Criminal Cases Doctrines

Book 1

]LACSON v EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

TOPIC: EX POST FACTO LAW

HELD:

Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not penal law.
It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts
of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations;  or
those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide dor their punishment. R.A 7975,
which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and
other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a pro-
cedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of
all kinds can properly administer justice.  Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of
R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

DEL SOCORRO v VAN WILSEM

TOPIC: GENERALITY OF THE LAW

HELD:

In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel, the Court held that –

Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are gov-
erned by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when staying
in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15). It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respon-
dent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article195 of the Family Code as a conse-
quence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that re-
spondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has
the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that
being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of
and capacity to support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing
his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.

PPL v LIANG
TERRITORIALITY
HELD:

The immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts was
done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioner's case falls within
the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut
the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evi-
dence, should it so desire.

Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming
petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the
case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomat-
ic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions.5  As already mentioned above, the
commission of a crime is not part of official duty.

SHAUFF v CA
TERRITORALITY

While the doctrine of immunity is also applicable to complaints filed against state officials, it
only contemplates acts done in their official capacity. This does not cover acts contrary to law
& injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. When an official acts in a manner that invades or vio-
lates the personal & property rights of another, the aggrieved party may sue the official & such
suit will not be a suit against the state. (Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Ali-
gaen) The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply where the public official is being sued in
his private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.

Doctrine of immunity of suit can’t be applied if such person is sued in their individual capacity.

AAA v BBB

TERRITORIALITY
HELD:

What R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital infidelity  per se  but the psychological vio-
lence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife. Otherwise stated, it is the violence in-
flicted under the said circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in
the law is only one of the various acts by which psychological violence may be committed.
Moreover, depending on the circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the
illicit relationship may or may not even be causing mental or emotional anguish on the wife.
Thus, the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and distinct element in the
commission of the offense.

What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that acts of
violence against women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes;
meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation oc-
cur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court
wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdic-
tion to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same ex-
cludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly
tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.

It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of vio-
lence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph (C) was commit-
ted outside Philippine territory, that the victim be a resident of the place where the complaint is
filed in view of the anguish suffered being a material element of the offense. In the present sce-
nario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband are residents of Pasig City since
2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.

PPL v INUHA
CONSPIRACY

HELD:

On the matter of conspiracy, we have consistently held that conspiracy need not be shown by
direct proof of an agreement by the parties to commit the crime. The conduct of the malefac-
tors before, during or after the commission of the crime is sufficient to prove their conspiracy.
Once proved, the act of one becomes the act of all. All shall be answerable as co-principals
regardless of the extent or degree of their participation. As an alternative defense, appellants
present the theory that even assuming they participated in the killing of Siegfred, they should
only be held liable for the commission of an impossible crime under Article 4, Par. 2 of the Re-
vised Penal Code, penalized under Article 59 thereof. 31 Appellants theorize that the shots
fired by Armada already resulted in the death of the victim, and hence, their subsequent shoot-
ing of the victim merely constitutes the impossible crime of killing an already dead person. The
proposition not only completely contradicts their defense of alibi and denial, it is also specula-
tive as to cause of death. The defense of impossible crime is irreconcilable with alibi.

PPL v REYES
ATTEMPTED
HELD:

The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction between attempted rape
and acts of lasciviousness. The felony of attempted rape requires such intent; the felony of acts
of lasciviousness does not. Only the direct overt acts of the offender establish the intent to lie
with the female. However, merely climbing on top of a naked female does not constitute at-
tempted rape without proof of his erectile penis being in a position to penetrate the female's
vagina. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the
pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slight-
est penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis,
there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of las-
civiousness. 

PPL v REYES
CONSUMATED RAPE

HELD:

In objective terms, carnal knowledge, the other essential element in consummated statutory
rape, does not require full penile penetration of the female.   the touching that constitutes rape
does not mean mere epidermal contact, or stroking or grazing of organs, or a slight brush or a
scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis, but
rather the erect penis touching the labias or sliding into the female genitalia. Accordingly, the
conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes con-
summated rape proceeds from the physical fact that the labias are physically situated beneath
the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, such that for the penis to touch either of them is to at-
tain some degree of penetration beneath the surface of the female genitalia.  It is required,
however, that this manner of touching of the labias must be sufficiently and convincingly estab-
lished

PPL v ABELLA
FURSTRATED

HELD:

In cases of frustrated homicide, the main element is the accused’s intent to take his victim’s
life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt
regarding homicidal intent. And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things, the
means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his
victim. The petitioner belabors his claim that had he intended to kill Benigno, he could have
repeatedly hacked him to ensure the latter’s death, and not leave right after the blow to chase
Alejandro instead.


In Benigno’s case, he sustained an 11-centimeter long hacking wound in the neck and a 4-cm
long incised wound in his left hand caused by the unsterile scythe used by the petitioner. Dr.
Ardiente testified that "it is possible to have complications resulting from these injuries because
the wounds were extensive and they were big and they were open wounds, so there is a pos-
sibility of infections resulting from these kinds of wounds, and the instrument used was not a
sterile instrument contaminated with other things.” No complications developed from Benig-
no’s wounds which could have caused his death, but he was confined in the hospital for a pe-
riod of 17 days from September 6, 1998 to September 23, 1998.

The use of a scythe against Benigno’s neck was determinative of the petitioner’s homicidal in-
tent when the hacking blow was delivered. It does not require imagination to figure out that a
single hacking blow in the neck with the use of a scythe could be enough to decapitate a per-
son and leave him dead. While no complications actually developed from the gaping wounds in
Benigno’s neck and left hand, it perplexes logic to conclude that the injuries he sustained were
potentially not fatal considering the period of his confinement in the hospital. A mere grazing
injury would have necessitated a lesser degree of medical attention.

PPL v COLINARES
FRUSTRATED (what distinguishes frustrated homicide from attempted homicide)

HELD:

The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the accused’s intent to take his vic-
tim’s life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible
doubt regarding homicidal intent.  And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other
things, the means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflict-
ed on his victim. Here, Arnel struck Rufino on the head with a huge stone. The blow was so
forceful that it knocked Rufino out. Considering the great size of his weapon, the impact it pro-
duced, and the location of the wounds that Arnel inflicted on his victim, the Court is convinced
that he intended to kill him. The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempt-
ed, not frustrated, homicide. In Palaganas v. People, we ruled that when the accused intended
to kill his victim, as shown by his use of a deadly weapon and the wounds he inflicted, but the
victim did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime is frustrated murder or frus-
trated homicide. If the victim’s wounds are not fatal, the crime is only attempted murder or at-
tempted homicide. Thus, the prosecution must establish with certainty the nature, extent,
depth, and severity of the victim’s wounds. While Dr. Belleza testified that "head injuries are
always very serious," he could not categorically say that Rufino’s wounds in this case were "fa-
tal.

PPL v VALENZUELA
CONSUMATED
HELD:

That once the offenders therein obtained possession over the stolen items, the effect of the
felony has been produced as there has been deprivation of property. The presumed inability of
the offenders to freely dispose of the stolen property does not negate the fact that the owners
have already been deprived of their right to possession upon the completion of the taking. We
thus conclude that under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of frustrated theft

PPL vs CARANDANG
(lol idk unsay connect niya sa topic bsta mao rani ang relatable to crim 1 sa case for me )

HELD:
In fine, in the application of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with
homicide, the law looks at the constituent crime of homicide which is a crime against persons
and not at the constituent crime of robbery which is a crime against property. Treachery is ap-
plied to the constituent crime of homicide and not to the constituent crime of robbery of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

The crime of robbery with homicide does not lose its classification as a crime against property
or as a special complex and single and indivisible crime simply because treachery is appreciat-
ed as a generic aggravating circumstance. Treachery merely increases the penalty for the crime
conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code absent any generic mitigating circum-
stance.

PPL vs PADRONES
CONSPIRACY

HELD:

  It has been held that conspiracy, like the offense itself, must be shown to exist beyond rea-
s o n a b l e d o u b t .  2 8  S o a l s o h a s i t b e e n h e l d t h a t c o n s p i r a c y " t r a n s c e n d s
companionship."  29 Hence, the fact that the two accused may have happened to leave togeth-
er, and one of them left a closing warning, can not instantly support a finding of conspiracy.
The prosecution is, in addition, hard put to adduce evidence demonstrating facts that the par-
ties had priorly come to an agreement to commit the crime with which they are charged. Al-
though the act of agreeing need not be demonstrated, evidence of the fact of agreement must
nonetheless be convincingly shown. The accused's acts after the fact, by themselves, are in-
adequate to show that previous agreement.

TAN vs TAN
ARTICLE 10

HELD:

Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the
RPC, thus:

SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and oth-
er applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)

Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the fu-
ture may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This
Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the
contrary. (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary ca-
pacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law
is silent on a particular matter.

PPL vs ALCONGA
SELF DEFENSE

HELD:

An accused was no longer acting in self-defense when he pursued and killed a fleeing adver-
sary, though originally the unlawful aggressor, there being then no more aggression to defend
against, the same having deceased from the moment deceased took to his heels. Under the
doctrine in United States v. Vitug, supra, when the deceased ran and fled without having inflict-
ed so much as a scratch upon appellant, but after, upon the other hand, having been wounded
with one revolver shot and several bolo slashes, as aforesaid, the right of appellant to inflict
injury upon him ceased absolutely — appellant "had no right to pursue, no right to kill or injure"
said deceased — for the reason that "a fleeing man is not dangerous to the one from whom he
flees. ’’

PPL vs MONTALBO
SELF DEFENSE

HELD:

The appellant herein did not act in self-defense, the elements of which were not all present in
this case. Though the deceased struck him with his fists, the appellant was not justified in mor-
tally wounding his assailant with the penknife. This was not a reasonably necessary means of
repelling the attack.  (U.S. v. De Castro, 2 Phil., 67; Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of
November 28, 1885; 35 Juris prudencia Criminal, 858-861.) Moreover, the appellant provoked
the attack by pulling the deceased’s coat-sleeve, taking two steps backward, and challenging
him with the remarks, "What do you want?”

PPL vs SUMICAD
SELF DEFENSE

HELD:

It is undoubtedly well established in jurisprudence that a man is not, as a rule, justified in taking
the life of one who assaults him with his fist only, without the use of a dangerous weapon. The
person assaulted must, in such case, either resist with the arms that nature gave him or with
other means of defense at his disposal, short of taking life. But that rule contemplates the situ-
ation where the contestants are in the open and the person assaulted can exercise the option
of running away. It can have no binding force in the case where the person assaulted has re-
treated to the wall, as the saying is, and uses in a defensive way the only weapon at his dis-
posal. One is not required, when hard pressed, to draw fine distinctions as to the extent of the
injury which a reckless and infuriated assailant might probably inflict upon him (Browell vs.
People, 38 Mich., 732). And it was not incumbent on the accused in this case, when assailed
by a bully of known violent disposition, who was larger and stronger than himself.