G.R. No.

1503            March 14, 1905

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,

vs.
ALEJO RAVIDAS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

F: The defendants Alejo Ravidas and Narciso Melliza, together with several other defendants,
were tried in the Court of First Instance of Misamis on a charge of insurrection. five of them,
to wit, were acquitted with regard to the eight first named was made final as to them by
reason of their withdrawal from the appeal. It has also become final as regards the other eight
on account of their escape. Such escape implies withdrawal within the meaning of the
principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure. The appeal is, therefore, only
continued in this instance as regards Alejo Ravidas and Narciso Melliza.
The counsel prays for the acquittal of both defendants.
I: Whether defendants committed the crime of rebellion/insurrection?
R: No, "it is not proven", he says with respect to Alejo Ravidas, " that he permitted or
encouraged insurrection or engaged in the same by abetting them directly or indirectly."
However reproachful the silence of the defendant may be, it does not in itself constitute the
crime of insurrection. Act No. 292 defines and specifies the acts which shall be punished as
insurrection, but among those acts the silence of the defendant is not enumerated. This silence
is not an act; it is, rather, an omission. These facts are not sufficient to hold him liable for the
crime of insurrection.
The same can be said with reference to Narciso Melliza, as there is no evidence showing that
he had promoted, encouraged or aided any insurrection or that he in any way participated in
the same. From the fact that he sold rice in great or small quantities to persons who
afterwards appeared to be insurgents. It is not shown that he sold the rice to the insurgents
knowing that they were such and with the deliberate purpose of aiding the insurrection.

Art. 134. Rebellion or insurrection; How committed. — The crime of rebellion or

insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the
purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the
Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces,
depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers
or prerogatives. (As amended by R.A. 6968).

G.R. No. L-36426             November 3, 1932

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IGNACIO NABONG, defendant-appellant.

F: This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Nueva Ecija, finding the appellant, Ignacio Nabong, guilty of the offense of
sedition. The appellant is an attorney engaged in the practice of law at Cabanatuan, in the
Province of Nueva Ecija
At a necrological service on the occasion of the death of a local communist leader, the
defendant a speech, in the course of this speech Nabong criticized the members of the
Constabulary, using words substantially to the following effect:
“They committed a real abuse in seizing the flag. The members of the Constabulary
are bad because they shoot even innocent women, as it happened in Tayug. — In view
 of this, we ought to be united to suppress that abuse. Overthrow the present
government and establish our own government, the government of the poor. Use your
whip so that there may be marks on their sides.”
I: whether defendant committed the crime of inciting to sedition?
R: Yes, The language used by the appellant clearly imported an overthrow of the Government
by violence, and it should be interpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it was
evidently intended to be understood. The word "overthrow" could not have been intended as
referring to an ordinary change by the exercise of the elective franchise. The use of the whip,
an instrument designed to leave marks on the sides of adversaries, is inconsistent with the
mild interpretation which the appellant would have us impute to the language. It was the
purpose of the speaker, beyond a doubt, to incite his hearers to the overthrow of organized
government by unlawful means
We bear in mind the fact that the appellant is a lawyer by profession, and by reason of his
intelligence and education, as well as by the obligation of his office as a lawyer, it was his
duty to exercise his influence in support of the State. In taking this position and uttering the
seditious words which he is proved to have used, the appellant violated not only the written
law but his oath of office as an attorney.

Art. 142. Inciting to sedition. — The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without taking
any direct part in the crime of sedition, should incite others to the accomplishment of any of
the acts which constitute sedition, by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems,
cartoons, banners, or other representations tending to the same end, or upon any person or
persons who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous
libels against the Government (of the United States or the Government of the
Commonwealth) of the Philippines, or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof, or
which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing the functions of his office, or
which tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, or which
suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which lead or tend to stir up the people
against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of
the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices.

Art. 139. Sedition; How committed. — The crime of sedition is committed by persons who
rise publicly and tumultuously in order to attain by force, intimidation, or by other means
outside of legal methods, any of the following objects:
1. To prevent the promulgation or execution of any law or the holding of any popular
election;
2. To prevent the National Government, or any provincial or municipal government or any
public officer thereof from freely exercising its or his functions, or prevent the execution of
any administrative order;
3. To inflict any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any public officer or
employee;
4. To commit, for any political or social end, any act of hate or revenge against private
persons or any social class; and
5. To despoil, for any political or social end, any person, municipality or province, or the
National Government (or the Government of the United States), of all its property or any part
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