Legal Writing PDF

Philippine Copyright, 2014
by
ISBN 978-971-23-7492-0
ITEM CODE 85-OT- 00069-B
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ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

BY THE AUTHORS
I dedicate this book to my parents, Domiciano and Josefina Abad, whom I
cannot honor enough.
Roberto A. Abad
CONTENTS
1. Legal Writing
Scope of Legal Writing
Aims of the Book
2. The Legal Dispute
Meaning of Legal Dispute
Its Significance in Legal Writing
Legal Dispute and The Principal Issue
Importance of Principal Issue
3. Stages of Writing
Two Stages of Legal Writing
Value of Pre-Work
4. Getting at the Facts of the Case
Facts of a Case
Random Notes versus Summary
Facts Seen through the Issue
Cluttered Facts
Relevant Facts Extracted
Facts Set in Sequence
Writing Exercises
The Case of a Child and a Neighbor’s Dog
5. Knowing the Applicable Law or Rule
Sources of Law or Rule
Facts Reexamined
Writing Exercises
6. Getting into the Issues
Issues in Multiple Legal Disputes
Subordinate Controlling Issues
Relevant and Irrelevant Issues
A List of All Issues
Factual and Legal Issues
Correct Statement of the Issues
Threshold Issues
Writing Exercises
7. Roughing Out the Argument
Balanced Presentation
Anatomy of a Legal Argument
The Key Fact In Rules
The Case Fact
Meaning of “Rule”
Roughed Out Arguments
Creative Thinking
Arguments that Build Up
Arguments that Destroy
Pre-Work Reviewed
Writing Exercises
8. Introducing the Issues
Need for Introduction
Sufficiency of Introduction
The Statement of the Case
The Statement of Facts
Short Introductions
Writing Exercises
9. Writing the Argument
Jump Off Points
Three Statements of an Argument
Persuasive Arguments
Convincing Rule Statement
Convincing Fact Statement
Correct Conclusion Statement
Positioning Variation
Building Blocks of Arguments
Omitted Statement
Closing Statement
Writing Exercises
10. Tightening Your Work
Language Problems
Needless Words
Active versus Passive Voice
Third Person Speaks
Block Quotations
Writing Exercises
11. Writing Clearly
Right Connectives
Abstract versus Concrete Writing
Substitute Names
Headings
Writing Exercises
12. Writing Legalese
Legal Clichés
Old English
Sounding Formal
Cheap Words
Self-praise
Sentence-length Variety
Writing Exercises
13. Writing Legal Opinions
Illustrative Case: Chan v. Century Bank
14. Writing Trial Memoranda
Illustrative Case: Maranan v. Gonzalo Realty
Writing Exercises
15. Writing Petitions For Review
Illustrative Case: Excal Corp. v. Jimenez
Writing Exercises
16. Writing a Decision
Illustrative Case: Hudson Power Corp. v. Nemo Shipping
Writing Exercises
APPENDICES
Appendix A –– People v. Takad
Appendix B –– Garcia v. Silver Films, Inc
Appendix C –– National Supplies Authority v. Allied Shipping Corp
Appendix D –– Pointers in Answer School and Bar Examination Questions
This edition includes pointers
in answering law school and bar
examination questions.
1.
Legal Writing
Scope of Legal Writing

This book is about the things that lawyers write to win others over to
their point of view. If you were a practicing lawyer, you would be doing a
lot of this kind of work. For instance, when your client, say, a restaurant
owner, writes to you regarding the threat of a possible lawsuit from a
customer who was taken ill after eating in your client’s restaurant, you may
have to write him back, giving him your views regarding his probable
liability based on the facts he tells you. This is legal writing.
When the case gets to court, you would be filing a number of pleadings
like an answer to the customer’s complaint, denying your client’s liability or
minimizing it. Further down the road, you would probably file for him
assorted pleadings, motions, oppositions, replies, rejoinders, memoranda, and
other papers. These are legal writings.
And if you were to be the judge, who is also a lawyer, and must decide the
case, you would have to put your decision in writing, announce its results,
and reveal to the parties your reasons for the decision. Under our laws, the
parties are entitled to know why they won or lost a case. The strength of your
decision lies in the validity and persuasiveness of the opinion supporting it.
This, too, is legal writing.
But legal writing does not only begin when you pass the bar. As law
students, you begin to churn out some form of legal writing once you enter
law school. When you digest cases, answer examination questions, and write
your thesis or any other paper in law school, you begin to train yourself for
actual legal writing because the most basic elements you need to apply in
digesting cases and answering your law school exams are the same ones you
will use in legal writing in the practice of law: the facts, the issue, and the
arguments or principles of law that resolve the issue.
Aims of the Book
The principal aim of this book is to help you write pleadings, legal
opinions, memoranda, and other position papers, clearly and convincingly,
and to win others to your point of view. Consequently, apart from learning
the general structure of effective legal writing, this book will do more.
One. This book will help you identify and put together the facts on which
the issues of a case will be decided. As a rule, cases will not come with the
facts all sorted out for you. You will discover, as you study the documents,
hold interviews with the parties involved, or simply examine the records, that
the relevant facts in a case are far from organized and come mixed up with
the irrelevant. He who is able to extract and organize the relevant facts would
have the advantage of arguing from uncluttered truth. You can get there if
you persevere in the lessons of this book.
Two. This book will also help you find the law or rule that applies to your
case given the nature of the legal dispute involved. You will discover that
laws are not restricted to those enacted by duly constituted legislative bodies
called “statute law.” A great body of laws also evolves from judicial
precedents, where courts interpret laws as these apply to specific cases. This
body of laws is referred to as “case law.” Your knowledge of the law
involved in your case, both statute law and case law, must complement your
knowledge of the facts to prepare you for the job of writing to persuade your
reader to your point of view.
Three. This book will help you correctly identify the issue or issues in a
case. The issue does for an opinion or a pleading what the rudder does for a
ship. If you argue the wrong issue, it would be like pointing your rudder to
the wrong direction such that your argument would not touch port and miss
the real issue that the case presents. When this happens, your case would be
decided on an issue that you chose not to be heard on. You can avoid this.
Four. This book will help you pack power into your arguments. It will
show you the elements of a balanced presentation of those arguments and
what it takes to destroy the argument of the opposite side while building up
your own. It will also show you the importance of a closing statement and
how you could prepare a most effective one.
Five. This book will show you how to edit your work, tighten your
sentences, and make your writing come through to your reader clearly. A
number of legal writing prescriptions in this book may appear controversial
to some but controversies initiate discussion and the free marketplace of ideas
always profits from it. All that is required is an open mind.
Six. This book aims to help you write better. Some say that the ability to
write well is a natural gift that is not available to all. This might be true. But
the fact that you have gotten this far in your studies gives you the right to
assume that you have the gift to write. All you have to do now is improve on
your gift.
Master a few refurbished techniques collected in this book and you are on
your way to preparing adequate, clear, and convincing pleadings, legal
opinions, memoranda, and other position papers. Of course, the greatest
secret of success in writing well is in constantly striving to use what you
learn. They will not work unless you put them into practice.
And beyond practice, to be a good a writer one must be a prolific reader.
Learn the styles of effective writers such as best selling authors, opinion
writers, and respectable journalists. During your stay in law school you are
forced to absorb the writing style used in laws and jurisprudence, which may
seem impressive but not the most effective way of communication. This book
will encourage you to view legal writing as a communication skill as much as
an advocacy skill.
2.
The Legal Dispute
A legal dispute lies at the heart of every case. In fact, most of your writing
assignments as a lawyer would probably be devoted to arguing and resolving
such a dispute.
Meaning of Legal Dispute

For the purpose of this book, there is a legal dispute when one party
complains of a violation of his right by another who, on the other hand,
denies such a violation. A legal dispute in this sense is akin to a cause of
action in a civil suit in which the defendant denies the claim against him. It is
this denial that tenders a legal dispute.
When a person renting an apartment allegedly could not pay the agreed
monthly rents yet refuses to leave his unit, a legal dispute arises. This consists
of: (a) the apartment owner’s claim that the tenant fails to pay the agreed
monthly rents and must leave his unit; and (b) the tenant’s denial of the
claim and insistence to retain the unit. You have in this case a right
protected by law, an alleged violation of such right, and a denial of the
allegation—a legal dispute.
The right claimed to have been violated must of course be a legal right
since courts will uphold and vindicate only those rights that are established or
recognized by law. For instance, a Filipino may claim that he deserves to be
allowed to travel to the United States. But, if the U.S. embassy denies him the
visa required for entry into that country, he cannot file a lawsuit to compel its
issuance since Philippine laws do not grant him that right.
Likewise, the dispute over the demand that Filipino rather than English be
made the primary medium of instruction in all levels of education is not a
legal dispute since it does not involve an actual violation of some right. The
controversy, although of public interest, will not to be resolved by litigation
but by legislative action.
What is the legal dispute when a person allegedly refuses to pay his debt?
The legal dispute lies in: (a) the creditor’s claim that the debtor unjustly
refuses to pay his debt under a promissory note that he issued in favor of
the creditor; and (b) the debtor’s denial of such a claim. Again, you have
here a right protected by law, an alleged violation of the right, and a denial of
the allegation.
In a criminal case, the legal dispute consists in the State’s claim that the
accused has violated its right to compel obedience to its laws and in the
latter’s denial of the claim during his arraignment. So what does the legal
dispute consists of when a person defrauds another by selling a fake Rolex
watch to him for the price of a genuine one? This consists of: (a) the State’s
charge that the accused defrauded the complainant by selling a fake
Rolex watch to him for the price of a genuine one; and (b) the accused’s
denial of the charge.
Its Significance in Legal Writing

Why is it important in legal writing that you are able to know and identify
the legal dispute involved in a case?
Since a legal dispute involves a violation of a right protected by law or
which violation the law punishes, nothing less than the resolution of such
dispute could properly end it. Precisely, we say that a legal dispute is at the
heart of every case subject of legal writing because it is like a tumor that
would not go away until it is excised. Consequently, if you fail to correctly
identify the legal dispute and address it, you would just be running around in
circles, contributing nothing to its final termination. That is how important it
is!
Legal Dispute and the Principal Issue

As a rule, the legal dispute, recast in the format of an issue, provides
the principal issue in every case. Take the earlier case of the tenant who
could not pay the agreed monthly rents yet refuses to leave his apartment
unit. We said that the legal dispute consists in: (a) the apartment owner’s
claim that the tenant fails to pay the agreed monthly rents and must leave his
unit; and (b) the tenant’s denial of the claim and insistence to retain the unit.
Put in the format of an issue, the principal issue is “whether or not the
tenant who fails to pay the monthly rents must leave the apartment
unit.”
Take also the case of the person who refuses to pay his debt. We said that
the legal dispute lies in: (a) the creditor’s claim that the debtor unjustly
refuses to pay his debt under a promissory note that he issued in favor of the
creditor; and (b) the debtor’s denial of such a claim. Rewritten in the format
of an issue, the principal issue is “whether or not the debtor unjustly
refuses to pay his debt under a promissory note that he issued in favor of
the creditor.”
In the criminal case discussed above, we said that the legal dispute consists
in: (a) the State’s charge that the accused defrauded the complainant by
selling a fake Rolex watch to him for the price of a genuine one; and (b) the
accused’s denial of the charge. Recast as an issue, the principal issue is
“whether or not the accused defrauded the complainant by selling a fake
Rolex watch to him for the price of a genuine one.”
What does the legal dispute consists of when a building official issues to
the owner an occupancy permit for a building with inadequate fire exits? It
consists of: (a) the complainant’s claim that respondent building official
issued to the owner an occupancy permit for a building with inadequate fire
exits in violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act 3019; and (b) the
respondent’s denial of that claim. Transformed into an issue, the principal
issue is “whether or not respondent building official issued to the owner
an occupancy permit covering a building that has inadequate fire exits in
violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act 3019.”
Importance of Principal Issue

Why is knowledge of the principal issue important to you? It is important
to you because your case will be decided for or against you based on that
issue. It is important because you judge the significance of every argument
that you want to use to persuade your reader by its relevance to the principal
issue. Any argument that does not touch base with the principal issue or
issues (there could be more than one principal issue involved in a case) would
be quite useless and a waste of time.
3.
Stages of Writing
Legal writing, when methodically done, is much like a construction of a

building. You move in stages. You gather all the materials you need, sort
them out, cut them to size, and join them together according to a plan. Before
you end, you then give your building the finishing work it requires.
Two Stages of Legal Writing

Legal writing also moves in stages. It has two main stages:
The First Stage is Pre-work. Here, you are at the beginning of your
writing assignment and are looking at the facts and evidence of the case as
they are made available to you. If it is a new case, the facts might come from
interviews of the persons involved in the problem or from related documents
that require sorting. These materials would be absolutely raw. Quite often, the
dates when the important events took place are mixed up. On the other hand,
if it is a case that has undergone trial, you might be looking at the transcript
of the testimonies of witnesses and the documentary exhibits presented in the
case.
Pre-work is a process. Whatever your assignment might be, your pre-work
would be inadequate unless you go through at least five levels of efforts:
1. Establishing where the legal dispute lies in the case;
2. Discovering its relevant facts;
3. Knowing the laws or rules that apply to it;
4. Identifying the issue or issues that you would address; and
5. Roughing out the arguments that you would use.
The Second Stage is Write-up. Here, having all the ideas you need
concerning your legal writing assignment, your task is to put flesh, color, and
shape to them. You will now transform the sketches and outlines you
produced during pre-work into a full draft of the paper required of you––a
pleading, a legal opinion, a petition, a comment, a memorandum, a position
paper, or even a decision.
Editing and rewriting will complete the write-up stage.
Value of Pre-work
Most haphazardly finished legal writing can be traced to lack of pre-work
or to pre-work hastily done. The need for pre-work is true for all kinds of
presentations that are aimed to convince others to a certain point of view. A
successful salesman needs to have a complete knowledge and mastery of his
product, all its good points and bad. With this edge, he can then develop his
sales pitch or the line of arguments he could draw from, polish them to
perfection, and make a sale. In a real sense, legal writing is a sort of
presentation. The lawyer should be able to make a convincing presentation of
his case in the limited time that he is able to hold his reader’s attention. To
succeed in this, the lawyer needs pre-work.
Lack of time to do pre-work, a frequent excuse, cannot be a valid
justification for dispensing with one. The writer who settles for an opinion,
pleading, or position paper not based on pre-work does not care about the
comprehensiveness and convincing quality of his work. He just submits his
work to his client or to the court for the sake of meeting the deadline given to
him. He does not care about its result. This attitude, however, is the reason
behind many failed legal writings and careers. You do not want this.
4.
Getting at the Facts of the Case
Almost always, legal writing stands on two legs: (1) the facts and (2) the
laws involved in the case. And pre-work always starts with getting the facts
right.
Facts of a Case
When you study the facts of a case, you should not leave them until you
have come to a complete understanding of what the case is about from every
angle. When you are able to examine the position of the opposite side just as
you have examined that of your client, you would be able to tell the latter that
you know more about his case than he does. You short-change your client
when you casually read the facts from your source materials without truly
understanding and absorbing their contents. Deep concentration and
absorption is required of every good preparation for a case.
Random Notes versus Summary

One way to study case materials is to make short random of the facts of the
case that you consider important as you go over them. This is a good practice.
But purely random notes do not give you the complete picture. Because they
are random, they are often uncorrelated and are, therefore, useful only for
work done in one sitting. When you set aside your work and return to it after
a long duration, your random notes would have lost their correct meaning and
you have to start all over again. You would never be able to use these
incomplete notes as a permanent catalogue of the facts that you want to go
back to repeatedly at various stages of the proceedings in a case.
What you need is systematically prepared notes that adequately capture the
entire factual terrain of the case, with the important points properly marked
out. Studies in some English colleges show that there is a better way than
taking random notes for absorbing complex or difficult texts or written
materials. It is summarizing. You can best understand and absorb written
materials when you summarize their contents. Your summary serves as a
detailed map in your hand, able to guide you in negotiating your way through
the dispute involved.
Summarizing to compress the information you need, forces you to search
your materials for what is important. It compels you to toss an item of fact
over in your mind, assess its importance and relevance to the issues in the
case, and decide whether to keep it in or throw it out of your summary. When
you come to an item of fact and ask yourself, “What is the significance of this
fact to this case?” you begin to wonder. Then, all your accumulated
knowledge and experience bear on that item of fact and, usually, your mind
produces the right answer.
Facts seen through the Issue

When handling a new case, whatever stage you may find it, you need to
go over the materials very quickly and determine preliminarily the
principal issue or issues involved in the case. That is your key to pre-work.
Only when you have an idea of what the principal issue is, could you make a
good job of extracting the relevant facts from your materials.
In a classroom experiment, the professor asked the students to do pre-work
by carefully reading the following facts about a case:
The Beers War

Atlas Brewery Company discovered that distributors of
San Manuel Brewery in Metro Manila had in their
warehouses hundreds of cases of empty beer bottles owned by
Atlas Brewery. The distributors of San Manuel beer
apparently bought the empty bottles from retailers to reduce
the volume of sales of Atlas beer in their areas. The San
Manuel beer distributors claimed, on the other hand, that
they merely retaliated against Atlas beer distributors who had
been buying and destroying the empty bottles of San Manuel
beer in their areas.
A law student, Fred Sanchez, complained that when he
drank beer with friends one evening in June at a restaurant
near his school, he found a cockroach in the bottle of San
Manuel beer that he had drunk from. He vomited upon such
discovery and suffered anxiety over fear that he would get
sick. He got angry with the restaurant owner for serving the
beer and threw the bottle with the pest in it at him, causing
injury on the owner’s head. The restaurant owner blamed
San Manuel Brewery for the incident and sued it. San Manuel
Brewery, on the other hand, blamed Atlas Brewery and its
distributors for tampering with its products.
Fred Sanchez and his friends created a lot of noise about
poisoned San Manuel beer products and initiated a boycott of
those products. Their action found them friends from among
the Atlas Brewery distributors.
After the students read the above, they were asked to write in one sentence
a comprehensive summary of what the case is all about. They were to
complete the sentence: “The case is about…” Stop reading after this
paragraph for a moment and try to complete the sentence yourself without re-
reading the facts. “The case is about … . ”
The students gave a variety of answers but most of them gave the
equivalent of the following summaries:
1. The case is about the struggle between San Manuel
Brewery and Atlas Beer Company over the distribution of
their competing products.
2. The case is about how fierce competition in beer
distribution could be very ugly.
3. The case is about a law student’s crusade against unsafe
products that come out of the market.
4. The case is about tampering with bottled products and
the dangers it presents.
Actually, the facts above spoke of only one “case” ever having developed
among the parties involved. This is the lawsuit that the restaurant owner filed
against San Manuel Brewery for the injury he suffered in the hands of an
outraged customer whom he served with a pest-laden bottle of beer. Did you
get it right? Do not be discouraged if you did not. Very few students
perceived this detail because they did not know what was expected of them
when they read the article the first time.
The point in the exercise is that, not knowing what they are looking for,
different people would tend to get different impressions out of the same
material that they have read. In the exercise, it is only after reading the
material are the students informed that they are to state what the “case” is
about.
Just how do you make a complete summary from raw data? One way is to
take out the non-essential facts from your written materials like contracts,
deeds, letters, records, books, testimonies or sworn statements. Cross out
those non-essential facts, leaving only the essential ones on the page of each
document or paper. Consider this problem asked in a bar examination. The
examiner probably picked up the facts from the syllabus of the case and so
indiscriminately copied a lot of details that are not essential to the problem.
Section 10 of Ordinance No. 105 of Tagaytay City provides
that at least 5% of the total area of any memorial park
established within its jurisdiction shall be set aside for charity
burial of its pauper residents and that no permit to establish,
operate, and maintain a private memorial park shall be
granted without the applicant’s conformity or agreeing to
such condition. The City argues that it is within its powers to
pass said ordinance; that the ordinance is a valid exercise of
police power; and that the portion taken is for public use, the
same being intended for paupers pursuant to its duty to
provide for the health and safety of its inhabitants.
Discuss the constitutionality of said ordinance.
The challenge is to make a short summary of the above by crossing out the
non-essential facts. Surely, you would be quite reckless if you just wield a
pen and cross out every word from the text that you fancy as having of no use
to you. What you need is a more precise pruning knife. As already stated, that
pruning knife is nothing else but your understanding of the principal issue
that the case presents. Only when you know that issue or at least have a
preliminary idea of what it is, could you do a correct job of cutting away
useless data to get to the essential facts you need.
Fortunately, in the above problem, the bar examiner himself states the
principal issue for you: he wants you to “discuss the constitutionality of the
ordinance,” i.e., “whether or not it violates the right that it seeks to
regulate—the right of the owner to his land.” Now, use this issue to prune
away the facts that are not relevant to it. Consider the first sentence of the
problem:
such condition.
Surely, the particular number of the ordinance involved (Ordinance No.
105), the particular number of the section of the ordinance (Section 10), or
the particular place where it was enacted (Tagaytay City) are not relevant to
the constitutionality of the ordinance. You will also note that some details of
the quoted problem are superfluous. For instance, if the lots taken were to be
“for charity burial,” it would be superfluous to say that it would benefit
“pauper residents.” Also, in the phrase “no permit to establish, operate, and
maintain a private memorial park,” the words “establish” and “maintain”
are superfluous because “to operate” assumes these two terms.
The above sentence needed 63 words to describe the facts of the problem.
By crossing out the unneeded facts, what remains could be summarized in
only 26 words, less than half the original number. Thus, rid of irrelevant
details, your summary should read:
such condition.
In practice, however, crossing out portions of the documents will damage
such documents and render them useless for other purposes. Quite often, you
need to preserve the documents in their original state. Your alternative is to
go over them, identify those facts that are essential to your understanding of
the issues in the case, and put those facts in your outline.
operate, and maintain a private memorial park shall be granted
without the applicant’s conformity or agreeing to such
condition.
Put together, the extracted facts should read like this:
The ordinance requires memorial parks to give away to the
poor 5% of their land area as a condition to being granted
permits to operate.
With the facts summarized in their barest essentials, it is now far easier for
you to see the problem in its simplest form. Do you agree? You will no
longer be distracted by unimportant and obtrusive facts. Making a summary
of the facts of the case you are tasked to write about will do the same for you.
Cluttered Facts
As you have seen, it is only when you know the principal issue or at least
have a preliminary idea of what it is about that you could do a correct job of
making a summary of the facts of your case. Consider the following
testimonies, some conflicting, given by witnesses in an actual rape case. The
names have, of course, been changed. To make the example simple for study,
the transcripts have been edited and the cross-examination by opposing
counsels dispensed with. Go over it once to enable you to get a sense of what
the issue or issues are between the parties.
Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN)
October 8
(Abridged and edited for study)
COURT STAFF: (After swearing in the witness) State your
name and personal circumstances.
WITNESS: I am Julia Torres, eighteen years old, single,
and a resident of Barrio Talaan, Lian, Batangas.
PROSECUTOR: With the Court’s permission. Do you
know Ronald Galang, the accused in this case?
A. Yes, sir. He is there (pointing to the accused).
Q. Why do you know him?
A. He raped me.
Q. Where did this happen?
A. It happened on the rice field near Mario’s house.
Q. How did Ronald rape you?
A. I struggled to get free but he pointed a knife at my side
and threatened to stab me if I called for help or persisted in
fighting back.
Q. So what did you do?
A. Out of fear, I gave in and he raped me.
Q. What did you do after Ronald raped you?
A. I kept the matter to myself for a while.
Q. Why?
A. Because I was afraid of the trouble that will happen if
my parents and brothers found out. They loved me so much.
Q. For how long did you keep the matter to yourself?
A. After two days of worrying and feeling bad, I finally told
my aunt about it and she in turn told my parents.
Q. What was the reaction of your parents?
A. They were quite furious and wanted to take the matter
into their own hands but cooler heads prevailed.
Q. So what did you do after that?
A. I went to the police to complain.
Q. Is that all that you did?
A. I also submitted myself to medical examination.
Q. When did Ronald rape you?
A. He raped me on June 12 at 7 p.m.
Q. How did you meet Ronald on June 12?
A. I went to the house of Celia in our barrio to attend a
wedding party and I saw him there.
Q. Do you have any relationship with Ronald?
A. None. He was only my suitor.
Q. What were your feelings during the party?
A. I was in high spirit because I met a lot of friends and had
a good time.
Q. Do you recall any unusual thing that happened at that
wedding party?
A. Someone exploded firecrackers nearby and this caused a
scare for a while.
Q. You said that you saw your suitor, Ronald, at the party.
Did you have occasion to talk to each other?
A. He wanted to talk to me but I ignored him because I
disliked him for a suitor. In fact, I stayed away from him.
Q. What happened after you ignored him?
A. The married couple danced after supper and people
joined in.
Q. What did you do after the dancing?
A. At 11 p.m. I took leave to go and started to walk home
alone in the moonlight.
Q. Did anything unusual happen during your walk home?
A. When I was about fifty meters from Mario’s house,
Ronald came behind me and requested that he walk me home.
Q. What was your reaction to him?
A. I really did not like him. I declined and doubled my
steps.
Q. So what happened after you walked faster?
A. Ronald caught my arm and wrestled me to the ground?
Q. What kind was the ground over there? A. It was rough
ground and dry.
Q. What did Ronald do while your were down on the
ground?
A. He covered my mouth with a hand so I could not shout.
He pointed a knife at me and forced me to yield to him.
Q. Did it not bother you that you left the wedding party
alone by yourself?
A. No, sir. Walking alone did not bother me because I knew
everyone in the barrio.
Q. What route did you take going home?
A. I took a short cut across Mario’s farm, in the direction
of our house.
Q. Can you describe the path that you took?
A. The path was quite uneven and difficult.
Q. How was it?
A. I was used to it and I managed very well.
PROSECUTOR: That is all.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
October 12
WITNESS: I am Dr. Amado Ampil, of legal age, married,
and a medical examiner for the Province of Batangas, and a
resident of Batangas City.
PROSECUTOR: Have you ever examined a woman by the
name of Julia Torres?
A. Yes, I examined Julia Torres after she complained to the
Lian police that she had been raped. It took her two days
before reporting the incident.
Q. Could you describe her physical built?
A. She was of small built, 4 feet 11 inches in height, and of
fair complexion.
Q. What was your finding[s] after conducting a medical
examination of her?
A. I found after examining her body that she suffered from
laceration of the cervix posterior portion and laceration of the
vaginal canal posterior portion. The lacerations are about two
days old.
Q. Did you find any other injuries on her body?
A. None, sir.
Q. Did you prepare a medical report showing such finding?
A. Yes, sir. This is my report. (Marked as Exhibit A.)
PROSECUTOR: That will be all.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
October 16
WITNESS: I am Ronald Galang, twenty years old, single,
and a resident of Barrio Talaan, Lian, Batangas.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: With the Court’s permission. Do
you know the complainant in this case, Ms. Julia Torres?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. She testified that you raped her, what can you say about
that?
A. I did not rape Julia.
Q. But did you have sexual relation with her on the evening
of June 12?
A. Yes, sir. But she freely agreed to make love with me that
night of the wedding party at Celia’s house.
Q. The medical examiner testified that she found
lacerations on Julia’s vaginal canal when he examined her
two days later. What can you say about that?
A. That must be true. I discovered that evening that Julia
was a virgin because she bled. It worried me but she said that
it was not too painful.
Q. Did you communicate with each other after that evening
of June 12?
A. Julia called for me the following day, insisting that I
marry her because she was afraid she might have become
pregnant.
Q. What was your reply to her?
A. Because I had to look after my parents yet, I declined,
asking her to wait a while.
Q. And what was her reaction to that?
A. Julia became angry and threatened to complain to her
parents that I raped her.
Q. What was your reaction to what she said?
A. I still refused to marry her right away.
Q. So what did she do?
A. She accused me of raping her.
Q. What relation, if any did you have with Julia about the
time of the alleged rape?
A. Julia and I had been sweethearts for over two months
before June 12.
Q. How did you come to meet each other at that wedding in
Celia’s house?
A. On that evening we met by prior agreement at Celia’s
house right in our barrio.
Q. What happened when you met each other at that
wedding party?
A. Things started out well and I had some fun meeting my
friends. But, because of their jokes that I had some other girl,
Julia became angry and refused to talk to me.
Q. What did you do then?
A. I left to brood outside.
Q. How long did you stay outside?
A. Not too long. I returned to the party an hour later after a
friend called me inside.
Q. What did you do when the wedding party ended?
A. When the party ended, I walked alongside Julia and
tried to explain the jokes played by my friends.
Q. How did she react to your explanation?
A. She did not want to believe me at first. After awhile, I
convinced her to sit with me on a piece of log near the house
of Mario.
Q. What happened after you sat on that log?
A. The evening was romantic and we eventually reconciled.
Q. What happened after you reconciled?
A. We kissed and embraced and, forgetting ourselves, we
made love on the grass.
Q. What did you do after you made love to Julia?
A. I walked with her up to about twenty meters of her
house.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: That is all.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
October 25

WITNESS: I am Mario Perez, forty-five years old, married,
farmer, and a resident of Barrio Talaan, Lian, Batangas.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: With the court’s permission. Do
you remember where you were on the evening of June 12?
A. I remember that I was home that evening of June 12.
Q. Why do you remember that evening?
A. I was told that a rape was committed on my farm that
evening and it so happened that my two-year old daughter
was then running a fever.
Q. Is it possible you went to bed early that evening?
A. I remember that I slept late because I had to watch our
sick daughter while my wife took her turn to rest.
Q. Was the farm visible that night?
A. The night was not so dark because the moon shone
brightly in the sky.
Q. What time did you go to bed after watching your sick
daughter?
A. I took my turn to sleep after midnight.
Q. During the time you were looking after your daughter,
do you remember hearing the outcry of a woman from
somewhere outside your house?
A. No. I heard no outcry from outside my house.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: That is all.
Obviously, the above testimonies contain much that is not connected to the
rape issue. They are filled with details that usually accompany raw
storytelling. When making a summary of them, whole sentences can go and
these would not affect the essence of the story.
Relevant Facts Extracted

Can you sort out the testimonies above and make a short summary of the
facts that really matter to the case? This is not difficult, as you have earlier
seen. Just remember the lesson you learned. First, try to identify the legal
dispute involved in the above case. Obviously, the legal dispute consists in:
(a) the government’s charge that Ronald raped Julia; and (b) the latter’s
denial of the charge. Second, rewrite the legal dispute in the format of an
issue to produce your principal issue then put down this issue in bold print,
and place it right before you as you do your summarizing. Using this issue as
guide, you can then peel away from the narrations all the facts that are not
connected to such issue. It will hold you to your aim.
After rewriting your principal issue, it should read:
WHETHER OR NOT RONALD RAPED JULIA.
See how these lessons are applied to the testimony of Julia, reproduced
below. The facts relevant to the issue and essential to the outline have been
put in bold. The explanations for doing away with the non-essential facts
have been bracketed and [italicized.]
October 8
name and personal circumstances. [Note: Obviously, you do not
need to put in your outline this statement about the oath and the
request made to the witness to state her personal circumstances.
They do not yield any fact of the case.]
WITNESS: I am Julia Torres, eighteen years old, single, and
a resident of Barrio Talaan, Lian, Batangas. [Note: The rape
event tells a story. To make sense, every story must say who are
involved, what happened, when it happened, where it happened,
how it happened, and possibly why it happened. These
descriptions of Julia Torres, the victim, are essential to
appreciating her humanity and put the legal dispute into its
proper context. Consequently you need them in your outline.]
PROSECUTOR: With the Court’s permission. Do you know
Ronald Galang, the accused in this case?
A. Yes, sir. [Note: When the witness says, “yes,” to a question,
the facts contained in the question, which she affirms with her
“yes” answer are implicitly incorporated into the answer. If those
facts are relevant, they should go into your outline.] He is there
(pointing to the accused).
A. He raped me. [Note: Surely relevant.]
Q. Where did this happen?
A. It happened on the rice field near Mario’s house. [Note:
This answers the question “where?”]
Q. How did Ronald rape you?
A. I struggled to get free but he pointed a knife at my side
and threatened to stab me if I called for help or persisted in
fighting back. [Note: Shows how it was committed.]
Q. So what did you do?
A. Out of fear, I gave in [Note: Is this relevant to the issue?
Of course, for it shows why the rape succeeded.] and he raped me.
[Note: This is just a repeat of a previous statement.]
Q. What did you do after Ronald raped you?
A. I kept the matter to myself for a while. [Note: Is this
relevant? Yes. Ordinarily, the victim of a grave wrongdoing
would complain about it to someone. Julia’s silence could affect
the credibility of her claim.]
Q. Why?
A. Because I was afraid of the trouble that will happen if
my parents and brothers found out. [Note: Since this is Julia’s
justification for incurring delay in reporting the crime, it should
be relevant like the preceding answer.] They loved me so much.
[Note: That her parents and brothers loved her so much would
have no bearing on the issue of whether or not Ronald raped her.]
Q. For how long did you keep the matter to yourself?
A. After two days of worrying and feeling bad, I finally told
my aunt about it and she in turn told my parents. [Note: Her
reason for changing her mind and eventually reporting the matter
should also be considered relevant in judging her credibility.]
Q. What was the reaction of your parents?
A. They were quite furious and wanted to take the matter into
their own hands but cooler heads prevailed. [Note: The reaction is
limited to her parents and brothers; it is irrelevant to the rape
issue.]
Q. So what did you do after that?
A. I went to the police to complain. [Note: Is this relevant?
Yes. Complaining to the police about the commission of a crime
lends credence to the claim that it took place.]
Q. Is that all that you did?
A. I also submitted myself to medical examination. [Note:
Same reason as the above.]
Q. When did Ronald rape you?
A. He raped me on June 12 at 7 p.m. [Note: States the time.]
Q. How did you meet Ronald on June 12?
A. I went to the house of Celia in our barrio to attend a
wedding party and I saw him there. [Note: This fact is essential
to an understanding of the antecedents of the alleged crime.]
Q. Do you have any relationship with Ronald?
A. None. He was only my suitor. [Note: Some say that this is
irrelevant since it is possible for Ronald to rape Julia whatever be
their relationship. Others think, however, that this is important
since it shows that Ronald was attracted to Julia.]
Q. What were your feelings during the party?
A. I was in high spirit because I met a lot of friends and had a
good time. [Note: Even if true, it does not help you know whether
or not Ronald raped Julia.]
Q. Do you recall any unusual thing that happened at that
wedding party?
A. Someone exploded firecrackers nearby and this caused a
scare for a while. [Note: Same as preceding observation.
Irrelevant.]
Q. You said that you saw your suitor, Ronald, at the party. Did
you have occasion to talk to each other?
A. He wanted to talk to me but I ignored him because I
disliked him for a suitor. In fact, I stayed away from him.
[Note: This is relevant because Julia’s attitude towards Ronald, if
true, would render it unlikely that she would let him escort her
home from the wedding party or have consented sex with him.]
Q. What happened after you ignored him?
A. The married couple danced after supper and people joined
in. [Note: This fact has no bearing at all to the rape case.]
Q. What did you do after the dancing?
A. At 11 p.m. I took leave to go and started to walk home
alone in the moonlight. [Note: This is relevant to the issue
because it shows the circumstances immediately preceding the
alleged rape.]
Q. Did anything unusual happen during your walk home?
A. When I was about fifty meters from Mario’s house,
Ronald came from behind me and requested that he walk me
home.
Q. What was your reaction to him? [Note: Same observation as
the preceding answer.]
A. I really did not like him. [Note: This is redundant, a
repetition of a previous statement.] I declined and doubled my
steps. [Note: This also sets the stage for the rape event.]
Q. So what happened after you walked faster?
A. Ronald caught my arm and wrestled me to the ground?
[Note: Use of force is an element of the rape.]
Q. What kind was the ground over there?
A. It was rough ground and dry. [Note: This could be
relevant if it somehow sheds light on the issue of whether or not
the rape took place.]
Q. What did Ronald do while you were down on the ground?
A. He covered my mouth with a hand so I could not shout.
He pointed a knife at me and forced me to yield to him. [Note:
This is no doubt relevant since it tends to show that Ronald raped
Julia.]
Q. Did it not bother you that you left the wedding party alone
by yourself?
A. No, sir. Walking alone did not bother me because I knew
everyone in the barrio. [Note: This is relevant to counter the
claim that, being a woman, it was quite unlikely for her to be
walking home alone.]
Q. What route did you take going home?
A. I took a short cut across Mario’s farm, in the direction
of our house. [Note: This fact is needed to link the other relevant
facts together.]
Q. Can you describe the path that you took?
A. The path was quite uneven and difficult to ply. [Note: This
is probably irrelevant since it neither helps resolve the issue of
whether or not the rape took place nor does it help tie the facts
together.]
Q. How was it?
A. I was used to it and I managed very well. [Note: Same
observation as above.]
PROSECUTOR: That is all.
One thing wonderful about analyzing the facts to sort out the relevant from
the irrelevant is that such a process makes you see the component parts of the
problem and their relationships. And this usually reveals to you some of the
strengths and weaknesses of the testimonies and the documents, the keys to
developing the arguments that you would eventually use when you start
writing your paper. For example, in analyzing whether Julia’s claim that she
walked home alone is relevant or not, one insight you got is that what she did
was rather unusual for a woman in the barrio to do. This could put a cloud on
her credibility.
Follow the same procedure in sorting out the testimonies of the medical
examiner, Ronald Galang and Mario Perez.
Facts Set in Sequence

Equally important to getting rid of irrelevant matters is putting the events
in the order of their occurrence. When the sequence of the events is in
disarray, with subsequent events told ahead of preceding ones or with
frequent flashbacks to the past as the story unfolds, you are likely to get
confused. You will be looking at items of facts that are out of context or
detached from their surrounding circumstances.
Take the testimony of Julia after the irrelevant facts have been thrown out.
It is far from being narrated in order of time. Thus––
–– Julia Torres is eighteen years old, single, and a resident

of Barrio Talaan, Lian, Batangas.
–– She knows Ronald Galang, the accused.
–– He raped her on the ricefield near Mario’s house.
[Julia’s testimony begins with the consummation of the rape.]
–– She struggled to get free but he pointed a knife at her
side and threatened to stab her if she called for help or
persisted in fighting back. [She then backtracks a little to
narrate the struggle that preceded the sexual act.]
–– Out of fear, she gave in. [Here, Julia returns to the
consummation of the rape. In the next line, she moves forward
again.]
–– After the rape, she kept the matter to herself because she
was afraid of the trouble that will happen if her parents and
brothers found out.
–– After two days of worrying and feeling bad, she finally
told her aunt about it and the latter in turn told her parents.
–– She went to the police to complain.
–– She submitted herself to medical examination.
–– He raped her on June 12 at 7 p.m. [Julia’s story flashes
back to the moment of the rape.]
–– She went to the house of Celia in our barrio to attend a
wedding party and she saw him there. [It is only here that Julia
tells how her story begins.]
–– Ronald was only her suitor.
–– He wanted to talk to her but she ignored him because
she disliked him for a suitor. In fact, she stayed away from
him.
–– At 11 p.m. she took leave to go and started to walk home
alone in the moonlight.
–– When she was about fifty meters from Mario’s house,
Ronald came behind her and requested that he walk her
home.
–– She declined and doubled her steps.
–– Ronald caught her arm and wrestled her on rough and
dry ground.
–– He covered her mouth with a hand so she could not
shout. He pointed a knife at her and forced her to yield to
him.
–– Walking alone did not bother her because she knew
everyone in the barrio.
–– She took a short cut across Mario’s farm, in the
direction of her house. [Julia ends her story at its middle part,
just before Ronald interferes with her journey home and rapes
her.]
If in writing your paper on the case, you choose to stick by the order in
which Julia tells her story, you could confuse your reader. Yet, it is not
difficult to sort out the facts and put them in the order of their occurrence.
Just spot the point where Julia’s story logically begins, here, her encounter
with Ronald at the wedding party, then, arrange after it the other events in the
order of their occurrence until you reach the end of her story, her submission
to medical examination.
Are you done? When you are done sorting out the facts in Julia’s
testimony, putting them in order, and drawing up your short summary, it
might look like the one below. The non-essentials have been removed to
reveal the essentials. Further, the order of the events has been straightened
out to show the correct sequence. The narration has been rewritten to make
the outline a third person narrative.
Julia Torres, eighteen years of age, single, said that she

went to the house of Celia at Barrio Talaan, Lian, Batangas,
on June 12 at 7 p.m. to attend a wedding party. She saw her
suitor, Ronald Galang, but ignored him since she disliked
him.
At 11 p.m. Julia took leave to go home alone. This did not
bother her because she knew everyone in the barrio. She took
a short cut across Mario Perez’s farm. About fifty meters
from the latter’s house, Ronald came behind her and asked
that he walk her home. She declined but Ronald caught her
arm and wrestled her on the rough ground, covering her
mouth so she could not shout.
Julia struggled to get free but Ronald pointed a knife at her
side and threatened to stab her. Out of fear, she gave in and
he ravished her.
After the rape, Julia kept the matter to herself for fear of
trouble if her parents and brothers found out. But, she finally
told her aunt. They went to the police and she submitted to
medical examination.
What benefits do you derive from arranging the facts in proper order or
sequence? The benefits are as follows:
1. The facts are easier to understand when put in the order of time. The
reason is simple: they follow a natural order or flow. Actual human
experience occurs in the order of time where one event follows another with
the ticking of the hour. A story that jumps ahead, goes back to a previous
event, and then returns to resume its advance where it temporarily dropped
off is unnatural. It can be quite confusing. The human mind is not at ease
with such a manner of storytelling.
2. When facts are arranged in the proper order, you would clearly see how
each fact relates to or connects with others. Each fact acquires deeper
significance when viewed along with related facts. That Ronald sat on a piece
of log with Julia would be meaningless if seen in isolation. Before they sat on
the log, she did not want to talk to him at all. After sitting alongside each
other on the log, they had a quick romantic reconciliation. Their sitting on the
log acquires significance.
3. When the factual versions of either side are put in order and matched,
you would also be able to see clearly the areas where the respective versions
agree and disagree. This in turn will furnish you with a balanced appreciation
of each opposing claim.
4. Facts, properly arranged, prepare you for the work of writing up the
facts of the case in your pleading or memorandum.
Apart from the benefits already mentioned above, making a summary of
your materials and arranging these in the proper sequence enable you to
create a compact index to the facts of the case, including the testimonies and
the documents you work on. Lawyers usually handle a hundred cases at a
time. With your compact summary, you do not have to re-read your
voluminous materials each time you want to be reminded of the important
details of the case. Your summary will be your map in guiding you
throughout the course of trial of the case and during appeal.
Writing Exercises
1. For exercise, sort out the rest of the testimonies in the rape case, make a
summary of the relevant facts, and arrange them in order.
2. You have seen how little data are important to a case when the facts
have been sorted out for relevance and order. Consider the following
sample case:
The Case of a Child and a Neighbor’s Dog

Peter Banag, the father of a child who was attacked by a
neighbor’s dog, has come to consult you about the possibility of
his bringing a lawsuit against Arthur Sison, a neighbor. Peter
brought along Fred Puzon to the interview. Fred witnessed what
happened. The following is your interview with him:
Interview with Mr. Fred Puzon,

accompanied by client, Mr.
Peter Banag. Sept. 21
Q. Fred, how old are you?
A. I am twenty-one, Attorney.
Q. What do you do for a living?
A. I work with the government.
Q. Where do you live?
A. I live at 24 Annapolis St., Cubao, Quezon City.
Q. Did you see the dog attack Mr. Banag’s daughter?
A. Yes, sir. I saw it bite Mary’s leg and even her arms as
she fell to the ground.
Q. Do you know who owned that dog?
A. Yes, sir, the dog belonged to Arthur Sison.
Q. What did you do when you saw the dog attack Mary?
A. I immediately ran to help her but, unfortunately, I
tripped on the gutter and fell on my hands and knees.
Q. So what happened?
A. I recovered quickly, moved on, and kicked the dog away.
I then stood by to protect Mary from further attacks.
Q. What happened to the dog?
A. The dog kept on barking and looked as if it would attack
us.
Q. Did it attack you?
A. No because Arthur came out of his house and sent his
dog into his yard.
Q. How about Mary, what happened to her?
A. Arthur picked her up, called a tricycle, and brought her
to a nearby clinic for treatment.
Q. And you, what did you do?
A. My friend then arrived and we left for the mall.
Q. Did you know how old Mary was at that time?
A. I found out that he was about six years old.
Q. How did you get to know Arthur?
A. We are neighbors. He lives at 12 Annapolis Street, the
same street where I lived.
Q. Do you know why Mary was near Arthur’s house?
A. She went there to buy ice-candies. Arthur had been
selling ice-candies at his house for sometime.
Q. How did you know that?
A. I myself used to buy ice-candies from him especially
during summer.
Q. When did the incident involving Mary happen?
A. It happened on September 12 at about 3 p.m.
Q. What were you doing at that time?
A. I was waiting on Annapolis Street for my friend Henry
Uy to come and pick me up so we could go to the mall.
Q. Do you remember what day of the week it was?
A. It was a Saturday afternoon.
Q. What did you see Mary doing from where you stood?
A. I saw Mary approach Arthur’s gate and knock on it. But
no one answered.
Q. So what did she do?
A. Still she kept on knocking softly at the gate.
Q. What happened next?
A. A young girl of her age passed by and Mary waived at
her.
Q. So what happened next?
A. Arthur’s dog came out to the yard. As Mary tested the
gate by pushing it, the gate yielded and the dog jumped out.
Q. What did Mary do?
A. She held the gate open and called in saying that she
wanted to buy ice-candy. “Pagbilan nga po ng ice-candy,” she
said.
Q. So what happened?
A. That was the time I saw the dog go after her. It attacked
her from behind as she turned and ran to leave.
Q. What was your reaction to what you saw?
A. I was shocked for a moment.
You asked Peter why he came to consult with you and he said that he
asked Arthur to pay her daughter P20,000.00 in damages for what she
suffered but all he got was a letter from him. He gave you the following
letter.
Mr. Peter Banag

16 Annapolis St.,
Cubao, Quezon City
Dear Mr. Banag:
I regret that I could not grant your demand to pay you
P20,000.00 for the injuries that your daughter suffered on
September 12 when she came to my house at 12 Annapolis
Street, Cubao, Quezon City. I was not at fault.
I was napping in my house on the afternoon your daughter
came to our gate. I was awakened when I heard some
commotion outside. I thought for a while that people were
quarreling. But I heard someone shouting that my dog had
attacked a child. I immediately got up and ran out. As I did, I
saw Fred Puzon, our neighbor, trying to stop my dog,
Prancer, from attacking your daughter, Mary, who lay on the
ground just outside the gate. Other neighbors had started to
come out to see what was happening.
To augment the income of my family, I engaged in the
business of selling ice-candies at my house beginning in
March of last year. My sale had been brisk especially during
the summer days. I always sold my ice-candies at the gate
when people came to buy. That gate had an automatic closer.
But at times, I left it unlocked from the inside because my
children often went in and out. I had a dog in my house,
Prancer, but my gate carried a written warning about the
presence of that dog. Until that afternoon of September 12,
Prancer had not attacked any one.
I immediately stepped out into the street as soon as I can
and sent Prancer inside. I was really surprised that you had
allowed your daughter to leave the house without an escort. I
myself took care that my young children did not go out alone.
At any rate, I called a tricycle and brought Mary to a
medical clinic nearby for treatment of her wounds and for an
injection. Later, her mother followed us to the clinic and she
comforted her daughter. I paid the medical bill.
I am sorry but I do not believe that I should be liable to
your daughter for damages.
Very truly yours,
Arthur Sison
Before you could give Mr. Banag your legal opinion on his case, you need
to do pre-work. Sort out the relevant facts from the irrelevant and put the
relevant facts in order. As in the rape case, try provisionally to identify the
legal dispute and get a sense of the principal issue that divides your client,
Peter, and his neighbor, Arthur. Have a clear understanding of that issue and
use it to guide you in extracting the useful facts of the case. Then make a
short summary of the facts from your client’s point of view as well as from
that of Arthur. Put your work on paper.
5.
Knowing the Applicable Law or Rule
After working on the testimonies and documents in your case, you would
have produced an outline of the facts that are relevant to the legal dispute that
it presents. Now you are ready to make a search for those specific laws or
rules that, applied to the facts, will either help or burden you in prosecuting
or defending your side of the dispute.
Sources of Law or Rule

There are two general sources of laws and rules:
Statute law: This consists of laws and rules enacted by duly constituted
rule-making authorities like Congress (Republic Acts and Batas Pambansa),
the President (Presidential Decrees and Executive Orders), the Supreme
Court (Rules of Court), local government councils (city or municipal
ordinances), and administrative regulatory agencies (implementing rules and
regulations).
Case law: This consists of decisions of courts and persons or agencies
performing judicial functions. These decisions interpret and apply statute law
to specific situations. The rulings in these cases become legal precedents that,
when invariably affirmed and used, become part of the law itself.
But just how do you locate the right law and legal precedents? Two steps
are suggested:
First. Identify the general nature of the legal dispute involved. In the case
between Julia and Ronald, the legal dispute consists in the government’s
allegation that Ronald had sex with Julia, employing force and intimidation
in violation of law, and in Ronald’s denial of the charge. The case, therefore,
concerns a crime that involves chastity. This should lead you to the statute
law on rape, namely, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. It reads:
Article 266-A. Rape; when and how committed. –– Rape is

committed —
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force or intimidation.
xxx xxx xxx
Second. Having become familiar with the facts of your case, search for
legal precedents that have more or less parallel facts. Nothing is new in this
world. You will discover that there is hardly any new case that would have no
parallel or similarity to a previous case that a court or quasi-judicial body has
once decided. Find the rulings in those parallel case, whether for or against
your side of the dispute, and you will have more confidence in charting the
course of your arguments. Usually, it is the diligent that succeeds in tunneling
the whole depth of case law to extract the gold nuggets he needs to prevail in
his assigned case. Seize that advantage.
In rape cases, both the prosecution and the accused will find Philippine
jurisprudence rich in judicial precedents that will help their case. Consider the
following:
For the Prosecution

In the review of rape cases, jurisprudence has laid down the
following guiding principles: a) an accusation in rape can be
made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to
prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, though
innocent, to disprove the charge; b) considering that, in the
nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the
crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be
scrutinized with great caution; and c) the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
for the defense. (People v. Sta. Ana, G.R. 115657, June 26,
1998.)
The failure of the victim to immediately report the rape is
not necessarily an indication of a fabricated charge. (People v.
Casil, 241 SCRA 285; People v. Montefalcon, G.R. 111944,
April 25, 1995.)
The absence of physical injury does not negate the
commission of rape. (People v. Gapasan, 243 SCRA 53.)
It would be improbable for a barrio girl of tender age and
definitely inexperienced in sexual matters to fabricate a
charge for no reason at all that will put herself and her family
in a very uncompromising situation, which could even invite
reprisal. (People v. Vitor, 245 SCRA 392.)
Failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not make
voluntary the rape victim’s submission to the criminal act of
the accused. (People v. Marabillas, 303 SCRA 352.)
Threatening the victim with a knife, a deadly weapon, is
sufficient to cow the victim and it constitutes an element of
rape. (People v. Alquizalas, 305 SCRA 367.)
For the Defense

Although the “sweetheart theory” has not gained favor
with the courts, such is not always the case if the hard fact is
that the accused and the supposed victim are, in truth,
intimately related except that, as is usual in most cases, either
the relationship is illicit or the victim’s parents are against it.
(People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676.)
In rape cases, the claim of the complainant of having been
threatened appears to be a common expedient of face-saving
subterfuge. (People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676.)
Courts will take judicial notice of the fact that in the rural
areas, young ladies are strictly required to act with
circumspection and prudence and great caution is observed so
that their reputation will remain intact. (People v. Godoy, 250
SCRA 676.)
In rape cases, the testimony of the offended party must not
be accepted with credulity. (People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676.)
As to be reasonably expected, a ravished woman would
instinctively call for help or at least flee her lecherous captor
to safer ground when opportunity present itself. (People v.
Sinatao, 249 SCRA 554.)
It is strange that even as complainant asserts sexual abuse
through violence and intimidation, she did not offer any
resistance when assaulted, an unlikely impulse for a woman
confronted with such an affront to her honor, and it is odd
that her supposed rape appears to be punctiliously made.
(People v. Sinatao, 249 SCRA 554.)
Apart from above sources of laws and rules, you have rules that derive
from the wisdom of common experience. These are especially useful in
resolving factual issues. Our jurisprudence is rich in these. For example:
Errorless recollection of a harrowing incident cannot be
expected of a witness, especially when she is recounting details
of an experience so humiliating and so painful as rape. (People
v. Calayca, 301 SCRA 192.)
Fear has its bizarre way of rendering people immobile even
in life-and-death situations. (People v. Realin, 301 SCRA 495.)
Even the most trustful witnesses can sometimes make
mistakes but such innocent lapses do not necessarily affect
their credibility. (People v. Reduca, 301 SCRA 516.)
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness but it must also be credible in
itself, such that common experience and observation of
mankind lead to the inference of its probability under the
circumstances. (People v. Perucho, 305 SCRA 770; People v.
Lagmay, 306 SCRA 157.)
Inconsistency concerning a minor matter does not affect the
credibility of complainant’s testimony. (People v. Empante,
306 SCRA 250.)
Wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight or starlight may, in
proper situation, be considered sufficient illumination,
making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on that
ground unmeritorious. (People v. Adoviso, 309 SCRA 1.)
The test to determine the value of the testimony of a witness
is whether or not such is in conformity with human
knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind.
(People v. Dela Cruz, 313 SCRA 189.)
Match the applicable laws or rules with the relevant facts of your case and
you are ready to work on your arguments. Get a good book in legal
bibliography and learn how to search for the statutes and judicial precedents
that you need. These topics are not embraced in this book.
Facts Reexamined
Having discovered the laws or rules that apply to your case, you should
now be in a better position to review your summary of the facts and add to it
the other relevant facts that you may have omitted. You could also subtract
from your summary those facts that now appear irrelevant to the applicable
laws or rules and precedents that you have discovered.
Writing Exercises
1. Go back to the case that Peter Banag consulted you with, namely, the
dog’s attack of her little daughter. Presumably, you did your pre-work,
sorted out the relevant from the irrelevant facts, and put your facts in
order. Consequently, you must already have on paper an outline of the
facts that you abstracted from your interview with Fred Puzon and from
Arthur Sison’s letter to your client. Based on the issues and the facts,
check out and copy the laws or the rules that should properly govern
them.
2. Check out too those parallel cases that the Supreme Court has previously
decided. See if the rulings and doctrines established in these cases could
be cited against you or to your advantage. Put them all on paper as part
of your pre-work.
6.
Getting Into the Issues
After making a short outline of the relevant facts of the case and after
ascertaining the laws or rules that apply to those facts, your next step in pre-
work is to pinpoint the specific issues that the conflicting claims of the
parties present and to put those issues down in writing. Identifying the issues
and writing them on paper are indispensable to all kinds of legal writing for a
simple reason: everything you write—the facts, the law, the argument, and
the relief—must take bearing on those issues. You write aimlessly when you
are unable to understand the issues in your case or are unable to hold on to it.
You have learned that, as a general rule, the legal dispute itself, recast in
the format of an issue, provides the principal issue in every case. You also
learned that knowledge of the principal issue is important because any
argument you make will benefit you only to the extent that you are able to
relate it to that issue.
For example, the issue of whether or not Julia Torres ignored Ronald
Galang at the wedding party because she disliked him (rather than, as Ronald
claimed, she was angry with him because of the jokes played by his friends)
is remotely relevant to the principal issue of whether or not Ronald raped
Julia. In both cases, she ignored him and whether she did for one or the other
reason will not shed much light on the issue of rape.
Issues in Multiple Legal Disputes

Not all cases present one legal dispute that converts into one principal
issue. A lawsuit could involve multiple legal disputes and, therefore, multiple
principal issues. This is particularly true in civil cases where there could be as
many legal disputes as there are claims of violations of separate rights of the
parties. In these cases, you should address each of the principal issues that the
several legal disputes present.
Occasionally, however, multiple legal disputes could converge into one
controlling issue. For example, in a lawsuit, Rudy Solis, a music composer,
claims that his friend Sergio Gomez appropriated as his own and sold to a
record company a song that he (Solis) had created. Gomez’s denial of this
claim would create the first legal dispute. A further claim of Solis that
Gomez maligned him as a thief of intellectual property and Gomez’s denial
of this additional claim would constitute a second legal dispute in the case.
Gomez, on the other hand, claims that it was Solis who tried to steal the song
from him. Solis’ denial of this claim would create the third legal dispute. A
further claim by Gomez that the lawsuit was malicious and Solis’ denial of
this claim would establish the fourth legal dispute.
The claims, the denials, and the counterclaims produce four legal disputes
in all because four rights were allegedly violated—two from each side. Yet
all these dispute seem to depend on just one controlling issue: whether or not,
Solis or Gomez, created the song. It would be helpful to be aware that this
convergence to one controlling issue could happen. What is essential is to
spot the controlling issue, the resolution of which serves as the key to
resolving the multiple legal disputes.
Subordinate Controlling Issues

Quite often, the resolution of the principal issue in a case depends on
how a subordinate issue raised in connection with it is resolved. For
example, the resolution of the principal issue of whether or not the tenant has
violated the lease by not paying the rent might depend on the subordinate
issue of whether or not the rent may be deemed paid by a set off of the
lessor’s separate debt to the tenant.
A second example would be the case of the tenant who did not pay the
rents, because he has in the meantime acquired ownership of the apartment
from the bank that foreclosed the mortgage on it. The resolution of the
principal issue would now depend on the subordinate issue of whether or not
the tenant subsequently acquired ownership of the leased property. In these
examples, the subordinate issues have become the controlling issues that
would decide the outcome of the case.
Consider another example. Relying on advertisements about the benefits to
women of a facial cream called Maxim, Pacita Guerrero bought the cream
from a supermarket and used it. She developed rashes that left scars on her
face. She sued Maxim & Co., the manufacturer of the cream, for damages.
But the latter invoked the small prints on the label of the cream container that
warned against possible allergy in the use of the cream. Since every
consumer has the right to buy only safe products from cosmetic
manufacturers, Guerrero claims that Maxim & Co. violated this right when it
sold to her a facial cream that harmed her face. Maxim denies this claim,
however, stating that Guerrero has been forewarned of possible allergy and
that she accepted the risk when she bought and used the cream.
The fact that Guerrero suffered rashes in using Maxim’s cream is admitted.
The legal dispute consists in Guerrero’s claim that Maxim violated her right
to be sold only safe products and Maxim’s denial of the claim. The principal
issue emanating from this dispute, then, is whether or not Maxim violated
Guerrero’s right to be sold only safe products. The resolution of this issue
depends, however, on the subordinate controlling issue raised by the nature
of Maxim’s defense: whether or not Maxim has the right to market cosmetic
products that could cause harmful allergy to some, provided that the product
label discloses this risk.
In the case of the public works project director and his men who allowed a
private contractor to deviate from the agreed building plan and reduce his
scope of work yet got paid the original agreed price, these public officers
may raise the defense that the government ordered an additional job done in
exchange for the reduction in the scope of the earlier agreement. The issue
would be whether or not such an agreement existed.
Relevant and Irrelevant Issues

Quite often, the opposing parties make conflicting claims regarding the
facts of the case in their pleadings or testimonies. Must you discuss all the
factual issues raised by these conflicting claims? Not all issues raised in a
case merit discussion and resolution. Only relevant issues matter. Conflicting
claims on collateral matters, if discussed to establish the lack of credibility of
a witness, could be relevant to the side issue of whether or not to believe the
testimony of that witness. As a rule, however, only issues that when
resolved determine the outcome of the legal dispute are relevant to the
case.
For instance, in the rape case, Ronald Galang claims that he was Julia
Torres’ boyfriend but she denies it, asserting that he was merely her suitor.
The issue regarding the character of their relationship is relevant because,
while it is possible for a man to rape his girlfriend, it seems improbable that
he would do so considering the love that binds them. What is more, a finding
that Ronald was Julia’s boyfriend would establish her as a liar because she
testified that he was merely her suitor. This would discredit Julia’s other
testimonies.
Conversely, irrelevant issues have no value in a case even if they are
debated and resolved since they are of no consequence to the outcome of
the legal dispute. For example, also in the rape case, the issue of whether or
not Ronald is a good son for preferring to look after his parents rather than
marry Julia is irrelevant. Being a good or a bad son would not really help
resolve the legal dispute that centers on Julia’s charge that he raped her on the
night in question and his denial of the charge. Some good sons commit rape.
Is the subordinate issue of whether or not the winning contractor in a
government project is a “kumpare” of the head of the bidding committee
relevant to the charge that the latter gave that contractor undue benefit? The
answer is yes since that relationship could create a bias. Is the issue of
whether or not the bidding committee head arrived five minutes late for the
bidding relevant to that charge? Here, unless his late arrival resulted in some
favor to a bidder, the answer is no.
The lesson here is that you must distinguish between relevant and
irrelevant issues, dropping the irrelevant and focusing only on the
relevant. This is important because your discussion of irrelevant issues
would produce no advantage and might even weaken your position in the
case. On the other hand, if you make a mistake and drop a relevant issue, you
might be forfeiting that issue to your client’s loss.
A list of All the Issues

Issues are not too difficult to spot. There is an issue when the contending
parties do not agree on a given point. To detect an issue, all you need to do
is compare the facts and the laws that the two sides claim and identify the
areas of their disagreement. For closer evaluation, it should make sense in
pre-work to draw up a list of all the issues that the opposing claims of the
parties present. But, first, it should equally make sense to take note of what
the parties agree on.
Take the rape case. Both Ronald and Julia agreed that they attended the
wedding party at Barangay Talaan, Lian, Batangas, on the evening of July 12.
They disagreed, however, on the rest of what happened.
The following are the issues that their conflicting claims raise:
1. Whether or not Ronald was Julia’s suitor;
2. Whether or not she ignored him at the party because she disliked him;
3. Whether or not she walked home alone from the party;
4. Whether or not Ronald caught up with her on the ricefield and grabbed
her;
5. Whether or not Ronald raped Julia, employing force and intimidation;
and
6. Whether or not Julia was prompted by a genuine desire for justice in
filing the charge of rape against Ronald.
In the above, the dominant issue is the fifth, whether or not Ronald raped
Julia, employing force and intimidation, since it embodies both the principal
issue and the legal dispute that the case presents. As for the first issue in the
list, whether or not Ronald was Julia’s suitor, it may be regarded as a
subordinate issue since its resolution could shed light on the principal issue.
As for the second issue in the list, whether or not Julia ignored Ronald at the
party, we have already said that this is remotely relevant to the principal issue
and so could be dropped from the discussion.
But how about the other issues we identified above, namely, the third,
whether or not Julia walked home alone; the fourth, whether or not Ronald
caught up with her and grabbed her; and the sixth, whether or not Julia was
prompted by a genuine desire for justice in filing the charge of rape against
Ronald? Does each of these issues merit separate discussions in the
argument?
The answer is no. These three factual issues are intimately related and may
be considered as mere circumstances absorbed in the controlling issue of
whether or not Ronald raped Julia, using force and intimidation. Julia’s
walking home alone and Ronald’s catching up with her to grab and wrestle
her to the ground are closely related antecedents of the rape. There is no point
in discussing these conflicting claims apart from the rape itself if no separate
arguments could be arrayed in support of each. On the other hand, Julia’s
desire to file criminal charges against Ronald is but a natural consequence of
the rape, if it indeed took place. It, too, need not be addressed independently
of the controlling issue of whether or not Ronald had sex with Julia, using
force and intimidation.
Let us consider the following claims, based on an actual case. For study,
they have been simplified to highlight the issues that the litigants tender for
adjudication:
Allan: I shipped frozen shrimps from Davao to Manila on Ben’s vessel,
using a refrigerated container rented from Cesar. The shrimps arrived already
spoiled in Manila due to the negligence of Ben or Cesar or both.
Ben: I am not liable. The refrigerated container was defective. It was old.
My vessel’s captain was highly efficient in navigation.
Cesar: My refrigerated container was not old. It was in good condition.
The vessel’s crew was negligent in checking the power supply to the
container. I deny that the ship’s captain was a highly efficient navigator. I
insured myself with Dante’s Insurance against damages to the shrimps while
in my container during the voyage.
Dante: I am not liable since Cesar did not file his claim within 10 days of
the discovery of the damages as the policy required.
The above presents two distinct legal disputes. There is a legal dispute, we
said, when one party complains of a violation of his right by another who, on
the other hand, denies such a violation. Under this definition, the legal
disputes consist of:
a) Allan’s claim that Ben and Cesar were negligent in handling

the shrimps and Ben and Cesar’s denial of the claim; and
b) Cesar’s claim that Dante unjustifiably refused to honor his
liability under the insurance policy for the spoiled shrimps and
Dante’s denial of the claim.
The conflicting claims of the parties generate seven issues. Are all these
issues relevant to the legal disputes that the case presents? Let us consider
each of these issues:
1. Whether or not Ben and Cesar were negligent in handling the shrimps
(relevant since it is a statement of one of the principal issues in the case);
2. Whether or not Cesar is entitled under the insurance policy to
reimbursement from Dante for liability for the damage to the shrimps
(relevant being a statement of one of the principal issues);
3. Whether or not the refrigerated container was defective (relevant being
determinative of Cesar’s liability);
4. Whether or not the refrigerated container was an old unit (although an
old unit could be in good running condition, its age could give credence to
the claim that it bogged down during the voyage, a relevant point);
5. Whether or not the vessel’s captain was highly efficient in ship
navigation (this is definitely irrelevant unless it can be shown that the
shrimps died of dizziness because of the vessel’s bumpy ride);
6. Whether or not the vessel’s crew was negligent in checking the power
supply to the container (relevant being determinative of Ben’s liability); and
7. Whether or not Cesar filed his claim against the insurance policy on
time (relevant being determinative of Dante’s liability).
Which among the above issues are controlling, meaning that the outcome
of the case hangs on their resolution? The third, whether or not the
refrigerated container was defective, could determine Cesar’s liability; the
sixth, whether or not the vessel’s crew was negligent in checking the power
supply to the container, could determine Ben’s liability; and the seventh,
whether or not Cesar filed his claim against the insurance policy on time,
could determine Dante’s liability.
Factual and Legal Issues

All too often, the conflicting claims of the parties could tender factual as
well as legal issues. An issue is factual when the contending parties
cannot agree that a thing exists or has actually happened. For example,
there is a factual issue when the prosecution claims that the accused took and
pocketed the victim’s cellular phone during the time they were both in the
library while the accused claims that he did not and, in fact, never even went
near the victim. The factual issue in this case is whether or not the accused
took and pocketed the victim’s cellular phone.
Suppose the complainant claims that the traffic officer demanded a bribe in
exchange for returning complainant’s driver’s license while the traffic officer
claims that he did not. Is the issue of whether or not the traffic officer
demanded a bribe in exchange for returning complainant’s driver’s license a
factual or legal issue? It is a factual issue.
There is also a factual issue when the plaintiff claims that the food he ate at
the defendant’s restaurant was spoiled while the latter claims that it was not.
Here, the factual issue is whether or not the food plaintiff ate in the
defendant’s restaurant was spoiled.
On the other hand, an issue is legal when the contending parties assume
a thing exists or has actually happened but disagree on its legal
significance or effect on their rights. For example, in a case of rape, the
prosecution and the defense might agree that the male organ of the accused
merely touched the sex organ of the victim and did not penetrate it, yet they
could disagree on whether or not the fact amounted to rape. You have here
the legal issue of whether or not there is rape when the male organ merely
touched the surface of the female organ.
Suppose the respondent in an administrative case admits falsifying his
timecard to collect overtime pay from the government agency he works for.
Is the issue of whether or not respondent has, in falsifying his timecard to
collect overtime pay, committed grave misconduct that warrants dismissal a
factual or legal issue? It is a legal issue.
There is also a legal issue when there is an agreement that the deceased
died of cancer because of heavy smoking, but the family he left behind and
the cigarette company being sued disagree on the latter’s liability for such
death. The legal issue in this case then is whether or not cigarette companies
are liable for deaths caused by smoking their products.
Correct statement of the Issues

Because the statement of the issue or issues in a case is critical to an
effective and focused legal writing, every issue should be correctly phrased.
One. For instance, why are the statements of the issues preceded by the
words “whether or not”? By using the introductory words “whether or not,”
you automatically incorporate the opposing views, the positive and the
negative, into one statement of the issue. It, therefore, makes for a fair
statement of that issue.
Two. You will notice that the issues listed above are stated in terms of
what Julia claims the fact to be (e.g., whether or not Ronald was her suitor)
rather than in terms of Ronald’s opposite claims (whether or not she was his
sweetheart). The reason for this is that the plaintiff or the accuser in a case
always bears the burden of proving the affirmative of his or her claims. As a
general rule, therefore, the issues to be tried and decided are best defined in
terms of those affirmative claims.
For example, will you say “whether or not the defendant was negligent in
driving his car” or “whether or not the defendant was careful in driving his
car?” Since the plaintiff or the accuser in a case always bears the burden of
proving the affirmative of his claim, the issues to be tried and decided are
best defined in terms of those affirmative claims.
An exception to this is when the defendant, the respondent, or the accused
in the case admits the facts constituting the claim against him but raises a
defense that exempts him from liability under it. For example, the accused in
a criminal case might admit that he killed his victim yet pleads self-defense to
avoid liability. In such a case, the issue would be defined in terms of the
defense he invokes: whether or not the accused killed the victim in self-
defense.
Three. Another thing is that the statement of the issue must be fair, not
slanted in favor of a party. For example, the statement of the issue “whether
Ronald used force or intimidation in raping Julia,” is not fair since it already
assumes that he raped her. The reader will detect the resort to a slanted
statement of the issue and doubt the integrity of the advocating lawyer.
Four. The statement of the issue should also be comprehensive, leaving no
relevant point outside its embrace. For example, in the rape case, “whether or
not Ronald raped Julia,” is sufficiently comprehensive to cover all
subordinate issues of significance, including whether or not the two are
sweethearts.
Five. The statement of the issue must be specific and clear. For instance, in
a case involving the constitutionality of a law passed by Congress, the
statement of the issue, “whether or not the law is valid,” is too ambiguous. It
lacks sufficient details to enable the reader to understand what matter is
involved and follow the arguments in the case. A clearer statement of the
issue would be “Whether or not the Bouncing Checks Law violates the
constitutional right against being imprisoned for non-payment of debt.” The
writer must modify his statement of the issue to cover the area of the case that
he has chosen to attack or defend.
Six. Try at all times to capture in your statement of the issue, the gist or
essence of the specific violation of right that the defendant committed. Take
the case of the debtor who refuses to pay what he owes under the promissory
note that he executed in favor of another. Is it sufficient to say that the issue
is “whether or not the debtor is liable to the creditor?” No, you should rather
say that the issue is “whether or not the debtor unjustly refuses to pay his debt
under a promissory note that he issued in favor of the creditor.”
Is it sufficient to say that the issue is “whether or not the respondent
building official violated Section 3(b) of Republic Act 3019?” No, it would
be better to say, “whether or not the building official issued to the owner an
occupancy permit for a building that has inadequate fire exits, in violation of
Section 3(b) of Republic Act 3019.”
An issue stated in this way will keep you on course when you write your
memorandum, position paper, decision, or petition.
Threshold Issues
One final point in this discussion: you must not overlook threshold issues
that cases sometimes present. Threshold issues are those that could slam
the door to any judicial consideration of the case on its merits. For
instance, a court could not decide a case falling outside the scope of its
authority, a case filed in the wrong place, a case filed by the wrong party, or a
case filed after too many years. Usually, threshold issues are brought out by a
motion to dismiss in a civil action or a motion to quash in a criminal action,
filed before the issues on the merit of the case are joined by the filing of an
answer in the first or a plea of not guilty in the second.
The resolution of these threshold issues and similar others takes
precedence over the main legal disputes. For example, in the rape case, if the
criminal information is filed with the Municipal Trial Court rather than the
Regional Trial Court where it belongs, there is a threshold issue of whether or
not the former court has authority or jurisdiction to try and decide the case. In
any event, pleadings that address threshold issues are crafted in the same way
as other legal writings.
Writing Exercises
1. Presumably, you have, as part of pre-work, defined the legal dispute,

identified the laws that govern the case of the child attacked by a dog.
Hopefully, you put these all on paper. Your next task is to identify the
principal issue or issues that the legal dispute or disputes present as well as
the subordinate issues following the example given above in the rape case.
Then, choose from the issues you have identified, the controlling issue or
issues that when resolved will put an end to the dispute.
7.
Roughing Out the Argument
You have made an outline of the relevant facts; you have located the laws
or rules that apply to those facts; and, finally, you have identified the issues
in the case. You are now ready to take the next step in pre-work: roughing
out your arguments. This, in a sense, would be like drawing up your plans
before actually constructing your building. Roughing out your arguments
would give you an overall picture of your presentation and provide purpose
and direction to your writing.
Balanced Presentation
But first, take a familiar story that begs for an effective argument. A son
failed in one of his major subjects in college because he spent too much time
with his barkadas. His father warned him about such a result but he did not
mind him. When it happened, the father was so angry that he refused to give
his son money for re-enrollment. The son now approaches his father to plead
his case with him.
If you were the son, how would you present your case? Here is one way:
Dad, I want to re-enroll this semester [he speaks of what he

wants to do, but not about what his dad wants to do; and he fails
to state the issue that his dad has to decide]. I would be happy if
you let me re-enroll, dad, despite what happened [he speaks of
what will make him happy, but omits to mention of what will make
his dad happy].
If you don’t let me re-enroll, I will surely be unable to finish
my studies. [Shifting the blame.] How could you do that to me?
[Shifting the burden of explanation.]
Do you think the father would give in to his son’s request? Chances are he
would not. The son wronged his dad by ignoring his valid warning. When the
son failed to value the father’s effort in financing his schooling by not
studying diligently, his father’s moral and social obligation to finance his
schooling should be deemed over. Meanwhile, the son did not plan his
argument ahead of time and did not see the issue from the father’s point of
view. His efforts were doomed from the start.
If he prepared well, the son would probably have followed a different tack.
He would have said instead:
Dad, please consider letting me re-enroll. I made a mistake

when I ignored your warnings concerning my barkadas. I
hope you could forgive me.
I really miscalculated my chances in that subject. But as
you can see, I passed my other major subjects with high
grades. I have learned my lesson and I promise not to repeat
my mistake. In fact, as you can see, I have stopped going out
with my barkadas altogether.
Dad, could you give me another chance?
Does this approach have a better chance? Definitely.

It is forthright, honest, and realistic. And it shows to the father what he can
still do for his son after what he did. First, the son stated clearly what the
issue is and that it is up to his father to decide it. (Dad, please consider letting
me re-enroll.) Next, he acknowledged the argument against him (I made a
mistake when I ignored your warnings) but he immediately argued that it was
a mistake his father could choose to overlook (I hope you could forgive me).
Then, he brought up the arguments in his favor (I passed my other major
subjects with high grades … I promise not to repeat my mistake … I have
stopped going out with my barkadas altogether). Finally, he appealed to his
father’s good sense (Dad, could you give me another chance?).
Any attempt to persuade someone to accept your opinion or point of view
must, much like the above, consider the structure of a balanced thesis
presentation:
First –– A clear statement of your thesis or where you stand on

the issue to be resolved;
Second –– The arguments that can be made against your
position but with an explanation that those arguments do not
doom such position;
Third –– The arguments in favor of your position; and
Fourth –– An appeal to the good sense of the person or persons
who will resolve the issue. (In writing a decision, this fourth
element may, of course, be omitted by the judge since he is the
person who will resolve the issue. Nonetheless, the judge must
convince the reader that his decision is correct.)
The above structure represents the psychology of every balanced attempt

to win others to your point of view in a controversy. But how do you guard
yourself against the mindless approach that characterizes many legal
writings? There is only one answer. Complete your pre-work. Plan and
rough out a balanced approach to your arguments before writing them
up. When you have done these, you would be able to scout the whole terrain
that your writing would cover, aided by a map in your hand. You would be
able to see the relevance and strengths of your argument and decide how to
most effectively present them when you write.
How do you rough out your arguments so you could see a broad picture of
how they look when you are finished? Since the main thing in roughing out
your arguments is to see how they balance, use a balance sheet format.
Recall that when you sorted out the facts of your case and looked up the
laws or rules that applied to those facts, what guided you was your “statement
of the issue” that the case presented. Now, however, in crafting your
arguments, you need to be guided by your thesis statement or proposition. As
counsel for Ronald, your thesis statement would be: “Ronald did not rape
Julia.” Write it clearly at the top center of your balance sheet.
(Where You Stand on the Issue)
RONALD DID NOT RAPE JULIA
What is the point in adopting as your balance sheet heading your thesis
statement that “Ronald did not rape Julia,” rather than your statement of the
issue, “whether or not Ronald raped Julia.” The point is that the thesis
statement represents the goal you set for your arguments. It will give you
direction in shaping and coloring your arguments.
Next, write on the left column of your balance sheet the arguments that can
be made against you, and on the right column write how such arguments do
not doom your case. In addition, write also on the right column an
enumeration of the positive arguments in your favor. Finally, state
underneath the arguments your closing statement, an appeal to the good sense
of the reader.

(Arguments Against You) (Arguments in Your Favor)
(Appeal to Your Reader’s Good Sense)

You need to write only the gist of the arguments against you or for you. It
is during the write-up stage that you will develop and expand these
arguments and make them convincing. Still, your statement of each of your
arguments must be concise, clear, and logical so that, looking at them on your
balance sheet, you will be able to see the whole picture.
Anatomy of a Legal Argument

But where will you get the arguments with which you will fill up your
above balance sheet?
You should understand what an argument is. An argument is a reason you
offer to prove your thesis or proposition. For example, in the son’s case, his
thesis or proposition is that “his dad should let him re-enroll in school.” What
reason can the son offer to prove his thesis correct? One reason the son can
offer is that, “although he failed in one subject, he did not do so badly since
he got high grades in his other subjects.” He still merits support from his dad.
In the rape case, your thesis or proposition might be that Ronald did not
rape Julia. What reason can you offer to prove your thesis correct? A reason
that you could offer is that, although Mario lived near where the rape
supposedly took place, he did not hear Julia’s outcry. Is this a good reason?
Yes, since it makes sense.
The great bulk of legal arguments are in the mold of the classic categorical
syllogism. A most basic example of this is the following:
Major premise: All men are mortal.
Minor premise: Jose is a man.
Conclusion: Jose is mortal.
The major premise, all men are mortal, is a statement of a generally
accepted rule or truth. The minor premise, Jose is a man, is a statement that
brings a particular thing or individual within the class or situation covered by
the generally accepted rule or truth. The conclusion, Jose is mortal, is a
statement that follows after the major and minor premises, deducing that the
generally accepted rule or truth applies to the particular thing or individual.
Here is an example. Arguing from common experience, a witness can be
discredited in this manner:
People who lie cannot be believed.
Armando lied in his testimony.
Therefore, he cannot be believed.
You need to understand that every sound legal argument is a
combination of the right rule and the right fact. For example, what
argument can you make if your thesis or proposition is that “Jose should be
punished for crossing the red light.”
First, you can state the rule that “Crossing the red light is punishable by
law.”
Next, you can state the fact in Jose’s case that “Jose crossed the red light.”
Finally, you can state your conclusion that “Therefore, Jose should be
punished by law.”
To sum up: Crossing the red light is punishable by law. Jose crossed the
red light. Therefore, Jose shall be punished by law.
The above argument consists of three statements: the rule statement
(crossing the red light is punishable by law), the case fact statement (Jose
crossed the red light), and the conclusion statement (therefore, Jose should
be punished by law).
The Key Fact in Rules

You will note that the rule statement (crossing the red light is punishable
by law) has a fact component for its subject, namely, “crossing the red
light.” This is logical because all rules identify the facts on which they will
operate or apply. We will call this fact component of the rule (crossing the
red light in our example) its “key fact.” It is a key fact because its presence
in the case of Jose opens up such case to the application of the rule.
To further illustrate this, the law that punishes theft identifies the key fact
to which the law applies. It applies, according to the penal code, to “the
taking, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of
persons nor force upon things, of the personal property of another without
the latter’s consent.” If the case fact involving a particular individual, say
Cesar, shows that he took the property of another under the circumstances
described in the law, then the law will apply to Cesar, given that its key fact
is present in his case. When the key fact component of the rule statement is
present in the case fact statement, you have a positive match. The rule applies
to the case fact. Thus:
Any person who, with intent to gain but without violence
against or intimidation of person nor force upon things, shall
take the property of another without the latter’s consent, shall
be punished for theft.
Cesar took, with intent to gain, Mario’s cellphone from his
desk when his back was turned and without his consent.
Consequently, Cesar shall be punished for theft.
What argument can you make, on the other hand, if your thesis or
proposition is in the negative, namely that David cannot be punished for
crossing the red light? First, you can state the rule that “beating the red light
is punishable by law” (the rule that governs beating the red light) “but
crossing the yellow light does not amount to crossing the red light” (an
interpretative rule that excludes crossing the yellow light from the meaning of
crossing the red light). Next, you can state the case fact that “David actually
crossed a yellow light.” Finally, you can state the conclusion that “Therefore,
David cannot be punished by law.” Thus––
Crossing the red light is punishable by law. But crossing the
yellow light does not amount to crossing the red light. David
actually crossed a yellow light. Therefore, David cannot be
punished by law.
The key fact on which the general rule operates is “crossing the red light.”
But this is not found in the particular case of David for he “actually crossed a
yellow light.” Consequently, the punishment due to persons who cross red
lights does not apply to David. His crossing a yellow light repels the
operation of the law, producing a negative conclusion.
Let us take another example. The law gives the right to bear the surnames
of the father and the mother only to legitimate children. If the issue is
whether or not the law will apply to a particular child, the key fact in the law
(the fact that the child needs to be legitimate) must be present in his case. If
the case fact is that Justo is an “illegitimate child,” the law does not apply to
him. Justo has no right to bear the surnames of his father and his mother. The
rule does not apply to his case fact.
The above arguments, positive as well as negative, typify the classic
categorical syllogism, applied to legal writing. This is made up of three
statements: (1) the statement of a rule that applies to a given fact or set of
facts (the rule statement); (2) the statement of the fact of a particular case
that opens up such case or closes it to the application of the rule (the case fact
statement); and (3) the conclusion that the rule applies or does not apply to
the particular case (the conclusion statement).
The Case Fact

As already stated, rules usually identify the key fact upon which such rules
will apply. Only when this “key fact” exists in a particular case, i.e., in the
“case fact” will the rule apply to such case.
Is it the rule that dictates what the fact of a particular case ought to be or is
it the fact of the case that dictates what the rule ought to be? Of course, the
answer is that it is the fact of a particular case that determines what will
govern it, not the other way around. In our first example, we can apply the
rule that “crossing the red light is punishable by law” to the case of Jose
because “Jose crossed the red light.”
When preparing your argument, therefore, begin by ascertaining the fact or
facts of your case. Once you know the facts, you can check these out again
whatever rule is proposed to govern them. But it is not that easy.
Theoretically, the facts of a case do not change. Facts are facts and you
cannot alter them. Unfortunately, however, putting your finger on the correct
facts of a case can be difficult since the evidence of those facts can be marred
by the witness’ bias, by human error in observing them, by lack of ability to
communicate what one observed, and, not too rarely, even by a motive to lie.
And, even when the correct facts of a particular case or its “case fact” has
been ascertained, you will observe that the “rule” that applies to it can
significantly change as you turn that case fact around, showing its different
hues and contours. For this reason, prepare to deal with issues regarding what
your case fact truly is.
Meaning of “Rule”
Once you have ascertained your case fact, where will you find the “rule,”
the key fact of which is in favor of or against your case fact and which would
either produce the positive or negative conclusion that you desire?
The term “rule” used in this discussion has a broad scope. As previously
mentioned in Chapter 5, Knowing the Applicable Law or Rule, includes
legislated rules like:
a. Constitutional provisions. Where the fact of the case is that the
government has taken possession of your client’s land for road building
without paying him for it, you can invoke the Constitutional provision that
“private property shall not be taken except upon payment of just
compensation” to prove your thesis that your client is entitled to
compensation.
b. Statutory provisions. Where your opponent’s client pleads lack of
liability for a wrong he has committed because he did not know that the law
forbade it, you can invoke the provision of the civil code that “ignorance of
the law excuses no one” to prove your thesis that he is liable.
c. Rules of Court provisions. Where the accused offers money to the
complainant for dropping the case, you can cite the provision of the Rules of
Court that “an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in
evidence as an implied admission of guilt” to prove your thesis that the
accused is guilty of the charge.
But the “rule” also includes case laws or judicial precedents. Judicial
precedents are the most convenient source of argument. The hardworking
lawyer or student, the plodder, will discover a treasury of arguments in the
law reports. In real life, no problem is new. Somewhere, the issues you now
face have been argued and resolved in a variety of ways. All you have to do
is tap the law books where they are indexed and preserved.
Take for example the defense of alibi. If your opponent invokes it, you can
easily put it down by invoking an abundance of precedents that says:
The defense of alibi, as a rule, is considered with suspicion

and is always received with caution, not only because it is
inherently weak and unreliable, but because it can be easily
fabricated. (People v. Paraiso, 349 SCRA 335.) Alibi cannot
prevail over positive identification of the accused by the
prosecution witnesses who have no motive to lie. (People v.
Lovedorial, 349 SCRA 402.)
If you are on the other side, a counterargument exists:
Alibi can be believed where it can be shown that the
accused was at another place at the time of the commission of
the offense and it was physically impossible for him to be at
the place where it happened. (People v. Plana, 370 SCRA 542.)
And when the prosecution is unable to establish the guilt of
the accused, alibi assumes importance. (People v. Morales, 363
SCRA 342.)
The “rule” also includes widely accepted truths that derive from logic,
common sense, or even common experience. For example, if the issue is
whether or not the accused killed the victim in self-defense, you can put
down such defense by evidence that shows that he died of a gunshot wound
on his back. Common sense dictates that shooting the victim on his back is
incompatible with defending oneself. Another good example is the truth that
“it would be improbable for a barrio girl of tender age and definitely
inexperienced in sexual matters to fabricate a charge of rape for no reason at
all.” This is a “truth” developed from observance of common life in the
countryside. You can invoke it as a form of rule in arguing the credibility of
the complainant in a rape case.
Roughed Out Arguments

Having seen the anatomy of every sound legal argument, you should be
ready, if you were counsel for Ronald, to rough out your argument on the
rape charge against him.
On the left column of your balance sheet, one argument that your opponent
can make out against Ronald is that “vaginal lacerations usually found in
rape victims were found in Julia.” Spelled out, the applicable rule here would
be that “vaginal lacerations are usually found in rape victims.” The case fact
is that “Julia had vaginal lacerations,” the conclusion would be that she
probably had been raped.
Ronald might in turn state on the opposite column of his balance sheet his
counter argument that “as a virgin Julia could have lacerations during
consented sex.” Spelled out, the applicable rule here is that “true, vaginal
lacerations are usually found in rape victims but (stating an exception to the
rule) such lacerations can also be found in consented sex with a virgin.”
Applying this rule to the case fact that “Julia was a virgin,” the conclusion
would be that “the lacerations found in her do not necessarily indicate rape.”
When placed in your balance sheet of arguments, the above should read:

Vaginal lacerations usually As a virgin, Julia could have

found in rape victims were vaginal lacerations during
found in Julia. consented sex.
Some students who were given the task of making an outline of their
arguments in the rape case showed a tendency to state only either the case
fact statement or the rule statement in their arguments. And a good number of
them did not know how to look for meaningful points that support their thesis
or proposition. They confessed that their undergraduate courses simply did
not give them that kind of preparation and training.
For example, a student regarded as a strong argument to prove that Ronald
did not rape Julia the point that “he and she were sweethearts.”

He and she were sweethearts.
It might be a good argument but it states only the case fact in his argument,
omitting the applicable rule, which, presumably, is that “it is not likely for a
man to rape his sweetheart.” The better way to rough out the argument is to
say, “Being sweethearts, it was not likely for Ronald to rape Julia.” Both the
case fact and the rule are incorporated in this outline argument.
A student, taking the side of the prosecution, attempted to refute Ronald’s
above argument but he simply stated as counterargument the case fact that
“Ronald was only a suitor.”

RONALD RAPED JULIA
(Arguments in
(Arguments Against You)
Your Favor)
Being sweethearts, it was not likely for Ronald was only

Ronald to rape Julia. a suitor.
Since the student did not state the applicable rule in his outline argument,
he could very well end up saying, “it is likely for a suitor to rape the girl he
courts.” But, not being consistent with human experience, this argument is
not plausible.
Probably, the student’s unstated rule is that “uncorroborated claims, when
denied by the adverse party, may be considered self-serving.” In such a case,
he should combine this with his “case fact” and produce the counterargument
that: “But, uncorroborated, Ronald’s claim is self-serving since Julia never
admitted it.” An alternate counterargument is that: “Being only a suitor,
Ronald was capable of committing the rape.”

RONALD RAPED JULIA
(Arguments (Arguments in Your Favor)

Against You)
Being
But, uncorroborated, Ronald’s claim is
sweethearts, it
self-serving since Julia never admitted
was not likely
it. Or, being only a suitor, he was
for Ronald to
capable of the crime.
rape Julia.
The lesson here is that you must think your argument through to its
essential elements so you could test its validity or soundness.
Let us go to another example, this time of a student in search of an
argument to support his view that Ronald raped Julia. The student wrote this
point in his favor: “Julia ignored Ronald during the wedding party so this
made him feel bad.”

RONALD RAPED JULIA
(Arguments
(Arguments in Your Favor)
Against You)
Julia ignored Ronald during the wedding

party, making him feel bad.
Is the above a good argument? No. It does not appear to have any
reasonable relation to the student’s thesis that Ronald raped Julia. The beauty
of a balance sheet format is that your thesis, “Ronald raped Julia,” is written
prominently on top of your proposed arguments. To test the validity of the
argument that the student raised, just see if his thesis follows from it. Thus: if
he says “Julia ignored Ronald during the wedding party, making him feel
bad,” could you deduce from this that “Ronald raped Julia?” When the two
ideas do not connect, the argument is invalid.
Below are the other roughed out arguments and the closing statement that
Ronald could use. See if they connect to the writer’s thesis or proposition.

(Arguments in Your
(Arguments Against You)
Favor)
Because women will rarely But not when the woman’s

admit to having been raped testimony, like that of
unless true, a rape victim’s Julia, is inherently
testimony can stand alone. incredible.
Absence of bruises on her

body despite rough
grounds negates rape by
use of force.
Being a barrio woman, it is

likely that someone like
Ronald walked her home
at that late hour.
(Appeal to Your Reader’s Good Sense)

It is but fair that testimony inconsistent with common
experience is not believed.
Creative Thinking
When you have exhausted legislated rules and court precedents in search
of suitable arguments that will support your thesis or proposition and these do
not satisfy you, try creative thinking. Let your subconscious mind take over
the problem. This process often yields indigenous solutions and pleasant
surprises. And the steps are simple.
First, be sure that your mind gets all the data and inputs about the case that
your source materials would yield. Working like a computer, the mind will
process only those facts that have been put into it.
Second, pose the problem to your mind. For example, ask your mind the
question: “How can I prove that Ronald did not rape Julia?” Repeat this
question to yourself a number of times until you are satisfied that it has been
planted into your mind.
Third, forget about the case. Take time out and let your subconscious
mind do the work. Go to sleep. You will be surprised that the answer will pop
out of your head in the middle of what you are doing. Be prepared to jot it
down immediately.
Arguments that Build Up

Apart from being able to form a combination of the right “rule” and the
right “case fact” to support your thesis or proposition, here is a list of other
arguments that you can use to build up your side of an issue:
a. The favorable testimony comes from a credible witness.
The testimonies of those who are involved in the case or their
relatives and friends are often regarded as partisan. Those with no
bias, one way or the other, are excellent witnesses. For example,
the medico-legal expert and the farm owner, Perez, in the rape
case have no bias or motive to testify falsely in the case.
b. The party’s version is inherently credible and consistent
with common experience. The truth of narrative stories is often
judged by its compatibility with common experience. For
example, if the fact that Ronald and Julia were sweethearts can be
established, you can believe his claim that they forgot themselves
when one evening they stopped and sat down in the middle of a
rice field.
c. All the elements or requisites of a valid claim or defense
have been proved. Some laws prescribe factual elements or
requisites in order for claims or defenses to be operative. You
make a good argument when you prove that you have established
them all. For example, the prosecution in the case against Ronald
can show that it has established all the elements of the crime of
rape to warrant conviction.
Arguments that Destroy

Pointing out that the opposite party invokes the wrong “rule” or that he has
failed to prove the “case fact” component of his argument are the basic ways
of destroying his thesis or proposition. Below are some additional arguments
that provide the same result.
a. The argument raised is irrelevant. An argument is
irrelevant when it does not help resolve the issue one way or the
other. When your opponent says, “Ronald is immoral and
irresponsible because he refuses to marry Julia even when he
admits that he took her innocence from her,” you can say, “The
argument is irrelevant since being irresponsible does not make a
man a rapist.”
b. The argument has little weight given the other
considerations in the case. Here you can assume that your
opponent has made a valid argument but you hasten to state that
other considerations outweigh that argument. Thus, when your
opponent says, “Ronald’s failure to see Julia’s parents to explain
his side shows his guilt,” you could say, “That failure can be
explained. Their sons would have killed Ronald if he immediately
went to see them after their daughter cried rape.”
c. The argument is baseless. A claim made with no fact to
support it is baseless. When your opponent says, “Julia is a good,
innocent girl who would not cry rape if it were untrue,” you could
say, “But, that is baseless since there is no evidence to show that
she is good and innocent.”
d. The argument is contrary to common experience. As a
rule, claims that go against ordinary human experience are bizarre
and cannot be believed. When your opponent says, “Julia was not
afraid to walk home alone through empty rice fields near
midnight,” you can say, “That is unbelievable. No woman in her
right mind will do that.”
e. The argument is inconsistent with undeniable facts. No
assertion can defeat facts that cannot lie. When your opponent
says, “Julia wasted no time to file her complaint against Ronald,”
you can say, “The record shows that she showed up at the police
station two (2) days after the alleged rape.”
f. The argument is inconsistent with a prior claim. Persons
who say one thing now and another thing later cannot be relied on
to tell the truth. When your opponent says, “Julia testified that
Ronald was her suitor,” you can say, “She once admitted to a
friend that she was his sweetheart.”
The above enumerations of arguments that build up or destroy are of
course not intended to be exclusive. The mind and the imagination are
limitless and no list such as what has been drawn up above can contain them.
Further, this book uses simple cases for easy illustrations but real cases can
be complex and can bring forth arguments that cannot be captured in a box.
You must consider other arguments or reasons and use them so long as they
tend to support the stand you have taken. If you learn the basic lessons in this
book, doubtless, you can handle the demands of more difficult and complex
legal writings.
Pre-work Reviewed
As pre-work comes to an end, a summary of the steps taken under it should
round up the discussion. Pre-work consists of the following steps:
a. Ascertain the legal dispute. After going over your materials
quickly, do you detect the presence of a legal dispute where one
claims that another has violated his right and where this other
denies such violation? Rewrite your statement of the legal dispute
in the format of an issue and put this down in writing to guide you
in making an outline of the facts and in looking for the laws and
rules that apply to such facts.
b. Make an outline of the relevant facts. Now go over your
materials again, this time more closely, and make an outline of
the relevant facts of the case, discarding the irrelevant.
Afterwards, complete your work on the facts by arranging them in
correct order.
c. Identify the Issues. Identify the principal issue or issues
raised in that case and, if present, the subordinate controlling
issues as well. Make a list of all the other issues that the parties to
the case raised, then choose from these what are relevant to the
resolution of the legal dispute or disputes involved.
d. Rough out your argument. Rough out your argument on a
paper, using the balance sheet format. Write on top of the balance
sheet the stand you take on the relevant issue presented. Write on
the left column of the balance sheet the arguments against you
and on the right column your refutation of such arguments plus
the positive arguments in your favor. State only the gist of those
arguments. At the bottom of the balance sheet, write your closing
statement, usually an appeal to the good sense of the reader.
Writing Exercises
If you did the work suggested in this book, you would no doubt have
identified the principal issue or issues as well as the subordinate issues that
the legal dispute or disputes in the case of the girl that a neighbor’s dog
attacked present.
Now, decide whether or not you will recommend to your client, Mr.
Banag, the filing of a lawsuit against Mr. Sison. Rough out on paper the
arguments that you can use in support of the advice that you choose to
recommend to him.
8.
Introducing the Issues
After completing pre-work, you are now ready for the write-up stage.
You cannot submit your outline of argument to the court because it will
probably not make any sense to the judge. You alone would be able to
understand your outline. Consequently, you have to flesh out your outline-
argument, give it color and shape, and make it strong and convincing to your
reader.
Need for Introduction

At the start of this book, we defined legal writing as the things that
lawyers write to win others over to their point of view. But you cannot just
hit your reader with your point of view respecting an issue without telling
him the circumstances of the case that brought about the issue. He just would
not be able to see your point of view.
An argument set forth without some preamble of facts can be likened to an
answer that a student writes on his examination notebook. It represents his
point of view on the question that the professor asked in the test paper. To
illustrate this point, take this answer in a political law question.
3. He is not right. Although the Constitution provides that

no law shall be passed impairing the obligations of contract,
the Supreme Court has ruled that the police power of the
state empowers the legislature to enact laws regulating
contracts in the interest of the public welfare. Every contract
is presumed to carry with it the reservation that it shall be
subject to laws passed subsequent to their perfection.
In this case, the law in question is a valid exercise of police
power since it seeks to protect the interest of the poor.
Therefore, Gregorio is wrong. The law is constitutional.
Can you fully grasp what the student’s argument above is all about? Not
likely, since you do not have the benefit of knowing the background facts and
the issue behind the answer. This is not to say, of course, that a direct answer
like the above will not work in a classroom setting. It will. We may presume
that the professor who will check the answer knows the question that the
student addresses. It will make no sense, therefore, for the student to repeat
the professor’s question in his answer.
Unfortunately, most lawyers bring into their law practice their mindsets as
students. They would often hit the judge directly with their argument without
adequately introducing the issue that they present to him for resolution. They
wrongly assume that the judge has the background facts planted firmly in his
head and that he has been waiting with bated breath to read the pleadings as
soon as these are filed. Quite often, the assumption is wrong.
The judge may have read the previous pleadings in the case, he may have
conducted the trial, and he may have heard the testimonies of the witnesses,
but he cannot be expected to remember all these each time he reads a party’s
pleading as it reaches his hands. The odds are that he would not because:
a. The attention span of human beings is quite limited. Hence,

the judge might be present in the course of the testimony but it is
too much to expect him to have listened to everything that had
been said. You cannot assume that he barred inner thoughts and
other distractions during every proceeding in a case.
Consequently, you have to lay to him those facts that are relevant
to the issue that he would resolve.
b. Hearings in the Philippine system are piecemeal. The judge
hears the testimonies of the various witnesses over some period of
time, from one to five years in certain cases. Consequently, when
some facts make up the issue in the case or its incident, you need
to restate those facts to the judge.
c. It is possible that the judge had gotten the facts wrong from
past pleadings or during the hearing. You may have to correct
those impressions by recalling the facts as they were.
d. In the case of the justices of an appellate court, you need to
apprise them of the facts of the case simply because they did not
hear the evidence and they rely on the lawyer’s summaries of
them.
Even if your own client supplied the facts on which he seeks your opinion
regarding an issue arising from them, you still need to restate those facts to
him to insure that he and you have a shared understanding of the facts. In this
way, you would have no misunderstanding with him.
Now, let us go back to the student’s answer in the examination notebook.
Since you are not the professor correcting that answer, we will reproduce for
you the question asked the student. See if you can appreciate the student’s
answer better.
[Question.] The legislature enacted a law fixing the amount

of rentals that apartment owners may impose upon their
tenants. Gregorio, an apartment owner, assails the law as
unconstitutional in that setting the rates of rentals is not a
proper and constituent function of government. Besides, the
law violated the freedom of contract between apartment
owners and their tenants. Is he right? Explain.
[Answer.] He is not right. Although the Constitution
provides that no law shall be passed impairing the obligations
of contract, the Supreme Court has ruled that the police
power of the state empowers the legislature to enact laws
regulating contracts in the interest of the public welfare.
Every contract is presumed to carry with it the reservation
that it shall be subject to laws passed subsequent to their
perfection.
In this case, the law in question is a valid exercise of police
power since it seeks to protect the interest of the poor.
Therefore, Gregorio is wrong. The law is constitutional.
Does it not help to state the background of the legal dispute between the
parties and the issue that it presents before you state your opinion or point of
view on that issue? It does. Without that background, you can never hope to
get your reader to understand your opinion or argument.
Sufficiency of Introduction
But how much background facts do you put into your pleading or opinion
to introduce the issue or issues that you will address? There is but one
answer: only as much background facts as are needed for an
understanding of the issue or issues that the parties present. The rules
governing ordinary appeals provide the standard for sufficiency. They
recognize the need for two statements to introduce the issue or issues in a
case: (a) the statement of the case; and (b) the statement of the facts. This
might well be the model for other legal writings like memoranda, comments,
position papers, petitions, and even decisions.
The Statement of the Case

The purpose of a statement of the case is to provide a clear and concise
statement of the nature of the action, a summary of the proceedings so far
had, any challenged order or decision issued in the case, and other matters
necessary to an understanding of the controversy.
You should underline the phrase “necessary to an understanding of the
controversy” because many lawyers are fond of making longwinded and
elaborate “statement of the case.” Invariably, they also throw in a detailed
summary of what the parties allege in the complaint and the answer when this
is hardly needed in most cases.
Take an appellant’s brief that the losing party filed with the Court of
Appeals in an appeal from a Regional Trial Court’s decision. The only issue
the case presented was whether or not the defendant maligned the plaintiff by
publicly accusing her of stealing her jewelry. See if this simple issue justifies
the elaborate details that filled up the appellant’s statement of the case, edited
to protect the identities of the persons involved.
Statement of the Case

Plaintiff-appellee Celia De Leon filed a civil action against
defendant-appellant Laura Casal for damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila where it was docketed as Civil
Case No. 45678.
Plaintiff De Leon alleged in her complaint that on March
10 at the Hotel Intercontinental, in the presence of a certain
Ms. Rita Young and other persons, defendant Casal
maliciously, recklessly, or in bad faith injured her good name
and business reputation by accusing her of stealing her
jewelry and that in making the accusation, defendant Casal
allegedly stated:
“Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto kanina. Nasaan
ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang ang
lumabas ng kuwarto; ikaw ang kumuha.”
Plaintiff De Leon further alleged that the above statements
were false, untrue, and malicious, made by defendant Casal,
knowing at the time she uttered them that they were false and
untrue; that she uttered them with actual malice and ill will
which caused the dishonor, discredit, and contempt of
plaintiff De Leon; that because of the accusation, plaintiff De
Leon was bodily searched, her bag and car were also
searched, and these were seen and witnessed by her friends,
acquaintances, and the general public. Plaintiff De Leon
likewise alleged that all the above acts committed against her
were instigated and initiated by defendant Casal with actual
malice and ill will, causing her dishonor and placing her in
public contempt.
After summons was served on defendant Casal, she filed an
answer with counterclaim. She denied plaintiff De Leon’s
charge, claiming that at no time was the latter singled out for
confrontation or investigation much less did defendant Casal
accuse her or utter the subject remarks. For filing a malicious
suit against her, defendant Casal sought payment of
attorney’s fees by plaintiff De Leon.
Later, the lower court set the case for pre-trial conference.
Both parties filed their respective pretrial briefs in
compliance with an order of the lower court that calendared
the case for pre-trial conference. The pre-trial conference
having been terminated, trial commenced with plaintiff De
Leon testifying, followed by corroborating witnesses. During
defendant Casal’s turn to present evidence, she had no
witness but herself.
The lower court rendered a decision dated August 21
holding defendant Casal liable for publicly maligning plaintiff
De Leon and ordering the former to pay the latter actual and
moral damages. Considering that the decision was contrary to
law and the evidence, defendant Casal appealed from it to this
Honorable Court.
Probably, Casal’s lawyer thought that the bits of information he provided
in his above statement of the case would assist the Court of Appeals in
understanding and resolving the issue that the parties raised. They would not.
Firstly, the issue was simply whether or not Casal maligned De Leon by
publicly accusing her of stealing her jewelry. Making reference in the
statement of the case to the service of summons, to the holding of a pre-trial
conference, and to the number of witnesses presented by either side provides
no help to the court in understanding the issue.
Secondly, down the road in his brief, Casal’s lawyer would be writing a
statement of facts that summarizes the conflicting evidence of the parties
regarding the alleged defamatory remarks. This is the place to introduce the
factual issue, not in the statement of the case.
Besides, where trial has taken place, it would usually serve no useful
purpose to recite in the statement of the case the allegations of the parties in
their pleadings. With the evidence adduced at the trial, the court would render
its decision, not on the basis of those allegations but on the basis of the
evidence so adduced. It should be sufficient for the purpose of identifying the
principal issues tendered by the pleadings to simply mention the basic legal
disputes that the claims of the parties produced.
Rewritten, the statement of the case, purged of non-essentials, might look
like this:
Plaintiff-appellee Celia De Leon filed a complaint for
damages against defendant-appellant Laura Casal before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case 45678 for falsely
accusing her of stealing Casal’s jewelry. Casal denied this
charge in her answer and asserted a counterclaim for
attorney’s fees against De Leon for having filed an unjustified
suit. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision, holding
defendant Casal liable in actual and moral damages for
maligning De Leon. This prompted the latter to appeal the
decision to this Court.
At times, specific allegations in a pleading constitute evidence of judicial

admission and, therefore, may be vital to the case. But these allegations need
not be in the statement of the case. It will usually be enough that you cite
them in the argument section of your memorandum or paper. Of course,
where a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment has been sought
by one or both parties, a recitation of the allegations of the complaint and
answer in the statement of the case will be useful.
In criminal cases, lawyers also often quote the criminal information as part
of their statement of the case. Is this needed? It is not. Unless the allegations
in the information are in issue, it will be pointless to quote the contents of the
information in your statement of the case. It will be sufficient to point out that
the accused has been charged with a particular crime like theft or homicide.
The Statement of Facts

The statement of the case describes the nature of the action and the
proceedings it had gone through. The “statement of facts,” on the other hand,
narrates the transaction or event that created the legal dispute and led to the
filing of the suit. In an eviction case, the statement of facts may be expected
to recite that the landlord and the tenant came to an agreement over the lease,
that the tenant violated the agreement, that the landlord made a demand on
the tenant to vacate the property, and that the latter refused to do so. The
statement of facts may also be expected to narrate the tenant’s defense for
declining to leave the landlord’s property.
The usual concern here is whether or not your statement of facts should
present only your client’s version of the facts of the case. A great majority of
lawyers believe that since you are expected to champion your client’s side of
the case, you are not required to do your opponent the favor of reciting his
version of the facts in your brief. It is up to each side to present a statement of
facts based on his client’s version.
But you do not do your opponent any favor with a two-sided statement of
facts. Actually, you do yourself and the court the favor of better
understanding the issue and the arguments you present when you show the
conflicting claims of the parties. And this is what will serve your case well.
The statement of facts, like the statement of the case, is neither intended as
nor is the place for arguments. Its function is to introduce the issue or issues
that the case presents.
You may look at the structure of a memorandum, opinion, brief, petition,
comment, position paper, decision, or similar legal writing as follows:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STATEMENT OF FACTS
PLAINTIFF’S VERSION DEFENDANT’S VERSION

OF THE FACTS OF THE FACTS
THE ISSUE OR ISSUES
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
RELIEF
You can see from the flow of thoughts in the above diagram that, if your
purpose were to build up your facts to enable your reader or the court to have
a full grasp of the issue or issues that you intend to argue, then it makes no
sense to present only one side’s version of the facts. Issues are the product of
disagreement. Only by fairly showing the conflicting claims of the parties can
the court or your reader truly understand the issues that divide them.
Besides, the Rules of Court require parties to include their conflicting
claims in their respective statement of facts. Section 13(d) of Rule 44 requires
the appellant’s statement of facts to make “a clear and concise statement in a
narrative form of the facts admitted by both parties and of those in
controversy.” In the case of the appellee’s brief, Section 14(b) requires the
appellee merely to state whether he accepts the statement of facts in the
appellant’s brief, which includes the conflicting versions. If he does not, he
should merely point out its insufficiencies or inaccuracies without repeating
the matters in the appellant’s statement of facts.
Since the background facts are meant to give the judge or the reader a fair
understanding of the case and the issues that the parties present, you should
fairly state your opponent’s version of those facts. You should not report that
version with a slant in your favor, whether obvious or subtle, believing that
you will gain some advantage in this way. The background facts are not the
place for argument or for opinionated narrative. The reader will eventually
see your unfair tactics and your distortions may boomerang on you.
The next question is how much details must go into your statement of the
facts? The test of sufficiency of the statement of facts of your pleading is its
ability to enable the judge or the reader to understand, with minimum
words, the issue or issues that you want him to resolve and the arguments
that you adduce on those issues.
Many students and lawyers feel insecure about an austere statement of
facts. They strongly feel that, unless the statement of facts includes all the
details that the evidence yields, whether or not these are remotely relevant to
the issue or issues presented, their facts would be incomplete. A good number
of them also feel that, unless evidence favorable to their case is included in
their statement of facts, they could not use it in their arguments. They forget
that the purpose of the statement of facts is merely to provide a background
of the transaction or event involved to enable the court or the reader to see the
issues in their proper context.
Remember the defamation case discussed above? The appellant’s brief
(also edited) has been reproduced below. Its statement of the case and
statement of facts are quite lean but observe how the argument section pours
out all the needed evidentiary details, including quotations from critical
portions of the transcripts of testimonies. Observe, too, how the recital of the
two versions of the facts of the case does not result in the giving of advantage
to the opposite side.
[CAPTION OMITTED]
Defendant-appellant Laura Casal, by counsel, respectfully
states:

Plaintiff-appellee Celia De Leon filed a complaint for
damages against defendant-appellant Laura Casal before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case 45678 for falsely
accusing her of stealing Casal’s jewelry. Casal denied this
charge in her answer and asserted a counterclaim for
attorney’s fees against De Leon for having filed an unjustified
suit. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision, holding
Casal liable in actual and moral damages for maligning De
Leon. This prompted the latter to appeal the decision to this
Court.
Statement of Facts
Plaintiff De Leon testified that at 4:30 p.m. on March 10
she dropped in, as wedding coordinator, at a room at the
Hotel Intercontinental in Makati to see the bride who was
then preparing for her wedding at a nearby church.1 De Leon
left after a few minutes to attend to the venue of the
reception.2 At about 5 p.m., she returned to the bride’s room
where defendant Casal, the bride’s cousin, confronted her,
claiming that she must have taken her jewelry because she
alone came in and out of the room.3 Casal’s jewelry was
missing.4 The hotel called the police to investigate the matter.
They searched De Leon and took her fingerprints.5
Casal testified, on the other hand, that she brought with her
to the bride’s room a paper bag containing the things that she
would wear and a set of jewelry valued at about P1 million.6
She waited for her turn to be made-up and, meantime, placed
her paper bag on a table.7 The others in the room were the
bride’s parents, other relatives, the couturier, and the make-
up artists.8 De Leon came in but left after some minutes.9
After she had been made-up, Casal went to the bathroom to
put on her gown. When she later searched the paper bag for
her jewelry, it was gone.10 The police searched the room but
did not find it. They investigated those who had access to the
room, including De Leon.11 Casal denied confronting the
latter and implying that she took the jewelry.12 Later after
the wedding, the police came and took the fingerprints of all
the people who had access to the bride’s room at the time of
the loss.13
Statement of the Issue

The only issue in this case is whether or not Casal maligned
De Leon by publicly accusing her of stealing her jewelry.
Arguments
I.
CASAL DID NOT PUBLICLY ACCUSE DE LEON OF
STEALING HER JEWELRY
The trial court gave credence to De Leon’s testimony that
Casal singled her out as the jewelry thief, telling her in the
presence of others, “Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan
ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang ang lumabas
ng kuwarto, ikaw ang kumuha.” The trial court concluded
from this that Casal indeed publicly humiliated her without
justification.
But the trial court ignored the other significant portions of
De Leon’s testimony. She said in contradiction to the above
that she learned she had been suspected because a certain
Noel later told her that the group of Casal had their eyes on
her. Thus,
Q: What did Mr. Sanchez, the bridegroom’s father,
tell you?
A: He said, “What happened at the hotel? It is a
shame that someone from the bride’s side lost her
jewelry.”
Q: Then what did you answer?
A: I told him that what happened to me is more
shameful because I was merely going about my work
and I had been suspected. He then told me,
“Suspected, who told you that you had been
suspected?” I pointed to Noel and I said, “He told me
that I had been suspected.” And then Mr. Sanchez
faced Noel, “Young man, from whom did you learn
that Celia had been suspected as the jewelry thief?”
And Noel said, “From Mrs. Casal’s group, sir.” 14
The above is a revelation. For, if it were true that Casal had
publicly accused her of taking the jewelry when she went into
the bride’s room, what was the point in her claiming after
that public confrontation that it was from Noel that she
learned she had been suspected? This is absurd. Clearly, De
Leon’s initial statement had been a lie. Basic is the rule that,
to be believed, a testimony should be in accord with the
common order of things.15
Besides, Mrs. Villanueva, De Leon’s own witness did not
confirm what De Leon said. Mrs. Villanueva testified that
what Casal said was, “Siya lang yung nakita kong galing sa
C.R.”16 However interpreted, this statement did not at all
suggest that Casal had publicly and maliciously accused De
Leon of stealing the jewelry.
Further, De Leon admitted in the course of her testimony
that she learned of Casal’s loss of her jewelry only on the
following day, March 11. Indeed, as she testified, she could
not believe what Mr. Mariano told her concerning such loss.
Thus:
Q: After that what happened next?
A: Mr. Mariano said, “The reason, young lady, is that Mrs.
Casal had lost her jewelry worth P1 million.”
Q: And then what happened?
A: And then I said, “She lost it? She should have been
careful considering how expensive the jewelry was.” Our
conversation ended there.17
xxx xxx xxx
Q: While you were still in the room the people there were
excitedly talking about what happened, is that right?
A: Yes. But I did not know what was missing at that time.
Q: But later you were informed that what was missing was
the jewelry in the paper bag?
A: No. I was informed the following day.
Q: And who informed you the following day that what got
lost was the jewelry of Mrs. Casal?
A: Mr. Mariano. He was the father of the bride.18

If De Leon learned of the fact of loss of the jewelry only on
the following day, March 11, what was her basis in claiming
that in the afternoon of October 10 when she stepped into the
bride’s room at the hotel a second time, Casal publicly
accused her of taking her jewelry? Her claim makes no sense.
II.
ASSUMING CASAL SAID THE WORDS IMPUTED TO

HER, IT IS NOT SHOWN THAT SHE DID SO
MALICIOUSLY AND IN BAD FAITH.
The trial court ruled that by the words she used, “Ikaw lang
ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka
pumunta? Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kuwarto, ikaw ang
kumuha,” Casal implied by this that only De Leon could have
taken the jewelry. She made this accusation with malice and
bad faith since she did so without any solid proof.
But, assuming that Casal indeed uttered those words, the
circumstances show that she did not do so maliciously or in
bad faith. Malice is defined as the intentional doing of a
wrongful act without just cause or excuse, with intent to
inflict an injury or under circumstances that the law will
imply an evil intent.19 In libel and slander, malice involves an
evil intent or motive arising from spite or ill will or personal
hatred.20 In the law of malicious prosecution, it is the
intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal justification,
and may be inferred from the absence of probable cause.21
It cannot be said that an accusation expressed during a
startling event, when the person who made it was in a state of
shock or disbelief at her loss, made it with deliberate malice.
Things happened spontaneously. Casal could not have had the
opportunity to reflect and deliberate on her action upon
discovering her loss. She uttered what first came into her
mind, a natural thing under the circumstances.
Besides, her suspicion of De Leon was not altogether
baseless. Admittedly, the latter went in and out of the room
hurriedly.22 She said so herself.23 Clearly, Casal was not
motivated by any ill will or personal hatred when she
supposedly uttered her suspicion. And when she supposedly
sought an investigation of the incident focusing on De Leon,
she merely exercised her right. Qui jure suo utitur nulum
damnum facit. One who exercises his rights does no injury.
Even if damage results from a person’s exercising his legal
rights, it is damnum absque injuria.
In fact, however, the investigation did not single out De
Leon. All the people in the room at that time were
interviewed, their bags were searched, and their fingerprints
taken. The relatives of Casal were not spared from the
interrogation, the body and bag search, and the
fingerprinting.24
Closing Statement
It does frequently happen that some valuable things are

suddenly discovered stolen in a big household, in a classroom,
or in an office full of personnel. Since it is likely that only one
was a thief, would it be best that the loss be endured and
overlooked for the sake of protecting the sensibilities of the
greater number who are presumably innocent? Surely not,
since it is finding out the truth by investigating and searching
everyone who had the opportunity of committing the offense
that will remove the cloud of suspicion from him. Feelings
might get hurt but the truth will set every one free.
Relief
WHEREFORE, defendant-appellant Laura Casal

respectfully prays the Court to set aside the decision of the
trial court dated August 17 and dismiss the complaint against
her.
The next question is: in preparing your statement of facts, must you source
your facts from both the direct and cross-examination of the witnesses from
either side? Where the parties have conflicting versions, it would seem
best when you prepare the background or introductory facts to extract
your facts solely from the direct testimonies of the witnesses from either
side. The direct testimonies of witnesses, as a rule, embody the versions that
the parties espouse.
When the cross-examinations have done some damage to the testimony
of your opponent’s witnesses, use these in the argument portion where
they would have greater impact and telling effect.
Short Introductions
The need to introduce the issue with some background facts or antecedent
circumstances (the equivalent of the statement of facts) is not limited to a
memorandum that a party submits after trial. They work, too, for incidental
issues brought up in the course of the proceedings. Take for example this
motion to quash a criminal information filed in an estafa case. The motion
can only be understood if the argument is preceded by a recital of the
information that the party seeks to quash. Observe how the issue then flows
into the argument.
[CAPTION OMITTED]
MOTION TO QUASH
Accused Sergio M. Lazaro, by counsel, respectfully states:
The Charge
The prosecution has accused Sergio M. Lazaro of estafa by
misappropriation or conversion under Article 315, paragraph
1(B), of the Revised Penal Code. The information reads:
That on or about August 15 in Makati City and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, while acting for and in behalf of Lovely
Garments Corporation, obtained from Asiatic Bank a
loan in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
US Dollar ($100,000.00) using as collateral a deed of
assignment dated July 27 executed in favor of Asiatic
Bank conveying all its rights, title and interests in
confirmed purchase order No. 1234 of its foreign
buyer, Macy’s Inc. of the United States; that far from
complying with the undertaking in the deed of
assignment, said accused, did then and there, willfully
and feloniously defraud Asiatic Bank, by allowing the
payment of the purchase order covered by the deed of
assignment to another entity; that upon the maturity
of the loan from Asiatic Bank, the accused failed to
pay said loan; that despite repeated demands from
Asiatic Bank, said accused failed and refused to pay
the loan of $100,000.00 to the damage and prejudice
of said bank in the aforesaid amount.
Issue Presented
The only issue accused Lazaro presents in this motion to

quash is whether or not the facts charged in the information
constitute the offense of estafa by misappropriation or
conversion.
Elements of Estafa by
Misappropriation or Conversion
The elements of estafa by misappropriation or conversion,
of which accused Lazaro has been charged, are as follows:
One. That money or goods be received by the
accused in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return,
the same;
Two. That there be misappropriation or conversion
or denial on the part of the accused of such receipt;
Three. That such misappropriation or conversion
of such money or property by the accused is to the
prejudice of another; and
Four. That there is a demand made by the offended
party on the accused.
Argument
For estafa by misappropriation or conversion to apply to
the transaction subject of this criminal action, it is essential
that accused Lazaro, acting for Lovely Garments, receive the
money in trust for or as an agent of the bank. The classic
example of this kind of estafa involves the trust receipt. In
such a transaction, the offender receives goods in trust for the
bank but he is unable to account for the goods or the proceeds
of their sale. Consequently, he is liable for estafa by
misappropriation or conversion. (People v. Cuevo, 104 SCRA
312).
In People v. Cuevo (supra), the information clearly
alleged that the accused received the merchandise “in
trust” for the bank “under an express obligation … to
account for the said merchandise, or to deliver and
turn over to the [bank] the proceeds of the sale [of
such merchandise].” Since the accused in that case
failed to account for the merchandise or turn over the
proceeds of its sale, the prosecution charged him with
estafa.
In contrast, the information in the present case,
broken down to its essentials, alleges that:
1. Lovely Garments (represented by accused
Lazaro) obtained a loan of US$100,000.00 from the
Bank;
2. In getting the loan, Lovely Garments used as
collateral a deed of assignment in favor of the bank in
which Lovely Garments conveyed all its rights, title
and interests in a purchase order of a foreign buyer,
Macy’s Inc. of the United States;
3. Far from complying with the deed of assignment,
however, accused Lazaro defrauded the Bank by
allowing the payment of the purchase order to
another entity;
4. When the loan matured, accused Lazaro failed to
pay it; and
5. Despite demands from the Bank, he failed to pay
the loan.
Quite clearly, the present criminal action is based on the
failure of a borrower to pay a bank loan. But failure to pay a
loan is not a criminal act. When the borrower spends the
money for his benefit, he could not be said to have
misappropriated or converted the money to the prejudice of
the bank.
In a loan, it is understood that the borrower spends the
money for his purpose. He does not act as agent of the bank
with respect to the money he borrowed for his use. Indeed, the
information does not say that the accused was to hold the loan
money in trust for the bank or for a purpose that places him
under an obligation to account for where the money went.
Article 315, No. 1(b) does not apply when the contract
between the accused and the complainant has the effect of
transferring to the accused the ownership of the thing
received. (Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 1971
Edition, p. 628.) When the bank gave Lovely Garments a
loan, it transferred ownership of that money to Lovely
Garments. Indeed, it has been held that when the contract is a
loan of money, the accused debtor cannot be held liable for
estafa for merely refusing to pay, or denying having
contracted, the debt. (U.S. v. Ibañez, 19 Phil. 559.) Loan
money is known as mutuum. It is a loan for consumption and
the ownership of the thing loaned passes to the borrower.
Wherefore, the accused Sergio M. Lazaro respectfully
prays the Court to issue an order quashing the information
and dismissing the case.
In a different light, an opposition to a motion for postponement would
probably exemplify a pleading that needs the least introduction. Still, the
lawyer opposing the postponement must, as a minimum requirement for
understanding the issue that his opposition tenders, state the background
facts. Thus—
[CAPTION OMITTED]
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO RESET HEARING
Plaintiff Benjamin S. Amurao, by counsel, respectfully
states:
1. [The introduction:] On June 11 defendant filed a motion
to reset the hearing set on June 24 at 8:30 a.m. on the ground
that his counsel has to attend another hearing on the same
date and time in a criminal case before the Regional Trial
Court of Calamba, Laguna.
2. [The statement of the issue:] But plaintiff must oppose
the motion.
3. [The argument:] It will be recalled that the hearing on
June 24 was set by agreement of the parties, with both counsel
consulting their calendars of hearings. The motion to reset
means that defendant’s counsel gave low priority to this case,
hence, he would willingly sacrifice it for his other case. This is
unjustified.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays the Court to
deny defendant’s motion to reset the hearing of this case set
on June 24.
Very often, when a party appeals a decision of the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court by filing a petition for review of the decision, the latter court
would require the other party, called the respondent, to comment on the
petition. Since the petition has already presented the relevant facts of the case
and introduced the issues that have to be resolved, will it be necessary for the
respondent to restate the facts and the issue in his comment?
You should look at it this way. When you file your comment months and
several other intervening businesses later, the court will have lost focus of
your case. Consequently, it is essential for the respondent, whom you
represent, to give a brief background of the facts and the issue in his
comment to enable the court to recall what the case is about and appreciate
the comment.
And when the petitioner files a reply to the respondent’s comment, the
reply should itself recall the antecedents of the case in order to put his reply
arguments in the proper context. But the introduction in the reply should not
repeat the elaborate introduction made in the petition. It should be lean and
terse, confined to the highlights of past pleadings, a reminder only, not a full
repetition of what had been previously said.
Writing Exercises
If you did pre-work on the facts, the law, the issues, and the outline of your
arguments in the case of the girl attacked by a neighbor’s dog, you would be
ready to leave pre-work and move to writing up the legal opinion that the
girl’s father requested from you. Begin by drafting the background facts of
the case that will introduce the issue or issues that it presents.
1TSN, May 22, pp. 19-20.

2Id., p. 22.
3Id., p. 24.
4Id., p. 27.
5Id., p. 29.
6TSN, May 27, p. 9.
7Id., p. 10.
8Id., p. 12.
9Id., p. 14.
10Id., p. 17.
11Id., p. 18.
12Id., p. 21.
13Id., p. 24.
14TSN, May 22, 2003, pp. 19-20.
15People v. Baquiran, L-20153, June 29, 1967; People v. Acusar, 82 Phil.
490; People v. Maron, G.R. 56858, December 27, 1982.
16TSN, June 15, pp. 8-10.
17TSN, May 22, pp. 35-36.
18TSN, June 5, pp. 26-27.
19Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., 1990.
20Becker v. Brinkop, 230 Mo. App. 871, 78 S.W. 2d 538, 541.
21Palermo v. Cottom, Mo. App., 525 S.W. 2d 758.
22TSN, May 27, p. 9.
23TSN, May 27, pp. 11-12.
24TSN, June 4, pp. 19-21.
9.
Writing the Argument
After writing the introduction to the issue or issues in the case, you step
into the second part of the write-up stage: putting flesh and color to your
arguments and making your closing statement.
Jump Off Points

As a rule, you need to be launched into your argument by some topic or
opening statement. Most experienced writers jump off with a topic statement
that signals or defines the direction of their argument. This is usually done in
two ways:
1. You can launch your argument by briefly stating your opponent’s claim
with the intention of defining the area that your argument will attempt to
assail. For example:
[Your statement of the opposing claim:] In support of their

first assignment of error, petitioners contend that since its
inception in the 1970s, the club in practice has not been a
corporation. They add that it was only the respondent
spouses, motivated by their own personal agenda to make
money from the club, who surreptitiously caused its
registration with the SEC. They then assert that, at any rate,
the club has already ceased to be a corporate body. Therefore,
no intra-corporate relations can arise as between the
respondent spouses and the club or any of its members.
Stretching their argument further, petitioners insist that since
the club, by their reckoning is not a corporation, the SEC
does not have the power or authority to inquire into the
validity of the expulsion of the respondent spouses.
Consequently, it is not the correct forum to review the
challenged act. In conclusion, petitioners put respondent
spouses to task for their failure to implead the club as a
necessary or indispensable party to the case.
[Your argument:] These arguments cannot pass judicial

muster. Petitioners’ attempt to impress upon this court that
the club has never been a corporation is devoid of merit. It
must fail in the face of the Commission’s explicit finding that
the club was duly registered and a certificate of incorporation
was issued in its favor x x x. It ought to be remembered that
the question of whether the club was indeed registered and
issued a certification or not is one which necessitates a factual
inquiry. On this score, the finding of the Commission, as the
administrative agency tasked with among others the function
of registering and administering corporations, is given great
weight and accorded with high respect. We therefore have no
reason to disturb this factual finding relating to the club’s
registration and incorporation.
[Another argument:] Moreover, by their own admission

contained in the various pleadings, which they have filed in
different stages of this case, petitioners themselves have
considered the club as a corporation. This admission, under
the rules of evidence, binds them and may be taken or used
against them. Since the admission was made in the course of
the proceedings in the same case, it does not require proof,
and actually may be contradicted only by showing that it was
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission
was made. x x x (Vesagas v. Court of Appeals, 371 SCRA 508,
513-514; penned by Justice Reynato S. Puno.)
Note that, in the above, the jump off statement is followed by two
arguments that strike at the merit of the opposing position.
2. You can also begin your argument by stating your thesis or proposition,
your intention being to support it with the argument that follows. For
example:
[Statement of your thesis:] The trial court correctly

disbelieved his alibi. [Your argument:] Alibi and denial, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are
negative and self-serving evidence that deserve no weight in
law. They cannot be given greater evidentiary value over a
credible witness’ testimony on affirmative matters. Except for
Lina Linatoc’s corroboration, the only evidence supporting
the alibi and denial of appellant is his own say-so. And Lina
happens to be his common-law wife; thus her testimony is
necessarily suspect and cannot prevail over the offended
party’s positive identification of the accused as her rapist.
(People v. Viernes, 372 SCRA 231, 249-250; penned by Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban.)
Go over any legal writing and almost always you will discover the use of
the same pattern: a topic sentence (the opposing claim or the writer’s thesis)
followed by the argument.
Three Statements of an Argument

We said that every sound legal argument is the right rule and the right fact,
put together. A legal argument is made up of three statements: (1) the
statement of a rule that applies to a given fact or set of facts (the rule
statement); (2) the statement of the fact of a particular case that opens up
such case or closes it to the application of the rule (the case fact statement);
and (3) the conclusion that the rule applies or does not apply to the
particular case (the conclusion statement).
Your balance sheet or short form argument may just say, “For a woman, it
was not likely for Julia to walk home alone in the middle of the night.”
Actually, what you are saying is that [the rule:] “Filipino women do not walk
home alone so late in the night. Still, [the case fact:] Julia said that she did.
Therefore, [the conclusion:] she must have lied.” Written up into a full
argument, it might read like this:
[The rule:] Filipino practice and tradition in the rural areas

tend to protect women, especially young girls, when they go
out late in the evening. When the girl attends a night party,
the host usually arranges for a relative or a friend to walk her
home. [The case fact:] In this case, Julia, a young girl raised in
the rural areas, testified that she walked home alone after the
wedding party although it was already late at night and she
had to walk across rice fields to get home. [The conclusion:] It
may be inferred from this that she had not told the truth.
Indeed, it seemed more probable that her sweetheart, Ronald,
escorted her home.
Your balance sheet argument may just say, “Mario did not hear Julia’s
outcry.” Actually, what you are saying is that [the rule:] “Women forced to
submit to sex against their will would naturally make loud outcries for help.
[The case fact:] Mario did not hear Julia make an outcry. Therefore, [the
conclusion:] Ronald did not rape her.” Written up into a full argument, the
above might read like this:
[The rule:] A woman forced to submit to a man’s sexual

attack will no doubt make a loud outcry. [The case fact:] In
this case, although the rape allegedly took place just 50 meters
away from Mario’s house, a distance that would have enable
the latter to hear Julia’s shriek for help when it happened,
Mario testified that he did not hear such an outcry. [The
conclusion:] Inevitably, the conclusion is that Julia made no
outcry, she having assented to Ronald’s moves.
Persuasive Arguments
Why is awareness of the three essential statements of your legal argument
(the rule, the case fact, and the conclusion) important when you write up that
argument? It is important because the effectiveness of your argument
depends on how ably you write up each statement of your argument into
a convincing part. This is all what an argument is about, convincing another
to buy your point of view. Knowing the essentials enables you to dismantle
your argument, reinforce or improve the weak parts, emphasize the strong,
and put them together again to produce a persuasive argument.
Convincing Rule Statement

If your rule is that women will ordinarily not admit having been raped
unless true and if your case fact is that Julia admitted having been raped by
Ronald, then your conclusion will be that Julia’s admission is probably true.
Will the following be a sufficient write-up of your argument?
Since women will ordinarily not admit having been raped

unless true and since Julia admitted to having been raped by
Ronald, it follows that her admission of that rape is probably
true.
But the above argument is too bare to ensure its full acceptance by the
reader. Full acceptance comes from being convinced, first, that the rule you
propose is correct and, second, that the key fact to which the rule applies is
similar to (or different from) the case fact (the fact of the particular case). An
insurance salesman cannot hope to succeed in selling insurance by simply
telling his client the basic statement: “Insurance is good for family men.
Since you are a family man, insurance is good for you.” His client can accept
the fact that he is a family man, but he needs convincing that, as a rule,
insurance is good for family men.
It is the same with the above argument in the rape case. Your reader can
accept the case fact that Julia admitted to having been raped by Ronald since
this fact is not denied. But your reader needs to be convinced that women as a
rule will not admit to being raped unless true. You need to write more about
it to convince your reader as to its correctness.
Rewritten to reinforce your rule statement, the argument might go like this:
[The rule statement:] It takes lots of courage for any woman
to cry out and testify that she has been raped. When she steps
forward to confess what happened to her, she exposes herself
to the humiliation of acknowledging that a man has ravished
her body and violated her virginity. The police investigation
will surely make a spectacle of her. And rowdy police
investigators are not known for prudence and gentleness. She
also has to bare her body to the prying hands of a medical
examiner who is a stranger to her. And, as soon as her
neighbors learn of it, she permanently loses her good
reputation. Suitors will avoid her like a leper. For these
reasons, women are not likely to admit to being raped unless
true. [The case fact statement:] Since Julia acknowledged
having been raped by Ronald, [The conclusion:] her testimony
may be assumed to be true.
The writer of the above is not satisfied with the bare rule statement “that
women will ordinarily not admit to being raped unless true.” He shows how
true and valid the statement is, given the great troubles to which the rape
victim places herself when she dares come out to complain. The writer’s
vivid description of her travails enables the reader to go through the
experience and sympathize with the rape victim. This is what it means when
we said earlier that the effectiveness of your argument depends on how ably
you write up each statement of your argument into a convincing point.
In a case decided by the Supreme Court,1 Caltex shipped a quantity of fuel
oil on board a vessel owned by Delsan Transport from Batangas to
Zamboanga City. Caltex insured its cargo with Home Assurance.
Unfortunately, the vessel sank near Panay Gulf by an inclement weather,
taking with it the entire cargo of oil. After Home Assurance paid Caltex for
its loss, it filed a suit against Delsan Transport to recover what it paid.
But Delsan Transport argued that, under the Insurance Code, Caltex, as
shipper of the goods, should be deemed to warrant that the vessel was
seaworthy. Delsan Transport argued that, since Home Assurance paid Caltex
its loss, the implication is that it accepted the latter’s lack of fault and the
vessel’s seaworthiness. And being seaworthy, the vessel’s sinking could only
be imputed to force majeure, relieving Delsan Transport of any liability.
Given the above case fact statement, the focus now shifts to the rule
statement that applies to such fact. It is here—in the rule section—that the
Court focused its argument in favor of Home Assurance. Thus:
The payment made by [Home Assurance] for the insured

value of the lost cargo operates as waiver of its right to
enforce the term of the implied warranty against Caltex
under the marine insurance policy. [By this statement the Court
concedes for argument’s sake the “case fact” that the payment
resulted in a waiver of Caltex’s warranty.] However, the same
cannot be validly interpreted as automatic admission of the
vessel’s seaworthiness by [Home Assurance] as to foreclose
recourse against [Delsan Transport] for any liability under its
contractual obligation as a common carrier. [Here the court
sets down its thesis or proposition.] The fact of payment grants
Home Assurance subrogatory right which enables it to
exercise legal remedies that would otherwise be available to
Caltex as owner of the lost cargo against [Delsan Transport].2
[Now it states its conclusion.] Article 2207 of the New Civil
Code x x x.
[What follows is a reinforcement of the rule statement in the

Court’s argument:] The right of subrogation has its roots in
equity. It is designed to promote and to accomplish justice
and is the mode which equity adopts to compel the ultimate
payment of a debt by one who in justice and good conscience
ought to pay.3 It is not dependent upon, nor does it grow out
of, any privity of contract or upon written assignment of
claim. It accrues simply upon payment by the insurance
company of the insurance claim. [Then the Court restates its
conclusion from another point of view:] Consequently, the
payment made by [Home Assurance] to Caltex (assured)
operates as an equitable assignment to the former of all the
remedies which the latter may have against [Delsan
Transport].
You will note from the Court’s discussion of its chosen rule statement, that
it had recourse to statute and case laws to reinforce the validity of that view.
This is the task of legal research. You need to fathom the depths of
jurisprudence for the right rulings and precedents that apply to the facts of the
particular case.
You will note from the Court’s discussion of its chosen rule statement, that
it had recourse to statute and case laws to reinforce the validity of that view.
This is the task of legal research. You need to fathom the depths of
jurisprudence for the right rulings and precedents that apply to the facts of the
particular case.
Convincing Fact Statement

At times, the parties to the dispute could agree that a specific rule governs
a case but they are unable to agree whether the key fact to which it applies is
similar to or different from the fact of the case. In this situation, it is the
statement of the case fact that needs building up. In the rape case against
Ronald, he could concede the “rule” that a woman’s testimony, standing
alone, can support a conviction for rape provided it is conclusive, logical, and
probable. But he could choose to show that Julia’s testimony is the opposite,
i.e., inconclusive, illogical, and improbable.
[The rule:] Although a woman’s testimony, standing alone,

can support a conviction for rape, such testimony must be
conclusive, logical, and probable.
[The case fact:] But, firstly, the medico-legal officer who
examined Julia’s whole body did not find any bruise either on
her back or on her arms. Yet, she testified that she struggled
to get free from Ronald on rough ground, a situation that
would surely have produced those bruises. What happened,
then, is that Ronald made love to her gently, consistent with
his claim that she consented to the sexual act.
[Another case fact:] Secondly, Julia’s testimony that she
walked home alone after the wedding party is improbable
especially since it was nighttime and she had to walk across
rice fields. A Filipina woman would naturally ask the host or
a friend to walk with her home. Indeed, this was what
probably happened. Her sweetheart, Ronald, escorted her.
[Still another case fact:] Thirdly, the rape allegedly took
place just 50 meters away from Mario’s house. At that
distance, surely, Mario who was still awake would have heard
Julia shriek for help when it happened. A woman forced to
submit to a man’s sexual attack would no doubt make a loud
outcry. The fact that no one heard Julia’s outcry shows that
she assented to Ronald’s moves.
[The conclusion:] For the above reasons, Julia’s testimony
cannot support a judgment for conviction.
You will note from the above that each of the three case facts raised to
reinforce Ronald’s case fact statement is in itself an argument that embodies a
rule, a case fact, and a conclusion. What does this tell you? This tells you that
several arguments could be clustered to bring home just one major point. This
also tells you that the variety by which arguments can be structured,
combined, and set apart are limitless. Although all sound arguments use the
same building blocks (rule, case fact, and conclusion), they cannot be
channeled into a simple formula.
In a case, the Supreme Court found no disagreement among the parties
regarding the rule that defines the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). All agreed that the DARAB had
exclusive jurisdiction over disputes concerning tenancy relationship. But the
Court readily acknowledged that the parties disagreed on the facts of the case.
Consequently, in ruling in favor of the respondent tenants, the High Court
reinforced the case fact statement in its argument. Thus:
[The rule:] In Estates Development Corporation v. CA, the

essential elements of a tenancy relationship were listed in this
wise: “For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there
must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. In
order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it
would be essential to establish all its indispensable elements,
to wit: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee; 2) subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to
the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to
bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee;
and 6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee.”
[Statement of the opposing claim:] Petitioner claims that
private respondent were not her tenants, and that they raised
the defense of tenancy in the criminal case merely to escape
prosecution for qualified theft. On the other hand, private
respondents assert that they were petitioner’s tenants, as
shown by the evidence adduced by the parties before the
RTC.
[The conclusion:] After a careful review of the records of
this case, we hold that an agrarian dispute existed between the
parties. [The case fact:] First, the subject of the dispute
between them was the taking of the coconuts from the
property owned by petitioner. Second, private respondents
were the overseers of the property at the time of the taking of
the coconuts, as can be gleaned from the Kasabutan (or
Agreement) executed between them on November 25, 1991 x x
x. Third, petitioner allowed private respondents to plant
coconut, coffee, jackfruit and cacao as shown by the said
Agreement x x x. Finally, a tenurial arrangement exists
among herein parties as regards the harvesting of the
agricultural products, as shown by the several remittances
made by private respondents to petitioner. These are
substantiated by receipts. (Monsanto v. Zerna, 371 SCRA 664,
675-676; penned by Justice Artemio V. Panganiban.)
One effective technique in presenting multiple points in favor of your view

is to put them in a numbered series as in the above. By numbering the facts
that persuaded the Court in concluding that the DARAB had jurisdiction over
the case, it lent the strength of number to its argument.
Correct Conclusion Statement

The examples above of uses of the combinations of rule and case fact
statements also show how the third statement, the conclusion statement, must
logically flow from its two (2) premises. When stating your conclusion, you
simply draw an inference that the fact of a particular case opens it up or
closes it to the application of the rule that governs such case.
The idea behind being able to recognize and understand each of the three
statements that make up your argument is that such recognition and
understanding will enable you to reinforce that statement in your argument
that seems most vulnerable. Conversely, it enables you to destroy your
opponent’s thesis or proposition by attacking the essential statement of his
argument, his rule, his case fact, or his conclusion that seems weakest.
Positioning Variation
Conventionally, arguments are started off with a statement of the
applicable rule, followed by a statement of the case fact, and ended by a
conclusion that the rule applies or does not apply to the case fact. This
conventional sequence has been observed in the sample argument below. It
states the rule that, in cases involving contracts, exemplary damages may be
awarded when the defendant acts in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner. And, after ascertaining the case fact that
defendant has not acted in that manner, the Court makes the conclusion that
plaintiff is not entitled to exemplary damages. Thus:
[The rule:] The law on exemplary damages is found in

Section 5, Chapter 3, Title XVIII, Book IV of the Civil Code.
These are imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or
compensatory damages. They are recoverable in criminal
cases as part of the civil liability when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances; in
quasi-delict, if the defendant acted with gross negligence; and
in contracts and quasi-contracts, if the defendant acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
[The case fact:] BPI Investments did not act in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner, when
it asked for preliminary attachment. It was just exercising a
legal option. The sheriff of the issuing court did the execution
and the attachment. [The conclusion:] Hence, BPI Investments
is not to be blamed for the excessive and wrongful
attachment. (BPI Investment Corp. v. D.G. Carreon
Commercial Corp., 371 SCRA 58, 70; penned by Justice
Bernardo P. Pardo.)
In writing up an argument, must you always follow the conventional

sequence of rule, fact, and conclusion? The answer is no. Actually, your
argument will make sense so long as you are able to string along those three
essential statements whatever may be their order or positions.
In a case, although the Supreme Court acknowledged the rule that the
drawer of a dishonored check who informed its payee that he did not have
sufficient funds in the bank cannot be considered to have violated Batas
Pambansa 21, it made a case fact finding that the accused in that case did not
give that information to the complainant. The Court thus drew up the
conclusion that the rule could not apply to the accused. But the Court in this
case chose to follow a different sequence. It began with the conclusion,
followed it up with the rule, and then the case fact.
[The conclusion:] The case of Magno v. Court of Appeals

relied upon by accused-petitioner, does not find application to
the present case. [The rule:] In Magno, we held that there was
no violation of the bouncing checks law because there was
evidence that complainant was told by the drawer that he did
not have sufficient funds in the bank. The drawer, from the
very beginning, never hid the fact that he did not have funds
with which to put up the warranty deposit, and openly
intimated the same to complainant. Although the ruling in
Magno was reiterated in the case of Idos v. Court of Appeals,
again, we note that in Idos, petitioner repeatedly notified the
complainant of the insufficiency of funds. In both cases, the
complainant was duly notified by the drawer of the
insufficiency of funds. It also serves to emphasize that in Idos,
petitioner’s acquittal was not based on complainant’s
knowledge that petitioner did not have sufficient funds in the
bank. x x x
[The case fact:] In the case under consideration, accused-
petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to substantiate her
claim that private respondent knew that she (accused-
appellant) had difficulty maintaining sufficient funds in or
credit with the bank. On the other hand, private respondent
during cross-examination categorically denied having been
advised by accused-petitioner not to deposit the checks: x x x
(Lagman v. People, 371 SCRA 686, 696-697; penned by Justice
Santiago M. Kapunan.)
In an argument in another case, the Supreme Court also followed a

different internal sequence. It began with the case fact, followed it up with
the rule, and then the conclusion. The petitioners in the case filed a petition
for review with the Court of Appeals but the latter court dismissed the case
for failure of the petitioners to enclose a certified true copy of the adverse
decision and resolutions of the trial court. On appeal, the Supreme Court
reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeals. See the three elements in the
High Court’s argument.
[The case fact:] The copies of the decision and resolution of

the Regional Trial Court attached to the petition for review
filed by petitioners in the Court of Appeals are duplicate
originals. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for review of petitioners on the ground that copies of
the decision and resolution of the Regional Trial Court must
be certified true copies.
[The rule:] The Court of Appeals based its action on Rule
42, Section 12 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, but this
rule provides that petition for review of decisions and
resolutions of Regional Trial Courts must “be accompanied
by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of
judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified
correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court. [The
conclusion:] It suffices, therefore, that a copy of a decision or
resolution attached to a petition for review is a duplicate
original. (Lee v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 707, 714-715;
penned by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza.)
Building Blocks of Arguments

As you may have noted, every sound legal argument takes shape, using as
building blocks the three essential statements: the rule, the case fact, and the
conclusion. Observe how the following decision of the Supreme Court in
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v. Court of Appeals (65 SCRA 237), penned by
Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro who advocated and practiced simplicity and
clarity in writing, put together the arguments, using those same building
blocks. The case concerns two Filipino passengers who were offloaded from
an airplane to give their seats to two white passengers.
DECISION
In this appeal by way of certiorari the Koninklijke

Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V., otherwise known as the KLM
Royal Dutch Airlines (hereinafter referred to as the KLM)
assails the award of damages made by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. 40620 in favor of the spouses Rufino T. Mendoza
and Consuelo T. Mendoza (hereinafter referred to as the
respondents).
Sometime in March 1965, the respondents approached
Tirso Reyes, manager of a branch of the Philippine Travel
Bureau, a travel agency, for consultations about a world tour,
which they were intending to make with their daughter and a
niece. Reyes submitted to them, after preliminary discussions,
a tentative itinerary, which prescribed a trip of thirty-five
legs; the respondents would fly on different airlines. Three
segments of the trip, the longest, would be via KLM. The
respondents expressed a desire to visit Lourdes, France, and
discussed with Reyes two alternate routes, namely, Paris to
Lourdes and Barcelona to Lourdes. The respondents decided
on the Barcelona-Lourdes route with knowledge that only one
airline, Aer Lingus, serviced it.
The Philippine Travel Bureau to which Reyes was
accredited was an agent for international air carriers, which
are members of the International Air Transport Association,
popularly known as the “IATA,” of which both the KLM and
the Aer Lingus are members.
After about two weeks, the respondents approved the
itinerary prepared for them and asked Reyes to make the
necessary plane reservations. Reyes went to the KLM, for
which the respondents had expressed preference. The KLM
thereafter secured seat reservations for the respondents and
their two companions from the carriers, which would ferry
them throughout their trip, with the exception of Aer Lingus.
When the respondents left the Philippines (without their
young wards who had enplaned much earlier), they were
issued KLM tickets for their entire trip. However, their
coupon for the Aer Lingus portion (Flight 861 for June 22,
1965) was marked “RQ” which meant “on request.”
After sightseeing in American and European cities (they
were in the meantime joined by their two young companions),
the respondents arrived in Frankfurt, Germany. They went to
a KLM office there and obtained a confirmation from Aer
Lingus of seat reservations on Flight 861. After meandering in
London, Paris and Lisbon, the foursome finally took wing to
Barcelona for their trip to Lourdes, France.
In the afternoon of June 22, 1965, the respondents with
their wards went to Barcelona airport to take their plane,
which arrived at 4:00 o’clock. At the airport, the manager of
Aer Lingus directed the respondents to check in. They did so
as instructed and were accepted for passage. However,
although their daughter and niece were allowed to take the
plane, the respondents were off-loaded on orders of the Aer
Lingus manager who brusquely shoved them aside with the
aid of a policeman and who shouted at them, “Coños!
Ignorantes Filipinos!”
Mrs. Mendoza later called up the manager of Aer Lingus
and requested that they provide her and her husband means
to get to Lourdes, but the request was denied. A stranger,
however, advised them to take a train, which the two did;
despite the third class accommodations and lack of food
service, they reached Lourdes the following morning. During
the train trip the respondents had to suffer draft winds as
they wore only minimum clothing, their luggage having gone
ahead with the Aer Lingus plane. They spent $50 for that
train trip; their plane passage was worth $43.35.
On March 17, 1966 the respondents, referring to KLM as
the principal of Aer Lingus, filed a complaint for damages
with the Court of First Instance of Manila arising from
breach of contract of carriage and for the humiliating
treatment received by them at the hands of the Aer Lingus
manager in Barcelona. After due hearing, the trial court
awarded damages to the respondents as follows: $43.35 or, its
peso equivalent as actual damages, P10,000 as moral
damages, P5,000 as exemplary damages, and P5,000 as
attorney’s fees, and expenses of litigation.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The KLM
sought complete exoneration; the respondents prayed for an
increase in the award of damages. In its decision of August 14,
1969, the Court of Appeals decreed as follows: “Appellant
KLM is condemned to pay unto the plaintiffs the sum of
$43.35 as actual damages; P50,000 as moral damages; and
P6,000 as attorney’s fees and costs.”
Hence, the present recourse by the KLM.
The KLM prays for exculpation from damages on the
strength of the following particulars, which were advanced to
but rejected by the Court of Appeals:
(a) The air tickets issued to the respondents stipulate that
carriage thereunder is subject to the “Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air,” otherwise known as the “Warsaw
Convention,” to which the Philippine Government is a party
by adherence, and which pertinently provides:
“ART. 30. (1) In the case of transportation to be
performed by various successive carriers and falling
within the definition set out in the third paragraph of
Article I, each carrier who accepts passengers,
baggage or goods shall be subject to the rules set out
in the convention, and shall be deemed to be one of
the contracting parties to the contract of
transportation insofar as the contract deals with that
part of the transportation which is performed under
his supervision.
“(2) In the case of transportation of this nature, the
passenger or his representative can take action only
against the carrier who performed the transportation
during which the accident or the delay occurred, save
in the case where, by express agreement, the first
carrier has assumed liability for the whole journey.”
(b) On the inside front cover of each ticket the following
appears under the heading “Conditions of Contract”:
“1. x x x (a) Liability of carrier for damages shall
be limited to occurrences on its own line, except in the
case of checked baggage as to which the passenger
also has a right of action against the first or last
carrier. A carrier issuing a ticket or checking baggage
for carriage over the lines of others does so only as
agent.”
(c) All that the KLM did after the respondents completed
their arrangements with the travel agency was to request for
seat reservations among the airlines called for by the itinerary
submitted to the KLM and to issue tickets for the entire flight
as a ticket-issuing agent.
The respondents rebut the foregoing arguments, thus:
(a) Article 30 of the Warsaw Convention has no application
in the case at bar which involves, not an accident or delay, but
a willful misconduct on the part of the KLM’s agent, the Aer
Lingus. Under Article 25 of the same Convention the
following is prescribed:
ART. 25. (1) The carrier shall not be entitled to
avail himself of the provisions of this convention
which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is
caused by his willful misconduct or by such default on
his part as, in accordance with the law of the court to
which the case is submitted, is considered to be
equivalent to willful misconduct.
“(2) Similarly, the carrier shall not be entitled to
avail himself of the said provisions, if the damage is
caused under the same circumstances by any agent of
the carrier acting within the scope of his
employment.” (italics by respondents)
(b) The condition in their tickets, which purportedly excuse
the KLM from liability appears in very small print, to read
which, as found by the Court of Appeals, one has practically
to use a magnifying glass.
(c) The first paragraph of the “Conditions of Contract”
appearing identically on the KLM tickets issued to them
indubitably shows that their contract was one of continuous
air transportation around the world:
“1. x x x ‘carriage’ includes the air carrier issuing
this ticket and all carriers that carry or undertake to
carry the passenger or his baggage hereunder or
perform any other service incidental to such air
carriage. . . . Carriage to be performed hereunder by
several successive carrier is regarded as a single
operation.”
(d) The contract of air transportation was exclusively
between the respondents and the KLM, the latter merely
endorsing its performance to other carriers, like Aer Lingus,
as its subcontractors or agents, as evidenced by the passage
tickets themselves which on their face disclose that they are
KLM tickets. Moreover, the respondents dealt only with
KLM through the travel agency.
[The issue presented, as stated above, is whether or not
KLM is liable for damages.]
1. [The conclusion:] The applicability insisted upon by the
KLM of Article 30 of the Warsaw Convention cannot be
sustained. [The rule:] That article presupposes the occurrence
of either an accident or a delay, [The case fact:] neither of
which took place at the Barcelona airport; what is here
manifest, instead, is that the Aer Lingus, through its manager
there, refused to transport the respondents to their planned
and contracted destination.
2. [The conclusion:] The argument that the KLM should not
be held accountable for the tortious conduct of Aer Lingus
because of the provision printed on the respondents’ tickets
expressly limiting the KLM’s liability for damages only to
occurrences on its own lines is unacceptable. [The case fact:]
As noted by the Court of Appeals that condition was printed
in letters so small that one would have to use a magnifying
glass to read the words. Under the circumstances, [The rule:]
it would be unfair and inequitable to charge the respondents
with automatic knowledge or notice of the said condition so as
to preclude any doubt that it was fairly and freely agreed
upon by the respondents when they accepted the passage
tickets issued to them by the KLM.
[The rule:] As the airline which issued those tickets with the
knowledge that the respondents would be flown on the
various legs of their journey by different air carriers, the
KLM was chargeable with the duty and responsibility of
specifically informing the respondents of conditions
prescribed in their tickets or, in the very least, to ascertain
that the respondents read them before they accepted their
passage tickets. [The case fact:] A thorough search of the
record, however, inexplicably fails to show that any effort was
exerted by the KLM officials or employees to discharge in a
proper manner this responsibility to the respondents. [The
conclusion:] Consequently, we hold that the respondents
cannot be bound by the provision in question by which KLM
unilaterally assumed the role of a mere ticket-issuing agent
for other airlines and limited its liability only to untoward
occurrences on its own lines.
3. [The rule:] Moreover, as maintained by the respondents
and the Court of Appeals, the passage tickets of the
respondents provide that the carriage to be performed
thereunder by several successive carriers “is to be regarded as
a single operation,” which is diametrically incompatible with
the theory of the KLM that the respondents entered into a
series of independent contracts with the carriers which took
them on the various segments of their trip. [The conclusion:]
This position of KLM we reject. [The case fact:] The
respondents dealt exclusively with the KLM which issued
them tickets for their entire trip and which in effect
guaranteed to them that they would have sure space in Aer
Lingus Flight 861. The respondents, under that assurance of
the internationally prestigious KLM, naturally had the right
to expect that their tickets would be honored by Aer Lingus to
which, in the legal sense, the KLM had indorsed and in effect
guaranteed the performance of its principal engagement to
carry out the respondents’ scheduled itinerary previously and
mutually agreed upon between the parties.
4. [The case fact:] The breach of that guarantee was
aggravated by the discourteous and highly arbitrary conduct
of an official of the Aer Lingus which the KLM had engaged
to transport the respondents on the Barcelona-Lourdes
segment of their itinerary. [The rule:] It is but just and in full
accord with the policy expressly embodied in our civil law
which enjoins courts to be more vigilant for the protection of
a contracting party who occupies an inferior position with
respect to the other contracting party, [The conclusion:] that
the KLM should be held responsible for the abuse, injury,
and embarrassment suffered by the respondents at the hands
of a supercilious boor of the Aer Lingus.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
dated August 14, 1969 is affirmed, at KLM’s cost.
Omitted Statement
At times, you could omit from your argument one of its essential
statements—your rule, your case fact, or even your conclusion—if that
element is so evident that it goes without saying.
For example, if you could show by evidence of his birth certificate that the
defendant has lied about his age, you could immediately conclude that what
he said about his age could not be believed. You need not state your “rule”
that “falsehoods cannot be believed” since this goes without saying.
Likewise, you could also omit stating your conclusion when it is already
obvious based on how you clearly discussed your “rule” and your “case
fact.” Leaving it to your reader to draw his own conclusion could work very
well. Take for example this argument in a Supreme Court decision:
[The issue:] The principal issue raised is the validity of the

donation executed by Catalina in favor of Violeta. [The rule:]
Under Article 749 of the Civil Code, the donation of an
immovable must be made in a public instrument in order to
be valid, specifying therein the property donated and the
value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. As a mode
of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective
transfer of title over the property from the donor to the
donee, and is perfected from the moment the donor knows of
the acceptance by the donee, provided the donee is not
disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting the donation.
Once the donation is accepted, it is generally considered
irrevocable, and the donee becomes the absolute owner of the
property. The acceptance, to be valid, must be made during
the lifetime of both the donor and the donee. It may be made
in the same deed or in a separate public document and the
donor must know the acceptance by the donee.
[The case fact:] In the case at bar, the deed of donation
contained the number of the certificate of title as well as the
technical description of the real property donated. It
stipulated that the donation was made for and in
consideration of the “love and affection which the DONEE
inspires in the DONOR, and as an act of liberality and
generosity.” x x x
The donee’s acceptance of the donation was explicitly
manifested in the penultimate paragraph of the deed x x x.
x x x The fact that it was acknowledged before a notary
public converts the deed of donation in its entirety into a
public instrument. x x x (Quilala v. Alcantara, 371 SCRA 311,
317-319; penned by Justice Consuelo Yñares-Santiago.)
In the above, the conclusion that the deed of donation in question meets all
the requirements of a valid donation is quite obvious and did not have to be
stated.
The danger, however, is that many lawyers and students presume that their
rule, their case fact, or their conclusion is quite evident that they need not
state it in their argument. It often happens that they misread how their
average readers think. The omitted proposition or conclusion could be quite
unclear to these readers. In such a case, the argument has no force.
Consequently, in case of doubt, it will be best to completely deploy all the
essential statements of your argument.
Closing Statement
On occasions, it will help to make a closing statement. The idea behind
every closing statement is to depart on a good note after packing your
pleading with every sort of argument in support of your stand. Consequently,
your closing argument should not appear to argue even if it may appeal to the
good sense of the judge exercised in your favor. How can you do this? Recall
to your reader those truths that underlie every good decision in identical
cases. He cannot disagree with that. Consider this closing statement in the
rape case:
Concluding Statement
Ronald is entitled to an acquittal. In rape, the Court must thoroughly

examine the evidence of the complainant since only her testimony stands
between conviction and acquittal. Where her testimony is inconsistent with
common experience and defies reason as in this case, it should not be
believed. The version of the accused may itself be weak but the conviction
cannot rest on such weakness. It must stand on the strength of the
prosecution’s evidence alone.
Prayer
Wherefore, the accused respectfully prays that judgment be rendered

acquitting him of the charge of rape.
xxx xxx xxx
Writing Exercises
1. If you did pre-work on the case of the girl whom a neighbor’s dog
attacked, you will have already roughed out your arguments. You should be
ready by now to flesh these out. Do so applying the principles, lessons, and
techniques that you have learned.
2. Write up, too, your closing statement in the case.
1Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 369 SCRA 24 (2001),
penned by Justice Sabino R. De Leon, Jr.
2Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. v. William Lines, Inc., 306
SCRA 762, 778 (1999).
3Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 184
SCRA 54, 58 (1990), citing Boney, Insurance Commissioner v. Central
Mutual Ins. Co. of Chicago, 197 S.E. 122.
10.
Tightening Your Work
Completing the write-up portion of your pleading or paper would not be

enough if your aim were excellence in writing. Editing is essential to
excellent writing. Indeed, some say that true writing is rewriting.
Each person, like you, has his writing style and he is entitled to conform to
that style. This book does not suggest that you change your style; it only
suggests some ways you can make your writing style even better. These
suggestions aim to help you write clearly and vigorously, in your own style.
Consequently, when the suggestions appear to hinder your writing style,
disregard them. But keep an open mind to make changes when you discover
something useful for you in the lessons provided in this and in the succeeding
chapters.
Language Problems
Ordinary people complain that they encounter so much difficulty and
frustration in trying to understand the “legal garbage” that lawyers put down
in their opinions or pleadings, even though these would be read by or are
ultimately intended for non-lawyers.
One reason for this is that most lawyers simply lack practical training in
the art of making opinions or writing thesis. The emphasis in law schools is
on learning enough of the law to pass the class or the bar examinations rather
than on writing about the law for others. Because of this, what the law
students acquire are skills in making loose syllabi, outlines, or short notes
needed for preparing for the examinations. These are not writings intended
for convincing others to accept a point of view.
Consequently, on leaving law school, most law graduates write pleadings
in the familiar format they knew—disorganized, long-winded, and repetitious
loose notes. And, to compensate for inadequate training, a good number of
these graduates resort to using in their pleadings out-of-context “legalese
words or phrases” cut out of some Supreme Court decisions. As young
lawyers, they hope to impress more than to persuade.
Here is a classic example in the use of needless words, claimed to be the
work of a lawyer:
I hereby give, transfer, and convey to you, each and every
interest, right, title, claim, and benefit that I have in the said
orange, together with its rind, skin, juice, and pulps, with all
the rights and benefits appurtenant thereto, including the full
power to bite, or suck, or otherwise eat the same or give the
same away, with or without the rind, skin, juice, and pulps,
anything hereinbefore or hereinafter or in any other means of
whatever nature or kind whatsoever to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Yet, all that the lawyer wanted to say is:
Have an orange.
Needless Words
Think of a memorandum in a case as a pot of special dish, a mixture of
different ingredients in prescribed quantities, mixed together, and cooked as
the dish required. If you pour five cups of water when the recipe calls for
only one cup, you would be watering down the taste of your dish. A
memorandum with more words that are needed to bring home its message to
the reader has the same result. Useless circumlocutions clutter and dissipate
the power of your message. Consequently, you must develop the practice of
throwing out excess words, phrases, and sentences and tightening your work
to make it compact and terse.
Vigorous writing, said Strunk and White in that famous little book,
Elements of Style,1 is concise. “A sentence should contain no unnecessary
words, a paragraph no unnecessary sentences, for the same reason that a
drawing should have no unnecessary lines and a machine no unnecessary
parts. This requires, not that the writer make all sentences short, or avoid all
detail and treat subjects only in outline, but that every word tell.”
Under the Revised Rules of Court, every party to a lawsuit must send to his
adversary a copy of every pleading or paper that he files in court. The rules
prefer that a messenger personally deliver the copy but sending it by
registered mail is also allowed. It has been noted, however, that some lawyers
furnished copies of their papers to their opponents by registered mail even if
the latter held office just next door. For this reason, Section 11 of Rule 13 of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that when a lawyer sends a
copy of his paper to his opponent by registered mail he should include an
explanation for doing it that way.
In a case, one lawyer included this explanation in his paper:
EXPLANATION
Pursuant to Section 11 of Rule 13 of the New Rules on Civil

Procedure, explanation is hereby given that a copy of this
pleading was served upon opposing counsel by means of
registered mail and not by personal service, the latter mode
being impractical due to and for the reasons that heavy
volume of deliveries/service/filing of equally important
pleadings, motions, notices of the law firm in other courts or
tribunals and to opposing counsels or parties render such
personal service impossible not to mention the separate and
different geographical distance that need to be traversed if
personal service is resorted to.
Yet, all that the lawyer wanted to say is:
Explanation: Defendant has to serve a copy of this

comment on the plaintiff by registered mail because of the
distance and the lack of a messenger who can make a personal
service.
Just how do you tighten a piece of legal writing without sacrificing the
color and substance of your argument? It is simple. Take out those words,
phrases, or sentences that do not contribute to your reader’s understanding of
what you are saying.
Consider the arguments that an airline company offered in its defense
against a suit by disgruntled passengers.2 The spouses Manuel and Karen
Romano and their friends Julio Fernan, Vicky Sandoval, Art Gatchalian, and
Laura Sevilla decided to take a vacation in Bangkok, Thailand. They asked
Sweet Travel, Inc. to book them on a morning flight on May 8. Sweet Travel
in turn endorsed the booking to Hope Tours, Inc., a member of the
International Air Transport Association (IATA) and an agent of China
Airlines (CAL). On May 5 Hope Tours issued the tickets on behalf of CAL
on the faces of which appeared the word “OK” to signify a confirmed
booking status for each of the passengers.
But, when the group checked in for their flight, only the Romanos had
confirmed reservations. CAL put the rest on waiting list but only Fernan and
Sandoval got seats on the plane when some confirmed passengers did not
show up. CAL advised Gatchalian and Sevilla to get on another airline’s
flight that was leaving hours later. CAL declined, however, to make the
arrangement for them. Eventually, only four (4) of the original six boarded
the CAL flight. Because the four travelers had to wait for hours at the
Bangkok airport for their two companions, their host had to leave them. They
had to fend for themselves and give up their scheduled afternoon tours. On
returning to Manila, the group sued CAL, Sweet Travel, and Hope Tours for
damages arising from the expenses, inconveniences, and frustrations that they
suffered.
In defending itself, CAL claimed that it received reservations for the six
passengers on May 4, recorded them in its computers, and confirmed the
reservations subject to actual ticketing not later than noon of May 5 or the
reservations would automatically be cancelled. At Sweet Travel’s request,
CAL extended the ticketing deadline to noon of May 6 and later to noon of
May 7. Meantime, Sweet Travel endorsed the ticketing of the six passengers
to Hope Tours.
But, since neither Sweet Travel nor Hope Tours reconfirmed the bookings
of the group before the May 7 time limit, these were cancelled due to expired
ticketing option. At 2 p.m. of the same day, Sweet Travel rebooked the group
on a waitlist status for the same flight. On May 8, CAL confirmed the
bookings for the Romano spouses but not those for their four companions.
When the six of them came to the airport and presented their tickets, CAL
accepted only the Romanos for check-in despite the confirmed status written
on all their tickets. Only when some confirmed passengers appearing on
CAL’s list did not show up, did it take Fernan and Sandoval in. Gatchalian
and Sevilla had to take a Thai Airlines’ flight late that afternoon.
Below is how CAL’s counsel presented his client’s arguments.
Defendant CAL did not violate its contract of carriage with
the plaintiffs. The two plaintiffs with the surname Romano,
who were holding confirmed reservations, were immediately
accommodated on defendant CAL’s Flight CL 507/May
8/Manila-Thailand. On the other hand, the two other
plaintiffs namely Fernan and Sandoval, who were wait listed,
eventually boarded the subject flight because not all
confirmed passengers for said flight showed up at the NAIA.
As to the two remaining passengers, namely Gatchalian and
Sevilla, they were waitlisted passengers who, therefore,
cannot demand that they be accommodated on the same flight
since they were not holding confirmed reservations thereon.
Defendant CAL never repudiated the contract it entered
into with the two plaintiffs with the surname Romano as it
was willing, and in fact, did fulfill its obligation to fly said
plaintiffs to Bangkok, Thailand, in accordance with the
nature and extent of its commitment to said plaintiffs under
their completed transactions. It must be remembered that it
was the two plaintiffs with the surname Romano who refused
to board the plane early and who chose to wait for two or
three hours to ascertain whether the other plaintiffs can
board the flight that day. Hence, any alleged inconvenience
and discomfort suffered by the two plaintiffs with the
surname Romano involving their travel arrangements on the
day of the flight cannot be attributed to defendant CAL since
for there to be any breach by defendant CAL, there must
have been refusal and failure to abide by the terms of the
contract by defendant CAL which is not the case herein (Cf.,
Arts. 1156 and 1159 in relation to Arts. 1305, et seq., Civil
Code).
Neither can the two plaintiffs with the surname Romano
impute liability to CAL for any vicarious emotional suffering
they claim to have experienced respecting the circumstances
of the other four plaintiffs. Each of the members of the group
had a contract with defendant CAL that is entirely separate
and distinct from that of the others as “contracts take effect
only between the parties and cannot be binding upon nor be
enforced against one who is not a party to it” (Ozaeta v. Court
of Appeals, 228 SCRA 7, 11; see also Capital Insurance &
Surety Co., Inc. v. Central Azucarera del Danao, 221 SCRA
99, 104). Therefore, the two plaintiffs with the surname
Romano have no standing to question any arrangement that
may have been effected between defendant CAL and the four
other plaintiffs who were wait listed.
Given the foregoing discussion, it is with more reason that
defendant CAL cannot be held accountable for whatever
confusion and disturbance that was allegedly suffered by
plaintiffs Fernan, Sandoval, Gatchalian, and Sevilla. As
passengers with unconfirmed reservation, the extent of
defendant CAL’s obligation to said plaintiffs [other than the
two passengers with the surname Romano] is defined by their
status as wait listed passengers.
This circumstance indicated that defendant CAL could not
have reneged on any obligation to board the plaintiffs [other
than the two passengers with the surname Romano] on the
subject flight because such duty never materialized as it was
subject to the change in the status of said plaintiffs from wait
listed to confirmed passengers. In effect, any obligation on the
part of defendant CAL to board the remaining plaintiffs at
such point was yet a potentiality to be determined by the
availability of accommodations and consequent confirmation
of their bookings.
Further, it must be noted that despite their unconfirmed
bookings, two of the four wait listed plaintiffs, namely,
Fernan and Sandoval, were able to board the flight with
defendant CAL’s intervention. This positively disputes
plaintiff’s claim that defendant CAL violated its contract with
the said four plaintiffs because on the contrary, defendant
CAL actually rendered service beyond the requirements of its
contract with the wait listed plaintiffs.
In all these subject transactions, neither is there any fact on
record which shows that defendant CAL was less than
diligent in the performance of its service to the plaintiffs or
that it deviated from the established procedure warranted by
the circumstances. Nor is there any incident which would
negative the courteous assistance defendant CAL’s employees
have accorded the plaintiffs. In fact, defendant CAL was
more than attentive to the plaintiffs as it gave way to their
request by accommodating two (2) of the four (4) plaintiffs on
the same flight that day upon defendant CAL’s intercession.
The argument is plausible but it seems that the author did not go over his
pleading to rid it of useless and sometimes redundant words or phrases. Here
are the suggested revisions:
Defendant [this description of CAL’s position in the suit need
not be repeated all throughout the paper; describing CAL as
“CAL” is adequate] CAL did not violate its contract of
carriage with the plaintiffs (group) [since the plaintiffs were
collectively identified in the statement of facts as “the group,” it
would be less confusing to consistently describe them as such
rather than according to their position in the suit]. The two (2)
plaintiffs with the surname Romano(s) [calling a couple by
their surnames “the Romanos” is less cumbersome and correct;
since the Romanos are a couple, it is also superfluous to say that
they are two], who were holding had [“had” is shorter yet the
meaning is not changed] confirmed reservations, were
immediately accommodated taken into the [“taken into” is less
stiff] on defendant CAL’s Flight CL 507/ May 8/ Manila-
Thailand [since the details of the flight are not in issue, it will
be superfluous to mention them]. On the other hand [‘on the
other hand’ is supposed to tie together two contrasting ideas; it is
inappropriate here since what follows does not present a different
situation] the two (2) other plaintiffs [when a number is written
in word, here “two,” you usually do not have to write its
equivalent in figures (2) inside a parenthesis for that would be
superfluous unless you are writing a check.] namely Fernan and
Sandoval, who were while at first [“while at first” sounds
better since it introduces a subsequent event] wait listed,
eventually boarded the subject flight because not all after
confirmed passengers for said flight did not showed up at the
NAIA [this phrase has been shortened with no change in
meaning]. As to the two (2) remaining passengers, namely
[crossed out because it repeats what had already been said]
Gatchalian and Sevilla they were wait listed passengers who,
therefore, [superfluous to mention that “they were wait listed”
because of later statement that they had no confirmed
reservations] cannot demand that they be accommodated on
the same flight the right to board [the “right to board” is
shorter] since they were not holding did not have [“did not
have” is simpler] confirmed [superfluous] reservations
thereon.
Defendant CAL never repudiated the its contract it entered
into with the two (2) plaintiffs with the surname Romanos. as
it was willing, and In fact, did fulfill its obligation to fly it flew
said plaintiffs them to Bangkok, Thailand, in accordance with
as was the nature and extent of its commitment to said
plaintiffs under their a completed transaction. [The words that
were crossed out can be dispensed with.] Of course, It must be
remembered that it was the two (2) plaintiffs with [plain
clutter!] the surname Romanos who refused to board the
plane early and who chose to wait for two or three hours to
ascertain whether if the others plaintiffs can board the flight
that day were allowed on the plane [“were allowed on the
plane” is more direct]. Hence, any alleged if the Romanos
suffered inconvenience and discomfort suffered by the two (2)
plaintiffs with the surname Romano involving with respect to
their travel arrangements on the day of the flight, they cannot
be attributed to defendant blame this on CAL since for there
to be any breach by defendant CAL, there must have been
refusal and failure to abide it neither refused nor failed to
abide by the terms of the contract by defendant CAL which is
not the case herein with them. [Here the sentence was
shortened by excising unneeded words and rewriting a few.] (Cf.,
Arts. 1156 and 1159 in relation to Arts. 1305, et seq., Civil
Code).
After the revision, the first two paragraphs of CAL’s arguments read like
this:
CAL did not violate its contract of carriage with the group.
The Romano spouses had confirmed reservations and were
immediately taken into the flight. Fernan and Sandoval, while
at first wait listed, were eventually allowed to board after
confirmed passengers did not show up at the NAIA.
Gatchalian and Sevilla, the remaining two, could not demand
the right to board since they did not have confirmed
reservations.
CAL never repudiated its contract with the Romanos. In
fact, it flew them to Bangkok, Thailand, as was its obligation,
in accordance with the nature of its commitment under a
completed transaction. Of course, the Romanos refused to
board the plane early and chose to wait two or three hours to
ascertain if the others were allowed on the plane. Therefore, if
the Romanos suffered inconvenience and discomfort with
respect to their travel arrangements for the day, they cannot
blame these on CAL since it neither refused nor failed to
abide by its contract with them. (Cf., Arts. 1156 and 1159 in
relation to Arts. 1305, et seq., Civil Code.)
Do you sense the difference when work is tightened by deleting

unnecessary words and phrases? Below is the rest of the argument after
revision. Compare it with the original, examine what was done to tighten the
argument, and trace the revisions on the original to appreciate the changes
made.
Neither can the Romanos impute liability to CAL for their
emotional grief in having witnessed the fate of their
companions. Each passenger has a contract with CAL that is
separate and distinct from those of the others. “Contracts
take effect only between the parties and cannot be binding
upon nor enforced against one who is not a party to it”
(Ozaeta v. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 7, 11; see also Capital
Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. v. Central Azucarera del Danao,
221 SCRA 99, 104). The Romanos have no standing to
question CAL’s transactions with the others who were wait
listed.
It follows from the above that, with more reason, CAL
cannot be held liable for the confusion and disturbance that
Fernan, Sandoval, Gatchalian, and Sevilla allegedly suffered.
Since the latter did not have confirmed reservations, CAL’s
obligations to them are defined by their wait listed status.
The circumstances show that CAL could not have reneged
on its obligation to board the four wait listed passengers
because this obligation depended on the change of their
booking status from “wait listed” to “confirmed.” The
obligation to board them was a mere possibility that depended
on seat availability and confirmation of bookings.
Further, CAL intervened to allow Fernan and Sandoval to
board the flight despite their unconfirmed bookings. This
refutes the claim that CAL violated its contracts with the wait
listed passengers. On the contrary, CAL served them beyond
what those contracts required.
The record fails to show that CAL was less than diligent in
its service to the passengers or that it deviated from
established procedures. Nor does the record show that CAL’s
staffs failed to render courteous assistance to them. Indeed,
CAL was more than attentive in that it boarded on the same
flight two of those who had been wait listed.
A great number of lawyers today still write as if they are being paid based
on the quantity of words they put into their pleadings. Unfortunately, their
works suffer in quality, adversely affecting their chances of winning their
cases. They simply cannot get the sympathy of judges to whom they submit
work that requires tiresome reading. In the end, these lawyers earn even less.
Consequently, remain vigilant in spotting unneeded words in your writing.
Since these have a way of creeping into your work, learn to recognize them.
Below are examples of what could be done to get them out of your sentences.
Sense the strength that sentences gain when unneeded words are taken out
without changing their message.
The question as to whether the Whether the

accused is guilty must be resolved accused is guilty
in court. must be resolved in
court. (10 as against
14 words)
There is no doubt but that the law No doubt the law

must be obeyed. must be obeyed. (7
against 11 words)
The sincerity of his conviction is His sincere

conceded but it does not suffice. conviction, while
conceded, is not
enough. (8 against
12)
It must be stressed that Administrative

administrative complaints are complaints are
accusatorial in nature (if the accusatorial! (4
sentence needs to be stressed, against 11)
underline it or put an exclamation
point at the end).
But more than what has just been More, a legal

observed, a legal impediment stands impediment bars
in the way of giving the lenient the lenient
treatment appellant invokes in his treatment appellant
appeal. invokes in his
appeal. (13 against
25)
It is that the records of the case do The records of the

not afford any basis on which to case do not show
judge the degree of instruction of appellant’s degree
the appellant, no evidence having of instruction, no
been taken relative thereto because evidence having
he entered a plea of guilty. been taken
regarding it
because of his plea
of guilty. (25
against 38)
On April 30 all the rights, interests, On April 30 all of

and participation (since “all Garcia’s interests in
interests” embraces rights and the property were
participation, the latter words are sold at public
superfluous) of Garcia in the said auction. (15 against
property were sold at public 20)
auction.
At the outset, it should be clarified Clearly, the accused

that (if your clarification comes at did not admit his
the beginning of your discussion, it guilt. (8 against 15)
might be superfluous to make a
point of it by saying, “At the
outset.”), the accused did not admit
his guilt.
The decision subject of this petition Respondent Judge
has been rendered by respondent Jaime Solis
Judge Jaime Solis, hereinafter rendered the
referred to as the respondent judge decision subject of
(this last phrase is useless when the this petition. (11
case involves only one judge; you against 21)
could just refer to him straight as
respondent judge).
A credit card is used for borrowing A credit card is

purposes. used for borrowing.
(7 against 8)
It is more in keeping with reason to It stands to reason

hold that once guilt is admitted, that once guilt is
evidence can be dispensed with. admitted, evidence
can be dispensed
with. (14 against 19)
He is a man who cannot be trusted. He cannot be

trusted. (4 against
8)
This is a case that is difficult to This case is difficult

understand. to understand. (6
against 9)
His version is a strange one. His version is

strange. (4 against
6)
The reason why he fled is that he He fled out of fear.

was afraid. (5 against 10)
In spite of the fact that she got paid, Although paid, she
she refused to drop the case. refused to drop the
case. (8 against 15)
We call your attention to the fact We remind you that

that you have not left your address you have not left
with us. your address with
us. (12 against 16)
The fact that he had not succeeded His failure worried

worried him. him. (4 against 9)
The fact that she had arrived Her arrival

saddened him. saddened him. (4
against 8)
Carlos, who was the star witness in Carlos, the star

the case, was missing. witness in the case,
was missing. (9
against 11)
Baguio, which was the venue of the Baguio, the venue

conference, was cool. of the conference,
was cool. (8 against
10)
While they were having dinner, the During dinner, the

accused shot the victim. accused shot the
victim. (7 against
10)
Republic Act No. 123 (since 123 is a Republic Act 123
number, describing it as such is does not apply. (6
superfluous) does not apply. against 7)
Under the circumstances, however, With Ignacio

with coaxing and cajoling on the tempting and
part of the accused, there was seducing her, Ruby
nothing unlikely in the stage of agreed to have sex
sexual congress with complainant with him. (11
being reached. against 26)
Active versus Passive Voice

One technique works to tighten and enliven any writing: use of the active
voice in place of the passive voice. English has two voices: (1) the active; and
(2) the passive voices. The passive voice is indirect, limp, and weak. For
example: “Abel was killed by Cain.” Abel is the subject of the sentence yet
he does nothing in the sentence. Something was being done to him. And the
sentence needed five words to describe what happened.
On the other hand, the active voice is direct, vigorous, and strong. “Cain
killed Abel.” Cain is the subject of the sentence and he is doing something in
the sentence. The sentence needed only three words to describe what
happened. Sense the difference.
Abel was killed by Cain. Cain killed Abel.
Computer programs for composing sentences usually carry suggestions for

grammar and good writing. One of these is their preference for active over
passive voice. The following excerpt from a pleading illustrates the lifeless
quality of a work heavily dependent on the use of passive voice. Counsel
used mostly the passive voice in showing that the motorcycle driver, whom
his company’s truck sideswiped, negligently moved by the truck’s side.
Apparent is the fact that the negligence of the truck driver

was not established. Nowhere in the victim’s testimony does it
state that the truck driver was driving negligently. More
apparent is the fact that the truck he was driving was moving
slowly following the flow of the traffic and was therefore
proceeding with caution. This is so in view of the fact that, as
the victim himself testified, there was a traffic jam and it was
physically impossible for big trucks to drive fast.
On the contrary, and what is equally clear from the above
testimony, is the fact that the victim was proceeding without
any caution and at the same time was at the wrong side of the
road. This is so because it is always the natural and actual
operational tendency of big trucks (especially those with
trailers) to make wide turns to the left or to the right. Now,
naturally, when a prudent man sees or is driving beside it, his
reaction would be to distance himself from the said truck or
better still to stop completely until the truck passes. But
despite this, the victim completely did the opposite thing. He
was not careful to stop and allow the truck to pass.
The revised version, employing the active voice, appears below:
Apparently, the prosecution failed to prove the driver’s

negligence. Indeed, the victim did not claim that the truck
driver drove his truck negligently. More evidently, the latter
proceeded with caution and moved slowly with the flow of
traffic. This follows from the fact that, as the victim himself
said, a traffic jam beset the road and this made it impossible
for big trucks to move fast.
On the contrary, the victim clearly testified that he
proceeded without caution and on the wrong side of the road.
By their nature, big trucks (especially those with trailers)
tended to make wide turns either to the left or to the right.
Naturally, a prudent man driving alongside such a truck
would keep distance from it or, better still, would come to a
complete stop and let the truck pass first. Here, the victim did
the opposite thing: he did not care to stop and allow the truck
to pass.
See how the work dramatically improves by the simple process of

converting from passive to active voice. Consider the following additional
examples of sentences using the passive voice that have been converted to
active voice:
The documents were

Manuel fabricated the
fabricated by
documents. (4 as against 6 words)
Manuel.
The ransom note was

Adama wrote the ransom note. (5
written by appellant
against 8)
Adama.
It is the contention of
Cruz contends that he duly
appellant Cruz that
established his alibi. (8 against
his defense of alibi
15)
was duly established.
There was enough

light inside the house With enough light in the house,
to enable Celestina to Celestina could recognize the
recognize the intruders. (11 against 14)
intruders.
It was admitted by
Petitioner admits that he filed
petitioner that
motions for reconsideration of
motions for the assailed decision. (12 against
reconsideration were 20) [The word “above” may be
filed by him with deleted when the discussion
reference to the above involves no other decision.]
assailed decision.
The passive voice of course has its use. For example: “Celso was killed.”
The subject (Celso) is not acting but is being acted upon. This shows the cold
brutality of what had been done to him. On the whole, however, passive
voice should be the exception and active voice should dominate your writing.
When you are able to do this, your writing will acquire new vigor; your style
will be enhanced.
Third Person Speaks

Legal writing is often best written in the third person, as most written
works are. The main reason for this is that he who writes in the third person,
focuses attention to his work or message rather than to himself. Besides, a
statement is more forceful and convincing without personal pronouns. It
carries more conviction.
I believe that God exists. God exists.
It is my opinion that smoking Smoking causes

causes cancer. cancer.
I think that Jose committed the Jose committed the

crime. crime.
Writing in third person says exactly the same thing but it has more punch.
“I believe” makes the sentence weak and defensive. Also, when you say, “I
believe, etc.” you are writing about yourself. You are placing yourself
between the reader and your topic. Furthermore, “I think” and “I feel” are
redundant since the reader knows that the statements belong to you as their
author.
Do not try, however, to conceal “I think” in the phrase “the writer thinks”
or “in the opinion of the writer.” These are substitute first persons and are
even more annoying.
In the opinion of the writer, Something should be done

something should be done about the problem
about the problem immediately. (8 as against
immediately. 14 words)
Here are other first person substitutes:
One never knows what Anything might happen. (3

might happen. against 6)
A person should always Credit is essential. (3

have credit. against 6)
Courts often write in substituted first person. Nothing is essentially wrong

with this and tradition in the Philippines seems to favor such a format. But
there is merit in courts writing in the third person since it is shorter, yet the
meaning remains exactly the same.
In our considered opinion, the The defendant acted

defendant acted in bad faith. (The in bad faith. (6 as
court’s statement about itself against 10 words.)
diverts attention from the real
subject of the sentence, the bad
faith of the accused.)
We do not find any reversible The trial court

error on the part of the trial committed no
court. reversible error. (7
against 14)
Be that as it may, however, we take Still, the penalty of

the view that the penalty of suspension from
suspension from office is too office is too severe.
severe. (10 against 20)
We find it difficult to disregard The accused’s

the extrajudicial confession of the extrajudicial
accused just because he confession is difficult
repudiated it during the trial. to disregard just
because he
repudiated it during
trial. (15 against 20)
Again, observe that the second versions are shorter yet their meaning
remains exactly the same. And when the courts or the parties use third person
in their writings, they are able to avoid talking about themselves. All the
focus falls on the merit of the case.
The defendant thinks that the The evidence is

evidence is strong. strong.
In the opinion of the prosecution, the The accused

accused defrauded the victim. defrauded the
victim.
The Court finds that the accused is The accused is

guilty as charged. guilty as charged.
Writing in second person creates the same problem.
You (second-person) cannot help liking this This book

book. (The focus is on the second person is
rather than on the central message.) irresistible.
Writing in second person has of course its uses as when you write a recipe
for some dish or you write a how-to-do-it book like this one. The sentences in
this format function as suggestions or instructions.
Block Quotations
Another way of cramping your work with unnecessary words is the use of
excessive block quotations. Take this argument in an administrative action
against a judge for gross ignorance of the law. The complainant filed the
charge against the judge after receiving an adverse decision in his case. The
judge employed the following argument in his defense.
The task of a judge as dispenser of justice is not easy.

Because he must decide a case one way or the other, he
usually cannot satisfy all the litigants involved. Here,
complainant Sison, the losing party, seemed unhappy over
respondent judge’s decision and has filed an administrative
case against him for alleged gross ignorance of the law. But,
as the Supreme Court said in Flores v. Abesamis:
As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial
remedies against errors or irregularities being
committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or
irregularities which may be regarded as normal in
nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of
evidence, or in construction or application of
procedural or substantive law or legal principle)
include a motion for reconsideration or after
rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for
new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies
against error or irregularities, which may be deemed
extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical,
capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of
duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions of
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for
inhibition, a petition for change or venue, as the case
may be.
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that
disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against
Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a
substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether
ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion
of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of
judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding,
are prerequisites for the taking of other measures
against the persons of the judges concerned, whether
of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only
after the available judicial remedies have been
exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken
with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his
criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said
to have opened, or closed.
You put unnecessary burden on your reader when, as in the above, you
bodily quote large chunks from Supreme Court decisions and then leave it to
him to determine which portion of what you quote directly applies to your
case. In reality, judges simply scan these quotations, if they do not skip them
altogether, hoping to spot the portions that make sense in the case. When that
fails, few would bother to reread the quotations.
To lighten the burden of your reader, simply quote the important portion of
the court’s ruling or paraphrase it before quoting it. In this way, you give
your reader the option of skipping the quotations if he finds no need for
reading them. In a case, the surety company, which guaranteed the timely
completion of a building, tried to avoid liability by pointing out that the
building owner neglected to report the contractor’s delay the first time the
owner noted it. Observe below how the owner’s counsel paraphrased the
Supreme Court ruling that he invokes before quoting it:
Although David found Marc Builders to have incurred
some delay earlier in April in pursuing the project, such delay
was not substantial. Only about three months from the start
of the project had passed. David considered taking some
adverse action but, on further consideration, he realized that
the delay did not yet threaten the timely completion of the
project, which had been set on November 27, still several
months away. Consequently, David found it premature to
cancel the contract and file a claim against the contractor’s
surety for such non-threatening delay.
The Supreme Court held in Umali v. Court of Appeals,3 that

[here is the paraphrasing] slight defaults or mere suspicions of
possible defaults did not toll the period for filing the claim
against the surety bond. Thus:
Fundamental likewise is the rule that, except where
required by the provisions of the contract, a demand
or notice of default is not required to fix the surety‘s
liability. Hence, where the contract of suretyship
stipulates that notice of the principal‘s default be
given to the surety, generally the failure to comply
with the condition will prevent recovery from the
surety. There are certain instances, however, when
failure to comply with the condition will not
extinguish the surety‘s liability such as failure to give
notice of slight defaults, which are waived by the
obligee; or on mere suspicion of possible default; or
where, if a default exists, there is excuse or provision
in the contract exempting the surety from liability
therefor; or where the surety already has knowledge
or is chargeable with knowledge of the default.
Moreover, when a doctrine of law invoked is quite well-known and is
securely entrenched in past precedents, it would serve no useful purpose to
quote from portions of so many decisions of the Supreme Court. In fact, you
could simply cite those decisions in your work without having to copy
portions of them.
Writing Exercises
The following portions of a memorandum filed in a theft case need

tightening. Use the lessons you learned in eliminating needless words and
using the active voice.
On or about 10:30 a.m. of May 23, respondent Jaime
Gozon, accompanied by his accountant, went to Carlton Beer
Parañaque Sales Office and requested for the reconciliation of
his account. He was attended thereto by Financial Analyst
Ben Lazo. The warehouseman, Cenon Veles, was requested by
Lazo to bring the needed documents for reconciliation and to
attend the meeting as well.
While waiting for Mr. Veles, Lazo was requested by Gozon
that he be allowed to see BPI Check No. 17894 dated June 20
in the amount of P4,709,760.00, claiming that it was already
covered by the return of equivalent value of beer empties to
Carlton. This claim was disputed by Lazo who explained that
P2,700,000.00 worth of empties was still unaccounted for.
This, notwithstanding, check custodian Belen Yusi was asked
by Lazo to immediately show to Gozon the postdated check in
question.
The requested check, however, was attached to a bond
paper, containing, among others, BPI Check No. 27867
postdated to July 8 in the amount of P11,500,000.00. The
bond paper containing these checks was initially given to
Gozon’s accountant, but was subsequently gotten hold of by
Gozon. Thereafter, the latter instructed his accountant to
pack-up their things and they hurriedly left the sales office.
Yusi pleaded with Gozon to return the checks and even
tried to prevent him from leaving but all her efforts proved
futile. As the events happened so fast, Yusi failed to notify the
security guards about the incident, hence, the failure of the
latter to prevent Gozon and his accountant from leaving the
sales office at 10:51 a.m. or barely eleven minutes from the
time of their arrival.
Gozon claims that the relation between Carlton Beer and
him was one of creditor-debtor and that their problem lay in
the reconciliation of accounts and the non-payment of the
beer empties which cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution
for theft. Carlton Beer cannot agree. In the first place, the
issue is not the non-payment of beer empties, but a criminal
act of stealing. Secondly, the stolen check BPI Check No.
27867 dated July 8 in the amount of P11,500,000.00 was
issued by Gozon in payment of the contents of Carlton Beer
products and not for empties thereof (Annexes A, B, and C).
While it is probably true that the matter of Gozon’s illegal
taking of the checks was never discussed during the
subsequent reconciliation meetings of the parties, this could
be explained. The reconciliation of account, which was an
offshoot of the parties’ agreement to purchase and sell, was
governed by the Civil Code while the criminal act of theft was
covered by the penal code. This was precisely the reason why
the theft committed by Gozon on May 23 was never discussed
nor considered by the representatives of Carlton Beer,
whenever the parties were discussing the issue of
reconciliation of account.
1Fourth Edition, p. 23.

2The details have been changed to protect the privacy of the persons
involved.
3189 SCRA 529, 545-546 (1990).
11.
Writing Clearly
One of the primary criteria for good writing is clarity in writing. A good
number of techniques have been developed for writing clearly. This book will
address some of the most helpful ones in legal writing.
Right Connectives
Communicated thoughts can be likened to a cargo train. A locomotive
engine leads several cars of cargo to their destination with each car connected
to the next by special coupling mechanisms. Without these connections, the
cargo cars would go nowhere.
When you put together several sentences or ideas to deliver one message,
you need coupling mechanisms to tie these ideas together. These are called
connectives or transitory devices. They help the reader see the connections
between your sentences or paragraphs. Without them, many readers would be
confused regarding your intentions.
Take for example this sentence:
The deceased was rich. She left P50,000.00 to her maid in

her will.
Insert the connective “indeed” between the sentences and see its effect on
the message.
The deceased was rich. Indeed, she left P50,000.00 to her

maid in her will.
The message brought about by the connective “indeed” is that the deceased
must have really been rich because she could afford to give away P50,000.00
to a maid. In other words, the second sentence affirms the truth of the first
sentence.
Now, change the connective “indeed” with the word “yet” and see the
effect.
The deceased was rich. Yet, she left P50,000.00 to her maid
in her will.
Sense the difference that the change in connective makes. Now, the
message is different. The deceased was quite rich, probably a billionaire, but
she was too stingy and gave her faithful maid only P50,000.00. From a
positive image, the deceased acquires a negative one.
In spoken language, the listener usually succeeds in getting the connections
between the speaker’s ideas because the latter gets an assist in clarifying his
meaning from his gestures, from the expression of his face, from the tone of
his voice, or from his pauses. These are not available in written language.
You need the help of connectives or transitory devices to link your ideas one
after the other and present a unified thought. You cannot assume that your
reader can read unspoken tie-ups between ideas.
The English language has many useful connectives:
CONNECTIVES FUNCTION EXAMPLES
And Connects two Defendant

ideas of the same refused to
kind. acknowledge
his debt and he
would not pay
it.
Besides, what is Adds another a) Plaintiff
more, thought to the called
furthermore, in first. (They could defendant by
addition, and be used phone.
again interchangeably.) Besides, he
wrote him a
letter.
b) He is stupid.
What is more,
he is ugly. (A
negative
thought is
added to
another
negative
thought.)
First, next, then, Arranges ideas in a) First, he

and finally; order. introduced
meanwhile himself to her;
(describing next, he dated
simultaneous her; then, he
occurrences); proposed to
later; since then her; and
finally, he
married her.
b) Carlos
robbed the
store.
Meanwhile,
Jose stood
outside as
lookout.
c) He sued her.
Later, he
agreed to settle
with her.
d) He won a
million pesos.
Since then he
has not
stopped
spending the
money.
Nearby, above, Arranges ideas in The victim was

below, beyond, space. sleeping in his
to the right, to room. Nearby,
the left the accused
was stealing
his things.
But, still, Connects two a) Juliet said

however, on the contrasting ideas. that she cried
other hand, yet, They could, as a for help. But
nevertheless, and rule, be used Mario testified
rather interchangeably that he did not
but each seems to hear her cries.
fit best in certain b) The
combinations of plaintiff claims
contrasting ideas. that the debtor
had not paid
him. On the
other hand, the
debtor claims
that he had
paid the
plaintiff.
c) He was poor
yet generous.
d) He did not
love her.
Rather, he
lusted after
her.
In fact, as a Connects the first Alibi is a weak

matter of fact, idea with a second defense. In
indeed one that points it fact, it
up; the second crumbles in
idea affirms or the face of a
supports the positive
validity of the first identification.
idea.
For example, for Adds an The freedom

instance illustration to an of speech is
idea. not absolute.
For example,
you cannot
walk into a
crowded
theater and
shout “Fire!
Fire!”
In other words Adds an Mark longs to

explanation to an see her always,
idea or ideas listen to her
voice, and
touch her. In
other words, he
loves her.
Therefore, so, Connects an idea The accused
hence, with another that acted in self-
consequently, follows from it. defense.
and accordingly Therefore, he
is not guilty.
Of course, to be Grants an All men are

sure exception or created equal.
limitation to an Of course,
idea. some men are
more
intelligent
than others.
In short, to sum Summarize He lost his job,

up, and in brief several ideas. he sold all he
had to pay his
debts, and he
still owed
more. In short,
he was
bankrupt.
The beauty of using connectives to put together two or more ideas in legal
writing is that they also serve as tools for developing logical reasoning. You
are able to test the relation between ideas by trying one connective in place of
another.
Do not think, however, that connectives are the only devices you can use
for joining ideas. You can join two sentences together simply by putting into
the second sentence a word that points to a word you used in the first. These
are called word bridges. For example:
If the purpose of reorganization is to be achieved, changes

in the rankings of the employees should be expected. For one
to insist on having his old rank would render the exercise
useless.
In a case, the law in question was the provision of the Civil Code that
provides that attorney’s fees “cannot be recovered” except under certain
circumstances. Thus:
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and

expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be
recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the
plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to
protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the
plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding
against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad
faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid, just and
demandable claim;
(6) In action for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household
helpers, laborers, and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen’s
compensation and employer’s liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising
from crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and
equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should
be recovered.
Counsel for the plaintiff offered the following argument that challenged the
award of attorney’s fees against his client. Counsel did not use the
appropriate connectives.
Non-recovery is the general rule. Ramos has the burden of

proving that his claim for attorney’s fees against Acme
Company falls within the exceptions. The trial court had to
make a finding that the exception he claims in fact exists.
Here, the trial court has made no finding that Ramos’ case
falls within the exceptions. The trial court awarded him
exemplary damages. It might also award him attorney’s fees.
The trial court did not find any factual basis for awarding
exemplary damages. Its award of attorney’s fees is just as
baseless.
As the decision of the trial court shows, Acme Company
acted in good faith in filing the suit against Ramos for the
purpose of quieting its title to the subject land. Acme
Company obtained judgment against the former owner of the
land. It levied on the property in due course. It bought the
same at public auction. Ramos questioned the execution
proceedings. The Court of Appeals upheld them. It affirmed
Acme Company’s right to place the title to the land in its
name.
Could you see the connections between the sentences or the ideas?
Compare the same argument, this time with the proper connectives. See if the
argument has become clearer.
Since non-recovery is the general rule, then Ramos has the

burden of proving that his claim for attorney’s fees against
Acme Company falls within the exceptions. Further, the trial
court has to make a finding that the exception he claims in
fact exists.
Here, the trial court has made no finding that Ramos’ case
falls within the exceptions. True, the trial court awarded him
exemplary damages and, therefore, it might also award him
attorney’s fees. But, since the trial court did not find any
factual basis for awarding exemplary damages, then its award
of attorney’s fees is just as baseless.
Moreover, as the decision of the trial court shows, Acme
Company acted in good faith in filing the suit against Ramos
for the purpose of quieting its title to the subject land. First,
Acme Company obtained judgment against the former owner
of the land; second, it levied on the property in due course;
and third, it bought the same at public auction. Ramos
questioned the execution proceedings but the Court of
Appeals upheld them and affirmed Acme Company’s right to
place the title to the land in its name.
Abstract versus Concrete Writing

Excessive use of big, general words like equality, justice, grave abuse of
discretion, executory, commenced, or jurisdiction can result in
abstractionism. Using these words often tempts you into believing that you
have said something profound when you may have actually said almost
nothing––at least nothing that a reader can really understand and use in his
life.
An abstraction is any word that applies to a large class of things rather
than to any single, concrete object or idea. Every word is in some measure
an abstraction, but some abstractions are more general than others. Too many
abstract words make for vagueness, even meaninglessness. Good writing is
specific; it makes things real.
The opposite of abstract is concrete. Concrete words are words that
stand for real things, things that appeal in one way or another to the
senses. “Structure,” for example, is more general than “house,” “house” is
more general than “shed,” and “shed” is more general than “a dilapidated
little shack with makeshift walls and a cardboard roof.”
Stick to concrete words as much as possible. The secret is that, if you are
writing an essay on an abstract subject, pin it down quickly with specific
examples that illustrate exactly what you mean. To illustrate:
Although no formal agreement is necessary to establish

conspiracy and said conspiracy may be inferred from the
circumstances attending the commission of the crime, yet
conspiracy like any other ingredient of the offense must be
established by clear and convincing evidence. There must be
evidence of intentional participation in the transaction with a
view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
(People v. Agda, 111 SCRA 330.)
The reader would probably be able to understand better the abstract

principle stated above if it could be translated into an actual example. Thus––
True, in conspiracy the prosecutor does not have to present

proof that the conspirators held a conference, sat around the
table, agreed on their evil plot to commit the crime, and
sealed their agreement with a written contract. Still, the
prosecutor must show concert of action among them.
Evidence that a group of armed men barged into a bank at
the waive of their leader’s hand, with some staying outside as
lookouts, with others emptying the tellers cash boxes, and
with all departing in deliberate haste at a command, clearly
shows their concerted action and unity of purpose, the
ingredients of conspiracy.
Consider the following legal opinion. In the 70s, the government did not
only take taxes from imported cargoes, it also undertook the handling and
delivery of these cargoes from the hold of the ship to the importer’s truck.
The government collected substantial fees for this extra service. But it refused
to answer for losses that importers incurred due to thieveries and neglect of
government workers. In rejecting the claims of importers for damages, one
opinion said:
That there are practical, as distinguished from merely
logical, reasons in support of such a view should be apparent
from the recognition of the likelihood that the government
would ever so often be hailed into court considering that
engaged as it has lately been in varied activities appropriate
to a welfare state the probability of private parties being
adversely affected by action taken by it is not remote. A loss
of property right could always be plausibly alleged. A claim
for money could easily by conjured. Thus, the demands on the
government’s time and energy could reach limits well-nigh
intolerable. After all it is an admitted fact that our people
display no hesitancy in going to court whenever they feel
aggrieved, even if the injury is more fancied than real. Thus,
the functional or sociological approach to law would seem to
call for a similar conclusion.
Actually, the gist of the argument is that if the government must answer all
lawsuits that could possibly be brought against it and pay damages, the
government would have no time and resources left to attend to its important
functions. But, since the argument was written in the abstract, the ordinary
men who are affected by the resolution of the issue involved would have no
hope of truly understanding the reasons given to support the argument.
Rewritten for the ordinary reader, it might read:
Practical reasons support the rule that the state or the

government cannot be sued without its consent. For, if the
government can be sued and required to pay damages for all
the wrongs it has done, the queue to the court would indeed
be long. The government would be facing suits for profits that
businessmen lost because of mismanaged traffic, for deaths or
sicknesses caused by uncollected garbage, for cars wrecked by
roads left in disrepair, or for compensation to those who
failed to land jobs due to worthless training in public schools.
The lawsuits would be infinite. For everyone has a reason to
complain against the government.
If the state must face all sorts of suits and pay damages,
most government officials would be tied up in court
appearances and unable to do their work. What is more,
awards of damages would soon empty the public treasury.
When these happen, the traffic would get worse, the
uncollected garbage would mount, the roads would be
impassable, and public schools would close down. The people
who sued the state would have killed it.
Substitute Names
Identifying the parties based on their positions in the case, such as “the
complainant” and “the accused,” “the plaintiff” and “the defendant,” “the
petitioner” and “the respondent,” “the appellant” and “the appellee,” or “the
protestant” and “the protestee” often results in confusion and the need to
return to the statement of the case to be reminded on who is who.
Unfortunately, most readers get lost in or are confused by the use of these
descriptions in lengthy articles.
The parties have names like Theresa Luna, Lino Gonzalez, San Miguel
Corporation (SMC), or Philippine Airlines (PAL). It would be better to use
these names throughout your discussions especially when the case reaches a
higher court and the parties begin to assume cumbersome and confusing
descriptions like “the plaintiff-appellant,” “the defendant-appellee,” “the
defendant-petitioner,” or “the plaintiff-respondent.” Some lawyers still draft
contracts that refer to people as “the party of the first part” and “the party of
the second part.” Modern legal writers have long abandoned these substitute
names.
Headings
If a legal paper is short, may be two or three pages, headings that divide
the discussions into subject matters might not be necessary. But, when the
paper is long and abound in a variety of topics, it would help to use headings.
Headings help readers detect the turns that discussions make as they shift
from one topic to another.
Headings are of two kinds: (1) general; and (2) specific.
1. General headings provide some kind of signposts that point out to the
reader the grounds he is about to cover in his reading. Examples of these are
the “Statement of the Case,” “Statement of the Facts,” “Subject Matter of the
Case,” “Issues Presented,” “Assignment of Errors,” “Conclusion,” and
“Relief.”
General headings are essential to trial memoranda, briefs on appeal, and
petitions for review. In fact, procedural rules require the use of some of these
headings. And even when not so required, they are as essential to legal
writings as floor numbers are on elevators. General headings help you get
quickly to the portion of a substantial legal work that you want to read or go
back to.
2. Specific headings, on the other hand, are like newspaper headlines. They
attempt to capture in a few words the essence of a particular argument or
discussion. This kind of heading is especially helpful in marking out the
beginning of every new topic in a row of topics. For example, a discussion
that argues the point that the prosecution has failed to prove damage in an
estafa case, the writer could place the following heading at the middle of the
page, properly underlined or put in bold type:
1. The Element of Damage

Most lawyers, however, prefer to use specific headings that also sum up
the point made in each argument. Thus:
I.
THE BANK SUFFERS NO DAMAGE FROM ITS TRANSACTION
WITH THE ACCUSED
Note that, as a rule, subheadings are in the present tense and are not
punctuated with a period.
Writing Exercises
Make the following abstract legal points concrete, with the end in view of
convincing your reader regarding their correctness:
1. Police power rests upon public necessity and upon the right
of the state and of the public to self-protection. For this reason, its
scope expands and contracts with changing needs.
2. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated
with psychological incapacity.
3. Unlawful aggression does not exist where the peril to one’s
life, limb, or right is neither actual nor imminent.
12.
Writing Legalese
Another reason why ordinary people find it hard to understand legal

writing is the tendency of many lawyers to use peculiarly legalese language.
But some will say that lawyers have a language all their own and a peculiar
way of putting their thoughts into writing. They argue that injecting legal
jargons is the traditional way of writing and any other method would violate
tradition and diminish the awe and mystery to which lawyers are entitled.
Your belief is of course entitled to respect. But the changing world and the
demand to be understood have begun to challenge the validity of this belief.
Legal clichés belong to a bygone era. Modern legal writing demands
simplicity, clarity, and accuracy.
As someone said, the law is a “device for social control.” The government
enacts laws to govern human conduct. Laws forbid people from doing evil
things or from hurting others. They also require people to do things that are
needed for the good of all in the community. Since effective obedience to
laws requires an understanding of them, laws should be written in plain and
ordinary English or Filipino that the average layman could understand.
Legal Clichés
Admittedly, some lawyers are notorious for copying words or phrases,
usually found in old case reports or law books, which they deem profound or
which give a sense of importance to what they write. They probably believe
that their individual style of writing would somehow gain added substance
and strength using those borrowed words and phrases. But, in truth, these
legal clichés have become hackneyed and weak through much repetition.
Worse, to non-lawyers, they sound so unnatural and pretentious, if not
arrogant. Ask yourself the question. Would you use this kind of language
when writing to your mother or to your friends? If you would not, why use
them in your pleadings? The judges and your clients to whom you usually
address yourself are your elders or friends.
Take these examples:
Petitioner respectfully submits that Respondent

respondent court gravely abused its court
discretion. (Since petitioner filed the gravely
pleading, it would be superfluous for him to abused its
identify himself as the party making the discretion.
submission; “respectfully” is a good word but (6 as against
when it is thrown in as a matter of form, the 10 words)
sincerity is gone.)
Even a cursory perusal of Section 21 will Section 21

readily reveal (this might sound like, “If you did not
have the brains, the meaning of the law authorize
should be clear to you after a casual reading”) respondent
that nothing therein was mentioned or court to
impliedly stated about the authority of issue a writ
respondent court to issue a writ of execution of execution
in cases covered by the said rule. in cases
covered by
it. (18
against 37)
Lest it be forgotten, (this might sound like, The law is

“You are forgetful, so hear this”) the law is supreme. (4
supreme. against 8)
We humbly submit (this might seem to others The answer

like a declaration of your innate humility) is no!! (4
that the answer to the foregoing query is a against 13)
resounding no (if you want your no answer
to resound, use exclamation points.)
Suffice it to state (this might sound like, Plaintiff was

“With your level of intelligence, it would be in estoppels.
definitely useless to say more”) that plaintiff (4 against 9)
was in estoppels.
The argument is untenable (but probably The

better than declaring the argument untenable argument
is proving it). It fails to take into account the fails to
fact that the accused did not see the consider
oncoming truck. that the
accused did
not see the
oncoming
truck. (14
against 21)
Petitioner’s argument is bereft of merit (if it Petitioner’s

really lacks merit, it would probably be better argument
to prove it rather than declare it). It ignores ignores the
the law. law. (5
against 10)
Preambles like the above legal clichés get in the way and do not add to the
meaning of the main message of the sentence. Still, if your purpose is to write
something about what you did in the case or pass judgment upon the other
person’s point of view rather than just show how his view lacks merit, it is
your choice.
There was no denial of the acts of Although he admitted

intercourse having taken place, the sexual
but the accused would insist that intercourse, Ignacio
complainant did so willingly the would insist that
explanation, according to him, Ruby freely agreed to
being that she was his sweetheart. it, she being his
sweetheart. (19
against 33)
Old English
Many prefer, despite the language revolution that drives a changing world,
to stick to old English usages. That is to be respected. But if you are the kind
that would want to address young readers as well, you might consider the
following suggestions:
In the case at bar, the court Here, the court declined to

declined to apply the rule. apply the rule.
The facts in the instant case The facts are not disputed.
(this phrase is superfluous if
you are discussing no other
case) are not disputed.
The parties in the case at The parties have agreed to

bench (same effect as arbitration.
“instant” case) have agreed
to arbitration.
The requirements are, to The requirements are as

wit: follows:
He left for Manila. He left for Manila. Arriving

Arriving thereat, he phoned there, he phoned his dad.
his dad.
He wrote her a letter, a He wrote her a letter, copy
copy of which is attached enclosed as Annex A.
hereto as Annex A.
Upon receipt of the Upon receipt of the

aforesaid decision, decision, petitioner filed his
petitioner filed his notice of notice of appeal.
appeal.
When the witness saw the When the witness saw the
ceiling on fire, he was ceiling on fire, he was
alarmed thereby. But the alarmed by it (or “it
door lock had jammed so alarmed him”). But the
by reason thereof, he left door lock had jammed so
through the window. he left through the window.
He approached the room He approached the room

and looked therein. and looked in it.
As the crowd marched, he As the crowd marched, he

went therewith. went with it.
He brought a chair and sat He brought a chair and sat

thereon. on it.
The accused stopped the The accused stopped the

tricycle and alighted tricycle and alighted from
therefrom. He forthwith it. He then dragged her to
dragged her to the tricycle. the tricycle.
The case against petitioner The case against petitioner
herein was set for hearing. was set for hearing.
The said motion was The prosecution opposed

opposed by the prosecution. the motion. (Quite often, you
can do without the word
“said” especially when the
article speaks of only one
motion.)
The trial was postponed to The trial was postponed to

enable the accused therein enable the accused to
to prepare his defense. prepare his defense.
Comes now petitioner, Petitioner, by counsel,

through the undersigned states:
counsel, unto this
Honorable Court, most
respectfully states:
Sounding Formal
Legal writing should not be made up exclusively of big, formal words
dressed in tuxedos. The standard for all effective writing is being understood.
Some lawyers, in the mistaken belief that they will sound more dignified,
insist on using polysyllabic words like “accompanied” instead of “went
with,” “informed” instead of “told.” Quite often, however, they merely
succeed in sounding like stuffed shirts.
The accused was in possession Blando had a gun.

of a gun.
Appellant posits that he has the Appellant assumes that
right. he has the right.
Mario Reyes commenced a Mario Reyes filed an

complaint for ejectment against eviction suit against
Josephine Cruz. Josephine Cruz. (9
against 10)
The finding of the court is The court’s finding

based on the factual milieu rests on appellant’s
presented by appellant. version of the facts.
Petitioner’s contentions are Petitioner’s claims are

nebulous if not speculative. vague if not speculative.
Laura stated that the accused Laura said that the

detained her. Al contrario, the accused detained her.
accused declared that she came On the other hand, the
voluntarily. accused claimed that
she came voluntarily.
Albeit incidental, his traversal Though incidental, his

of plaintiff’s statement is rejection of plaintiff’s
portentous. claim is ominous.
The duty of the court is to The court’s duty is to

adjudicate the contentious decide the conflicting
positions of the parties. claims of the parties.
Any pronouncement of the Anything the court says

court will only be advisory. will only be advisory.
It would then result that on the Based on the above
basis of the foregoing discussion, an
disquisition, an amendment of amendment of the
the criminal information criminal information
cannot be allowed. cannot be allowed.
He denied detaining Laura, He denied detaining

contrary to her asseverations in Laura, contrary to her
her testimony. positive testimony.
This is indubitable proof of This is unquestionable

Soberano’s criminal intent. proof of Soberano’s
criminal intent.
He prevented her from He prevented her from

communicating with anyone. talking with anyone.
Objectively and subjectively However viewed, the

considered, the circumstances circumstances point to
point towards appellant’s appellant’s innocence
innocence and are incompatible and do not support the
with attributions of guilt. charges.
In the light of the foregoing Because of the

circumstances, it was circumstances, the court
improvident for the court a quo below recklessly
to conclude that appellant concluded that
detained the complainant. appellant detained the
complainant.
The serious illegal detention Charging Joel with

theory appears to be an serious illegal detention
impulsion upon complainant seems to be a thought
and her relatives who, frantic born of the worries that
about the ardor of appellant in Melba and her relatives
his romance with complainant had over his intense love
wanted to keep appellant away for her. They wanted to
from her because she separate them since she
apparently no longer did not seem to have
reciprocated his love with the deep feelings for him
same degree of passion. anymore.
The police accompanied the The police went with the

accused to the courtroom. accused to the
courtroom.
The court informed the accused The court told the

of his rights. accused of his rights.
He appeared to be guilty. He seemed guilty.
He consumed his lunch. He ate his lunch.
He desired a lawyer of his own. He wanted a lawyer of

his own.
The sheriff implemented the The sheriff carried out

court order. the court order.
The individual has been He has been arrested.

arrested.
He likes the manner in which it He likes the way in
was done. which it was done.
As a rule, when you can choose between an easy, familiar expression and
one that seems more “dignified,” the easier word is the better choice if it
means exactly the same thing. You may of course use the more formal word
without any adverse effect. But you need to guard against the temptation of
trying to sound dignified. Your writing will have natural dignity if it is
serious and thoughtful. It is when you try to doctor it up with high-flown,
stately-sounding, polysyllabic substitutes for direct and simple words that
you begin to sound pompous.
Cheap Words
But this does not mean that you should always use short or familiar words.
Some words are so familiar that they have become the equivalent of a large
number of other words. They have ceased to have any specific meaning.
Examples of these are descriptive words like good, nice, pretty, ugly, bad,
awful, big, little, fast, slow, funny, crazy, great, and fine. They are used
everyday to describe anything that sounds positive or negative. This steak is
good (tasty, tender, fresh, etc.). The movie is good (entertaining, amusing,
well priced, ably directed, etc.) Check the thesaurus until you find a more
precise meaning for your particular purpose.
For example, the word “crazy” has different shades: insane, mad, lunatic,
unbalanced, psychopathic, cracked, non compos mentis, touched, bereft of
reason, moonstruck, scatterbrained, maniacal, delirious, irrational,
lightheaded, incoherent, rambling, doting, wandering, amuck, frantic, raving,
pixilated, eccentric, demented, deranged, schizophrenic. Do not dwell in the
slum of cheap language when the thesaurus offers you riches that you can
use.
Self-praise
Many judges and lawyers tend to add remarks in their decisions or
pleadings about how diligently they have worked on their cases. These
remarks are common and often well intended but, to non-lawyers, they sound
like self-praise. In these modern days, judges and lawyers might want to
consider editing out such remarks since they divert attention from the main
message of the sentence. For example:
A meticulous scrutiny of the evidence of The record

record [it is like saying, “take note that I am shows that
meticulous in my work”] shows that defendant
defendant offered convincing proof of his offered
claim. convincing
proof of his
claim. (11 as
against 17
words)
In our considered opinion [“you must know The

that we carefully weighed everything before defendant
forming this opinion”], the defendant acted acted in bad
in bad faith. faith. (6
against 10)
After we have thoroughly and The record

conscientiously gone over the record of the satisfactorily
case (“yes, we want you to know that we shows that
worked very, very hard on this one”), we are the evidence
sufficiently satisfied (but if one is satisfied, substantiates
it cannot be less than sufficiently) that the the
observations and conclusions contained in observations
the foregoing memoranda are fully and
substantiated and supported (the point is conclusions
somewhat overstated) by the evidence on in the
record. memoranda.
(17 against
37)
A careful scrutiny (“yes, we carefully The

scrutinize everything in the case”) of the testimonies
testimonies coming from the complainant of Ruby and
and the accused fails to yield to the Ignacio do
conclusion that a finding of his guilt is not show the
warranted. latter’s guilt.
(12 against
27)
The Court had thoroughly delved into the No amount

records of the instant case and of
painstakingly assayed the evidence adduced examination
by the parties. We find the evidence of the of the
prosecution grossly insufficient to sustain a prosecution’s
conviction. evidence
could justify
a finding of
guilt of the
accused. (17
against 34)
Sentence-length Variety
Try to listen to people speak and you will observe that their sentences vary
in length. Even before you learned how to write, you knew language as you
hear it spoken by others. And, though you could read and write sentences
later in years, your everyday conversations have remained largely verbal. In
other words, your inner ear is tuned to verbal sentences of various lengths.
Take for example these words from a father whose son wanted to go out
with his friend on a Friday evening:
I’ll let you go out but be here by twelve o’clock midnight at

the latest. And when I say twelve o’clock midnight, I don’t
mean that you can come home at twelve-thirty in the morning
or twelve-fifteen or twelve-five. I mean twelve midnight.
Believe me because I warn you that you will not be able to go
out with your friends again if you come home any later than
twelve. Mark my word.
Do you see how the lengths of the sentences vary from medium to long, to
short, to long, and to short?
I’ll let you go out but be here by twelve o’clock midnight at

the latest. (16 words)
And when I say twelve o’clock midnight, I don’t mean that
you can come home at twelve-thirty in the morning or twelve-
fifteen or twelve-five. (25)
I mean twelve midnight. (4)
Believe me because I warn you that you will not be able to
go out with your friends again if you come home any later
than twelve. (27)
Mark my word. (3)
Writing is, in the final analysis, a form of talk––preserved talk.

Consequently, when you write sentences at more or less uniform lengths, you
strain the inner ear. You write unnaturally. When you find pleadings of
lawyers or decisions of courts boring or strenuous reading, it is your inner ear
refusing to take what you read.
For example, the oppositor of a petition for the appointment of a guardian
for three minors offered the following arguments to defeat the petition:
Romina is not qualified to be appointed guardian of the

orphaned minors and administrator of their cash savings and
properties. She treated the large amounts of cash that she
received on behalf of the minors like they were her own.
Although she is an accounting major graduate, she did not
segregate the cash she got by depositing these in a bank in
trust for them, something that parents do for their children’s
savings. Had she done this, she would have an unquestionable
record of the money she received on their behalf and the
money she withdrew for expenses. Ironically, she claims that
she has much experience in handling money for other people
since she once worked for a bank.
What is more, Romina was aware that the resources of the
deceased parents of the kids show no potential for growth and
that the cash they have in the bank could just run out. Yet,
she has not presented any plan to the Court for seeing the
kids through college with what resources they have left.
Instead, she squandered their money on unbelievable
expenses, given that in just seven months, she spent P1.2
million in household expenses for them. This means that for
two kids in elementary and one in high school, she spent an
average of P158,000.00 monthly for them.
The above is of course faultless in grammar and clarity. Anyone who

prefers to write in this way would not make any mistake. It is a correct way
of writing. But to ordinary readers, the sentences are invariably long and,
therefore, seem unnatural for easy storytelling. If you want your writing to be
easier on the inner ear and interesting, the important principle to remember is
to capture in writing the basic rhythm of speech. Vary your sentence length.
Sense the change in this suggested re-writing to vary the sentence length:
Romina is not qualified to be appointed administrator of

the cash and other properties of the orphaned minors since
she treated these as if they were her own. For one thing, she is
an accounting major. Yet, she did not segregate the amounts
she received by depositing these in a bank in trust for the
minors, something that parents do all the time for their
children’s savings. Clearly, she is irresponsible. Had she
opened those accounts for them, she would have an
unquestionable record of the money she received on their
behalf and the money she withdrew for expenses. Ironically,
she used to work for a bank. The experience apparently did
not profit her, given the manner she treated the money
belonging to the minors.
What is more, Romina knew that the resources of the
deceased parents of the kids show no potential for future
growth. The cash in the bank is exhaustible. Yet, she has not
presented any plan to the Court for seeing the kids through
college with what resources they have left. In truth, she
squandered their money. They were just two kids in
elementary school and one in high school but in just seven
months, she spent P1.2 million for them in household
expenses, an average of P158,000.00 monthly. Would you
believe it?
Writing Exercises
The following has been lifted from a Supreme Court decision but the
names of the persons and places involved have been changed to protect the
real parties. Some portions have been deleted to shorten it for this editing
exercise. The decision, as written, is logical and grammatically correct. It
follows a certain style, however, that would be difficult, except for the most
discerning, to understand on first reading. The author favors long, complex
periodic sentences where the main noun meets its verb after a number of
intervening digressions. And he does not treat the events in the ordinary
sequence. The challenge is to rewrite it, using the editing techniques you
have learned above, and make it clear and appealing to the ordinary reader.
Fate apparently dealt a low blow to the Romero family

when on the evening of November 30, 1970, the daughter,
Rita, not even fifteen then, alone in the rented room in a
house at Aliw Beach, Zamboanga City, where she was living
with her mother, who was then away for the night, was,
according to her complaint for rape, compelled to submit
twice because of force to the sexual advances of the accused
Hector Galos, also a boarder in the same house. There was no
denial of the acts of intercourse having taken place, but the
accused would insist that complainant did so willingly, the
explanation, according to him, being that she was his
sweetheart. He would stress likewise his continued presence in
the room until the dawn of the next day and the absence of
any outcry on her part, which could have been heard by those
staying in the adjoining rooms. His testimony as to the
absence of force being employed was corroborated by another
boarder, who occupied the adjacent room, and the owner of
the house itself. The lower court preferred to believe the girl’s
version and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. The severity
of the penalty inflicted under the circumstances where, as is
not unusual in rape cases, there is a conflict of testimony as to
what actually did transpire, led us to peruse with greater care
the records of the proceeding. x x x As will be more fully
explained, a careful scrutiny of testimony coming from the
complainant and the accused fails to yield the conclusion that
a finding of guilt is warranted. We have to reverse.
The disparity in the versions offered by the contending
parties cannot obscure certain indubitable facts. The accused
did not by the use of force or deceit gain entrance into the
rented room where the sordid incident took place. There was
no denial of the version by him and his two witnesses that
earlier in the evening the complainant was with a group,
included in which was the accused, engaged in drinking and
light banter. It could very well be that the euphoric feeling
induced by this young girl’s imbibing the tuba wine led to the
relaxation of what could be inhibiting factors. Once inside the
room, and with the accused apparently being a suitor whose
advances had not been spurned, to put it at its mildest, it was
not expected that sexual intimacies would take place. It could
very well be that the young lady did not initially agree to
indulge in an act of intercourse. Under the circumstances,
however, with coaxing and cajoling on the part of the accused,
there was nothing unlikely in the stage of sexual congress
being reached. What is more, it happened twice. There could
have been a third time, except that it was foiled because the
chair on which it was attempted gave way due to the
combined weight of the participants. The man had no weapon
with which to intimidate the complainant. There were no
intimations that there was opposition on her part. She did not
yell or scream. The two witnesses on either side of the room,
separated only by a thin plywood partition, certainly would
have been aware of any breathing. That certainly was not
indicative of rape. Moreover, to repeat, the accused stayed
until dawn. Even early the next morning, they were seen
together. x x x Hence acquittal ought to have been the proper
verdict.
1. The accused has in his favor the presumption of
innocence. That is a mandate of the fundamental law. It may
be noted that even when the previous Organic Act did not so
provide, a defendant according to the early case of U.S. v.
Asiao, decided in 1902, with Justice Torres as ponente, “must
be presumed to be innocent until [his] guilt is proven by
satisfactory testimony. … The burden of proof is thus on the
prosecution to demonstrate guilt. Every vestige of doubt
having a rational basis must be removed. More specifically,
where the offense charged is rape through force, there must
be a showing of compulsion being resorted to and coercion
being employed. The element of voluntariness must be
lacking. x x x
2. The opinion of the Court is not to be misinterpreted. It
goes no further than to acknowledge that the proof submitted
on behalf of complainant did not measure up to the exacting
standard required in cases of this nature.
In the light of the applicable constitutional provision and
the authoritative precedents requiring full respect for the
constitutional rights of an accused, a reversal is called for. x x
x
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is set aside
and the accused is acquitted of rape.
13.
Writing Legal Opinions
Every so often, a client would seek your legal opinion on some matter of
concern to him. Before rushing into an opinion, however, you would do well
to keep the following in mind:
One. Ascertain the purpose for which your client seeks your opinion. Does
he merely want to know his rights? Does he need to show your opinion to
others? Does he have to make an important decision that could have deep
repercussions for him and others? Is he facing a potential lawsuit? Your
client is not a lawyer and, unless you go deep into his reason for seeking your
opinion or try to understand his real problem, he could be posing the wrong
questions to you. And, consequently, you could be giving him the wrong
answers.
In a case, a client asked her lawyer his opinion regarding what constituted
psychological incapacity for marriage. After her lawyer told her, she
preoccupied herself with establishing evidence that her husband was
psychologically incapacitated for marriage to the point that she strained to fit
the facts of her case into what the law required. She gave this evidence to his
lawyer. But the Court was unconvinced and did not grant annulment. Yet, as
it turned out, the couple was in the first place married without a proper
marriage license. Not being at fault, she was entitled to annulment on this
ground but she had to go through so much expense and hardships in
establishing a weak case based on another ground because, before responding
to her query, her lawyer did not bother to find out what she needed his
opinion for.
Do not settle, therefore, for a hypothetical question. Try to get your client’s
trust. If you cannot, it might be preferable that you refrain from giving her an
opinion or that you make it doubly clear to her that the opinion you give
might be the wrong one for her. In this way, you avoid taking the blame for
any mishap.
Second. Do pre-work. Get all the facts you need for forming a competent
opinion. A wrong factual premise will naturally produce a wrong legal
diagnosis. Go over the materials you got from your client, ascertain the legal
dispute involved, and put down in writing the principal issue that it produces.
Next, make a summary of the relevant facts of the case and put them in
correct sequence. Identify the issues that have to be resolved and rough out
the arguments that support your thesis.
Third. After pre-work, do the write-up, following what you learned earlier
in this book. Introduce the issues by providing the background facts that are
needed to understand those issues. You prevent a misunderstanding with your
client when you summarize for him the facts on which you rely in rendering
your opinion.
Illustrative Case: Chan v. Century Bank

Below is a sample legal opinion. Like similar examples in this book, do not
consider it a prescribed form. Forms are hardly important. It is substance that
matters although, in legal writing, substance must meet certain minimum
requirements of content. These are: a) background facts that adequately
introduce the issues in the case, b) a statement of what those issues are, c) the
position you take on those issues, d) the arguments that may be made against
you, e) the arguments in your favor, and f) what you want your reader to do
under the circumstances. Format and style are up to you.
September 14, 2013

Mr. Rogelio G. Chan
Milan Furniture Co., Inc.
245 Juan Luna Street
Binondo, Manila
Dear Mr. Chan:
Here is the opinion that you requested.
The facts, as I gather from you and your documents, are as
follows:
On May 12, 2012 you applied with the Century Bank in
Binondo, Manila, on behalf of Milan Furniture Co., Inc., for a
letter of credit, Annex A, covering its importation of
hardwood from Vietnam. On arrival of the goods, the bank
agreed to advance the payment of their price to your supplier.
In turn, you executed a promissory note in the name of Milan
Furniture, Annex B, undertaking to pay back the bank’s
advance within three months of the date of the note. You also
signed a trust receipt, Annex C, covering receipt of the goods.
The trust receipt provided that, in case of the sale of the
imported hardwood, Milan Furniture would turn over the
proceeds of that sale to the bank to apply to your loan.
Because Milan Furniture had been unable to pay its
promissory note to the bank when it fell due, on October 17,
2012 the lawyers of the bank sent you a demand letter, Annex
D, requesting full payment of the debt or return of the goods.
I understand that, on receipt of the letter, you tried to
negotiate with the manager of the bank, offering to return the
imported hardwood that you were yet unable to sell or use.
But the bank manager rejected your offer, stating that the
bank did not accept goods in payment of debts owed it. Since
further negotiations also failed, the bank sent you a final
demand for payment on December 4 under a threat of filing a
criminal complaint for estafa involving the trust receipt that
you executed in its favor.
The question you pose is whether or not, under the above
facts, you may be held liable for estafa under PD 115, the
Trust Receipt Law, in relation to Section 1(b) of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code.
In my opinion, since the bank opted not to accept the goods
even when you offered to return them on behalf of Milan
Furniture, it should be deemed to have withdrawn its earlier
demand from you to pay or “return the goods covered by said
Trust Receipt.” Effectively, the bank chose to consider Milan
Furniture to have already bought those goods, altogether
removing the transaction from the coverage of Section 13 of
the Trust Receipt Law.
I base my opinion on the following:
The relevant provision of the Trust Receipt Law or PD 115
provides:
SEC. 13. Penalty Clause. — The failure of an
entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the
goods, documents or instruments covered by a trust
receipt to the extent of the amount owing to the
entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or to
return said goods, documents or instruments if they
were not sold or disposed of in accordance with the
terms of the trust receipt shall constitute the crime of
estafa, punishable under the provisions of Article
Three Hundred and Fifteen, Paragraph One (b), of
Act Numbered Three Thousand Eight Hundred and
Fifteen, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised
Penal Code. x x x
The related provisions of Section 1(b), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, under which the violation is made to fall,
states:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). –– Any person who
shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
herein below x x x:
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence,
namely:
xxx xxx xxx
b. By misappropriating or converting, to the

prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust or
on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery
of or to return the same, even though such obligation
be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by
denying having received such money, goods, or other
property.”
From the above, the following are the elements of estafa
involving a trust receipt:
1. The entrustee received the goods under a trust receipt
from the entruster under an obligation to turn over the
proceeds of the sale of the goods or to return said goods;
2. The entrustee misappropriated or converted the goods by
failing to turn over the proceeds of their sale or to return said
goods to the entruster;
3. The misappropriation or conversion is to the prejudice of
the entruster; and
4. The entruster made a demand on the entrustee.
One of the elements of estafa involving a trust receipt is
that the entrustee [in this case, you or Milan Furniture]
received the goods under a trust receipt from the entruster [in
this case, Century Bank] under an obligation to turn over the
proceeds of the sale of the goods or to return said goods. The
Trust Receipt Law, PD 115, provides in Section 11 that the
liability for estafa under paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 of the
Penal Code arises in case of “the failure of an entrustee to
turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods … or to return
said goods.”
The trust receipt in this case, Annex A, echoes the above
provisions of the Trust Receipt Law. Under it, Milan
Furniture or you as its signatory, undertook “to turn over to
the BANK the proceeds” of the sale of the goods1 or, “in case
of non-sale,” to “return the goods covered by this Trust
Receipt to the BANK upon its demand.”2
But the terms of the trust receipt does not end there. The
trust receipt, Annex A, gives Century Bank an option not “to
accept the return of the goods.” In effect, Century Bank could
chose to regard such goods already sold to Milan Furniture
even though the latter could and wanted to return them. The
seventh paragraph of the Trust Receipt, Annex A, thus reads:
We agree that the BANK is not obliged to accept
any return of the goods under this Trust Receipt by
us or to consider any return thereof if accepted or
demanded by the BANK, as satisfaction of our
indebtedness to the BANK.
Century Bank in fact availed itself of the above option. It
opted not to accept the goods even when you offered to return
them. Consequently, Century Bank should be deemed to have
withdrawn its earlier demand that you or Milan Furniture
pay or “return the goods covered by said Trust Receipt
immediately.” Effectively, Century Bank chose by its action to
consider the subject goods sold to Milan Furniture, altogether
removing the transaction from the coverage of Section 13 of
the Trust Receipt Law.
The essence of the crime of conversion or misappropriation
is that the offender to whom money or goods has been
entrusted has unfaithfully or with abuse of confidence failed
to return what was merely entrusted to him and appropriated
it for his own. Here, neither Milan Furniture nor you could be
considered as having unfaithfully or with abuse of confidence
misappropriated and converted the goods subject of the trust
receipt. Century Bank did not want those goods back. It had
regarded them sold outright to Milan Furniture. The latter’s
liability for the goods should, therefore, be considered purely
civil.
Moreover, Section 13 of the Trust Receipt Law provides
that the “failure of an entrustee to turn over the proceeds of
the sale of the goods … or to return said goods … if they were
not sold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the
trust receipt shall constitute the crime of estafa.” The essence
of the penal provision of the law, therefore, is that the
entruster [here, Century Bank] has entrusted the good to the
entrustee [Milan Furniture or you] for him to sell. Once sold,
the entrustee was to turn over the proceeds of the sale to the
entruster.
Section 13 does not embrace instances where the goods are
turned over by the entrustor to the entrustee for the latter’s
use in his own business. This is clear from the ruling of the
Supreme Court in Colinares v. Court of Appeals3 that reads:
Also noteworthy is the fact that Petitioners are not
importers acquiring the goods for re-sale, contrary to
the express provision embodied in the trust receipt.
They are contractors who obtained the fungible goods
for their construction project. At no time did title
over the construction materials pass to the bank, but
directly to the Petitioners from CM Builders Centre.
This impresses upon the trust receipt in question
vagueness and ambiguity, which should not be the
basis for criminal prosecution in the event of violation
of its provisions.4
In this case, on May 12, 2012 Century Bank agreed with
Milan Furniture to open a letter of credit (LC) on the latter’s
behalf to cover a shipment of hardwood from Vietnam for use
in its manufacture of furniture.
Notwithstanding that Milan Furniture imported the
hardwood in question so it could use them in manufacturing
furniture, Century Bank made you, a representative of your
company, sign a trust receipt that made it appear as if
Century Bank had turned over the hardwood to Milan
Furniture for it to sell to others and to turn over to the bank
the proceeds of the sale. The Supreme Court has long
condemned such practice. Thus, it said in the Colinares case:
The practice of banks of making borrowers sign
trust receipts to facilitate collection of loans and place
them under the threats of criminal prosecution should
they be unable to pay it may be unjust and
inequitable, if not reprehensible. Such agreements are
contracts of adhesion which borrowers have no option
but to sign lest their loan be disapproved. The resort
to this scheme leaves poor and hapless borrowers at
the mercy of banks, and is prone to misinterpretation,
as had happened in this case. Eventually, PBC showed
its true colors and admitted that it was only after
collection of the money, as manifested by its Affidavit
of Desistance.5
That the transaction was a loan is made clear from
paragraph 1 of the agreement for the opening of a letter of
credit between Century Bank and MHTI, Annex A. It
provides that, in consideration of the opening of the letter of
credit on behalf of Milan Furniture in the amount of
US$39,060, the latter undertook to pay the bank on demand
for all drafts drawn against such letter of credit, with interest
at 13% per annum. The title to the goods never really passed
to the bank. Century Bank did not import them from
Vietnam; it merely opened a letter of credit for the benefit of
Milan Furniture. The supplier shipped the hardwood to
Milan Furniture under the cover of that letter of credit. In
short, Century Bank merely provided the loan that financed
the shipment.
Since the transaction was a loan, Milan Furniture’s liability
to Century Bank should only be regarded as civil. The
criminal action against you must fail. It is but fair and the
investigating prosecutor or the court should see the point.
A word of reservation: I base my opinion on the language
of the laws involved as well as on settled judicial precedents.
But, in the event the bank files a criminal complaint against
you, there is the chance, however small, that the public
prosecutor may just decide to file it in court, subjecting you to
the hassle, expense, and risk that criminal trials entail. But I
am confident that, ultimately, you will be absolved.
Please let me know if I can be of further service to you in
this matter.
Very truly yours,
ANNA ELIZABETH A. DE DIOS
There is one last point. Legal opinions have their limitations. You have to
realize that not all legal disputes are best resolved through judicial remedies.
Litigations are best avoided, if the economics do not make sense, as when
your client’s debtor is practically bankrupt. In such a case, your client would
merely be throwing away good money, by incurring expenses for docket fees
and attorney’s fees with no hope of recovering anything. Further, a legal
confrontation could irreparably damage relationships that may be far more
valuable than the benefits derived from a judicial resolution of the dispute.
Law is based on wisdom but law is not wisdom.
1Third paragraph, Trust Receipt, Annex B.

2Id., fifth paragraph.
3339 SCRA 609 (2000).
4At p. 623.
5Supra, at pp. 623-624.
14.
Writing Trial Memoranda
In trials by jury in the United States and other countries that have adopted
that system of hearing and deciding cases, trial is usually followed by oral
arguments from both sides. Counsel stands before a jury of ordinary men and
women, orally sums up his case and tries to persuade them with evidence and
arguments to accept his client’s point of view. In the Philippines, only one
person—the judge who is trained and experienced in the law—sits to hear the
case in its entirety and passes judgment on the dispute. Because cases are
tried in installments over a period of time, usually a year or two, counsels
often need to argue their cases at the end of trial. They do this by written
memoranda.
As we said earlier, pre-work is indispensable to a substantial and
convincing trial memorandum. It will do well for you, therefore, to go over
the pleadings, the transcript of the testimonies of the witnesses, and the
documentary exhibits. Working on these materials, identify the legal dispute
involved and, based on it, draw up the principal issue in the case. From there,
proceed to make an outline of the relevant facts that the opposing parties
claim and pinpoint the issues that you need to address.
After pre-work, write up your client’s memorandum in the case. Make sure
that your memorandum embodies the following indispensable parts:
1. A summary of the nature of the action and the court proceedings so far
had in it;
2. A summary of the facts of the case—the transaction or event that
brought about the legal dispute and the lawsuit—as seen from the opposing
points of view of the parties;
3. A statement of the relevant issues that the parties present for resolution;
and
4. An orderly presentation of the arguments that support your client’s
position.
Illustrative Case: Maranan v. Gonzalo Realty

In a case, the president of a corporation, acting in his own name, leased
one of the properties of his company to a third person at a fixed rent for 25
years. After the president left, the tenant brought a lawsuit to enforce the
contract against his company. Following the trial, defendant company filed a
memorandum in the case, reproduced below. It shows a species of such
pleading. Certain details have been altered to preserve the privacy of the
parties involved.
Republic of the Philippines

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
National Capital Judicial Region
Mandaluyong City, Branch 156
RAMON C. MARANAN,
Plaintiff,
-versus- SCA No. CV 0341
GONZALO REALTY CORP.,
Defendant.
x--------------------------------------x
DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM
Defendant, by counsel, respectfully submits its
memorandum in the case:
The Case
Plaintiff Ramon C. Maranan filed this action for

declaratory relief and damages against defendant Gonzalo
Realty Corporation, claiming that the Court needed to
ascertain the rights of the parties under a contract of lease
between them before its terms were violated. In its answer,
Gonzalo Realty claimed that it did not authorize the contract
of lease and that the action was improper for declaratory
relief. The parties claimed moral damages and attorney’s fees
against each other.
The Facts
At the trial, Maranan gave his version of the events. He had

been renting the land in question from Gonzalo Realty from
April 2002 under a Contract of Lease, Exhibit A (Transcript
of Stenographic Notes, August 27, 2012, p. 5). Ted Gonzalo,
its president and director, represented Gonzalo Realty in that
contract (id., p. 6). The contract was for twenty-five years at
P3,000.00 rent per month, which he had always paid. At the
beginning Ted or Celia, his secretary, gave Maranan
unofficial receipts for the rents but from August 2010
Gonzalo Realty began to give him official receipts (id., p. 13).
From September 2011, however, Gonzalo Realty refused to
take his monthly rents, insisting that he should increase this to
P8,000.00 (id., p. 14).
Maranan went to Gonzalo Realty’s office and asked
Edmund Gonzalo, its new president, to honor the contract
signed by the former president, Ted Gonzalo. But Edmund
and her sister, Judith Gonzalo, told him that the contract was
void. Maranan had not since seen Ted Gonzalo. These events
prompted him to file the present action. A second witness,
Fred Simon testified that he had been paying Maranan’s rents
to Susan, the secretary of Gonzalo Realty at its office and
that, although Edmund knew of such payments, he did not
object to them (Exh. H).
Judith Gonzalo, a stockholder, a member of the board of
directors, and the corporate secretary of Gonzalo Realty
(TSN January 30, 2009, pp. 5-6), presented her company’s
version. She served as company president from August 2010
to December 2011, succeeding her brother Ted (id., p. 7) who
served from 2004 to July 2010. Later, her other brother
Edmund took over as president. Gonzalo Realty had been
leasing lots and a building in San Dionisio, Baclaran and
Tambo in Parañaque (id., p. 8), including the two small lots
subject of this case (id., p. 9).
Judith first learned of the lease of the two small lots to
Maranan in 2010 when, on becoming Gonzalo Realty’s
president, she asked their secretary to instruct all the tenants
to pay their rents directly to Gonzalo Realty and no longer to
Ted. Beginning in August 2006 Maranan paid his rents to
Gonzalo Realty, which issued him official receipts (id., p. 10;
Exh. B to B-19). The company did not issue the other receipts
that Maranan presented in court (Exh. D to D-34), some of
which included official receipts issued by his brother Ted’s
company, the TRG Enterprises (id., p. 11). TRG stood for Ted
R. Gonzalo.
Gonzalo Realty did not authorize Ted to enter into the lease
contract, Exh. A, with Maranan (id., p. 12). Judith first saw it
only in August or September 2011 while she was making her
rounds of their properties. When Judith asked Maranan if
they could already increase his rents, the latter produced a
lease contract with Ted Gonzalo for twenty-five years at
P2,000.00 rent per month with no escalation (id., p. 13). As
soon as she saw the contract, Judith wrote Maranan,
informing him of its invalidity and demanded an increase in
his rent to P8,000.00 per month, subject to a 10% yearly
increase (id., p. 14).
According to Gonzalo Realty’s by-laws, its president’s
powers were purely managerial or administrative (id., p. 14;
see Sections 4 and 5). This allowed him to lease corporate
properties for not more than one year; for leases over one
year, the contracts had to pass Judith and be approved by the
board of directors of the company (id., p. 15). In this case, the
board learned of Maranan’s contract with Ted only in August
2011. It neither authorized nor ratified that contract (id., p.
17). To defend itself against the suit, Gonzalo Realty had to
hire the services of counsel for P100,000.00 and P3,000.00 for
every hearing he attended (id., pp. 17-18).
The Issues
The Court defined the issues in this case in its pre-trial

order as follows:
1. Whether or not the Contract of Lease executed by and
between Ted Gonzalo and Ramon Maranan binds Gonzalo
Realty; and
2. Whether or not either party is entitled to damages and
attorney’s fees.
Arguments
I.
TED GONZALO DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO
BIND GONZALO REALTY TO THE LONG-TERM LEASE
AGREEMENT THAT HE SIGNED WITH MARANAN
Maranan claims that Gonzalo Realty is bound by the
contract that he entered into with Ted Gonzalo since, as
president of Gonzalo Realty, the latter had the necessary
authority to act for it. But the fact that Ted was Gonzalo
Realty’s president in 2002 did not mean that all his acts were
the acts of the corporation. Consider the following:
First. Ted did not enter into the subject contract of lease on
behalf of Gonzalo Realty, either as its president or as its
agent. The portion of the contract, Exhibit A, which identified
who the parties were to that agreement, shows that Maranan
contracted only with Ted in his personal capacity. Thus––
This Contract is made and entered into by and
between:
TED R. GONZALO, of legal age, Filipino, married,
with residence and postal address at 336 J.P. Rizal
St., Mandaluyong City, hereinafter referred to as the
LESSOR;
-and-
RAMON C. MARANAN, of legal age, Filipino with
residence and postal address at 478 Tangco St.,
Mandaluyong City, hereinafter referred to as the
LESSEE.
Since the above contract specified Ted Gonzalo as the
“lessor” of the property, Maranan cannot pretend that he
entered into that contract with Gonzalo Realty itself. The
latter’s name does not appear on the face of the contract at
all. As a businessman, Maranan is intelligent and his eyes
were open. He should be held bound by the representations in
that contract that he had dealt only with Ted in his personal
capacity.
Second. The contract falsely claimed that Ted owned the
subject lots. The “whereases” clause unmistakably states:
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the LESSOR [Ted Gonzalo] is the
registered owner of two parcel of land, covered and
embraced by Lot 25, containing an area of 102 square
meters and Lot 26 with an area of 15 square meters,
both situated at Banaba Subdivision, Poblacion,
Mandaluyong City;
WHEREAS, the LESSEE desires to lease the above
mentioned two Lots and the Lessor is willing to lease
the same unto said Lessee, under the following terms
and conditions, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Maranan testified that he knew that the two Lots belonged

to Gonzalo Realty even before he leased them (TSN, August
27, 2002, p. 29). He, therefore, acted with malice and bad faith
when he nonetheless agreed to lease them from Ted under an
understanding, which was a false one as Maranan very well
knew, that Ted owned the property. A party who had acted in
this way could not avail himself of any equitable relief from
the consequences of his improper conduct.
Third. It does not help Maranan’s case that he admitted in
the course of re-cross that before he leased the property from
Ted, he had seen the deed of exchange, Exhibit G, which
Gonzalo Realty entered into with Acme Realty Corp. for a
swap of the lots between them. Since that document was a
sample of how Gonzalo Realty, a corporation, contracted with
third persons, Maranan was familiar with the form used.
Indeed, he admitted that he read the front portion of the deed
of exchange and saw that, although the contracting party was
Gonzalo Realty, the document declared that Ted, its
president, represented it in the transaction.
Still, when it came to the two Lots that Maranan allegedly
leased from Gonzalo Realty, he went along with the idea that
Ted would act on his own, in a personal capacity, rather than
as Gonzalo Realty’s representative. Maranan could not,
therefore, claim ignorance of what it took to bind a
corporation to a contract. He knew that the lease contract did
not bind Gonzalo Realty.
Fourth. Even if Maranan and Ted had wanted the latter to
bind Gonzalo Realty into that contract, still Ted could not do
so. Section 23 of the Corporation Code vests in the board of
directors the corporate powers of a corporation, including the
power of control over all its properties.
Sec. 23. The board of directors or trustees. –– Unless
otherwise provided in this Code, the corporate powers
of all corporations formed under this Code shall be
exercised, all business conducted and all property of
such corporation controlled and held by the board of
directors or trustees to be elected from among the
holders of stocks, or where there is no stock, from
among the members of the corporation, who shall
hold office for one (1) year and until their successors
are elected and qualified.
As president, Ted only had powers of general
administration under the corporation’s by-laws (TSN,
January 30, 2011, p. 14). Article 1877 of the Civil Code
governs the scope of his authority. Thus:
Art. 1877. An agency couched in general terms
comprises only acts of administration, even if the
principal should state that he withholds no power or
that the agent may execute such acts as he may
consider appropriate, or even though the agency
should authorize a general and unlimited
management.
Consequently, with his limited powers, Ted could not
encumber the properties of the corporation for a twenty-five-
year lease with no adjustments in rent. Such is not an act of
general administration. Indeed, Article 1878(8) of the Civil
Code provides that a person acting for his principal, like Ted
acting for Gonzalo Realty, needs a special power of attorney
“to lease any real property to another for more than one
year.” Thus:
Art. 1878. Special powers of attorney are necessary
in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(8) To lease any real property to another person for

more than one year;
xxx xxx xxx
Here, neither the complaint nor the contract of lease states

that Ted had been empowered with a special power of
attorney approved by the Board of Directors of Gonzalo
Realty to lease its two Lots to Maranan for twenty-five years
with no change in rental.
Fifth. Assuming that Ted had the authority to enter into
long-term lease contracts on behalf of Gonzalo Realty even
without a special power of attorney from its board of
directors (a point that is not conceded), still he could not have
bound Gonzalo Realty to the particular contract subject of
this case. Article 1883 of the Civil Code provides that, if an
agent “acts in his own name, the principal has no right of
action against the persons with whom the agent has
contracted; neither have such persons against the principal.”
Here, clearly, Ted acted in his own name. Consequently,
Maranan had no right of action against Gonzalo Realty.
II.
GONZALO REALTY HAS NOT RATIFIED THE

CONTRACT OF LEASE BETWEEN TED GONZALO AND
MARANAN
Maranan next claims that Gonzalo Realty should be
considered as having ratified the contract in question
considering how it had received monthly rents from him as
evidenced by the receipts that it issued.
But Gonzalo Realty could not ratify a contract that it did
not know existed. Judith Gonzalo testified that they learned of
the contract of lease between Ted and Maranan only in
August 2010 and Gonzalo Realty lost no time to assail it.
Indeed, neither Maranan nor his warehouseman, Fred Simon,
testified to having previously discussed with Judith or
Edmund Gonzalo, whom they knew were directors and later
presidents of the company, the matter of the twenty-five-year
contract of lease.
Nor could Maranan capitalize on the fact that he had
faithfully paid monthly rentals of P2,000.00 for the property
from 2007 to August 2011.
Consider the following:
1. As Judith Gonzalo testified, when she took over from
Ted as president of Gonzalo Realty in August 2010, she
simply continued to have the rentals collected from the known
existing tenants on their properties. She had assumed, in the
absence of any written contract in the files of the corporation,
that these tenants were, consistent with Guillermo’s limited
authority, on a month-to-month lease only since they were
paying rents on a monthly basis.
Consequently, Maranan cannot infer from the fact of
Gonzalo Realty’s receipt of rentals from him beginning in
August 2010 that it had knowledge and approved of his 2007
contract of lease. Only when Maranan invoked his alleged
twenty-five-year contract with Ted and sent a copy of it to
Gonzalo Realty around August 2011 did the latter learn of its
existence. And Gonzalo Realty promptly informed Maranan
that the contract was void.
2. The receipts that Maranan got for the rents he paid are
consistent with Gonzalo Realty’s lack of knowledge of the
contract and his occupation of the property in 2007. The
paper trail of receipts he offered is interesting and proves this
point. Consider the following:
First. The lease evidently ran for over two years from April
2007 to July 2010 as a secret, illicit agreement solely between
Maranan and Ted. The receipts corresponding to this period
were mostly unofficial, written on scratch papers of various
sizes (Exh. D to D-34). In some cases, official receipts had
been issued but these were in the name of TRG Enterprises, a
business that belonged to Ted. TRG stood for Ted R. Gonzalo.
For five years, therefore, Maranan and Ted actually cheated
Gonzalo Realty of earnings from its property.
Second. Official receipts from Gonzalo Realty appeared
only from August 2010, consistent with Judith Gonzalo’s
testimony that only from that month did their company begin
to collect rents from Maranan (Exh. B to B-19). She testified
that they assumed that Maranan had been leasing the
property on a month-to-month basis and they collected rents
from him in good faith on the basis of that belief.
III.
GONZALO REALTY IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES

For having instituted this baseless and malicious suit,
Maranan should be held liable to Gonzalo Realty for moral
damages and attorney’s fees.
WHEREFORE, defendant Gonzalo Realty Corporation
respectfully prays the Court to render judgment:
1. Dismissing the petition for lack of merit; and
2. Ordering plaintiff Ramon C. Maranan to pay defendant
moral damages of P1 million and attorney’s fees of
P100,000.00 plus appearance fee for counsel at P3,000.00 per
hearing.
[Explanation: A copy of this memorandum has been served
on the adverse party by registered mail in view of the distance
and the absence of a messenger who could make a personal
service.]
Manila for Muntinlupa City, May 12, 2009.
ISABELA H. FONTILA Counsel for

Gonzalo Realty Corp.
2nd Flr. Olympia Bldg.
445 Buendia Avenue
Makati City
Atty. Roll No. 23456
IBP 544498 12-21-09
PTR 8723254 01-02-09
MCLE Compliance III-295
Email: ihfontilla@yahoo.com
Copy furnished:
Atty. Shaira A. Cruz
346 President Avenue
Parañaque City
Writing Exercises
You will find in Appendix A of this book the important portions of the
record of an actual carnapping case. The names of persons and places
involved have been changed to protect the privacy of those involved. And,
although the materials have been edited, the purpose is only to eliminate
collateral discussions and control length. What remains are faithful to their
substance.
Assume that the case has been submitted for decision and the court has
required you to file a memorandum in support of your client’s case, whether
you choose to be lawyer for the prosecution or for the accused. Use what you
have learned and go through the process suggested in this book.
1. Read the materials closely and determine the legal dispute by
ascertaining what right of a party the other has violated.
2. Make an outline of the relevant facts of the case, arranging them in the
order of time.
3. Afterwards, study the laws and rules involved in such a dispute.
4. List down all the issues involved and identify the controlling issue or
issues that, when resolved, will end the legal dispute.
5. Rough out your argument on a paper, using the balance sheet format. At
the bottom of the balance sheet, write your closing statement, usually an
appeal to the good sense of the reader.
6. Write up your memorandum, introducing the issue or issues, fleshing
out your arguments, and making a closing statement. Finally, edit your
work to rid it of needless words and improve its clarity.
You cannot learn legal writing by just knowing its theories and techniques.
You sharpen an ax only by passing it through a grinding stone. And this
practice case is such a grinding stone.
15.
Writing Petitions for Review
When you lose a case in the Court of Appeals, your last recourse is an
appeal by certiorari from that court’s decision to the Supreme Court. This
appeal is also available from the decision of the Sandiganbayan or the
Regional Trial Court on pure questions of law. Although appeal by certiorari
is essentially an appeal, it is initiated by filing a petition for review that has
the features of an original complaint or petition. Thus, apart from making a
concise statement of the matters involved as well as the arguments you rely
on in support of your petition, you need to incorporate in it the formal parts
of an initiatory pleading like the parties’ identities, verification, and a
certificate of non-forum shopping. Additionally, you have to show the
timeliness of your action.
The Supreme Court is not bound to entertain every petition for review of a
decision of the Regional Trial Court, the Sandiganbayan, or the Court of
Appeals. In fact, the Supreme Court gives due course to only a very small
number of the hundreds of petitions for review filed with it monthly. This is
dictated by necessity. The High Court has very limited capacity for fully
reviewing every decision rendered by those courts.
So how do you get the Supreme Court to give due course to your particular
petition for review? The main thing, of course, is that you must present a
meritorious case. But even if your case were really meritorious, it will not do
if the Supreme Court is unable to see and appreciate its merit. To succeed,
your petition must be:
1. Clear—You need to be understood. If you present a hazy picture of your
case, it would be doomed from the start. Take pains to rewrite your draft over
and over until it is so clear that your reader can understand what the case is
about in one reading. That is probably all the chance you would get in the
first place to earn a due course—one reading. Some of the techniques for
writing clearly have been discussed earlier. Use them.
2. Brief—You need to be understood fast. You can be sure that all petitions
for review are read, if not by a justice himself, at least by some competent
lawyer-assistant who do initial screening or summarizing of sort. If you make
a lengthy presentation because you use more words and sentences than you
need to, your reader will lose interest in your case, his mind will wander
away, and you will lose him. Result: No due course. You need, therefore, to
tighten your work and make it terse to fit into the time that your reader
mentally allots to you.
3. Interesting—You need, above all, to create in the Supreme Court’s mind
an interest in your case. And you can do this only if you can convince it that
the court below has committed a grievous wrong that compels the High Court
to intervene. Small wrongs have small chances. Quite often, a strong and
compelling yet respectful language would do it since you need to
communicate a sense of controlled anger over the injustice done your case. A
timid and equivocal voice is seldom heard.
It will also help if, in the Court’s mind, deciding your case will contribute
to the development of jurisprudence. Cases that present novel issues tend to
get into first base because the Supreme Court is also a teaching court.
Final point. A large number of petitions, some probably meritorious, get
thrown out every year on account of incompleteness. The rules require you to
include the following in your client’s petition:
a) The full names of the petitioner (appellant) and the respondent (the
adverse party);
b) An indication of the material dates showing when your client, the
petitioner, received notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject
of the petition, when he filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if he
did, and when he received notice of its denial;
c) A concise statement of the matters involved in the petition [the facts of
the case, the issues petitioner presents in relation to the appealed decision,
and the position he takes on those issues];
d) The reasons or arguments he relies on for the allowance of the petition;
e) His verification of the facts stated in the petition; and
f) A sworn certification that petitioner has not indulged in the evil of forum
shopping signed by the petitioner himself.
In addition to the above, your client is required to:
a) Pay the docket and other fees;
b) Attach to his petition a clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified
true copy of the judgment, final order, or resolution subject of review and its
requisite number of plain copies;
c) Attach, too, such material portions of the record below as would support
the petition;
d) File the required number of plain copies of the petition;
e) Submit an affidavit of service of copies of the petition on the adverse
party and the court below by personal service or by registered mail with
registry receipts attached and with an explanation why personal service was
not done;
f) See to it that the affidavit of service, the verification, and the
certification of non-forum shopping indicate competent evidence of the
identities of the persons who swore to such documents; and
g) If petitioner is represented by counsel, indicate in the petition counsel’s
IBP official receipt, PTR, Roll of Attorney, and MCLE Compliance or
exemption numbers as well as counsel’s email address and phone numbers.
The rules provide that the failure of the petitioner to comply with any of
the above requirements “shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.”
Both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have rigidly, some says
arbitrarily, dismissed cases for non-compliance and refused to reconsider the
dismissal even when the parties seek to rectify unintended omissions.
Illustrative Case: Excal Corp. v. Jimenez

Here is a sample petition for review. Some details have been altered to
protect the privacies of the persons involved.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EXCAL CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
- versus - G.R. No. __________
(CA-GR. CV 70743)
Spouses CARLO and EDNA
JIMENEZ, Spouses LUIS and
BELLA GOZON, and Spouses
ROGER and LORNA LIM,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------x
PETITION FOR REVIEW
Petitioner, by counsel, respectfully states:
The Parties
1. Petitioner Excal Corporation (Excal) is a domestic

corporation engaged in the importation and distribution of
gasoline and other petroleum products. It holds offices at the
Excal Building, Makati Avenue, Makati City.
2. Respondent spouses Carlos and Edna Jimenez (the
Jimenezes), spouses Luis and Bella Gozon (the Gozons), and
spouses Roger and Lorna Lim (the Lims) are Filipinos, of
legal ages and residents of Bacolod City. They can be served
with the processes of the Court thru their counsel of record,
Atty. Ramon L. Samson at 4th Floor, Hermanos Building,
Garcia Road, Bacolod City.
Material Dates
3. On December 18, 2012 Excal received a copy of the

adverse decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
70743 dated December 12, 2012, a certified true copy of which
is attached to the original of this petition as Annex A.
Consequently, Excal had until January 2, 2004 within which
to file a petition for review of that decision.
4. On January 2, 2013 Excal filed with this Court a motion
for extension of thirty days from that date or until February
1, 2013 within which to file its petition for review of the Court
of Appeals’ decision. Excal is filing this petition within the
period it asked for.
Statement of the Matters Involved
5. For an unknown reason, in the course of the discharge of

gasoline from a truck to the underground storage tank of a
gas station, the fuel being discharged caught fire. When the
truck driver who had left his truck unattended returned and
saw the fire, he immediately drove his truck away from the
gas station but dragged along a hose that spewed flames.
These set the nearby buildings on fire.
6. In ruling that liability for the accident belonged to Excal,
which happened to have sold the fuel to the independent gas
station dealer involved in the case, the Court of Appeals made
the following rulings:
One. Since Excal and the gas station dealer
continued transacting business without renewing or
extending their dealership contract in writing after it
had expired, Excal should be considered as having
replaced its dealer and directly become the operator
of the gas station;
Two. Also because of its failure to extend or renew
such dealership contract in writing, the damage
caused by the gas station fire should be borne by
Excal.
Three. Excal is liable notwithstanding that the
truck belonged to an independent hauler and the gas
station belonged to an independent petroleum dealer.
Four. Suppliers of fuel like Excal continue to be
liable for the neglect of others in distributing and
storing the fuel they have sold.
7. Excal implores the Court to rectify the above rulings for
not only do they contravene the law, they are also irrational
and unjust.
The Facts and the Case
8. The facts of the case are not in dispute. Excal supplied

gasoline and other petroleum products to two classes of
gasoline stations: those that it owned and those that belonged
to independent dealers. In the latter case, the dealers owned
the building and other structures in their gas stations except
gas-pumping and related equipment. Neither the dealers nor
their employees worked for Excal.1
9. In this case, Excal had a Retail Dealer Contract2 with

James Ursal who owned and operated a gas station in Burgos
Avenue, Bacolod City. Although this contract expired in May
2008, they continued to transact business with each other in
the usual way.3
10. To facilitate delivery of its products to its dealers, Excal
engaged the services of independent haulers who were
equipped with their own tank trucks and hired their own
truck drivers. In this case, Excal had a contract of haulage
with Vicente Rama4 who did business under the name Rama
Freight Services.5 Under the contract, Rama assumed
exclusive liability for any damage arising from the neglect of
his employees. Section 3.2 of that contract provides:
3.2 “Any and all drivers, mechanics and other
personnel, of the CONTRACTOR (Rama) are not,
and under no circumstances shall be deemed,
personnel and employees of EXCAL and for this
reason the CONTRACTOR alone shall be answerable
for the payment of their wages and salaries and the
safeguarding of their health and safety and the
performance of the other obligations in accordance
with existing laws and regulations, it being further
understood as a consequence that the
CONTRACTOR alone shall be responsible for any
and all accidents, injuries and death involving said
personnel, agents, and/or employees.”
11. At about 10 o’clock on the morning of January 3, 2010,
James Ursal bought a tank-truck of gasoline from Excal.
After issuing the invoice and the receipt covering payment,
Excal loaded the gasoline into the tank truck of Rama, then
driven by his truck driver, Jose Noble. The tank truck left the
oil depot and proceeded to the gas station in Burgos Avenue.6
12. While gasoline was being discharged from the tank
truck into the fill pipe that led to the gas station’s
underground tank, Noble left his truck unattended to buy
dried fish from the nearby marketplace. On returning to the
station, he saw that fire had broken out from the
underground fuel tank. But rather than detach the rubber
hose from the flaming fill pipe, he drove his truck in reverse,
dragging along a flaming fuel hose. Flames from the hose set
the buildings owned by the Jimenezes, the Gozons, and the
Lims on fire.7 The authorities were never able to establish
what started the fire in the underground tank.
13. As a result of the fire, the Jimenezes, the Gozons, and
the Lims filed separate actions for damages against Excal,
Ursal (the gas station operator), and Rama (the truck owner)
in Civil Cases 123567, 123569, and 123572 of the Regional
Trial Court of Bacolod City. These were consolidated in
Branch 28 of the court. After trial, the trial court rendered a
decision, an authentic copy of which is here attached as Annex
B, a) holding Excal, Rama, and Ursal solidarily liable for
negligence that led to the conflagration; and b) ordering them
to pay the Jimenezes P1.5 million, the Gozons P1.2 million,
and the Lims P1.7 million in actual damages and P100,000.00
each in attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.
14. Excal, Ursal, and Rama appealed the decision to the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 70743. Excal filed its
appellant’s brief, copy here attached as Annex C. In response,
the Jimenezes, the Gozons, and the Lims filed a consolidated
appellees’ brief, copy here attached as Annex D.
15. On December 12, 2012 the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court, hence, this petition.
Questions of Law Presented
Petitioner Excal presents the following questions of law:
1. Whether or not Excal may be considered at fault for
continuing to do business with James Ursal, an independent
petroleum dealer, without renewing or extending their
expired dealership agreement;
2. Whether or not a causal connection exists between
Excal’s failure to renew or extend its dealership contract with
Ursal and the fire that inflicted damages on the buildings
surrounding the latter’s gas station;
3. Whether or not Excal is liable for the fire that occurred
during the unloading by an independent hauler of the fuel it
sold to an equally independent dealer at the latter’s gas
station; and
4. Whether or not a supplier of fuel can be held liable for
the neglect of others in distributing and storing such fuel.
Reasons for Allowing the Petition
I.
A RULING THAT PARTIES ARE AT FAULT FOR
CONTINUING THEIR BUSINESS WITHOUT RENEWING
THEIR CONTRACT CONTRAVENES THE LAW.
The Court of Appeals blames Excal for the gas station fire.
It ruled that, since James Ursal operated that gas station
under an expired dealership contract, Excal should be
deemed to operate it directly and assume liability for the fire.
Said the Court of Appeals:
Excal was negligent for having allowed the
continued operation of the gasoline station in selling
and storing its products for over one year, from May
2008 until the fire incident in January 2010, without
an existing dealership contract. It bears to note that
Excal’s five (5) year dealership contract with
appellant James Ursal had long expired as of May
2008. Notwithstanding, Excal continued to deliver gas
and petroleum products to the gasoline station upon
the request of one Rolando Arnaiz. Clearly, there was
no dealer to speak of in respect of the subject gasoline
station in the absence of a dealership contract, with
the result that the said gasoline station should be
considered as being run by Excal itself, thereby
making the station a company-operated one.
Consequently, Excal cannot disown the petroleum
products that it delivered at the time of the fire
incident. Responsibility cannot therefore be
transferred by appellant to a particular dealer in the
absence of a contract to that effect. If at all, the
persons running the gasoline station are merely its
agents in the business. As held in Pleasantville
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, “the
rule is that the principal is responsible for the acts of
the agent, done within the scope of his authority, and
should bear the damage caused to third persons.”
Conceding arguendo that the dealership contract
was impliedly renewed, with whom did Excal renew
its contract, when at the time of the conflagration it
was the spouses Rico and Sonia Ursal who operated
the gasoline station? This question was not squarely
answered by Excal. James Ursal executed a Special
Power of Attorney in favor of Rico Ursal and such
Special Power of Attorney expired with the expiration
of James Ursal’s contract with Excal in 2008. Excal
did not enter into another contract with Rico Ursal.
All told, no dealership agreement existed at the time
of the incident in January 3, 2010, hence, Excal is not
relieved of any liability as result of the conflagration.
(At pp. 8 and 9)
But, with due respect to the Court of Appeals, although
Excal’s contract with James Ursal expired in May 2008, they
continued to do business with each other observing the same
terms and conditions provided in that contract. By their acts,
therefore, they impliedly extended or renewed their
dealership contract. This principle of implied extension or
renewal is quite fundamental. All sorts of everyday contracts
rest on it, including leases on buildings and hires of services.
The world of business cannot grind to a halt just because
parties are too busy to renew or extend their contracts.
Implied renewals or extensions of contracts are not outlawed
in this country.
Just as bizarre is the Court of Appeals’ ruling that since
Excal and James Ursal did not renew their dealership
contract in “writing,” Excal should be regarded as the direct
operator of the gas station, with James Ursal acting merely as
its agent. Again, no law or jurisprudence supports this ruling.
There is nothing in the law on ownership of property or
business that says that a supplier automatically becomes the
owner and operator of his dealer’s business once they fail to
renew their dealership agreement in writing.
The Court of Appeals’ ruling would give rise to many
absurd and ridiculous situations. For instance, in contracts of
lease of apartments, the failure of the apartment owner and
his tenant to renew their expired lease contract would,
following the Court of Appeals’ ruling, make the apartment
owner liable if his tenant brings in obnoxious materials into
that apartment to the prejudice of the neighbors. Because of
the non-renewal of the lease contract the tenant becomes the
owner’s agent, making the owner of the apartment liable for
his tenant’s acts. No law supports this proposition.
II.
THE ALLEGED NEGLECT OF EXCAL TO RENEW ITS
DEALERSHIP CONTRACT WITH URSAL DID NOT
CAUSE THE GAS STATION FIRE AND SO IT CANNOT
BE THE SOURCE OF EXCAL’S LIABILITY
But, assuming that Excal was negligent in failing to renew
its dealership contract with James Ursal, still it cannot be held
liable for the damages brought about by the fire.
Basic is the rule in quasi-delicts that, in order to recover
damages, a causal connection between the fault or negligence
and the damage must exist. Negligence as giving rise to a
cause of action for damages for personal injuries requires not
only proof of damage to the plaintiff and negligence on the
part of the defendant but also the connection of cause and
effect between such negligence and the damage.8
This Court has consistently ruled that, for liability to
attach, it must be shown that the damage to the plaintiff was
the natural and probable, or direct and immediate,
consequences of the defendant’s culpable act or omission.9 In
other words, the fault or negligence must be the proximate
cause of the damage. Proximate cause has been defined as
that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.10
Here, however, no rational link exists between Excal’s
alleged neglect in failing to renew its supply agreement with
James Ursal and the act that set the buildings around the gas
station on fire. Consequently, the non-renewal of the
agreement creates no liability on Excal’s part.
III.
THE SUPPLIER OF FUEL TO AN INDEPENDENT
DEALER CAN BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE FIRE THAT
OCCURRED DURING THE UNLOADING OF THAT
FUEL BY AN EQUALLY INDEPENDENT HAULER
The Court of Appeals held that Excal should nonetheless be
held responsible for the damages caused by the fire since it
had not yet completed delivering the gasoline to James Ursal
when the fire broke out. It said:
Assuming further, that there was an existing
dealership contract between Excal and James Ursal at
the time of the fire incident, still Excal cannot avoid
liability by contending that the ownership of the
petroleum products had already been transferred to
James Ursal upon payment of the price and delivery
of the products. It bears to stress that at the time the
fire broke out, there was as yet no complete delivery
of the petroleum products since the tank truck was
still in the process of discharging gasoline.
But the unrefuted evidence on record shows that Excal sold
and transferred possession and control of the gasoline
involved in this case to its dealer, James Ursal, when the
latter’s representative Rolando Arnaiz went to the oil depot,
bought the gasoline, paid for them, and had Rama’s tank
truck receive them for delivery to Ursal’s gas station.11
Under a contract of sale, Excal ceased to be the owner of
the petroleum products from its receipt and turnover at
Excal’s depot. James Ursal acquired ownership of them while
they were on transit and while being unloaded at his gasoline
station. The New Civil Code provides:
Art. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be
transferred to the vendee upon the actual or
constructive delivery thereof.
What is more, the tank truck and its supply of gasoline
safely arrived at James Ursal’s gas station. As an independent
hauler of petroleum products, Rama assumed the
responsibility for delivering them safely to Ursal’s gas station.
As an independent dealer, Ursal assumed responsibility for
receiving the products, opening the right fill pipe, allowing
gasoline to be discharged into it, and supervising the proper
use of its facilities. Surely, it would be unreasonable to suggest
that Excal, the company from which depot the fuel came,
should monitor and supervise the use of its products wherever
they may be found.
Although petroleum products, like gasoline and liquefied
petroleum gas or LPG, are flammable materials, they are
widely and commonly used even in households. Those who
buy these materials may be assumed to know how to use them
safely. Still accidents do happen. But must the supplier of
these products be liable for all such accidents?
In this case, as the trial court and the Court of Appeals
found, while gasoline from the tank truck was being
discharged into the gas station’s underground tank, the truck
driver left it unattended to buy something from the nearby
market. For an unknown cause, the underground tank caught
fire. On his return, the truck driver maneuvered the truck in
reverse without detaching the rubber hose from the flaming
fill pipe of the underground tank. Consequently, he dragged
along the flaming fuel hose that set the surrounding buildings
of the Jimenezes, the Gozons, and the Lims on fire.
The Court of Appeals has no valid reason for holding Excal
solidarily liable with Rama. Neither Noble (the truck driver
who worked for Rama) nor Rama himself worked for Excal.
Excal contracted with Rama, an independent hauler, to haul
and deliver petroleum products from its oil depot to its
customers. And under the Hauling Contract that governed
their relation, Rama took it upon himself to assume exclusive
liability for any damage that his employees may cause. Its
Section 3.2 provides:
3.2 “Any and all drivers, mechanics and other
personnel, of the CONTRACTOR (Jose Villaruz) are
not, and under no circumstances shall be deemed,
personnel and employees of EXCAL, and for this
reason the CONTRACTOR alone shall be answerable
for the payment of their wages and salaries and the
safeguarding of their health and safety and the
performance of the other obligations in accordance
with existing laws and regulations, it being further
understood as a consequence that the
CONTRACTOR alone shall be responsible for any
and all accidents, injuries and death involving said
personnel, agents, and/or employees.” (underscoring
supplied.)
Of course, the Court of Appeals held that Excal was
negligent in allowing the particular tank truck enter its depot
and load the gasoline intended for James Ursal’s gas station
although it was not among the several tank trucks listed in the
Hauling Contract. Said the Court of Appeals:
Likewise, Excal was negligent in allowing through its
employee, Cesar Ruiz, appellant-hauler’s truck with plate No.
NVC-245 to enter its depot and load Excal’s products despite
the fact that same was not among those listed in the hauler’s
contract. In this regard, Section 4.2 of the hauler’s contract
provides:
“4.2 In order to faithfully comply with its commitments to
EXCAL as herein stipulated, the CONTRACTOR binds and
obligates himself to assign three units tank trucks for the
exclusive use of hauling requirement of EXCAL and such
units herein and hereby assigned are particularly identified
and described as follows:
Plate No. Capacity

NVC 248 10
NVC 482 10
TH-FVG 484 10
But the undisputed evidence on record shows that Excal

took the extra precaution of ensuring that the particular tank
truck of Rama had all the requirements needed to make a safe
delivery of its petroleum products.12
Besides, although the truck involved was not in the list
mentioned, the contract did not prohibit Rama from using
other trucks that also met what it required. What was
controlling in the agreement was Rama’s obligation to
provide tank trucks that are properly equipped to carry
Excal’s products to its customers. And Rama complied with
it.
More importantly, the fire in this case did not originate
from the tank truck nor did it occur as a result of any defect
in that truck.13 Consequently, the Court of Appeals had no
basis for exploiting the use of the unlisted truck in the
delivery of the gasoline to James Ursal’s gas station.
Nor did an employer-employee relationship exist between
Excal and James Ursal or Rico Ursal, the independent dealer
and his manager. They did not work for Excal. The Retail
Dealer Contract between Excal and James Ursal specifically
relieved Excal of any liability for damages arising from fault
in the storage and handling of its petroleum products at the
gas station. Paragraph 14 of their contract provides:
“INDEPENDENT BUSINESSMAN. BUYER
(James Ursal) discloses that he is an independent
businessman/business and as such it guarantees that
SELLER (Excal) will be free and harmless from any
claims or suits of whatsoever nature arising from
BUYER’s operation of the business.
Excal did not at all exercise control over the operation of
the gutted gasoline station.
IV.
A RULING THAT SUPPLIERS OF FUEL ARE LIABLE

FOR THE NEGLECT OF OTHERS IN DISTRIBUTING
AND STORING SUCH FUEL CONTRAVENES THE LAW
The Court of Appeals ruled that Excal was accountable for
the fire that occurred at James Ursal’s gas station because it
was remiss in providing adequate measures for the safe
distribution and storage of the fuel that Ursal bought from it.
It held that:
Moreover, Excal was remiss in its obligation of
providing adequate measures for the safe distribution
of its petroleum products. One who has in its
possession or its control articles or products which
are highly inflammable, like gasoline, is duty-bound
to take exceptional vigilance, care and precaution in
the handling thereof to prevent any injury or damage
to others. Such degree of care and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand to prevent and undue
risk of harm to others, appellant Excal failed to
exercise. Consequently, its contention that it is no
longer responsible once the prepaid product left its
depot is erroneous since it is obliged to ensure not
only the safe delivery but the safe storage as well of its
products.
But, in the first place, there is no evidence that the fire at
James Ursal’s gas station could be traced to an inadequate
distribution or storage safety measure that was the
responsibility of Excal. The immediate cause of the
conflagration in the neighborhood of the gas station was the
truck driver’s neglect in leaving his truck unattended while
discharging gasoline and in backing it out of the gas station
with its hose spewing out fire. Surely, there was nothing that
Excal could reasonably do to prevent what happened since it
did not supervise or control the work of Rama’s driver.
As independent businesses, both the hauler of fuel products
and the operator of the gas station have to answer for their
own actions and the doings of their employees. These haulers
and gas station operators do apply, like any other business,
for government permits and licenses appropriate to the
nature of their activities and requiring compliance with the
standards of safety prescribed for their particular businesses.
It would be unreasonable and unjust to impose on
manufacturers and suppliers an unending liability for the
mishandling and misuse of their products by any person
wherever these may be found.
Prayer
WHEREFORE, petitioner Excal Corporation respectfully

prays the Court to render judgment modifying the decision of
the Court of Appeals by absolving Excal from any liability in
the case.
Petitioner prays for such other reliefs as are just and
equitable under the circumstances.
[Explanation: Copies of this petition have been served on
the adverse parties by registered mail in view of the distance
involved and lack of messenger who could undertake personal
service.]
Makati City for Manila, January 31, 2013.
SHAIRA A. CRUZ
Counsel for Petitioner Excal Corp.
5th Floor, Homer Building
245 Bataan Street, Palanan, Makati City
Atty. Roll 22345
IBP No. 545698 12-21-12
PTR No. 6453254 01-02-2013
Email: sacruz@yihee.com
Tel. and Fax 8765432
Verification and Certification

I, Atty. Amy V. Villalon, of legal age and with office
address at the Excal Building, Makati Avenue, Makati City,
after having sworn in accordance with law, depose and state
that:
1. I am the General Counsel and Corporate Secretary of
Excal Corporation, duly empowered to cause the filing of this
petition on its behalf under a board resolution, copy here
attached;
2. I have read the foregoing petition and the facts stated in
it are true based on the authentic record of the case;
3. I have not theretofore commenced any action or filed any
claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal, or
quasi-judicial agency;
4. To the best of my knowledge, no such action or claim is
pending therein; and
5. If I should thereafter learn that the same or a similar
action or claim has been filed or pending, I shall report that
fact within five (5) days therefrom to this Court.
AMY V. VILLALON
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 31st day of

January 2009 in Makati City. Affiant exhibited to me his LTO
Driver’s License No. N10-68262687, expiring on May 24,
2012.
BEN I. MADRID
Notary Public
Attorney’s Roll 45678
Appointment No. 678
Until December 31, 2013
PTR # 56789 1-12-13 Manila
IBP # 24680 1-12-13
1234 Quezon Avenue, Q.C.
bim@madridlaw.com
Doc. No. 218;
Page No. 27;
Book No. I;
Series of 2013.
Copy furnished:
The Court of Appeals

Ma. Orosa St., Ermita, Manila
Atty. Noel C. Javier

Javier Santos Reyes & Garcia
2nd Floor, Standard Bldg.
Magsaysay Drive, Bacolod City
Atty. Roy B. Cancio

Empress Bldg.
Damaso St., Bacolod City
Atty. Liberador Guadiz

Hanson Bldg., Iresare St.
Bacolod City
Writing Exercises
An actor and his talent manager sued a film producer for rescission of the
actor’s movie contract and damages. Before filing an answer, the producer
entered into a compromise agreement with the talent manager maintaining the
contract but providing for payment of a substantial sum to the actor. The
latter told the court, however, that he did not authorize the agreement for
what he wanted was for the producer to release him from the contract.
Meantime, as the case dragged on, the actor got involved in a film festival
scandal that diminished his image. When the producer offered to release him
from his contract, he suddenly had a change of heart. He told the court that he
would now accept the compromise agreement signed by his talent manager
and sought a judgment based on that agreement. Over the producer’s
objections, the trial court rendered judgment approving the compromise
agreement and directing the producer to pay the amount mentioned in it. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
For exercise, write a petition for review on behalf of the film producer,
appealing the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. The
materials you need consist in the copies of the Court of Appeals’ decision,
the film producer’s appellant’s brief, and the actor’s appellee’s brief. These
are found in Appendix B of this book. Certain details about the parties and
the events have been changed to protect the privacy of those involved. The
challenge is for you to seek a reversal of the Court of Appeals’ decision.
1TSN, July 28, 2010, pp. 29-34.

2Exhibit 5 for Petron.
3TSN, February 7, 2010, pp. 4-7.
4Exhibit 1 for Petron.
5TSN, December 5, 2006, pp. 3-15; TSN, July 28, 2006, pp. 22-35.
6TSN, June 29, 2010, pp. 6-13.
7TSN, December 5, 2010, pp. 4-7; TSN, December 15, 2010, pp. 27-31;
TSN, December 16, 2010, pp. 14-15.
8De Gregorio v. Go Chong Bing, L-7663, December 2, 1957.
9Algarra v. Sandejas, 22 Phil. 293; Taylor v. Meralco, 16 Phil. 8; De
Gregorio v. Go Chong Bing, 102 Phil. 556.
10Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186.
11TSN, June 29, 2010, pp. 6-13.
12TSN, July 28, 2010, pp. 27-29.
13TSN, December 16, 2010, p. 15.
16.
Writing a Decision
In a decision, the judge makes a choice of which opposing claims he

accepts as true or correct. But, since due process entitles every litigant to
know the reason or reasons for the decision in his case, it is incumbent for the
judge to make a clear, logical, and convincing presentation of that decision.
As a rule this requires that he lays down: (a) the conflicting claims of the
parties, (b) the issues that separate them, (c) the resolution of those issues,
and (d) an adjudication of the respective rights and liabilities of the parties.
Some judges tend to write excessively lengthy decisions, believing that
they are expected to summarize the pleadings of the parties and the
testimonies of all the witnesses in the case before addressing the issues that
the case presents. But, this is unnecessary. As already stated in Chapter 7,
what is required is only such amount of background facts as would be
sufficient to enable the reader to understand the issues that the parties raise.
A few judges believe that making findings of fact means that they can
simply make a summary of the facts as they found these to be without need of
resolving the conflicting factual versions of the parties. At times, they
precede this summary with the court introduction: “The facts of this case as
found by the Court are as follows.” This is wrong because a party is entitled
to know the reason why the judge rejects his version in favor of that of his
opponent.
The best and simplest approach in dealing with conflicting factual versions
is to briefly summarize both versions, identify the relevant issues of fact and
resolve such issues, stating the reason for accepting one version and not the
other. In a maritime case, a commercial vessel, temporarily under the
command of a government-license harbor pilot, bumped into a power barge
that had been lashed to the wharf and supplied electricity to the city. The
power barge owner filed a lawsuit against the vessel for the damage suffered
by its barge. For its defense, the vessel placed the blame on the harbor pilot
and insisted that the barge did not suffer any compensable damage.
Illustrative Case: Hudson Power Corp. v. Nemo Shipping

The sample decision below sets a correct pattern for adjudicating the issues
raised in the case.

Branch 115, Manila
HUDSON POWER CORP.,

Plaintiff,
- versus - Civil Case No. 16295
NEMO SHIPPING CORP.,
Defendant.
x----------------------------------x
DECISION
Plaintiff Hudson Power Corporation (HPC) filed this action

against Nemo Shipping Corporation for the alleged fault of its
vessel’s captain that resulted in damage to its power barge at
the Layag Wharf in Cagayan de Oro City. Nemo Shipping
resisted the action, claiming that the fault lay, not with its
vessel, but with either the harbor pilot who commanded her
during docking or with HPC itself.
Stipulated Facts
At the pre-trial hearing, the parties stipulated on the
following facts:
1. Nemo Shipping’s vessel, the MV Iligan, and HPC’s
power barge 102 were at the Layag wharf, Cagayan de Oro
City on March 20, 2005;
2. Power barge 102 was a non-propelled vessel;
3. Capt. Henry Suntay was the master or captain of MV
Iligan;
4. While maneuvering at the Layag wharf, MV Iligan hit
HPC’s power barge 102;
5. Nestor J. Canto, the manager of power barge 102, filed a
marine protest; and
6. The Board of Marine Inquiry (BMI) acquired
jurisdiction over the separate marine protests filed by Mr.
Canto and Capt. Suntay.
The Evidence of the Parties
At the trial, HPC presented Atty. Renato Collar, the BMI

presiding officer who testified that the BMI heard the marine
protests of Mr. Canto1 and Capt. Suntay.2 After the Board
submitted its findings and recommendations to the Philippine
Coast Guard.3 The latter rendered a decision on November
23, 2011, finding Nemo Shipping liable for ramming HPC’s
power barge 102.4 Ms. Elena Lazaro, a BMI stenographer,
identified the transcript of stenographic notes5 taken during
the hearing.
HSC’s only other witness was Mr. Nestor Canto, the plant
manager of power barge 102 that supplied electricity to the
Mindanao power grid. Based on his testimony, he
immediately went to the wharf soon after learning of the
ramming incident. He noted sludge oil leaking from a crack
on the power barge’s hull. To stop the oil leak, he applied
water epoxy on the barge’s clutch. In his report, a certain Mr.
Neri estimated the damage to the barge at P1 million. Mr.
Canto used this report as basis for his marine protest.
Despite the ramming, the power barge soon resumed
generating power. Months later, HPC dry-docked it with the
National Shipyard Corporation or Nasco for repair.6 HPC
paid Nasco P6,775,000.007 for the works. Further, HPC
suffered P500,000.00 in moral damages and spent P18,000.00
for its marine protest and the case.
Nemo Shipping, on the other hand, presented as witness the
Chief Mate of MV Iligan, Senen Torres. Based on Torres’
testimony, at the time of the incident, Capt. James Yabut, a
harbor pilot, commanded MV Iligan. The Philippine Ports
Authority or PPA assigned harbor pilots to assume
mandatory control of vessels docking at the Layag Wharf.
Capt. Yabut did not work for Nemo Shipping of MV Iligan at
the time of the docking, Chief Mate Torres stood beside Capt.
Yabut and relayed his commands to the crew.
Capt. Yabut gave his first command, “Slow ahead engine.”
This meant that those in control of the engine room below
were to move the vessel slowly forward. The command came
when the vessel was about 200 meters from the wharf and was
traveling at a speed of 15 kilometers per hour. Responding,
the vessel slowed down. When she came to about 100 meters
from the wharf, Capt. Yabut gave his next command, “Dead
slow ahead.” The vessel moved even slower. When she came
to some 25 meters from the wharf or 50 meters from the
power barge, Capt. Yabut gave the command, “Engine stop.”
The vessel was then moving westward parallel to the wharf
and towards the barge. He gave his next command, “drop
anchor,” just when MV Iligan was just 15 to 20 meters from
the power barge. The vessel slowed down but her bow
managed to bump the hull of HPC’s power barge berthed at
the wharf.
The impact of the bump on the power barge was slight and
did not cut her ropes. Although it tripped off the power lines,
it caused no hull damage either to MV Ilagan or to HPC’s
power barge 102. The barge had two rubber tires serving as
fenders to protect its steel hull from vessels maneuvering
around the wharf. Unfortunately, MV Ilagan hit the part of
the hull that had no rubber tire protection.
Chief Mate Torres, himself an expert mariner, found fault
in the way the harbor pilot maneuvered MV Iligan. Diligence
required Capt. Yabut to first test the capability of the vessel’s
twin engines before maneuvering her. He did not. What is
more, he failed to order the dropping of the anchor before
giving the command, “engine stop,” to halt the vessel’s
momentum. He miscalculated her distance and speed.
Mr. Jerry Roces, legal assistant of Nemo Shipping, testified
that as a consequence of the filing of the complaint, his
company suffered moral damages and incurred expenses for
attorney’s fees.
The Issues
The case presents the following issues:

First, whether or not Nemo Shipping is liable to HPC for
what damages its power barge 102 may have suffered on the
occasion of its ramming by MV Iligan; and
Second, whether or not the parties are entitled to damages
and attorney’s fees.
Discussion
1. No one disputes the fact that, at the time of the ramming

of power barge 104, Capt. Yabut, a harbor pilot commanded
MV Iligan as it maneuvered to berth alongside the Layag
wharf in Cagayan de Oro City as required by maritime rules.
Sections 8, Article III of PPA Administrative Order 03-85
provides:
SEC. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service. –– For
entering a harbor and anchoring thereat, or passing
through rivers or straits within a pilotage district, as
well as docking and undocking at any pier/wharf, or
shifting from one berth or another, every vessel
engaged in coastwise and foreign trade shall be under
compulsory pilotage.
xxx
Since Nemo Shipping had no choice but to yield the
navigational control of its vessel to compulsory pilotage by
Capt. Yabut, the latter and the Harbor Pilot’s Association
with their bondsmen should be the ones to assume liability for
any accident that resulted from the docking procedure. This
is but fair especially since HPC did not care to present any
witness to show that Nemo Shipping, through its captain and
crew, was at fault in responding to Capt. Yabut’s command.
The fact is that Nemo Shipping’s chief mate, a licensed
mariner, testified without contradiction that Capt. Yabut was
at fault in calculating the vessel’s speed and distance and in
giving improper commands during the maneuver.
Consequently, he alone or the Harbor Pilot’s Association
should answer for the consequences of such fault.
2. HPC of course puts the blame on Nemo Shipping,
alleging that the latter’s vessel failed to respond adequately to
the astern maneuvers directed by the harbor pilot. To support
this claim, HPC relied heavily on the findings of the BMI8
and the decision of the Philippine Coast Guard9 in BMI Case
567-01 as well as in the transcript of stenographic notes10 of
the testimonies of Capt. Suntay and Capt. Yabut before the
Board.
But the record will show that when HPC filed its complaint,
it based its cause of action solely on the fact of the collision.
Thus:
“3. On 20 March 2010 at around 0019 Hrs. while
the aforesaid Power Barge 102 is docked and
stationed at Layag Wharf, Cagayan de Oro City,
defendant’s vessel –– MV Iligan, piloted by a certain
Captain Henry Suntay and assisted by port pilot
Captain James Yabut, hit and rammed Power Barge
104”;
HPC did not allege as cause of action the result of the
administrative investigation conducted by the BMI. Indeed,
HPC admittedly filed the present court action without
awaiting the findings and decision of the BMI and the
Philippine Coast Guard concerning the docking incident. In
fact, HPC admits so much in its complaint:
“10. During the hearing of the twin Marine Protests
before the Board of Marine Inquiry (BMI), both
parties failed to settle amicably and decided to
proceed with the presentation of their respective
evidences and witnesses. The proceedings before the
BMI are administrative in nature and this quasi-
judicial body has no jurisdiction to award damages.
To date, said Marine Protest remains unresolved
despite plaintiff’s motion for its early resolution”;
Clearly, therefore, HPC chose to have the trial court
directly hear and resolve the issue of negligence tendered by
Nemo Shipping’s denial of the allegation in its answer. HPC
assumed, therefore, the burden of proving in court that the
captain and crew of MV Iligan acted negligently during the
docking maneuvers. HPC cannot discharge that burden by
simply presenting a copy of the subsequent findings and
decision of the BMI and the Philippine Coast Guard.
Nor could HPC comfort itself that it may be deemed to
have amended its complaint and modified its cause of action
when it presented in evidence copies of those administrative
findings and decision.11 The rule on implied amendment
cannot apply because Nemo Shipping in fact formally
objected to HPC’s introduction of the findings and decision of
the BMI and Philippine Coast Guard.12
Parenthetically, it could very well have happened that
Nemo Shipping did not appeal the decision of the BMI and
the Philippine Coast Guard to the Department of
Transportation and Communication thinking that it would
have the opportunity to absolve itself of the charge of
negligence during the hearing before this court. And the
events proved it correct.
The HPC cannot also make use of the transcripts of
stenographic notes of the testimonies that Capt. Suntay and
Capt. Yabut gave before the BMI. Nemo Shipping objected to
the admission of those transcripts for being hearsay. HPC did
not establish during the trial that Capt. Suntay and Capt.
Yabut were deceased or unable to testify, warranting the
presentation in evidence of their testimonies before the
BMI.13
3. Besides, the testimony of Mr. Torres, the chief mate of
MV Iligan who transmitted Capt. Yabut’s commands to the
engine room, is undisputed. These commands were
inadequate to reverse the vessel’s speed and momentum as it
moved towards the wharf. Thus:
Q: And do you remember the commands that
Harbor Pilot Yabut issued as you neared the Layag
Wharf?
A: Yes. After he boarded the vessel, he issued the
command “slow ahead engine.”
Q: What was the speed of the vessel when he gave
that command?
A: About one knot.
Q: What is the equivalent of that in terms of
kilometers?
A: 15 to 29 kilometers per hour.
Q: And at the time Mr. Yabut gave that command,
how far was the vessel from Layag Wharf?
A: She was about 200 meters from the wharf.
Q: And when the command “slow ahead engine”
was given, how did the vessel respond?
A: The vessel slowed down.
Q: What command did Capt. Yabut give after the
first?
A: He said, “dead slow ahead.”
Q: What did that mean?
A: The vessel was to go even slower.
Q: How far was the vessel from the Layag Wharf
when that command “dead slow ahead” was given?
A: She was approximately 100 meters from the
wharf.
Q: And how did the vessel respond to the command
“dead slow ahead”?
A: It slowed down some more.
Q: After the “dead slow ahead” command, what
command did Capt. Yabut next give, if any?
A: He commanded, “engine stop.”
Q: What did that mean?
A: It meant stopping the power that moved the
vessel.
Q: Did that mean engine shut down?
A: No. It meant stopping the vessel’s propellers.
Q: After he gave that command “engine stop,” did
the propellers continue to move?
A: No, sir. They stopped.
Q: How far was the vessel from the power barge
when Capt. Yabut gave the command “engine stop”?
A: About fifty meters.
Q: What was the rate of travel of the vessel when
Capt. Yabut gave the command “engine stop”?
A: Less than one knot.
Q: You said that the vessel was moving parallel to
the wharf when Capt. Yabut gave the command “stop
engine.” Did he give any other command?
A: He ordered, “drop anchor.”
Q: How soon did he give that command after the
“stop engine” command?
A: About three to four seconds later.
Q: When he gave the command “drop anchor,”
how far was the MV Iligan from the HPC power
barge?
A: Approximately 15 meters to 20 meters. The
vessel still had momentum.
Q: What response did the vessel make after the
command “drop anchor”?
A: The vessel further slowed down.14

(underscoring supplied)
Evidently, Capt. Yabut’s delayed commands caused MV
Iligan to ram the power barge. He miscalculated during the
maneuvers of the vessel its speed and distance from the Layag
wharf. As Mr. Torres testified:
Q: As an experienced mariner, would you have
given the same orders that Harbor Pilot Yabut gave
during the docking of MV Iligan on March 20, 2005?
A: No, sir.
Q: What would you have done under those same
circumstances?
A: I would have first put to test the capacity of the
vessel’s twin engine before approaching the pier of
Layag Wharf.
Q: After testing the engine, what would you have
done?
A: I would have given the standard commands.
First, “slow ahead,” followed by “drop anchor,” then
“engine stop.”
Q: Why drop the anchor before stopping the
engine?
A: The vessel had a momentum; dropping the
anchor would have stopped it.
Q: To what do you account the accident?
A: Harbor Pilot’s error.
Q: Why do you blame the harbor pilot?
A: He approached the wharf with too much speed.
He should have reduced the vessel’s speed before
approaching the dock. I think he miscalculated the
distance and speed of the vessel.15 (underscoring
supplied)
HPC did not present evidence to controvert the chief mate’s
testimony. Based on it, the harbor pilot clearly did not
observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the
circumstances demanded. Capt. Yabut should, therefore, be
held personally liable for the damages caused to the power
barge. Section 11(1), Article III of PPA Administrative Order
03-85 supports this conclusion, thus:
SEC. 11. Control of vessels and liability for damage.
––
On compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot
providing the service to a vessel shall be responsible
for the damage caused to a vessel or to life and
property at ports due to his negligence or fault. He can
only be absolved from liability if the accident is
caused by force majeure or natural calamities
provided he has exercised prudence and extra
diligence to prevent or minimize damage.
Section 31, Article V of the same administrative
order provides:
SEC. 32. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot or
Pilot’s Association. –– The duties and responsibilities
of the Harbor Pilot shall be as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
f) a pilot shall be held responsible for the direction

of a vessel from the time he assumes his work as a
pilot thereof until he leaves it anchored or berthed
safely; Provided, however, that his responsibility shall
cease at the moment the Master neglects or refuses to
carry out his order. (underscoring supplied)
In Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals,16 the

Supreme Court ruled that a harbor pilot is personally liable
for damages arising from his neglect in maneuvering a vessel
under his command. Thus:
In general, a pilot is personally liable for damages
caused by his own negligence or default to the owners
of the vessel, and to third parties for damages
sustained in a collision. Such negligence of the pilot in
the performance of a duty constitutes a maritime tort.
In common law, a shipowner is not liable for injuries
inflicted exclusively by the negligence of the pilot
accepted by a vessel compulsorily. The exemption
from liability for such negligence shall apply if the
pilot is actually in charge and solely in fault.
4. HPC of course argues that, even with the harbor pilot’s
presence, Capt. Suntay remained in full control and
command of MV Iligan, citing Section 11(2), Article III of
PPA Administrative Order 03-85. Thus:
The master shall retain overall command of the
vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby he can
countermand or overrule the order or command of
the harbor Pilot on board. In such event, any damage
caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports by
reason of the fault or negligence of the Master shall be
the responsibility and liability of the registered owner
of the vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse
against the Master. Such liability of the owner or
master of the vessel or its pilots shall be determined
by competent authority in appropriate proceedings in
the light of the facts and circumstances of each
particular case. (underscoring supplied)
But the overall responsibility of the master of the vessel
should be reconciled with the specific responsibility of the
harbor pilot for assuming control of the command of the ship
for the purpose of maneuvering the vessel and berthing it at
the wharf. The rules provide that the harbor pilot is liable for
any damage “due to his negligence or fault”17 and “his
responsibility shall cease at the moment the master neglects or
refuses to carry out his order.”18
Evidently, since HPC bears the affirmative of its action, it
had the burden of proving that Capt. Yabut gave the correct
commands but MV Iligan’s crew failed to obey them,
resulting in the accident. HPC could have also proved that,
although Capt. Yabut gave patently wrong commands, the
master of the vessel had the opportunity to countermand
them. Here, however, HPC failed to present evidence
establishing either of these propositions. All that HPC has
proved in this case is that the proximate cause of the ramming
of the power barge was Capt. Yabut’s negligence, he having
been in command and control of the vessel, when she
negotiated the waters approaching the wharf.
HPC of course claims that the proximate cause of the
accident was MV Iligan’s engine failure during the docking
maneuver. But, again, HPC did not present evidence to
establish this claim. Actually, Philippine Coast Guards’
records show that the vessel had been seaworthy before,
during, and after the incident. MV Iligan, said the certificate
of inspection, “has been duly inspected in accordance with
existing regulations and found to have complied with the
requirements regarding the condition of the hull, machinery,
navigational, fire-fighting equipment, manning and life-saving
appliances.”19
5. Besides the Layag Wharf is a public berthing place, built
for use by self-propelled vessels like MV Iligan. Indeed, the
wharf supported substantial traffic of cargo and passengers
for Cagayan de Oro City. Consequently, non-propelled vessels
had no business berthing permanently at the wharf to
perform some other service. Yet HPC permanently lashed its
power barge 102, a non-propelled vessel, to such busy wharf
to supply electricity to the Mindanao power grid. Mr. Canto
of HPC confirmed this during his testimony:
Q: So this power barge was non-propelled, is that
right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: It was non-propelled because it was not
equipped to navigate the water on its own power,
right?
A: Yes.
Q: You had to tow that barge, using another boat,
in order to move it, is that right?
A: Yes.
Q: Yet, knowing that your power barge was non-
propelled, you moored it to the Layag Wharf, is that
right?
A: Yes.
Q: You are familiar with Layag Wharf?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You know for a fact that Layag Wharf was
being used for loading and unloading passengers and
cargoes, is that right?
A: That’s what I observed.20
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Since when had your power barge been moored

at Layag Wharf?
A: From way back in 2003.
Q: Your purpose in berthing the power barge
alongside that wharf was to supply electricity to the
Mindanao Grid in the long term, is that right?
A: Yes.
Q: So in other words, you berthed your barge on
that wharf not for the purpose of loading or
unloading cargoes but to supply electricity to the area
on a long-term basis, is that correct?
A: Yes.21
Clearly, when HPC placed its power barge alongside the
wharf, it voluntarily assumed the risk of being hit or rammed
by vessels that frequently maneuvered around the wharf to
get a berth. Under the doctrine of assumption of risk, HPC is
barred from recovering damages. Thus:
A plaintiff who voluntarily assumes a risk of harm
from the negligent or reckless conduct of the
defendant cannot recover for such harm. The defense
may arise where a plaintiff, by contract or otherwise,
expressly agrees to accept a risk of harm arising from
the defendant’s conduct, or where a plaintiff who
fully understands a risk of harm caused by the
defendant’s conduct, or by a condition created by the
defendant, voluntarily chooses to enter or remain, or
to permit his property to enter or remain, within the
area of such risk, under circumstances manifesting
his willingness to accept the risk.22 (underscoring
supplied)
What is more, although HPC lashed its power barge
permanently to that busy commercial wharf, it took no steps
to protect the barge from the constant maneuvering of vessels
that docked in and out of the wharf. It did not secure
insulating posts or adequate rubber bumpers on its
vulnerable sides. Mr. Canto of HPC admitted this.
Q: It was common for ordinary boats to load and
unload cargoes and passengers at that wharf and then
leave as soon as their businesses were done?
A: Yes.
Q: So when you planted your power barge
alongside that wharf, with intent to stay long and
practically become a part of the wharf itself, did you
take the precaution of guarding your hull against
those maneuvering boats?
A: Actually, we planned to move the barge inward
near HPC’s land-based plant in Cagayan de Oro City
but the mooring area had not yet been completed.
Q: Meantime, did you take steps to protect your
barge at the wharf from being rammed by incoming
and outgoing boats with wooden posts lashed together
to served as its fenders?
A: No, sir, because the PPA did not allow us to
build structures or posts to protect our power barge.
Q: Yet, you maintained yourself there? A: Yes.
The record shows that HPC placed only two rubber tires
along the length of the vulnerable side of its power barge.23
These were clearly insufficient and were unable to fully
absorb the bump caused by Capt. Yabut’s faulty maneuvers.
6. In its complaint, HPC claims more or less P1 million as
actual damages. In the list of damages and incidental loss,24
NPC estimated a total of P1 million as damages, broken down
as follows:
MATERIAL
1. 3-INCHES ROPE 3 ROLL 135,000.00
2. SLUDGE OIL IN THE
630 LTRB 1,575.00
TANK
3. STEEL PLATE 1”X4’X8’ 5 SHT 50,000.00
4. INNER BEAM SUPPORT 2 LGNT 25,000.00
5. UNDERWATER EPOXY 3 KIT 54,000.00
P265,575.00
GENERATION LOST
112,000
1. POWER BARGE 104 240,000.00
KWH
6,480
2. POWER BARGE 102 12,960.00
KWH
3. GEN. SANTOS DIESEL
1,963
4. POWER PLANT 3,926.00
KWH
P256,886.00
ESTIMATED COST FOR
THE REPAIR
P
OF DAMAGE PORTION
477,539.00
SAY P 1,000,000.00
But as HPC’s complaint admits, the above consists of mere

estimates of the damages and incidental losses that it suffered.
As it happened, it did not present proof of its actual damages
and losses. Admittedly, HPC did not bother to have the
alleged damage that its power barge suffered immediately
repaired. Such damage being slight, HPC operated the power
barge for months and waited for the time when she was
scheduled for dry-docking and general repairs. Consequently,
HPC never established the specific injury that the bumping
incident supposedly inflicted on its barge.
The only evidence HPC presented was its contract of
general repair25 with Naseco and a voucher for P6,775,000.00
showing that it partially paid P6,775,000.00 to Naseco26 for
the dry-docking and repair of its barge. But, in the first place,
HPC’s contract of repair with Naseco shows on its face that
the repair had nothing to do with the supposed damage that
the barge suffered from the bumping by MV Iligan. The
contract shows that the damage to be repaired was caused by
typhoon “Ruping” that struck Naga, Cebu on November 13,
2003. In fact, its first whereas clause states:
WHEREAS, in view of the urgent need to repair
Power Barge No. 104 which was damaged on
November 13, 2003, when typhoon “Ruping” struck
Naga, Cebu; to put the same back into commercial
operation, HPC requested quotation from
CONTRACTOR (Naseco) who has the only dry-
docking facilities in the Philippines suited for this type
of Barge due to her size, aside from the fact that it is
also a government-owned and controlled corporation.
Basic is the rule that damages must not only be capable of
proof, it must be actually proved with a reasonable degree of
certainty.27 Damages cannot be presumed or be based on
flimsy and non-substantial evidence, nor upon speculation,
conjecture or guesswork.28 Here, HPC failed to prove the
damages with reasonable certainty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the above, the Court renders
judgment, dismissing the complaint. It also dismisses Nemo
Shipping’s compulsory counterclaim for insufficiency of
evidence to prove it.
SO ORDERED.
It used to be that decisions did not employ headings. Today, however, a
number of justices and judges have begun using headings to identify sections
of their decisions. This is an important development because headings serve
as guideposts to readers especially in ponderous decisions. Any device that
improves the level of communication from the writer to the reader is most
welcome.
Writing Exercises
A government-owned forwarding company shipped a cargo of powdered

milk from Manila to Davao City on board the defendant shipping line’s
vessel. The goods did not reach their beneficiaries, however, prompting the
forwarding company to file an action for damages against the shipping line.
The only issue presented in the case is whether or not defendant’s vessel
delivered the cargo of milk to plaintiff’s consignee in Davao City. The
trial judge wrote a decision in this maritime case, reproduced at the end of
this book in Appendix C. Probably, the trial judge thought that he had to
summarize in his decision all the evidentiary details that the transcript of
stenographic notes grinded out. This is quite unnecessary.
Applying what you learn, see if you can make the decision leaner without
sacrificing the purpose of the statements of the case and the facts. The
decision has been edited to protect the privacies of the persons involved and
to make the material suitable for study.
1Exhibit D.
2Exhibit E.
3Exhibit H.
4Exhibit G.
5Exhibit I.
6Exhibit K.
7Exhibit L.
8Exhibit G.
9Exhibit H.
10Exhibits I and J.
11Section 5, Rule 10.
12See Defendant’s Comment on the Formal Offer of Evidence, September
16, 2004.
13Section 47, Rule 130.
14TSN, November 25, 2004, pp. 10-18.
15TSN, November 25, 2008, pp. 25-26.
16297 SCRA 30.
17Section 11(1), Article III of PPA Administrative Order 03-85.
18Section 32(f), Article V of PPA Administrative Order 03-85.
19Exhibit 7-B.
20TSN, June 30, 2008, pp. 18-19.
21TSN, June 30, 2008, pp. 19-20.
2257 Am Jur 2d, p. 663.
23TSN, November 25, 2008, p. 21.
24Exhibit B.
25Exhibit K.
26Exhibit L.
27Choa Tek Hee v. Phil. Publishing Co., 34 Phil. 447; Sanz v. Lavin Bros.,
6 Phil. 299; Rubiso v. Rivera, 41 Phil. 39; Heredia v. Salinas, 10 Phil. 157;
Song Fo & Co. v. Hawaiian-Philippine Co., 34 Phil. 447; Siguenza v. CA,
137 SCRA 510; Refractories Corp. v. IAC, 176 SCRA 539.
28Hua Ling Electrical Equipment v. Reyes, 145 SCRA 713; Danao v. CA,
154 SCRA 447; Perfecto v. Gonzales, 128 SCRA 635; Raagas v. Troya, 22
SCRA 839.
APPENDIX A

Regional Trial Court
Pasig City
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff,
– versus – Crim. Case No. 12345-H
Violation of R.A. 6539
ROMULO TAKAD,
(Anti-Carnapping Act)
Accused.
x----------------------------------------x
INFORMATION
The prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges
Romulo Takad with the crime of violation of R.A. 6539 (Anti-Carnapping
Act), committed as follows:
On or about November 21, 2007, in Pasig City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, with intent to
gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner, did,
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal
and drive away a Kawasaki motorcycle with sidecar, colored
black, bearing plate No. TU-9952, with a value of P80,000.00,
belonging to Bayan Development Corporation, represented by
Zenny G. Aguirre, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
Contrary to law.
Pasig City, November 22, 2007.
Isidro T. De Leon
Prosecutor III
I certify that this information is filed pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, the accused having opted not to
avail of his right to a preliminary investigation and not having executed a
waiver of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ismael T. Duldulao
Prosecutor III
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this 22nd day of November, 2007 in

Pasig City.
David P. Collantes
Asst. City Prosecutor
By the authority of the City Prosecutor under Office Order No. 2001-021
dated June 21, 2006.
Andres C. Ranjo
Prosecutor III
Approving Prosecutor
Witnesses:
1. Zenny G. Aguirre, 54 Helena St., Teresita Vill., Marikina City
2. Carlos P. Parlade, 84 West Road, Maybunga, Pasig City
3. Mario S. Mankas, 94 West Road, Maybunga, Pasig City
Bail Recommended: One Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos
(P180,000.00)

Branch 123
Pasig City
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Plaintiff,
- versus - CRIM. CASE NO. 12345-H
ROMULO C. TAKAD,
Accused.
x-----------------------------------------x
TRANSCRIPT of stenographic notes taken at the hearing on January 7,

2004 before the HON. LORNA S. ACOSTA.
Appearances:
Prosec. ISIDRO T. DE LEON, Public Prosecutor.
Atty. PAULO A. CRUZ, Counsel for the Accused
ZENNY G. AGUIRRE – Prosecution witness
COURT: Call the witness.
INTERPRETER: Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you will give
in this trial shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so
help you God.
A. I do, ma’am.
INTERPRETER: State your name and personal circumstances.
A. ZENNY AGUIRRE, 33 years old, employee of Bayan Development
Corp., and residing at 54 Helena St., Tanza Village, Marikina.
PROSEC. DE LEON: The witness is being presented to testify on the loan
obtained by Ma. Teresa Lacsamana, the live-in-partner of the accused,
respecting the tricycle subject of this case; also on the whereabouts of the
tricycle and how the accused took it while in possession of a certain Carlos
Parlade, the assignee of the tricycle. May it please your honor?
COURT: Proceed.
PROSEC. DE LEON: (DIRECT EXAMINATION)
Q. Ms. Aguirre, what is your work?
A. I am an account officer of Bayan Development Corporation or BDC.
Q. Since when have you been with the BDC?
A. Since 1995.
Q. What kind of business is BDC doing?
A. It extends loans to Sakbayan members and the members of Tricycle
Operators and Drivers Associations or TODA.
Q. Do you remember having extended a loan to Ma. Teresa Lacsamana?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When was that?
A. Sometime in May 2003.
Q. How much loan did she get?
A. It was a group loan of P480,000.00 but her share in it was P80,000.00.
Q. Do you have evidence of that loan?
A. We have the promissory note, the chattel mortgage, and the Kasunduan.
Q. I am showing to you a copy of a Kasunduan, is this it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now on the third page or this Kasunduan, there are six “borrowers,”
will you kindly point to us the name of Ma. Teresa Lacsamana?
A. This is her name.
PROSEC. DE LEON: (Witness pointing to the document.) We request that
the document be marked as Exhibit “A.”
COURT: Mark them.
PROSEC. DE LEON: Whose signature is this on top of the typed name
Ma. Teresa Lacsamana?
A. That is her signature.
Q. How did you know that it is her signature?
A. I was present when she signed that document.
Q. Are you authorized to represent BDC before this Court?
A. Yes, sir, I have a written authority.
Q. What happened after you granted that loan to Ms. Lacsamana?
A. We released the tricycle to her. That was the time I met the accused
Takad because he came with her to get the tricycle.
Q. What was the paying period of the loan?
A. Thirty months, sir.
Q. Did Ms. Lacsamana comply with the paying period?
A. No, sir, sometimes she failed to pay.
Q. When was her last payment?
A. If I am not mistaken her last payment was for the month of July 2007.
Q. What action did the BDC take when Ms. Lacsamana defaulted in her
loan after July 2007?
A. BDC pulled out the tricycle from her on October 2, 2007.
Q. What was its basis for pulling out the tricycle?
A. Under the Kasunduan, if the borrower was unable to pay, the tricycle
could be pulled out from him.
Q. What did you do with the tricycle?
A. We gave it to the treasurer of the group, Mr. Ricardo Marasigan, for
him to manage.
Q. By the way, Ms. Aguirre, in whose name was the Official Receipt and
the Car Registration of the tricycle registered?
A. In the name of Ma. Teresa Lacsamana.
Q. Are these the copies of the CR and OR, previously marked as Exhibit
“B” and “B-1”?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. For how long was the tricycle placed under the temporary management
of the treasurer of the group?
A. More or less 15 days.
Q. After 15 days, what happened?
A. I agreed with Ms. Lacsamana to give her until October 17 within which
to redeem the tricycle and, if not, we will permanently repossess the tricycle.
Q. Did Ms. Lacsamana comply with her undertaking?
A. No, sir.
A. On October 18 we got the tricycle from the treasurer of their group.
Q. What happened after that?
A. October 18 was a Friday. On October 22, Ms. Lacsamana and Mr.
Takad went to our office. They wanted to pay the outstanding balance of her
loan so we could release the tricycle.
Q. Did you allow them to pay her outstanding balance?
A. No, sir.
Q. What happened after you did not allow them to pay her outstanding
balance on the loan?
A. Takad said, “Huwag na huwag kong makikita ang tricycle sa Pasig.”
A. We kept it for a while until November 20.
Q. And what did you do with it after November 20?
A. We gave the tricycle to Carlos Parlade, the new assignee.
Q. Did you have documents to show this assignment to Mr. Parlade?
A. None because, before we could draw up one, at 1:00 o’clock on the
early morning of November 21, Mr. Parlade told me that the tricycle was
missing. He called the office in the morning.
Q. What did you do about it?
A. I went to see Mr. Parlade and asked him for details regarding how the
tricycle was lost.
Q. What did he tell you?
ATTY. CRUZ: Asking for hearsay evidence, Your Honor.
PROSEC. DE LEON: He already testified that she went to Carlos Parlade
and asked him for details. My question is a follow up, Your Honor.
COURT: Answer.
A. He told me that he saw the tricycle being driven away by someone.
Q. Did Mr. Parlade tell you who stole the tricycle?
A. He described the man as small, with short hair, and with a face towel on
his shoulder.
Q. Do you remember having given a statement to the police?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Showing to you this statement dated November 21, 2007, is this the
statement that you mentioned?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. There is a signature on top of the word “nagsasalaysay,” do you know
whose signature it is?
A. My signature.
PROSEC. DE LEON: We request that her statement be marked as Exhibits
“C” for the prosecution.
COURT: Mark them as requested.
PROSEC. DE LEON:
Q. Apart from that statement, do you remember having given any other
with respect to this incident?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I’m showing to you this statement dated November 22, previously
marked as Exhibit “D,” is this the other statement you referred to?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Whose signature is that over the name Zenny Aguirre?
A. My signature, sir.
Q. How much was the value of the vehicle?
A. P80,000.00.
Q. Where is it right now?
A. I do not know where the tricycle is right now.
PROSEC. DE LEON: That is all.
COURT: Cross.
ATTY. CRUZ: (CROSS EXAMINATION)
Q. The Certificate of Registration of the tricycle dated May 29, 2007 is in
the name of Ma. Teresa Lacsamana and the LTO Official Receipt of the same
date is also in her name. Are these the evidence of her ownership of the
tricycle?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I understand that your company, BDC, loaned to Ms. Lacsamana the
money that she used to buy the tricycle, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. She was to pay BCD in daily installments according to the Kasunduan,
is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did Ms. Lacsamana execute a chattel mortgage on the tricycle in favor
of BDC?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is the execution of the chattel mortgage part of the Kasunduan?
A. Yes, sir, that is one of the documents.
Q. When she was not able to pay the installments, it was BDC that took the
tricycle from Ms. Lacsamana?
A. Yes, sir, with the group.
Q. I understand that at the time you took the tricycle from her, Ms.
Lacsamana asked you not to take the tricycle yet but to give her a chance to
pay her arrears?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. But you did not grant her request?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you get a court order transferring ownership of the tricycle from
Ms. Lacsamana to BCD before you took the tricycle?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you get a court order authorizing you to take the tricycle from Ms.
Lacsamana?
A. No, sir.
Q. You took it from her because she could not pay her debt, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you make an effort to buy the tricycle from Ms. Lacsamana before
it was stolen?
A. No, sir.
Q. It is your understanding that when she did not pay her debt, the
ownership of the tricycle is automatically transferred to BDC, is that right?
A. No, sir, since she had not paid her obligation, BDC still owns the
tricycle.
Q. Let us make it clear, you said that BDC loaned Ms. Lacsamana the
money, which she used to buy the tricycle; it was not BDC that bought the
tricycle, it was Ms. Lacsamana who bought the tricycle?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who is the owner of the tricycle?
A. Ma. Teresa Lacsamana is the owner of the tricycle. But the money she
used in buying the tricycle was the money of BDC.
Q. In other words, as you understood it, if she did not pay the loan, the
BDC becomes the owner of the tricycle, correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Because of your understanding, you did not bother to file any action in
court to transfer ownership of the tricycle from Lacsamana to BDC, is that
right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. According to you, the tricycle was stolen from near the house of Carlos
Parlade at 1:00 o’clock of November 21, 2007. Since you were not there
when it happened, you merely heard about it from Mr. Parlade is that correct?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Mr. Parlade told you about it at 7:00 o’clock of that same morning, is
that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Mr. Parlade told you that he and the driver of the tricycle, saw a man
driving away with the tricycle, is that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. He also told you that, unfortunately, he did not recognize the man
because he was driving away, is that right?
A. They did not know him but then he recognized him because they faced
each other.
Q. But Mr. Parlade told you that he did not know the accused Takad
personally?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Did Mr. Parlade tell you that he was able to see the man’s appearance as
well as his face?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. And when you heard from Mr. Parlade that the tricycle had been stolen,
you thought right away that it was the accused Takad who did it, is that right?
A. Yes, Sir. That formed in my mind.
Q. You thought that the thief was accused Takad because he warned you
against his seeing the tricycle in Pasig, is that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. And you told Parlade about who you thought took the tricycle, is that
right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. And, based on your description of accused Takad, Mr. Parlade agreed
with you?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. You said that after the BDC finally pulled out the tricycle from Mr.
Marasigan on November 18, Ms. Lacsamana and accused Takad went to
BDC and offered to redeem the tricycle by paying all the arrears on it, is that
right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Under what authority did you refuse Ms. Lacsamana the right to redeem
her tricycle by paying all her arrears?
A. I asked my boss if we would allow her to get it back. We had reports
that the tricycle might be dismantled and its parts sold (kahuyin). My boss
answered in the negative. The accused had a reputation for dismantling
tricycles in Palatiw.
Q. You said that, after you refused redemption of the tricycle, accused
Takad said, “Wag na wag kong makikita ang tricycle na ‘yan sa Pasig.” And
it was this remark that made you conclude that he was the one who stole the
tricycle. Is that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Are you sure that all he said was, “Wag na wag kong makikita ang
tricycle na ‘yan sa Pasig.” That is all he said?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Did he say, in addition, “Kung makikita ko ‘yan sa Pasig, nanakawin ko
‘yang tricycle na ‘yan.” Did he say that?
A. No, Sir.
Q. If he did not say “kung makikita ko ‘yan sa Pasig, nanakawin ko ‘yang
tricycle na ‘yan,” the idea that he meant to steal the tricycle in Pasig is only
your idea. Is that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. He could have very well meant that “kung makikita ko ‘yan sa Pasig,
idedemanda ko kayo ng carnapping dahil wala kayong karapatang kunin ang
tricycle sa kanya.” That is what he could have meant. Is that right?
A. Maybe, Sir.
ATTY. CRUZ: That is all, Your Honor.
COURT: Re-direct
PROSEC. DE LEON: No redirect, Your Honor.
(CAPTION OF CASE OMITTED)
TRANSCRIPT of stenographic notes taken at the hearing of the above
entitled case on January 27, 2008.
COURT: You may call your witness.
PROSEC. DE LEON: May we call to the witness stand Mr. Carlos Parlade.
COURT: Swear in the witness.
INTERPRETER: Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you will give
in this trial shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so
help you, God.
A. I do, ma’am.
A. Carlos Parlade, 50 years old, married, construction worker, presently
residing at #84 West Road, Maybunga, Pasig City.
PROSEC. DE LEON: His testimony is being offered to prove that BDC
gave the tricycle subject of this case to Mr. Parlade; that when he went home
sometime on November 21, 2007, he saw the accused steal the tricycle; he
will identify his statement and the accused in this case and give other relevant
statements.
Q. Mr. witness, where were you on November 21, 2007 at 1:00 o’clock in
the morning?
A. I was in my house.
Q. Where is your house located, Mr. Parlade?
A. At 84 West Road, Maybunga, Pasig City.
Q. On November 21, 2007 at around 1:00 o’clock in the morning, do you
remember any unusual incident that happened in that place?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And what was that unusual incident?
A. I lost a tricycle.
Q. Where did this tricycle come from?
A. From BDC, sir.
Q. What were you doing at that time?
A. I had just entered the house then.
Q. And what were you doing then?
A. Since it was raining and I was wet, I changed my clothes.
Q. What did you do after that?
A. I went out of the house to chain the tricyle.
Q. Were you able to chain the tricycle after you went out of your house?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why not?
A. Because I saw someone pushing the tricycle away.
Q. When you said “tinutulak niya ang tricycle,” to whom are you referring
to?
A. The person who got the tricycle.
Q. Is that person who got the tricycle in Court?
A. Yes, sir, he is the one.
INTERPRETER: Witness pointed to a person seated on the bench who,
when asked, gave his name as Romulo Takad.
PROSEC. DE LEON: After you saw the accused pushing the tricycle
away, what did you do?
A. I shouted at him. I said “Hoy, bat dala-dala mo iyang motor.”
Q. What did the accused do, if any?
A. He turned and faced me.
Q. Were you able to recognize him?
A. The face, I recognized him.
Q. Would you please describe the place where this happened?
A. A light from the post lighted the place. The tricycle was five meters
from my house.
Q. What kind of light was that, Mr. witness?
A. It was a big streetlight.
Q. You said that the tricycle was five meters from your house when you
saw the accused pushing it. How far was the accused from your house?
A. Also five meters, sir.
Q. After you shouted at him, what did the accused do?
A. He faced me, kicked start the engine, and then drove away.
Q. What did you do next, if any?
A. I ran after him but since the tricycle ran so fast, I was not able to catch
up with it.
Q. What did you do after that, if any?
A. I reported the theft of the tricycle to Ms. Zenny Aguirre and we looked
for the tricycle the whole night.
Q. Were you able to locate it?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you execute an affidavit with regards to this case?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I am showing to you a sworn statement earlier marked as Exhibit E, is
this your statement?
A. This is the one.
Q. Whose signature is this over the name Carlos Parlade?
A. That is my signature.
PROSEC. DE LEON: That would be all, Your Honor.
COURT: Cross.
ATTY. CRUZ: Your affidavit says that you appeared before the police at
1:30 p.m. on November 21, 2007, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The tricycle was stolen in the early morning of November 21, and you
gave your statement to the police in the afternoon of the same day, is that
right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The police investigator asked you the questions and then you gave your
answers, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. All the answers that appear on this sworn statement were exactly as you
told the police, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And did you read the sworn statement before you sign it?
A. I was asked to read it.
Q. You signed it because you found nothing wrong with it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You said in your sworn statement that you are a member of the
Maybunga Security Force, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Your work involved looking for persons who commit crimes in your
barangay, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were you aware then that it was important for you, as a witness to a
crime, to give a good description of the person whom you saw stole your
tricycle?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You said that you saw his face. Did you see it clearly?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you note that he had fair or light complexion?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You also naturally noted that he had short crop hair, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You also noticed that he had pronounced jaws?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. But, although you noted these details of his face, you still did not tell
the police when you reported the crime that he had fair or light complexion,
is that right?
A. Because the police did not ask me those details.
Q. But, since you knew because of your experience that those details were
important to the police, when you were not asked, you did not bother to still
give the police your description of the face of this person?
A. I was not able to remember those.
Q. Please go over your sworn statement and tell us if you gave to the
police those descriptions of the accused that you mentioned?
A. I said here, in answer to #14, “medyo maigsi ang buhok.”
Q. But the other description that he is of light complexion and has
pronounced jaws, did you put that in your statement?
A. No, sir.
Q. I read from your sworn statement that you arrived at your house at
around 1:00 o’clock in the morning and you said that you saw no one around,
is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You mean that the place was empty of people?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you parked the tricycle on the sidewalk next to your house?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You said that, as you went out of your house, you saw the accused
pushing the tricycle away, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, you said that when you saw the accused with the tricycle, he was
five meters from you, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In other words, he was somewhat near you?
A. Yes, sir, “medyo malapit siya.”
Q. Now, you said “medyo malapit siya,” please read what you said in your
sworn statement about the distance of the accused from you at that time.
A. “Nang makita ko medyo malayo na ang tricycle na itinutulak ng isang
tao.”
Q. You said when you testified that he was “medyo malapit” but you said
in your affidavit, “medyo malayo,” which is correct?
A. I said he was a bit far because he was five meters from me.
Q. You said that you shouted at the man on the tricycle and he looked back
but he suddenly started the motor and drove away with the tricycle, is that
right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Since the purpose of the man was to flee from you, he merely glanced
back, is that right?
A. Hindi po, opo, medyo matagal po.
Q. Opo, hindi po, what is really your answer?
A. Opo, medyo matagal po.
Q. After the taking of the tricycle, you spoke to Zenny Aguirre of BDC, is
that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And she told you that in October, Takad warned her against seeing the
tricycle in Pasig?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. But when you saw Zenny, you had not yet met the accused Takad, is
that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I understand that you went back to the police station on November 21,
at 5:30 in the afternoon?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The police told you that Takad had been arrested and you have to come
back and identify him, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When you went to the police station, they led you into a room and the
investigator pointed out Takad to you, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And he asked you if he was the one who took the tricycle?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In other words, you were not shown the accused Takad in a police line
up with other persons of the same built so you could try to pick him out as the
tricycle thief?
A. No, sir.
Q. When you saw him at the police station, was his appearance and
physical built the same as when you saw him take the tricycle?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is his appearance and built now the same as when you saw him take the
tricycle on November 21, 2007.
A. It seems he changed.
Q. What change did you notice?
A. He became fairer, now.
Q. That is the only change you noticed?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I notice that your answers to the questions are in Tagalog, are you
familiar with the Tagalog language?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When you say in Tagalog that “ang katawan ng tao ay manipis,” does
that mean that he is slim?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when you say that his body is “katamtaman ang laki,” does that
mean that he is medium built?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when you say the body is “malapad,” that means that he is
somewhat big?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you please read to us from item 14 of your affidavit the description
of the built of the person whom you saw stole the tricycle?
A. “Answer: Medyo malapad ng konti ang katawan at medyo maiksi ang
buhok.”
ATTY. CRUZ: May I request the accused Takad to stand up. Will you
agree with me that the body of the accused Takad, that the body is medium
built only?
A. I cannot tell.
ATTY. CRUZ: (Talking to the accused) How tall are you?
A. “5’5 ½”
Q. What is your weight?
A. 120 pounds.
ATTY. CRUZ: That would be all.
COURT: REDIRECT.
PROSEC. DE LEON: No redirect, Your Honor.
entitled case on February 19, 2008.
COURT: Swear the witness.
INTERPRETER: Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you would give
in this trial shall be the truth and nothing but the truth?
WITNESS: Yes, I do.
WITNESS: Mario S. Mankas, 19 years old, jobless, residing at 66 West
Road, Maybunga, Pasig City.
COURT: Your witness.
PROSEC. DE LEON. Your Honor, we are offering the testimony of this
witness to prove that he witnessed a carnapping incident on November 21,
2007 and other matters in relation thereto.
COURT: Proceed.
PROSEC. DE LEON: (DIRECT EXAMINATION)
Q. Mr. Mankas, on November 21, 2007 at around 2 a.m., do you remember
where you were?
A. I was playing computer at a neighbor’s house.
Q. Do you remember any unusual incident that happened at that time?
A. Yes, sir, I saw Kuya Carlos running after a tricycle.
Q. Who is this Kuya Carlos?
A. His full name is Carlos Parlade.
Q. What did you do then?
A. I also ran after the tricycle behind Kuya Carlos.
Q. Where you able to see that person driving the tricycle?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. If he is in the courtroom could you point to that person?
INTERPRETER: Witness pointed to a man wearing a beige T-shirt and
maong pants, who gave his name as Romulo Takad.
PROSEC. DE LEON:
Q. What was your position in relation to the tricycle when you saw this
man?
A. I was four steps away from him.
Q. Could you describe the place, whether or not it was lighted?
A. It was lighted.
Q. In relation to this incident, do you remember having executed an
affidavit?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I am showing to you a Sinumpaang Salaysay, is this your affidavit?
A. Yes, sir, it is the one.
Q. Whose signature is this on top of the name Mario Mankas?
A. It is mine.
PROSEC. DE LEON: May I ask that the Sinumpaang Salaysay be marked
as our Exhibit “F.” I think I have no more questions, Your Honor.
COURT: Cross.
ATTY. CRUZ: May it please, Your Honor.
COURT: Proceed.
ATTY. CRUZ: (CROSS-EXAMINATION)
Q. Your name is Mario?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. May I call you Mario?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Mario, your sworn statement says that you appeared before the police at
4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of November 21, 2003, is that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. The police investigator asked you the question and then you gave your
answer, is that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. So, all the answers that appear in the sworn statement were exactly as
you told them to the police investigator?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. How far was your neighbor’s house, where you played computer, from
the house of your Kuya Carlos?
A. About 10 meters, sir.
Q. This house where you played computer was along West Road. Is that
right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. The way I understand it, you were playing computer at the time the
tricycle of Kuya Carlos was stolen?
A. I just finished playing the computer.
Q. So, what were you doing at the time the tricycle was stolen?
A. I was washing my hands at the gate in the front yard.
Q. So, where was the faucet located?
A. Near the side of the gate.
Q. When you were washing your hands, were you facing the road or were
you facing the house?
A. I was facing the road.
Q. So, as you were washing your hands, you saw the tricycle and your
Kuya Carlos running after it?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Do you know how to drive a tricycle?
A. No, Sir.
Q. Are you familiar with the speed of tricycle passing along West Road
shortly after midnight?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. What is the usual speed of tricycles passing West Road after midnight?
A. “Medyo mabilis.”
Q. You said in your sworn statement that this tricycle was running very
fast. Would you say that it was running at least twice the usual speed of
tricycles running on that road after midnight?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When you saw the tricycle, was the tricycle in front of you or it has
already passed you?
A. It was still in front of me.
Q. And it was running, according to you at twice the speed of other
tricycles?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Now, you said that you saw your Kuya Carlos running after the tricycle.
Is that right?
Q. So, how far was he behind the tricycle?
A. About 9 to 10 meters away?
Q. You said that the tricycle was running at a very fast speed. If the driver
of the tricycle was driving very fast, you will agree with me that you only had
a brief glance of the driver. Is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And apart from the fact that the tricycle was running at a very fast
speed, you could not have seen much of the person driving it because, as you
said in paragraph 5 of the affidavit, “hindi ko gaanong namukhaan dahil
nakayuko ako.” Is that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Now, because you only had a glance of the man and because your head
was bowed down, when you were asked by the police to describe the man on
the tricycle, you could only describe his built. Is that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. As he was moving away from you, did the driver wave his arms?
A. No, Sir.
Q. Did he stand on the tricycle seat?
A. No, Sir.
Q. Did he swing his body to the right or to the left?
A. No, Sir.
Q. So, he sat still on the tricycle holding the steering bars as the tricycle
sped away from you. Is that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. That was how you saw him. Is that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Are you sure?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. You merely had a glance at him, right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Your head was bowed down. The man did not move but he just sat still
holding the steering bars of the tricycle. Yet, you said in your affidavit that
you were able to identify him partly by how his body moved?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, you said in your affidavit that you were able to identify the man
on the tricycle as the accused Takad because of the shape of his body?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Was the man on the tricycle that you saw a hunchback?
A. No, Sir.
Q. Did his body have an abnormal shape?
A. None, Sir.
Q. Was there anything about the shape of the body of the man on the
tricycle that is different from the body of other men of the same size as him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was abnormal about his body?
A. Medyo maskulado, sir.
ATTY. CRUZ: May ask the accused to stand up and turn his back for the
Court to observe whether his is a mascular person.
PROSEC. DE LEON: Your Honor, that is way back year 2003 and today is
already February 2004. The built of a man changes especially when he is in
jail, Your Honor.
ATTY. CRUZ: Well, Carlos Parlade testified that accused Takad had the
same appearance during the taking of the tricycle as when he was in Court.
Q. You also said that you identified the man on the tricycle by the shape of
his nape or “batok”?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Was the nape of the man on the tricycle abnormally shaped?
A. No, Sir.
Q. So, it looks like the “batok” of other people. Is that right?
A. Not really, Sir.
Q. What is the difference between the “batok” of that man on the tricycle
and the “batok” of other men?
A. The nape of this man was longer.
ATTY. CRUZ: Will the prosecution stipulate that the length of the nape of
the accused is about 2 inches from the neckline of his T-shirt?
PROSEC. DE LEON: We so stipulate.
ATTY. CRUZ: Who brought you to the police station to give your
statement?
A. It was Kuya Carlos.
Q. He told you that you were going there to look at the person who stole
the tricycle?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. You were brought to the police station because you were going to look
at the accused so you can identify him. Is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did the police place the accused Takad on a line of several men who
were more or less of the same built as he was?
A. No, Sir. He was just sitting.
Q. And when you entered the room, someone pointed the accused Takad to
you. Is that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. So, before you gave your statement to the police, you already had a
good look at Takad?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. So, when you were asked to describe the physical built of the person
who stole the tricycle, Takad was there in the room with you. Is that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Because you were looking at him there, you were able to say that he
was medium built. Is that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. In that room?
A. Yes, Sir.
ATTY. CRUZ: That is all, Your Honor.
PROSEC. DE LEON: No re-direct, Your Honor.
entitled case on March 12, 2008.
INTERPRETER: (swearing the witness) Do you solemnly swear that the
evidence you will give in this trial shall be truth, the whole truth and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
WITNESS: Yes, I do, Ma’am.
WITNESS: Romulo Takad, 43 years old, married, residing at 374 Villa
Street, Palatiw, Pasig City.
COURT: Proceed.
ATTY. CRUZ: (DIRECT EXAMINATION) We are offering the
testimony of the witness to belie the claim that he stole the tricycle subject of
this case.
Q. Mr. witness, do you know Teresa Lacsamana?
A. Yes, Sir. She is my live-in partner.
Q. Are you married?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you know a tricycle with Plate No. TS-9952 that the information
said you stole from the possession of Carlos Parlade?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know who owns that tricycle?
A. Yes, sir. It belongs to Ma. Teresa Lacsamana, sir.
Q. How do you know that she is the owner of the tricycle?
A. Because I was with her when she got the tricycle from BDC.
Q. Who represented BDC when you went there?
A. Ms. Zenny Aguirre, sir.
Q. Why were you there when Ms. Lacsamana took the tricycle?
A. She told me to accompany her so I could drive it home.
Q. Ms. Aguirre testified that Ms. Lacsamana defaulted on her installment
payments, is that true?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And, because of that she said that BDC pulled out the tricycle from Ms.
Lacsamana and turned it over to Mr. Ricardo Marasigan, the treasurer of their
group.
A. No, sir.
Q. What is the truth?
A. The truth is that we were the once who brought the tricycle to the house
of Ricardo Marasigan.
Q. Why did you bring the tricycle to the house of Mr. Marasigan?
A. Because Ms. Aguirre requested us to bring it there.
Q. What is the reason for that?
A. In the meantime, the tricycle was to be in the care and custody of the
treasurer of their group.
Q. According to Ms. Aguirre the tricycle was pulled out by BDC from Ms.
Lacsamana on November 18, 2006, is that true?
A. No, sir.
Q. What is the truth?
A. The truth is that she took the tricycle from the treasurer of the group on
October 18, 2006.
Q. Were you and Ms. Lacsamana informed about the action of BDC before
they pulled out the tricycle?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why do you remember that they pulled out the tricycle on October 18,
2006?
A. Because there was a verbal agreement between Ms. Lacsamana and Ms.
Aguirre that Ms. Lacsamana could redeem the tricycle by paying her arrears
on October 17. Ms. Lacsamana mortgaged her car to raise the money.
Q. And, was Ms. Lacsamana able to pay what she owed on October 17,
2006?
A. No, sir, because we arrived late at the office of BDC and it was already
closed.
Q. And, what did you do?
A. On October 18, we went to the house of the treasurer of the group to
request him to accompany us to BDC but we found out that the tricycle had
already been taken from him.
Q. And, did you go to BDC as you said you will?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And, whom did you see there?
A. Ms. Aguirre, sir.
Q. And, what did you tell her?
A. Ms. Lacsamana and I requested Ms. Aguirre to allow us to pay what
was due on the tricycle.
Q. And, what did she tell you?
A. Ms. Aguirre would not allow us.
Q. Did she tell you why she would not allow you?
A. She said that her company did not want to give us the tricycle anymore
because we did not have the means to pay the balance.
Q. How much did Ms. Lacsamana owe BDC on the date you went there to
redeem the tricycle?
A. According to Ms. Aguirre it was more than P14,000.00.
Q. And, did you have enough money to pay your balance of more than
P14,000.00 at the time you went there?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. According to Ms. Aguirre after she declined Ms. Lacsamana’s attempt
to redeem the tricycle, you warned her that you should not see the tricycle in
Pasig implying that you threatened to do something if that happened, is that
true?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why? What was it that you told her concerning the tricycle?
A. I pleaded with Ms. Aguirre that I hope I will not see the tricycle in our
place because it was going to hurt us if we will see it there considering that
we spent a lot of time and sweat looking after the tricycle and it would pain
us so much to see it there.
Q. And, what did Ms. Aguirre tell you after you told her what you said?
A. Ms. Aguirre said, okay.
Q. Between the time you spoke to Ms. Aguirre and the time that you were
taken by police officers on November 21, 2007, did you see the tricycle in
Pasig?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did anyone tell you among your friends or relatives having seen the
tricycle in Pasig between the time you talked to Ms. Aguirre and the time you
were taken by the police on November 21, 2007?
A. None, sir.
Q. Carlos Parlade testified that he saw you take the tricycle of Ms.
Lacsamana away from near his house at 374 West Road, Maybunga, Pasig
City, where it was parked at 1:00 o’clock in the morning of November 21,
2007. Mario S. Mankas also testified that at 2:00 o’clock in the morning of
the same day he saw you driving away the tricycle from the house of Carlos
Parlade. Now you were present when they testified about this?
A. I was here, sir.
Q. What can you say about these testimonies of Mr. Parlade and Mr.
Mankas?
A. Those were not true, sir.
Q. Do you remember where you were on the early morning of November
21, 2007?
A. I was at the house sleeping.
Q. Who else were in your house in the morning of November 21, 2007?
A. I was alone, sir.
Q. Where was Ms. Lacsamana?
A. She was in Singapore, sir.
Q. How were you able to remember that you were at home in the morning
of November 21, 2007?
A. Because I was awakened by the police who took me.
Q. When Mr. Parlade was asked in his Sinumpaang Salaysay in a question
and answer form and I quote: “Q – Ano ba ang itsura ng taong nakita mong
nagnakaw ng inyong tricycle? A. Nakasando ng kulay puti, nakapantalon ng
maong, medyo malapad ng konti ang katawan at medyo maiksi ang buhok.”
Please stand up, Mr. Witness, so the Court can observe whether you are slim,
medium built, or wide in body. What is your height, Mr. Witness?
A. 5’5 ½ inches, sir.
Q. And, what is your weight now?
A. 120 lbs., sir.
Q. What was your weight on November 21, 2007?
A. It was probable that I weighed less because “baksak ang katawan.”
Q. Do you have evidence of how you looked on November 21, 2007 or
about that date?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why do you say that, do you have evidence?
A. I had my picture taken at Pariancillo after the police arrested me.
INTERPRETER: Witness is turning over his picture to the interpreter and
to the presiding judge.
ATTY. CRUZ:
Q. And, when was this pictures taken?
A. Before my inquest.
ATTY. CRUZ: May we request that this picture be marked as Exhibits “1”
for the defense.
COURT: Mark it.
ATTY. CRUZ: How old are you, Romulo?
A. Going to 43, sir.
Q. During the past 40 years, were you ever charged with the commission
of any crime before the police, the barangays, the courts, or the fiscal’s
offices?
A. None, sir.
ATTY. CRUZ: That will be all, Your Honor.
COURT: Cross?
PROSEC. DE LEON: Mr. Witness, you mentioned that you reside at 374
Villa Street, Palatiw, Pasig City. How far is this from West Road, Maybunga,
Pasig City?
A. It is quite far, sir.
Q. Give us an estimate of the distance?
A. From the Pasig Kapitolyo to Edsa Shrine in Ortigas.
Q. Do you reckon by road distance, using the regular route?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is there available public transportation running that route on a 24-hour
basis?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In other words, if you want to go to Maybunga Pasig you can go there
anytime?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did you feel when the tricycle was taken from Teresa Lacsamana?
A. I had hurt feelings.
Q. Since you were hurt, if you were given the chance to get back the
tricycle, would your hurt feelings be cured?
A. Some of my pains would be relieved.
Q. Since that would relive your pains, you would do any means to get the
tricycle?
A. I will do everything to repossess the tricycle in a legal way.
Q. What do you mean by doing everything to get the tricycle back in a
legal way?
A. What I mean in a legal way is we will pay BDC what we owe on the
tricycle.
Q. You mentioned a while ago that you tendered payment but Ms. Aguirre
rejected it, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. At that instance when she rejected the payment, what came into your
mind aside from the pain that you felt?
A. I pleaded with Ms. Aguirre.
Q. You pleaded with her, how did you plea with her?
A. I pleaded with Ms. Aguirre that I hope the tricycle will not be seen in
our place.
Q. And, did you come to know that the tricycle was given to Mr. Parlade?
A. It was only when the tricycle was stolen that I came to know that it was
given to Carlos Parlade.
COURT: Redirect?
ATTY. CRUZ: No redirect, Your Honor.
COURT: Session resumed. Call your last witness.
ATTY. CRUZ: May we call on our last witness, Maria Teresa Lacsamana,
to the witness stand.
INTERPRETER: (swearing the witness) Do you solemnly swear that the
evidence you will give in this trial shall be the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth, so help you God?
WITNESS: Yes, I do ma’am.
INTERPRETER: Please state your name, age, and other personal
circumstances.
WITNESS: MARIA TERESA LACSAMANA, 33 years old, single,
businesswoman, residing at No. 374 Villa Street, Palatiw, Pasig City.
ATTY. CRUZ: I am offering the testimony of the witness for the purpose
of belying the testimony of Ms. Aguirre concerning the circumstances under
which the tricycle was taken from her.
Q. Do you know the accused Romulo Takad?
A. Yes, sir.
A. He is at present my live-in partner, sir.
Q. Are you married?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you know this tricycle with Plate No. TS-9952 that Ms. Aguirre said
you took from BDC by way of loan?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Ms. Aguirre said that you defaulted in the installment payments of the
tricycle, is that true?
A. I was unable to pay the installments for fifteen days.
Q. When you were unable to pay those installments, what happened to the
tricycle?
A. Ms. Aguirre took it and we surrendered it to our treasurer, Mr.
Marasigan.
Q. What agreement, if any, did you have with Ms. Aguirre concerning the
payment of the amount due to BDC?
A. Ms. Aguirre gave me a deadline to pay the balance.
Q. Do you remember the date of that deadline?
A. She gave us a deadline of October 17.
Q. Were you able to pay your balance on the tricycle on October 17?
A. No, sir, I was not able to pay on October 17 because I was only able to
get the money in the afternoon.
Q. Where did you get the money you were going to use to pay for the
balance of the tricycle?
A. I mortgaged my car for P100,000.00.
Q. Were you able to pay for your balance on that tricycle on October 17,
2006 as you agreed with Ms. Aguirre?
A. I went to BDC to pay my balance but it was already closed and I
returned on October 18 to pay but Ms. Aguirre did not accept my payment.
Q. How much at that time did you owe BDC when you went there on
October 18?
A. I owed it P14,000.00 including the interest.
Q. Did you have money to pay for the balance?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You said that Ms. Aguirre refused to accept your payment, did she tell
you the reason why she refused to accept your payment?
A. She did not give any reason why she did not accept the balance that I
was paying her but she said if she gave me another chance I might not able to
pay the rest.
Q. Now, according to Ms. Aguirre after she refused to allow you to redeem
the motorcycle, accused Romulo Takad, told her that he should not see the
tricycle in Pasig City, is this true?
A. Romulo Takad told Ms. Aguirre that if she will not accept the balance
they were tendering if possible that he should not see the tricycle in Pasig
because it was going to hurt him.
Q. And, what was the reaction of Ms. Aguirre when Romulo Takad said
that?
A. There was no reaction from Ms. Aguirre but she only said, “Sige, pero
taga-Pasig lang din ako.”
Q. Where were you in the early morning of November 21, 2006?
A. I was in Singapore, sir.
Q. When did you leave for Singapore?
A. November 16, sir.
Q. And, when did you come back to the Philippines?
A. December 14, sir.
ATTY. CRUZ: That is all for the witness, Your Honor.
COURT: Cross?
PROSEC. DE LEON: When did you leave for Singapore, Madam
Witness?
A. November 16, sir.
Q. What year, Madam Witness?
A. 2007, sir.
Q. In other words, on November 21, 2007 you did not have personal
knowledge whatsoever of what transpired since you were in Singapore?
A. Yes, sir, I did not have any knowledge of it.
PROSEC. PARAS: No more questions, Your Honor.
COURT: Redirect?
ATTY. CRUZ: No redirect, Your Honor.
KASUNDUAN
Ang kasunduang ito ay sa pagitan ng BAYAN DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, na babanggitin dito bilang BDC at ng SCCPPTODA 2 na
babanggitin dito bilang SAMAHAN.
Kaming mga kasapi ng SCCPPTODA 2, sa pulong na ginanap ngayong
ika-19 ng March 2007, ay nagkaisa at nagpasya sa mga sumusunod:
1. Na ang halangang nahiram sa BDC Sakbayan Program ay gagamitin
lamang sang-ayon sa inaprubahang proyekto sa ilalim ng Sakbayan Program.
Ito ay ang mga sumusunod:
1.1 Paunang pondo para sa GROUP GUARANTEE FUND na itatatag para
sa SAMAHAN.
1.2 Pambili ng bagong motor at bagong sidecar.
2. Na ang halagang nahiram ng SAMAHAN na Four Hundred Eighty
Thousand Pesos (P480,000.00) o Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00) bawat
isa ay babayaran lamang sa loob ng thirty (30) months na may interest rate na
thirty-six percent (36%) per annum, add-on.
3. Na ang bawat kasapi ng samahan ay maghuhulog-bayad araw-araw sa
itinalagang Ingat-Yaman ng SAMAHAN sang ayon sa mga sumusunod:
3.1 Halagang P147.65 araw-araw sa loob ng thirty (30) months pagkatapos
ng ibinigay na taning na bilang ng araw para sa “break-in period.”
4. Na ang araw-araw na hulog bayad ng mga kasapi ng SAMAHAN ay
idedeposito lingguhan tuwing araw ng Miyerkules sa itinalagang Ingat-
Yaman sa Bangko kung saan ang SAMAHAN ay nagbukas ng isang
“Checking Account” na nasa pangalan ng kanilang Lider at Ingat-Yaman;
5. Na ang halagang inutang sa BDC ng SAMAHAN as babawasan ng
dalawa’t kalahating porsyento (2.5%) o halagang P12,000.00. Ang nasabing
ibinawas na halaga ay magsisilbing paunang pondo na ilalagak sa GROUP
GUARANTEE FUND ng SAMAHAN.
5.1 Na ang Group Guarantee Fund ng SAMAHAN ay ilalagak sa pag-
iingat ng BDC sa pangalan ng SAMAHAN;
5.2 Ang bawat kasapi ng SAMAHAN ay maghuhulog ng P10.00
araw-araw bilang lagak-kontribusyon sa Group Guarantee Fund. Ito ay
isasabay sa araw-araw na hulog-bayad para sa utang sa BDC na
nabanggit sa Kasunduan 3.1;
5.3 Na ang Group Guarantee Fund ng SAMAHAN ay kikita ng
interes na nagkakahalaga ng 5% kada taon.
5.4 Ang Group Guarantee Fund ng SAMAHAN ay hindi maaaring
galawin/gamitin ng sinuman sa SAMAHAN sa anumang oras o
pagkakataon. Ito ay lubusang ibibigay sa SAMAHAN kapag ang utang
sa BDC ay lubos nang nabayaran.
6. Na itinalaga si Danilo Mortel bilang Pangulo o Lider ng SAMAHAN na
siyang tagapangalaga nito; si Ricardo Marasigan bilang Ingat-Yaman na
siyang tagapangasiwa sa araw-araw na koleksyon at kalagayang pananalapi
ng SAMAHAN; at si Jerry Bolivar, bilang Awditor, na siyang mangangalaga
sa katumpakan ng koleksyon at mga bagay-bagay na may kinalaman sa
pananalapi ng SAMAHAN;
7. Na ang itinalagang Lider ng SAMAHAN ay mangunguna sa
pagpapatupad ng KASUNDUAN;
8. Na ang itinalagang Ingat-Yaman ay mahigpit na magpapasunod sa
itinakdang araw-araw na hulog bayad sang-ayon sa kas. 3.1, at lingguhang
mag-uulat sa kalagayang pananalapi at ng pagpapatupad ng koleksyon;
9. Na ang awditor ay magpapatibay sa katumpakan sa ulat ng Ingat-Yaman
batay sa kanyang sariling pagtutuos;
10. Na ang SAMAHAN ay magdaraos ng regular na pagpupulong na
gaganapin tuwing Biyernes sa ganap na 1:00 ng hapon;
10.1 Ang nasabing regular na pagpupulong ay dadaluhan ng BDC
Account Officer sa loob ng tatlong (3) buwan matapos maibigay ang
bagong tricycle. Pagkatapos noon, ang pagdalo ng Account Officer ay
magiging dalawang beses na lamang bawat buwan o sang-ayon sa
pangangailangan;
11. Ang SAMAHAN sa pangunguna ng Lider ay magpapatuloy sa regular
na lingguhang pagpupulong hanggang matapos at lubos na mabayaran ang
pagkakautang ng SAMAHAN sa BDC upang mapangalagaan ang pinansiyal
at kapakanan ng bawat kasapi;
12. Ang sinumang kasapi ng SAMAHAN na lumiban sa regular na
pagpupulong na walang pasubali at/o matibay na dahilan ay magmumulta ng
P50.00 sa bawat pagliban. Ito ay ilalagak sa Bangko ng SAMAHAN;
13. Ang multa sa pagliliban sa pulong ay dapat mabayaran sa loob ng
dalawang araw mula sa araw ng kaukulang pagpupulong. Ang pagwawalang
bahala sa nasabing multa ay mangangahulugan ng pagbawas nito sa araw-
araw na hulog-bayad ng kasaping nagkasala;
14. Ang patuloy na pagliban sa pagpupulong at pagwawalang bahala sa
pagbabayad-multa ay mangangahulugan ng paggamit sa sinasaad sa
probisyon bilang 15.1 ng kasunduang ito;
15. Na pananagutan ng SAMAHAN na bayaran o punan/ takpan ang
anumang pagkukulang sa hulog-bayad ng sinuman o alinman sa kasapi ng
SAMAHAN sa itinakdang araw ng bayaran sa BDC. Ito ay upang hindi
tumalbog ang hulog-tseke ng buong SAMAHAN. Subalit;
15.1 Kapag ang isang kasapi ay hindi makabigay ng tatlong
karampatang arawang hulog-bayad sa loob ng isang kinsenas o
napapaloob sa isang tseke sa BDC, ang kanyang tricycle ay hahatakin ng
SAMAHAN kasama ang linya (TODA) at/o prangkisa at ito ay
pangangasiwaan ng SAMAHAN upang ang arawang kita nito ay
tuwirang gagamitin ng SAMAHAN para sa darating na arawang hulog-
bayad ng kasaping nagkasala;
15.2 Ang nahatak na tricycle ay mananatili sa pangangasiwa ng
SAMAHAN hanggat’t hindi lubos na nababayaran ang nagging
pagkukulang sa SAMAHAN;
15.3 Ang tricycle na mula sa inutang sa BDC ay hindi maaaring
isanla, ibenta o ilipat ng pagmamay-ari hangga’t hindi pa lubusang
nababayaran ang utang at pananagutan sa BDC;
15.4 Bilang pagtataguyod sa mga nabanggit sa itaas na kasunduan
Blg. 15.2, at bilang proteksyon para sa SAMAHAN laban sa anumang
maaaring pagmamalabis ng sinumang kasapi, ang buong SAMAHAN ay
lalagda sa isang DEED OF SALE na ilalagak sa pag-iingat ng BDC.
Pinagtitibay din ng kasunduan na hangga’t tumutupad ng lubos sa
kasunduan ang buong SAMAHAN, ang nasabing DEED OF SALE ay
winawalang halaga at bisa ng BDC.
16. Na anuman ang mangyari sa alinmang tricycle ng sinumang kasapi ng
SAMAHAN (e.g., manakaw, masira bunga ng aksidente), ang buong
pagkakautang, balanse o natitirang pagkakautang ng SAMAHAN sa BDC ay
babayaran at aabonohan pa rin ng buong SAMAHAN;
17. Na ang biniling motorsiklo o tricycle ay ipapatala bilang pampublikong
sasakyan (dilaw na plaka) sa loob at hindi lalagpas ng dalawang (2) buwan
mula sa araw ng pagbibigay ng BDC sa naturang motor o tricycle sa
SAMAHAN;
18. Na ang SAMAHAN ay magsisilbing modelo o magandang halimbawa
sa buong TODA at komunidad sa pamamagitan ng pagtangkilik at pagtupad
sa “Siyam na Kapasyahan” ng BDC SAKBAYAN PROGRAM;
19. Na ang pagiging matagumpay ng SAMAHAN sa paghawak ng
kanilang proyekto na pinayagan sa ilalim ng BDC SAKBAYAN
PROGRAM, ang siyang magsisilbing daan tungo sa patuloy o pagtuloy-tuloy
ng mga serbisyo ng BDC sa SAMAHAN at kanilang TODA;
20. Na ang bawat kasapi ng SAMAHAN ay nauunawaan at sumasang-
ayon sa lahat ng nilalaman nitong Kasunduan at anumang paglabag ninuman
sa mga kasapi dito ay magsisilbing daan upang ang BDC, sa pamamagitan ng
SAMAHAN ay putulin ang ugnayan sa tiwaling kasapi at gawin ang
sumusunod;
20.1 Hatakin ang tricycle o mga tricycle kasama ng linya (TODA)
at/o prangkisa ng tiwaling kasapi na kabilang sa Chattel Mortgage
Contract sa BDC.
TULUNGAN NAWA KAMI NG DIYOS NA MAGAMPANAN NG
TAPAT ANG AMING MGA TUNGKULIN AT PANANAGUTAN.
PINAGTIBAY AT
NILAGDAAN:
BORROWERS:
JERRY BOLIVAR DANILO MORTEL RODEL
MA. TERESA LACSAMANA LANDIGAN JULIO ANDIN
RICARDO MARASIGAN
KINATAWAN NG BDC:
ZENNY G. AGUIRRE
Senior Account Officer
BDC Ortigas Branch
REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS)
MAKATI CITY ) S.S.
Sa harap ko, na isang Notaryo Publiko sa Makati City ngayong ika April 2,
2002, ay dumulog ang mga nakalagda sa itaas, na may katibayan ng
paninirahan sa nabanggit sa ilalim ng kani-kanilang pangalan, na nakilala ko
silang lahat bilang nagsasagawa ng naritong kasulatan na pinatunayan nila sa
harap ko na malayang ginawa at tinanggap at ayon sa kanilang kagustuhan.
SAKSI ANG AKING LAGDA AT SELYONG PANTATAK, ngayong ika
April 2, 2006 dito sa Makati City.
JOSEPH B. CARREON
Notary Public
Appointment No. M-212 (3/20/2006 to 12/31/2007)
Roll No. 51613; Surigao Sur
MCLE No. IV-0095784
PTR No. 076892 01-31-06 Makati
IBP No. 345986 01-21-06 Makati
2nd Floor 3560-B Hilario St.,
Fairview, Quezon City
Kas. Blg. 315;
Pahina 57;
Aklat Blg. 2;
Taon 2006.
APPENDIX B

Branch 107, Manila
BRENDA SIMON and LORENZO

GARCIA,
Plaintiffs,
Civil Case No.
- versus -
30012
SILVER FILMS, INC.,
Defendant.
x----------------------------------x
ORDER
For resolution are the following incidents:
1. Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendant Silver Films, Inc.;
2. Manifestation/Motion to Deny Silver Film’s Motion to Dismiss filed by
plaintiff Lorenzo Garcia;
3. Motion to Dismiss filed by plaintiff Brenda Simon;
4. Opposition with Motion to Strike Out the Motion to Dismiss of Brenda
Simon filed by plaintiff Lorenzo Garcia;
5. Comment on the Opposition filed by defendant Silver Films, Inc.;
6. Motion for Leave to file Supplemental Complaint and to Admit
Attached Supplemental Complaint filed by plaintiff Garcia;
7. Motion for Production, Inspection, and Copying of Documents filed by
plaintiff Garcia;
8. Opposition to the Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Complaint and
Motion for Production of Documents filed by defendant Silver Films, Inc.;
9. Manifestation filed by plaintiff Garcia on July 4, 2004;
10. Comment thereon filed by plaintiff Simon;
11. Comment on Manifestation filed by defendant Silver Films, Inc.; and
12. Manifestation filed by plaintiff Garcia on August 16, 2004.
Defendant Silver Films, Inc. first moved to dismiss the case on the ground
that the dispute between the parties had already been settled and amicably
resolved as per amendment to the 2000 and 2002 Contract dated June 17,
2003. Plaintiff Simon filed also a motion to dismiss on the basis of the said
Amendment and manifested that she is no longer interested in pursuing the
case. Plaintiff Garcia opposed the two motions alleging among others that the
Amendment dated June 17, 1998 was executed without his knowledge and
consent and contained provisions which were grossly disadvantageous to him
and should therefore be disapproved; that plaintiff Simon is not the real party
in interest and hence, not in a position to move for the dismissal of the case;
that plaintiff Simon’s motion does not comply with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the
Revised Rules of Court and prayed that plaintiff Simon’s motion to dismiss
be stricken out from the record.
Defendant Silver Films, Inc. joined plaintiff Simon in moving for the
dismissal of the case via its opposition to the motion to strike out arguing that
the motion to dismiss filed by plaintiff Solis was in accordance with Section
1, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court and that plaintiff Simon, as manager
of plaintiff Garcia can legally bind him. Plaintiff Garcia then moved for leave
to file supplemental complaint and to admit supplemental complaint as well
for production, inspection, and copying of the original contracts executed by
plaintiff with defendant Silver Films, Inc. for the years 2000, 2001, 2002
including the amendment, which was opposed by defendant Silver Films, Inc.
Subsequently, in the interest of expediting the settlement of the case, after
several preliminary conferences initiated by the Court and which were
attended only once by representative of defendant Silver Films, Inc., plaintiff
Garcia manifested his willingness to honor the Amendment dated June 17,
2003 provided that the same be considered a compromise agreement and
judgment be rendered by this Court in accordance therewith. Both defendant
Silver Films, Inc. and plaintiff Simon were not amenable to the same.
Defendant Silver Films, Inc. suggested instead that the case be settled by
implementing the agreement reached in the preliminary conference held on
June 23, 2003 and likewise, expressed its willingness to release plaintiff
Garcia from his 1999 and 2002 contracts. In reply, plaintiff Garcia observed
that defendant Silver Films, Inc. and plaintiff Simon appear to be repudiating
the very same Amendment they vigorously sought to enforce and bind
plaintiff Garcia.
From the foregoing, this Court notes that notwithstanding that the
Amendment dated June 17, 2003 was the basis of defendant Silver Films,
Inc.’s motion to dismiss, said defendant expressed its non-conformity with
plaintiff Garcia’s manifestation to abide by the terms of said amendment for
purposes of settling the case. The same holds true with respect to plaintiff
Simon who initially prayed for the dismissal of the case on the basis of said
amendment. The amendment however shows that she executed the same in
her capacity as manager/agent of plaintiff Garcia and thus, her
act/representation legally binds the principal, plaintiff Garcia, pursuant to the
rules on agency.
In view thereof, this Court, in the exercise of its discretion, resolves to
render judgment based on the Amendment to the 2000 and 2002 Contract
dated June 17, 2003 considering the same as a Compromise Agreement
between the parties. All the other motions are hereby denied for having
become moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, October 24, 2004
(Name omitted)
Judge

Branch 107, Manila
BRENDA SIMON and LORENZO
GARCIA,
Plaintiffs,
Civil Case No.
- versus -
30012
SILVER FILMS, INC.,
Defendant.
x----------------------------------x
ORDER
For the resolution are the following incidents:

1) Motion to Defer Filing of Answer and Motion for Reconsideration Re:
Order dated October 24, 2004 filed by defendant Silver Films, Inc., through
counsel, on November 20, 2004; 2) opposition thereto filed by plaintiff
Lorenzo Garcia, through counsel, on December 27, 2000; 3) Reply to
Opposition filed by defendant Silver Films, Inc., through counsel, on January
10, 2005; 4) Motion to Strike Out filed by Garcia, through counsel, on
November 28, 2004; 5) Opposition thereto filed by defendant, through
counsel, on November 29, 2004.
Defendant Silver Films, Inc. moved for reconsideration of the Order of the
Court dated October 24, 2004 alleging among others that there was no basis
in fact and in law for a compromise agreement there being no compromise
agreement submitted by the parties for the approval of the Court; the
judgment contained in the questioned order cannot be deemed a judgment
under Rule 36, nor a judgment by default, judgment on the pleadings, or
summary judgment since herein defendant has not yet filed its answer to the
complaint; if the motion to dismiss filed by defendant has been denied, then
the basis thereof — addendum dated June 17, 1998, cannot be used as the
basis for judgment on compromise; there was denial of due process as
defendant was not given the opportunity to file its answer after its motion to
dismiss had been denied.
Likewise, said defendant moved to defer the filing of its answer. In
opposition thereto, plaintiff Garcia argued that defendant seeks to repudiate
the Amendment dated June 17, 1998 in its attempt to have the questioned
order reconsidered but invokes the same amendment to have the instant
complaint dismissed; the subject amendment has all the requisites of a
compromise agreement having been signed by the parties and their respective
counsel and subsequently ratified by plaintiff Garcia; defendant has no reason
to complain of denial of due process in the issuance of the questioned order
being the one who submitted the subject amendment as basis for the
dismissal of the complaint. In reply, defendant stressed non-compliance with
the rules of procedure laid down by the Supreme Court on the part of the
court warranting a reconsideration of the questioned order.
Plaintiff Garcia also moved that the pleadings filed by defendant be
stricken off the records for failure to comply with the three-day notice rule
prescribed by the Rules. Herein defendant opposed the same alleging that the
copy of the motion received personally by plaintiff was in addition to the
copy thereof sent by registered mail by defendant at least four days before the
scheduled hearing.
Plaintiff Brenda Simon did not file comment/opposition to the questioned
order despite the extension granted.
Anent the procedural aspect, the motions filed by defendant Silver Films,
Inc. were sent through registered mail on February 20, 2005 and set for
hearing four days after, February 24, 2005, hence, complied with the Rules.
In any case, plaintiff Garcia’s opposition to the said pleadings cured whatever
procedural defect there may be (Jardin v. Hallasgo, 117 SCRA 535, 1982).
Going over the merits of the instant motion for reconsideration, this Court
agrees with the defendant Silver Films, Inc. that indeed no formal
compromise agreement was submitted by the parties for the approval of the
court. Yet, said defendant urged this court to believe that there was such a
settlement of dispute between the parties in view of the Amendment dated
June 17, 2003 which it in fact used as basis for asking the dismissal of the
complaint. Further, plaintiff Brenda Simon joined said defendant in moving
for the dismissal of the complaint on the same ground alleging amicable
settlement through a compromise agreement, which is the subject
amendment. For purposes of expediting the settlement of this case, plaintiff
Garcia expressed willingness to abide by the terms of the subject amendment
albeit initially not agreeable to it. When the Court finally rendered judgment
based on the subject amendment per order dated October 24, 2004, defendant
Silver Films, Inc. questioned the same.
After a careful study of the arguments raised by the parties in support of
their respective claims, this Court resolves to adhere to its previous ruling
that a compromise agreement was entered into by the parties through the
Amendment dated June 1998.
A perusal of the Amendment dated June 2003 shows that it was duly
signed by plaintiff Simon as agent of plaintiff Garcia and defendant Silver
Films, Inc. and their respective counse. Through the terms thereof are
disadvantageous to him, plaintiff Garcia ratified the same. Thus, for all
intents and purposes, the subject amendment has all the attributes of a
compromise agreement though not denominated as such.
It bears stressing that defendant Silver Films, Inc. and plaintiff Brenda
Simon, in their respective motion to dismiss, considered the amendment a
settlement of the dispute between the parties with plaintiff Simon
categorically calling the same a compromise agreement. After having led this
Court to believe that settlement had been reached by the parties through the
subject amendment, defendant would now urge the Court to disregard the
amendment just because events have transpired after the execution thereof
which would render compliance with the terms thereof difficult more so after
the ratification of the same by plaintiff Garcia.
With the approval of the amendment dated June 1999 as a Compromise
Agreement, the proceedings in this case are terminated and the pending
motions at the time of the approval thereof are denied for having become
moot and academic as embodied in the questioned order.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration
and Motion to Defer Filing of Answer filed by defendant Silver Films, Inc.
are hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, March 6, 2004
(Name omitted)
Judge
COURT OF APPEALS
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
LORENZO GARCIA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
- versus - CA-G.R. CV No. 54389
SILVER FILMS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant,
x-------------------------------x
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S BRIEF
Defendant-appellant, SILVER FILMS, INC., by counsel, respectfully
avers:
I
Prefatory Statement
Plaintiff-appellee Lorenzo Garcia in the instant case claims, with the lower
Court’s sanction, that there is a Compromise Agreement between the parties
involved.
Defendant-appellant Silver Films, Inc., however, categorically denies the
existence of a Compromise Agreement and further asserts that it is entitled to
file an Answer on account of the denial by the lower court of its Motion to
Dismiss.
II
Statement of the Facts
1.01 Plaintiff Brenda Simon (Simon) and plaintiff-appellee Lorenzo Garcia
(Garcia) filed with the lower Court a Complaint dated 27 May 2003 which
sought the rescission of the 2002 Agreement entered into with defendant-
appellant Silver Films, Inc.
1.02 While the case was pending, a renegotiation between plaintiff-
appellee Garcia, represented by Simon, and defendant-appellant Silver Films
took place which resulted in an Amendment dated 17 June 2003 that
superseded all terms and conditions embodied in their previous contracts.
1.03 Defendant-appellant Silver Films and plaintiff-appellee Simon
separately filed Motions to Dismiss on the ground that the dispute involving
the parties had already been settled through said Amendment.
1.04 Plaintiff-appellee Garcia opposed the Motions to Dismiss, alleging
that he did not authorize Simon to represent him in the renegotiation of the
agreements.
1.05 Subsequently, Garcia, in a Manifestation dated 03 July 2004,
expressed his willingness to honor the terms and conditions of the
Amendment dated 17 June 2003 on the supposition that the same shall be
considered a Compromise Agreement.
1.06 Defendant-appellant Silver Films and plaintiff-appellee Simon
vehemently opposed Garcia’s proposal to treat the aforesaid Amendment as a
Compromise Agreement. Instead, defendant-appellant suggested that the
terms and conditions to the Agreement reached by the parties during the
preliminary conference held on 23 July 2004 be adhered to, i.e., defendant-
appellant shall release plaintiff-appellee Garcia from his contractual
commitments.
1.07 The trial court, in an order dated 24 October 2004, treated the
Addendum to the 1996 and 1998 Contracts dated 17 June 2003 as a
Compromise Agreement and denied all pending motions, including the
Motions to Dismiss separately filed by defendant-appellant Silver Films and
Simon.
1.08 Defendant-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
dated 24 October 2004. The lower court, however, rendered an order dated 06
March 2005 which denied the aforecited motion for reconsideration and ruled
in favor of plaintiff Garcia, stating that:
“a compromise agreement was entered into by the parties through the
Amendment dated 17 June 2003.
xxx
SO ORDERED.”
1.09 Hence, this appeal.
III
Assignment of Errors
2.01 The lower Court erred in treating the Amendment dated 17 June 2003
as a Compromise Agreement between the parties.
2.02 The lower Court erred in depriving defendant-appellant Silver Films,
Inc. of its right to procedural due process, said defendant-appellant being
entitled to file an answer after the Court denied its motion to dismiss.
2.03 The lower Court erred in making two (2) diametrically opposed
moved: (1) in denying the motion to dismiss filed pursuant to the
Amendment; and (2) in treating the rejected Amendment as the Compromise
Agreement itself.
IV
Argument
The Amendment dated 17 June 1999

cannot be treated as the Compromise
Agreement itself.
3.01 The Court’s order dated 24 October 2004 categorically stating that
there was a Compromise Agreement between the parties is totally unfounded
because it was rendered without properly considering the facts.
3.02 The vehement objection and written opposition of defendant-appellant
Silver Films, Inc., and plaintiff Simon to the alleged Compromise Agreement
clearly show the absence of a “meeting of minds” between the parties
involved.
3.03 In Godoy v. Court of Appeals (250 SCRA 629), the Supreme Court
aptly characterized a compromise as a “bilateral act or transaction.” The
questioned Compromise Agreement lacks this indispensable element;
completely absent in said Compromise Agreement is “an unqualified
agreement among the parties to be bound by the judgment on consent,” a
fundamental requirement laid down by the Supreme Court in Republic v.
Bisaya Land Transportation Co., Inc. (81 SCRA 8 [1978]).
3.04 Despite the foregoing judicial pronouncements, the lower Court
arrogated unto itself the power to declare the existence of a Compromise
Agreement, in utter disregard of defendant-appellant’s vigorous objection and
opposition.
Defendant-appellant was deprived of

its right to procedural due process
because after its motion to dismiss
was denied, it was not given
the opportunity to file its Answer
as required by the Rules of Court
3.05 The denial of the motion to dismiss ipso facto entitles the movant to
file an answer. This is sufficiently clear in Section 4, Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court which mandates, in part:
“If the motion is denied, the movant shall files his answer within the
balance of the period prescribed…”
3.06 The defendant-appellant was deprived of its right to file an answer
when the lower Court terminated all judicial proceedings after rendering the
order dated 06 March 2005 denying all pending motions, including the
motion to dismiss filed by defendant-appellant, and treating the Amendment
dated 17 June 1999 as the Compromise Agreement itself, the existence of
which is disputed by defendant-appellant.
3.07 In Home Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Court of Appeals (273 SCRA
360), the Supreme Court authoritatively stated the consequence resulting
from the denial of a motion to dismiss in this manner:
“… in case of a denial of the motion, the movant is not deprived of the
rights to submit its own case and to present its evidence.”
3.08 The lower Court disregarded all the foregoing considerations, in clear
violation of defendant-appellant’s procedural right to due process, i.e., its
opportunity to be heard.
The lower Court erred in making two
(2) diametrically opposed moves.
3.09 Defendant-appellant maintains that the lower Court cannot deny its
motion to dismiss filed pursuant to the Amendment dated 17 June 2003 at the
same time consider said Amendment as the Compromise Agreement itself
because these two (2) acts are wholly repugnant or absolutely irreconcilable.
4.01 The denial of the motion to dismiss, in fact, amounts to a rejection of
the Amendment itself. This indisputable circumstance bars the lower Court
from treating the rejected Amendment as the Compromise Agreement itself.
V
Prayer
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant-appellant Silver Films,
Inc. respectfully prays that the decision appealed from be reversed and set
aside.
Defendant-appellant prays for cost of suit and for such further or other
relief as may be deemed just or equitable.
Pasig City for Manila.
04 July 2006.
ROMAN CRUZ & TAPALES
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
Suite 877 Harbor View Bldg.
Roxas Boulevard, Manila
IBP 544498 12-21-13
PTR 8723254 01-02-13
MCLE Compliance IV-295
Email: ihfontilla@yahoo.com
By:
PAULO A. CRUZ
PTR 8529903 06-09-06
IBP 440693 04-28-06
Copy furnished:
MARIA LEILA B. PENERA
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellees
5/F Rivera Santos Building
54 Antonio Luna Street
Sta. Cruz, Manila

COURT OF APPEALS Manila
SECOND DIVISION
LORENZO GARCIA ,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
- versus - CA-G.R. CV No. 54389
SILVER FILMS, INC.,
x-------------------------------x
APPELLEE’ S BRIEF
Plaintiff-Appellee Lorenzo Garcia, through counsel, respectfully states:
Prefatory Statement
On its face, the Defendant-Appellant’s Brief dated July 4, 2000, and served
on plaintiff-appellee Garcia on July 21, 2004, utterly fails to comply with the
requirements of Section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court. The caption does
not even indicate the docket number of the case in the Court a quo. Hence,
the appeal deserves outright dismissal.
Counter-Statement of Facts
The Statement of Facts in the Defendant-Appellant’s Brief contains
inaccuracies, which need to be rectified, lest this Honorable Court be misled.
In paragraph 1.06 its statement of the facts, defendant-appellant Silver
Films, Inc., makes reference to an alleged Agreement reached by the parties
during the preliminary conference held on July 23, 2000. No such Agreement
exists. The records do not show the slightest hint of any agreement reached
by the parties on July 23, 2004.
Indeed, defendant-appellant Silver Films cannot claim to have entered into
the imagined agreement, because a day after the preliminary conference, or
on July 24, 2004, it still filed a Motion for Extension of time within which to
file its Comment on plaintiff-appellee Garcia’s Manifestation dated July 3,
2000, whereby the plaintiff-appellee decided to honor the “Amendment to the
2000 & 2002 Contract” dated June 17, 2003.
In other words, if it were true, as defendant-appellant Silver Films claims,
that the parties entered into an agreement during the July 23, 2004
preliminary conference, the defendant-appellant would not have bothered to
file its Motion for Extension, and waste its time preparing its Comment
wherein it merely manifested its willingness to release plaintiff-appellee
Garcia from his 2000 and 2002 contracts.
ARGUMENTS
First Assigned Error:

The Lower Court erred
in treating the Amendment
dated June 17, 2003 as a
Compromise Agreement.
The Court a quo did not so err.
A scrutiny of the “Addendum to the 2000 & 2002 Contract, dated June 17,
2005 shows that it was signed by defendant-appellant Silver Films assisted by
its counsel, and by plaintiff Brenda Simon in representation of plaintiff-
appellee Garcia assisted by counsel. While initially, plaintiff-appellee Garcia
refused to honor the Amendment, nevertheless per his Manifestation dated
July 3, 2004, he ratified the Amendment. Thus, the Amendment has all the
requisites of a compromise agreement.
Defendant-Appellant Silver Films even admitted in writing the validity of
the compromise agreement when it declared in its Motion to Dismiss dated
June 27, 2003 that “in an agreement dated 17 June 2003 between the parties
all incidents which are the subject of the complaint in the above-captioned
case were settled and amicably resolved.”
Second Assigned Error:
in depriving defendant-
appellant Regal Films
of its right to procedural
due process, said defendant-
appellant being entitled to
file an Answer after the
denial of its Motion to
Dismiss.
The Court a quo did not so err.
Defendant-Appellant Silver Films cannot claim denial of procedural due
process, inasmuch as it was the one who submitted and brought to the
attention of the Court a quo the Amendment dated June 19, 1999 containing
the terms of amicable settlement between the parties. It cannot now complain
if the Court a quo stamped its imprimatur on the Amendment and treated it as
a compromise agreement –– which is what it really is.
Besides, the rule giving the defendant the opportunity to file an Answer
after the denial of its motion to dismiss, applies only when the ground
invoked in such motion to dismiss is one of those enumerated in Section 1,
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. In such case, an Answer is necessary in view
of the existence of litigable issues raised in the Complaint, which need to be
responded to.
In the case at bar, defendant-appellant Silver Films motion to dismiss was
grounded on the amicable settlement between the parties. It goes without
saying that the Court a quo has the power to protect the rights of the parties
and ensure compliance with the terms and conditions of the amicable
settlement.
Verily, the Court a quo acted most judiciously and rightly in treating the
Amendment dated June 17, 2003 as a compromise agreement, and in denying
defendant-appellant Silver Films’ motion to dismiss. Had the Court a quo not
done so, the result would have been unfair and unjust to plaintiff-appellee
Garcia, because the case would have been dismissed without defendant-
appellant Silver Films having complied with its contractual commitments
under the Amendment. Up to now, defendant-appellant Silver Films has not
paid the following to plaintiff-appellee Garcia pursuant to the Amendment:
(a) The amount of P100,000.00 in consideration for the waiver by
plaintiff-appellee Garcia of any and all rights to the parcel of land
covered by his talent contracts; and
(b) The additional amount of P1,000,000.00 by way of talent fees
under the 1998 contract.
Plaintiff-appellee Garcia had long ago performed his part of the bargain.
Defendant-appellant Silver Films does not deny and has never put in issue the
performance by the plaintiff-appellee of his obligations as an actor. In fact,
the agreed movies of the plaintiff-appellee had all been shown a long time
ago. Neither can defendant-appellant Silver Films dispute that the plaintiff-
appellee had already dropped all his claims to the parcels of land, which he
was supposed to receive in consideration for his appearance in the movies
produced by the defendant-appellant.
What we have here is plain and simple stubborn refusal of defendant-
appellant Silver Films to compensate plaintiff-appellee Garcia for his services
rendered as an actor.
Third Assigned Error:

in making two diametrically
opposed moves.
The Court did not so err.
If anybody is guilty of inconsistency of actions, it is defendant-appellant
Silver Films. Such self-contradiction is best exemplified by the defendant-
appellant’s act of invoking the Amendment dated June 17, 2003 in insisting
on the dismissal of the case, but repudiating the same Amendment in arguing
that there is no compromise agreement between the parties.
Fortunately, the Court a quo saw through defendant-appellant Silver
Films’ devious and sinister ploy to evade its contractual obligations to
plaintiff-appellee Garcia, and avoid payment of the amounts due to the
plaintiff-appellee under the Amendment dated June 17, 2003. As earlier
stated, had the Court a quo simply dismissed the case as desired by
defendant-appellant Silver Films, grave injustice would have occurred,
because the defendant-appellant has no intention whatsoever of honoring its
commitments under the Amendment. Plaintiff-Appellee Garcia would have
been compelled to litigate anew to enforce the Amendment.
Thus, action of the Court a quo is not only supremely Solomonic, but it
also avoided multiplicity of suits.
CONCLUSION
Under the facts and circumstances, it is, clear that defendant-appellant

Silver Films came to this Honorable Court with unclean hands, not having
paid a single centavo due to plaintiff-appellee Garcia under the Amendment
dated June 17, 2003, while pretending to have been aggrieved by the action
of the Court a quo. Defendant-Appellant Silver Films has been able so many
times to get away with not paying the fees due to its talents. This time, this
Honorable Court should not allow the defendant-appellant to escape.
It has been more than three years since the Amendment was executed. To
date, plaintiff-appellee Garcia is holding an empty bag. It is time for this
Honorable Court to write finis to this case by declaring the appealed Orders
immediately final and executory, the same being in the nature of a judgment
upon a compromise agreement (Pls. see: Prudence Realty & Dev. Corp. v.
CA, 231 SCRA 379, 388-389, citing World Machine Enterprises v. IAC, 192
SCRA 459).
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, plaintiff-appellee Garcia respectfully prays of this

Honorable Court to dismiss the instant appeal, and to affirm in toto the
questioned Orders or the Court a quo dated October 24, 2004 and March 6,
2005, respectively, declaring such Orders to be immediately final and
executory.
[Explanation: A copy of this Appellee’s Brief has been served on the
adverse party by registered mail in view of the distance and the lack of
messenger who can make a personal service.]
Manila, August 1, 2002.

MARIA LEILA B. PENERA
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellee
5/F Rivera Santos Building
54 Antonio Luna Street
Sta. Cruz, Manila
PTR 346874 01-08-97 Manila
IBP 674980; 01-07-97 Manila
MCLE Compliance IV-123
Email: mlbp@penlaw.ph
Copy Furnished:
ROMAN CRUZ & TAPALES

Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
Suite 877 Harbor View Bldg.
Roxas Boulevard, Manila

COURT OF APPEALS
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
LORENZO GARCIA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, CA-G.R. CV No. 54389
- versus -
SILVER FILMS, INC.,
x----------------------------------x (Justices’names omitted)
PROMULGATED: June 5, 2004
DECISION
Before us on appeal is the Order of Branch 107 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila treating and approving the “Amendment to the 2000 and 2002
Contract” as a compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 30012, “Brenda
Simon and Lorenzo Garcia v. Silver Films, Inc.,” for rescission of contract
with damages.
In 2000 Lorenzo Garcia (Garcia) a television artist and movie actor, and
his manager Brenda Simon (Simon) entered into a contract with Silver Films,
Inc. (Silver Films) whereby Silver Films undertook to convey to Garcia a
parcel of land located in Quezon City, aside from giving him talent fees, in
consideration for his services as actor in the films it was going to produce.
After appearing in a number of films and despite demands, Silver Films
failed to convey to Garcia the parcel of land.
In 2002, Garcia, Simon, and Silver Films again entered into another
agreement incorporating the same undertaking that Silver Films would
convey to Garcia the same lot. Again, despite Garcia’s appearance in several
films produced by Silver Films, the undertaking remained unheeded,
spawning the complaint subject of the present appeal.
Silver Films moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
the case was already settled/compromised by the execution of an
“Amendment to the 2000 and 2002 Contract” (Amendment) by Silver Films
and Simon in her capacity as Garcia’s manager/agent which Amendment was
attached as Annex “A” to the complaint.
Simon likewise moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the same
ground invoked by Silver Films.
Garcia, claiming that the Amendment was executed without his knowledge
and consent and that it contained provisions disadvantageous to him, opposed
the motion of Silver Films. Garcia also opposed his talent manager’s motion,
claiming that she had ceased to be his manager and that, therefore, she had no
authority to enter into and sign the Amendment.
Before the scheduled preliminary conference of the case at the court a quo,
Garcia manifested his willingness to now honor the Amendment provided
that it be considered as a compromise agreement and that judgment be
rendered in accordance therewith.
Later, alleging that the relationship between Garcia and Silver Films had
become acrimonious, Simon commented that Silver Films was more inclined
to release Garcia from the 2000 and 2002 contracts than to abide by the terms
and conditions of the Amendment, and that if Silver Films opposed Garcia’s
manifestation, she would be inclined not to honor the Amendment.
Silver Films confirmed Simon’s comment and manifested that it was
releasing Garcia from the 2000 and 2002 contracts. Garcia countered that as
Simon and Silver Films were repudiating the Amendment, he was deprived
of what is rightly due him.
By Order of October 24, 2004, the court a quo “in the exercise of its
discretion,” resolved to render judgment based on the Amendment to the
1999 and 2002 Contract, which it considered to be a Compromise Agreement
between the parties.
Hence, this appeal, Silver Films assigning as errors of the court a quo the
following:
“. . . in treating the Amendment dated 17 June 2003 as a Compromise
Agreement between the parties.
“. . . in depriving the defendant-appellant Silver Films, Inc. of its right to
procedural due process, said defendant-appellant being entitled to file an
answer after the Court denied its Motion to Dismiss.
“. . . in making two (2) diametrically opposed moves: (1) in denying the
Motion to Dismiss filed pursuant to the Amendment and (2) in treating the
rejected Amendment as the Compromise Agreement itself.”
In the main, Silver Films argue that there was no “meeting of minds”
between the parties to the Amendment, citing the case of Galoy, et al. v. CA
(250 SCRA 629) which characterized a compromise agreement as a bilateral
transaction and that of Republic v. Bisaya Land Transportation Co., Inc. (81
SCRA 8) which held that in order that a judgment by compromise can be
rendered, there must be “an unqualified agreement among the parties to be
bound by the judgment on consent.”
The argument is untenable.
The cases cited by Silver Films are not in point.
In the Galoy case, nowhere in the judgment does it appear nor can it be
inferred that the court took into account any agreement or concessions made
by the parties. The decision rendered therein was based entirely on the merits.
In the Republic case, although there was a motion for judgment based on
consent which amounted to a judgment based on compromise agreement,
there was no “meeting of the minds among the parties” for before they could
come to an unqualified agreement on the judgment requested to be entered,
appellee-corporation-movant withdrew the motion for judgment on consent.
In the instant case, there was an Amendment to the contract signed by
Simon and Silver Films’ representative to which amendment Garcia through
his Manifestation expressed his conformity. There was, therefore, consent of
all the parties.
The amendment/compromise agreement was perfected and is binding on
the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of
mind of Silver Films and/or Simon by claiming, in their Opposition/Reply to
Garcia’s Manifestation, that after the 2000 National Films Festival fiasco in
which Garcia was involved, the relationship between the parties had become
bitter to render compliance with the terms and conditions of the Amendment
no longer possible and consequently release Garcia from the 2000 and 2002
contracts (vide Olaybar v. NLRC, 237 SCRA 819 [1994]).
WHEREFORE, the appealed Order is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
APPENDIX C

Branch 86, Manila
NATIONAL SUPPLIES AUTHORITY
and NATIONAL TRUCKING
AUTHORITY,
Plaintiffs,
- versus - Civil Case No. 62709
ALLIED SHIPPING CORP.,
Defendant.
x-----------------------------------------------x
DECISION
This is an action for damages arising from alleged breach of the contract of
carriage, filed by the plaintiffs National Supplies Authority (NSA) and
National Trucking Corporation, both government corporations, against
defendant Allied Shipping Corporation (Allied Shipping) for its alleged
failure to deliver to plaintiff NSA’s consignee 4,868 bags of non-fat dried
milk worth P2,794,232.00 plus freight prepaid in the amount of P8,707.65 for
a total of P2,862,939.64.
During the pre-trial, the parties offered for resolution by the court the
following issues:
1. Whether or not defendant Allied Shipping was able to deliver the cargo
involved herein, which it carried on board its vessel, to the consignee Mr.
Hassan Salim of plaintiff NTC in Zamboanga;
2. Whether or not defendant Allied Shipping exercised the extraordinary
diligence required of common carriers in connection with the cargo subject
matter of this case;
3. Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to its claim for actual, exemplary,
and moral damages; and
4. Whether or not the defendant is entitled to recover damages from the
plaintiffs under its counterclaim.
After the pre-trial, the parties presented their respective evidence,
testimonial and documentary.
Evidence for the plaintiffs.
1. Vicente Tuason, plaintiff NSC’s manager for Relief Operations,

testifying on direct examination on May 19, 2003 with respect to the
procedural flow in the transport of relief goods, declared that his department
engaged the services of defendant common carrier to ship the commodities
involved; that upon NSC’s delivery of the commodities to the common
carrier, the latter would issue the corresponding bill of lading acknowledging
receipt of the commodities on board its vessel and of the payment of freight;
that the NSC sent the bill of lading to the consignee of its goods, namely, Mr.
Hassan Salim of NTC; that upon receipt of the bill of lading, Mr. Salim
would go to the defendant common carrier to surrender the consignee’s copy
of the bill of lading in exchange for the release of the commodities and,
accordingly, sign the corresponding delivery receipt; that NTC is still in
possession of the consignee’s copy of the bill of lading covering its
commodities because they were not received by Salim; and that Salim,
however, had no letter explaining why he was returning the bill of lading in
2003.
On cross-examination, however, Ruiz testified that from 2000 to the
present, he has been in charge of relief operations; that Hassan Salim
belonged to the Freight Forwarding Operations Department of the NTC; that
they have some amount of control or supervision over those in the Freight
Forwarding Operations Department; that he sent the bills of lading by
registered mail to Salim who received them; that he never went to
Zamboanga City and did not hold office there; that Salim allegedly reported,
by telephone call the non-delivery of the commodities covered by the bills of
lading to supervisor Leonora Sotto, who was in charge of shipping but is no
longer connected with the NTC, and this information was relayed or told to
him by manager Justo Belema of the Freight Forwarding Department; that no
written report, however, was made to him by Sotto or Belema; that he did not
require Salim to report in writing; that they were supposed to make monthly
reports; that he does not know if Salim made a report to Belema; that he is
familiar with the signature of Salim though he never saw him signing
documents; that Salim is no longer connected with the NTC, having
voluntarily resigned when an investigation was conducted on the missing
commodities that were allegedly not received by their Zamboanga office; that
Salim resented the investigation; and that Ruiz does not know what happened
to the investigation.
2. Atty. Gregorio Lantana, second witness for the plaintiff, testified on
August 25, 2007 that he has been the claim insurance manager of the NTC
since 2003; that he came to know the defendant Allied Shipping when he was
asked to investigate the loss of 5,824 bags of non-fat dried milk; that in
December 2003, he went to Zamboanga City and conferred with Hassan
Salim, Banch Supervisor of their Zamboanga office; that Salim told him that
he did not receive the shipment and showed him the original copies of the
consignee’s bill of lading; that he went to the local office of Allied Shipping
and conferred with the latter’s representative; that said representative told
him that the goods were already withdrawn by Salim but he could not
produce any receipt signed by Salim; that he went back to Manila bearing
with him the original bills of lading; that he made a report dated December
14, 2003, which he submitted to Atty. Homer Garrido (Exh. L to L1); that on
February 3, 2004, he went back to Zamboanga city for further investigation
and conferred with Salim; that Salim insisted that he did not withdraw the
goods from Allied Shipping; that he postponed the investigation to the
following day, but Salim did not appear and, instead, sent somebody to
submit his signed resignation to him and Helen Jacinto, the domestic
forwarding manager of NTC; that he then went to Allied Shipping to confer
with its representative who insisted that the goods were withdrawn by Salim;
that he was given xerox copies of the cargo delivery receipts which did not
bear the signature Salim; that the checker of Allied Shipping told him that the
signatures on the receipts are not the same as the signature of Salim; that he
knows the signature on the receipts are not the same as the signature of
Salim; that he just saw the signature if Salim, but did not see him sign; that he
did not ask the checker of Allied Shipping to make a written statement that
Salim signed the receipts; that upon arrival in Manila, he prepared a claim
letter to Allied Shipping, dated March 11, 2004 (Exh. F, F-1); that Artemio
Carpio, claims officer of Allied Shipping, sent a reply letter, dated March 15,
2004, denying their (NTC’s) claim (Exh. G); that, thereafter, in March or
April, 2004, be conferred personally with Carpio whom he asked for
evidence showing that Salim received the good, and submitted copies of the
cargo delivery receipts earlier submitted by Allied Shipping checker; that
Carpio sent another letter to NTC, dated April 26, 2004, denying the claim of
NTC (Exh. H); that the NTC management referred the matter to the Office of
the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) which filed this case; that for
OGCC’s services, NTC agreed to pay P100,000.00 at attorney’s fees; that
CARE, on the other hand, prepared a report of Loss, Damage, etc. which it
sent to the NTC containing the value of the lost relief goods (Exhibits I, I-1 to
I-17); that the figures contained in Exhibits I-17 and I-14 are not clear; that
after receiving the claims of CARE, the NTC paid the same to CARE
Philippines, as evidenced by the subrogation receipts issued by CARE, dated
January 31, 2006 (Exh. K); July 10, 2002 (Exh. K-2); October 8, 2006 (Exh.
K-3); February 27, 2003 (Exh. K-4); February 27, 2007 (Exh. K-5); June 29,
2007 (Exh. K-6); and June 29, 2007 (Exh. K-7), in the total amount of
P3,295,475.03, out of which the plaintiff NTC has paid the total amount of
P2,257,141.64.
On cross-examination, the same witness testified that in December 2004,
he went to Zamboanga City to conduct an investigation on the CARE goods
and conferred with a representative of Allied Shipping; that when he learned
that the commodities were no longer in the custody of Allied Shipping, he
went back to Zamboanga; that he was not satisfied with the first investigation
he conducted; that he was not able to pinpoint the persons responsible for the
loss of the commodities; that he conducted further investigation and asked
additional questions from Salim; that after talking to the checker of Allied
Shipping, he wanted to test the credibility of Salim whose credibility he
doubted to some extent; that he had several persons to suspect – Salim, the
checker and other personnel of Allied Shipping and third parties, or a
conspiracy of all of them; that the day before Salim resigned, he talked to him
on February 2, 2005; that after asking Salim several questions; he was
reluctant to answer and so, he postponed his investigation; that instead the
following day, Salim sent somebody else to submit his resignation letter; that
since Salim was one of his suspects, he asked him questions which would
tend to show that Salim received, or know what happened to the
commodities; that after February 3, 2005, he never saw Salim anymore; that
he went back to the office of Allied Shipping at the Pier in Zamboanga and
talked to the checker but did not write down his name in his report (Exh. N);
that when he believed that he had completed his investigation; he made his
report; that the Allied Shipping checker gave him copies of the cargo delivery
receipts showing that Salim received the goods subject matter of this case,
and these are part of the exhibits (Exh. 4, dated October 17, 2003; Exh. 4-A,
dated October 20, 2003; Exh. 4-B, dated October 25, 2003, and Exhibit 4-C,
dated October 1999; and up to December 1999); that Helen Jacinto continued
doing business with Allied Shipping after Salim resigned; that Salim was
only five (5) years in service and not yet entitled to retirement (hearing of
July 27, 2007); that he met Salim on February 2, 2005; that on February 3,
2005, Salim never showed up; that his meeting with a representative of Allied
Shipping took place on February 4, 2004; that the Allied Shipping
representative gave him copies of cargo delivery receipts; that he received
some of the delivery receipts earlier in December 2004; that he showed the
receipts to Salim who told him that the signatures are not his; that, except for
some of the delivery receipts dated December, 2003 and January, 2004, the
rest were submitted to him by a representative of Allied Shipping; that the
delivery receipts, dated December 3, 2003, December 19, 2003, December
23, 2003, January 11, 2004, February 4, 2004, were received by him from the
Allied Shipping representative in Zamboanga; that Salim denied having
signed the said receipts when he showed them to him on the first week of
December, 2003; that when he talked with Salim in their office, after
receiving the delivery receipts from the representative of Allied Shipping, he
did not ask Salim to go with him to Allied Shipping for confrontation with
the representative of Allied Shipping who said Salim did not sign those
receipts because of the peace and order conditions at that time; that there
were constant bombings in the area and the relationship between Christian
and Muslims was not good; that he did not know what would happen if there
was confrontation between Salim and the Allied Shipping and he had no
reason to doubt the signature of Salim; that he went back to Zamboanga in
2005 for further investigation because he was not satisfied with the outcome
of his first investigation as he was unable to pinpoint the person responsible
for the loss of the cargoes; that he went to Zamboanga to further investigate
Salim because he doubted his credibility; that he could not point to any
definite person responsible; that on February 2, 2004 Salim was reluctant to
answer his questions, while on February 3, Salim did not appear anymore at
the scheduled conference, so that these facts strengthened his doubt on
Salim’s credibility; that as of now, he has no reason, on the basis of the
documentary evidence, about Salim’s guilt; that he had no participations in
the hearing of Allied Shipping for the shipment of the goods; that it is stated
at the back of the Bills of Lading (Exhs. D to D-8) that it should be released
only to the consignee or his authorized representative; that there is nothing in
the bill of lading which would prohibit Allied Shipping from delivering the
cargoes to the consignee’s representative who would acknowledge receipt
thereof in the cargo delivery receipt. (Hearing of August 20, 1996)
Evidence for the defendants.
3. Ricardo Samson, first witness for the defendant testified on October 8,

2007 that he has been a delivery checker of Jose Razon Shipping Agency,
with office at Zamboanga City, since 1999; that he took care of the delivery
of cargoes from the port to the consignee or his authorized representative;
that he required the production of the consignee’s copy of the original
covering the particular shipment or a certified true copy thereof from their
office; that upon production of said bill of lading, he checked the container
van and its seal; that, if it is okay, he asks the consignee or his representative
to break the seal and open the van and then they load the cargo of non-fat dry
milk on the consignee’s truck; that they checked the cargo loaded on the
truck and he counts them; that he then prepares the delivery receipt and have
it signed by the consignee’s representative; that he knows NTC which has
kept a branch in Zamboanga City from 1998; that he made deliveries to NTC;
that the last time he made deliveries to it was from October to December,
2003, specifically to Hassan Salim whom he had known personally since
1998 when he was still a delivery checker for Compania Maritima; that he
started working as a delivery checker of Jose Razon Shipping Agency in
August, 1999; that proof of the deliveries he made to Salim from October to
December 2003 are the original and xerox copies of the cargo delivery
receipts; that he has other original delivery receipts but they got lost because
in 2006, their office was renovated and all records and files were placed
temporarily in boxes; that said receipts got lost and cannot be located, despite
diligent efforts to locate them; that exhibits 4, 4-a to 4-g, 4-q, 4-r are original
copies, while exhibits 4-h to 4-p are xerox copies thereof; that he signed the
cargo delivery receipts marked as Exh. 4-J and 4-J-1; 4-K and 4-K-11; 4-P
and 4-P-1; 4-q and 4-q-1; 4-r and 4-r-1; that the other cargo receipts were
signed by Angel de Leon, their head checker (Exhs. 4, 4-x-1 and 4-x-2; 4-q
and 4-q-1; that the other cargo delivery receipts were signed by his co-
checker Ismael Zamora (Exhs. 4-a and 4-a-1; 4-b and 4-b-1; 4-c and 4-c-1; 4-
d and 4-d-1; 4-e and 4-e-1; 4-f and 4-f-1; 4-h and 4-h-1; 4-i and 4-i-1; 4-l and
4-l-1; 4-m and 4-m-1; 4-n and 4-n-1; 4-o and 4-o-1; that aside from his
signatures, he could identify the signatures of his co-checkers Armand Lara
and Ariel Zumar because they have been working together for the same
company for many years and he has seen them sign their signatures in his
presence and he is familiar with their signatures; that he can identify the
signatures appearing at the lower left-hand portion of the cargo delivery
receipt. Exh. 4 (Rollo, p. 493), under the printed words reading: “Received
the above in good order condition;” that in Exhibit 4, the signature appearing
under the said printed word is that of Lito Asis, a representative of NTC who
went to Allied Shipping when there is a shipment of the NTC to withdraw the
cargo, and that his signature is familiar to him because there were several
occasions when Asis signed the delivery receipts in his presence; that he does
not know the signature (Exh. 4-a-2) appearing under the same printed words
in the cargo delivery receipt, Exh. 4-a (Rollo, p. 494); that he does not know
the signature (Exh. 4-b-a) appearing under the same printed words in the
cargo delivery receipt marked as Exh. 4-B (Rollo, p. 495); that the signature
marked as Exh. 4-c-a, appearing on the delivery receipt, Exh. 4-c (Rollo, p.
496) is that of Lito Asis; that he does not know the signature (Exh. 4-D-2)
appearing on the delivery receipt, Exh. 4-D (Rollo, p. 497); that the signature
marked as Exh. 4-E-2 appearing on the delivery receipt marked as Exh. 4-E is
that of Hassan Salim; that the signature marked as Exhibit 4-F-2 appearing on
the delivery receipt marked as Exhibit 4-F (Rollo, p. 499) is that of Salim;
that the signature marked as Exhibit 4-O-2 in Exhibit 4-O (Rollo, p. 508) is
that of Salim; that the signatures marked as Exhibits 4-i-2; 4-j-2, 4-k-2, and
4-l-2 and appearing in the cargo delivery receipts, marked, respectively as
Exhibits 4-i (Rollo, p. 502); 4-J (Rollo, p. 503); 4-K (Rollo, p. 504); and 4-l
(Rollo, p. 505), are those of Asis; that he does not know the signatures of the
consignee’s representatives marked as Exhibits 4-g-2, 4-m-2, 4-p-2, and 4-r-
2, appearing in the cargo delivery receipts marked, respectively as Exhibits 4-
g (Rollo, p. 501); 4-n (Rollo, p. 507), 4-p (Rollo, p. 509), 4-q (Rollo, p. 510),
and 4-r (Rollo, p. 511); that with the representation of a certified true copy of
the bill of lading stamped “Please release” by the person carrying it, ha had
no doubt in releasing the cargo to such person.
On cross-examination, the same witness testified that the cargoes covered
by the delivery receipts, Exhibits 4-p, 4-q and 4-r, were delivered to the
persons who presented the true copies of the delivery receipts and paid the
handling charges, whom he presumed was a representative of the NTC; that
their practice was to released the goods to the consignee or his authorized
representative; that there were times when the consignee Hassan Salim went
to the port just to make sure if the shipments were delivered to them; that
Salim told them to just allow his driver, assistant, or brother to sign the
delivery receipts because he has allegedly many other appointments to attend
to; that Salim talked personally to him and Armand Lara, head checker; that
the goods covered by the delivery receipts, Exh. 4-e, 4-f, 4-h and 4-o were
signed by Salim in his presence.
4. Ismael Zamora, second witness for the defendant, testified on October
29, 2007 that he has been a delivery and release checker of Jose Razon
Shipping Agency from 1986 to the present; that he knows plaintiff NTC
which frequently shipped goods through defendant Allied Shipping; that
these were unloaded at the port and were brought to NTC warehouse by
trucks belonging to Jose Razon Trucking; that January 2004 was the last time
for them to deliver bags of non-fat dried milk; that from October 2003 to
January 2004 they handled similar shipments of non-fat dried milk and, as a
delivery checker, he delivered those cargoes to Hassan Salim, manager of
NTC who received the cargoes himself; that he saw Salim personally receive
the cargoes for every delivery made; that after he made the deliveries, he told
Salim to sign the delivery receipts which he did sign either personally or
made his companion sign; that he asked the consignee or his representative to
sign the delivery receipts, Exhibits 4 to 4-r; that Exh. 4-x-1 is the signature of
their head checker Armand Lara; that they were together and he saw him
sign; that Exh. 4-x-2 is the signature of Lito Asis, assistant manager of Salim;
that he saw Asis sign the delivery receipts whenever he received the goods;
that Exh. 4-a-1 is his signature; that Exh. 4-a-2 is his signature; that Exh. 4-b-
2 is the signature of Salim’s subordinate; that Exhibit 4-c1 is his signature;
that Exhibits 4-d-1, 4-e-1, 4-h-1; 4-i-1; 4-l-1; 4-m-1, 4-n-1 and 4-o-1 are his
signatures; that Exhibits 4-d-2, 4-g-2 and 4-m-2, 4-n-2, 4-p-2, 4-q-2 are the
signatures of Salim’s subordinate; that Exhibits 4-e-2, 4-f-2, 4-h-2 and 4-o-2
are the signatures of Salim; that Exhibits 4-f-1 and 4-g-1 are the signatures of
Armand Lara; that Exhibits 4-i-2, 4-j-2, 4-k-2 and 4-l-2 are the signatures of
Lito Asis; that Exhibits 4-j-1, 4-k-1, 4-p-1, 4-q-1 and 4-r-1 are the signatures
of his co-checker Ariel Zumar; that after the delivery of the cargo, the person
who received the cargo signed the delivery receipt; that not all the delivery
receipts were signed by Salim, some were signed by his subordinates, and
this is so because sometimes Salim told him that he had other appointments
and so he instructed his subordinates to sign the receipt in his absence; that
during all the deliveries he made, Salim and his subordinates were present.
On cross-examination, the same witness testified that even if the consignee
Hassan Salim was present all the time during the deliveries, there were times
when he did not sign the delivery receipts because sometimes he went to
attend some important appointments and left before the deliveries were
completed and just directed his subordinates to sign for him (Hearing of
November 17, 2007).
5. Atty. Ariel M. Luna, third witness for the defendant testified that he is
the corporate secretary and administrative head of Allied Shipping; that on
March 15, 2004, Allied Shipping, thru Artemio Carpio, head of its Claims
Department, sent a reply-letter to NTC’s letter of March 11, 2004, relative to
5,824 bags of milk loaded on its vessels (Exh. 1); that Carpio conducted an
investigation and then wrote another letter to NTC, dated April 26, 2004,
informing him that the 5,824 bags of milk were delivered to the consignee
Hassan Salim, the NTC authorized branch representative as per the Allied
Shipping cargo delivery receipts and container list attached thereto (Exh. 2);
that Allied Shipping received a letter, dated February 1, 1989, from Helen
Jacinto, Domestic Freight Forwarding Operations Manager, NTC, stating that
Hassan Salim was no longer authorized to represent NTC in whatever
capacity, effective January 31, 2004, and that Antonio Evanglelista was
appointed O.I.C for the NTC Zamboanga Branch (Exh. 3); that because of the
filing of this case, Allied Shipping was compelled to engage the services of
counsel for P150,000.00 and has further spent P60,000.00 to secure the
attendance of witnesses from Zamboanga, including airplane tickets, hotel
bills, allowances of witnesses and expenses of counsel in coming to court;
and the cost of filing this case, plus moral damages for tainting the
defendant’s reputation by filing this suit in the amount of P2,000,000.00 and
exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00.
On cross-examination, the same witness testified that the filing of this case
affected the business credibility of the defendant and brought hardship in
soliciting business. (Hearing of January 23, 2008).
On February 1, 2008, the same witness further testified that he prepared a
summary of expenses incurred by LSC in this case (Exh. 4; Rollo, p. 492),
with supporting documents. (Exhs. 4-a to 4-f; 4-h to 4-n; Rollo, pp. 312-325.)
From the evidence adduced by the parties during the trial, it is established
that on April 20, 2003, plaintiff NSC and CARE entered into an Agreement
under which they undertook to continue a Food Assistance Programs, a
jointly sponsored nutrition project for preschool children and pregnant and
nursing mothers, in support of which CARE bound itself to acquire by
donation from the United States Government, food commodities (non-fat
dried milk and other available USDA foods deemed suited to the need) for a
three-year period beginning January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2004 (Exh. A);
that in order to comply with such agreement, plaintiff NSC engaged the
services of its co-plaintiff NTC to receive and store the commodities,
including their transshipments and deliveries to various beneficiaries as may
be directed by the Department of Health (DOH), as per the Contract of
Services entered into on August 12, 2000 between NSC and NTC (Exh. B);
that pursuant to its agreement with NTC, the DOH issued to NTC several
delivery orders (Exh. C, C-1 to C-16) directing the latter to effect the
shipment and delivery of non-fat dried milk to the Municipal Health Oficer
(MHO), Isabela, West, Basilan (Exhs. C, C-1); to the MHO, Isabela North,
Basilan (Exh. C-2); to the MHO, Lamitan East, Basilan (Exh. C-3); to the
MHO, Lamitan West, Basilan (Exh. C-4); to the MHO, Lantawan, Basilan
(Exh. C-5); to the MHO, Maluso, Basilan (Exh. C-6); to the MHO, Sumisip,
Basilan (Exh. C-7); to the MHO, Tipo-tipo, Basilan (Exh. C-8); to the MHO,
Tuburan, Basilan (Exh. C-9); to the Provincial Health Officer (PHO), Jolo,
Sulu (Exh. C-10); to the PHO, Dipolog City (Exh. C-11); to the City Health
Officer (CHO), Dapital City (Exh. C-12); to the CHO, Dipolog City (C-13);
to the PHO, Pagadian City (C-14); to the CHO, Pagadian City (C-15); and to
the CHO, Zamboanga City (Exh. C-16); that, accordingly, on various dates in
September and October, 2003, NTC shipped Five Thousand Eight Hundred
Twenty Four (5,824) bags of non-fat dried milk to its consignee Hassan
Salim, NTC Branch, Zamboanga City, thru various vessels of the common
carrier, defendant Allied Shipping which issued the corresponding Bills of
Lading in favor of NTC (Exhs. T-1, T-2, T-3; T-6; T-8; T-9; T-10 and T-11;
Exhs. D, D-1, to D-8), with freight and wharfage dues prepaid in Manila in
the total amount of P68,707.65 (Exhs. E, E-1, E-2, E-3, E-4, E-5, E-6, E-7
and E-8); that Hassan Salim was the consignee designated in all the bills of
lading covering the various shipments (Exhs. L to L-1-a; N to N-1); that in a
letter dated March 11, 2004 (Exh. F to F-3), plaintiff NTC demanded from
the defendant Allied Shipping reimbursement of the value of the subject bags
of non-fat dried milk, but said demand was denied on the ground that the said
goods were already delivered to Salim (Exhs. C and H; 1 and 2).
It appears that while Hassan Salim was the consignee named in all the bills
of lading, and while he personally attended the deliveries of the individual
shipments to NTC, together with his subordinates, there were times when,
although present at the early stages of the deliveries, he had to leave in order
to attend other appointments allegedly, and allowed or authorized his
subordinates to continue receiving the deliveries and to sign the
corresponding delivery receipts after the deliveries of the cargoes taken out of
the container vans were completed. Ricardo Samson and Ismael Zamora, who
were there, attested to the presence of Hassan Salim when Allied Shipping
made its deliveries to NTC. Plaintiffs NTC and NSC never effectively
rebutted these. They utterly failed to present Hassan Salim to refute or deny
the same if they were not true. Hence, delivery of the commodities in
question by Allied Shipping to NTC is established.
It is also significant to point out that even Atty. Gregorio Lantana, second
witness for the plaintiff, testified that on February 2, 2005, the day before
Hassan Salim resigned from his position as Branch Supervisor of NTC,
Zamboanga City, he talked to Salim. He asked Salim several questions on the
missing cargoes and the latter was reluctant to answer. And so, Atty. Lantana
postponed his investigation to another day. Why was Salim reluctant to
answer when he was the person responsible for the goods, being the
consignee thereof and the Branch Supervisor of the NTC? According to Atty.
Lantana, instead of appearing for further investigation the following day,
Salim, whose credibility he doubted and who was one of his suspects, sent
somebody else to submit his resignation letter; that Atty. Lantana wanted to
ask Salim questions which would tend to show that he received or knew what
happened to the commodities, but after February 3, 2005, he never saw Salim
anymore. Salim’s avoidance of further investigation and his resignation from
the NTC are telltale evidence of his guilt. “The wicked flee, even when no
man pursueth, but the righteous are as bold as a lion.”
Furthermore, why was Salim allowed to resign? Why were administrative
charges not filed against him? And why was he not included as a party
defendant in this case so that the plaintiffs could have recovered damages
from him? Why was the government so weak-kneed, fearful and impotent
against Salim? Why? Why?
Under the circumstances, and considering the evidence presented by the
plaintiffs as against the unrebutted evidence for the defendant on the delivery
of the commodities in question to Salim, the plaintiffs have failed to prove
their causes of action by clear preponderance of evidence. Hence, their
complaint must be dismissed. The defendant, on the other hand, must be
awarded damages on its counterclaims which the court finds justified under
the circumstances, by way of reimbursement for their expenses arising out of
this litigation in the amount of P50,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the amount
of P70,000.00.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant and
against the plaintiffs, dismissing the latter’s complaint, and ordering the
plaintiffs, pursuant to the defendant’s counterclaims, to pay, jointly and
solidarily, to the defendant, actual damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and
attorney’s fees in the amount of P70,000.00 plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, May 14, 2008.
(Name omitted)
Judge
APPENDIX D
Pointers in Answering School

and Bar Examination Questions
1. Matters of Form
If you were a bar candidate or just a law student preparing for a school
exam, you could be writing your answer according to the following format:
The Tagaytay City ordinance concerning memorial parks is
unconstitutional. The Constitution provides that private property shall not
be taken for public use without payment of just compensation. But mere
government regulation of the use of private property to promote public
welfare does not amount to taking of property. It is when property is
appropriated and applied to some public purpose that there is taking that
is compensable. Here, the ordinance does not merely regulate use of lots
within the memorial park. Five percent of the lots are required to be given
away for free to the poor of the city to promote their welfare.
Consequently, there is taking without payment of just compensation. The
ordinance is unconstitutional.
What is wrong with this?
First, it violates the ordinary rule of paragraphing. The first line is brought
to the leftmost edge of the page while the succeeding lines are the ones that
are indented. It is usually the other way around.
Second, visually, it projects a solid wall, an obstacle course, that
challenges the examiner to penetrate. “This one,” says the examiner, “is
giving me a hard work correcting his paper.” And the thing that lawyers hate
most is hard work.
Would the following format be more agreeable to the eye? Definitely.
8.
The issue is whether or not Alfredo’s dismissal violates his freedom of
religious worship and its free exercise.
The Constitution provides that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
worship without preference shall forever be allowed. Indeed, in the hierarchy
of values, such freedom is deemed superior to contractual and property rights.
Here, to Alfredo, Sabbath is not a day for work but for worship just as
much as most others believe that Sunday is a day of rest and worship. If he is
dismissed because of the exercise of his freedom, the dismissal is
unconstitutional.
Here, the number tag of the question you are answering is placed at the
center of the first line. But you could also put it before the first word of your
answer, if that is what you prefer.
Like the above, observe paragraphing when you shift from one idea to the
next. Paragraph breaks give the examiner a brief respite after each point.
Visually, his task seems easier when divided into short or medium length
paragraphs. You make the examiner’s journey through your notebook easier.
Always start on a new page for every numbered question. It is neat and
turning to a new page gives the examiner a sense of accomplishment in
correcting your notebook.
2. Making corrections
When correcting a mistake, simply run a line across the erroneous word or
sentence. For example:
The President dismissed the mayor.
Here, if you want to change the word “dismissed” to “suspended,” simply
run one line across the word you want to change, and then write the correct
word over it if the space permits. Otherwise, run the line thru the rest of the
sentence and rewrite it like this:
The President dismissed the mayor suspended the mayor.
3. Budgeting time
Always budget your time. Count the numbers of questions asked and
divide these by the time available to you. That will give you an idea of how
much time you have to spend on each item. At halftime, check where you are
and consider working faster when you have fallen behind.
It would be a pity if you have to pass your notebook with some questions
left unanswered. You suffer full deductions for every unanswered question.
In a question that requires you to give a reason for your answer, you would
always get some points for a plausible answer even if it is essentially wrong.
On the other hand, if you work in haste, you could miss one item in the set of
questions. Since, an unanswered item suffers a full deduction, this can make
the difference between your passing and failing the exam. Consequently, you
might want to consider placing a checkmark on each item you have already
answered so you will know if you missed any.
4. Enumeration questions
Sometimes, examiners would ask you enumeration questions like what the
elements of a particular crime are or what marriages are void from the
beginning. When you are certain of your answer, you might answer the last
question like this:
The following marriages are void from the beginning:
1. Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even
with the consent of parents and guardians;
2. Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform
marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both
parties believing good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal
authority to do so;
3. Those solemnized without license, except those covered by the
preceding;
4. Those bigamous and polygamous marriages not falling under
Article 42;
5. Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the
identity of the other; and
6. Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
But, when you are unsure of your answer or could not give all that are
required, do not number your enumerations. Use the colon and semi-colons
like this:
The following marriages are void from the beginning: those
contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the
consent of parents and guardians; those solemnized by any person not
legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were
contracted with either or both parties believing good faith that the
solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so; those contracted
through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other;
and those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
As a rule, the examiner scans the answers and will rarely go back to count
what you wrote. He will decide by impression. If you write it this way, the
examiner would likely assume that you have put in everything.
5. Problem questions
Students of law usually come from different educational backgrounds, not
all of them with suitable preparations for resolving legal problems. You
probably first encountered the essay-type of test questions in high school.
And, most likely, no one taught you how to write an essayed answer. Still,
your teachers somehow allowed your work to pass, giving you a sense that
you had done right.
Since your method worked for you in high school, you brought it with you
to college. Again, you may have managed to get by on it. Then, you entered
law school. But law maintains an intellectual discipline all its own.
Unfortunately, a number of you may not have fully adapted to that discipline
and have refused to change your answering pattern. Although you have
moved into a new city, you still use the map of the old city. No wonder you
sometimes get lost.
For most parts, presenting a sound legal position on any question follows
the mold of the classic categorical syllogism. Although no one can say that
answers to problem questions must follow a fixed model, you would not
make a mistake if you use this syllogism as such model. It is exemplified by
this problem and answer:
Problem: Is Carlos mortal?
Answer: All men are mortal.
Carlos is a man.
Therefore, Carlos is mortal.
The first part of the answer states the rule as to who are regarded as
mortal, thus, “All men are mortal.” It is a rule statement. The second part of
the answer applies the rule to the fact of the case, thus, “Carlos is a man.”
The rule that all men are mortal applies to Carlos because he is a man. The
third part of the answer is the conclusion, “Therefore, Carlos is mortal.”
But, by the nature of rules, they are hardly ever absolute. They often
recognize exceptions to their applications or on occasions need to be
interpreted to meet the peculiarities of specific cases. For instance, suppose
the last problem is altered somewhat:
Problem: Is Helen mortal?
Answer: All men are mortal; men include women.
Helen is a woman.
Therefore, Helen is mortal.
The statement “all men are mortal“ gives the general rule. The statement
that “men include women” acknowledges a relevant interpretation of that
rule. The statement, “Helen is a woman,” applies the rule to Helen. The
conclusion is then drawn that Helen is mortal. The same pattern: rule,
application to case, and conclusion can be used in answering problem
questions in classrooms and bar examinations. For a deeper understanding of
legal logic, read Chapters 6, 7, and 8 of this book.
But consider adding an introduction or topic statement to your answer
pattern. The topic statement introduces the subject of your answer. It helps
orient the examiner to the particular problem that you are about to tackle. If
you are certain of your answer, it would be preferable that, for topic sentence,
you write down your thesis or the position you have taken with respect to the
issue that the problem presents, e.g., “Helen is mortal.” If not, just state the
issue and make it your topic sentence, e.g., “The issue is whether or not
Helen is mortal.”
Your answer pattern will now be: Topic, Rule, Application to case, and
Conclusion or TRAC. Let us have a simple legal problem:
Problem: Jose crossed the red light while driving an ambulance in an
emergency. Did he violate the rule that punishes crossing the red light?
Answer:
[T] Jose should be punished for crossing the red light while driving an
ambulance in an emergency. (Alternative topic sentence: The issue is whether
or not Jose should be punished for crossing the red light while driving an
ambulance in an emergency.)
[R] Crossing the red light is punishable by law (the general rule) but
driving an ambulance on an emergency is exempt (an exception).
[A] Jose crossed the red light while driving an ambulance on an
emergency.
[C] Therefore, Jose did not violate the rule that punishes crossing the red
light.
Examiners rarely use simple problems. The trick is that they prefer asking
questions involving the application, not of the general rule or law itself, but
of judicial interpretations of that law or the exceptions to it.
Now let us take up an actual bar examination problem. It says:
Section 10 of Ordinance No. 105 of Tagaytay City provides that at
least 5% of the total area of any memorial park established within its
jurisdiction shall be set aside for charity burial of its pauper residents and
that no permit to establish, operate, and maintain a private memorial park
shall be granted without the applicant’s conformity or agreeing to such
condition.
The City argues that it is within its powers to pass said ordinance; that
the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power; and that the portion
taken is for public use, the same being intended for paupers pursuant to
its duty to provide for the health and safety of its inhabitants.
Before tackling the problem, however, you need to get a clear
understanding of its facts. The trick is to sort out the relevant facts from the
irrelevant. To be able to do this, you need to identify the issue that the
problem presents. In most cases it is found at the end of the problem. Here, it
is found in the sentence: Discuss the constitutionality of said ordinance.
You can encircle or underline it to get a correct focus on what you need to
answer because bar candidates or students are often distracted by other
aspects of the problem. Transposed in the format of an issue, it reads:
whether or not the ordinance is constitutional.
So, having identified the issue, you are now ready to work on the facts and
sort out the relevant from the irrelevant. What facts are relevant to the
constitutionality of the ordinance? The answer is simple: it is the provision of
the ordinance that affects the rights of the owner of the memorial park.
Since no rule stops you from writing notes on the questions sheet, feel free
to go over the facts and underline those that are relevant to the issue. Are the
number and section of the ordinance relevant to its constitutionality? No.
How about the fact that it was enacted by Tagaytay City? Neither. As already
stated, go for the provision of the ordinance that affects the right of the
owners of memorial parks. Thus, the ordinance “provides that at least 5% of
memorial park…be set aside for charity burial…” or “no permit to operate…
shall be granted.” You may skip the words “establish” and “maintain” as
redundant but you must underline the phrase “without the applicant’s
conformity,” being relevant to the owner’s exercise of his right. The words
“agreeing to such condition” is redundant.
In the next paragraph, underline the “City argues that it is within its powers
to pass said ordinance” and “a valid exercise of police power” since this is
the city’s argument that its ordinance is constitutional. But skip “and that the
portion taken is for public use, the same being intended for paupers pursuant
to its duty to provide” since the relevant provisions of the ordinance already
states this. Finally, underline “for the health and safety of its inhabitants”
since this goes into the exercise of police power.
This is how the problem would appear on the questionnaire after you
underline the relevant facts:
Section 10 of Ordinance No. 105 of Tagaytay City provides that at
least 5% of the total area of any memorial park established within its
jurisdiction shall be set aside for charity burial of its pauper residents and
that no permit to establish, operate, and maintain a private memorial park
shall be granted without the applicant’s conformity or agreeing to such
condition. The City argues that it is within its powers to pass said
ordinance; that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power; and that
the portion taken is for public use, the same being intended for paupers
pursuant to its duty to provide for the health and safety of its inhabitants.
Without the words that we skipped, the question would read like this:
Ordinance … provides that at least 5% of … memorial park … be set aside
for charity burial … no permit to … operate … without the applicant’s
conformity.
City argues … it is within its powers to pass said ordinance … a valid
exercise of police power … for the health and safety of its inhabitants.
Does the above present the question more clearly? Definitely! For a more
extensive discussion of the facts and the issues of a case, read Chapters 3 and
5 of this book.
Now that you have identified the issue and checked out the relevant facts,
you are ready to look for the applicable rule. This is actually your problem-
solving stage. Here, it would be best to do a little pre-work on the margin of
your questionnaire.
What law or principle applies to the problem concerning the ordinance that
requires owners of memorial parks to give 5% of their lands to the poor for
free? Is it an exercise of police power, like an ordinance that requires owners
of land to set back their houses three meters from their property line to
maintain an aesthetic environment? Or is it an exercise of the power of
eminent domain, like an ordinance expropriating private land for use in road
building? The answer is the second since the ordinance does more than
regulate use of property. It takes title to part of the memorial park from the
owner. Thus, begin your answer by stating the general rule provided in the
Constitution that “Private property shall not be taken for public use
without payment of just compensation.”
But remember this. Like the crossing-the-red-light case, the examiner is
usually not after the application of the general rule per se. That is too
elementary. He is usually after the interpretation of the general rule or its
exception.
How has the rule that “private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation” been interpreted? Does any one of these
interpretations apply to our case? Let us consider various interpretations and
choose the right one:
–– There is taking of private property for public use when the
government invades the property in a permanent in character.
–– Taking by the national government of the property of local
government is compensable taking.
–– Mere government regulation of the use of private property is
not “taking” that requires compensation.
–– There is taking of private property for public use when the
government takes the title over the property from the owner.
The first interpretation (there is taking of private property for public use
when the government invades the property in a permanent in character) is not
relevant to the issue since the government did not forcibly take possession of
or invade the property in our case. The second interpretation (taking by the
national government of the property of local government is compensable
taking) is also not relevant since the case involves private land. But the third
interpretation (mere government regulation of the use of private property is
not “taking” that requires compensation) is relevant. This is the position
taken by the city government on the issue raised in the case. The fourth
interpretation (there is taking of private property for public use when the
government takes the title over the property from the owner) is relevant since
the government wanted to take ownership of 5% of the land so it can give
them to the poor.
Is there an exception in which the government can take private property
and not have to pay for it? There is one exception: the taking is not
compensable in cases of destruction of injurious private property. Example is
bird-flue infestation of privately owned chicken farms. The government can
order their destruction to prevent the spread of the decease without having to
pay just compensation. Does this apply to our case? No. Then do not include
it in your answer.
After such pre-work, you are now ready to write you answer using the
TRAC model (topic, rule, application to case, and conclusion):
5. The Tagaytay City ordinance concerning memorial parks is
unconstitutional. (Alternative topic statement: The issue is whether or not
the Tagaytay City ordinance concerning memorial parks is
unconstitutional.)
The Constitution provides that private property shall not be taken for
public use without payment of just compensation. Mere government
regulation of the use of private property to promote public welfare does
not amount to taking of that property. It is when the government takes the
title over the property that there is taking that is compensable.
Here, the ordinance does not merely regulate use of lots within the
memorial park. The government takes five percent of the lots so it could
give them free to the poor of the city. Consequently, there is taking
without payment of just compensation. The ordinance is unconstitutional.
Answers need not be long-winded. Give a straight answer and you would
be able to finish your exam early and help the examiner facilitate correction
of your booklet. Long answers do not help.
Here is another sample problem.
8. Alfredo was a government employee in the Department of
Agriculture. After reading some verses in the Bible closely, he came to
believe in his heart that Sabbath fell on Wednesdays, not on Sundays, as
others believe. Consequently, he refused to report for work on
Wednesdays despite several warnings from his superiors concerning it.
Because of his habitual absence during Wednesdays, his superiors
dismissed him from work. He sought reconsideration of the dismissal but
this was denied.
Is his dismissal from work a violation of the freedom of religion
provided by the Constitution? Explain your answer.
Like the previous problem, you must first sort out the facts. In sorting
them out, be guided by the issue that the examiner presents. And where do
you find the issue in this problem? Again, it is towards the end of the
problem: “Is his dismissal from work a violation of the freedom of
religion provided by the Constitution?” You can encircle or underline it.
Transpose it then into the format of an issue and it will read: whether or not
Alfredo’s dismissal from work violates his freedom of religion.
Having identified the issue, you can further work on the facts of the case to
determine what facts are relevant to the determination of validity of Alfredo’s
dismissal from work. With this in mind, the facts that you need to underline
are:
8. Alfredo was a government employee in the Department of
Agriculture. After reading some verses in the Bible closely, he came to
believe in his heart that Sabbath fell on Wednesdays, not on Sundays as
others believe. Consequently, he refused to report for work on
Wednesdays despite several warnings from his superiors concerning it.
Because of his habitual absence during Wednesdays, his superiors
dismissed him from work. He sought reconsideration of the dismissal but
this was denied. Is his dismissal from work a violation of the freedom of
religion provided by the Constitution? Explain your answer.
Without the words that we skipped, the question would read like this:
Alfredo … a government employee … believes in his heart that
Sabbath fell on Wednesdays … Because of his habitual absence during
Wednesdays, his superiors dismissed him from work … a violation of the
freedom of religion …?
With the relevant facts and the issue known, your next step is to search for
the applicable general rule, and its interpretations or exceptions. Apparently,
the general rule that applies to the case is found in the Constitution, thus,
“The Constitution provides that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
worship without preference shall forever be allowed.” A relevant
interpretation of this general rule would be one made by the Supreme Court:
“Indeed, in the hierarchy of values, such freedom is deemed superior to
contractual and property rights.” The right to dismiss an employee is implicit
in a contract of employment.
Following the TRAC model, the answer would read something like this:
8.
The issue is whether or not the dismissal violates the freedom of
religious worship and its free exercise. (Alternate topic sentence “The
dismissal violates the freedom of religious worship and its free
exercise.”)
The Constitution provides that the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious worship without preference shall forever be allowed. Indeed, in
the hierarchy of values, such freedom is deemed superior to contractual
and property rights.
Here, to Alfredo, Sabbath is not a day for work but for worship just as
much as most others believe that Sunday is a day of rest and worship. If he is
dismissed because of the exercise of his freedom, the dismissal is
unconstitutional.
Actually, the answer is wrong but it is logical and written well. It is certain
to earn significant points for the student or candidate. Developing an ability
to answer questions clearly and logically already improves your chances of
passing your exam.
Now, here is an actual question asked in the bar. The facts are short but
you can still underline the relevant facts as was done in previous examples:
2. A and B were married on January 1, 1980. Two weeks later, on their
way home from honeymoon, the car A was driving turned turtle. A died
instantly while B was unharmed. A month thereafter, B had illicit
relations with C. On October 5, 1980, B gave birth to X. In X’s birth
certificate, B declared that X’s father is C.
Resolve the issue of X’s paternity with reasons.
Here is the topnotcher’s answer. Although he used the TRAC model, he
omitted the T or topic sentence, something that you could also do.
2. Under the Civil Code of the Philippines, a child born after 180 days
following the celebration of marriage and within 300 days following its
dissolution is presumed legitimate [the general rule]. Against that
presumption, only physical impossibility of access between the couple
during the first 120 days of the 300 days, which preceded the birth of the
child, can be used [the exception].
In this case, X was born within the period above contemplated. There
was no physical impossibility of access between the spouses A and B
during the early part of the first 120 days that preceded the birth of the
child the fact being that they were on their honeymoon prior to A’s death.
The fact that the mother declared against the legitimacy of the child is
inconsequential. This the law expressly provides.
X is the legitimate child of A and B.
Here is another sample problem:
3. Patrick and Liza were married by the Provincial Governor of
Cagayan. At the time of the celebration of their marriage, both spouses
believed in good faith that provincial governors had the authority to
solemnize marriages. What is the status of the marriage? Support your
answer.
Using the TRAC model, one student answered it in this manner:
3. The marriage between Patrick and Liza is valid.
Under the Family Code, one of the requisites of a valid marriage is the
authority of the solemnizing officer. But lack of authority will not impair
the validity of the marriage if either or both of the parties believed in
good faith through mistake of fact that the solemnizing officer had such
authority, without prejudice to the civil or criminal liability of such
officer.
Here, since both spouses believed in good faith that Reverend Juan
Sanchez was a priest with authority to solemnize marriage, their marriage
shall be regarded as valid but Sanchez may be civilly or criminally
prosecuted.
The reference to the liability of the unauthorized officer is irrelevant to the
issue that the case presents. Students or bar candidates have the tendency to
bear away from the issue and address other concerns probably to show that
they know more than just what was being asked of them. The result is not
what they expect. Addressing an irrelevant point often results in a deduction
from what could have been a perfect score. Stay on the issue. Do not digress
from it.
6. Multiple Choice Questions
Multiple-choice questions are actually a matching test. You have the main
stem of the question on the one hand and the several choices of answers on
the other. But the point of every question is the same. You are expected to
match the main stem with the correct choice of answer.
Questions are usually of several types. Here are some samples.
a) Name the thing described.
A party’s allegation in a pleading filed in another case [the main stem
of the question] constitutes (a) extrajudicial admission (b) judicial
admission (c) hearsay evidence (d) privileged matter [the choices].
The main trick in answering multiple-choice questions is to apply a process
of elimination. You sometimes have four or three answers to choose from.
Usually, if there are four choices, two are definitely and clearly inappropriate.
They are outright dummies and you can call them that. In the problem,
answers (c) and (d) are the dummies since a party’s statement in his pleading
is neither hearsay matter nor is privileged. Answer (b) is a correct
characterization of a party’s allegation in his pleading. It seems acceptable
but is actually a wrong answer and for that reason you can call it the phony.
It is a wrong answer because the pleading where the allegation is found has
been filed in another case. What remains is (a), the correct answer. It is the
correct answer because an admission made outside the courtroom constitutes
extrajudicial admission.
Here is another sample of the “name the thing” variety:
The law that will determine jurisdiction over a particular case [the
main stem of the question] is the law in force at the time (a) the
summons is served (b) the cause of action accrued (c) the action is filed
(d) the issues in the action are joined [the choices].
Answers (a) and (d) are the dummies because they are clearly inapplicable.
Answer (c) is the phony because, although the filing of the action constitutes
judicial demand and arrests the running of the prescriptive period, it is the
wrong answer. The correct answer is (b) because it is only at the
commencement of the action that the jurisdiction of the court over it can be
known.
b) Complete the sentence.
Positively stated, police power is the power (a) to ensure equal protection
(b) to maintain peace and order (c) to call on the armed forces to suppress
lawlessness (d) to enact laws that promote the public welfare.
Answers (a) and (c) are the dummies because they are clearly inapplicable.
Answer (b) is the phony because, although the term police is associated with
peace and order, it is the wrong answer. The correct answer is (d) because
police power is actually has to do with making reasonable laws and rules.
Another sample:
Laws enjoy the presumption that they are (a) needed (b) constitutional
(c) published (d) accepted.
Answers (c) and (d) are the dummies because they are clearly inapplicable.
Answer (a) is the phony because, although laws may be presumed needed, it
is irrelevant in the context of the fact the question is asked in a political law
exam. The correct answer is (b) because laws are presumed constitutional.
c) Find the rule that applies to the facts.
A law that provides for the drafting of only able-bodied men, not
women, to fight the rebels in Mindanao (a) is consistent with, (b)
violates, (c) is irrelevant to, (d) champions, the right to equal protection.
If the party offering a mere photocopy of a document intentionally
destroyed the original, (a) the original will be presumed adverse to him
(b) he will be barred from offering the photocopy (c) he will be punished
for contempt (d) his action will be dismissed.
Try to answer the above yourself. Identify the dummies, the phony, and the
correct answer among the choices. Do the same in the following varieties of
multiple choice questions.
d) Find the facts on which the rule applies.
Fire marshals may conduct administrative searches of houses to check
on violations of the fire code provided they have (a) inspection orders
from the fire chief (b) the city council’s approval (c) a search warrant (d)
their badges.
Censorship of motion picture is allowed to guard the public against
(a) evil deeds (b) bad acting (c) excessive admission fee (d) obscenity.
e) Find the right exception to the rule.
Under the parole evidence rule, when an agreement is in writing, no
evidence of the terms of such agreement can be presented except (a) the
written agreement itself (b) the testimony of the parties regarding those
terms (c) secondary evidence of such agreement.
f) Find the correct interpretation of a rule.
Constitutional equality accepts the need for classifying men, ideas, and
things provided that such classifications are (a) desirable (b) reasonable (c)
indispensable (d) understandable.
g) Find the legal justification for an act.
President Aquino denied admission of former president Ferdinand Marcos
into the Philippines under her power (a) to protect national security (b) to
maintain peace and order (c) to enforce a judicial order (d) to direct foreign
relation.
The law requiring registration of labor unions does not violate the freedom
of association because (a) such registration is for listing purposes only (b)
unionism needs regulation for the protection of their members (c) registration
is needed to give unions juridical personalities (d) the interest of the State is
paramount.

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Philippine Copyright, 2014

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Scope of Legal Writing

The Legal Dispute

Meaning of Legal Dispute

Its Significance in Legal Writing

Legal Dispute and the Principal Issue

Importance of Principal Issue

Legal writing, when methodically done, is much like a construction of a

Two Stages of Legal Writing

Random Notes versus Summary

Facts seen through the Issue

The Beers War

COURT STAFF: (After swearing in the witness) State your

Relevant Facts Extracted

Facts Set in Sequence

–– Julia Torres is eighteen years old, single, and a resident

Julia Torres, eighteen years of age, single, said that she

The Case of a Child and a Neighbor’s Dog

Interview with Mr. Fred Puzon,

Mr. Peter Banag

Very truly yours,

Knowing the Applicable Law or Rule

Sources of Law or Rule

Article 266-A. Rape; when and how committed. –– Rape is

xxx xxx xxx

For the Prosecution

For the Defense

Getting Into the Issues

Issues in Multiple Legal Disputes

Subordinate Controlling Issues

Relevant and Irrelevant Issues

A list of All the Issues

a) Allan’s claim that Ben and Cesar were negligent in handling

Factual and Legal Issues

Correct statement of the Issues

1. Presumably, you have, as part of pre-work, defined the legal dispute,

Roughing Out the Argument

Dad, I want to re-enroll this semester [he speaks of what he

Dad, please consider letting me re-enroll. I made a mistake

Does this approach have a better chance? Definitely.

First –– A clear statement of your thesis or where you stand on

The above structure represents the psychology of every balanced attempt

(Where You Stand on the Issue)

(Arguments Against You) (Arguments in Your Favor)

(Appeal to Your Reader’s Good Sense)

Anatomy of a Legal Argument

The Key Fact in Rules

The Case Fact

The defense of alibi, as a rule, is considered with suspicion

Roughed Out Arguments

(Where You Stand on the Issue)

(Arguments Against You) (Arguments in Your Favor)

Vaginal lacerations usually As a virgin, Julia could have

(Where You Stand on the Issue)

(Arguments Against You) (Arguments in Your Favor)

He and she were sweethearts.

(Where You Stand on the Issue)

Being sweethearts, it was not likely for Ronald was only

(Where You Stand on the Issue)

(Arguments (Arguments in Your Favor)

(Where You Stand on the Issue)