Avelino vs.

Cuenco

GR L-2821, 4 March 1949

FACTS: Senator Tañada and Senator Sanidad filed a resolution enumerating charges against the then
Senate President Jose Avelino and ordering the investigation thereof. Before Senator Tañada could
deliver his privilege speech to formulate charges against the incumbent Senate President, the petitioner,
motu propio adjourned the session of the Senate and walked out with his followers, leaving twelve other
members who continued meeting and elected the respondent, Marciano Jesus Cuenco, as Acting
President. Avelino thereupon filed quo warranto proceedings against Cuenco, contending that the latter
had not been validly elected because twelve members did not constitute a quorum – the majority required
of the 24-member Senate.

ISSUES:

(1) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?

(2) If it has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?

HELD: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground that it involved a political question. In
view of the separation of powers, the judiciary should not interfere nor take over a political nature of the
controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president.

Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the minority of ten senators
who left the Hall may not prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their
unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or
less. Hence, the Court ruled inter alia that there was a constitutional majority of the Senate for the
purpose of a quorum required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate. Firstly
because the minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least
fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence
from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of twenty-three
senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the
House: does not mean "all" the members. A majority of all the members constitute "the House". Thus, the
Court found it injudicious to declare the petitioner as the rightful President of the Senate, since the office
depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of
the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority.

Araullo vs Aquino, GR 209287

DAP: A Digest of the Supreme Court Decision

1. The Disbursement Acceleration Program Digest of the Supreme Court Decision ARAULLO VS
AQUINO III

2. The Disbursement Acceleration Program G.R. Nos. 209287, 209135, 209136,

209155,209164,209260,209442, 209517 and 209569 FACTS OF THE CASE Facts of the Case

3. The Disbursement Acceleration Program G.R. Nos. 209287, 209135, 209136,

209155,209164,209260,209442, 209517 and 209569 FACTS OF THE CASE On September 25, 2013,
Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the Senate of the Philippines to reveal that
some Senators, including himself, had been allotted an additional P50 Million each as incentive for voting
in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.

4. The Disbursement Acceleration Program FACTS OF THE CASE Responding to Sen. Estrada's
revelation, Secretary Florencio Abad of the DBM issued a public statement entitled Abad: Releases to
Senators Part of Spending Acceleration Program explaining that the funds released to the Senators had
been part of the DAP, a program designed by the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate economic
expansion.
5. The Disbursement Acceleration Program FACTS OF THE CASE Secretary Abad clarified that the
funds had been released to the Senators based on their letters of request for funding; and that it was not
the first time that releases from the DAP had been made because the DAP had already been instituted in
2011 to ramp up spending after sluggish disbursements had caused the growth of the gross domestic
product (GDP) to slow down.

6. The Disbursement Acceleration Program FACTS OF THE CASE G.R. Nos. 209287, 209135, 209136,
209155,209164,209260,209442, 209517 and 209569 The revelation also prompted Maria Carolina
Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file
various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions
was: DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”

7. The Disbursement Acceleration Program FACTS OF THE CASE But Secretary Abad argued that the
DAP is based on certain laws particularly the General Appropriations Act (GAA) (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to
augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and
authority to use savings, respectively).

8. The Disbursement Acceleration Program FACTS OF THE CASE The Nature of DAP

9. DAP FACTS OF THE CASE The Nature of DAP When he assumed office in the middle of 2010,
President Aquino made efficiency and transparency in government spending a significant focus of his
Administration. Yet, although such focus resulted in an improved fiscal deficit of 0.5% in the gross
domestic product (GDP) from January to July of 2011, it also unfortunately decelerated government
project implementation and payment schedules.

10. DAP FACTS OF THE CASE The Nature of DAP The World Bank observed that the Philippines'
economic growth could be reduced, and potential growth could be weakened should the Government
continue with its under spending and fail to address the large deficiencies in infrastructure.

11. DAP FACTS OF THE CASE The Nature of DAP The economic situation prevailing in the middle of
2011 thus paved the way for the development and implementation of the DAP as a stimulus package
intended to fast-track public spending and to push economic growth by investing on high-impact
budgetary PAPs to be funded from the savings generated during the year as well as from unprogrammed
funds.

12. DAP FACTS OF THE CASE The Nature of DAP In that respect, the DAP was meant to stimulate the
economy by way of accelerated spending.

13. DAP FACTS OF THE CASE The Nature of DAP The Administration would thereby accelerate
government spending by: streamlining the implementation process through the clustering of infrastructure
projects of the Department Of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and the Department of Education
(DepEd), and (2) frontloading PPP-related projects due for implementation in the following year.

14. DAP FACTS OF THE CASE The Nature of DAP The March 2012 report of the World Bank, released
after the initial implementation of the DAP, revealed that the DAP was partially successful. The
disbursements under the DAP contributed percentage points to GDP growth by the fourth quarter of
2011.

15. DAP FACTS OF THE CASE The Nature of DAP The continued implementation of the DAP
strengthened growth by 11.8% year on year while infrastructure spending rebounded from a 29%
contraction to a 34% growth as of September 2013. The DAP thus proved to be a demonstration that
expenditure was a policy instrument that the Government could use to direct the economies towards
growth and development.

16. DAP FACTS OF THE CASE The Nature of DAP Basically, the DAP was to be implemented and
funded by declaring savings coming from the various departments and agencies derived from pooling
unobligated allotments and withdrawing unreleased appropriations; (2) releasing unprogrammed funds;
and (3) applying the savings and unprogrammed funds to augment existing P APs or to support other
priority PAPs.
17. DAP FACTS OF THE CASE The Nature of DAP The Government, by spending on public
infrastructure, would signify its commitment of ensuring profitability for prospective investors. The PAPs
funded under the DAP were chosen for this reason based on their: (1) multiplier impact on the economy
and infrastructure development; (2) beneficial effect on the poor; and (3) translation into disbursements.

18. DAP FACTS OF THE CASE The Nature of DAP Basically, the DAP was to be implemented and
funded by declaring savings coming from the various departments and agencies derived from pooling
unobligated allotments and withdrawing unreleased appropriations; (2) releasing unprogrammed funds;
and (3) applying the savings and unprogrammed funds to augment existing PAPs or to support other
priority PAPs.

19. DAP Issues

20. DAP ES The Issues Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.” Whether or not the DAP, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP, violate
Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, specifically:

21. DAP THE ISSUES a.) Whether or not the cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to
augment the appropriations of other offices outside the Executive is unconstitutional; b.) Whether or not
the funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any appropriation in the General
Appropriations Act is unconstitutional;

22. DAP THE ISSUES c.) Whether or not the withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing
agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as
savings prior to the end of the fiscal year is unconstitutional:

23. DAP THE ISSUES c.) Whether or not the withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing
agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as
savings prior to the end of the fiscal year is unconstitutional, and Whether or not the Doctrine of operative
fact was applicable

24. DAP Held/ Ruling

25. DAP HELD: HELD/ THE RULING DAP did not violate Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution DAP
was not an appropriation measure; hence no appropriation law was required to adopt or to implement it.

26. DAP THE RULING No law was necessary for the adoption and implementation of the DAP because
of its being neither a fund nor an appropriation, but a program or an administrative system of prioritizing
spending; and that the adoption of the DAP was by virtue of the authority of the President as the Chief
Executive to ensure that laws were faithfully executed. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the
power vested in Congress under Section 29(I), Article VI of the Constitution.

27. DAP THE RULING However: DAP, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the
DAP, violated Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution

28. DAP THE RULING Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution provides: 5) No law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations

29. DAP THE RULING The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), supra must be
made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (1) There is a law authorizing the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their
respective offices;

30. DAP THE RULING (2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for
their respective offices; and (3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general law for
their respective offices.
31. DAP THE RULING As to the first requisite: The General Appropriation Act (GAA) of 2011 and 2012
lacked valid provisions to authorize transfers of funds under the DAP; hence transfers under the DAP
were unconstitutional. And although the GAA of 2013 had provision for such transfer, it however lacked
other the requisites.

32. DAP THE RULING As to the second requisite: There were no savings from which funds could be
sourced for the DAP. The funds used in the DAP -the unreleased appropriations and withdrawn
unobligated allotments -were not actual savings within the context of Section 25(5), supra, and the
relevant provisions of the GAAs.

33. DAP THE RULING Savings should be understood to refer to the excess money after the items that
needed to be funded have been funded, or those that needed to be paid have been paid pursuant to the
budget. There could be savings only when the PAPs for which the funds had been appropriated were
actually implemented and completed, or finally discontinued or abandoned. Savings could not be realized
with certainty in the middle of the fiscal year; The funds for slow-moving PAPs could not be considered as
savings because such PAPs had not actually been abandoned or discontinued yet.

34. DAP THE RULING At this point, the Supreme Court also discussed that there is no executive
impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s power to refuse to spend
appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually
prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which
did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the
DAP was the transfer of funds.

35. DAP THE RULING As to the third requisite: Cross-border augmentations from savings were
prohibited by The Constitution. The phrase respective offices used in Section 25(5), supra refers to the
entire Executive, with respect to the President; the Senate, with respect to the Senate President; the
House of Representatives, with respect to the Speaker; the Judiciary, with respect to the Chief Justice;
the Constitutional Commissions, with respect to their respective Chairpersons.

36. DAP THE RULING Those transfers of funds, which constituted cross-border augmentations for being
from the Executive to the COA and the House of Representatives, are graphed as follows:

37. The Disbursement Acceleration Program The plain text of Section 25 (5), supra disallowing cross-
border transfers was disobeyed. Cross-border transfers, whether as augmentation, or as aid, were
prohibited under Section 25 (5), supra.

38. DAP THE RULING Other issues The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not
covered by any appropriation in the General Appropriations Act is unconstitutional

39. DAP THE RULING No funds from savings could be transferred under the DAP to augment deficient
items not provided in the GAA The Supreme Court conclude that the "savings" pooled under the DAP
were allocated to PAPs that were not covered by any appropriations in the pertinent GAAs:

40. DAP THE RULING a. Disaster Risk, Exposure, Assessment and Mitigation (DREAM) project under
the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) covered the amount of Pl.6 Billion; b. Aside from this
transfer under the DAP to the DREAM project exceeding by almost 3 00 the appropriation by Congress
for the program Generation of new knowledge and technologies and research capability building in
priority areas identified as strategic to National Development the Executive allotted funds for personnel
services and capital outlays. The Executive thereby substituted its will to that of Congress;

41. DAP THE RULING c. Philippine Council for Industry, Energy and Emerging Technology Research
and Development (DOST-PCIEETRD) for Establishment Of the Advanced Failure Analysis Laboratory,
which the appropriation code and the particulars -Research and Management Services -appearing in the
SARO did not correspond to the program specified in the GAA.

42. DAP THE RULING Other issues Whether or not the withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the
implementing agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased
appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year is unconstitutional

43. DAP THE RULING Sourcing the DAP from unprogrammed funds despite the original revenue targets
not having been exceeded was invalid. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money
source for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the
National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this
case, no such clear certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.

44. DAP THE RULING The requirement that revenue collections must exceed revenue target should be
understood to mean that the revenue collections must exceed the total of the revenue targets stated in
the BESF. Moreover, to release the unprogrammed funds simply because there was an excess revenue
as to one source of revenue would be an unsound fiscal management measure because it would
disregard the budget plan and foster budget deficits.

45. DAP THE RULING Other issues Doctrine of operative fact was applicable

46. DAP THE RULING The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act
prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that
cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but
sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or unconstitutional law
produces no effect.

47. DAP THE RULING To declare the implementation of the DAP unconstitutional without recognizing
that its prior implementation constituted an operative fact that produced consequences in the real as well
as juristic worlds of the Government and the Nation is to be impractical and unfair. Unless the doctrine is
held to apply, the Executive as the disburser and the offices under it and elsewhere as the recipients
could be required to undo everything that they had implemented in good faith under the DAP. That
scenario would be enormously burdensome for the Government.

48. DAP THE RULING Equity alleviates such burden. The other side of the coin is that it has been
adequately shown as to be beyond debate that the implementation of the DAP yielded undeniably
positive results that enhanced the economic welfare of the country. To count the positive results may be
impossible, but the visible ones, like public infrastructure, could easily include roads, bridges, homes for
the homeless, hospitals, classrooms and the like. Not to apply the doctrine of operative fact to the DAP
could literally cause the physical undoing of such worthy results by destruction, and would result in most
undesirable wastefulness.

49. DAP THE RULING The doctrine of operative fact can apply only to the PAPs that can no longer be
undone, and whose beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the DAP, but cannot apply to the
authors, proponents and implementers of the DAP, unless there are concrete findings of good faith in
their favor by the proper tribunals determining their criminal, civil, administrative and other liabilities.

50. DAP SUMMARY In summary, the High Tribunal ruled (on DAP) as unconstitutional the following: • the
creation of savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and the withdrawal of these funds for implementing
agencies; • the cross-border transfers of the savings from one branch of government to another; • the
allotment of funds for projects, activities, and programs not outlined in the General Appropriations Act;

51. DAP E N D

G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 BELGICA vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M.
ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

NATURE:

These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.
 FACTS:

The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN
Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects"
using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging
five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and
Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints
are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3)
implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.

Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas
project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO.
Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional

G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently

G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For
The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking
that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which
provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents

UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist
order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary
Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of
powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political
dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
116
2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910, relating to the Malampaya Funds, and under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.

HELD:

1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of
project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional
oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the
sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be
confined to mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of
the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the constitution.

Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the
budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional.

2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President”‖ constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude to use the
Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally
appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.”

Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:

(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared constitutional. IT INDICATED
PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE
PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM
CALAMITIES.

(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” was declared unconstitutional.IT
GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR ANY
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE LAW
DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE
THE SAME.

Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary (194 SCRA 317)

Article IX (B), Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity
to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary (194 SCRA 317)

FACTS: The petitioner are assailing the Executive Order No. 284 issued by the President
allowing cabinet members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the
executive department to hold 2 positions in the government and government corporations and to receive
additional compensation. They find it unconstitutional against the provision provided by Section 13, Article
VII prohibiting the President, Cabinet members and their deputies to hold any other office or employment.
Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B further states that “Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporation or their subsidiaries." In the opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor General,
the said Executive Order is valid and constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated “unless otherwise
allowed by law” which is construed to be an exemption from that stipulated on Article VII, section 13, such
as in the case of the Vice President who is constitutionally allowed to become a cabinet member and the
Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.

ISSUE: Whether Section 7 of Article IX-B provides an exemption to Article VII, section 13 of the
constitution.

RULING: The court held it is not an exemption since the legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions
is to prevent government officials from holding multiple positions in the government for self enrichment
which a betrayal of public trust. Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to
all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the
exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants. Thus the phrase “unless otherwise provided by the Constitution” in Section 13, Article
VII cannot be construed as a broad exception from Section 7 of Article IX-B that is contrary to the
legislative intent of both constitutional provisions. Such phrase is only limited to and strictly appliesonly to
particular instances of allowing the VP to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. The court thereby declared E.O 284 as null and void.

Dimaporo v. Mitra
FACTS:
Dimaporo was elected as a representative for the second legislative district of Lanao del Sur during the
1987 congressional elections. Dimaporo filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of governor of
ARMM. Secretary and Speaker of the House excluded the name of Dimaporo from the Roll of Members
of HR Under Art IX of Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code. Dimaporo lost the election wrote a letter
intending to resume performing his duties and functions as an elected member of the Congress.
Unfortunately, he was not able to regain his seat in the Congress. Dimaporo contended that he did not
lose his seat as a Congressman because Art. IX Sec. 67 of BP 881 is not operative in the present
constitution, and therefore not applicable to the members of Congress. Grounds may be termed to be
shortened:
1. Holding any officer or employment in the government or ant subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof.
2. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for a disorderly behavior
3. Disqualification as determined by a resolution of the electoral tribunal in an election contest
4. Voluntary renunciation of office

ISSUE: W/N Dimaporo can still be considered as a member of Congress even after he has filed for
another government position

HELD: No.
In the constitution there is a new chapter on the accountability of public officers. In the 1935 Constitution,
it was provided that public office is a public trust. Public officers should serve with the highest degree of
responsibility and integrity. If you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who has mandated to serve
for 6 years to file for an office other than the one he was elected to, then that clearly shows that he did not
intend to serve the mandate of the people which was placed upon him and therefore he should be
considered ipso facto resigned. The filling of a certificate shall be considered as an overt act or
abandoning or relinquishing his mandate to the people and he should therefore resign if he wants to seek
another position which he feels he could be of better service