1) Planters Product v. Fertiphil Corp.

G.R. No. 166006  March 14, 2008

(Locus Standi)

FACTS:

President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI No.
1465 which provided, among others, for the imposition of a capital recovery
component (CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers which resulted in
having Fertiphil paying P 10/bag sold to the Fertilizer and Perticide Authority (FPA).

FPA remits its collection to Far East Bank and Trust Company who applies to the
payment of corporate debts of Planters Products Inc. (PPI).

After the Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10
levy.  Upon return of democracy, Fertiphil demanded a refund but PPI refused. 
Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI with the
RTC on the ground that LOI No. 1465 is unjust, unreaonable oppressive, invalid and
unlawful resulting to denial of due process of law.  

FPA answered that it is a valid exercise of the police power of the state in
ensuring the stability of the fertilizing industry in the country and that Fertiphil did
NOT sustain damages since the burden imposed fell on the ultimate consumers.

RTC and CA favored Fertiphil holding that it is an exercise of the power of

taxation ad is as such because it  is NOT for public purpose as PPI is a private
corporation.

 ISSUE:
1. W/N Fertiphil has locus standi
2. W/N LOI No. 1465 is an invalid exercise of the power of taxation rather the police
power

Held:
1. Yes.  In private suits, locus standi requires a litigant to be a "real party in interest"
or party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.  In public
suits, there is the right of the ordinary citizen to petition the courts to be freed from
unlawful government intrusion and illegal official action subject to the  direct injury
test or where there must be personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result.  Being a mere procedural
technicality, it has also been held that locus standi may be waived in the public
interest such as cases of transcendental importance or with far-reaching implications
whether  private or public suit, Fertiphil has locus standi.

As a seller, it bore the ultimate burden of paying the levy which made its products
more expensive and harm its business.  It is also of paramount public importance
since it involves the constitutionality of a tax law and use of taxes for public purpose.

2. Yes. Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the state but
distinct and have different tests for validity.  Police power is the power of the state to
enact the legislation that may interfere with personal liberty on property in order to
promote general welfare.  While, the power of taxation is the power to levy taxes as to
be used for public purpose.  The main purpose of police power is the regulation of a
behavior or conduct, while taxation is revenue generation. The lawful subjects and
lawful means tests are used to determine the validity of a law enacted under the police
power.  The power of taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed by inherent and
constitutional limitations.

In this case, it is for purpose of revenue.  But it is a robbery for the State to tax the
citizen and use the funds generation for a private purpose.  Public purpose does NOT
only pertain to those purpose which are traditionally viewed as essentially
governmental function such as  building roads and delivery of basic services, but also
includes those purposes designed to promote social justice. Thus, public money may
now be used for the relocation of illegal settlers, low-cost housing and urban or
agrarian reform.

2) PAMBANSANG KOALISYON NG MGA SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA AT

MANGGAGAWA SA NIYUGAN (PKSMMN), etc. v. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, etc. CONSOLIDATED WITH G.R. No. 147811. (Coco Levy)

FACTS: These are consolidated petitions to declare unconstitutional certain

presidential decrees and executive orders of the martial law era and under the
incumbency of Pres. Estrada relating to the raising and use of coco-levy funds,
particularly: Section 2 of P.D. 755, (b)Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468, (c)
E.O. 312, and (d) E.O. 313.

On June 19, 1971 Congress enacted R.A. 6260 that established a Coconut Investment
Fund (CI Fund) for the development of the coconut industry through capital
financing. Coconut farmers were to capitalize and administer the Fund through the
Coconut Investment Company (CIC) whose objective was, among others, to advance
the coconut farmers interests.For this purpose, the law imposed a levy ofP0.55on the
coconut farmers first domestic sale of every 100 kilograms of copra, or its equivalent,
for which levy he was to get a receipt convertible into CIC shares of stock.

In 1975 President Marcos enacted P.D. 755 which approved the acquisition of a
commercial bank for the benefit of the coconut farmersto enable such bank to
promptly and efficiently realize the industry's credit policy.Thus, the PCA bought
72.2% of the shares of stock of First United Bank, headed by Pedro Cojuangco.Dueto
changes in its corporate identity and purpose, the banks articles of incorporation were
amended in July 1975, resulting in a change in the banks name from First United
Bank United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB).

In November 2000 then President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order (E.O.) 312,
establishing a Sagip Niyugan Program which sought to provide immediate income
supplement to coconut farmers and encourage the creation of a sustainable local
market demand for coconut oil and other coconut products.The Executive Order
sought to establish aP1-billion fund by disposing of assets acquired using coco-levy
funds or assets of entities supported by those funds.A committee was created to
manage the fund under this program.A majority vote of its members could engage the
services of a reputable auditing firm to conduct periodic audits.

At about the same time, President Estrada issued E.O. 313, which created an
irrevocable trust fund known as the Coconut Trust Fund (the Trust Fund).This aimed
to provide financial assistance to coconut farmers, to the coconut industry, and to
other agri-related programs.The shares of stock of SMC were to serve as the Trust
Funds initial capital.These shares were acquired with CII Funds and constituted
approximately 27% of the outstanding capital stock of SMC.E.O. 313 designated
UCPB, through its Trust Department, as the Trust Funds trustee bank.The Trust Fund
Committee would administer, manage, and supervise the operations of the Trust Fund.
The Committee would designate an external auditor to do an annual audit or as often
as needed but it may also request the Commission on Audit (COA) to intervene.

To implement its mandate, E.O. 313 directed the Presidential Commission on Good
Government, the Office of the Solicitor General, and other government agencies to
exclude the 27% CIIF SMC shares from Civil Case 0033, entitled Republic of the
Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al.,which was then pending before the
Sandiganbayan and to lift the sequestration over those shares.

On January 26, 2001, however, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo ordered

the suspension of E.O.s 312 and 313. This notwithstanding, on March 1, 2001
petitioner organizations and individuals brought the present action in G.R. 147036-37
to declare E.O.s 312 and 313 as well as Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468
unconstitutional.On April 24, 2001 the other sets of petitioner organizations and
individuals instituted G.R. 147811 to nullify Section 2 of P.D. 755 and Article III,
Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468 also for being unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Are the coco-levy funds public funds?

HELD: YES, Coco-levy funds are public funds. The Court was satisfied that the
coco-levy funds were raised pursuant to law to support a proper governmental
purpose.They were raised with the use of the police and taxing powers of the State for
the benefit of the coconut industry and its farmers in general. The COA reviewed the
use of the funds.The BIR treated them as public funds and the very laws governing
coconut levies recognize their public character.

The Court has also recently declared that the coco-levy funds are in the nature of
taxes and can only be used for public purpose.Taxes are enforced proportional
contributions from persons and property, levied by the State by virtue of its
sovereignty for the support of the government and for all itspublic needs. Here, the
coco-levy funds were imposed pursuant to law, namely, R.A. 6260 and P.D. 276.The
funds were collected and managed by the PCA,an independent government
corporation directly under the President.And, as the respondent public officials
pointed out, thepertinent laws used the termlevy, which meansto tax, in describing the
exaction.

R.A. 6260 and P.D. 276 did not raise money to boost the governments general funds
but to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of a threatened industry,
the coconut industry, which is so affected with public interest as to be within the
police power of the State. The funds sought to support the coconut industry,one of the
main economic backbones of the country, and to secure economic benefits for the
coconut farmers and farm workers.

Lastly, the coco-levy funds are evidently special funds. Its character as such fund was
made clear by the fact that they were deposited in the PNB (then a wholly owned
government bank) and not in the Philippine Treasury.

3) REPUBLIC v. BACOLOD-MURCIA MILLING, ET AL. GR L-19824-26,

July 9, 1966 En Banc (Special Assessment- Tax or Regulation)

FACTS: Joint appeal by three sugar centrals, respondents herein. from a decision of
the Court of First Instance of Manila finding them liable for special assessments under
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 632.

The appellants' thesis is simply to the effect that the "10 centavos per picul of sugar"
authorized to be collected under Sec. 15 of Republic 632 is a special assessment. As
such, the proceeds thereof may be devoted only to the specific purpose for which the
assessment was authorized, a special assessment being a levy upon property
predicated on the doctrine that the property against which it is levied derives some
special benefit from the improvement. It is not a tax measure intended to raise
revenues for the Government.

ISSUE: Is the imposition of special assessment an exercise of the taxing power

RULING: The Court deemed it relevant to discuss its holding in Lutz v. Araneta. For
in this Lutz case, Commonwealth Act 567, otherwise known as the Sugar Adjustment
Act, all collections made thereunder "shall accrue to a special fund in the Philippine
Treasury, to be known as the 'Sugar Adjustment and Stabilization Fund,' and shall be
paid out only for any or all of the following purposes or to attain any or all of the
following objectives, as may be provided by law." Analysis of the Act, and
particularly Section 6, will show that the tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to
provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry.
In other words, the act is primarily an exercise of the police power.'

On the authority of the above case, then, We hold that the special assessment at
bar may be considered as similarly as the above, that is, that the levy for the Philsugin
Fund is not so much an exercise of the power of taxation, nor the imposition of a
special assessment, but, the exercise of the police power for the general welfare of the
entire country. It is, therefore, an exercise of a sovereign power which no private
citizen may lawfully resist.

4) GEROCHI v. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

GR 159796, July 17, 2007, En Banc
(Universal Charge – Tax or Regulation/Police Power)

FACTS:

On June 8, 2001 Congress enacted RA 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Act of
2001. Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi and company assail the validity of Section 34 of
the EPIRA Law for being an undue delegation of the power of taxation. Section 34
provides for the imposition of a “Universal Charge” to all electricity end users after a
period of (1) one year after the effectively of the EPIRA Law.

The universal charge to be collected would serve as payment for government debts,
missionary electrification, equalization of taxes and royalties applied to renewable
energy and imported energy, environmental charge and for a charge to account for all
forms of cross subsidies for a period not exceeding three years. The universal charge
shall be collected by the ERC on a monthly basis from all end users and will then be
managed by the PSALM Corp. through the creation of a special trust fund.

ISSUE:Whether or not there is an undue delegation of the power to tax on the part of
the ERC

HELD:

No, the universal charge as provided for in section 34 is not a tax but an exaction of
the regulatory power (police power) of the state. The universal charge under section
34 is incidental to the regulatory duties of the ERC, hence the provision assailed is not
for generation of revenue and therefore it cannot be considered as tax, but an
execution of the states police power thru regulation.

Moreover, the amount collected is not made certain by the ERC, but by the legislative
parameters provided for in the law (RA 9136) itself, it therefore cannot be understood
as a rule solely coming from the ERC. The ERC in this case is only a specialized
administrative agency which is tasked of executing a subordinate legislation issued by
congress; which before execution must pass both the completeness test and the
sufficiency of standard test. The court in appreciating Section 34 of RA 9136 in its
entirety finds the said law and the assailed portions free from any constitutional defect
and thus deemed complete and sufficient in form.

5) JOSE J. FERRER v. MAYOR BAUTISTA

G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015
(Socialized Housing Tax –both power to tax/police power and Garbage fees)

Facts:
 The City of Quezon passed two ordinances namely.
 The first one was the Socialized Housing Tax of QC allowing the imposition of
special assessment (1/2 of the assessed valued of land in excess of P100k)
 The second one was Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013 on Garbage Collection
Fees imposing fees depending on the amount of the land or floor area).
 Jose Ferrer, as a property in Quezon City questioned the validity of the city
ordinances.
 According to Ferrer:
 The city has no power to impose the tax.
 The SHT violates the rule on equality because it burdens real property
owners with expenses to provide funds for the housing of informal settlers.
 The SHT is confiscatory or oppressive.
 Also, he assails the validity of the garbage fees imposition because:
 It violates the rule on double taxation.
 It violates the rule on equality because the fees are collected from only
domestic households and not from restaurants, food courts, fast food
chains, and other commercial dining places that spew garbage much more
than residential property owners.

Issue: WON the ordinances were valid.

Held: 

1st ordinance: Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City is valid.

Cities have the power to tax

It must be noted that local government units such as cities has the power to tax. The
collection for the socialized housing tax is valid. It must be noted that the collections
were made to accrue to the socialized housing programs and projects of the city. 

The imposition was for a public purpose (exercise of power of taxation + police
power)
In this case, there was both an exercise of the power to tax (primary) and police power
(incidental). Removing slum areas in Quezon City is not only beneficial to the
underprivileged and homeless constituents but advantageous to the real property
owners as well. 
The situation will improve the value of the their property investments, fully enjoying
the same in view of an orderly, secure, and safe community, and will enhance the
quality of life of the poor, making them law-abiding constituents and better
consumers of business products.

There is no violation of the rule on equality

Note: There is a substantial distinction between: real property owner and an informal
settler. In fact, the Supreme Court said that the disparity is so obvious. It is inherent in
the power to tax that a State is free to select the subjects of taxation. Inequities which
result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation.

All these requisites are complied with: An ordinance based on reasonable

classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the
law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must
not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all
members of the same class.

The ordinance is not oppressive or confiscatory

The ordinance is also not oppressive since the tax rate being imposed is consistent
with the UDHA (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992). While the law
authorizes LGUs to collect SHT on properties with an assessed value of more than
P50,000.00, the questioned ordinance only covers properties with an assessed value
exceeding P100,000.00. As well, the ordinance provides for a tax credit equivalent to
the total amount of the special assessment paid by the property owner beginning in the
sixth (6th) year of the effectivity of the ordinance.

2nd ordinance: The imposition of garbage fee is invalid.

Note: There was no violation of double taxation but there was a violation of the rule
on equity.

There is no violation of double taxation: the garbage fees are not taxes
In Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon City, the Court declared that:
"if the generating of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely
incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact
that incidentally revenue is also obtained does not make the imposition a tax."

Contention of Ferrer: that the imposition of garbage fee is tantamount to double

taxation because garbage collection is a basic and essential public service that should
be paid out from property tax, business tax, transfer tax, amusement tax, community
tax certificate, other taxes, and the IRA of the Quezon City Government. All these are
valid taxes. The garbage fees are license fees

Footnote: In order to constitute double taxation in the objectionable or prohibited

sense the same property must be taxed twice when it should be taxed but once; both
taxes must be imposed on the same property or subject-matter, for the same purpose,
by the same State, Government, or taxing authority, within the same jurisdiction or
taxing district, during the same taxing period, and they must be the same kind or
character of tax.
There is a violation of the rule on equality: no substantial distinction
There is no substantial distinction between an occupant of a lot, on one hand, and an
occupant of a unit in a condominium, socialized housing project or apartment, on the
other hand. 
Most likely, garbage output produced by these types of occupants is uniform and does
not vary to a large degree; thus, a similar schedule of fee is both just and equitable.

The garbage fees or rates are unjust and inequitable

A resident of a 200 sq. m. unit in a condominium or socialized housing project has to
pay twice the amount than a resident of a lot similar in size; unlike unit occupants, all
occupants of a lot with an area of 200 sq. m. and less have to pay a fixed rate of
Php100.00; and the same amount of garbage fee is imposed regardless of whether the
resident is from a condominium or from a socialized housing project.

The classifications are not germane to the purpose of the ordinance

The declared purpose is: "promoting shared responsibility with the residents to attack
their common mindless attitude in over-consuming the present resources and in
generating waste."

Instead of simplistically categorizing the payee into land or floor occupant of a lot or
unit of a condominium, socialized housing project or apartment, respondent City
Council should have considered factors that could truly measure the amount of wastes
generated and the appropriate fee for its collection. Factors include, among others,
household age and size, accessibility to waste collection, population density of the
barangay or district, capacity to pay, and actual occupancy of the property.

SC: 
→ Validity of Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City is upheld. 
→ Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013, which collects an annual garbage fee on all
domestic households in Quezon City, is unconstitutional and illegal.

6) VICTORIAS MILLING V. MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIA

(Presumption when the law is silent – Is it a Tax or Exaction)

FACTS: Ordinance 1 was approved by the municipal Council of Victorias on

September 22, 1956 by way of an amendment to two municipal ordinances separately
imposing license taxes on operators of sugar centrals   and sugar refineries. The
changes were: with respect to sugar centrals, by increasing the rates of license taxes;
and as to sugar refineries, by increasing the rates of license taxes as well as the range
of graduated schedule of annual output capacity.

Plaintiff Victorias Milling Co. filed a suit to ask for judgment declaring the said
Ordinance null and void as it is discriminatory since it singles out plaintiff which is
the only operator of a sugar central and a sugar refinery within the jurisdiction of
defendant municipality; and that it constitutes double taxation.
ISSUES:
1) Whether Ordinance 1 is discriminatory.
2) Whether Ordinance 1 constitutes double taxation.

RULING:

1) No. The ordinance does not single out Victorias as the only object of the ordinance.
Said ordinance is made to apply to any sugar central or sugar refinery which may
happen to operate in the municipality. The fact that plaintiff is actually the sole
operator of a sugar central and a sugar refinery does not make the ordinance
discriminatory. Not even the name of plaintiff herein was ever mentioned in the
ordinance now disputed.

2) No. First, the two taxes cover two different objects. Section 1 of the ordinance
taxes a person operating sugar centrals or engaged in the manufacture of centrifugal
sugar. While under Section 2, those taxed are the operators of sugar refinery mills.
One occupation or business is different from the other. Second, the disputed taxes are
imposed on occupation or business. Both taxes are not on sugar. The amount thereof
depends on the annual output capacity of the mills concerned, regardless of the actual
sugar milled. Plaintiff's argument perhaps could make out a point if the object of
taxation here were the sugar it produces, not the business of producing it.

Notes:

We accordingly say that the designation given by the municipal authorities does not
decide whether the imposition is properly a license tax or a license fee. The
determining factors are the purpose and effect of the imposition as may be apparent
from the provisions of the ordinance. Thus, "[w]hen no police inspection, supervision,
or regulation is provided, nor any standard set for the applicant 23 to establish, or that
he agrees to attain or maintain, but any and all persons engaged in the business
designated, without qualification or hindrance, may come, and a license on payment
of the stipulated sum will issue, to do business, subject to no prescribed rule of
conduct and under no guardian eye, but according to the unrestrained judgment or
fancy of the applicant and licensee, the presumption is strong that the power of
taxation, and not the police power, is being exercised." 2

7) CHEVRON PHILIPPINES v. BCDA

GR. No. 173863, September 15, 2010
(Royalty Fees- Is it a Tax or Regulation/Police Power)
Facts:
On June 28, 2002, the Board of Directors of respondent Clark Development
Corporation (CDC) issued and approved Policy Guidelines on the Movement of
Petroleum Fuel to and from the Clark Special Economic Zone. In one of its
provisions, it levied royalty fees to suppliers delivering Coastal fuel from outside
sources for Php0.50 per liter for those delivering fuel to CSEZ locators not sanctioned
by CDC and Php1.00 per litter for those bringing-in petroleum fuel from outside
sources. The policy guidelines were implemented effective July 27, 2002.

The petitioner Chevron Philippines Inc (formerly Caltex Philippines Inc) who is a fuel
supplier to Nanox Philippines, a locator inside the CSEZ, received a Statement of
Account from CDC billing them to pay the royalty fees amounting to Php115,000 for
its fuel sales from Coastal depot to Nanox Philippines from August 1 to September
21, 2002.

Petitioner, contending that nothing in the law authorizes CDC to impose royalty fees
based on a per unit measurement of any commodity sold within the special economic
zone, protested against the CDC and Bases Conversion Development Authority
(BCDA). They alleged that the royalty fees imposed had no reasonable relation to the
probably expenses of regulation and that the imposition on a per unit measurement of
fuel sales was for a revenue generating purpose, thus, akin to a “tax”.

BCDA denied the protest. The Office of the President dismissed the appeal as well for
lack of merit.

Upon appeal, CA dismissed the case. CA held that in imposing the royalty fees, CDC
was exercising its right to regulate the flow of fuel into CSEZ under the vested
exclusive right to distribute fuel within CSEZ pursuant to its Joint Venture Agreement
(JVA) with Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) and Coastal Subic Bay
Terminal, Inc. (CSBTI) dated April 11, 1996. The appellate court also found that
royalty fees were assessed on fuel delivered, not on the sale, by petitioner and that the
basis of such imposition was petitioner’s delivery receipts to Nanox Philippines. The
fact that revenue is incidentally also obtained does not make the imposition a tax as
long as the primary purpose of such imposition is regulation.

When elevated in SC, petitioner argued that: 1) CDC has no power to impose fees on
sale of fuel inside CSEZ on the basis of income generating functions and its right to
market and distribute goods inside the CSEZ as this would amount to tax which they
have no power to impose, and that the imposed fee is not regulatory in nature but
rather a revenue generating measure; 2) even if the fees are regulatory in nature, it is
unreasonable and are grossly in excess of regulation costs.

Respondents contended that the purpose of royalty fees is to regulate the flow of fuel
to and from the CSEZ and revenue (if any) is just an incidental product. They viewed
it as a valid exercise of police power since it is aimed at promoting the general
welfare of public; that being the CSEZ administrator, they are responsible for the safe
distribution of fuel products inside the CSEZ.

Issue:
Whether the act of CDC in imposing royalty fees can be considered as valid exercise
of the police power.
Held:
Yes. SC held that CDC was within the limits of the police power of the State when it
imposed royalty fees.

In distinguishing tax and regulation as a form of police power, the determining factor
is the purpose of the implemented measure. If the purpose is primarily to raise
revenue, then it will be deemed a tax even though the measure results in some form of
regulation. On the other hand, if the purpose is primarily to regulate, then it is deemed
a regulation and an exercise of the police power of the state, even though incidentally,
revenue is generated.

In this case, SC held that the subject royalty fee was imposed for regulatory purposes
and not for generation of income or profits. The Policy Guidelines was issued to
ensure the safety, security, and good condition of the petroleum fuel industry within
the CSEZ. The questioned royalty fees form part of the regulatory framework to
ensure “free flow or movement” of petroleum fuel to and from the CSEZ. The fact
that respondents have the exclusive right to distribute and market petroleum products
within CSEZ pursuant to its JVA with SBMA and CSBTI does not diminish the
regulatory purpose of the royalty fee for fuel products supplied by petitioner to its
client at the CSEZ.

However, it was erroneous for petitioner to argue that such exclusive right of
respondent CDC to market and distribute fuel inside CSEZ is the sole basis of the
royalty fees imposed under the Policy Guidelines. Being the administrator of CSEZ,
the responsibility of ensuring the safe, efficient and orderly distribution of fuel
products within the Zone falls on CDC. Addressing specific concerns demanded by
the nature of goods or products involved is encompassed in the range of services
which respondent CDC is expected to provide under Sec. 2 of E.O. No. 80, in
pursuance of its general power of supervision and control over the movement of all
supplies and equipment into the CSEZ.

There can be no doubt that the oil industry is greatly imbued with public interest as it
vitally affects the general welfare. Fuel is a highly combustible product which, if left
unchecked, poses a serious threat to life and property. Also, the reasonable relation
between the royalty fees imposed on a “per liter” basis and the regulation sought to be
attained is that the higher the volume of fuel entering CSEZ, the greater the extent and
frequency of supervision and inspection required to ensure safety, security, and order
within the Zone.

Respondents submit that the increased administrative costs were triggered by security
risks that have recently emerged, such as terrorist strikes. The need for regulation is
more evident in the light of 9/11 tragedy considering that what is being moved from
one location to another are highly combustible fuel products that could cause loss of
lives and damage to properties.

As to the issue of reasonableness of the amount of the fees, SC held that no evidence
was adduced by the petitioner to show that the fees imposed are unreasonable.
Administrative issuances have the force and effect of law. They benefit from the same
presumption of validity and constitutionality enjoyed by statutes. These two precepts
place a heavy burden upon any party assailing governmental regulations. Petitioner’s
plain allegations are simply not enough to overcome the presumption of validity and
reasonableness of the subject imposition.