1. G.R. No.

148279             May 27, 2004

CORPORATE INN HOTEL, ANNIE DEL ROSARIO AND JULIE
PALINSAD, petitioners, 
vs.
JENNEVIE H. LIZO, respondent.

FACTS: 21 days after Respondent Jennevie Lizo’s employment as a probationary

account executive (tasked to deal with clients, entertain customers, and promote
patronage of the hotel), Petitioner and its officers terminated her services due to the
complaints received from its clients few weeks after her employment. Aggrieved,
respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal and other
monetary claims against petitioners.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not respondent was illegally dismissed.

(2) WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS MAY BE ALLOWED TO DISREGARD
THE MANDATORY 10-DAY PERIOD OF PERFECTING AN APPEAL FROM
THE DECISION OF LABOR ARBITER.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
 LABOR ARBITER: Decided that respondent was illegally dismissed. Then
petitioner filed for Motion for Reconsideration.
 NLRC: Denied the Motion in a Resolution. Then petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA.
 CA: Affirmed in toto the NLRC Resolution. Petitioner then filed a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with the SC.
 SC: Denied the petition affirming the Decision and Resolution of the CA.
RULING:
(1) Yes. Respondent was illegally dismissed. The Labor Arbiter decided in this
wise:

“All told, it is the finding of this Arbitration Branch that the imputation against the
complainant are but the product of afterthoughts, if not surmises, and guessworks.
The inevitable conclusion is that complainant was dismissed without just and valid
cause and absent due process. Accordingly, she is entitled to her backwages from
February 15, 1999 up to the date of this decision and to separation pay equivalent to
one (1) month salary. xxx”

(2) NO. Petitioners is not allowed to disregard the mandatory 10-Day period
of perfecting an appeal from the decision of Labor Arbiter.

"Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, a decision of a Labor Arbiter is final
and executory unless appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission
by any or both of the parties within ten (10) days from notice of the said
 Decision. Thus, the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period
for the same is jurisdictional in character."

In the instant case, petitioner Corporate Inn’s appeal to the NLRC was filed
out of time and petitioner realized this lapse from start but it pleaded for
leniency with the NLRC.

While we may have sidestepped the rule on the statutory or reglementary

period for filing an appeal, yet, we emphasized this caveat: "we cannot
respond with alacrity to every clamor of injustice and bend the rules to
placate a vociferous protestor crying and claiming to be a victim of a wrong.
It is only in highly meritorious cases that this Court opts not to strictly apply
the rules and thus prevent a grave injustice from being done." 7 However this
exception does not obtain here. Wherefore, the petition is denied.

NOTE:
REQUIREMENTS IN PERFECTING AN APPEAL: SECTION 3(a), Rule VI of the
NLRC New Rules of Procedure:
1. The Appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as provided in
Section 1 of this Rule shall be under oath with proof of payment of the
required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in
Section 6 of this Rule;
2. Shall be accompanied by memorandum of appeal which shall state the
grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof: and
3. The relief prayed for and a statement of the date when the appellant received
the appealed decision, order or award and proof of service on the other party
of such appeal.

‘A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall
not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.’
4. G.R. No. 140853             February 27, 2003
ARIEL A. TRES REYES, petitioner,
vs.
MAXIM’S TEA HOUSE and JOCELYN POON, respondents.

Facts:
Respondent had employed Ariel Tres Reyes as a driver since October 1995. In
the wee hours of the morning of September 27, 1997, petitioner and seven of his co-
employee passengers met an accident when he noticed a ten-wheeler truck coming
his way at full speed despite the fact that the latter’s lane had a red signal light on.
Petitioner maneuvered to avoid collision, but nonetheless the van was driving struck
the truck which they sustained physical injuries and both vehicles were damaged.
The management of Maxim's required petitioner to submit, within forty-eight hours,
a written explanation as to what happened. He complied but his employer found his
explanation unsatisfactory and as a result he was preventively suspended for thirty
(30) days, Maxim's terminated petitioner for cause.

The Labor Arbiter found that petitioner was grossly negligent in failing to avoid
the collision petitioner filed a "Motion for Partial Reconsideration" with the NLRC.
The NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that there was no
negligence on petitioner's part. Respondents moved for reconsideration of the
foregoing decision, but said motion was denied by the Commission Respondents then
filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, the appellate court
decided in favor of the employer and its manager.

Issue:
Whether or not the “Motion for Partial Reconsideration” be considered as an
appeal to the NLRC considering that the motion contained no statement when
petitioner received a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s decision to determine the timeliness
of the motion cum appeal, petitioner’s failure to pay the necessary filling fees and for
want and verification and absence of proof that it was filed within the reglementary
period.

Ruling:
Yes, the “Motion for Partial Reconsideration” be considered as an appeal to the
NLRC.

In one of the Court decided cases that in labor cases, rules of procedure should
not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. They are merely tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice, and where their strict application would result in
the frustration rather than promotion of substantial justice, technicalities must be
avoided. Technicalities should not be permitted to stand... in the way of equitably and
completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties. Where the ends of
substantial justice shall be better served, the application of technical rules of
procedure may be relaxed.

In this case, it would have readily seen that the said pleading had complied with
the technical requirements of an appeal. The records also clearly show the basis for
the finding of the Commission that the appeal fees were paid. That petitioner’s
declaration in his motion that he received a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s decision on
September 28, 1998 is more than sufficient compliance with said requirement
imposed by Section 3, Rule VI and likewise find that the motion in question was filed
with the NLRC on October 8, 1998 or on the tenth (10th) day from the date of receipt
by petitioner of his copy of the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Hence, the Court are
constrained to conclude that the appellate court had no basis for concluding that the
NLRC had gravely abuse its discretion when NLRC gave due course to the motion and
treated it as an appeal when in fact the petitioner complied the requisites for
substantial requirements for an appeal.
5. St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC
G.R. No. G.R. No. 130866| |16 Sep 1998

Overview:
Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of
Petitioner on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of employment
executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly
payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly
misappropriating P38,000.00. Petitioner on the other hand claims that private
respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of
petitioner St.Martin’s Funeral Home and in January 1996, the mother of Amelita
passed away, so the latter took over the management of the business.
Amelita made some changes in the business operation and private respondent
and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management thereof. As a
consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally
terminated his employment. The labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed between the
parties and therefore his office had no jurisdiction over the case.

Facts:
 Bienvenido Aricayos alleged that he started working as operations manager in
St. Martin Funeral Home on 6 Feb 1995.
 There was no contract of employment nor was his name included in the in
the semimonthly payroll.
 [1996] He was dismissed from employment for misappropriating ₱38K which
was intended for payment of VAT to the BIR.
 St. Martin claims that Aricayos is not an employee but only the uncle of Amelita
Malabed, owner of St. Martin.
 Aricayos was allegedly voluntarily helping, as an indication of gratitude, because
Amelita’s mother gave him financial assistance when he was still working
overseas.
 When Amelita’s mother passed away, Amelita took over the management of the
business. She then discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes
and other government fees, although the records purported to show that the
same were already paid.
  Amelita then made some changes in the business operation and private
respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the
management thereof.
 Aricayas filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

LA: No employer-employee relationship. Hence, no jurisdiction over the case.

NLRC: set aside the LA’s decision. Remanded to LA. Petitioner filed MR, denied.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari.

Issue:
W/N the CA may exercise judicial review over decisions rendered NLRC.

Ruling: YES.

In San Miguel v. Secretary of Labor , it was held that there is an underlying

power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and
jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of
judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect
the substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances
which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust
adjudications.

In this case, the petitioners rightfully filed a motion for reconsideration, but the
appeal or certiorari should have been filed initially to the Court of Appeals – as
consistent with the principle of hierarchy of courts. As such, the Supreme Court
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals.

Additional Notes:
[1972] The NLRC was first established in the Department of Labor by Pres. Decree
No. 21. Decisions of the NLRC were expressly appealable to the Secretary of Labor →
President.

[1974] Pres. Decree No. 442 was enacted. LABOR CODE, art. 302 later 223. It granted
the aggrieved party of the remedy of appeal from the decision of the NLRC to the
Secretary of Labor. Pres. Decree No. 1391, however abolished such appeals. No
appellate review has since been provided for.
 As stated above, in San Miguel v. Secretary of Labor, the court ruled that there is
an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions
of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute; and that
the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its
jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties.
Remedy of the aggrieved party:
1. Timely file a motion for reconsideration (precondition for subsequent
remedy)
2. Seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
a. Even if the 10 day period for finality of the NLRC decision has lapsed the
Supreme Court may still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari if
filed within the 60 day reglementary period under Rule 65.

Furthermore, in BP Blg. 129, sec. 9, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7902: Cases
under the LABOR CODE are now part of the exclusionary clause. This would mean
that appeals from the NLRC cannot be brought before the CA, but to the Supreme
Court.

This is illogical and impracticable since there are no cases in the LABOR CODE
wherein the decisions, resolutions, order or awards are within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter.

1. There was an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of review. The
purpose of Batas Blg. 129 is to ease the workload of the Supreme Court by the transfer
of some of its burden of review of factual issues to the Court of Appeals. The court
held, therefore, that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were
eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari
was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of the decisions of the NLRC.

2. Appeal on certiorari (RULES OF COURT, Rule 45): SC only. Special civil action of
Certiorari (RULES OF COURT, Rule 65): SC and CA, concurrently.

3. Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 to supposed appeals from the
NLRC to the SC are interpreted and declared to mean and refer to petitions for
certiorari under Rule 65. All such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the
Court of Appeals in strict observance of the hierarchy of courts. Now, Labor Code,
art. 229, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6715 (1989) and renumbered in 2015.
8. RUBBERWORLD PHILS., INC. and JULIE YAO ONG vs. NLRC, AQUINO
MAGSALIN, PEDRO MAÑIBO, RICARDO BORJA, ALICIA SAN PEDRO AND
FELOMENA TOLIN, G.R. No. 128003, July 26, 2000

FACTS:

On August 26, 1994, Rubberworld, a corporation engaged in the

manufacture of footwear, bags and garments, filed with the Department of Labor
and Employment a notice of temporary shutdown of operations to take effect on
September 26, 1994. However, before the effectivity date, Rubberworld was
forced to prematurely shutdown its operations.

As a result, private respondents as employees filed with the NLRC a

complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal and non-payment of separation
pay on November 11, 1994.

On November 22, 1994, Rubberworld filed with the SEC a petition for
declaration of suspension of payments with a proposed rehabilitation plan. The
SEC granted the petition and issued the order stating, “all actions for claims
against Rubberworld. . .pending before any court, tribunal, office, board, body,
Commission or sheriff are hereby deemed suspended.”

Consequently, on January 24, 1995, Rubberworld submitted to the labor

arbiter a motion to suspend the proceedings invoking the SEC order. The labor
arbiter did not act on the motion and ordered the parties to submit their
respective position papers.

The labor arbiter declared Rubberworld guilty of illegal shutdown and

ordered the payment of separation pay with moral and exemplary damages to
the private respondents.

Rubberworld appealed to the NLRC alleging abuse of discretion and

serious errors in the findings of facts of the labor arbiter. The NLRC affirmed the
decision of the labor arbiter but deleted the award for damages.

Rubberworld now files to the SC a petition to annul the resolution of the

NLRC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Department of Labor and Employment, the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC may legally act on the claims of respondents despite the order of the
SEC suspending all actions against a company under rehabilitation.
RULING:

No, the DOLE, Labor Arbiter and NLRC may not legally act on said claims.

PD No. 902-A is clear that “all actions for claims against corporations,
partnerships or associations under management or receivership pending before
any court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly.” The law did
not make any exception in favor of labor claims.1

Thus, when NLRC proceeded to decide the case despite the SEC suspension
order, the NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases. As a consequence, any resolution, decision or order that it rendered or
issued is a nullity.
 ON “REFUND DOCTRINE”
“Please note that this doctrine was abandoned already by the Supreme Court as it
easily demonstrates how a favorable decision by the Labor Arbiter could harm, more
than help, a dismissed employee.” (Garcia v. PAL, Inc., G.R. No. 164856, 20 January
2009)

10. Genuino vs. NLRC, 539 SCRA 342, December 04, 2007

Facts:
Genuino's employment was terminated by Citibank. She then filed a complaint
before a Labor Arbiter for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal with damages. The
Labor Arbiter finds the dismissal without just cause and ordered to reinstate
complainant immediately to her former position without loss of seniority rights and
other benefits, with backwages. On appeal, NLRC reversed the judgment by Labor
Arbiter and declared that the dismissal is for just cause, however, it reiterated the
award to pay the salaries due to the complainant from the date it reinstated
complainant in the payroll. Genuino and Citibank both filed petitions for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals, however, the decision is REITERATED and AFFIRMED
in all other respects except with modification ordering Citibank to pay Genuino
P5,000.00 as indemnity for non-observance of due process.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT CITIBANK (EMPLOYER) HAS THE RIGHT TO
REQUIRE GENUINO (EMPLOYEE) TO REFUND THE SALARIES SHE RECEIVED
WHILE THE CASE WAS ON APPEAL and later finds that the dismissal is valid and
for just cause.

Ruling:
Yes.

The Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, Book VI, Rule 1, Sec. 7 provides
that, “If the decision of the labor arbiter is later reversed on appeal upon the finding
that the ground for dismissal is valid, then the employer has the right to require the
dismissed employee on payroll reinstatement to refund the salaries s/he received
while the case was pending appeal, or it can be deducted from the accrued benefits
that the dismissed employee was entitled to receive from his/her employer under
existing laws, collective bargaining agreement provisions, and company practices.”

Here, considering that Genuino was not reinstated to work or placed on payroll
reinstatement, and her dismissal is based on a just cause, then she is not entitled to be
paid the salaries stated in item no. 3 of the fallo of the September 3, 1994 NLRC
Decision. Hence, she should refund the salaries she received based upon the Labor
Arbiter and NLRC’s decision.

DISMISSAL, JUST CAUSE AND DUE PROCESS

10. Genuino vs. NLRC, 539 SCRA 342, December 04, 2007

Facts:
This is a consolidated case anchored from the dismissal of Petitioner MARILOU
GENUINO by the other Petitioner CITBIBANK, both assailing the decision of the
NLRC. GENUINO, on her part contends that her dismissal is not valid and illegal.
CITIBANK on its part questioned the NLRC's order to pay Genuino's salaries from the
date of reinstatement until the date of the NLRC's decision.
Facts show that, Citibank sent Genuino a letter charging her with "knowledge
and/or involvement" in transactions "which were irregular or even fraudulent."
Genuino wrote Citibank back to substantiate the charge of fraudulent transactions.
Also, the counsel of Genuino demands for the bill of particulars regarding the charges.
But the Citibank’s counsel replied that the bank has no intention of converting the
administrative investigation of the case to a full blown trial but instead, give Genuino
an opportunity to explain her side on the issue of whether she violated the conflict of
interest rule—either in writing or in person. Genuino’s lawyers wrote a letter to
Citibank's counsel asking "what bank clients' funds were diverted from the bank and
invested in other companies, the specific amounts involved, the manner by which and
the date when such diversions were purportedly affected." Genuino did not appear in
the administrative investigation nor submit a written explanation. Citibank did not
reply to the letter of Genuino’s lawyer but noted the non-appearance of Genuino in
the administrative investigation. Thereafter, Citibank informed Genuino of the result
of their investigation. It found that Genuino with Santos used "facilities of Genuino's
family corporation, namely, Global Pacific, personally and actively participated in the
diversion of bank clients' funds to products of other companies that yielded interests
higher than what Citibank products offered, and that Genuino and Santos realized
substantial financial gains, all in violation of existing company policy and the
Corporation Code. Genuino's employment was terminated by Citibank on grounds of
(1) serious misconduct, (2) willful breach of the trust reposed upon her by the bank,
and (3) commission of a crime against the bank.

Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of Genuino is FOR JUST CAUSE and in
accordance with due process.

Ruling:
THE DISMISSAL WAS FOR JUST CAUSE BUT LACKED DUE PROCESS.

In Tabacalera Insurance Co. v. NLRC, No. L-72555, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA
667, 674-675., it was held that, “Art. 282(c) of the Labor Code provides that an
employer may terminate an employment for fraud or willful breach by the employee
of the trust reposed in him/her by his/her employer or duly authorized representative.
In order to constitute as just cause for dismissal, loss of confidence should relate to
acts inimical to the interests of the employer.”

In Equitable Banking Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 102467, June 13, 1997, 273
SCRA 352, 378, it was held that, “the act complained of should have arisen from the
performance of the employee's duties.

In Labor v. NLRC, G.R. No. 110388, September 14, 1995, 248 SCRA 183, 200 ,
Supreme Court held that, “For loss of trust and confidence to be a valid ground for an
employee's dismissal, it must be substantial and not arbitrary, and must be founded on
clearly established facts sufficient to warrant the employee's separation from work.”
 In Reyes v. Minister of Labor, G.R. No. 47805, February 9, 1989, 170 SCRA 134,
140, it was held that, “[L]oss of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an
employee and proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee's misconduct is not
required. It is sufficient if there is some basis for such loss of confidence or if the
employer has reasonable ground to believe or to entertain the moral conviction that
the employee concerned is responsible for the misconduct and that the nature of his
participation therein rendered him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded
by his position.”

In this case, As Assistant Vice-President of Citibank's Treasury Department,

Genuino was tasked to solicit investments, and peso and dollar deposits for, and keep
them in Citibank; and to sell and/or push for the sale of Citibank's financial products,
such as the MBS, for the account and benefit of Citibank. She held a position of trust
and confidence. There is no way she could deny any knowledge of the bank's policies
nor her understanding of these policies as reflected in the survey done by the bank.
She could not likewise feign ignorance of the businesses of Citibank, and of Global
and Torrance. it is to the interests of Citibank to retain its clients and continue
investing in Citibank. Curiously, Genuino did not even dissuade the depositors from
withdrawing their monies from Citibank, and was even instrumental in the transfers
of monies from Citibank to a competing bank through Global and Torrance, the
corporations under Genuino's control.

THE DISMISSAL LACKED DUE PROCESS.

The Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code (Book V, Rule XIV,
Sec. 2.), provide that any employer seeking to dismiss a worker shall furnish the latter
a written notice stating the particular acts or omissions constituting the grounds for
dismissal.

In this case, the letters sent by Citibank did not identify the particular acts or
omissions allegedly committed by Genuino. The extent of Genuino's alleged
knowledge and participation in the diversion of bank's clients' funds, manner of
diversion, and amounts involved; the acts attributed to Genuino that conflicted with
the bank's interests; and the circumstances surrounding the alleged irregular
transactions, were not specified in the notices/letters.
 11. Garcia vs. Philippine Airlines Inc.,
576 SCRA 479
January 20, 2009

Petitioners: Employees – Juanito A. Garcia and Alberto Dumago

Respondent: Philippine Airlines

Facts:

Petitioners in this case faced an administrative charge by their employer, Philippine

Airlines after being caught in the act of sniffing shabu in their workplace. After due
notice, PAL dismissed petitioners prompting the latter to file a complaint for illegal
dismissal which was resolved by the Labor Arbiter in their favor ordering inter alia
their reinstatement.

Subsequently, respondent company was placed under corporate rehabilitation. From

the Labor Arbiter who issued a Writ of Execution respecting the reinstatement
aspect of his January 11, 1999 decision, respondent appealed to NLRC which reversed
said decision.

Later, a writ of execution as regards the reinstatement was issued by the Labor
Arbiter. Respondent then filed an urgent petition for injunction on the ground that it
cannot comply with the reinstatement order due to its corporate rehabilitation.

Issues:

1. Whether a subsequent finding of a valid dismissal by NLRC removes the basis

for implementing the reinstatement aspect of the Labor Arbiter’s decision?

2. Whether respondent company is justified in refusing to comply with such

reinstatement order in view of its corporate rehabilitation?

Ruling:

On the first issue, jurisprudence has maintained that even if the order of
reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of
the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the
period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. The employee is not required to
reimburse whatever salary he may have received for he is entitled to such.
The provision of Art 223 is clear that an award by the Labor Arbiter for reinstatement
shall be immediately executory even pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the
employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement. The legislative intent is
obvious i.e. to make an award of reinstatement immediately enforceable, even
pending appeal.

On the second issue the predicament of a corporate rehabilitation rendered it

impossible for respondent to exercise its option under the circumstances. It is settled
that upon appointment by the SEC of a rehabilitation receiver, all actions for claims
before any court, tribunal or board against the corporation shall  ipso jure be
suspended.

Case law recognizes that unless there is a restraining order, the implementation of the
order of reinstatement is ministerial and mandatory. This injunction or suspension of
claims by legislative sanction (corporate rehabilitation) partakes of the nature of a
restraining order that constitutes a legal justification for respondent's non-compliance
with the reinstatement order. Respondent's failure to exercise the alternative options
of actual reinstatement and payroll reinstatement under Article 223 was thus justified.
Such being the case, respondent's obligation to pay the salaries pending appeal, as the
normal effect of the non-exercise of the options, did not attach.

In sum, the obligation to pay the employee's salaries upon the employer's failure to
exercise the alternative options under Article 223 of the Labor Code is not a hard and
fast rule, considering the inherent constraints of corporate rehabilitation.