Industrial CyberSecurity 4.

0 : Preparing the
Operational Technicians for Industry 4.0
 
  Konstantinos Karampidis Spyros Panagiotakis Manos Vasilakis
  Department of Information & Department of Electrical & Department of Electrical &
  Communication Systems Computer Engineering Computer Engineering
Engineering Hellenic Mediterranean University Hellenic Meditertanean University
  University of the Aegean Heraklion, Crete, Greece Heraklion, Crete, Greece
  Samos, Greece spanag@hmu.gr mtp187@edu.teicrete.gr
  karampidis@aegean.gr
  Giorgos Papadourakis
  Evangelos K. Markakis Department of Electrical &
  Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering
  Computer Engineering Hellenic Mediterranean University
  Hellenic Mediterranean University Heraklion, Crete, Greece
  Heraklion, Crete, Greece papadour@cs.teicrete.gr
  markakis@pasiphae.eu
 
  I. INTRODUCTION
  Abstract— In the context of Industry 4.0, industrial The project InCyS 4.0 (Industrial CyberSecurity 4.0)
  facilities are connected to corporate data networks and [1], co-funded by the Erasmus+ Programme of the
are frequently administered remotely over the European Union, aims to offer open source course
 
Internet. However, these new technologies have materials and Higher Education (HE) training to fill the
 
brought new threats into the world of industrial evident gap in awareness and competence in cyber
 
automation, since the Industrial Control Systems (ICS) security for operational technicians in Industry 4.0. In the
 
in place today were designed to operate for decades, modern automated industrial landscape of digitally
 
and many of them were developed without any serious connected control systems, new risks [2] abound for which
  industrial employers should become aware of. The
regard to IT security. Hence, the modern labor market
  industrial labor market needs technicians and engineers
in the industry needs trained technicians and engineers
  capable to identify potential cybersecurity threats and who are aware of the cyber risks and dangers and who can
  able to respond adequately when an attack is respond adequately or minimize the risk when detected.
  identified. Personnel training in these skills is costly, as The present curricula need to incorporate practical
  experienced and skilled trainers are required for an preparation in these issues for all technicians and
  ever-changing technological environment. In this engineers who will come into contact with industrial
  control systems (ICS). Typically, the operation of an ICS,
context, InCyS 4.0 (Industrial CyberSecurity 4.0) is a
  could be interrupted by an operator error or a failure at a
2-year KA2 project co-funded by the Erasmus+
  production unit. Nowadays that production units are
programme of the European Union, that aims to create connected to Internet, cyberattacks are becoming more
  open source educational material to address training
  often [3], especially in the last decade. In 2007, a former
of industrial production technicians for handling employee of Tehama Colusa Canal Authority (TCCA)
  cyber-security vulnerabilities. In order InCyS4.0 to installed unauthorized software on a computer used to
  assure that the developed training material fits the divert water from the Sacramento River for irrigation
  needs of European Industries, it conducted a field purposes. This software infected supervisory control and
  research in every partner country. Field research had data acquisition system (SCADA). It caused a denial of
  the form of an anonymous questionnaire targeting the service and although the damage was limited, it is a good
  IT personnel of local industries. Aim of the research paradigm how an administrator negligence (forgot to
  was the investigation of the security weaknesses of the revoke rights of the former employee) can cause damage
  participating enterprises and the extraction of the to an industry. In 2011 a cyberattack was reported; the so-
  profile of the industrial IT engineers, so the project called Night Dragon Operation. It was found that it started
  adapts the training content to the feedback. This paper in mid-2006 and hit over 70 organizations, businesses
  describes the rationale, aims and objectives of the worldwide, the United Nations and the International
  project, presents the outcomes of the research and Olympic Committee. More recent attacks [4][5][6]
  outlines the proposed course material. concern ransomware, where attackers gain control to
  victims resources and encrypt data demanding ransom
Keywords — cybersecurity, operational technicians, payments in cryptocurrency.
 
  personnel training, operational technology, industry 4.0, These few paradigms of cyberattacks show that ICS
  education systems can be easily compromised and attackers can hit
  at the different layers of ICS architecture i.e. a) the
 

978-1-7281-1016-5/19/$31.00 ©2019 IEEE

hardware layer b) the firmware layer and c) the software
Layer [7]. Moreover, the integration of the Operational
Technology (OT) and the Information Technology (IT)
make industries more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. IT/OT
integration is the end state where instead of a separation of
IT and OT as technology areas with different areas of
authority and responsibility, there is integrated process
and information flow. A critical factor that boosted OT
and IT convergence is the industrial Internet of Things
(IIoT). In the past, OT and IT had different objectives. IT
was focused to the business applications, while OT was
dedicated solely on the manufacturing process.
Collaboration was not established due to different
technology or different networks. Recently OT has started
to adopt IT technologies. For example, Internet Protocol
(IP) is used as an all-purpose networking protocol and
common operating systems (e.g. Windows) is frequently
found in many devices. The integration of OT and IT
benefits companies by reducing cost and risks along with
higher performance and gains in flexibility. The
advantages of an OT/IT convergence are:
• Cost
• For IT, cost is about demonstrating and
predicting profitability. For OT, cost is reduced
of production expenses. For both, improving
costs positively impacts the organization.
• Performance - Productivity
• Agility
• Improved production timelines that makes room
for innovation, something that was difficult
within different OT and IT environments.
The major disadvantage is that the integration of the
two environments highlights each company’s security
gaps. Therefore, the need of taking countermeasures is
becoming compulsory. Countermeasures can be taken in
all layers of the ICS architecture or computer networks
(IT) but the most critical part is the training of the
personnel. A 2016 Deloitte-MAPI study [8] found that 75
percent of executives surveyed believed they lacked the
skilled talent resources needed to effectively implement
and maintain a secure connected production ecosystem.
While not all technicians will be responsible for
implementing cyber security, all technical operators and
supervisors using CNC/PLCs in automated systems,
robotics, electronic maintenance, I.T etc. need to be aware
of the risks and realities of ICSs and have the knowledge
to implement preventive measures and solutions. To
prepare actual and future technicians and engineers
adequately in these high-quality skills and competences
related to the modern industrial landscape is of utmost
relevance and importance.
In 2013 the German Prime Minister A. Merkel
declared the beginning of a new industrial revolution –
Industry 4.0. The new paradigm in Industry is based on
increased automation, more flexible and efficient
production involving Industrial Control Systems (ICS).
Europe is looking to Industry 4.0 – or the Digital
Transformation of Industry – as the opportunity to lead the
world in technological transformation and prosperity.
By now automation and digital control is well
underway in industrial operations due to its high
efficiency, process performance and commercial
competitiveness. However, the introduction of IT and
digital supply networks (DSNs) into automated systems
means that data is now shared among a large number of
applications, and machinery is operated using global
applications and network systems. The benefits of the use
of digital technology for operations are enormous but
come with new and increased risks. There is a real threat
to companies’ production security, safety and capacity, as
well as data privacy, when companies connect to
operational technology networks. Companies admit to
being unprepared for the array of cyber threats now
distinguishable. "As the complexity and sophistication of
attacks increase, it is becoming increasingly difficult to
find the highly skilled cybersecurity talent needed to
design and implement secure, vigilant, and resilient cyber
security solutions" [8].
Operational technicians in industrial companies are
not sufficiently aware of the threats nor do they have the
competences to take adequate preventive security or
response measures. InCyS 4.0 comes to fill this
knowledge gap and help industries to confront the new era
risks. InCyS 4.0 proposes the creation of an integrated
training course for high level technicians (EQF level 5 and
above) and operational workers who work or will work in
Industry, in critical infrastructures or in industrial
production. Automated industrial production services and
machinery are potential targets for hacking, sabotage, theft
and chaos. The project strengthens co-operation between
education, research and industry by offering more
attractive and effective education in the form of high-
quality learning opportunities that improve technical skills
and meet the needs of employers in an evolving labor
market.
II. METHODOLOGY
Industrial operational security is a pressing issue for
Industry 4.0 throughout Europe. The RiS3 (Regional Smart
Specialization Strategies) [9] highlights the urgent need to
prepare Industry 4.0 establishments for cyber security
attacks. While new waves of Artificial Intelligence and
cyber security packages can be purchased, technical
operations workers´ need to be better prepared as they are
often the weakest link in the security chain. By working
transnationally, the necessary educational initiative for
industrial security training can be condensed, reducing
costs for smaller industrial companies (SMEs) in Europe
which make up for a significant proportion of the 99% of
all enterprises in the nonfinancial business sector in the
EU28. It can also contribute to a representative educational
offer and to greater and more effective cooperation
between Education and Industry.
In this context, the InCyS 4.0 consortium comprises
partners from Greece, Portugal and Spain and unites higher
education institutions, a VET organization offering
training for high level VET (Vocational Education and
Training) and a consultancy enterprise. They are all
collaborate with industrial enterprises in their networks
(especially Small and medium-sized enterprises - SMEs)
from the very beginning. The project strengthens the
“knowledge triangle” and collaboration between
Education, Research and Industry, to offer more attractive
and effective education in the shape of high-quality
learning opportunities which improve employability and
also meet employer needs in the evolving work market.
They will all benefit from collaborating towards the
developed innovation in cyber security training (essential
for OT - operational technology). Training for staff in
these skills is expensive and all stakeholders see the need
to collaborate to ensure adequate training that meets the
needs of all. On the other hand, better skilled graduates
from all the partner countries will not only improve the
Industrial fabric, security and prosperity of each partner
country but also improve the employability of technical
graduates in these countries, countries still challenged by
excessively high youth unemployment rates. Improving
the chances of employment by improving necessary skills
is of paramount importance.
In order InCyS4.0 to assure that the provided training
material fits the needs of European Industries, it conducted
a field research in every partner country. Field research had
the form of an anonymous questionnaire targeting the IT
personnel of local industries, so the project investigates the
security weaknesses of the participating enterprises and
adapt its training content according to the feedback. From
each partner country, at least 10 representative large
enterprises or SMEs participated. Due to the criticality and
the significance of the given information, a confidentiality
agreement was signed. The following section presents the
results from this statistical research. For each question the
corresponding major statistical finding is highlighted.
Q1. Do you implement a security policy at your enterprise?
- 80% of the enterprises answered they implement
a security policy at their organization.
Q2. What is your password policy?
- 55% of the enterprises answered that they don’t
have a password policy. From the rest 45% that
implements a password policy, only ¼ of them
has very strict rules.
Q3. Do you implement any monitoring and control
measures of those who have access to each part of the
automation production process?
- Although most of the companies have monitoring
and control measures of those who have physical
access to each part of the automation production
process, only 42% of them keep detailed log files.
Q4. Is your network equipment physically secured in a
restricted access room?
- Only 60% of the companies have their network
equipment physically secured in a restricted
access room.
Q5. Do you implement any update/upgrade policy for the
firmware used in your automation mechanisms?
- 65% of the enterprises answered that they don’t
have an update/upgrade policy.
Q6. Are your workers allowed to connect their own
devices to the enterprise network?
- Employees are usually allowed (70%) to bring
their own devices at work, although the use of
their personal computers is prohibited.
Q7. Do you implement any scheduled awareness briefing
for the operators on security themes like phishing,
social engineering attacks, tailgating, etc.?
- 70% of the enterprises don’t have scheduled
awareness briefing for their operators on security
themes.
Q8. Can you estimate the cost of recovering the current
status of your automation network in case of a major
disruption caused by a security breach?
- 67% of the enterprises cannot estimate the cost of
recovering their automation network from a major
disruption caused by a security breach.
Q9. Do you implement a firmware and configuration
backup strategy for your automation devices?
- 60% of the enterprises implement a firmware and
configuration backup strategy for their
automation strategies. From these enterprises
only 50% check their backups regularly.
Q10. Is your network segmented into separated
subnetworks for IT (office network: PC's and servers)
and OT (automation network: PLC, HMI,
sensors/actuators)?
- Only 30% of the participating enterprises have
their networks segmented into different
subnetworks for IT and OT.
Q11. Do you have configured a firewall to control the
traffic between IT and OT networks?
- The majority of the enterprises (83%) have
configured a firewall to control the traffic
between the two networks.
Q12. Does your organization use manageable switches
in order to control and monitor network traffic?
- 60 % of the companies do not use manageable
switches and
Q13. Does your organization have deployed any traffic
analysis tool to detect abnormal traffic or unauthorized
connections?
- 75% of the organizations do not have deployed
any such traffic analysis tool.
Q14. Does your organization have any anti-
virus solution deployed in order to detect infected
hosts?
- Only 50% of the organizations have deployed
anti-virus solutions for the detection of infected
hosts.
Q15. Is it possible to remotely access (remote Desktop,
remote sessions) your organizational OT network?
- 70% of the enterprises allow remote access to
their organizational OT network.
Q16. Is remote access controlled by a firewall?
 - 65% of the enterprises which allow remote
access, have it controlled by a firewall.
Q17. Do you have any contingency plan in case of a
cyber-attack?
- 50% of the enterprises do not have a contingency
plan.
Q18. Does your organization use secure connections
towards your network equipment (VPN, SSH
tunnels)?
- The majority of the companies (70%) allow
secure remote connections to their systems, but
there is a critical 30% that do not.
Q19. Does your organization allow WLAN
connections on the OT network?
- 70% of the organizations allow WLAN
connections on their OT network.
Q20. Does the OT WLAN connection use WPA2?
- All of the enterprises that allow WLAN
connections on their OT networks have them
secured with WPA2 protocol.
Q21. Does your OT WLAN setup authenticate the
clients (RADIUS server or certificates)?
- Only 43% of the OT WLAN setups authenticates
the clients.
Q22. Does your OT WLAN setup filter clients using
MAC addresses?
- 65% of the OT WLAN setups do not filter clients
using MAC addresses.
III. EDUCATIONAL MATTERIAL OF INCYS4.0
The findings of the aforementioned research illustrate a
fuzzy and blurred landscape in the European SMEs as it
concerns their readiness for cyberspace attacks. Despite the
growing number of recent cyberphysical attacks, it seems
that IT operators do not consider this likelihood seriously.
Probably this ignorance comes from the past when most
industrial automation systems were monolithic and
vendor-specific solutions with little or any interaction with
the TCP/IP world. Indeed, in such information systems the
main risk was from physical intruders into the premises,
justifying thus the existence of guards and fencing around
the plants. But with industry 4.0 and the transformation of
existing industries into smart ones it induces via Internet of
Things solutions, cloud data centers, virtualization of
services, Artificial Intelligence and data analytics, the
weaknesses and pathogenesis of TCP/IP are injected into
Industrial Control Systems. In such an ecosystem, an
intrusion by cyber-attackers into the virtual cyberspace of
an enterprise is a far more obvious issue than any physical
attack against the physical establishments of a plant. The
results of the research highlight and verify the suspicions
for critical vulnerabilities and weaknesses of existing
industries into cybersecurity issues, especially as it
concerns awareness of associated personnel for them.
InCyS4.0 will provide a training course (EQF level 5+)
in cyber security awareness and responsiveness for current
and future technicians/engineers who will work
with/alongside Industrial 4.0 Control Systems. The flexible
didactic modules created for InCyS 4.0 consist of a total of
30-50 hours of training that:
− Provide an overview of the most important concepts
associated with the area of Industrial security.
− Help trainees to understand the main differences
between security policies that are carried out in IT and
OT environments.
− Analyze the main vulnerabilities and threats that can be
suffered in industrial environments.
− Know the different types of attacks that can be made to
an OT network or a critical infrastructure.
− Introduce the most important aspects associated with
the protection of critical infrastructures and current
regulations.
− Describe the main countermeasures that can be
included to strengthen industrial networks and
protocols.
The educational content that will be developed by the
project for training of the technical personnel in industries
comprises the following three modules:
− Industrial Systems
− Security Concepts in Industrial Environments
− Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability in
Industrial Environments
The following sections elaborate further on the content
of these modules.
Module 1: Industrial Systems: Components And
Characteristics - Integration of IT/OT
This module is an introduction to the architecture of the
ICS systems presenting the main components of them
including:
− The control loop consisting of various sensors and
actuators and a controller that manages the actuators
based on sensor readings and operator input.
− The human-machine interface (HMI) and SCADA
supervisory systems that allow operators to monitor
the controlled process and influence it.
− The data repository and data analytics tool that logs
all process control activity to allow reporting at
multiple levels.
− The Remote diagnostics and maintenance tool that
allows ICS support staff and vendors access to
diagnose and correct operational problems.
− The interconnecting network comprising several
different technologies from traditional serial
protocols (e.g., RS232/485) and fieldbus topologies
(e.g., Modbus, Profibus, CAN) to packet data
protocols (e.g., Profinet, Industrial Ethernet), TCP/IP
integration (e.g., VLANs, VPN, remote access, QoS)
and wireless connectivity (e.g., WLAN, 802.15.4,
LPWAN).
Module 2: Security Concepts In Industrial Environments.
This module:
a) Presents the modern virtual ecosystem of smart plants
as it is structured today in the context of Industry 4.0.
In this context, several state-of-the-art technological
innovations that transform the lifecycle of a typical
ICS into a distributed one are introduced. The latter
includes:
i) Cloud and Edge Computing. The former is the
trend that first introduced the sense of
virtualization for computing and storage resources
creating the different types of the “-as-a-Service”
paradigm (Infrastructure-aaS, Software-aaS,
Platform-aaS) [10][11][12]. Cloud computing
created the need for resources orchestration so
distributed resources are integrated and centraly
managed. Also, the introduction of IoT into
industrial environments brought the need for data
processing closer to the field devices to improve
response times and save bandwidth. This opened
the path to Edge computing. With Edge
computing some part of processing happens closer
to the location where it is needed and the
remaining to the cloud [13].
ii) Network Function Virtualization (NFV) and
Software Defined Networking (SDN). Cloud
computing paved the way for less typical forms of
virtualization, such as the NFV paradigm. With
NFV, IT virtualization is used to virtualize entire
classes of network node functions into building
blocks that may connect, or chain together, to
create communication services [14]. A virtualized
network function, may consist of one or more
virtual machines running software and processes,
on top of standard servers, switches and storage
devices, or even on top of some cloud
infrastructure [14]. Examples of NFV include
virtualized load balancers, firewalls, and intrusion
detection devices. NFV is ideally complemented
by SDN. The latter attempts to centralize network
intelligence by disassociating data plane of
computer networks from control plane and
assigning control plane to SDN controllers that are
considered to be the brain of SDN networks [13].
iii) Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). This refers to
the evolution of typical Industrial Control
Systems so interconnected sensors, actuators,
instruments, controllers and other devices are
networked together with industrial applications
[15]. This connectivity allows for a higher degree
of automation via data collection, exchange, and
analysis. IIoT is an umbrella term that
incorporates advances from various technological
fields such as wireless and computer networking,
cyber-physical systems, cloud and edge
computing, big data analytics, artificial
intelligence and machine learning, cybersecurity.
b) Highlights the most common security threads and
challenges that any such highly distributed ecosystem
should be aware of and ready to handle. In this context,
various cyber-attack scenarios on industrial systems
are analysed and demonstrated including:
• Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack
• Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks
• Modbus/TCP Protocol Attack
• Dictionary Attack
Module 3: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability in
Industrial Environments
This module focuses on issues of Information Security in
industrial environments emphasizing on the protection of
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (known as the
CIA triad) of industrial data. In this context, various
industry standards and recommendations on how data is
accessed, processed, stored, transferred and destroyed will
be examined including password, antivirus, firewall,
encryption, etc. policies. Furthermore, many different
forms of modern threads will be analyzed such as software
attacks, theft of intellectual property, identity theft, theft
of equipment or information, etc., with viruses, worms,
phishing attacks and Trojan horses to constitute common
examples of the former.
InCyS4.0 will also produce a Practical Cyber Security
Guide for technicians covering the fundamentals of cyber
security for Industrial Systems. This will take the form of
a Quick Guide, summarizing the main risks and steps to
follow for technicians working around digital control
systems in Industry 4.0. It can be distributed as a stand-
alone handbook on the most basic issues and as a
complement to the main training material.
As formal training in cyber security, specifically aimed at
reducing the risks involved in connected Industrial
Control Systems (ICS), is not yet available in formal
Educational programmes, the training provided by InCyS
4.0 is highly innovative. In the context of the project,
modular content will be created using eXelearning
software [16]. eXeLearning is a free software tool under
GPL-2 that can be used for creating interactive educational
web content. All the educational materials generated with
eXeLearning are exported in different digital formats, so
they can be used independently or integrated into a LMS
(Learning Management System) like Moodle. As such, the
InCyS 4.0 Course content will be highly transferable in
terms of access for integration into existing industrial
educational programmes or other training options. The
produced open source content, along with relevant
activities in the three modules and the quick guide, will be
sporadically available online on the project’s website
http://www.incybersecurity.eu/ .
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In the modern automated industrial landscape of Industry
4.0, the monolithic and vendor-specific industrial systems
of the past with little or any interaction with the TCP/IP
world, are transformed to digitally connected control
ecosystems. In such highly distributed environments
specialized software enables centralized management and
orchestration of available services and infrastructures
controlling the manufacturing process. The latter ideally
provides a unified operating framework for vendor-
agnostic, policy-driven service design, implementation,
analytics and lifecycle management for large-scale
workloads and services. However, the emergence of this
evolution comes with a price: new risks and security
threads abound for which industrial employers should
become aware of. The InCyS 4.0 research program aims
to fill the technological gap that exists between existing
operational technology personnel and state-of-the art
technological trends. This gap was highlighted from the
results of a statistical research that was conducted in many
industries from the three participating countries. The
analysis of the collected questionnaires identified the
needs of industrial personnel for technological awareness
in cybersecurity issues. Afterwards, a detailed
cybersecurity guide will be provided to industrial
production technicians, in a way that every term or
definition is simple-, to help them identify cyber-security
vulnerabilities. InCyS 4.0 involves universities, a
vocational training organization, a consultancy company
and industrial enterprises in each participating country.
The project strengthens co-operation between education,
research and industry by offering more attractive and
effective education in the form of high-quality learning
opportunities that improve technical skills and meet the
needs of employers in an evolving labor market.
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