctorily notarizing documents, it cannot be said that he upheld
legal processes thus violating Canon 1 of the CPR.  Neither can it be said that he promoted confidence in
the legal system.  If anything, his acts serve to undermine the functions of a diligent lawyer. He thus ran
afoul Rule 1.02 of the CPR. We cannot stress enough that as a lawyer, respondent is expected at all times
to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which
might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal profession. 38  A
lawyer’s mandate includes thoroughly going over documents presented to them typed or transcribed by
their secretaries.

With respect to the penalty imposed, given that Atty. Examen not only failed to uphold his duty as a
notary public but also failed to uphold his lawyer’s oath and ran afoul the provisions of the CPR, the Court
deems it proper to suspend Atty. Examen from the practice of law for a period of two years.

Dispositive Portion:

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto E. Examen is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
TWO (2) YEARS. In addition, his present notarial commission, if any, is hereby REVOKED, and he is
DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public for a period of two (2) years from finality of this
Decision. He is further WARNED that any similar act or infraction in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.

2.General Considerations

IVQ LANDHOLDINGS, INC., Petitioner, v. REUBEN BARBOSA , Respondent.

G.R. No. 193156, January 18, 2017, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS: Respondent Reuben Barbosa filed a Petition for Cancellation and Quieting of Titles against Jorge
Vargas III , Benito Montinola, IVQ, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Barbosa averred that he
brought from Therese Vargas (Therese) a parcel of land in Visayas Avenue, QC. Therese then surrendered
to Barbosa the owner’s duplicate copy of the title. Barbosa said he took possession of the subject property
and paid real estate taxes thereon in Therese’s name. Subsequently, Barbosa learned that Therese’s name
was cancelled and was replaced with IVQ’s name in the tax declarations.

Upon investigation, Barbosa found out that the subject property was previously registered in the
name of Kawilihan Corporation—from which Therese acquired the property, the date of entry being Nov.
1970. On the other hand, IVQ supposedly bought the subject property from Jorge who, in turn, acquired it
also from Kawilihan Corporation and the date of entry was Oct. 1976. Barbosa argued that even without
considering the authenticity of Jorge’s title, Therese’s title bore an earlier date. Barbosa, thus, prayed for
the trial court to issue an order directing the Office of the RD of QC to cancel Jorge’s title and adjudicate
ownership of the property to him.

Jorge, Benito, and IVQ countered that the alleged title from where Barbosa's title was allegedly
derived from was the one that was fraudulently acquired and that Barbosa was allegedly part of a
syndicate that falsified titles for purposes of "land grabbing." They argued that it was questionable that an
alleged lot owner would wait for 30 years before filing an action to quiet title. The Register of Deeds of
Quezon City neither filed an answer to Barbosa's petition nor participated in the trial of the case.

During trial, Barbosa stated that Atty. Jesus C. Apelado, Jr. (Atty. Apelado), the person who
notarized the March 3, 1986 Deed of Absolute Sale between Jorge and IVQ, was not authorized to do so as
Atty. Apelado was only admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in 1987. Also, the notarial register
entries, i.e., the document number, page number, book number and series number, of the Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of IVQ were exactly the same as those in the special power of attorney (SPA)
executed by Jorge in favor of Benito Montinola, who signed the Deed of Absolute Sale on behalf of Jorge.
The Deed of Absolute Sale and the SPA were notarized by different lawyers but on the same date.

The RTC granted Barbosa's petition and ordered the cancellation of IVQ's title. The RTC ruled that
Barbosa was able to establish the existence and due execution of the deeds of sale in his favor and that of
Therese Vargas. The Certification dated February 12, 2004 from the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-
Officio Sheriff of the RTC, Manila stated that the page on which the Deed of Sale dated October 4, 1978 in
favor of Barbosa might have been probably entered was torn. This, however, did not discount the
possibility that said deed was actually notarized and recorded in the missing notarial records page.
Moreover, the RTC found that Barbosa adduced evidence that proved the payment of Therese Vargas to
Jorge Vargas, as well as the payment of Barbosa to Therese Vargas.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC. IVQ instituted before this Court the instant
petition for review on certiorari, but the Court initially denied IVQ's petition. IVQ then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and averred that that the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Jorge was notarized by Atty.
Jejomar C. Binay, then a notary public for Mandaluyong.

To impugn the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Kawilihan Corporation and Therese,
IVQ submitted a copy of the Certification from the Office of the Bar Confidant that Espiridion J. Dela Cruz,
the notary public who supposedly notarized the said deed, is not a member of the Philippine Bar. IVQ also
submitted a copy of the Certification from the National Archives, stating that the Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of Therese was not found in their records. Anent the Deed of Absolute Sale between Therese and
Barbosa, IVQ presented a Certification from the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the
RTC of Manila, stating that the notarial entries of Atty. Santiago R. Reyes in said deed, pertained to a deed
of sale between other individuals.

Also, the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Barbosa was not found in the photocopies of pages 90,
91, and 92 of the aforesaid notarial records of Atty. Santiago R. Reyes, which pages were reproduced from
the National Archives. IVQ also submitted a Certification from the City Treasurer's Office of the City of
Manila, stating that Therese’s Residence Certificate No. A-423263 in the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Barbosa was not among those allotted to the City of Manila. IVQ also submitted a copy of the Certification
from the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Pasig City that Atty. Jejomar C. Binay, the officer who
notarized the said deed, was indeed appointed as a notary public for the province of Rizal for the year
1976 and the latter submitted his notarial reports for the said year.

ISSUE:

Whether or not IVQ’s title should be cancelled in favor of Barbosa.

RULING: No. Without ruling on the merits of this case, the Court finds that there is a need to reassess the
evidence adduced by the parties to this case and thereafter reevaluate the findings of the lower courts.

In the instant case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals adjudicated the subject property in favor of
Barbosa and directed the cancellation of IVQ's certificate of title.

Before this Court, IVQ adduced new pieces of documentary evidence that tended to cast doubt on the
veracity of Barbosa's claim of ownership.
Interestingly, despite the claim of both parties that their respective titles could be traced to TCT No.
71507 in the name of Kawilihan Corporation, neither of them thought to submit a certified true copy of
the cancelled TCT No. 71507, which would have indicated to whom the subject property had in fact been
transferred.

The parties likewise admit in their pleadings that there is an on-going investigation being conducted by
the LRA on the authenticity and genuineness of the certificates of title involved in the present case and to
date, the LRA has not issued any official report pertaining to said investigation.

After reviewing the factual and procedural antecedents of this case, the Court deems it appropriate that
further proceedings be undertaken in order to verify the authenticity and veracity of the parties'
certificates of title and other documentary evidence.

The aforesaid evidence belatedly introduced by IVQ are not technically newly-discovered evidence, given
that the same could have been discovered and produced at the trial of the case had IVQ exercised
reasonable diligence in obtaining them. Nonetheless, we find that the above evidence cannot simply be
brushed aside on this ground alone. The same are too material to ignore and are relevant in ultimately
resolving the question of ownership of the subject property. In Mangahas v. Court of Appeals, we
recognized the long line of jurisprudence that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

It is always in the power of this Court to suspend its own rules, or to except a particular case from
its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it. This Court is mindful of the policy of
affording litigants the amplest opportunity for the determination of their cases on the merits and
of dispensing with technicalities whenever compelling reasons so warrant or when the purpose of
justice requires it. (Citations omitted.)

Indeed, the alleged defects in the notarization of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 11, 1970
between Kawilihan Corporation and Therese Vargas and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 4, 1978
between Therese Vargas and Barbosa are by no means trivial.

The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not
an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those
who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into
a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed
by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.

The notary public is further enjoined to record in his notarial registry the necessary information
regarding the document or instrument notarized and retain a copy of the document presented to him for
acknowledgment and certification especially when it is a contract. The notarial registry is a record of the
notary public's official acts. Acknowledged documents and instruments recorded in it are considered
public document. If the document or instrument does not appear in the notarial records and there is no
copy of it therein, doubt is engendered that the document or instrument was not really notarized, so that
it is not a public document and cannot bolster any claim made based on this document.

The Court had occasion to discuss the consequence of an improperly notarized deed of absolute sale. Thus
- Article 1358 of the New Civil Code requires that the form of a contract transmitting or extinguishing real
rights over immovable property should be in a public document. Not having been properly and validly
notarized, the deed of sale cannot be considered a public document. It is an accepted rule, however, that
the failure to observe the proper form does not render the transaction invalid. It has been settled that a
sale of real property, though not consigned in a public instrument or formal writing is, nevertheless, valid
and binding among the parties, for the time-honored rule is that even a verbal contract of sale or real
estate produces legal effects between the parties.

Not being considered a public document, the deed is subject to the requirement of proof under
Section 20, Rule 132, which partly states that the party invoking the validity of the deed of absolute sale
had the burden of proving its authenticity and due execution. In the instant case, should the Deeds of
Absolute Sale in favor of Therese and Barbosa, respectively, be found to be indeed improperly notarized,
the trial court would have erred in admitting the same in evidence without proof of their authenticity and
in relying on the presumption regarding the regularity of their execution. Barbosa would then have the
additional burden of proving the authenticity and due execution of both deeds before he can invoke their
validity in establishing his claim of ownership.

Therefore, IVQ should be allowed to formally offer in evidence the documents it belatedly
submitted to this Court and that Barbosa should equally be given all the opportunity to refute the same or
to submit controverting evidence. Given that the Court is not a trier of facts and there still are factual
matters that need to be evaluated, the proper recourse is to remand the case to the Court of Appeals for
the conduct of further proceedings.

The Court, in particular, deems it necessary for the parties to submit a certified true copy of TCT No.
71507 that is registered in the name of Kawilihan Corporation, if possible. As previously discussed,
neither of the parties submitted the same before the trial court and no explanation was likewise offered
for this omission. As TCT No. 71507 is ultimately the title from which the certificates of title of Therese
Vargas and Jorge Vargas III supposedly emanated, the same may indicate which of the two subsequent
titles cancelled it.

It would likewise be expedient for the parties to submit evidence as to the character of their possession of
the subject property, given that the trial court ruled that neither of them were able to prove their
possession thereof.

The Court further reiterates its directive to the parties to submit information as to the results of the
investigation of the Task Force Titulong Malinis of the LRA regarding the authenticity ofTCT No. 159487
registered in the name of Therese Vargas and TCT No. 223019 registered in the name of Jorge Vargas III.

After the conclusion of its proceedings, the Court of Appeals is directed to submit to this Court a detailed
Report on its findings and conclusions within three months from notice of this Resolution. Said report,
along with all the additional evidence that will be offered by the parties, shall be thoroughly considered in
order to determine with finality the issue of ownership of the subject property.

WHEREFORE , the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for the purpose of hearing and receiving
evidence, including but not limited to, those specifically required by the Court in this Resolution. The
Court of Appeals is directed to conclude the proceedings and submit to this Court a Report on its findings
and recommended conclusions within three (3) months from notice of this Resolution. The Court of
Appeals is further directed to raffle this case immediately upon receipt of this Resolution.
 XERXES A. ABADIANO, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES JESUS and LOLITA MARTIR, Respondents.

G.R. No. 156310, July 31, 2008, NACHURA, J.

FACTS: The case stemmed from an action for quieting of title and/or recovery of possession of a parcel of
land filed by herein respondents against Roberto Abadiano, Faustino Montañ o, and Quirico Mandaguit.
Petitioner Xerxes A. Abadiano intervened in that case.

Lot No. 1318 of the Kabankalan Cadastre covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 20461 issued
on November 19, 1923 in the name of the spouses Inocentes Bañ ares and Feliciana Villanueva. Before the
issuance of OCT No. 20461, however, Inocentes and the heirs of Feliciana Villanueva (who had
predeceased her husband) executed an Agreement of Partition dated June 1, 1922 over Lot No. 1318. The
lot was partitioned and distributed as follows:
1. Lot No. 1318-A, in favor of Demetrio Bañ ares
2. Lot No. 1318-B, in favor of Ramon and David Abadiano (grandchildren of Inocentes and Feliciana)
3. Lot No. 1318-C, in favor of Amando Bañ ares.

The partition is embodied in a Deed of Partition executed on June 1, 1922 and notarized the following day
by Notary Public Jose Peralta with notarial inscriptions "Reg. No. 64, Pag. 69, Libro III."

On September 30, 1939, David Abadiano, who was absent during the execution of the Agreement of
Partition, executed a Deed of Confirmation acknowledging and ratifying the document of partition.

On February 15, 1962, OCT No. 20461 was administratively reconstituted and in lieu thereof OCT No. RO-
8211 (20461) was issued over Lot No. 1318, still in the name of Inocentes Bañ ares and Felicidad
Villanueva. Annotated at the back of the reconstituted title were the Agreement of Partition and the Deed
of Confirmation

On June 14, 1957 Demetrio Bañ ares sold his share of the lot to his son, Leopoldo. The same was annotated
at the back of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461).

Subsequently, Leopoldo Bañ ares filed before the CFI of Negros Occidental an ex-parte petition praying
for:
1. The confirmation of the Agreement of Partition, the Conformity executed by David Abadiano, and the
Deed of Sale between him and his father; and
2. The cancellation of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) and, in lieu thereof, the issuance of a new certificate of
title over the property.

In February 22, 1962, the court ordered the cancellation of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) and Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-31862 was issued by the Register of Deeds for Negros Occidental the
names of Dr. Leopoldo Bañ ares, Amando Bañ ares, and Ramon and David Abadiano.

Petitioner insists that this is still the valid and subsisting title over Lot No. 1318 and that no sale of the
portion pertaining to Ramon and David Abadiano ever took place.

Respondent spouses alleged that, prior to the issuance of TCT No. T-31862, Ramon Abadiano, for himself
and on behalf of David Abadiano, had already sold their rights and interests over Lot No. 1318-C to Victor
Garde. The sale was allegedly evidenced by a document of sale (Compra Y Venta) dated June 3, 1922 and
acknowledged before Notary Public Jose Peralta and bearing notarial inscription "Doc. No. 64, Pag. No. 60,
Book No. III, series of 1922." The sale was allegedly affirmed by David Abadiano in a document dated
September 30, 1939. They further alleged that from the time of the sale, Victor Garde and his heirs were
in continuous, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession and occupation in the concept of an owner
of Lot No. 1318-C. After acquiring the property, respondent spouses continued to plant sugarcane on the
land. Further, the defendants also entered the property and harvested the sugarcane on Lot No. 1318-B,
which by then had been acquired by Lolita B. Martir from her adoptive father, Amando Bañ ares.
Thus, in April 1982, herein respondent-spouses filed the Action to Quiet Title and/or Recovery of
Possession with Damages before the then CFI of Negros Occidental.

In their Answer with Counterclaim, defendants denied that the subject property was ever sold by Ramon
and David Abadiano, and that, consequently, defendant Roberto Abadiano had inherited the same from
Ramon. They also alleged, by way of Special and Affirmative Defenses, that the subject land still belonged
to the estate of Ramon and David Abadiano and was never alienated.

Xerxes Abadiano intervened in the proceedings before the trial court alleging likewise that his
predecessor Ramon Abadiano never sold their share of the property to Victor Garde.

The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants declaring plaintiffs spouses Jesus
and Lolita Martir as the true and legitimate owners of portions of Lot No. 1318 Kabankalan Cadastre
denominated as Lots 1318-B and 1318-C.

The trial court also brushed aside the defendants’ contention that the Compra Y Venta contained the same
notarial inscription as the Deed of Partition. It said that assuming this to be true, this may be considered
an error which did not nullify the Compra Y Venta; at most, the document would be non-registrable but
still valid. It also held that the defendants and intervenor were guilty of laches for failing to avail of the
many opportunities for them to bring an action to establish their right over Lot No. 1318-C.

The CA rendered a Decision affirming the Decision of the RTC in toto.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the Deed of Sale (Compra Y Venta) is a spurious

2. Whether or not petitioner is guilty of laches

RULING: YES. The Petition is impressed with merit. In appreciating the alleged Compra Y Venta
presented by respondents, the trial court concluded that "[t]he parties have no quarrel on the existence of
a Deed of Sale of a portion of Lot No. 1318 executed by Ramon Abadiano for himself and as representative
of David Abadiano, dated June 3, [1922] in favor of Victor Garde."

The trial court erred in its conclusion.

Borne very clearly by the records is the defendants’ repudiation of the existence of the sale in their
Answer with Counterclaim. They stated:

2. That defendants admit plaintiffs’ allegation in paragraph 4 that there has been no particular
designation of lot number (sic) for each of the co-owner (sic) of Lot No. 1318 but specifically
deny under oath the other allegations thereof the truth being that the property referred to here
as Lot No. 1318 remains undivided to this day that the owners thereof as shown by the TCT No.
31862 co-own the same pro-indiviso;

3. That defendants have no knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations
in paragraph 5 and therefore specifically deny the same under oath the truth being that Ramon
Abadiano and David Abadiano had not sold the land at bar to anyone and that consequently,
defendant Roberto Abadiano had inherited the same from the former; x x x. (emphasis supplied).

Likewise, petitioner specifically denied the allegations in paragraph 5 of the Complaint. He alleged that
the lot "had never been sold or alienated and the same still remains intact as the property of the
Intervenor and his co-owners by operation of law." This was testified to by Roberto Abadiano during the
trial. While it is true that this Court had previously ruled that mere denials would not have sufficed to
impeach the document, in this case, there was an effective specific denial as contemplated by law.
There is no denying that TCT No. 31862 is still the subsisting title over the parcel of land in
dispute. It is also a fact that the purported Compra Y Venta was not annotated on TCT No. 31862
until April 1982, shortly before the complaint was commenced, even though the deed was
allegedly executed in 1922.

Considering that the action is one for quieting of title and respondents anchored their claim to the
property on the disputed Compra Y Venta, it was incumbent upon the trial court to have resolved first the
issue of the document’s due execution and authenticity, before determining its validity.

Rule 130, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:

Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court without bad
faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is
only the general result of the whole;

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office.

Respondents attached only a photocopy of the Compra Y Venta to their complaint. According to
respondent Lolita Martir, the original of said document was in the office of the Register of Deeds. They
allegedly tried to obtain a copy from that office but their request was refused. No other evidence but these
bare assertions, however, was presented to prove that the original is indeed in the custody of the Register
of Deeds or that respondents’ due and diligent search for the same was unsuccessful.

The Rule states that when the original document is unavailable, has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability
without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

In the case at bar, respondents failed to establish that the offer in evidence of the document was made in
accordance with any of the exceptions allowed under the abovequoted rule, and yet, the trial court
accepted the document as genuine and proceeded to determine its validity based on such assumption.

The trial court likewise brushed aside the apparent defect that the document presented contained
the same notarial inscription as the Agreement on Partition. Indeed, the Deed of Partition and the
Compra Y Venta, though executed on different days, were notarized on the same day, and both
documents contained the signatures of the same witnesses and the same notarial inscription.

This notwithstanding, the court concluded, "Assuming this to be true, same could be considered an error
which did not nullify, (sic) the Deed of Sale or Compra Y Venta. At most, the document would be a non-
registrable, but valid document."

We stress that a notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner
therein expressed and has in its favor the presumption of regularity.

In this case, while it is true that the error in the notarial inscription would not have invalidated
the sale – if indeed it took place – the same error would have meant that the document cannot be
treated as a notarial document and thus, not entitled to the presumption of regularity. The
document would be taken out of the realm of public documents whose genuineness and due
execution need not be proved.

Accordingly, respondents not having proven the due execution and genuineness of the purported
Compra Y Venta, the weight of evidence preponderates in favor of petitioner.

2. No. In addition, several other factors militate against the finding of laches on the part of the
petitioner.

When the Original Certificate of Title was reconstituted on February 15, 1962, no annotation therein
was made of the Compra Y Venta or of the Deed of Sale between Ramon Abadiano and Victor
Garde. Only the Agreement of Partition, the Confirmation by David Abadiano, and the sale from
Demetrio to Leopoldo Bañares were annotated therein. Neither does the Deed of Sale of
Demetrio’s share in favor of Leopoldo, executed in 1957, mention that the property belonged to
anyone other than the parties to the Deed of Partition.

Likewise, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31862, which was issued in 1962 pursuant to an Order of the
Kabankalan CFI, was issued in the names of Leopoldo Bañ ares, Amando Bañ ares, and Ramon and David
Abadiano. Even at the time of the issuance of said TCT, there was no annotation of the alleged sale to
Victor Garde, which according to respondents took place in 1922.

If respondents’ contention were true, the TCT should not have been issued in April 1962 in the
name of Ramon and David Abadiano, but in the name of Victor Garde or Jose Garde – who by then
had supposedly acquired the property by virtue of the Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Sale
executed on December 29, 1961. As it is, neither respondents nor any of their predecessors in interest
participated in any of the proceedings for the issuance of the OCT, the reconstituted OCT, or the TCT.

Again, the TCT bears out the fact that the purported Compra Y Venta to Victor Garde was
annotated thereon only on April 23, 1982. On the other hand, several entries made in 1981 evince that
petitioner and his co-heirs took steps after Amando’s death to assert their rights over the property.

In 1976, the heirs of David Abadiano executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Roberto Abadiano
giving the latter authority to act, sue, and/or represent them in any suit or action for recovery of
possession or of whatever kind or nature. For their part, the heirs of Ramon Abadiano executed a
Declaration of Heirship and Adjudication over the part of Lot No. 1318 pertaining to their predecessor.

Ranged against these positive steps, respondents only have their bare assertions to support their claim
that they indeed had possession of the land through their predecessors in interest, which are insufficient
to overcome the testimony that it was Amando Bañ ares – and not Victor Garde – who had possession of
the property during the former’s lifetime, or that after Amando’s death, the lot remained unoccupied.

In sum, we find that petitioner is not guilty of such neglect or inaction as would bar his claim to the
property in question. In contrast, it is most telling that respondents, who are claiming to have been in
possession of the property by virtue of an alleged duly constituted sale for almost 60 years, have
themselves failed within that long period to have the same property transferred in their name or even
only to have the sale annotated on the title of the property.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51679 are reversed and set aside. A new one is entered:

(1) reversing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental in Civil
Case No. 1331;

(2) declaring the heirs of Ramon and David Abadiano as the lawful owners of Lot No. 1318-B, a
portion of Lot No. 1318 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31862, Kabankalan
Cadastre, Negros Occidental; and

(3) ordering respondents to pay petitioner and his co-heirs rentals at the rate of ₱3,000.00 per
hectare per year, from the time of actual occupation of the land in 1976 until March 1981, moral
damages in the amount of ₱100,00.00, exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00, and
attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱10,000.00.
 LEONOR CAMCAM, JOSE, FORTUNATO, VIRGINIA, GLORIA, FLORENDO, DELFIN, RODRIGO,
LEUTERIO, NARCISO, ONOFRE, ZENAIDA, AURELIA, TEOFILA, FELICIDAD, MERCEDES, LYDIA,
ALFREDO, BIENVENIDO, EFREN, LILIA, ERLINDA, MELINDA, MARYLOU, MERIAM, all surnamed
SALVADOR, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND ARCADIO FRIAS, Respondents.

G.R. NO. 142977, September 30, 2008, CARPIO MORALES, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Leonor Camcam and her husband Laureano Salvador were the registered owners of 2 parcels
of land (a residential lot and a mango and coconut land) located in San Carlos, Pangasinan.

The husband Laureano died intestate in 1941 and he was survived by his wife (petitioner Camcam),
brothers Agapito and petitioners Jose and Fortunato (all surnamed Salvador), as well as his nieces and
nephews from his deceased brother Luis (also co-petitioners).

On February 1983, petitioners filed before the RTC of Pangasinan a complaint against Arcadio Frias
(Frias) for the annulment of 3 documents executed and signed by Petitoner Camcam over the said lots.
These are the following
1. Exhibit B – A Deed of Adjudication Sale for the entire lot for a consideration of 11,000 dated
4 November 1982;
2. Exhibit A – A Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Sale of 1/2 portion of the two lots together
with Camcam’s conjugal share for a P45,000 dated 4 November 1982; and
3. Exhibit C – A Deed of Absolute Sale for the other lot for a consideration of 3,000. Dated 23
November 1982

Petitioner’s version of events:

It was Frias who offered to purchase the two lots from Camcam. Camcam, however, was only willing to
enter into a sale with right of repurchase within five years. Frias agreed but he deceived her into signing
the Deed of Adjudication-(Exhibit B) after which he paid her P 9,000 out of the P11,000, promising that he
would settle the balance of P2,000. But instead of delivering the balance, Frias deceived Camcam into
signing the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit C) telling her that since two lots were involved, she had to sign
another instrument.

Upon verification with Acosta, the notary public who notarized Exhibits B and C, petitioners discovered
that the deeds signed transferred ownership of the entire area covering the two lots. They also,
discovered that that Original Certificate of Title covering the two lots were cancelled and Transfer
Certificate of Title were issued in Frias' name. Further, they discovered that Frias registered the
document-Exhibit A which had the same date and notarial details as those of Exhibit B.

Petitioners alleged that assuming that the documents are valid, it is void with respect to the shares of
Camcam's co-heirs-co-petitioners as they were conveyed without their knowledge and participation.

Respondents version of events:

Camcam inherited the two lots, to the exclusion of her co-petitioners, under the old Civil Code and it was
she who convinced him to buy them.

Camcam later changed her mind and was willing to sell only the whole of the residential land. And as to
the mango and coconut land, she was giving her brothers-in-law two weeks to buy the remaining portion
thereof. Hence, he and Camcam forged Exhibit B. Camcam later informed him that her brothers-in-law
could not buy the remaining portion hence, he and Camcam forged Exhibit C.

After the execution of Exhibit B and C, Frias brought them to the Municipal Building to pay taxes. When
asked by an employee of the how much he paid for the lots, Frias confessed to not having indicated the
correct consideration on the documents because he wanted to "escape" paying taxes. On being informed
of the consequences of not reflecting the true consideration in the documents, he had the third document,
Exhibit A, prepared which, after explaining to Camcam the reason, she signed in notary public Acosta's
office.

The RTC ruled in favor of Frias and held that the contention that Camcam signed the documents without
signing them as unmeritorious. It held that she was the one who had “enough learning” and that
witnesses Pira, and Calpo signed them as well according to the testimony of Atty. Acosta. The disposition
of the conjugal portion of the lot was valid but the other half of the two lots should be divided among
the brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces by the right of intestate succession; to brothers and
sisters, per capita; and the nephews and nieces per stirpes. The remaining one-half belongs to defendant
herein-respondent Frias.

The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with the only modification being that the cost of survey should be
borne equally between the plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-appellee. Aggrieved petitioners filed this
Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in not declaraing null and void the three Deeds considering their physical
appearance and conditions indicating strongly the irregularities of their execution.

RULING: No. The petition is bereft of merit and the Deeds are valid.

The execution of the second document bearing the same date, an irregular notarization merely reduces
the evidentiary value of a document to that of a private document, which requires proof of its due
execution and authenticity to be admissible as evidence.The irregular notarization - or, for that
matter, the lack of notarization - does not thus necessarily affect the validity of the contract
reflected in the document. Tigno v. Aquino enlightens:

From a civil law perspective, the absence of notarization of the Deed of Sale would not necessarily
invalidate the transaction evidenced therein. Article 1358 of the Civil Code requires that the form of a
contract that transmits or extinguishes real rights over immovable property should be in a public
document, yet it is also an accepted rule that the failure to observe the proper form does not render
the transaction invalid. Thus, it has been uniformly held that the form required in Article 1358 is not
essential to the validity or enforceability of the transaction but required merely for convenience. We have
even affirmed that a sale of real property though not consigned in a public instrument or formal writing,
is nevertheless valid and binding among the parties, for the time-honored rule is that even a verbal
contract of sale or real estate produces effects between the parties.

Petitioners alleged fraud on Frias' part, hence, they had the burden of establishing the same by
clear and convincing evidence. This they failed to discharge.

By Camcam’s account, she signed the three documents relying on Frias' word that they were deeds of
"mortgage," and she did not read them because she "[did] not know how to read," When asked, however,
on cross-examination about her educational attainment, Leonor answered that she finished the third year
of a nursing course at San Juan de Dios Hospital.

Clarifying her statement that she did not know how to read, Leonor explained that she knew how to read
but her eyesight was blurred. Leonor's granddaughter-witness Gertrudes Calpo (Gertrudes) who signed
as witness in Exhibit B declared, however, that she read the contents of Exhibit B to Leonor, thus belying
petitioners' claim that Leonor signed the same without knowing its true contents.

As for Exhibit A which petitioners maintain is spurious, Camcam's signature therein being allegedly
forged, Camcam herself admitted having signed the same, and this was corroborated by Gertrudes.

As for Camcam's co-petitioners' invocation of their right of redemption of the share of Leonor in the lots
sold to Frias, points of law, theories, issues of fact, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial
court ordinarily are not considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal. Besides, given that petitioners already knew of the sale as early as 1983, they are guilty of laches,
having raised their right of redemption for the first time in 2000 when they filed the present petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing disquisition, DENIED.

SPOUSES LEHNER and LUDY MARTIRES, Petitioners, vs. MENELIA CHUA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 174240, March 20, 2013, PERALTA, J.

FACTS:

Subject of the instant controversy are twenty-four memorial lots located at the Holy Cross Memorial Park
in Barangay Bagbag, Novaliches, Quezon City. The disputed property is owned by Chua (respondent),
together with her mother, Florencia R. Calagos.

Chua borrowed from petitioner spouses (Sps Martires) the amount of ₱150,000.00. The loan was secured
by a real estate mortgage over the abovementioned property.Respondent failed to fully settle her
obligation. Subsequently, without foreclosure of the mortgage, ownership of the subject lots were
transferred in the name of petitioners via a Deed of Transfer.

Respondent filed with the RTC of Quezon City a Complaint against petitioners, Manila Memorial
Park Inc., the company which owns the Holy Cross Memorial Park, and the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, praying for the annulment of the contract of mortgage between her and petitioners
on the ground that the interest rates imposed are unjust and exorbitant. Respondent also sought
accounting to determine her liability under the law. She likewise prayed that the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City and Manila Memorial Park, Inc. be directed to reconvey the disputed property to her.
Subsequently, respondent moved for the amendment of her complaint to include the allegation that she
later discovered that ownership of the subject lots was transferred in the name of petitioners by virtue of
a forged Deed of Transfer and Affidavit of Warranty. Respondent prayed that the Deed of Transfer and
Affidavit of Warranty be annulled.

After trial, the RTC of Quezon City rendered a Decision in favor of petitioners and denied the complaint.
On appeal, the CA affirmed, with modification, the judgment of the RTC. The CA ruled that respondent
voluntarily entered into a contract of loan and that the execution of the Deed of Transfer is sufficient
evidence of petitioners' acquisition of ownership of the subject property. Respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.

The CA promulgated its assailed Amended Decision granting Chua’s Motion for Reconsideration which
reversed its earlier decision affirming the judgment of the RTC. The CA declared the Deed of Transfer,
as well as the Affidavit of Warranty as void ab initio. The CA reconsidered its findings and concluded
that the Deed of Transfer which, on its face, transfers ownership of the subject property to petitioners, is,
in fact, an equitable mortgage. The CA held that the true intention of respondent was merely to provide
security for her loan and not to transfer ownership of the property to petitioners. The CA so ruled on the
basis of its findings that: (1) the consideration, amounting to ₱150,000.00, for the alleged Deed of
Transfer is unusually inadequate, considering that the subject property consists of 24 memorial lots; (2)
the Deed of Transfer was executed by reason of the same loan extended by petitioners to respondent; (3)
the Deed of Transfer is incomplete and defective; and (4) the lots subject of the Deed of Transfer are one
and the same property used to secure respondent's ₱150,000.00 loan from petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Deed of Transfer executed by respondent in favor of petitioners over the subject
property carry evidentiary weight as to its to due execution and enjoy the presumption of regularity.

RULING: NO.

Petitioners are correct in pointing out that notarized documents carry evidentiary weight conferred upon
them with respect to their due execution and enjoy the presumption of regularity which may only be
rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to falsity. However,
the presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute
that the notarization was regular. A defective notarization will strip the document of its public
character and reduce it to a private instrument. Consequently, when there is a defect in the
notarization of a document, the clear and convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to a
duly-notarized document is dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such document
is preponderance of evidence.

In the present case, the CA has clearly pointed out the dubious circumstances and irregularities attendant
in the alleged notarization of the subject Deed of Transfer, to wit: (1) the Certification issued by the Clerk
of Court of the Notarial Section of the RTC of Makati City which supposedly attested that a copy of the
subject Deed of Transfer is on file with the said court, was contradicted by the Certification issued by the
Administrative Officer of the Notarial Section of the same office as well as by the testimony of the court
employee who prepared the Certification issued by the Clerk of Court, to the effect that the subject Deed
of Transfer cannot, in fact, be found in their files; (2) respondent's categorical denial that she executed the
subject Deed of Transfer; and (3) the subject document did not state the date of execution and lacks the
marital consent of respondent's husband.

Indeed, petitioners' heavy reliance on the Certification issued by the notary public who
supposedly notarized the said deed, as well as the Certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the
Notarial Section of the RTC of Makati City, is misplaced for the following reasons:
First, the persons who issued these Certifications were not presented as witnesses and, as such, they
could not be cross-examined with respect to the truthfulness of the contents of their Certifications;
Second, as mentioned above, these Certifications were contradicted by the Certification issued by the
Administrative Officer of the Notarial Section of the RTC of Makati City as well as by the admission, on
cross-examination, of the clerk who prepared the Certification of the Clerk of Court, that their office
cannot, in fact, find a copy of the subject Deed of Transfer in their files; and
Third, the further admission of the said clerk that the Certification, which was issued by the clerk
of court and relied upon by petitioners, was not based on documents existing in their files, but was
simply based on the Certification issued by the notary public who allegedly notarized the said Deed of
Transfer.

Assuming further that the notarization of the disputed Deed of Transfer was regular, the Court,
nonetheless, is not persuaded by petitioners' argument that such Deed is a sufficient evidence of
the validity of the agreement between petitioners and respondent.

While indeed a notarized document enjoys the presumption of regularity, the fact that a deed is
notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents. The presumption is not absolute and
may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

In the present case, the presumption cannot be made to apply, because aside from the regularity of its
notarization, the validity of the contents and execution of the subject Deed of Transfer was challenged in
the proceedings below where its prima facie validity was subsequently overthrown by the questionable
circumstances attendant in its supposed execution. These circumstances include: (1) the alleged
agreement between the parties that the ownership of the subject property be simply assigned to
petitioners instead of foreclosure of the contract of mortgage which was earlier entered into by them; (2)
the Deed of Transfer was executed by reason of the loan extended by petitioners to respondent, the
amount of the latter's outstanding obligation being the same as the amount of the consideration for the
assignment of ownership over the subject property; (3) the inadequacy of the consideration; and (4) the
claim of respondent that she had no intention of transferring ownership of the subject property to
petitioners.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the CA that the
agreement between petitioners and respondent is, in fact, an equitable mortgage. The circumstances
surrounding the execution of the disputed Deed of Transfer would show that the said document was
executed to circumvent the terms of the original agreement and deprive respondent of her mortgaged
property without the requisite foreclosure.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Amended Decision and Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals, dated September 30, 2005, July 5, 2006 and August 28, 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 76388, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 THELMA M. ARANAS VS. TERESITA V. MERCADO et.al.
G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014 BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS:

Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate survived by his second wife, respondent Teresita V.
Mercado and their five children (respondents); and his two children by his first marriage, namely:
Franklin L. Mercado and Thelma M. Aranas (petitioner.)

Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate shares in Mervir
Realty Corporation and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation. He assigned his real properties in
exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu to
Mervir Realty.

Thelma filed in the RTC in Cebu City a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of
Emigdio’s estate. The RTC granted the petition considering that there was no opposition. The letters of
administration in favor of Teresita were issued.

As the administrator, respondent Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio. She indicated
in the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had “left no real properties but only personal
properties” worth P6,675,435.25 in all.

Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, petitioner
Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it. The
RTC granted it.

Teresita filed a compliance with the order supporting her inventory with copies of three certificates of
stocks covering Mervir Realty shares of stock; the deed of assignment of real properties in exchange for
Mervir Realty shares of stock; and the certificate of stock issued by Cebu Emerson.

After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued an order finding and holding
that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included. RTC
directed the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had
been either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent
during his lifetime.

Teresita timely sought the reconsideration of the order on the ground that one of the real properties
affected located in Badian, Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir Realty, and that the parcels of land
covered by the deed of assignment had already come into the possession of and registered in the
name of Mervir Realty. Hence, it should not be included in the inventory.

The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration,stating that there was no cogent reason for the
reconsideration, and that the movants’ agreement as heirs to submit to the RTC the issue of what
properties should be included or excluded from the inventory already estopped them from questioning
its jurisdiction to pass upon the issue.

Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to approve the inventory,
and in ordering her as administrator to include real properties that had been transferred to Mervir realty,
Teresita, joined by her other heirs filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.

CA held that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had
been either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent
during his lifetime.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering that the RTC commit grave
abuse of discretion in directing the inclusion of the properties in the estate of the decedent
RULING: The fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in favor of Mervir Realty was
a notarized instrument did not sufficiently justify the exclusion from the inventory of the
properties involved. A notarized deed of sale only enjoyed the presumption of regularity in favor
of its execution, but its notarization did not per se guarantee the legal efficacy of the transaction
under the deed, and what the contents purported to be. The presumption of regularity could be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

As observed in Suntay v. Court of Appeals “Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests
in its favor the presumption of regularity, it is not the intention nor the function of the notary public to
validate and make binding an instrument never, in the first place, intended to have any binding legal
effect upon the parties thereto. The intention of the parties still and always is the primary
consideration in determining the true nature of a contract.”

Hence, it should likewise be pointed out that the exchange of shares of stock of Mervir Realty with the real
properties owned by Emigdio would still have to be inquired into. That Emigdio executed the deed of
assignment two days prior to his death was a circumstance that should put any interested party on
his guard regarding the exchange, considering that there was a finding about Emigdio having been
sick of cancer of the pancreas at the time. In this regard, whether the CA correctly characterized the
exchange as a form of an estate planning scheme remained to be validated by the facts to be established in
court.

The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens titles in the name of Mervir Realty could not
be a valid basis for immediately excluding them from the inventory in view of the circumstances
admittedly surrounding the execution of the deed of assignment. This is because:

The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a system of registration of titles
to lands. However, justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear the
unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State’s agents, in the absence of proof of his
complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to
quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that
were noted in the certificate at the time of registration or that may arise subsequent thereto. Otherwise,
the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land
registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their duties.

Assuming that only seven titled lots were the subject of the deed of assignment of January 10, 1991, such
lots should still be included in the inventory to enable the parties, by themselves, and with the assistance
of the RTC itself, to test and resolve the issue on the validity of the assignment. The limited jurisdiction of
the RTC as an intestate court might have constricted the determination of the rights to the properties
arising from that deed, but it does not prevent the RTC as intestate court from ordering the inclusion in
the inventory of the properties subject of that deed. This is because the RTC as intestate court, albeit
vested only with special and limited jurisdiction, was still “deemed to have all the necessary powers to
exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective.”

Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for the important purpose
of resolving the difficult issues of collation and advancement to the heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil
Code required every compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein Teresita herself, to “ bring into the
mass of the estate any property or right which he (or she) may have received from the decedent,
during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it
may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition.” Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided that any advancement by the decedent
on the legitime of an heir “may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions
and on the heir.” Rule 90 thereby expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate
court about the matters relating to the inventory of the estate of the decedent by authorizing it to direct
the inclusion of properties donated or bestowed by gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the
decedent.38

The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory of estate
properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its
determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was
best to include all properties in the possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator
to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of
the estate. As long as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected
as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the
judicial or quasi–judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually
refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal
or board exercising judicial or quasi–judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

In light of the foregoing, the CA’s conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC was
unwarranted and erroneous.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
decision promulgated on May 15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14, 2001 and May 18,
2001 by the Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court in Cebu to proceed with
dispatch in Special Proceedings No. 3094-CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the late Emigdio Mercado,
Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to resolve the case; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.
 G.R. No. 208450

SPS. ROBERTO ABOITIZ AND MARIA CRISTINA CABARRUS, Petitioners 

vs.
SPS. PETER L. PO AND VICTORIA L. PO, Respondents

G.R. No. 208497

SPS. PETER L. PO AND VICTORIA L. PO, Petitioners, 

vs.
SPS. ROBERTO ABOITIZ AND MARIA CRISTINA CABARRUS, JOSE MARIA MORAZA, AND ERNESTO
ABOITIZ AND ISABEL ABOITIZ, Respondents

G.R. No. 208450, June 5, 2017, LEONEN, J.

FACTS:

This case involves a parcel of land located in Cabancalan, Mandaue City, initially registered as OCT No. 0-
887, and titled under the name of Roberto Aboitiz. The land is referred to as Lot No. 2835. This parcel of
land originally belonged to the late Mariano Seno.

On July 31, 1973, Mariano executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his son, Ciriaco Seno, over a
1.0120-hectare land in Cebu. This property included 2 lots: Lot No. 2807 and the land subject of this
case, Lot No. 2835. Thereafter, Ciriaco sold the 2 lots to Victoria Po.

On July 15, 1982, Mariano died and was survived by his 5 children (Mariano Heirs): Esperanza Seno Vda.
De Kuizon, Ramon Seno, Benita Seno Vda. De Lim, Simeon Seno, and Ciriaco.

In 1990, Peter Po discovered that Ciriaco "had executed a [q]uitclaim renouncing [his] interest
over Lot [No.] 2807 in favor of [petitioner] Roberto." In the quitclaim, Ciriaco stated that he was
"the declared owner of Lot [Nos.] 2835 and 2807."

The Spouses Po confronted Ciriaco. By way of remedy, Ciriaco and the Spouses Po executed a
Memorandum of Agreement in which Ciriaco agreed to pay Peter the difference between the amount paid
by the Spouses Po as consideration for the entire property and the value of the land the Spouses Po were
left with after the quitclaim.

However, also in 1990, Lot No. 2835 was also sold to Roberto. The Mariano Heirs, including Ciriaco,
executed separate deeds of absolute sale in favor of Roberto. Thereafter, Roberto immediately
developed the lot as part of a subdivision called North Town Homes.

In 1991, the Spouses Po declared Lot No. 2835 for taxation purposes. In 1992, Roberto also declared Lot
No. 2835 for taxation purposes and was issued Tax Declaration No. 1100, annotated with: "This tax
declaration is also declared in the name of Mrs. VICTORIA LEE PO married to PETER PO under [T]ax
[Declaration] [N]o. 0634-A so that one may be considered a duplicate to the other."

In 1993, Roberto filed an application for original registration of Lot No. 2835 with the Mandaue
City RTC, acting as land registration court. The trial court granted the issuance of OCT No. 0-887 in the
name of Roberto. The lot was immediately subdivided with portions sold to Ernesto and Jose.

In 1996, the Spouses Po filed a complaint to recover the land and to declare nullity of title with
damages. The trial court ruled in favor of the Spouses Po. On appeal, the CA partially affirmed the trial
court decision, declaring the Spouses Po as the rightful owner of the land. However, it ruled that
the titles issued to respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel should be respected. It found that the Deed
of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses Po was duly notarized and was thus presumed regular
on its face. Their Memorandum of Agreement did not cancel or rescind the Deed of Absolute Sale but
rather strengthened their claim that they "entered into a contract of [s]ale."

ISSUE:

Whether the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco Seno and the Spouses Peter and Victoria Po should be
considered as evidence of their entitlement to the property.

RULING:

This Court finds that the Spouses Aboitiz failed to prove their claim of fraud. The Spouses Aboitiz
attempted to prove that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses Po was fake and
fraudulent by presenting certifications of its non-existence in the notarial books of the notary public who
notarized the document. However, a review of the certifications does not even state that the document
does not exist in the notarial books.

These Certifications do not declare that the Deed of Absolute Sale does not exist. They only state that at
the time of their issuance, the Notary Public had not submitted his notarial reports or that the document
had not been transferred to the archives for safekeeping. It cannot logically be concluded from these
certifications that the document is inexistent, false, or fraudulent. In any case, the Notary Public's failure
to submit his or her notarial report does not auect the act of notarization.

Rule 132, Section 30 of the Rules of Court provides that:

Section 30. Proof of notarial documents. - Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as
provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment
being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved.

When a private document is notarized, the document is converted to a public document which is
presumed regular, admissible in evidence without need for proof of its authenticity and due execution,
and entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.To overturn the presumption in favor of a notarized
document, the party questioning it must present "clear, convincing, and more than merely
preponderant evidence." Thus, parties who appear before a Notary Public should not be prejudiced by
the failure of the Notary Public to follow rules imposed by the Notarial Law. They are not obliged to
ensure that the Notary Public submits his or her notarial reports.

The Spouses Aboitiz failed to present clear and convincing evidence to overturn the presumption.
The notarized Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses Po is, thus, presumed
regular and authentic.

Consequently, this Court can affirm the finding that the property was sold to Ciriaco in 1973, and that
Ciriaco, as the owner of the property, had the right to sell it to the Spouses Po. Hence, the lot did not
form part of the estate of Mariano, and the Mariano Heirs did not have the capacity to sell the
property to the Spouses Aboitiz later on.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals' October 31, 2012 Decision and its June 17, 2013 Resolution in CA-
G.R. CV No. 03803 is AFFIRMED.
 JOY A. GIMENO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS ZAIDE, Respondent.

A.C. No. 10303, SECOND DIVISION, April 22, 2015, BRION, J.

FACTS: Complainant Joy A. Gimeno (Gimeno) filed a complaint3 with the IBP's Commission on Bar
Discipline, charging Atty. Zaide with:(1) usurpation of a notary public's office; (2) falsification; (3)use of
intemperate, offensive and abusive language; and (4) violation of lawyer client trust.

In her complaint, Gimeno alleged that even before Atty. Zaide's admission to the Bar and receipt of his
notarial commission, he had notarized a partial extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale on
March 29, 2002. She also accused Atty. Zaide of making false and irregular entries in his notarial registers.

In his answer, Atty. Zaide argued that he did not notarize the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial
partition. As it appeared on the notarial page of this document, his notarial stamp and falsified signature
were superimposed over the typewritten name of Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, the lawyer who actually
notarized this document. Atty. Zaide claimed that Gimeno falsified his signature to make it appear that he
notarized it before his admission to the Bar.

On the alleged falsification of his notarial entries, Atty. Zaide contended that he needed to simultaneously
use several notarial registers in his separate satellite offices in order to better cater to the needs of his
clients and accommodate their growing number. This explains the irregular and non-sequential entries in
his notarial registers.

In his report and recommendation, Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner Magpayo) found
Atty. Zaide administratively liable for violating the Notarial Practice Rules, representing conflicting
interests, and using abusive and insulting language in his pleadings.

He noted that Atty. Zaide violated Section 1 (a) and 1 (b), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules when he
maintained several active notarial registers in different offices. These provisions respectively require a
notary public to "keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection, a chronological official
register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound book with numbered papers" and to "keep
only one active notarial register at any given time."19

However, Commissioner Magpayo opined that Atty. Zaide should not be held administratively liable for
usurping a notary public's office. The investigating commissioner noted that the evidence presented on
this issue is not enough to prove that Atty. Zaide signed and notarized the March 29, 2002 partial
extrajudicial partition even after his admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial commission

For violating the Notarial Practice Rules, Commissioner Magpayo recommended that Atty. Zaide be
suspended for three months, and for another six months for employing abusive and insulting language.

The IBP Board of Governors (Board) opined that the evidence on record fully supports the findings of the
investigating commissioner. However, the Board modified the recommended penalty and imposed
instead the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial
commission, if existing, and two years suspension from being commissioned as a notary public .24

Atty. Zaide sought for the reconsideration2 of the Board's resolution but this was also denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Zaide violated the Notarial Practice Rules. (YES)

RULING:

The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors' findings and recommended penalty, and accordingly
confirms them.

a. Usurpation of a notarial office

This Court notes that at the time the document was purportedly notarized, Atty. Zaide's details as a
lawyer and as a notary public had not yet existed. He was admitted to the Bar only on May 2, 2002;
thus, he could not have obtained and used the exact figures pertaining to his roll number, PTR
number, IBP number and the expiration date of his notarial commission, prior to this date,
particularly on March 29, 2002.

This circumstance, coupled with the absence of any evidence supporting Gimeno's claim such as a witness
to the alleged fictitious notarization, leads us to the conclusion that Atty. Zaide could not have notarized
the document before his Bar admission and receipt of his notarial commission.

We can only conclude that his professional details, which were only generated after his Bar admission,
were stamped on the March 29, 2002 document. How this happened is not clear from the evidence before
us.

b. Maintaining different notarial registers in separate notarial offices

We find that Atty. Zaide violated the Notarial Practice Rules by maintaining different notarial registers in
several offices. Because of this practice, the following notarized documents had been irregularly
numbered and entered:

Section 1(a), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules provides that "a notary public shall keep, maintain,
protect and provide for lawful inspection as provided in these Rules, a chronological official notarial
register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound book with numbered pages." The same
section further provides that "a notary public shall keep only one active notarial register at any
given time." On this basis, Atty. Zaide's act of simultaneously keeping several active notarial registers is a
blatant violation of Section 1, Rule VI.

The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires a notary public to maintain only one active notarial register
and ensure that the entries in it are chronologically arranged. The "one active notarial register" rule is in
place to deter a notary public from assigning several notarial registers to different offices manned by
assistants who perform notarial services on his behalf.

Since a notarial commission is personal to each lawyer, the notary public must also personally administer
the notarial acts that the law authorizes him to execute. This important duty is vested with public interest.
Thus, no other person, other than the notary public, should perform it.

On the other hand, entries in a notarial register need to be in chronological sequence in order to address
and prevent the rampant practice of leaving blank spaces in the notarial register to allow the antedating
of notarizations.

In these lights, we cannot accept Atty. Zaide's explanation that he needed to maintain several active
notarial registers in separate offices so he could accommodate the increasing number of his clients
requiring his notarial services.

This Court stresses that a notary public should not trivialize his functions as his powers and duties are
impressed with public interest. A notary public's office is not merely an income-generating venture.
It is a public duty that each lawyer who has been privileged to receive a notarial commission must
faithfully and conscientiously perform.

Atty. Zaide should have been acutely aware of the requirements of his notarial commission. His flagrant
violation of Section 1, Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules is not merely a simple and excusable
negligence. It amounts to a clear violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides that "a lawyer [should] uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes."

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the recommended penalty of the Board
of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide is found GUILTY of
violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and for using intemperate, offensive and, abusive language
in violation of Rule 8.01, Canon 8 and Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His
notarial commission, if existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is declared DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is also SUSPENDED for one (1) year
from the practice of law.
 FE A. YLAYA, Complainant,  vs. ATTY. GLENN CARLOS GACOTT, Respondent.

Adm. Case No. 6475, January 30, 2013, BRION, J

Facts:

The subject of the case is a disbarment complaint filed by Fe A. Ylaya (complainant) against Atty. Glenn
Carlos Gacott (respondent) who allegedly deceived the complainant and her late husband, Laurentino L.
Ylaya, into signing a "preparatory" Deed of Sale that the respondent converted into a Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of his relative.

The complainant alleged that she and her late husband are the registered owners of two (2) parcels of
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title ( TCT) Nos. 162632 and 162633 located Puerto Princesa City.
Prior to the acquisition of these properties, TCT No. 162632 (property) was already the subject of
expropriation proceedings filed by the City Government of Puerto Princesa (City Government). The
expropriation case was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan and Puerto Princesa. The RTC
already fixed the price and issued an order for the City Government to deposit ₱6,000,000.00 as just
compensation for the property.2

The respondent briefly represented the complainant and her late husband in the expropriation case as
intervenors for being the new registered owners of the property. The complainant alleged that the
respondent convinced them to sign a "preparatory deed of sale" for the sale of the property, but he left
blank the space for the name of the buyer and for the amount of consideration.

The complainant denied that she and Laurentino were paid the ₱200,000.00 purchase price or that they
would sell the property "for such a measly sum" when they stood to get at least ₱6,000,000.00 as just
compensation.6

The complainant also claimed that the respondent notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001
even though Reynold and Sylvia (his mother’s sister) are his uncle and his aunt, respectively.7

The respondent denied all the allegations in the complaint.

On December 5, 2006, the complainant filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint
and To Dismiss the Case. The complainant executed an Affidavit affirming and confirming the existence,
genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized on March 6, 2000.

IBP Commissioner Anna Caridad Sazon-Dupaya found the respondent administratively liable for violating
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 (A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct) and
Canon 16 ("A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession) of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC
(2004 Rules on Notarial Practice). She recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a period
of six (6) months.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted the IBP Commissioner’s finding, but increased the penalty imposed
to two (2) years suspension and a warning.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Gacott can be held liable under AM No 02-8-13-SC

Ruling: NO. Rule IV, Section 3 (c) of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC provides as follows:

"Sec. 3. Disqualifications – a notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:
 (a) x x x.

(b) x x x.

(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or

consanguinity of the principal within the fourth civil degree."

The defense therefore of the respondent that he did not violate the aforementioned Rule because his
uncle Reynold So, the buyer is not the principal in the Subject Deed of Sale but the seller Laurentino Ylaya
(please see page 3 of the respondent’s Supplemental Position Paper) is misplaced. Clearly, both the buyer
and the seller in the instant case are considered principals in the contract entered into.

Furthermore, if we are to consider the argument of the respondent that his uncle was not a principal so as
to apply the afore-quoted provision of the Rules, the respondent still violated the Rules when he
notarized the subject Memorandum of Agreement between Laurentino Ylaya and his uncle Reynold So.
Clearly, both complainant and Reynold So were principal parties in the said Memorandum of Agreement.

In all, the respondent claims that these cited pieces of evidence prove that this administrative complaint
against him is fabricated, false and untrue. He also points to Atty. Robert Peneyra, the complainant’s
counsel in this administrative case, as the hand behind the complaint.58 According to the respondent, Atty.
Peneyra harbors ill-will against him and his family after his father filed several administrative cases
against Atty. Peneyra, one of which resulted in the imposition of a warning and a reprimand on Atty.
Peneyra.

Reynold, in his Affidavit dated October 11, 2004, confirms that there was a co-ownership between him
and Laurentino; that Laurentino decided to sell his half of the property to Reynold because he
(Laurentino) had been sickly and in dire need of money to pay for his medical bills; that Laurentino
agreed to the price of ₱200,000.00 as this was almost the same value of his investment when he and
Reynold jointly acquired the property; and that the sale to Reynold was with the agreement and consent
of the complainant who voluntarily signed the Deed of Sale.60

After examining the whole record of the case, we agree with the respondent and find the evidence
insufficient to prove the charge that he violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC. Specifically, (1) the evidence against
the respondent fails to show the alleged fraudulent and deceitful acts he has taken to mislead the
complainant and her husband into signing a "preparatory deed of sale" and the conversion into a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001 in favor of Reynold; and (2) no prohibition exists against
the notarization of a document in which any of the parties interested is the notary’s relative
within the 4th civil degree, by affinity or consanguinity, at that time the respondent notarized the
documents.

We reiterate that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is on the complainant; the Court
exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes her case by clear, convincing, and
satisfactory evidence.73Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a
whole, superior to or has a greater weight than that of the other party. When the pieces of evidence of the
parties are evenly balanced or when doubt exists on the preponderance of evidence, the equipoise rule
dictates that the decision be against the party carrying the burden of proof.74

In this case, we find that the complainant’s evidence and the records of the case do not show the
respondent’s deliberate fraudulent and deceitful acts. In the absence of such proof, the complaint for
fraud and deceit under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility must perforce be
dismissed.

We note that the respondent has not squarely addressed the issue of his relationship with Reynold, whom
the complainant alleges to be the respondent’s uncle because Reynold is married to the respondent’s
maternal aunt. However, this is of no moment as the respondent cannot be held liable for violating
Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC because the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001
and the MOA dated April 19, 2000 were notarized by the respondent prior to the effectivity of A.M.
No. 02-8-13-SC on July 6, 2004. The notarial law in force in the years 2000 - 2001 was Chapter 11
of Act No. 2711 (the Revised Administrative Code of 1917) which did not contain the present
prohibition against notarizing documents where the parties are related to the notary public
within the 4th civil degree, by affinity or consanguinity. Thus, we must likewise dismiss the charge
for violation of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.
 BERNARD N. JANDOQUILE, Complainant, vs. ATTY. QUIRINO P. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
A.C. No. 9514 April 10, 2013 VILLARAMA, JR., J.
FACTS:
Atty. Revilla, Jr. notarized a complaint-affidavit signed by Heneraline L. Brosas, Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa
and Elmer L. Alvarado. Heneraline Brosas is a sister of Heizel Wynda Brosas Revilla, Atty. Revilla, Jr.'s
wife. Jandoquile complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. is disqualified to perform the notarial act3 per Section
3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice to wit:
SEC. 3. Disqualifications. – A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of the
principal within the fourth civil degree.

Jandoquile also complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not require the three affiants in the complaint-affidavit
to show their valid identification cards.
Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not deny but admitted Jandoquile’s material allegations. The issue, according to
Atty. Revilla, Jr., is whether the single act of notarizing the complaint-affidavit of relatives within
the fourth civil degree of affinity and, at the same time, not requiring them to present valid
identification cards is a ground for disbarment. Atty. Revilla, Jr. submits that his act is not a ground for
disbarment. He also says that he acts as counsel of the three affiants; thus, he should be considered more
as counsel than as a notary public when he notarized their complaint-affidavit. He did not require the
affiants to present valid identification cards since he knows them personally. Heneraline Brosas and
Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa are sisters-in-law while Elmer Alvarado is the live-in houseboy of the Brosas
family.
Since the facts are not contested, the Court deems it more prudent to resolve the case instead of referring
it to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Revilla should be disbarred
RULING:
NO.
Indeed, Atty. Revilla, Jr. violated the disqualification rule under Section 3(c), Rule IV of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. We agree with him, however, that his violation is not a sufficient
ground for disbarment.
Atty. Revilla, Jr. readily admitted that he notarized the complaint-affidavit signed by his relatives
within the fourth civil degree of affinity. Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
clearly disqualifies him from notarizing the complaint-affidavit, from performing the notarial act, since
two of the affiants or principals are his relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity. Given the clear
provision of the disqualification rule, it behooved upon Atty. Revilla, Jr. to act with prudence and refuse
notarizing the document. We cannot agree with his proposition that we consider him to have acted more
as counsel of the affiants, not as notary public, when he notarized the complaint-affidavit. The notarial
certificate at the bottom of the complaint-affidavit shows his signature as a notary public, with a
notarial commission valid until December 31, 2012.
On the second charge, we agree with Atty. Revilla, Jr. that he cannot be held liable. If the notary
public knows the affiants personally, he need not require them to show their valid identification cards.
This rule is supported by the definition of a "jurat" under Section 6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. A "jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity;
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and
(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document.
In this case, Heneraline Brosas is a sister of Atty. Revilla, Jr.’s wife; Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa is his wife’s
sister-in-law; and Elmer Alvarado is the live-in houseboy of the Brosas family. Atty. Revilla, Jr. knows the
three affiants personally. Thus, he was justified in no longer requiring them to show valid identification
cards. But Atty. Revilla, Jr. is not without fault for failing to indicate such fact in the "jurat" of the
complaint-affidavit. No statement was included therein that he knows the three affiants
personally. Let it be impressed that Atty. Revilla, Jr. was clearly disqualified to notarize the
complaint-affidavit of his relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity. While he has a valid
defense as to the second charge, it does not exempt him from liability for violating the
disqualification rule.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Quirino P. Revilla, Jr., is REPRIMANDED and DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as a notary public, or from performing any notarial act if he is presently commissioned as a
notary public, for a period of three (3) months. Atty. Revilla, Jr. is further DIRECTED to INFORM the Court,
through an affidavit, once the period of his disqualification has lapsed.
4. Refusal to Notarize False or Incomplete Certificates

MERCEDITA DE JESUS, complainant, vs. ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZMALIT, respondent.

A.C. No. 6470. July 8, 2014, SERENO, C.J.

FACTS:

Before the Court is a disbarment complaint filed by Mercedita De Jesus (De Jesus) against respondent
Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit (Sanchez-Malit) on the following grounds: grave misconduct, dishonesty,
malpractices, and unworthiness to become an officer of the Court. Complainant alleged that respondent
had drafted and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market stall that falsely named the former as
its absolute and registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee sued complainant for perjury and for
collection of sum of money. Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized two contracts that
caused complainant legal and financial problems. One contract was a lease agreement notarized by
respondent sometime in September 1999 without the signature of the lessees. The other contract was a
sale agreement over a property covered by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) which
complainant entered into with a certain Nicomedes Tala. Respondent drafted and notarized said
agreement, but did not advise the complainant that the property was still covered by the period
within which it could not be alienated.

In addition to the documents attached to her complaint, complainant subsequently submitted

three Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) notarized by respondent and an Affidavit of Irene
Tolentino (Tolentino), complainant’s secretary/treasurer. The SPAs were not signed by the
principals named therein and bore only the signature of the named attorney in fact, Florina B.
Limpioso.

Respondent explained that the mortgage contract was prepared in the presence of complainant and that
the latter had read it before affixing her signature. However, complainant urgently needed the loan
proceeds so the contract was hastily done. It was only copied from a similar file in respondent’s
computer, and the phrase “absolute and registered owner” was inadvertently left unedited. With
respect to the lease agreement, respondent countered that the document attached to the Affidavit
Complaint was actually new. She gave the court’s copy of the agreement to complainant to accommodate
the latter’s request for an extra copy. Thus, respondent prepared and notarized a new one, relying on
complainant’s assurance that the lessees would sign it. As regards the purchase agreement, respondent
claimed that complainant was an experienced realty broker and, therefore, needed no advice on the
repercussions of that transaction.

IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. recommended the immediate revocation of the
Notarial Commission of respondent and her disqualification as notary public for two years for her
violation of her oath as such by notarizing documents without the signatures of the parties who had
purportedly appeared before her.

Respondent filed her first Motion for Reconsideration and Second Motion for Reconsideration.The IBP
Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XX-2012-119, denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration
for lack of substantial reason to justify a reversal of the IBP’s findings.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent committed misconduct and grievously violated her oath as a notary
public.

RULING: YES.

Court finds that she committed misconduct and grievously violated her oath as a notary public.

The important role a notary public performs cannot be overemphasized. The Court has repeatedly
stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but one invested with substantive
public interest. Notarization converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in
evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a notarized document is, by law, entitled to full
faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the
basic requirements in the performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the
integrity of a notarized document would be undermined.20

Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false statement or information
contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the Court
must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case may
dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be undermined, and public
confidence in notarial documents diminished. 21 In this case, respondent fully knew that complainant was
not the owner of the mortgaged market stall. That complainant comprehended the provisions of the real
estate mortgage contract does not make respondent any less guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latter’s
liability for tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 1 and
Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juvy Mell SanchezMalit is found guilty of violating Canon 1 and Rules
1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as her oath as notary public.
Hence, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective immediately. Her notarial
commission, if still existing, is IMMEDIATELY
 EUPROCINA I. CRISOSTOMO, MARILYN L. SOLIS, EVELYN MARQUIZO, ROSEMARIE BALATUCAN,
MILDRED BATANG, MARILEN MINERALES, and MELINDA D. SIOTING, complainants, vs. ATTY. PHILIP Z.
A. NAZARENO, respondent.

A.C. No. 6677. June 10, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J

FACTS
Complainants individually purchased housing units (subject properties) from Rudex International
Development Corp. (Rudex). Due to several inadequacies and construction defects in the housing units
and the subdivision itself, complainants sought the rescission of their respective contracts to sell before
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). In all the rescission cases, Rudex was represented
by herein respondent Atty. Nazareno. Judgments of default were eventually rendered against Rudex
which then filed petitions for review assailing the same. In the certifications against forum shopping
attached to the said petitions, Rudex, through its stated that it has not commenced or has
knowledge of any similar action or proceeding involving the same issues pending before any
court, tribunal or agency — this, notwithstanding the fact that Rudex, under the representation of
Atty. Nazareno, previously filed an ejectment case on September 9, 2002 against Sioting and her
husband.

On January 29, 2004, Rudex, again represented by Atty. Nazareno, filed another complaint against Sps.
Sioting before the HLURB for the rescission of their contract to sell and the latter’s ejectment, similar to
its pending September 9, 2002 ejectment complaint. On April 1, 2004, six (6) similar complaints for
rescission of contracts to sell and ejectment, plus damages for nonpayment of amortizations due, were
filed by Atty. Nazareno, on behalf of Rudex, against the other complainants before the HLURB. The
certifications against forum shopping attached on all these complaints likewise stated that Rudex has not
commenced or has any knowledge of any similar pending action before any court, tribunal or agency. The
said certifications were notarized by Atty. Nazareno himself.

Complainants jointly filed the present administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Nazareno,
claiming that in the certifications against forum shopping attached to the complaints for rescission and
ejectment of Rudex filed while Atty. Nazareno was its counsel, the latter made false declarations therein
that no similar actions or proceedings have been commenced by Rudex or remained pending before any
other court, tribunal or agency when, in fact, similar actions or proceedings for rescission had been filed
by herein complainants before the HLURB against Rudex and Atty. Nazareno, and an ejectment complaint
was filed by Rudex, represented by Atty. Nazareno, against Sps. Sioting. They also asserted that Atty.
Nazareno committed malpractice as a notary public since he only assigned one document number in all
the certifications against forum shopping that were separately attached to the six April 1, 2004
complaints for rescission and ejectment.

In a Report and Recommendation Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner
Oliver A. Cachapero recommended the suspension of Atty. Nazareno for a period of six (6) months for his
administrative violations

The Investigating Commissioner found, among others, that there were unassailable proofs that the
certification against forum shopping attached to Rudex’s ejectment complaint against Sps. Sioting had
been erroneously declared, considering that at the time Rudex filed the said complaint in September
2002, Sps. Sioting’s rescission complaint against Rudex, filed on May 24, 2002, was already pending.
Hence, it was incumbent upon Rudex to have declared its existence, more so, since both complaints 
involve the same transaction and essential facts, and a decision on the rescission complaint would
amount to res judicata on the ejectment complaint.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation, but modified the recommended penalty from a suspension of six (6) months to only
one (1) month.

ISSUE

Whether or not Atty. Nazareno should be held administratively liable and accordingly suspended for a
period of one month.

RULING : YES.

Separate from the proscription against forum shopping is the violation of the certification requirement
against forum shopping. Compliance with the certification against forum shopping is separate from and
independent of the avoidance of the act of forum shopping itself. There is a difference in the treatment
between failure to comply with the certification requirement and violation of the prohibition against
forum shopping not only in terms of imposable sanctions but also in the manner of enforcing them. The
former constitutes sufficient cause for the dismissal without prejudice to the filing of the complaint or
initiatory pleading upon motion and after hearing, while the latter is a ground for summary dismissal
thereof and for direct contempt.

Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the submission of false entries in a certification against
forum shopping constitutes indirect or direct contempt of court, and subjects the erring counsel to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions.

In the realm of legal ethics, said infraction may be considered as a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule
10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) which read as follows:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

In this case, it has been established that Atty. Nazareno made false declarations in the certifications
against forum shopping attached to Rudex’s pleadings, for which he should be held administratively
liable.

Separately, the Court further finds Atty. Nazareno guilty of malpractice as a notary public, considering
that he assigned only one document number to the certifications against forum shopping attached
to the six April 1, 2004 complaints for rescission and ejectment despite the fact that each of them
should have been treated as a separate notarial act. It is a standing rule that for every notarial act, the
notary shall record in the notarial register at the time of the notarization, among others, the entry
and page number of the document notarized, and that he shall give to each instrument or
document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in
his register. Evidently, Atty. Nazareno did not comply with the foregoing rule.

Worse, Atty. Nazareno notarized the certifications against forum shopping attached to all the
aforementioned complaints, fully aware that they identically asserted a material falsehood, i.e., that Rudex
had not commenced any actions or proceedings or was not aware of any pending actions or proceedings
involving the same issues in any other forum.

The administrative liability of an erring notary public in this respect was clearly delineated as a violation
of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code in the case of Heirs of the Late Spouses Villanueva v. Atty. Beradio, 36 to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false statement or information
contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix his or her notarial seal on it, the Court
must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case may dictate.
Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be undermined and public
confidence on notarial documents diminished. In this case, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach
of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. Respondent also violated Rule 1.01
of the Code which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct

Indeed, respondent ought to be reminded that:38

Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest,
such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a
private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.

When a notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of the document under his hand and seal
he gives the document the force of evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring documents to be
acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the solemnity which should surround the execution
and delivery of documents, is to authorize such documents to be given without further proof of their
execution and delivery. Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon him by
reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Failing
in this, he must accept the consequences of his unwarranted actions.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Philip Z. A. Nazareno is found GUILTY of making false declarations in the
certifications against forum shopping subject of this case, as well as malpractice as a notary public.
Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. He is also
PERMANENTLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public and, his notarial
commission, if currently existing, is hereby REVOKED.
 JOY T. SAMONTE, Complainant, v. ATTY. VIVENCIO V. JUMAMIL, Respondent.
A.C. No. 11668, July 17, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS

Complainant alleged that sometime in October 2012, she received summons from the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch XI, Davao City, relative to an illegal dismissal
case filed by four (4) persons claiming to be workers in her small banana plantation. Consequently,
complainant engaged the services of respondent to prepare her position paper, and paid him the
amount of P8,000.00 as attorney's fees. Despite constantly reminding respondent of the deadline
for the submission of her position paper, complainant discovered that he still failed to file the
same. As such, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision based on the evidence on record, whereby
complainant was held liable to the workers in the total amount of P633,143.68. When complainant
confronted respondent about the said ruling, the latter casually told her to just sell her farm to pay the
farm workers. Because of respondent's neglect, complainant claimed that she was left defenseless and
without any remedy to protect her interests against the execution of the foregoing judgment;9 hence, she
filed the instant complaint.

Respondent admitted that he indeed failed to file a position paper on behalf of complainant. However, he
maintained that said omission was due to complainant's failure to adduce credible witnesses to testify in
her favor. In this relation, respondent averred that complainant instructed her to prepare an Affidavit for
one Romeo P. Baol (Romeo), who was intended to be her witness; nevertheless, respondent was
instructed that the contents of Romeo's affidavit were not to be interpreted in the Visayan dialect so that
the latter would not know what he would be testifying on. Respondent added that complainant's uncle,
Nicasio Ticong, who was also an intended witness, refused to execute an affidavit and testify to her lies.
Thus, it was complainant who was deceitful in her conduct and that the complaint against him should be
dismissed for lack of merit.

In its Report and Recommendation, the IBP-CBD found respondent administratively liable and,
accordingly, recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. The
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforesaid Report and Recommendation, finding the
same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.

RULING: YES.

The Court concurs with and affirms the findings of the IBP, with modification, however, as to the penalty
in order to account for his breach of the rules on notarial practice.

The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this
regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause, and accordingly,
exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Accordingly, lawyers are required to
maintain, at all times, a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote their full attention, skill, and
competence to their cases, regardless of their importance, and whether they accept them for a fee or for
free.17 To this end, lawyers are enjoined to employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives.
In this case, it is undisputed that a lawyer-client relationship was forged between complainant and
respondent when the latter agreed to file a position paper on her behalf before the NLRC and, in
connection therewith, received the amount of P8,000.00 from complainant as payment for his services.
Case law instructs that a lawyer-client relationship commences when a lawyer signifies his agreement to
handle a client's case and accepts money representing legal fees from the latter, 19 as in this case. From
then on, as the CPR provides, a lawyer is duty-bound to "serve his client with competence and diligence,"
and in such regard, "not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
In light of the foregoing, the Court therefore agrees with the IBP that respondent should be held
administratively liable for violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR.

Likewise, the IBP correctly found that respondent violated Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the CPR. Records show
that he indeed indulged in deliberate falsehood when he admittedly prepared and notarized the affidavit
of complainant's intended witness, Romeo, despite his belief that Romeo was a perjured witness. In
Spouses Umaguing v. De Vera, the Court highlighted the oath undertaken by every lawyer to not only obey
the laws of the land, but also to refrain from doing any falsehood, viz.:

The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from
doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to
conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the
courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the
rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a coincidence,
therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by
the Code of Professional Responsibility. In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice."

Notably, the notarization of a perjured affidavit also constituted a violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. Section 4 (a), Rule IV thereof pertinently provides:

SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. – A notary public shall not perform any notarial act described in these Rules
for any person requesting such an act even if he tenders the appropriate fee specified by these Rules if:

(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or transaction is
unlawful or immoral.

On this score, it is well to stress that "notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act. It is
invested with substantive public interest. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public
converts a private document into a public document, making that document admissible in evidence
without further proof of authenticity thereof. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face. For this reason, a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties; otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of
this form of conveyance would be undermined."

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vivencio V. Jumamil is found GUlLTY of violating Rule 10.01, Canon 10
and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby
SUSPENDED for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution. Moreover, in view
of his violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, his notarial commission, if still existing, is hereby
REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2)
years. Finally, he is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with
more severely.
5. Commission Period and Expiration

EFIGENIA M. TENOSO Complainant, vs. ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ, Respondent.

A.C. No. 8384, April 11, 2013, EN BANC, LEONEN, J.

FACTS:

Etigenia M. Tenoso (complainant) filed a complaint against Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez (respondent)
alleging that respondent was engaged in practice as a notary public in Cordon, lsabela, without having
been properly commissioned by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City, Isabela. This is the RTC
exercising jurisdiction over the Municipality of Cordon.

This alleged act violates Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC).

In his two-page Answer, respondent denied the allegations saying, "I have never been notarizing any
document or pleadings" and added that he has "never committed any malpractice, nor deceit nor have
violated thelawyers (sic) oath".He dismissed such allegations as being "preposterous, full of lies,
politically motivated and x x x meant to harass or intimidate him".

Also, he surmised that the documents annexed to the Affidavit-Complaint were "tampered and
adulterated," or that "somebody might have forged his signature."

In his Report and Recommendation, Investigating Commissioner Atty. Salvador B. Hababag recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and disqualified from being
commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years for violating Rules 1.01 and 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

In a Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors affirmed the findings of the Investigating Commissioner but
increased the penalty of suspension from six (6) months to one (1) year. Respondent did not file a Motion
for Reconsideration or any other subsequent pleading.

On 12 August 2009, the IBP Board of Governors transmitted its Resolution to the Supreme Court for its
action following Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Echanez should be suspended from the practice of law on the basis of repeatedly
notarizing documents without the requisite notarial commission.

RULING: YES.

The Court modifies the IBP Board of Governors' Resolution.

Complainant presented evidence supporting her allegation that respondent had notarized various
documents in Cordon, Isabela from 2006 to 2008 and that respondent's name does not appear on the list
of notaries public commissioned by the RTC of Santiago City, Isabela for the years 2006 to 2007 and 2007
to 2008.

Respondent failed to present evidence to rebut complainant's allegations. Per Section 1, Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, the burden of proof is vested upon the party who alleges the truth of his claim or defense
or any fact in issue. Thus, in Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court
Administrator v. Gutierrez, where a party resorts to bare denials and allegations and fails to submit
evidence in support of his defense, the determination that he committed the violation is sustained.
Respondent merely posited that the notarized documents presented by complainant were "tampered and
adulterated" or were results of forgery, but he failed to present any proof. Respondent also resorted to
a sweeping and unsupported statement that he never notarized any document. Accordingly, the
reasonable conclusion is that respondent repeatedly notarized documents without the requisite
notarial commission.
The duties of notaries public are dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.
"Notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for notarization converts a private document to a public
instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity
and due execution."

In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent exposed party-litigants, courts, other lawyers
and the general public to the perils of ordinary documents posing as public instruments. As noted by the
Investigating Commissioner, respondent committed acts of deceit and falsehood in open violation of the
explicit pronouncements of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Evidently, respondent's conduct falls
miserably short of the high standards of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing required from
lawyers. It is proper that he be sanctioned.

WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez guilty of engaging in notarial practice without a
notarial commission, and accordingly, We SUSPEND him from the practice of law for two (2) years and
DISQUALIFY him from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall merit a more severe sanction.
 ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH SCHOOL (SLU-LHS) FACULTY AND STAFF,
COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ROLANDO C. DELA CRUZ, RESPONDENT.

A.C. NO. 6010, August 28, 2006, En Banc, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

FACTS: This is a disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the Saint Louis University-
Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) against Atty. Rolando C. Dela Cruz, principal of SLU-LHS, on the
ground of malpractice (notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.

Complainant alleged that respondent deliberately subscribed and notarized certain legal
documents on different dates from 1988 to 1997, despite expiration of respondent's notarial
commission on 31 December 1987. A Certification dated 25 May 1999 was issued by the Clerk of Court
of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Baguio City, to the effect that respondent had not applied for commission as
Notary Public for and in the City of Baguio for the period 1988 to 1997.

Respondent, on his part, admitted having notarized certain documents during the period when his
notarial commission had already expired. However, he offered some extenuating defenses such as good
faith, lack of malice and noble intentions in doing the complained acts.

The IBP found Atty. Cruz guilty of malpractice and recommended his suspension.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty Cruz violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
for notarizing documents despite the expiration of his notarial commission.

RULING: YES. It has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary
act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified
or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization of a private document converts the document into a
public one making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is
by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and, for this reason, notaries public must observe with
the utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of
the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.

The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere casual
formality. The Court has characterized a lawyer's act of notarizing documents without the requisite
commission to do so as "reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice but also x x x the
crime of falsification of public documents."

The Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is done by a member of
the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender
may be subjected to disciplinary action or one, performing a notarial act without such commission
is a violation of the lawyer's oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by
making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes,
indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer's oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall
squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
By acting as a notary public without the proper commission to do so, the lawyer likewise violates
Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Rolando Dela Cruz guilty of immoral conduct, in disregard of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two
(2) years, and another two (2) years for notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission or
a total of four (4) years of suspension.
HEINZ R. HECK, complainant, vs.JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 19,
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY,1respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, February 23, 2004, CALLEJO SR., J.:

FACTS:

In a verified Letter-Complaint Heinz R. Heck prayed for the disbarment of Judge Anthony E. Santos, RTC,
Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City. The complainant alleged that prior to the respondent’s appointment as
RTC judge on April 11, 1989, he violated the notarial law since Judge Santos was not duly commissioned
as notary public until January 9, 1984 but still subscribed and forwarded (on a non-regular basis)
notarized documents to the Clerk of Court VI starting January 1980 uncommissioned until the 9th of
January 1984.

The complainant submitted a certification from Clerk of Court, Atty. Beverly Sabio-Beja, containing the
records of the respondent judge being listed as a duly commissioned notary public, his failure to show
any entry of transmittal of notarial documents after December 1985, and that the last notarial
commission issued to him was on January 6, 1988 until December 31, 1989.

In his Answer, the respondent judge categorically denied the charges against him. He also submitted a
certification from Clerk of Court, Atty. Sabio-Beja, to prove that there was no proper recording of the
commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro as well as the submitted notarized
documents/notarial register.

Pursuant to the report of the Office of the Court Administrator recommending the need to resort to a full-
blown investigation to determine the veracity of the parties’ assertions, the Court, in a Resolution
resolved to: (a) treat the matter as a regular administrative complaint; and (b) refer the case to Associate
Justice Edgardo P. Cruz of the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and recommendation.

In a Sealed Report, Investigating Justice Edgardo P. Cruz recommended that [i] respondent (who retired
on May 22, 2002) be found guilty of violation of the Notarial Law by (a) notarizing documents without
commission; (b) tardiness in submission of notarial reports; and (c) non-forwarding of his notarial
register to the Clerk of Court upon expiration of his commission; and [ii] that for these infractions, he be
suspended from the practice of law and barred from being commissioned as notary public, both for one
year, and his present commission, if any, be revoked.

ISSUE:

Whether or not notarizing documents without the requisite commission constitutes malpractice,
if not the crime of falsification of public documents.

RULING:

1. YES. Notarizing Documents Without The Requisite Commission Therefore Constitutes

Malpractice, If Not The Crime Of Falsification Of Public Documents

It must be remembered that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the
contrary, it is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public one, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary
proof of its authenticity and due execution.

The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a
mere casual formality. The Court has characterized a lawyer’s act of notarizing documents
without the requisite commission therefore as "reprehensible, constituting as it does not only
malpractice, but also the crime of falsification of public documents." 34 For such reprehensible
conduct, the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the practice of law,
revocation of the notarial commission and disqualification from acting as such, and even
disbarment.

In the case of Nunga v. Viray,the Court had the occasion to state -

Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when
he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary
action. For one, performing a notarial [act] without such commission is a violation of the lawyer’s
oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he
is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in
deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely
within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

The importance of the function of a notary public cannot, therefore, be over-emphasized. No less
than the public faith in the integrity of public documents is at stake in every aspect of that
function.

The respondent did not object to the complainant’s formal offer of evidence, prompting the
Investigating Justice to decide the case on the basis of the pleadings filed. Neither did he claim
that he was commissioned as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983, nor deny the accuracy of
the first certification. The respondent merely alleged in his answer that "there was no proper
recording of the commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted
Notarized Documents/Notarial Register." Furthermore, as found by the Investigating Justice, the
respondent presented no evidence of his commission as notary public for the years 1980 to
1983, as well as proof of submission of notarial reports and the notarial register. 40

The respondent in this case was given an opportunity to answer the charges and to controvert
the evidence against him in a formal investigation. When the integrity of a member of the bar is
challenged, it is not enough that he deny the charges; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him.

The respondent’s allegation that the complainant was not a party in any of the documents so
notarized, and as such was not prejudiced thereby, is unavailing. An attorney may be disbarred
or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor which
include the statutory grounds under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Any
interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings. There can be
no doubt as to the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and
doings of public officers which citizens feel are incompatible with the duties of the office and from
which conduct the citizen or the public might or does suffer undesirable consequences. 43

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anthony E. Santos is found GUILTY of notarizing documents without the
requisite notarial commission therefor. He is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine in the amount of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)
 MILA VIRTUSIO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. GRENALYN V. VIRTUSIO, Respondent.

A.C. No. 6753, THIRD DIVISION, September 5, 2012, ABAD, J.:

FACTS:

Mila alleged that sometime in 1999 Atty. Virtusio convinced her to buy a house and lot at North Olympus
Subdivision in Novaliches, Quezon City, from its developer, Stateland Investment Corporation (Stateland).
Mila agreed for Atty. Virtusio to use her personal checks in paying the seller with Mila reimbursing her.
Mila gave Atty. Virtusio the following amounts: ₱ 95,000.00, ₱ 25,000.00, ₱ 65,000.00, ₱ 64,000.00 and ₱
64,000.00.

Mila began receiving letters from Stateland, demanding that she make good the dishonored checks that it
got. When she confronted Atty. Virtusio regarding this, the latter assured her that she would take care of
the problem. But the demand letters persisted. For fear of losing the property, Mila directly dealt with
Stateland in January 2000. She then found out that her arrearages had come close to ₱ 200,000.00,
inclusive of penalty and interest. In order not to lose the property, Mila and her husband decided to settle
their overdue obligation with money they borrowed at high interest.

Mila further alleged that Atty. Virtusio declined to return to her the money the latter misappropriated
despite demand. Only when Mila threatened to file a case against her did Atty. Virtusio agree to pay her
on February 20, 2001 by executing a deed of sale in her favor covering her Mazda car. Despite the sale,
however, Atty. Virtusio pleaded with Mila and her husband to let her keep the car meanwhile since she
needed it in her work. But, as it turned out, Atty. Virtusio had managed to register the car in her children’s
name and sold it to a third person. Mila filed a case of estafa against Atty. Virtusio apart from the present
disbarment case.

In her version of the facts, Atty. Virtusio wants to convince the Court that she committed no intentional
wrongs and that she was but a victim of circumstances. Although she admitted using Mila’s money rather
than pay Stateland with it, she explained that, having been busy attending to her sick son in Manila, she
failed to monitor her check disbursements, entrusting it to an office staff. Further, Atty. Virtusio claimed
that she should not be penalized for violation of the notarial law since this offense did not form part of the
original complaint to which she was required to respond. At any rate, she merely committed an oversight.
She had religiously renewed her notarial commission yearly since May 1995. When she notarized the
questioned documents, she believed in good faith that she had renewed her notarial commission for 2006
and 2007 just as before. She asked not to be punished for her mistake since it was brought about by her
sincere commitment to extend free legal service to the disadvantaged.

IBP Investigating Commissioner reported having found that Atty. Virtusio appropriated portions of the
money that Mila gave her for payment to Stateland, thus evidencing her moral unfitness to practice the
profession. The Commissioner recommended the imposition of the penalty of one year suspension from
the practice of law with a two-year disqualification from reappointment as Notary Public, given that she
had notarized documents despite the expiration of her notarial commission. The IBP Board of Governors
approved the report and recommendation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the IBP erred in finding Atty. Virtusio guilty of grave misconduct in her dealings with Mila
and in notarizing documents without a renewed commission.

RULING: NO.

By her own account, Atty. Virtusio admitted misusing the money that Mila entrusted to her for payment to
Stateland. Her excuse is that she lost track of her finances and mixed up her office funds with her personal
funds. Atty. Virtusio’s use for personal purpose of money entrusted to her constitutes dishonest
and deceitful conduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility. What is more, supposedly to
cover up for her fault, Atty. Virtusio executed a deed of sale covering her car in Mila’s favor rather
than return the money she defalcated. But, again acting with guile, she withheld possession of the
car and transferred its registration in the name of her children. Atty. Virtusio is guilty by her
above acts of gross misconduct that warrants her suspension for one year from the practice of law
following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

The Court cannot also countenance Atty. Virtusio’s notarization of documents after her notarial
commission had expired. Although the IBP discovered this violation of the notarial law only in the course
of the proceedings and was not a subject matter of Mila’s complaint, it cannot close its eyes to the same.
Besides, Atty. Virtusio had an opportunity to defend herself against this additional charge. Her defense is
that she thought that she had renewed her commission. Again, Atty. Virtusio’s defense is unsubstantial.
She did not renew her notarial commission for two years, 2006 and 2007, not just one. She could not have
missed that fact considering that, as she said, she had been renewing her commission yearly from 1995 to
2005.

A lawyer who notarizes a document without a proper commission violates his lawyer’s oath to obey the
law. He makes it appear that he is commissioned when he is not. He thus indulges in deliberate falsehood
that the lawyer’s oath forbids. This violation falls squarely under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Canon 7 as well. A proper sanction is authorized.

Considering, however, that based on the evidence Atty. Virtusio had notarized only two documents
without a proper notarial commission, the Court finds her suspension from notarial practice for
one year adequate.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS Atty. Grenalyn V. Virtusio GUILTY of gross misconduct and violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and IMPOSES on her the penalty of SUSPENSION from the
practice of law for one year, effective immediately. In addition, the Court REVOKES any Notarial
Commission she may presently have and DISQUALIFIES her from applying for it for one year also
effective immediately. Further, she is WARNED of a more severe penalty should she commit a similar
infraction in the future.
 VICTORINA BAUTISTA, Complainant,  vs. ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE, Respondent.

A.C. No. 6963, February 9, 2006, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts: Complainant Victorina Bautista prays for the suspension or disbarment of respondent
Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe for malpractice and unethical conduct in the performance of his duties as
a notary public and a lawyer. Complainant alleged that respondent prepared and notarized
a Magkasanib na Salaysay purportedly executed by Donato Salonga and complainant’s
mother, Basilia de la Cruz. Both affiants declared that a certain parcel of land in Bigte,
Norzagaray, Bulacan, was being occupied by Rodolfo Lucas and his family for more than 30
years. Complainant claimed that her mother could not have executed the joint affidavit on
January 3, 1998 because she has been dead since January 28, 1961.

In his Answer, respondent denied that he falsified the Magkasanib na Salaysay. He disclaimed

any knowledge about Basilia’s death. He alleged that before he notarized the document, he
requested for Basilia’s presence and in her absence, he allowed a certain Pronebo, allegedly a
son-in-law of Basilia, to sign above the name of the latter as shown by the word "by" on top of
the name of Basilia. Respondent maintained that there was no forgery since the signature
appearing on top of Basilia’s name was the signature of Pronebo.

Respondent filed a manifestation7 attaching thereto the affidavit of desistance

The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe

be suspended from the practice of the legal profession for one (1) month and any existing
commission of Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe as notary public, be revoked and Atty. Sergio
Esquibel Bernabe be barred from being granted a notarial commission for a period of one (1)
year.

The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner with modification that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for one year and his notarial commission be revoked and that he be disqualified for
reappointment as notary public for two years.

Issue: Whether or not

Ruling: The records sufficiently established that Basilia was already dead when the joint affidavit
was prepared on January 3, 1998. Respondent’s alleged lack of knowledge of Basilia’s death
does not excuse him. It was his duty to require the personal appearance of the affiant before
affixing his notarial seal and signature on the instrument.

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the
very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents
and truth of what are stated therein. The presence of the parties to the deed will enable the
notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant.

Respondent’s act of notarizing the Magkasanib na Salaysay in the absence of one of the

affiants is in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Notarial Law. By affixing his signature and notarial seal on the instrument, he led
us to believe that Basilia personally appeared before him and attested to the truth and
veracity of the contents of the affidavit when in fact it was a certain Pronebo who signed
the document. Respondent’s conduct is fraught with dangerous possibilities considering the
conclusiveness on the due execution of a document that our courts and the public accord on
notarized documents. Respondent has clearly failed to exercise utmost diligence in the
performance of his function as a notary public and to comply with the mandates of the law.
Complainant’s desistance or withdrawal of the complaint does not exonerate respondent or put
an end to the administrative proceedings. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis
of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been
proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for
suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford
no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for
his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of
the court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice.

We find the penalty recommended by the IBP to be in full accord with recent jurisprudence.
In Gonzales v. Ramos, respondent lawyer was found guilty of notarizing the document despite
the non-appearance of one of the signatories. As a result, his notarial commission was revoked
and he was disqualified from reappointment for a period of two years. In addition, he was
suspended from the practice of law for one year.
G.R. No. 157434             September 19, 2006
SPOUSES CLARO and NIDA BAUTISTA, petitioners, 
vs.
BERLINDA F. SILVA, Represented by HERMES J. DORADO, in his capacity as Attorney-In-Fact,
respondent.
Doctrine (1 PAR of the case) :.
ST

Facts: Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-37189 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila was registered in
the names of Spouses Berlina F. Silva and Pedro M. Silva. Pedro M. Silva, for himself and as
attorney-in-fact of his wife Berlina F. Silva, thru a Special Power of Attorney purportedly executed by
Berlina F. Silva in his favor, signed and executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the said parcel of land
in favor of defendants-spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista.

As a consequence, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 37189 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. V-2765 of the Registry of Deeds for the Valenzuela was issued in the names of
Spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista.

A Complaint for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT, Reconveyance and Damages was
filed with the RTC by Berlina, through Dorado as Attorney-in-Fact, against Spouses Bautista.

Spouses Bautista filed their Answer and a Third-Party Complaint against Berlina's husband, Pedro M.
Silva (Pedro).  The RTC declared third-party defendant Pedro in default for failure to file an answer to
the Third-Party Complaint.
Based on the evidence presented, the RTC found that the signature appearing on the Special Power
of Attorney (SPA) as that of Berlina Silva is a forgery, and that consequently the Deed of Absolute
Sale executed by Pedro in favor of Spouses Bautista is not authorized by Berlina.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Berlina and declared null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed in favor of the spouses Bautista. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.

Hence, the herein petition filed by Spouses Bautista.

Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioners are purchasers in good faith
2. To what extent, therefore, should an inquiry into a notarized special power of attorney go in order
for one to qualify as a buyer for value in good faith

Ruling: NO.  The SPA being a forgery, it did not vest in Pedro any authority to alienate the subject
property without the consent of respondent. Absent such marital consent, the deed of sale was a
nullity.
But then petitioners disclaim any participation in the forgery of the SPA or in the unauthorized sale of
the subject property. They invoke the status of buyers in good faith whose registered title in the
property is already indefeasible and against which the remedy of reconveyance is no longer available.
Whether or not petitioners are buyers for value in good faith is a question of fact not cognizable by this
court. However, the court does not fully subscribe to views of the lower court.

A holder of registered title may invoke the status of a buyer for value in good faith as a defense
against any action questioning his title. Such status, however, is never presumed but must be proven
by the person invoking it.

To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled land need only show that he relied on the face of
the title to the property. He need not prove that he made further inquiry for he is not obliged to explore
beyond the four corners of the title.  Such degree of proof of good faith, however, is sufficient only
when the following conditions concur:
1. the seller is the registered owner of the land; 
2. the latter is in possession thereof;
3. at the time of the sale, the buyer was not aware of any claim or interest of some other person in the
property, or of any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his capacity to convey title to the
property.

Absent one or two of the foregoing conditions, then the law itself puts the buyer on notice and obliges
the latter to exercise a higher degree of diligence by scrutinizing the certificate of title and examining
all factual circumstances in order to determine the seller's title and capacity to transfer any interest in
the property. Under such circumstance, it is no longer sufficient for said buyer to merely show that he
relied on the face of the title; he must now also show that he exercised reasonable precaution by
inquiring beyond the title. Failure to exercise such degree of precaution makes him a buyer in bad
faith.

To establish his status as a buyer for value in good faith, a person dealing with land registered in the
name of and occupied by the seller need only show that he relied on the face of the seller's certificate
of title. But for a person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller whose
capacity to sell is restricted, such as by Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code or Article 124 of the
Family Code, he must show that he inquired into the latter's capacity to sell in order to establish
himself as a buyer for value in good faith. The extent of his inquiry depends on the proof of capacity of
the seller. If the proof of capacity consists of a special power of attorney duly notarized, mere
inspection of the face of such public document already constitutes sufficient inquiry. If no such special
power of attorney is provided or there is one but there appear flaws in its notarial acknowledgment
mere inspection of the document will not do; the buyer must show that his investigation went beyond
the document and into the circumstances of its execution

In the present case, petitioners were dealing with a seller (Pedro) who had title to and possession of
the land but, as indicated on the face of his title, whose capacity to sell was restricted, in that the
marital consent of respondent is required before he could convey the property. To prove good faith
then, petitioners must show that they inquired not only into the title of Pedro but also into his
capacity to sell.

According to petitioners, to determine Pedro's capacity to sell, they conducted the following forms of
inquiry: first, they inspected the photocopy of the SPA presented to them by Pedro; second, they
brought said copy to Atty. Lorenzo Lucero (the notary public who prepared the deed of sale) and
asked whether it was genuine;  and third, they inspected the original copy of the SPA after they
advanced payment of Php55,000.00 to Pedro. Essentially, petitioners relied on the SPA,
specifically on its notarial acknowledgment which states that respondent appeared before the
notary public and acknowledged having executed the SPA in favor of Pedro.

The RTC and CA, however, found such inquiry superficial. They expected of petitioners an
investigation not only into the whereabouts of respondent at the time of the execution of the SPA but
also into the genuineness of the signature appearing on it.

We find such requirements of the RTC and CA too stringent that to adopt them would be to throw
commerce into madness where buyers run around to probe the circumstances surrounding each
piece of sales document while sellers scramble to produce evidence of its good order. An SPA under
scruitiny is not just any scrap of paper for the execution and attestation of which a notary public has
intervened.

2. When the document under scrutiny is a special power of attorney that is duly notarized, we
know it to be a public document where the notarial acknowledgment is prima facie evidence of
the fact of its due execution. A buyer presented with such a document would have no choice
between knowing and finding out whether a forger lurks beneath the signature on it. The notarial
acknowledgment has removed that choice from him and replaced it with a presumption
sanctioned by law that the affiant appeared before the notary public and acknowledged that he
executed the document, understood its import and signed it. In reality, he is deprived of such
choice not because he is incapable of knowing and finding out but because, under our notarial
system, he has been given the luxury of merely relying on the presumption of regularity of a duly
notarized SPA. And he cannot be faulted for that because it is precisely that fiction of regularity
which holds together commercial transactions across borders and time.

In sum, all things being equal, a person dealing with a seller who has possession and title to the
property but whose capacity to sell is restricted, qualifies as a buyer in good faith if he proves that
he inquired into the title of the seller as well as into the latter's capacity to sell; and that in his
inquiry, he relied on the notarial acknowledgment found in the seller's duly notarized special
power of attorney. He need not prove anything more for it is already the function of the notarial
acknowledgment to establish the appearance of the parties to the document, its due execution
and authenticity. Said rule should not apply when there is an apparent flaw afflicting the
notarial acknowledgment of the special power of attorney as would cast doubt on the due
execution and authenticity of the document; or when the buyer has actual notice of
circumstances outside the document that would render suspect its genuineness.

In the present case, petitioners knew that Berlina was in Germany at the time they were buying
the property and the SPA relied upon by petitioners has a defective notarial acknowledgment.
The SPA was a mere photocopy and we are not convinced that there ever was an original copy of
said SPA as it was only this photocopy that was testified to by petitioner Nida Bautista and offered into
evidence by her counsel. But then said photocopy of the SPA contains no notarial seal. A notarial
seal is a mark, image or impression on a document which would indicate that the notary public has
officially signed it. There being no notarial seal, the signature of the notary public on the
notarial certificate was therefore incomplete. The notarial certificate being deficient, it was as if
the notarial acknowledgment was unsigned. The photocopy of the SPA has no notarial
acknowledgment to speak of. It was a mere private document which petitioners cannot foist as
a banner of good faith.

All told, it was not sufficient evidence of good faith that petitioners merely relied on the
photocopy of the SPA as this turned out to be a mere private document. They should have
adduced more evidence that they looked beyond it. They did not. Instead, they took no
precautions at all. They verified with Atty. Lucero whether the SPA was authentic but then the latter
was not the notary public who prepared the document. Worse, they purposely failed to inquire who
was the notary public who prepared the SPA. Finally, petitioners conducted the transaction in haste. It
took them all but three days or from March 2 to 4, 1988 to enter into the deed of sale, notwithstanding
the restriction on the capacity to sell of Pedro. In no way then may petitioners qualify as buyers for
value in good faith.
6. Notarial Jurisdiction

BELLA A. GUERRERO, PETITIONER, VS. RESURRECCION A. BIHIS,

RESPONDENT.
G.R. NO. 174144, April 17, 2007 CORONA, J.

CORONA, J.:
Facts: Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella A.
Guerrero and respondent Resurreccion A. Bihis, died . Petitioner filed a
petition for the probate of the last will and testament of the decedent.
The petition alleged petitioner was named as executrix in the decedent's
will and she was legally qualified to act as such; the decedent was a
citizen of the Philippines at the time of her death; at the time of the
execution of the will, the testatrix was 79 years old, of sound and
disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence and
was capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.

Respondent opposed her elder sister's petition on the ground that the
will was not executed and attested as required by law; its attestation
clause and acknowledgment did not comply with the requirements of the
law; the signature of the testatrix was procured by fraud and petitioner
and her children procured the will through undue and improper pressure
and influence.

the trial court appointed petitioner as special administratrix of the

decedent's estate. Respondent opposed petitioner's appointment but
subsequently withdrew her opposition. Petitioner took her oath as
temporary special administratrix and letters of special administration
were issued to her.

The trial court denied the probate of the will ruling that Article 806 of
the Civil Code was not complied with because the will was
"acknowledged" by the testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrix's,
residence at Quezon City before Atty. Macario O. Directo who was a
commissioned notary public for and in Caloocan City.

Issue:

Whether or not the will "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the

instrumental witnesses before a notary public acting outside the place of
his commission satisfy the requirement under Article 806 of the Civil
Code

Ruling: NO

Article 806 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by

the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to
retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of
Court.

One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution

of a notarial will is that it must be acknowledged before a notary public
by the testator and the witnesses. This formal requirement is one of the
indispensable requisites for the validity of a will. In other words, a
notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the instrumental witnesses is void and cannot be accepted
for probate.

An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going

before some competent officer and declaring it to be his act or deed. In
the case of a notarial will, that competent officer is the notary public.

The acknowledgment of a notarial will coerces the testator and the

instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law, the notary
public, that they executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act
or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus
paving the way for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in
the execution of spurious wills, or those executed without the free
consent of the testator.It also provides a further degree of assurance that
the testator is of a certain mindset in making the testamentary
dispositions to the persons instituted as heirs or designated as devisees
or legatees in the will.

Acknowledgment can only be made before a competent officer,

that is, a lawyer duly commissioned as a notary public.

In this connection, the relevant provisions of the Notarial Law provide:

SECTION 237. Form of commission for notary public. -The appointment

of a notary public shall be in writing, signed by the judge, and
substantially in the following form:
GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
PROVINCE OF ___________

This is to certify that ____________, of the municipality of

________ in said province, was on the ___ day of __________, anno
Domini nineteen hundred and _______, appointed by me a notary
public, within and for the said province, for the term ending on the first
day of January, anno Domini nineteen hundred and _____.

_________________
Judge of the Court of
irst Instance[12] of said
Province

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 240. Territorial jurisdiction. - The jurisdiction of a notary

public in a province shall be co-extensive with the province. The
jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-extensive
with said city. No notary shall possess authority to do any notarial act
beyond the limits of his jurisdiction. (emphases supplied)
A notary public's commission is the grant of authority in his favor to
perform notarial acts.[13] It is issued "within and for" a particular
territorial jurisdiction and the notary public's authority is co-extensive
with it. In other words, a notary public is authorized to perform notarial
acts, including the taking of acknowledgments, within that territorial
jurisdiction only. Outside the place of his commission, he is bereft of
power to perform any notarial act; he is not a notary public. Any notarial
act outside the limits of his jurisdiction has no force and effect. As this
Court categorically pronounced in Tecson v. Tecson:[14]

An acknowledgment taken outside the territorial limits of the

officer's jurisdiction is void as if the person taking it ware
wholly without official character. (emphasis supplied)
Since Atty. Directo was not a commissioned notary public for and in
Quezon City, he lacked the authority to take the acknowledgment of the
testatrix and the instrumental witnesses. In the same vein, the testatrix
and her witnesses could not have validly acknowledged the will before
him. Thus, Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura's last will and testament was,
in effect, not acknowledged as required by law.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

JUDGE LILY LYDIA A. LAQUINDANUM, Complainant, vs. ATTY. NESTOR Q. QUINTANA, Respondent.
A.C. No. 7036, EN BANC, June 29, 2009, PUNO, CJ.

FACTS: This administrative case against Atty. Nestor Q. Quintana (Atty. Quintana) stemmed from a letter
addressed to the Court filed by Executive Judge Lily Lydia A. Laquindanum (Judge Laquindanum) of the
Regional Trial Court of Midsayap, Cotabato requesting that proper disciplinary action be imposed on him for
performing notarial functions in Midsayap, Cotabato, which is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the
commissioning court that issued his notarial commission, and for allowing his wife to do notarial acts in his
absence.

Judge Laquindanum alleged that pursuant to A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, executive judges are required to closely
monitor the activities of notaries public within the territorial bounds of their jurisdiction and to see to it that
notaries public shall not extend notarial functions beyond the limits of their authority. Hence, she wrote a letter
to Atty. Quintana directing him to stop notarizing documents within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court of Midsayap, Cotabato since certain documents notarized by him had been reaching
her office.

However, despite such directive, respondent continuously performed notarial functions in Midsayap, Cotabato as
evidenced by: (1) the Affidavit of Loss of ATM Card executed by Kristine C. Guro; and (2) the Affidavit of Loss of
Driver’s License executed by Elenita D. Ballentes.

In his Response, Atty. Quintana alleged that he filed a petition for notarial commission before the RTC of
Midsayap, Cotabato. However, the same was not acted upon by Judge Laquindanum for three weeks. He
alleged that the reason for Judge Laquindanum’s inaction was that she questioned his affiliation with the IBP
Cotabato City Chapter, and required him to be a member of IBP Kidapawan City Chapter and to obtain a
Certification of Payments from the latter chapter. Because of this, he opted to withdraw his petition. After he
withdrew his petition, he claimed that Judge Laquindanum sent a clerk from her office to ask him to return his
petition, but he did not oblige because at that time he already had a Commission for Notary Public issued by
Executive Judge Reno E. Concha of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City.

Atty. Quintana further argued that Judge Laquindanum had no authority to issue such directive, because
only Executive Judge Reno E. Concha, who issued his notarial commission, and the Supreme Court
could prohibit him from notarizing in the Province of Cotabato.

In the Hearing before the OBC, Judge Laquindanum presented a Deed of Donation, which was notarized by Atty.
Quintana in 2004. Honorata Rosil appears as one of the signatories of the document as the donor’s wife.
However, Honorata Rosil died on March 12, 2003, as shown by the Certificate of Death issued by the Civil
Registrar of Ibohon, Cotabato.

Judge Laquindanum testified that Atty. Quintana continued to notarize documents in the years 2006 to 2007
despite the fact that his commission as notary public for and in the Province of Maguindanao and Cotabato City
had already expired on December 31, 2005, and he had not renewed the same. 

In its Report and Recommendation, the OBC recommended that Atty. Quintana be disqualified from being
appointed as a notary public for two (2) years; and that if his notarial commission still exists, the same should be
revoked for two (2) years. The OBC found the defenses and arguments raised by Atty. Quintana to be without
merit, viz:

Apparently, respondent has extended his notarial acts in Midsayap and Kabacan, Cotabato, which is already
outside his territorial jurisdiction to perform as Notary Public.

Under the SEC. 11 of 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, respondent may perform his notarial acts within the
territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning Executive Judge Concha, which is in Cotabato City and the Province
of Maguindanao only. But definitely he cannot extend his commission as notary public in Midsayap or Kabacan
and in any place of the province of Cotabato as he is not commissioned thereat to do such act. Midsayap and
Kabacan are not part of either Cotabato City or Province of Maguindanao but part of the province of North
Cotabato. Thus, the claim of respondent that he can exercise his notarial commission in Midsayap, Cotabato
because Cotabato City is part of the province of Cotabato is absolutely devoid of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Quintana violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

RULING: YES. We adopt the findings of the OBC. However, we find the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for six (6) months and revocation and suspension of Atty. Quintana's notarial commission for two (2) years
more appropriate considering the gravity and number of his offenses.

After a careful review of the records and evidence, there is no doubt that Atty. Quintana violated the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility when he committed the following acts: (1) he
notarized documents outside the area of his commission as a notary public; (2) he performed notarial acts with
an expired commission; (3) he let his wife notarize documents in his absence; and (4) he notarized a document
where one of the signatories therein was already dead at that time.

The act of notarizing documents outside one’s area of commission is not to be taken lightly. Aside from being a
violation of Sec. 11 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, it also partakes of malpractice of law and falsification.
Notarizing documents with an expired commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more
specifically, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Since the public is deceived into believing that he has
been duly commissioned, it also amounts to indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer's oath
proscribes. Notarizing documents without the presence of the signatory to the document is a violation of
Sec. 2(b)(1), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the lawyer’s oath which unconditionally requires lawyers not to do or declare any
falsehood. Finally, Atty. Quintana is personally accountable for the documents that he admitted were signed by
his wife. He cannot relieve himself of liability by passing the blame to his wife. He is, thus, guilty of violating
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers not to directly or indirectly assist in
the unauthorized practice of law.

All told, Atty. Quintana fell miserably short of his obligation under Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.

Atty. Quintana should be reminded that a notarial commission should not be treated as a money-making venture.
It is a privilege granted only to those who are qualified to perform duties imbued with public interest. As we have
declared on several occasions, notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The
protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented
from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must be underscored that
notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of the authenticity thereof.

Dispositive Portion: 

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the notarial commission of Atty. Nestor Q. Quintana, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED,
and he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is also
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately, with a WARNING that the
repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his
receipt of this Decision to enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies
furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country. SO ORDERED.

RE: VIOLATION OF RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE

(A.M. No. 09-6-1-SC, January 21, 2015, MENDOZA, J.)
Facts: 

In their letter, complainants alleged that Atty. Siapno was maintaining a notarial office along
Alvear Street East, Lingayen, Pangasinan, and was performing notarial acts and practices in
Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City without the requisite notarial commission. They
asserted that Atty. Siapno was never commissioned as Notary Public for and within the
jurisdiction of Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City. Instead, he applied and was
commissioned to perform notarial functions by Executive Judge Anthony Sison of the RTC,
San Carlos City, Pangasinan from March 22, 2007 to December 31, 2008. His notarial
commission, however, was never renewed upon expiration. 

The RTC-Lingayen forwarded the said letter-complaint to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) which, in turn, indorsed the same to the OBC.

In its Resolution , the Court directed the Executive Judge of the RTC-Lingayen to conduct a
formal investigation on the complaint against Atty. Siapno and Executive Judge Reynaldo G.
Ros (Judge Ros) of the RTC-Manila to conduct a formal investigation on the alleged violation
of the Notarial Law 

In her Report and Recommendation, the Executive Judge found that Atty. Siapno was
issued a notarial commission within the jurisdiction of Lingayen, Pangasinan, from January
20, 2003 to December 31, 2004 and February 8, 2005 to December 3, 2006. His
commission, however, was cancelled on June 8, 2006 and he was not issued another
commission thereafter. The Executive Judge found Atty. Siapno to have violated the 2004
Rules on Notarial Commission when he performed notarial functions without commission
and recommended that he be fined in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Siapno violated the Notarial Law for performing notarial acts and
practices beyond his Notarial Jurisdiction

Ruling: Yes. 

The Court agrees with the findings of the Executive Judge but not to the recommended
penalty.

It was proven that Atty. Siapno notarized several instruments with an expired notarial
commission outside the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court. Section 11, Rule III
of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that:

Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts
in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2)
years commencing the first day of January of the year in which the commissioning is made,
unless earlier revoked or the notary public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of
Court.

Under the rule, only persons who are commissioned as notary public may perform notarial
acts within the territorial jurisdiction of the court which granted the commission. Clearly, Atty.
Siapno could not perform notarial functions in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City of the
Province of Pangasinan since he was not commissioned in the said places to perform such
act.

Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless and
routine act. It is invested with substantive public interest that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. It must be emphasized that the act of notarization by
a notary public converts a private document into a public document making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public must observe
with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.

By performing notarial acts without the necessary commission from the court, Atty. Siapno
violated not only his oath to obey the laws particularly the Rules on Notarial Practice but also
Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes all lawyers from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and directs them to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession, at all times. 

Considering that Atty. Siapno has been proven to have performed notarial work in Ligayen,
Natividad and Dagupan City in the province of Pangasinan without the requisite commission,
the Court finds the recommended penalty insufficient. Instead, Atty. Siapno must be barred
from being commissioned as notary public permanently and suspended from the practice of
law for a period of two (2) years.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for two (2) years and BARRED PERMANENTLY from being commissioned
as Notary Public, effective upon his receipt of a copy of this decision.

SO ORDERED