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Internship Report

(June 2014 – February 2015)

Involvement of African Diaspora in decision-making processes in the


Netherlands concerning Africa

Internship supervisors: Dr. Rico Lie and Margriet Goris (Project Manager)

Benhardt Edem Kofi Norglo

Study Programme: Master International Development Studies

Student Number:820514609070
Acknowledgement
This internship spans the period June 2014 to February 2015, during which I
took a two month break (November – December 2014) to follow the
Academic Consultancy training. In all the internship took six months.

During this period, a number of people have been very helpful in making the
research “involvement of the African diaspora in decision-making processes
in the Netherlands concerning Africa” successful.

I am grateful to the Almighty for granting me health, and making it possible


for the persons contacted by me to be willing to open up and talk to me. I
am grateful to financiers of this research, Africa in Motion (AIM) for giving
me this platform of tasting research among the diaspora in Europe.

My profound gratitude goes to my daily supervisor, Margriet Goris who was


always giving me encouragement, guiding me through and making
suggestions on how to improve my work. I also express my appreciation for
the guidance of Rico Lie concerning the general approach to the research
and his understanding in times when I had difficulty and did not know how
to continue the research.

Without the collaboration of the diaspora from Africa, this research would
not have been possible. I express my appreciation to Nurudeen Alhassan
(Vice Chair of Recogin), Joe Lamptey and all the executives of Stitchting
Akasanoma, Frank Idiok of Nigeria National Association, Angelique Mbandu
and all the members of AYP. I am also grateful to Isaac Acheampong, Pieter
van der Linden and Paul Mulder of Almere and everyone who made this
research possible.
Executive Summary
This internship report is based on a research that sought to find out to what
extent the African diaspora is involved in decision-making in the
Netherlands. The research covered participants from Ghana, Sierra Leone,
Congo, Ethiopia and Cameroon.

Data was mainly collected through interviews and observation over a period
of six months. A situational mapping of Ghanaian organisations was done to
provide a cursory view of their involvement in policy making. Participation in
workshops and conferences also offered an opportunity to engage diasporas
in conversations to pick their thoughts on the involvement of the diaspora in
decision-making in the Netherlands.

The study found that the diaspora is involved in some decision making
relating to policies, mostly at the municipality level. However, the
involvement tends to be more passive and consultative. This manner of
involvement leads the diaspora into self-mobilising organisations and
platforms to get involved. The study also found that the Complexity of a dual
relation of the diaspora and knowledge of both worlds was an essential
reason for them to want to be involved in decision-making concerning Africa.
They however faced some constraints such as lacking a unified front and
capacity in some areas, Financial challenges in terms of implementing
projects back in Africa and limited media coverage on their achievements.

This report contains other attachments. It is most likely that some


information in the attachments may not be captured in the main text of the
report. However, the main report provides a more elaborate explanation of
what is mostly contained in the attachments.
Contents
Acknowledgement ........................................................................................................................................ ii

Executive Summary...................................................................................................................................... iii

Table of Figures ............................................................................................................................................. v

1.0 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 1

1.1 Basis for Choosing Ghana........................................................................................................................ 2

1.2 Situational mapping of Ghanaian Hometown Associations and Organisations ..................................... 4

2.0 Task 1: Inventory of Opinions and actions in relation to how diaspora people living in the
Netherlands contribute to policy nationally, foreign or municipality .......................................................... 5

3.0 Rights-based approach............................................................................................................................ 6

3.1 Social inclusion and exclusion ................................................................................................................. 7

3.2 Task 2: Develop two cases; Debt relief & Sister-city relationship and how the Ghanaian diaspora is
involved ....................................................................................................................................................... 17

3.3 Sister-city relationships ......................................................................................................................... 20

3.4 Task 3: Work together with science shop on policy brief ..................................................................... 23

3.5 Task 4: Find background information for academic literature ............................................................. 23

Annex 1 .......................................................................................................................................................... i

Annex 2 ......................................................................................................................................................... A

Annex 3 .......................................................................................................................................................... I
Table of Figures
Figure 1 African diaspora engagement in policy......................................................................................... 14

Figure 2 relation between international policies, diaspora & remittances ................................................ 15


1.0 INTRODUCTION
Earlier studies under the Wageningenur science shop sought to evaluate the
contribution of the African diaspora to policy making from diverse
perspectives. Under the Africa in Motion (AIM) request to find how the
African diaspora is involved in policy making in the European Union, and
more specifically in the Netherlands, two studies have already been carried
out by Johannsen (2014) and Baudewijns et al. (2014). The two studies
observe that because of the diverse nature of the African diaspora and the
vast nature of the topic of policy, it is essential to approach the contribution
of African diapora to policy making from diverse perspectives.

Following from these two studies, in which perspectives and mapping of


diasporic groups was undertaken by Johannsen (2014) and a report on the
potential inputs the diaspora could make on policy concerning EU initiative
on raw materials by the ACT group Baudewijns et al. (2014), it became
clear that not much diasporic views were incorporated in the EU raw
materials initiative. It also became clear that the diasporic community
interviewed did not have much knowledge on the area of raw materials
initiatives of the EU. Given this backdrop, this study proceeded to narrow the
research more to specific diasporic community of Ghanaians and their
knowledge or contribution concerning the debt relief that Ghana received in
2004 from the Paris Club. Other diasporic African individuals were
interviewed to ascertain their impression about contributing to policy and
how they were able participate in policy making decisions at their
municipalities.

The study further sought to examine whether the Ghanaian diaspora was
involved in the decision by some municipalities to engage other cities in
Ghana in a sister-city or city twinning relationship. The study also considered
examining whether the Ghanaian diaspora in some municipalities contributed
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to or were influential in policies that steered the sister-cities relationships
and how these Ghanaians were personally collaborating with the municipality
here in the Netherlands and the city back in Ghana. At the time of this
research almost all the sister-city relationships did no longer exist. The only
active one, Almere-Kumasi formed a core of this research.

1.1 Basis for Choosing Ghana


Ghana is a bilateral partner to the Netherlands, having sustained a relation
that spans several decades. van Kessel (2002) observes a bilateral relation
of over 300 years. The relation initially took the form of trade in European
goods, slaves, Ghanaian gold, cocoa and other products (van Kessel, 2002).
The centuries before the 20th century witnessed both forced and voluntary
migration of Ghanaians (van Kessel, 2002) to other parts of the world, with
slavery often accounting for the forced migration. The 20th century however
witnessed a new wave of migrations precipitated by economic, political and
academic conditions in Ghana (Peil, 1995; van Kessel, 2002). Ghanaians
begun to migrate in large numbers to the Netherlands between 1974 and
1983 due to worsening economic conditions back in Ghana (Nijenhuis and
Zoomer, 2012; Tonah, 2007; van Kessel, 2002) and eventually constituting
themselves into a Ghanaian diasporic group.

Not much is known about contribution of the Ghanaian diasporic community


to policy decisions in the Netherlands. Ghanaians are second most important
migrant group from Sub-Saharan Africa in terms of numbers, only next to
Somalia with the latter accounting for 34631 migrants and the former 22263
(CBS, as cited in Johannsen, 2014). Ghanaians have been more researched
than other migrant groups from sub-saharan Africa who reside in the
Netherlands (van Kessel, 2002). However, most of the research tends to

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examine their way of life, value systems and religiosity (Mazzucato, 2007;
Peil, 1995) and their health situation vis a vis the healthcare system (Agyei
et al., 2014; Agyemang et al., 2013; Knipscheer et al., 2000; Knipscheer
and Kleber, 2007). Mazzucato (2008) distinguishes Ghanaian diaspora from
the Moroccan and Turkish by the fact that Ghanaians are usually economic
migrants. The same logic applies for most diasporic African migrants.
Studies do not examine whether Ghanaian migrants have some expertise
that could be harnessed at that political level for policy decisions.

Currently, it is estimated that some 20,000 Ghanaians are legally resident in


the Netherlands with some illegal migrants not statistically represented
(Baker, 2012). This implies that the number of Ghanaians in the Netherlands
could be higher than what current records show. (Mazzucato, 2007)
observes that records from the Ghana embassy proved that in the year
2000, some 40,000 Ghanaians in the Netherlands registered to vote in the
presidential elections of Ghana. This figure however does not exhaustively
explain the situation. For instance, the figure excludes persons under the
age of 18 and persons who above 18, but are unwilling to participate in
political activities for religious or diverse reasons. It is also not known if
Ghanaian students studying in the Netherlands were accounted for in the
statistics. This implies that Ghanaians in the Netherlands could be more.

However, this generic appreciation of migrants must be segregated from the


diasporic group of Ghanaians for which this study will target. The diasporic
group here referring to Ghanaians who have lived in the Netherlands for a
long time, encompassing first generation migrants and their families
thereafter, have become Dutch citizens, and yet maintain close ties with
Ghana which is manifested in remittances, sustained cultural links with
ethnic groups here and at home and conscious attempts at helping to
transform the development fortunes of the Ghana.
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Migrant Ghanaian populations mostly live in Amsterdam which accounts for
over 50 percent and the Hague (Nijenhuis and Zoomer, 2012; van Kessel,
2002). They constitute a minority and have not been in the limelight until an
Israeli plane crash in the 1980s in Amsterdam which warranted a need for
the state to reconsider their position as a minority worthy of some attention
(Knipscheer et al., 2000; van Kessel, 2002). According to van Kessel (2002),
this brought about a change in policy leading to granting of certain rights to
these Ghanaian migrants and allowing them to participate in policy issues
that affect them in the Netherlands. However, Nijenhuis and Zoomer (2012),
p.9 observe that “Ghanaians are not explicitly mentioned as a target group –
nor as a ‘problematic’ group - within the framework of Dutch integration
policies, and as such there are hardly any specific governmental
programmes or projects aimed at integration”.

1.2 Situational mapping of Ghanaian Hometown Associations


and Organisations
The Ghana embassy website contains 53 Ghanaian associations and
organisations. A breakdown of the organisations is attached as annex 1 to
this report. A cursory glance of names show that most of them are
hometown associations. Eleven (11) organisations have been indicated to be
new with the phrase “coming soon”, thus bringing effectively the number of
active organizations recorded on the embassy website to 42, as the 53
organisations include the 11 “unestablished” organization. Of these 42,
fourteen (14) representing 33.3% are hometown associations and 26.2%
are clubs implying in effect that 59.5% are founded around social activities.
A relatively small percentage of organisations, about 7.1% provide or are
gearing up to seek the general welfare of Ghanaian diasporic groups by
engaging in policy discourses at the micro level. These organisations are
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Council of Ghanaian Chiefs in the Netherlands Foundation (CoGhac), Council
of Ghanaian Organisations in the Netherlands (COGHAN) and Recogin
(STICHTING GHANESE GEMEENSCHAP NEDERLAND). The last two are
preferably called umbrella organizations, and since there can hardly co-exist
two umbrella organisations, the two organisations are having to deal with
their differences for now. The rest of the organisations are either foundations
for supporting children or for fun activities for children and also women
groups. Thirteen (13) organisations, representing 30.9% had phone
numbers that did not exist, or could not be reached at any time of call. Eight
(8) organisations had wrong emails that never went through. The rest
neither had email addresses nor websites, and in some instances did not
have both. Interestingly, representations of the two major political parties in
Ghana NPP and NDC had phone numbers that did not go through as well.

This situation makes difficult and a bit unrealistic to use the embassy’s site
as a starting point for research on such matters. Personal details obtained
from a few lucky calls proved to provide the key and networks needed.
However, as most of these organisations only meet for social events and
hometown matters of importance, they do not provide a fertile ground for
research on policy issues especially at the national level

2.0 Task 1: Inventory of Opinions and actions in relation to how


diaspora people living in the Netherlands contribute to policy
nationally, foreign or municipality
This task entailed inquiring from the diaspora how they contributed to
policies that affected them at their municipalities in the Netherlands here
and how they were able to contribute to bilateral relations or otherwise
between the Netherlands and their home country. The task is analysed

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within two theoretical frameworks, namely the rights-based approach and
the theory of social inclusion and exclusion.

3.0 Rights-based approach


The rights-based approach hinges on access. The access could either be in
relation to a resource or certain rights regarded as inalienable, provided by
the society or state. Oestreich (2014) discusses rights in terms of civil and
political rights. He however notes that the rights-based approach
encompasses economic, social and cultural rights. Cornwall and
Nyamu‐Musembi (2004),p.1417 (2004, p.1417) hold that, “...rights are
based on legal obligations (and in some cases ethical obligations that have a
strong foundation in human dignity even though they are only in the process
of being solidified into legal obligations).” Oestreich (2014) observes the
belief that rights unleash people to discover their potentials as such enable
them to undertake productive activities in an environment of non-
discrimination. He adds that non-discrimination is pivotal in the rights-based
approach. Offenheiser and Holcombe (2003) are of the opinion that rights-
based approach addresses those hurdles that preclude communities from
having rights, being able to make use of their potentials and having the
ability to make choices.

Advocacy for political and civil rights has been more pronounced and has
tended to overshadow other rights such as social, economic and cultural
rights (Offenheiser and Holcombe, 2003). However, all these rights are not
discussed in the isolation from access since it is access that determines the
availability of these rights.

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3.1 Social inclusion and exclusion
Porter (2000) defines social exclusion as policy discourses that seek to
compel or urge people to comply with socially accepted standards and not be
culpable of aberrations of such standards. The concept of exclusion in the EU
is a bit ambiguous, however, in the Netherlands and Germany, addressing
social exclusion implies “…reintegration in the labour market of the welfare
dependant..”(Ruggeri Laderchi and Savastano, 2013, p.15).Duffy (1998) as
cited in (Porter, 2000) perceive inclusion and exclusion to entail access to
the labour market in accordance with the UK and EU social policies. Access
to the labour market can be vital in the fight against poverty. Poverty keeps
people isolated and vulnerable. Whereas poverty can keep people vulnerable
and isolated, Offenheiser and Holcombe (2003) are of the opinion that
poverty is a consequence of social exclusion when perceived from the rights-
based approach. For the purpose of this report, social inclusion and exclusion
will not be restricted to the labour market, but will seek to discuss access by
the diaspora to political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights.

Generally speaking, the diaspora is quite active in the municipal level. Here
they are able to relish their political social, economic and cultural rights. In
the municipalities, they are able to participate in local elections to choose
their preferred political leadership and party. They are also able to mobilize
themselves, especially in areas where certain diasporic groups are more
resident. For instance, the Ghanaians in Bijlmer Arena are so organized that
they are able to draw the attention of the municipality. The municipality
urges and funds them to organize workshops on socially important issues
such as unemployment among the youth. Using such fora, the diaspora is
able to organize and seek the inputs of other members during the
workshops. Such inputs are then shared with the municipality for future
planning.

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The African diaspora also have diverse interest and opinions about
contributing to policy in the Netherlands. Generally, most of them are able to
have their opinions expressed at the municipality level. But whether opinions
shared are enough to influence policy is another matter to be studied in
detail in the near future.

At the municipality however, depending on the diasporic person interviewed,


the opinion about contributing to policy differed. For some, policy discourse
was too political for them, for others, they felt there was already an
established system of doing things, and their contribution would not change
anything. Yet, others thought being able to contribute to policy required
certain skill which rendered one effective and indispensable, and hence the
need to be engaged.

Interviewee 9 was asked about whether he thought the African diaspora


should be contacted on matters of bilateral relations between the
Netherlands and his home country in Africa, and whether the diaspora
should be more active in policy formulation at their municipalities. His
response was clear. He was gainfully employed and did not meddle in
politics. He was quite satisfied with his current situation in the Netherlands
leaving matters of policy to the politicians. However, when he felt personally
affected, he sought clarification from the relevant public institution or
discussed with colleagues of the diaspora on the best approach to address
such a policy decision. He stated as follows;

“for me, the politics doesn’t affect me. But when I feel it affects me, I
wake up and I do something about that. I will talk to people within the
government to give my voice, give my opinion. One thing I like about
living in Holland is that you can give your opinion about some policy if
you don’t like it”

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This respondent was also quite content with the fact that in the Netherlands,
he is able to express himself, a civil and political right that is denied in a
number of African countries. He added that it did not really matter if his
opinion is accepted or not. So long as he knows there is the avenue for him
to voice himself and stake an opinion, it was refreshing. He also believed
that a lot of decisions had already been taken, and he can’t do much as an
individual to change them. So he has to fit in.

By this position, he expresses the position that most interviewees held, that
the Dutch society was very democratic, and offered them the opportunity to
express themselves. Notwithstanding the fact they may not be able to
change political decisions, they are still content with the fact that they are
able to express themselves. Another interviewee in answering the researcher
concerning their political and civil rights, expressed a similar position as
follows,

“Is a very liberal country, like you have seen yourself.”

This however does not exclude these diasporic groups from enjoying certain
rights such as civil and political rights, as they are free to participate in
elections and be elected as well.

The enjoyment of civil and political rights can be individually advocated for in
diverse ways, and the results could be to the benefit of society on the whole.
A journalist expressed how he had spent so many years writing about the
zwarte piete and how after these years, he is beginning to see his labour
bear fruits. He note,

“I see myself as a strategic visionary who thinks and moves people.


Like the whole discussion about zwarte piet, I have written lots of

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articles about it in the past, and now I have seen that soldiers have
come up. They are now fighting the fight and they are now winning.”

Although this person did not physically mobilise people, sit in any policy
roundtable to discuss this matter of zwarte piet. His ability to use his
profession to redirect attention to relevant social issues proves that the
diaspora might not necessarily have to be on a negotiation table, but could
influence policy in areas where they have the capacity through knowledge
sharing which is leveraged by the society.

Same issue of capacity being important in determining who can be included


in policy discourses or implementation is also expressed by another
interviewee who said,

“Em consultation has sense if you get something out of it. If you have
100 people, there is no need consulting the 100 people if only one
person will be talking sense. Is waste of time. So you better go to that
one person and talk to them and inform the others.”

The diaspora is much saddled with the need first to settle into a new
environment, then the need to secure a job and make some income. If they
have settled for a long time, their focus is more on enhancing their
capacities and creating social networks. Interviewee 5 expressed the need to
settle down in the Dutch society as a demanding one, and therefore
requiring of a conscious effort to upgrade oneself to fit into the society.

“… for you to be effective and active in society, you have to develop


yourself because if you don’t develop yourself and have the skills, you
will remain at where you are and you cannot participate. When you
don’t develop yourself and have the proper tools in your hand,..”

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He was of the opinion that much more organized national umbrella
organisations in the Netherlands were more likely to contribute to policy.
This was however said with uncertainty, as he confirmed that diasporas are
more interested in social events such as parties, hometown association
gatherings and not into policy discourses.

Another respondent described as erroneous the conception of an idea that


the diaspora contributes to policy or should be allowed to contribute to
policy. He was of the opinion that policy formulation decisions were strictly
political and fitted within the political agendas of parties. It was only when
such policies were transmitted to the municipality level for implementation
that they became more accessible to the citizenry. And even at the level of
the municipality, he noted that policies could not be tinkered with anymore
than they had been set in the political agenda. The only option that
remained was for the municipalities to shape their projects in line with those
policies. He further noted that it was not only the diasporic groups that were
excluded from such policy formulation platforms, but even the indigenous
Dutch could not concretely say that they were duly involved in such
processes. He observed that this situation was not peculiar to the
Netherlands, but to many countries. He even stated that the situation was
not that different from what pertains to Ghana. In his own words, this is
what he said,

“it is always like that. Even in Ghana is like that. Government comes
with their protocol or what they call it.”

He added that what the citizenry had as their power was to listen to the
policy alternatives of the political parties and to reject policies they disliked
through the ballot.

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When it comes to economic rights, it depends on the person being
interviewed. One diasporic individual in an interview expressed a sense of
exclusion in the labour market and also felt that the government is
increasingly making it for diasporas to properly integrate in the Netherlands.
He stated it as simple as this,

“you are a citizen, but you cannot be a treated like a citizen”

To such a respondent, the difficulty to secure a stable job and a livelihood


for a sustained period creates a feeling of exclusiveness and the need to be
included in the environment he now considers himself a part of.

The conscious efforts by the municipality to engage the diaspora cannot be


overlooked. A respondent through phone interview was of the opinion that
the Amsterdam South east district and municipal councils provided subsidies
to Ghanaian organization, stitching Akasanoma, to sample views of members
of the public, mostly Ghanaians which will be used to help in formulation of
policies by the municipality. The respondent added that the subsidy was not
given because it was to help the Ghanaian diasporic group, but is given
because of the quality of proposal submitted to the municipality. He stated
that,

“here in this country, if you are a Chinese and you write a proposal to
solve the problem of a Ghanaian community, they will give you a
subsidy. There is no defined subsidy for any group. It is the project
you bring and what you merit”

At the time of this research, three workshops had already been planned by
the organization, with funding from the municipality. Two of such workshops
were to discuss unemployment among Ghanaian youths and the last one
was to be on health.

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An interviewee through phone conversation indicated that the district council
organizes fora and invites key figures to give their opinions about issue that
need to change. He however stated

“I am not aware of any at the national level yet, because we do not


have a unified organ to address this at the national level. National
level, we do not make any contributions yet.”

This was in response to question on whether they were able to influence any
policy at the national level. He added,

“there are other Ghanaians in Den Haag. Their affinity is with the
District council and not at the national level.”

Fig 1. Outlook of diaspora policy contribution.

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Figure 1 African diaspora engagement in policy

Figure 1 above illustrates that the African diaspora are engaged to some
extent in policy discourses. The broken line linking the diaspora at the
Municipalities to national level indicates either passive form of participation
or consultative form of participation. The diaspora is often engaged by policy
makers without the opportunity to make inputs to what is being discussed in
a passive manner. Alternatively, they get involved when the policy area has
already been determined and their contributions only feed into what has
already been planned. There is however no obligation on the part of policy
makers to incorporate their ideas. The unbroken arrow from national level to
municipality level shows that national policies directly affect diaspora, just
like any other citizen, or even worst, especially as some diaspora show
express feelings of exclusion. Between the national and bilateral or
multilateral are two solid arrows showing the interrelation between state
policy and international policies, especially at the European Union. Policies at
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the national level are likely to have effect on the European Union and its
member states just as European Union policies can affect national policies
here in the Netherlands.

The diaspora often percieves international policies, especially trade policies


as being “unfair” to the African diaspora. Participants in one of the
workshops on Africadag of 1st November advocated for win-win trade and
development policies. In their opinion, current policies were prosecuted in a
win-lose opinion. Their position is partly based on their observation that
“unfair” trade policies will adversely affect the earnings for their kith and kin
back home. These relations will in turn make demands of them, mostly
financially to enable them undertake alternative economic activities. The
diagram below shows the diasporas understanding of international policies.

Figure 2 relation between international policies, diaspora & remittances

Fig. Showing relation between international policies, diasporas and


remittances.

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From the figure above, diasporas hold the view that international trade
policies directly have an effect on the African continent. When policies are
fair, coupled with good political leadership, there would be opportunities for
relations in the home country who can seize on such opportunities to
enhance their livelihoods. On the other hand when there are very limited
opportunities, relations would make financial demands of the diaspora.
These financial demands may be for the establishment of some business,
settlement of some pressing family matters, among other reasons. The
arrow pointing downwards from international trade policies to home country
is an indication of the diasporas belief that international policies have direct
bearings on home countries. The broken line leading from home country to
the host country tells that demand for remittances are most likely to
increase when opportunities are less in home countries. The green unbroken
line from diasporas to home country indicates remittance transfers.

For most diasporas, they needed to take two jobs or more to be able to earn
more and to remit. Taking many jobs also implies stressing out more. This
has the tendency of affecting their health and even their productivity in the
home country. So when the diaspora talk about win-win, they actually imply
it in this manner; where the host country can benefit from their potential to
the fullest. They can be more productive and monies earned in the host
country will largely be spent in the host country instead of being remitted.

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3.2 Task 2: Develop two cases; Debt relief & Sister-city
relationship and how the Ghanaian diaspora is involved
Debt relief

In the early parts of 2000, it became clear that most African countries were
struggling to service their debts. Some countries declared HIPC to have their
debts cancelled or to not continue servicing such debts. Monies that went
into debt servicing could therefore be used to prosecute development
projects to ensure economic growth in those countries. Nigeria, for instance
agreed with the Paris club concerning the situation of its debt which
amounted to US$38 billion (Dijkstra, 2011). Following negotiations with the
Paris club, it was agreed for Nigeria to pay US$12billion of the US$38 billion,
whilst the remaining US$18 billion was waived (Dijkstra, 2011). Ghana on
the other hand received debt cancellation of US$860 million from its non-
Paris club creditors; it still had to service some multilateral debts as the
multilaterals were only willing to part with US$1102 million (de Bruijn &
Rehbein, 2011).

This study sought to inquire from the diaspora their knowledge about these
developments and how involved they were in the debt relief using the
theories indicated above. It turns out that the diaspora was not involved in
the discussions leading to such decisions. Available literature confirms such
decisions to be way above the normal discourses of the diaspora. Decisions
that granted debt relief to most African countries were products of
propositions by the G8 and decisions made following discourses made by the
Paris Club of creditors (Dessy and Vencatachellum, 2007; Nwozor, 2009). In
total, Africa received a debt relief of 65 $billion (Dessy and Vencatachellum,
2007).

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It is therefore not surprising that the African diaspora regarded such
decisions as extremely political or way above their influence. The diaspora
also found their livelihood and adjustment to the way of life in the
Netherlands to be of prime importance. This is an attestation that the
diaspora’s ability to influence policy is dependent on some levels of
integration. Firstly, the diaspora grapples to settle in, which almost never
completely happens. It is quite normal to hear people express the desire to
want to go back to the home country after some time. However, if this level,
which I call the hurdle stage is overcome, the next stage is to fully become a
member of the society, a point where the mentality is more tuned to the
Dutch system with less expressions of desires to go back home. It is at this
point that the diaspora can be more settled to make their inputs at the
municipality or national level. However, this second stage does not have to
do with how long a person lives in the Dutch society, but simply has to do
with the self, mind tuning and personal experiences.

The diaspora tended to be more engrossed in helping their relations back


home through remittances than exploring ways on how to contribute to
decisions that have to do with granting debt relief to their home countries.
In any case, such decisions were largely taken by multilateral and bilateral
donors who have their own modalities of operating. An interviewee
summarized his opinion of the Ghanaian diaspora in these terms of their
desire or otherwise to contribute to foreign policy decisions (debt relief) in
the Netherlands,

“No. I think they are more focused on helping each other here”.

He added

“they try to give the new comers some lessons in Dutch or help them
with their problems here because society can be very complicated
18
here. They have problem and they want to go to the municipality for
assistance. So the ones that speak the language a little bit better, they
help the others. I think they are not so much focused on helping their
brothers and sisters in Ghana, but more here”.

Interviewee 1 responded regarding the knowledge of his organization and


contribution to debt relief as follows;

“yea we were aware of it. But we didn’t participate in anything. You


see? We didn’t participate in anything. Yes we hear it from this eh...
We have a relationship with the Ministry of Foreign affairs here. We
have relationship with all those organisations. So some of this
information you get through newsletters and news brief who tell you to
a certain extent what is happening”

Obviously, this was a confirmation of the fact that such decisions are taken
at a higher political level, that is government to government or
multilateral/bilateral to government, and as citizens, they get to know about
events by what the media communicates.

Another respondent was not really concerned about the debt relief that
Ghana had received, but was more concerned about what the monies
accruing would be used for and how they would be used. He heard it from
the media, and for him, this was the question he asked himself,

“what is Ghana going to do with it”

Awareness of countries having received debt relief cuts across the spectrum
of people interviewed. It is also clear that the municipalities did not play a
role in such a decision as well. Although initially this research conceived that
the municipalities with sister-city relationships could have been involved in
debt relief benefited by Ghana from the Netherlands. The response turned

19
out to be contrary. Interviewee 4 did not hesitate to direct the research to
another source, stating that this could most probably be the correct place;

“You have to ask central government on this, Ministry of foreign


affairs, so am pretty sure.”

3.3 Sister-city relationships


Sister-cities or city twining has been in existence for a long time, and is
often evidenced by reciprocal support and emblematic exchange (Jayne et
al., 2011). Sister-cities begun to gained prominence about two decades ago
in Europe and has been used as an instrument of international cooperation
thus creating that sense of belongingness among cities and creating shared
space across boundaries (Joenniemi and Sergunin, 2011). It is estimated
that about 70% of municipalities globally are involved in sister city
relationships as a form of international cooperation (van Ewijk and Baud,
2009). About 72% of municipalities in the Netherlands are involved in
international cooperation; 21% of these municipalities have stipulated
policies on international cooperation, whilst 10% of municipal cooperation is
with developing countries(van Ewijk and Baud, 2009). Joenniemi and
Sergunin (2011) further add that city-twinning is also perceived as a form of
regionalization with lots of benefits for the cities involved. This is the
situation for instance with cities in a common political or economic regional
block, for instance in the European Union (EU). This idea of proximity
however does not erode entirely some of the benefits that accrue from
sister-city relationships that exist outside regional blocks. Intercontinental
city relationships have become very frequently the trend since the 1980s
with mostly support coming from the Western countries to countries in the
south, a north-south relationship.

20
In Almere-Kumasi sister relationship, the benefits have been lopsided with
Kumasi benefiting the most from development projects executed in the 12
assemblies of the Kumasi metropolis. As an interviewee stated in Almere,

“We completed lots projects, but small scale projects. Basically


schools, a lot of schools, but we also introduced house to house waste
collection schemes in Atonsu, poor area, a resource center. We built
library, street children.. street girl project”

These projects were however developed with the total inputs of the districts
involved. This was in fulfilment of the memorandum of understanding of
2012 to 2016, signed between the two cities which stated that such a
relationship was to be based on mutual co-operation. An interview stated
this succinctly when he said,

“So what I did was to go in 2007, to go with a delegation to Kumasi, to


find out which projects the people themselves want in Ghana. What
they needed. Not what we want from here, we bring it there, no!”

The Almere-Kumasi relationship was forged after the municipality had


difficulties continuing its relationship with Port Sudan. The reasons were
mainly due to political unrest in Port Sudan. The Almere municipality needed
to continue the logo south relationship in line with the international
cooperation policy of the government. It therefore began looking for a new
sister-city. It was in light of this that the University of Amsterdam
recommended the Kumasi municipality for twinning relationship.

The twinning process was facilitated by the University of Amsterdam, the


Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology in Kumasi, and a
non-governmental organization (NGO) in Kumasi called Catholic Graduates
for Action (CAGA). The CAGA had for a working partner an NGO in Almere

21
called Samenwerk. It must be emphasized here that the decision to build
this relationship was not conceived by the Ghanaians in Almere or discussed
with any Ghanaians in Almere. It was solely a decision of transnational
institutions working in the spirit of a bilateral relationship. The transnational
institutions here are the University of Amsterdam and the Kwame Nkrumah
University of Science and Technology.

The genesis of this relationship however does not erode the benefits that
come with it. Also, the flexibility of the relationship, especially during
implementation, to include the Ghanaians in Almere is loudable. A Ghanaian
chairs the NGO Samenwerk, and acts as a conduit between Almere in
Kumasi, bringing to the project a dynamism that is fulfilling to both parties
in the relationship. In such relationships, the diaspora can be a very
important bridging factor because they understand both worlds and are
more likely to easily be accepted by both sides.

The sister-city relationship has also fostered knowledge sharing and some
technology transfer, especially from the part of the municipality of Almere.
This has been realized with Almere sending experts to Kumasi metropolitan
assembly to assist with knowledge and expertise in the execution of
projects. While on separate occasions, some officers from the Kumasi
metropolitan assembly get to participate in workshops facilitated by the
Almere municipality here in the Netherlands. Interviewee 10 stated that the
participation of Dutch expertise was solely one of knowledge transfer as this
was the only way to ensure sustainability of projects in the Kumasi
metropolis. He makes this observation as follows,

“So two experts from here, they go and then the Dutch people said
well, we are not going to do the project itself, but is about knowledge
transfer.”

22
This position of knowledge sharing was also stated by interviewee 3 who
said workshops were usually organized for officials from the Kumasi
metropolis who flew over from Ghana to Almere to participate. In his words,
he was quite simple and straight-forward

“we provide a program usually for a week, and we do workshops and


sessions here, presentations.”

Products of Tasks 3 and 4 which are listed below are attached to this report
as Annex 2 and Annex 3 respectively.

3.4 Task 3: Work together with science shop on policy brief


Under this task, I worked together with the science shop to write a policy
brief which is attached as annex 2. The policy brief was curled out of an
academic paper written on the diaspora. The academic paper is attached as
annex 3 and executed under task 4 as explained below.

3.5 Task 4: Find background information for academic


literature
Under this task, I searched and used literature on the following theories;
rights-based approach, social mobilization, public participation and social
learning. These theories were then used to analyse data collected on the
diaspora and written into an academic paper which is attached as annex 3.

23
References

Agyei, B., Nicolaou, M., Boateng, L., Dijkshoorn, H., van den Born, B.-J.,
Agyemang, C. (2014) Relationship between psychosocial stress and
hypertension among Ghanaians in Amsterdam, the Netherlands-the GHAIA
study. BMC public health 14, 692.
Agyemang, C., Nicolaou, M., Boateng, L., Dijkshoorn, H., van de Born, B.-J.,
Stronks, K. (2013) Prevalence, awareness, treatment, and control of
hypertension among Ghanaian population in Amsterdam, the Netherlands:
the GHAIA study. European journal of preventive cardiology 20, 938-946.
Baker, H., (2012) Transnational contact of Ghanaian Migrants. A study of
meanings and Identity in Amsterdam Zuidoost.
Baudewijns, K., van der Boon, M., Degnet, M., Harrath, N., Korf, D., (2014)
Valuable knowledge of African Diaspora in European policy making.
Wageningenur.
Cornwall, A., Nyamu‐Musembi, C. (2004) Putting the ‘rights‐based
approach’to development into perspective. Third World Quarterly 25, 1415-
1437.
Dessy, S.E., Vencatachellum, D. (2007) Debt relief and social services
expenditure: The African experience, 1989-2003. African Development
Review 19, 200-216.
Jayne, M., Hubbard, P., Bell, D. (2011) Worlding a city: twinning and urban
theory. City 15, 25-41.
Joenniemi, P., Sergunin, A. (2011) Another face of integration: city twinning
in Europe. Research Journal of International Studies 22, 120-131.
Johannsen, E., (2014) Involvement of African Diaspora in decision-making
processes in the Netherlands concerning Africa. Wageningenur.

24
Knipscheer, J.W., De Jong, E.E., Kleber, R.J., Lamptey, E. (2000) Ghanaian
migrants in the Netherlands: General health, acculturative stress and
utilization of mental health care. Journal of Community Psychology 28, 459-
476.
Knipscheer, J.W., Kleber, R.J. (2007) Acculturation and mental health among
Ghanaians in the Netherlands. International Journal of Social Psychiatry 53,
369-383.
Mazzucato, V. (2007) The role of transnational networks and legal status in
securing a living: Ghanaian migrants in the Netherlands. COMPAS working
paper 43.
Mazzucato, V. (2008) The double engagement: Transnationalism and
integration. Ghanaian migrants' lives between Ghana and The Netherlands.
Journal of ethnic and migration studies 34, 199-216.
Nijenhuis, G., Zoomer, A., (2012) Transnational activities of immigrant
organizations in the Netherlands: Do Ghanaian, Moroccan and Surinamese
diaspora organizations enhance development?
Nwozor, A. (2009) Echoes of divergence within: The politics and
politicisation of Nigeria's debt relief. Review of African Political Economy 36,
23-35.
Oestreich, J.E. (2014) The United Nations and the Rights-based Approach to
Development in India. Global Governance 20, 77-94.
Offenheiser, R.C., Holcombe, S.H. (2003) Challenges and opportunities in
implementing a rights-based approach to development: an Oxfam America
perspective. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 32, 268-301.
Peil, M. (1995) Ghanaians abroad. African Affairs, 345-367.
Porter, F. (2000) Social Exclusion: What's in a Name? Development in
Practice 10, 76-81.

25
Ruggeri Laderchi, C., Savastano, S. (2013) Poverty and Exclusion in the
Western Balkans : New Directions in Measurement and Policy. Springer New
York, New York, NY.
Tonah, S. (2007) Ghanaians abroad and their ties home. Cultural and
religious dimensions of transnational migration.
van Ewijk, E., Baud, I. (2009) Partnerships between Dutch municipalities
and municipalities in countries of migration to the Netherlands; knowledge
exchange and mutuality. Habitat International 33, 218-226.
van Kessel, W. (2002) Merchants, missionaries & migrants: 300 years of
Dutch-Ghanaian relations.

26
Annex 1
Ghanaian associations and Organisations in the Netherlands (Summarised)

The organizations below were obtained from the website of the Ghana embassy. Out of 52 of them, 28 representing approximately 54% either
do not have any information provided on the website, or are fairly new. The remaining 24, representing 46 percent are categorized as follows in
order of the goals or what they exist for;

 Integration into Dutch society, 7 (29%)


 Hometown associations, 6 (25%)
 Cultural groups, 3 (13%)
 Policy, 1 (0.04%). although some organisations indicate they collaborate with Dutch institutions. Is not so clear at what level & whether
that collaboration is in connection with policy discourses. So they have not been considered as contributing to policy
 Executing projects in the home country 4 (16%)

There are a few associations that advocate the rights of women & also seek to empower them (women groups), beauty pageant organization
and a theater/movie association.

no Name of organization Goal

1. Adom Club

2. AFAPAC Foundation -promote activities related to HIV prevention & STDs

3. Afro Euro Foundation

4. Asanteman Club

i
no Name of organization Goal

5. Bana Club

6. Brong Ahafo Youth

7. Council of Ghanaian Chiefs in the Netherlands Foundation(CoGhaC Foundation)

8. Council of Ghanaian Organisations in the Netherlands (COGHAN) -unifying platform for all people of Ghanaian decent
in the Netherlands

-focus on policy formulation with Dutch Institutions

-Integration

9. Dagomba Youth Association (DAYA) of the Netherlands Ethnic group (Hometown association)

10. Denyigba Foundation Ethnic group (Hometown association)

11. Ekomefeemo Kpee

12. Face of Ghana organization Beauty pageant organizers

13. Faila Youth of Holland (Den Haag Branch)

ii
no Name of organization Goal

14. Foundation for Diversity, Integration and Development (DID Foundation) -Promote migrant integration into Dutch society

-promote development in sub-saharan Africa

15. Ghana Heritage Club

16. Ghana mma Kuo-Almere

17. Ghana Students Association Enschede

18. Ghanafuo Kroye Kuo Twente

19. Ghanatta Foundation -advocate welfare, education and employment of


Ghanaians

-integration of Ghanaians

-radio platform

-help less privileged in Ghana

20. Kotoko Circle 150

21. Kwahu Youngsters Association, The Hague Ethnic group (Hometown association)

22. Kwahuman Association of the Netherlands Ethnic group (Hometown association)

iii
no Name of organization Goal

23. Ladies Club (Adom Club)

24. Mfanteman Association

25. Mokemo Association

26. National Democratic Congress (NDC) - The Netherlands Political party branch in the Netherlands

27. New Patriotic Party-Holland Political party branch in the Netherlands

28. Offinso Union

29. Okwapeman Fekuw

30. Odwenanoma Cultural Group Cultural group

31. Okyeman Foundation -Ethnic group (Hometown association)

Also supports development projects in Ghana

iv
no Name of organization Goal

32. Old Timers/Old Ghanaian Burgers in The Hague

33. Parent and Child Support for Africans Foundation

34. Sikaman (now Akasanoma) Foundation -integration

-finance projects in Ghana

-information exchange between Ghanaians & Dutch


Institutions (integration)

35. SEAMEN ASSOCIATION OF GHANAIANS(IN EUROPE) & FRIENDS

36. Sekyereman Union

37. Sankofa Foundation -integration

-promote welfare of Ghanaians

-collaborate with Dutch organisations for


development projects in Ghana

38. Stand

v
no Name of organization Goal

39. Stichting Chayil -women foundation

-assist oppressed women

-empower women

40. Stichting Desmona Holland Foundation

41. Stichting Ghana Lovers Club Educate youth on Ghanaian culture

42. Stichting Ghana Union (Ghanaman Muntie)

43. Stichting Ghanese Gemeenschap Almere

44. Stichting Odwenanoma Cultural Group Cultural group introducing Ghanaian culture to
youth

45. Stichting Shaw-Khaw

46. Stichting Vice Versa -Integration

vi
no Name of organization Goal

-Intermediary between Ghanaians & Dutch


government

47. Stichting Wadata

48. Sticthing Zumunta

49. Stitching GAM (Ghana Agoro Mma) -film (theatre group)

-programs cover integration, bringing up children,


etc

50. Voice of Sub-Saharan African Women (VOSAW)

51. Volta Citizens Union Ethnic group (Hometown association)

52. Women In Positive Social Action (WIPSA) -improve situation of women

-organizes ‘Dance with Kings festival’ & other youth


programs

vii
Ghanaian associations and Organisations in the Netherlands (Detailed)

no Name of Contact person address Tel. Email address Website Communication Response
organization number status

1. Adom Club Coming soon - - - - - -

2. AFAPAC Foundation Dr. K.A.Adanse- +31 (0)20 1.afapac@planet.nl www.afapac.nl Email failed.
Pipim 600 3454 Have to call cell

3. Afro Euro Mr. Vincent +31 (0)70 info@afroeuro.org www.afroeuro.org


Foundation Gambrah 399 34 23

4. Asanteman Club Coming soon -

5. Bana Club Coming soon -

6. Brong Ahafo Youth -

7. Council of Ghanaian Mr. Ato Bob 06- info@ nananom@yaho -


Chiefs in the Hensen 16808505 o.com
Netherlands
Foundation(CoGhaC

viii
no Name of Contact person address Tel. Email address Website Communication Response
organization number status

Foundation)

8. Council of Ghanaian Isaac Adu 020- coghan2009@hotmail.c Phone number


Organisations in the Acheampong. 6908280 om not correct
Netherlands (Chairman)
(COGHAN) Joe Lamptey
(Secretary)
Steve Osei
Owusu
(Treasurer).
Doris Vidda
(Executive
Member)
Yaw Bempah
(Executive
Member

9. Dagomba Youth Mr. Natogmah Tel: info@ksshare.org Email failed.


Association (DAYA) Issahaku +31(0)2060
(Chairman) 09864 Phone number
of the Netherlands
Mr. Abdul- Cel: incorrect
Dayan Abukari +31(0)6451
Seidu(Secretary 83803
)
Mr.
Mohammed
Teibu
ix
no Name of Contact person address Tel. Email address Website Communication Response
organization number status

Ibrahim(Treasur
er)

10. Denyigba Cyril Kwame +31(0)299- stg_denyigbafoundation www.danyigbafou Email failed.


Foundation Ric-Doe 316426 @hotmail.com ndation.nl Have to call cell
(Chairman)

11. Ekomefeemo Kpee Coming soon

12. Face of Ghana Joe Lamptey + 31(0) 6 info@faceofghana.com www.faceofghana Email incorrect
organization (Chief Executive 14 782 552 .com
Officer/ Event Left a voice mail
Manager). + 31(0) on phone
6 55 355
Peter Kwaku 537
Duah (Executive
Director/Produc
tion Executive)

13. Faila Youth of No contact Gabriel No fon No email No website


Holland (Den Haag Metsustraat number
Branch) 136

2525 XV
Den Haag

x
no Name of Contact person address Tel. Email address Website Communication Response
organization number status

14. Foundation for Eendrachtst - did-


Diversity, Susana Ackah ( r. 58 foundation@hotmail.co
Chairperson )
Integration and 1335TP m
Development (DID Francis Senya ( Almere
Foundation) Treasuer )

Anthony Anto
Kusi ( Secretary
)

15. Ghana Heritage Sam Danso Postbus Tel: ghanaheritageclub@live Email failed.
Club (Organising 23512 +31(0)2069 .nl Have to call cell
Secretary) 1100 EA 74163
Cell: Reached him on
Amsterdam
+31(0)6422 cell. He
42828 traveled. Will
return 5/09

16. Ghana mma Kuo- No contact Carel No fon No email No website


Almere Willinklaan number
82
1328 LJ
Almere

xi
no Name of Contact person address Tel. Email address Website Communication Response
organization number status

17. Ghana Students Mr. Amos ITC - - -


Association Kabobah(Presid Hengelosest
Enschede ent) raat 99
Mr. Eric P.O.BOX 6
Adjei(Secretary) ITC BOX 191
Mr. Samuel 7500 AA
Tettey Enschede
Banfro(Organisi
ng Secretary)
Mad. Gertrude
Sackey(Fin.
Secretary)

18. Ghanafuo Kroye Mr. Alfred Atta Adelaarstra 064341417 alfredatta@gmail.com www.verenigingg Email failed.
Kuo Twente (Chairman) at 2 8 alfredmax@hotmail.co hana.nl Have to call cell
7574 BK m
He filled
Oldenzaal a.atta@home.nl
questionnaire

19. Ghanatta Ghanatta Office: +31 info@ghanatta.com www.ghanatta.co


Foundation Foundation 70 388 56 m
Calandstraat 30
1 (Unit 3.15) Mobile: +31
2521 AD - 614 73 93
The Hague 90
+31
642 93 77

xii
no Name of Contact person address Tel. Email address Website Communication Response
organization number status

11

20. Kotoko Circle 150 Coming soon

21. Kwahu Youngsters A. King Dankwa Wateringka +31(0)7034 dankwa.king@gmail.co No website Spoke with rep.
Association, The (Chairman) de 87 70213 m he will give my
Hague number to the
2515 AM
chairman to call
Den Haag

22. Kwahuman Mr. Sefa Postbus +31(0)6905 sefastephen@yahoo.co Phone number


Association of the Stephen 12872 062 m is incorrect
Netherlands (Chairman)
1100 AW
Mr. Kwame Amsterdam
Asiedu(Vice- Zuidoost
Chairman)

23. Ladies Club (Adom Nana Yaa Postbus +31(0)6559 nana_serwaah@hotmai Voicemail in
Club) Serwaah 131 33681 l.com Dutch
(Chairlady)
2501 CC
Sandra Osei Den Haag
Tutu (Secretary)

24. Mfanteman Coming soon

xiii
no Name of Contact person address Tel. Email address Website Communication Response
organization number status

Association

25. Mokemo Coming soon


Association

26. National Mr Pat S. Dogbe Jacob Chairman ndc_amsterdam@yaho No website Phone numbers
Democratic - (chairman) Krusestraat +31623957 o.com not going
Congress (NDC) - 50 347. through. Email
The Netherlands Mr. 1106 ZL sent
K.A.Acheremu - Secretary
Amsterdam
(Secretary)
+31644690
686

27. New Patriotic Party- Kobby Annan Kempering Chairman No email No website
Holland (Chairman) 1078 +31
1104 KG 615100420
Charles Owusu
Amsterdam
Ansah Secretary
(Secretary)
+31617421
386

28. Offinso Union Coming soon

xiv
no Name of Contact person address Tel. Email address Website Communication Response
organization number status

29. Okwapeman Fekuw Coming soon

30. Odwenanoma Mad. Victoria Postbus +31 (0)20- Odwenanoma@gmail.co Organization


Cultural Group Dankyi(Chairlad 22218 7757812 m for children.
y) 1100 CE +31 Fun group.
Glendy Amsterdam (0)6437172
Amsterlveen(Se Had a difficulty
44
understanding
cretary)
policy

31. Okyeman Dr. K.A.Adanse- okyeman.foundation@g


Foundation Pipim mail.com
(Chairman)
Mr. Ohene
Boafo(Vice
Chairman)
Mrs. I. Oduro-
Adjaidoo(Secret
ary)

32. Old Timers/Old Mr. Emmanuel Frans 062557442 Old people


Ghanaian Burgers Adu-Gyamfi Halsstraat 8 above 50yrs.
in The Hague 194 Meet once in a
2585 GD year to party.
The Hague Not a registered

xv
no Name of Contact person address Tel. Email address Website Communication Response
organization number status

entity

33. Parent and Child Mad. Nancy E.


Support for Africans Quarshie(Secret
Foundation ary)

34. Sikaman Baafi Owusu Kruitberg Tel: +31(0) sikaman@planet.nl www.sikaman.nl o Phone number
Foundation Sekyere 5033B 20 69 08 r www.radioakasa incorrect
(Chairman) 280 noma.com
1104
Samuel Ekow CA AMSTER Fax: +31(0)
Lamptey DAM 20 60 02
(Treasurer) 742
The
Richard Nyaku Netherlands
(Secretary)
Post Box
Joe Lamptey 23713,

1100
EE AMSTER
DAM

35. SEAMEN Mr. Emmanuel Heer Cell:+31(0)6 asareawuku@versatel.n Only exists to


ASSOCIATION OF Asare-Awuku - Hugostraat 12200404 / l help seamen
GHANAIANS(IN President 20 B +31(0)6150 who are
EUROPE) & Mr. Ato 3061 NL 65598 stranded in the
FRIENDS Cromwell - Rotterdam Netherlands

xvi
no Name of Contact person address Tel. Email address Website Communication Response
organization number status

Vice President
Mr. Richmond
Mensah - Tel: +31(0)
Financial 10 4781904
Secretary / +31(0)10
Mr. Peace 4750317
Aquaah -
Secretary

36. Sekyereman Union Nana K. Postbus No fon nakteng@yahoo.com Email sent


Kwarteng(Chair 12263 number
man) 1100 AG
Mr. J.K. Amsterdam
Boafo(Secretary
)

37. Sankofa Foundation George Duncan Office +31(0)70- info@sankofa.nl www.sankofa.nl , Nobody
(Chairman) address 3648739 www.thehagueafr answers (I see,
Binckhorstla icanfestival.nl probably a
an 36, C057 Dutch man
2516 BE The displayed)
Hague

38. Stand Coming soon

xvii
no Name of Contact person address Tel. Email address Website Communication Response
organization number status

39. Stichting Chayil Mad. Stella A.A. Millingenhof No fon stichtingchayil@yahoo.


Heh-Quarshie 168 number com
(chairperson)
1106 KL
Mad. Olivia Amsterdam
Nutekpor
(Treasurer)

Mr. P.A.S.
Quarshie
(Secretary)

Mr. Y. Nutsu (
Coordinator)

40. Stichting Desmona Poku Atta Parallelweg +31(0)7044 No email address Phone number
Holland Foundation 198 A 51560 incorrect
2525 NK
The Hague +31(0)6843
25001

41. Stichting Ghana Kwabena soestdijksek +31(0)7032 kwabenaopoku@live.nl Phone number


Lovers Club Opoku ade 535 10048 incorrect
Agyemang(Presi 2574 BE Den
dent) Haag
D.O.
Nketia(Secretar

xviii
no Name of Contact person address Tel. Email address Website Communication Response
organization number status

y)

42. Stichting Ghana Dr. Wireko Dieze 1 +31(0)6230 wirekoedward@yahoo. Wireko called
Union(Ghanaman Mpianim E.K 3068 GD 65059 co.uk me back. He
Muntie) Rotterdam proposes a
Postbus skype
85143 discussion
3009 MC
Rotterdam

43. Stichting Ghanese (Ghana No fon No email


Gemeenschap Mma Kuo- number
Almere Almere)

Carel
Willinklaan
82

1328 LJ
Almere

44. Stichting Victoria Postbus +31(0)2077 odwenanoma@gmail.c For children


Odwenanoma Nkansah 22218 57812 om cultural fun
Cultural Group activities
James Boateng 1100 CE
Amsterdam
Zuidoost

xix
no Name of Contact person address Tel. Email address Website Communication Response
organization number status

45. Stichting Shaw- Kofi Addae No address +31(0)6436 shaw.khaw-inc@live.nl Voicemail. I left
Khaw 74126 a message.
Email is
incorrect

46. Stichting Vice Versa Mad. Janny v.d. Postbus 06 –13 47 info@stichtingviceversa www.stichtingvic Suggests to call
Staaij 12572 40 27 .nl eversa.nl on Wednesday,
Mad. Charlotte 1100 AT 3/09
Aboagye Amsterdam
Mad. Doris mad. Doris –
Vidda d.vidda@gmail.com

47. Stichting Wadata Mr. Youssif Postbus +31(0) info@wadata.nl www.wadata.nl Phone number
Ouro-Akondo 22239 610084466 doesn’t exist.
1100 CE Email sent.
Amsterdam

48. Sticthing Zumunta Coming soon

49. Stitching GAM Veronica van de F.D.Kahlenb +31(0)2066 a.kamp23@chello.nl www.sgam.nl Fun group
(Ghana Agoro Kamp ergstraat 74 34338
Mma) 1087 LL
Amsterdam

xx
no Name of Contact person address Tel. Email address Website Communication Response
organization number status

50. Voice of Sub- Mad. Dorothy Prins Johan +31(0)6106 p.vosaw@yahoo.com Reached her on
Saharan African Boatemaa Willem 02176 cell. Email sent
Women (VOSAW) Ameyaw Frisolaan to her. Will
279 discuss details
2263 CP further
Leidschenda
m

51. Volta Citizens Union PAS Quarshie Opijnenhof No fon volta_citizensunion@ho


(Chairman) 120 number tmail.com
Samuel K. 1106 XX
Tiase(Vice- Amsterdam
Chairman) Z.O

52. Women In Positive Mad.Gifty Bijmeerdree +31(0)2060 wipsa@planet.nl Phone number


Social Action Manukure(Chai f 1239 00618 incorrect. Email
(WIPSA) rperson) 1103 TX address
Mr.K.A.Cherem Amsterdam incorrect.
nu(Secretary)

53. Individuals

54. Samson Nibi Provided


website that
contained most

xxi
no Name of Contact person address Tel. Email address Website Communication Response
organization number status

groups above

55. Barima Asamoa Kofi 06 - 5472


IV 1573 or 020
- 600 2631

56.

57.

xxii
Annex 2
POLICY BRIEF

Topic: Why policy formulators should consider contributions from


the African diaspora with regard to policies that affect both Africa
and Europe

Executive Summary

An uncertain lingers among policy makers and people in the academia


concerning the feasibility of engaging the African diaspora on policy
discourses that have direct implications and consequences for their countries
of origin (home countries).

It is argued that the diasporas do not have the capacity or cannot add
anything different to what is already been discussed and agreed upon and
executed policy makers. There is also the argument that the diaspora are
invited to participate in policy discourse. It however turns out that this form
of participation does not give them the platform to really contribute to
policies that they have always discussed among themselves. Yet still it is
argued that the African diaspora is so diverse to the extent that it does not
exist.

The African diaspora does exist, and does have knowledge that can be
beneficial to policy makers and experts in international development
cooperation. The diaspora may not have the expertise in all fields of
knowledge, but the duality of their knowledge and experience in Europe and
Africa ought not be overlooked by policy makers and politicians. An
engagement of the diasporas in bilateral, multilateral and international
cooperation agreements has the tendency change the fortunes of many
African countries and Europe in a mutual way. Africa would benefit in the
form of ‘win-win’ trade agreements, improved livelihoods, among others,
whilst Europe stands to benefit from reduced outmigration from the African
continent to Europe in search of better living conditions.

To derive these benefits however, the diaspora needs a more visible voice
and representation in Europe.

A
Introduction

An estimated 40,000 irregular migrants are believed to have died since 2000
(Aljazeera, 2014), while the BBC puts the figure for death since the 90s till
date at 20,000 (BBC(a), 2014). The desire of many of these migrants to
secure improved living conditions and enhance their economic fortunes has
driven many of them, from Africa to undertake such life threatening voyages
across the Mediterranean Sea to Europe. In 2013, the Mediterranean Sea
recorded the highest estimated number of irregular migration related deaths
of 3,072 as these people were believed to be escaping political and
economic conditions in Africa and the Middle East (Aljazeera, 2014).
Although domestic turmoil tends to compel migration in these patterns, the
global trade environment, economic and infrastructural imbalances, and a
lack of opportunities conspire to account for the situation.

Sub-Saharan Africa is one of three regions, the others being Central and
South America, that holds prospects for future food production because of
abundance of arable lands (futuredirections.org.au, 2011). The continent’s
wealth in mineral resources, rich flora and forna, confirm its potential not
only in agriculture, but in other investable areas. The African diaspora in the
Netherlands is already engaged in agricultural projects and other
development projects in local communities of their countries of origin.
Others have secured funding from Dutch institutions, but often, most of
them mobilize self-resources to execute these projects in their countries of
origin.

As it currently stands now, the African diaspora and their host countries
separately execute projects in African. All these projects are geared towards
improving the livelihoods of Africans, yet the fortunes of the continent has
not changed much. It is high time the diaspora collaborated with the host
country, and vice versa to derive mutual benefits from their investments in
the continent. But how can the two parties mutually engage? The answer lies
in mutually formulating and implementing policies that directly have
bearings on the socio-politico and economic fortunes of the continent.

However, It frequently asked; what quality can the diaspora bring into policy
discourses? Why must the diaspora participate in policy formulations in the
host countries and implementation of same policies in both host and home

B
countries? Are the diaspora not citizens of the host countries, why must they
be so keen on the home country?

These and other questions cannot be answered without understanding the


double engagement of the diaspora. Their social, political and economic
participation in the host country and their kinship ties in the home country
combine to give them socio-economic stress in terms of surviving the host
countries and meeting expectations back at home. Yet this double
engagement provides a wealth of knowledge that lies untapped, unless the
diaspora are engage by policy makers in policy discourses that tie with
bilateral and multilateral relations with Africa.

Rightly so, the diaspora has in recent times started to advocate for a voice in
multilateral and bilateral trade policies that are made between Africa and its
development partners in the global north. The diaspora beliefs improved
trade relations coupled with the recent move by many African countries
towards democracy provide fertile conditions to collaborate with policy
institutions in the global north. By formulating common policies on trade,
agriculture, migration, inter alia, the fortunes of many Africans on the
continent would turn around, and challenges of irregular migration would be
a thing of the past.

First the diaspora want to make a modest start by being able to contribute
to bilateral policies between their host countries and their home countries.
Secondly they want to be involved in formulation of multilateral trade and
resource exploitation agreements between the African continent and
development partners as a means of creating opportunities current African
and future generations.

It is known for some time now that foreign aid has not very much changed
the fortunes of the African continent. On the contrary, remittances have
been major contributors to the lives of many African families and economies.
In 2012, remittances world over was in excess of US$400 billion exceeding
official aid and virtually equaling the sum total of foreign direct investment
(Kosse and Vermeulen, 2014). What the continent needs is mutually
beneficial trade agreements and newly fashioned out international
cooperation that will find the African both at home and the diaspora playing
more vital roles in the global aspirations to reduce poverty and improve the
quality of life for all humans. This is feasible, but can only yield results when
C
people who have experiential knowledge of both worlds (the global north
and global south) are duly engaged.

The diaspora know and feel the direct impact of international agreements on
the home country. It is therefore realistic to engage them in policy
discourse, formulation and implementation stages of bilateral and
multilateral policies on between Europe and Africa.

Approaches

Three different researches were conducted over a period of one year. The
research sough to inquire from African diaspora why they should be involved
in bilateral policy formulations in host countries, how they are currently
being involved and what attempts they are making to get involved in policy
formulation.

A team of students working under an academic consultancy training course


conducted a simulation round on the 2008 European Union (EU) raw
materials initiative with Africa. This team conducted nine (9) interviews with
the diaspora teasing out tacit and explicit knowledge the diaspora possessed
which could have been immense inputs that could give the raw materials
initiative a different outlook.

A second batch of interviews was conducted by two different students under


internship programs with the WageningenUR Science Shop. One student
carried out a mapping of diaspora organizations by collecting short stories on
the knowledge of the diaspora, their aspirations and visions for the African
continent. The second student also conducted interviews seeking further
detail on how the diaspora contributes to policies in The Netherlands at the
national level, using the debt relief granted to some African countries as a
case on bilateral/multilateral policy. Another approach was to look at how
the diaspora contributed to policies at the municipal level and the role they
played city-twinning (sister-city) relations between the municipality of
Almere (Netherlands) and Kumasi (Ghana).

In addition to these interviews, series of workshops were conducted, during


the Africadag. Researchers also participated in other fora such as the
consultation meeting with Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Africaworks
conference, a workshop in the Bijlmer Arena. These workshops gave the

D
platform to expand views pertaining to how essential it is for the diaspora to
contribute to policies between Africa and the Global North.

Results

The diaspora are involved in the execution of several projects in their home
countries. These projects cover areas ranging from support for marginalized
and abused, poultry farming, fish farming, production of flowers and
vegetables, among others. All these projects seek to provide employment
opportunities and enhance the lives of communities in home countries.

Overall, it was found that the African diaspora was not active in the
formulation of policies that affected the African continent. The diaspora was
quite active in some municipalities, for instance Bijlmer Arena for the
Ghanaians, where they had a large representation and were consulted in
devising strategies to address challenges that the municipality identified
among them. But again this form of participation in policy was focused only
on their wellbeing in the Netherlands. They were however either unaware of
some bilateral agreements such as the EU raw materials initiative, or did not
play any role in such agreements.

The diaspora held the position that bilateral and multilateral policies were
largely determined by political interests for which their inputs or suggestions
would amount to nothing more than opinion sharing. In the city-twinning
relations, (only one Almere was studied), the diaspora did not participate in
the decision leading to the relation with Kumasi in Ghana. At some point
however, a representation of the Ghanaian diaspora was made chair of the
NGO implementing projects in Ghana. This inclusion introduced a dynamic in
terms of communication, providing a bridge for Dutch part and the Ghanaian
part.

The diaspora largely participates in a type of participation termed self-


mobilization. They organize themselves into hometown associations, clubs,
inter alia, and through these self-mobilizations, they are able to execute
projects in the home country. Their remittance transfers help to create
employment and establish small businesses for kith and kin.

E
Conclusion

The diaspora are currently unable to influence policy at the national level,
although they maintain the Dutch political climate is accommodating and
facilitates democratic participation.

The diaspora proved to have explicit and tacit knowledge. By explicit


knowledge we refer to knowledge gained from education and/or reading
other documentary materials. Tacit knowledge on the other had is the
knowledge gained through personal experiences and social interactions.
Their knowledge of both the Dutch/European and African contexts puts them
in a suitable position to add valuable perspectives to policy discourses
bringing to fore their explicit and tacit knowledge on policy.

Inability of the diaspora to contribute to bilateral and multilateral


agreements has socio-economic impacts on the African continent. Diaspora
asserts that trade agreements are lop-sided in favour of the EU, yet the
diaspora bears the burden of meeting economic expectations of kith and kin
in home countries putting economic stress on them.

Implications and Recommendations

Tacit and explicit knowledge of the diaspora should not be overlooked. Policy
makers and persons engaged in international cooperation stand to lose a lot
from a neglect of such knowledge. The diaspora provides that bridge
between Europe and Africa, and has the tendency to be exposed to
information that home country citizens might not divulge to Europeans
because of trust issues. Recognition of tacit and explicit knowledge can
provide new approaches to international trade discourses and multilateral
and bilateral trade agreements.

An organized representative body of the diaspora is needed. For instance, a


diaspora foundation can be set up to harness the once diverged, but now
converging skills and knowledge of the diaspora. Some diasporas have ideas,
want to impact policies, but do not know which African organized body to
consult. Through this foundation, the government can interact with a
diaspora that speaks with one voice. We further recommend that once the
foundation is set up, its leadership should be given short training
programmes (courses) from Dutch Policy institutions to enable them sharpen
their skills.
F
Improved economic conditions in the home countries would ease economic
pressure on diasporas and make them more productive in host countries.
But this depends on win-win policies for Europe and Africa which will result
in win-win benefits for both continents.

Incorporation of the diasporas in multilateral and bilateral trade policies that


create win-win situations for both the EU and Africa would improve socio-
economic conditions. When living conditions improve in Africa, the trans-
Mediterranean influx of economic migrants (refugees) to Europe from Africa
is likely to reduce. Strict migration policies would not change current
situation, improved economic conditions holds the key. And this can be done
by incorporate the knowledge of the diasporas.

References

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Agyemang, C. (2014) Relationship between psychosocial stress and
hypertension among Ghanaians in Amsterdam, the Netherlands-the GHAIA
study. BMC public health 14, 692.
Agyemang, C., Nicolaou, M., Boateng, L., Dijkshoorn, H., van de Born, B.-J.,
Stronks, K. (2013) Prevalence, awareness, treatment, and control of
hypertension among Ghanaian population in Amsterdam, the Netherlands:
the GHAIA study. European journal of preventive cardiology 20, 938-946.
Aljazeera, (2014) Mediterranean Sea the world’s deadliest migrant crossing,
report says.
Baker, H., (2012) Transnational contact of Ghanaian Migrants. A study of
meanings and Identity in Amsterdam Zuidoost.
Baudewijns, K., van der Boon, M., Degnet, M., Harrath, N., Korf, D., (2014)
Valuable knowledge of African Diaspora in European policy making.
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Cornwall, A., Nyamu‐Musembi, C. (2004) Putting the ‘rights‐based
approach’to development into perspective. Third World Quarterly 25, 1415-
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Dessy, S.E., Vencatachellum, D. (2007) Debt relief and social services
expenditure: The African experience, 1989-2003. African Development
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futuredirections.org.au, (2011) The Future Prospects for Global Arable Land.
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theory. City 15, 25-41.
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in Europe. Research Journal of International Studies 22, 120-131.
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Johannsen, E., (2014) Involvement of African Diaspora in decision-making
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Knipscheer, J.W., De Jong, E.E., Kleber, R.J., Lamptey, E. (2000) Ghanaian
migrants in the Netherlands: General health, acculturative stress and
utilization of mental health care. Journal of Community Psychology 28, 459-
476.
Knipscheer, J.W., Kleber, R.J. (2007) Acculturation and mental health among
Ghanaians in the Netherlands. International Journal of Social Psychiatry 53,
369-383.
Kosse, A., Vermeulen, R. (2014) Migrants' choice of remittance channel: Do
general payment habits play a role? World Development 62, 213-227.
Mazzucato, V. (2007) The role of transnational networks and legal status in
securing a living: Ghanaian migrants in the Netherlands. COMPAS working
paper 43.
Mazzucato, V. (2008) The double engagement: Transnationalism and
integration. Ghanaian migrants' lives between Ghana and The Netherlands.
Journal of ethnic and migration studies 34, 199-216.
Nijenhuis, G., Zoomer, A., (2012) Transnational activities of immigrant
organizations in the Netherlands: Do Ghanaian, Moroccan and Surinamese
diaspora organizations enhance development?
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politicisation of Nigeria's debt relief. Review of African Political Economy 36,
23-35.
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implementing a rights-based approach to development: an Oxfam America
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H
Annex 3
Framework Paper

Working Title:

Public Participation of African Diaspora: a shift from migration, trade and


development to a more holistic participation

Abstract

Africa In Motion (AIM), a lobby-organisation of African Diaspora in the


Netherlands that focuses on the economic emancipation of Africa, requested
the Science Shop of Wageningen University and Research centre, a
community-based research programme to carry out a research on the
involvement of African Diaspora in Dutch and European policy-making
concerning Africa. Their motive is the exclusion of African Diaspora in public
participation on policies which have a huge impact on the daily life in their
home country such as a raw materials initiative, agricultural agreements or
tariffs. This study is based on the stories of African Diaspora achieved by 25
in-depth interviews, publication and reactions on a booklet with their stories,
a simulation of an EU consultation round on the EU Raw Materials Initiative
and participatory observations of several events among which a workshop at
Afrikadag with 30 participants and a workshop at a consultation meeting at
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with 25 participants.

Horst (2013) proposes to move beyond conceptualisations of diaspora as


transnational aid workers, and towards understanding their engagement
with their countries of origin as a form of civic participation in their countries
of settlement. However public participation of African Diaspora in the
Netherlands is being advocated within the scope of 'Trade and development'
and 'Migration and development'. The expression of the African diaspora to
engage in policy discourses hinges on their claim to rights and access to
policy spaces. To this effect, the rights based approach and the theories of
inclusion and exclusion form a basis for claims by the diaspora to participate
I
in policy discourses that have direct bearings on their home countries. Part
of the African Diaspora aims at amplifying theses spaces to other policies
areas concerning their countries of origin. Recognizing African Diaspora as
stakeholders with knowledge and visions on their home countries and
(trans)forming African Diaspora organisations in to representative bodies
representing different understandings of the past and future of their country
of origin are indispensable according to African Diaspora in establishing a
dialogue.

1.0 Introduction

The term Diaspora has been used in different contexts depending on the
issue of interest. In its generic form, it refers to nationals of a nation or state
that live in another country other than the country of their origin. In step
with this understanding, diaspora has variously been used to refer to people
living overseas. Van Hear et al. (2004) consider the diaspora to embody
populations that are dispersed among places, usually outside their home
country and tend to establish and keep relationships between and among
themselves in an inter-country and intra-country manner. Sökefeld (2006)
perceives the diaspora as an imagination of community that has the
capability of linking sections of society in different territories.

Usually, the diaspora would comprise of migrants; the first generation,


second or several generations’ descendants of migrant parents. This gives
the diaspora a distinct position, making the kin of diasporic home countries
or countries of origin regard the diaspora partly as distant and separate; and
at the same time closely knit in kinship to be utterly ignored. Rouse (1992)
made a similar observation in his study of the Mexican community of
Aguilillan (Michoacan) and Red Wood in California (USA) stating that
although kin and friends were several kilometers away from each other, they
still felt very close to each other. Also significant is the fact that the
perceived distant relation status ascribed to the diaspora does not inhibit the
home countries’ drive to harness the financial, human capital or political
contributions of the diaspora which are deemed essential for national
development purposes.

The diaspora on the other hand, show their affinity to home countries by
involving themselves in the economic and political affairs of their home
country. Perceived as distant nationals, their continued interest and
J
interaction with the home country have been observed to have its grounding
on the emotional attachment that they have with the home country.

The diaspora has long been used to refer to Jews in foreign countries,
especially in the West with the usual religious and close sense of
belongingness and community life that is associated with them. Brubaker
(2005) observes the conceptual homeland notion and connotation of the
term referring to Jews, Armenian and Greek experiences away from the
homeland.

In recent times, the notion of the diaspora has been extended to include
other nationals aside the usual historical ascription to Jews, Armenian and
Greek. The African diaspora appears to have gained some attention,
becoming the focus of most diaspora scholarship in the 1950s. However,
Patterson and Kelley (2000) hold that the idea of the African diaspora is as
old as the idea diaspora itself. Palmer (2000) traces the initial dispersion of
Africans to a period of not later than 100,000 years ago. He observes five
diasporic streams and emphasizes that the fourth and fifth streams which
constitute the Atlantic slave trade in Africans and the movements of African’s
in the 19th century account for the modern African diaspora. Sheffer (1986)
holds the opinion that “Modern Diasporas are ethnic minority groups of
migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong
sentimental and material links with their countries of origin—their
homelands” . This article discusses the African diaspora in the context of the
modern diasporas.

The diasporas often tend to influence and be influenced by events in their


country of origin. They remit to family members, raise funds to support
developmental projects in health, education, microfinance and other
transformative sectors in the country of origin. They negotiate peaceful
socio-political environments in their home countries. Through peaceful
environments and favourable home country policy framework, the diaspora
is able to provide finance, support government programmes, procure bonds
that are floated on the market, whilst some personally return home to
provide expertise in sectors where their skills are very much needed.

Studies of the diaspora over the years illuminate contributions made by the
diaspora in terms of remittances and other direct poverty reduction related
projects in their home countries. However, a dearth of research and
K
knowledge still exists regarding the contribution of the diaspora to policy
decisions at the level of the host countries and how those policies directly
affect the countries of origin of the diaspora.

In recent times, the African diaspora is seeking a platform on which it can


contribute to policies that directly affect the continent. It requires to do so
by being engaged in formulation and implementation of bilateral and
multilateral trade, migration, and developmental policies that directly affect
the socio-economic well-being of Africans in the home countries of the
diaspora.

1.1 Rights based approach

The justification for diasporas to contribute to policies in host countries,


concerning their home countries is quite a debatable position to stake. The
argument is quite easier to make for diasporas who have the option of
retaining dual citizenship, especially like the Turks, Moroccans. Although
loyalty of citizens with dual nationality has been questioned, same critique
could be made of diasporas who have forfeited their nationality to embrace
new ones. It becomes simplistic to conclude that diasporas who forfeit their
nationality to obtain new nationalities automatically become fully integrated
and acculturated in their host country because of their newly assumed
status. It is likewise not straightforward to stick out a position that such
diasporas outrightly cut all links with the home country, maintain certain
cultures or give up all forms of socialisation previous acquired completely.
Given this complex position of the diaspora, it is not uncommon to find them
negotiating for all forms of inclusion in both home and host countries.
Diasporas continue contribute to the socio-economic wellbeing of their
countries of origin. This is typically reflected in the remittances sent.

The diasporan communities, who are mostly citizens of their host countries,
marginal in numbers as they often tend to be, are certainly not stripped of
the rights that avail to other citizens of that country. Zeleza (2005) notes
the magnitude of rights that diasporas have in some countries, specifically
citing the Netherlands and Scandinavia as examples. He observes that the
diasporas are leveraged certain rights which include the rights to vote in
local elections. They are thus able to vote for policy alternatives proposed by
different political parties and choose their preferred political leadership.

Yet, because of the ties the diaspora has with its home country, its political
decisions in the host country cannot entirely be dissociated from its interests
L
in seeking the welfare of its country of origin through political activity in the
host country. Examples of such activities of the diaspora can be seen when
the diaspora organises itself to petition, demonstrate or invoke the
intervension of host countries in the affairs of their home countries,
especially in times of political turmoils. This by extension implies that, the
diaspora is as well not immune to the host country’s policies that adversely
affect their countries of origin, since adverse policy would directly impinge
on their socio-economic freedom and rights as citizens of the host country.
Cornwall and Nyamu‐Musembi (2004) p.1417 hold that, “...rights are based
on legal obligations (and in some cases ethical obligations that have a strong
foundation in human dignity even though they are only in the process of
being solidified into legal obligations).” From this viewpoint, the rights of
relatives of the diaspora may not be stipulated in the legal provisions or may
not be obligatory observations of the host country, since they are not
citizens of that country. However, the host country has the ethical obligation
to undertake policies that will not adversely affect its citizenry in totality and
by extension the diaspora which legally and socially integrates into the host
country’s society.

Cornwall and Nyamu‐Musembi (2004) again add that rights-based approach


does not overlook, but seeks to make a special illumination of the severe
forms of marginalisation or alienation of even the smallest minority in
society. Therefore, to argue that the diasporan community accounts for a
minority of the population of the host country would amount to arguing that
minority citizens have no entitlement to rights and should not be protected
against adverse economic and political decisions. A justification for the
African diaspora to contribute to policy decisions that affect their home
countries emanates from their rights as minority groups whose rights should
not be infringed upon. The rights-based approach requires that resources be
shared equally, while the marginalized in addition should be able to exercise
their rights regarding such resources . These rights regarding resources can
largely be expressed when the diaspora has the leverage to contribute to
policy decisions in the host country regarding their home countries.

This paper would therefore proceed to discuss the need for the African
diaspora to contribute to policies that affect their socio-economic well-being
in the host country, and by extension policies that affect their countries of
origin. The discussion will be in the theoretical frameworks of public
participation, social learning and social mobilisations.

M
2.0 Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework provides the theoretical backbone on which the


research on the involvement of the African diaspora was build. It also
provided the basis for analysing data obtained from the field.

2.1 Public participation

It is a generally held view that public participation when intensified can bring
about improvements in the quality of policies and give legitimacy to
decisions taken by public institutions . Public participation also improves the
capacities and social capital of participating constituents . Public participation
hinges very much on discussions of social inclusion and social exclusion.
Who has to be invited to participate, who should not be invited to participate
and how should the targeted constituents be invited to participate? What
manner of participation is it? For instance, participants may be invited to
participate, but with little room for inputs or contribution to affect the
discussion. Cornwall (2008) describes this type of participation is as passive
participation. In other instances, they could be invited to participate in policy
discourses for which the agenda has been already set with opportunity for
them to make inputs. But this input may not transform significantly what is
already on the drawing board, what Cornwall (2008) describes as
participation by consultation. Also participation can be a means to executing
predefined project goals to minimise cost and can involve some contribution
from participants to decisions that have already been taken. This type of
participation, as Cornwall describes as functional, together with interactive
participation have the tendency to yield mutually beneficial results for all
parties involved in negotiation. This paper would elaborate that a
combination of both types of participation can be mutually beneficial to the
African diaspora and the European Union. Martin (2008) discusses public
participation in terms of representation by invoking questions about who
comprises an adequate enough or true representation of a given
constituency. All these discussions and questions present legitimate
concerns when issues of participation in policy discourses emerge, especially
about the African diaspora. But how can the African diaspora which
constitutes perhaps the closest African society in their host countries be
ignored in policy discourse that affect their home countries? Issues of who is
to be invited and who should not be invited can be assessible to host
countries, because of their detailed data on immigrants. Hajer (2005), points
N
to the fact that the setting of policy discourses has a huge bearing on what
is being said and whether what is being said can have any influence. The
presence of the African diaspora in host countries provides a great
opportunity and appropriate setting to discuss firsthand, policies, bilateral
and multilateral agreements, before “exporting” them to home countries of
such diasporas for implementation. Barnes et al. (2003) observe how
processes of inclusion and exclusion from public participation can be based
on assumptions and perceptions that center around issues of competence
and skills of constituents.

As it is now, the African diaspora is largely engaged in a type of participation


that Cornwall (2008) refers to as self mobilisation. The African diaspora
mobilises itself into hometown associations, African diaspora organisations
and other bodies. Through these associations they are able pool resources
together collectively or individually which are then delivered to their
respective communities in the home countries. Dominant in their form of self
mobilisation is remittances and the contribution such remittances make to
their families in the home countries, and the home states as a whole.

In 2005, remittances to developing countries worldwide amounted to


US$118 billion, doubling the amount received by these countries for
development assistance . Out of the US$118 billion, US$6.5 billion went to
sub-Saharan countries. In 2012, remittances world over was in excess of
US$400 billion exceeding official aid and virtually equaling the sum total of
foreign direct investment. Acosta et al. (2009) add that remittances exceed
foreign direct investments and investments by private persons. It is believed
that the amount of remittances could even be higher since the 400 billion
excluded unofficial transfers.

Although the contribution of the diaspora through self mobilisation to the


home country is enormous, the diaspora still sees opportunities, especially
where they can participate in a more functional and interactive manner to
policy discourse, bilateral and multilateral agreements that directly affect
their home countries. Abels (2007) is of the opinion that citizens are
increasingly shifting their involvement in policy discourses from the local
community platform to more national and internal stages. At such higher
levels, the participation by the diaspora havein bilateral and/or multilateral
policies can have more fruitful results with far-reaching mutual benefits for
the home countries and the host countries.
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2.2 Social learning

Mesoudi et al. (2015) see social learning as the imitation by individuals of


others in society. They also observe that social learning entails making use
of remedies proposed and used by others to solve your own problems. When
persons are unwilling to adopt solutions from others, and tend to be more
individualistic and seeking to solve problems by themselves, they are said to
be adopting asocial learning processes. The African diaspora is very much in
this process of social learning. The diaspora is disposed to learn and acquire
values, norms, ethics, and social practices that are valuable to both host and
home country. Webler et al. (1995) refer to the knowledge gained and
practices adopted by persons through interaction with society as the process
of social learning. The African diaspora through integration learn the Dutch
culture or European culture. Some further their education here in the
Netherlands and other countries in Europe, especially so for children of first
generation migrant parents. Their position as diaspora first exposes them to
first-hand information on events in the home country. They are also able to
acquire knowledge in the host country and blend these together, thereby
enhancing their social learning chances. The diaspora may not be capable of
solving all problems of the home country. However, due to added knowledge
acquired through social learning, they are in the position to suggest more
practical solutions to international trade or bilateral arrangements between
their host countries and their home countries.

An advantage here is that the diaspora is less likely to copy-paste; they are
more likely exposed to information that comes directly from kin and other
social relations than other citizens of host countries. Levitt (1998) regards
this process in which the diaspora infuses its norms, values, ideas, inter alia
with those of its host country, doing away selectively with what is
inapplicable and impractical as social remittance.

Pfutze (2014) observes how remittances are not only used to improve the
economic conditions of families in Mexico, but are also a process of political
empowerment. By this process of political empowerment, families that
receive remittances are less vulnerable to political clientelism. Pfutze (2014)
further notes that this form of empowerment is also partly attributable to the

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effects of social remittances which is only made realistic through social
learning.

2.3 Social movement

Social movements according Sökefeld (2006) emanate from collective


mobilisations that seek to question existing social and political orders.
Oftentimes social movements are discussed in the context of what is visible,
as in open confrontation, protestation or ideological expressions of
movements. Chávez (2011) however suggests a study of the counter-publics
since these give an insight beyond what is visibly expressed. In this paper,
we argue that the African diaspora although integrated in most societies in
the Netherlands still continue to hold discussions outside the public glare
regarding how they can influence socio-political and economic dynamics in
their home countries by using host country institutions. The African diaspora
is not only questioning the existing social and political orders in host
countries, it is actually questioning these orders in their global form. This
leaves the task to be accomplished by the diaspora an arduous one. The
African diaspora is seeking to impact global economic and political orders
that have almost entirely not changed much since the mid-20th century. The
African diaspora is therefore galvanizing expertise to use host country
institutions as well as institutions and individuals of home countries to
engender a new change in global economy and politics. In her study of
Armenian, Albanian and Palestinian diasporas in the UK, Koinova found that
openness or closeness of foreign policy of host country with home countries
and integration of the diaspora in the home country determined the
diaspora’s choice to use host country institutions, use other transnational
means or both to reach relations in home country . In the Netherlands, the
diaspora hinges its expectations on the democratic Dutch political system
and openness of the country to have bilateral relations with their home
countries back in Africa.

3.0 Methodology

Data for this paper are obtained from interviews and workshops conducted
at different stages of research by different students under the Wageningen
UR Science shop project. Because of the diversity in the African diaspora,
interviewees varied for at each stage of the research. The first set of 11
interviews comprised a collection of short stories by the African diaspora
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which was eventually compiled into a booklet. These interviewees were
selected from a wide range of professional backgrounds, ranging from law to
persons of artistic backgrounds. Also, diasporas who formed leadership of
organisations such as the African Diaspora Youth Network in Europe
(ADYNE), Sankofa Foundation, Himilo Relief and Development Association
(HIRDA), politicians and persons who founded and run their personal
organisations were interviewed.

The second batch of 11 interviews targeted different set of respondents with


more focus on the Ghanaian diaspora. Recogin, Stitching Akasanoma and
other individuals as suggested by other interviewees were interviewed. The
Nigerian National Association representation for Tilborg and Breda was
interviewed. One of the sister-city relationships between Almere-Kumasi was
examined to identify the role of the diaspora in the decisions leading to
partnership. In brief, this batch sought to find potential respondents who
may contribute or may have contributed to policy formulation at the
municipality or national level, and also to international cooperation in the
form of sister-city relationships (city twinning).

A simulation of consultation round on the 2008 European Union (EU) raw


materials initiative with Africa was carried out. The simulation sought to find
the knowledge of the African diaspora on such multilateral policy discourses
and what added knowledge/value they bring to the fore. In all, 9 diasporas
from different countries of origin were interviewed. These diasporas were
selected based on their knowledge or involvement on raw material related
policies and their general interest in international trade policies.

Data was also obtained through participant observations in different


workshops. Data was gathered from three workshops organised during the
Africadag of 1st November 2014. Opinions of the African diaspora were also
compiled through the consultation meeting (consultatiemiddag) of 14th
December 2014.

The diaspora was asked questions about their role or contribution to policy
decisions. The policies were targeted at different levels. Policies at the
national level and policies at the municipality level. To this effect, a general
idea about the exposure of the diaspora to policy discourses was solicited.
Some municipalities had sister-city or twinning relationships with other cities
in the global south. The research also sought to find from implementers of
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these relationships, the contribution or involvement of diaspora in such
relationships. The findings from these workshops and interviews are
presented below in the next section.

4.0 Findings

The research found that the African diaspora foresees a favourable climate
to be able to influence policies that affect Africa here in the Netherlands and
other European countries. The research also found that the diaspora was
involved in some form of participation; passive and self-mobilized. In
addition, the research found that the complexity of the diaspora in terms of
the duality of their relationship with home and host countries offers an
opportunity for policy makers and politicians to explore for mutual benefits
of Europe and the African continent.

4.1 Opportunity exists to influence policies here in the Netherlands


and Europe

The Dutch society is very accommodating and accepts expression of


opinions. Diasporans therefore see an opportunity to be able to participate in
policy discourses at the national level and to be able to engage with
politicians to influence policy. However, there are still some hurdles that
need to be overcome. Most diasporans believe the most they can do is
express their opinion, as they can do little to influence policies. For instance,
a Cape Verdean expressed displeasure at how his country of origin was in
2002 withdrawn from a list of countries that benefited from development aid
from the Netherlands. He and a delegation made an petition to
parliamentary groups. His delegation was given the opportunity to make a
submission, but they could not change the decision because it was a decision
that originated from multilateral arrangements, specifically from the World
Bank. This interviewee observed that the “decisions made by politicians are
hardly ever communicated to the public; they remain in their own elitist
sphere”.

Fact however remains that the Cape Verdean diaspora had the platform to
submit their petition. However, it is not just the submission of petitions that
is more essential. It is the possibility for such petitions to have an effect that
is essential. This hurdle however presents an opportunity for both the Dutch
political system and the African diaspora. Discussions of such economic

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issues by parties from both factions could avert economic hardship in the
home country, and by extension improve the ability of diasporas to save
more in host countries.

Also, in municipalities where certain diasporic groups seem to dominate,


they have a higher probability of being engaged in policy discourses. Here
they are able to relish their political social, economic and cultural rights. In
the municipalities, they are able to participate in local elections to choose
their preferred political leadership and party. They are also able to mobilize
themselves, especially in areas where certain diasporic groups are more
resident. In Bijlmer Arena where Ghanaians are quite dominant, an
interviewee stated that they were not in any way contributing to any policy
at the national level. He noted their contribution at the municipalit in these
words;

“where we are able to influence policy is maybe the local council. As


for the local council, we are able to influence policy in the local
councils as Ghanaians. Because if you look at the local council here in
Amsterdam South-East, Ghanaians are a lot here a lot of Ghanaians
live here. So when it comes to an election, Ghanaians are able to
mobilize and support certain people, and is only local government.
What affects us here, not back in Ghana”.

Here is evidence that there already exists some structure that both the
diaspora and the government can take advantage of. For instance, if
diasporas are already organised and have representative strucutes, they
provide an appropriate basis for engaging the diaspora in policies discourses
that directly affect the host countries of such diasporas concerned. In the
Bijlmer Arena Ghanaians are able to draw the attention of the municipality
towards certain policy issues. The municipality urges and funds them to
organize workshops on socially important issues such as unemployment
among the youth, health discussions, inter alia. Using such fora, the
diaspora is able to organize and seek the inputs of other members during
the workshops. Such inputs are then shared with the municipality for future
planning. This structure and process already provides an opportunity and a
participant base to contact and engage with the diaspora in policy issues
that have to do with Africa.
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4.2 Passive participation, self-mobilisation to functional and
interactive participation

The African diaspora holds the view that decisions taken by politicians and
policy makers only engage them as passive participants with little or no
consultation with them. They feel cannot influence policies at the national
level as those policies are already determined by political parties and other
bodies that are powerful and have interests that subsume those of the
diaspora. Yet the diaspora have the conviction that they can contribute
proactively to policy discourses. Their ability to self-mobilise themselves into
diasporic groups that seek to lobby interests of the diaspora and to assist
each other in diverse aspects of life attest to their position. Examples of such
self-mobilised groups include the African Young Pioneers (AYP), Africa in
Motion (AIM), African Diaspora Youth Network in Europe (AYPE), Sankofa
Foundation, and a host of others. From the short stories compiled throught
interviews, a diasporan recalled how his participation in a consultation
turned out to be a one sided event. He was invited to share his ideas but
ended at being told what was intended to be done. In his words he recounts,

“I remember attending a consultation meeting organized by the


Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The only thing they did was to present their
ideas and plans, which they had already agreed upon. There was no
room in the meeting for me to express my opinions. So I was
wondering, why are you inviting me?”.

This, and other similar positions are likely to set the tone for social
movements. The more overt form of social movement is probably less
destablizing than the overt form of protestations. The diaspora is getting
very connected with each other and organisations increasingly linked or
aware of each other as this research found out. To engage diasporic groups
passively has the tendency of making them collaborate more and strategise
more outside the formal policy discourse platform.. Passive participation is
one type of participation that most diasporas tend to experience. They are
invited to participate, but end up being told what has been planned already.
They believe that when the discussion is more of interest to government,
especially issues related to migration, then the diaspora organisations that
are involved in such thematic areas get to be invited. But even so, the
direction of deliberations and foreseen outcomes have already been decided.

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Even when the African diaspora is invited to participate, the invitation tends
to be very selective and targeted. For instance, an interviewee noted that
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited the African diaspora to policy
discourses concerning migration and refugee issues. But this type of
participation was mainly participation by consultation such that their
inputscould not very much change the policies being discussed. The Ministry
thus determines how information is garnered in that process and takes
charge of the analysis of same information. There is no obligation
whatsoever to incorporate inputs emanating from participants.

However, the diaspora is convinced that the absence of africans in policy


discourses pertaining to trade, migration, development projects, inter alia
limits the quality of such decisions and has the tendency to not produce the
desired results. Below is the observation of an interviewee in short stories
compiled.

“Very few Africans are present in conferences and meetings that affect
them directly. You miss the African voice in policy making. If you
would consider the African diaspora more seriously, policies would be
more effective”.

Ghanaian and Nigerian diaspora similarly thinks issues of bilateral policies


are beyond their influence. Generally, the Ghanaian diaspora when asked
about their knowledge and contribution to the debt relief that was received
from the Netherlands and other development partners, they indicated that
they only heard about it the media and other platforms. An interviewee
stated,

“yea we were aware of it. But we didn’t participate in anything. You


see? We didn’t participate in anything. Yes we hear it from this eh. We
have relationship with the Ministry of Foreign affairs here. We have
relationship with all those organisations. So some of them you get
newsletters and news brief who tells you to a certain extent what is
happening”.

Just as participation by the diaspora is sometimes in passive form or


consultative, it does provide them an opportunity to to be part of the policy
discourse platform. This is especially the situation at the municipalities
where diasporic groups have numbers and representation, like Bijlmer Arena

V
and Almere. But again, the contribution to policy discourses at the
municipalities by the diaspora must be framed to meet certain overarching
governmental policies. These overarching policies have already been decided
and defined by political leadership. An interviewee in Almere described as an
illusion the conception of an idea that the diaspora was involved in policy
formulation. He noted that everywhere in the world, national and bilateral
policies are formulated by political interests and is only persons of key
knowledge who are brought on board to help implement such policies.

Also, attempts to find out whether Ghanaians in the municipality of Almere


for instance contributed to the decisions leading to the sister-city
relationship between Almere and Kumasi in Ghana yielded a response to the
contrary. An official from the municipality responded with a suggestion; “You
have to ask central government on this. Ministry of foreign affairs am pretty
sure. But almere did not play a role in it”.

In all this however, what remains clear is that, the municipality realises the
value of the diaspora, and engages them whether passively or consultatively
to policy discourses. For instance when the municipality in Amsterdam Zuid-
Oost found a nagging problem of unemployement among Ghanaian youths,
it engaged the diasporic organisations in the area to organise workshops and
brainstorm to come up with recommendations as to way forward. The
situation is not entirely one of a non participation of the African diaspora in
policy decisions. For instance, a workshop on youth unemployment was
organised by Stitching Akasanoma because the municipality in Amsterdam
Zuid-Oost had identified youth unemployment among Ghanaians as a rising
concern. However, the diaspora by raising these concerns seeks to shift the
lobby front one of passive or consultative participation to more interactive
and functional participation. This way they can adequately bring to bear their
knowledge in policy discourses.

4.3 Complexity of a dual relation

The diaspora show ambivalent feelings of not being part of the Dutch
society; “alienated”, to say, and other times they sound as though they were
fully Dutch. An interviewee in expressing how he felt about being alienated
said it in these words “you are a citizen, but you cannot be treated like a
citizen”. This interviewee had a difficult securing a job after he had worked
for couple of private firms for some years. He has been in the Netherlands
W
for the past 24 years, furthered his education here and currently has
difficulties securing a job. He believes that every time policies are being
revised to keep the diaspora from getting a share of the pie. This
interviewee is engaged in agriculture in home country with about 450
hectares of organic farmland in three regions of Ghana, namely the Volta,
Brong Ahafo and Ashanti regions.

Another interviewee expressed unequal opportunities for diasporans in this


manner, referring to preference over Dutch to diasporas in certain job
placements. He was of this opinion,

“we have been telling them that there are enough qualified people
here, Ghanaians here, with Dutch citizenship who are qualified enough
even to be ambassadors in Ghana. You get me? But they always take
their own people there”.

Here the distinction is made in the phrase, “their own people”, separating
the Ghanaians (we) from the Dutch (them), thereby bring in the issue of
social inclusion and exclusion.Yet this diasporan was also full of praise of the
Dutch society, describing it as very democratic. The type of democracy
practice in Ghana comes no where close to that here in the Netherlands. This
interviewee even expressed the hope that Ghanaian in Ghana got to witness
how democracy worked here in the Netherlands.

Another observation from this interviewee was a feeling of segregation back


in the home country when he expressed frustration about how he was all of
a sudden treated differently once he got back to the home country. He said
such segregation was not just systemic, but individual driven

“for instance if I go into the customs office, there are people sitting
there, you get me? They even handle other foreigners better than they
handle us. So is not the system at all. It is the people. They will rather
handle another white man with more respect than they will handle us”.

This duality of position has implications for the socio-economic lifes of


diasporas here in the Netherlands. First, they have to integrate “properly” in
the host country and they also try not to lose long established contacts with
kith and kin back in the home country. They also have to support the
economic situations of their kin back in the home country and yet have to
earn enough to be economically and socially stable in the host country. This
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puts the diaspora in a stressing position economically. This also has
implications in their daily lives and the upbringing of their children and
general family life. They work hard in the host country to make a decent life,
and still have to remit to the home country so as to gain some acceptability
in the local communities from which they migrated. The home communities
very dependant on the diaspora to the point of irresponsibility, probably
because of limited economic opportunities. In a workshop in Bijlmer Arena, a
participant lamented how diasporans squeezed their earnings to invest back
in the home country; building houses and taking care of kin to detriment of
their own biological children. He noted how some of them had built houses
back in Ghana and how occupants of such houses would call to their disbelief
to request for money to empty the septic tanks of these houses.

The diaspora often percieves international policies, especially trade policies


as being “unfair” to the African diaspora. Participants in one of the
workshops on Africadag of 1st November advocated for win-win trade and
development policies. In their opinion, current policies were prosecuted in a
win-lose opinion. Their position is partly based on their observation that
“unfair” trade policies will adversely affect the earnings for their kith and kin
back home. These relations will in turn make demands of them, mostly
financially to enable them undertake alternative economic activities. The
diagram below shows the diasporas understanding of international policies.

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Fig. Showing relation between international policies, diasporas and
remittances.

From the figure above, diasporas hold the view that international trade
policies directly have an effect on the African continent. When policies are
fair, coupled with good political leadership, there would be opportunities for
relations in the home country who can seize on such opportunities to
enhance their livelihoods. On the other hand when there are very limited
opportunities, relations would make financial demands of the diaspora.
These financial demands may be for the establishment of some business,
settlement of some pressing family matters, among other reasons. The
Z
arrow pointing downwards from international trade policies to home country
is an indication of the diasporas belief that international policies have direct
bearings on home countries. The broken line leading from home country to
the host country tells that demand for remittances are most likely to
increase when opportunities are less in home countries. The green unbroken
line from diasporas to home country indicates remittance transfers.

For most diasporas, they needed to take two jobs or more to be able to earn
more and to remit. Taking many jobs also implies stressing out more. This
has the tendency of affecting their health and well-being of themselves and
their family in the host country. So when the diaspora talk about win-win,
they actually imply it in this manner; where the host country can benefit
from their potential to the fullest. Diaspora can spend their time, energy
and money on their career and that of their children. more productive and
monies earned in the host country will largely be spent in the host country
instead of being remitted.

4.4 Need for a Unified front and capacity enhancement

The diaspora feel they need a unified front to make headway with regards to
contributing to policy. It was found from the interviews and workshops that
people sometimes had ideas, but did not know where to convey such ideas.
An interviewee from Cape Verde in the short stories compiled on diasporas
exressed it in these words,

“many African diaspora organisations have no direct links to the


government. They have to seek support from big NGOs and its not easy to
get involved in larger organisations. Compounding this is that many
members of the African diaspora organisations have a lower educational
status and those highly educated tend to focus on their own careers.”

But this also brings to bear the questions of capacity and expertise. The
question about whether the African diaspora has all the expertise to handle
relevant policy issues that comes to fore. And even if they have the capacity,
do they have the created platform? One of the participations at the
consultation meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides a clear
summary “It is about creating space. Who is going to listen to us and why?”
Another interviewee from Ghana made a similar observation. He noted,

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“also, i recognise here that many Africans here lack professional skills to get
into contact with influential organisations or the government.”

However, the diaspora does have some capacity and knowledge to offer in
certain policy areas. In an interview with the Director of the African Diaspora
Policy Planning Center, he expressed their contribution to policy discourses
because they had the capacity. But also he stated in a very pragmatic
manner

“I should be modest. We are not experts on everything. We are not.


So we only focus on limited areas. But some issues, which should have
come to me, because I don’t know, I cannot add anything. You know
what I mean? Is not that we Africans we know all the issues. No! And
they shouldn’t consult me, they should consult those Africans who
know the issue”.

Clearly, there is admission here that one diasporic organisation does not
have the solution to all the policy questions and demands. But how these
different organisations are pooling their skills together for the benefit of the
diaspora is what has been raised in interviews and workshops. Diasporas are
organising themselves into a policy influence movement. This movement and
what it advocates cannot be missed from interviews with, and workshops
organised by the diaspora. In a workshop on Africadag, a participant
observed;

“How can the diaspora influence policies? And I think that is very
important. The diaspora is very large. We have very diverse diaspora
from Africa. Africa itself is very vast. So then you already ask me, how
do you unite the various different organisations that as a collection is
called the diaspora and then you have to prioritize on the policies you
like to address.”

So here the diaspora recognises its own diversity and a challenge it faces
from working in a polycentric manner. They are now beginning to advocate a
unified front. Not just a unified front that would champion their interests in
policy issues, but also a unified front that would help them prioritise the
many fragmented policy interests of the diverse diaspora and to choose
which ones to address at which times.

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Although the diaspora is faced with issues of limited education of some of its
members, the educated ones tend to either go about their own business,
carry out their engagements with the government in a fragmented manner
or may not have the skills required to engage in lobbying or engaging in
policy discourses, but do need to pool these differences together.

So certainly, it is not all African diaspora who can contribute to policy


discourse. It is also not all policy discourses that the African diaspora is
seeking to engage in. The request by the African diaspora, reflected
differently by different interviews aim at one thing - how to impact on
policies that have direct bearing on their home countries back in Africa.

Participants in the consultation meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs


suggest different strategies to incorporating the diaspora in policy
discourses. Some propose diaspora lobby groups whereas others suggests to
work with existing lobby organizations. Participants see lobby-ing as a skill
which some of them say they aren't familiar with. They recognize the need
of Diaspora training and experience in lobby-ing. One participant notes how
it took 18 years to achieve a budget-line for immigrants within the EU.
Similar propositions expectations were made by interviews who often
expressed the need for a unified front that would galvanize them into a more
potent lobby force.

Also important to mention is the practicality in terms of determining which


expertise is to be consulted, the availability of the expert, and who pays for
the services of the expert or whether the experts are willing to render their
services for free?

4.5 Financial constraints & limited media coverage

Another finding was that the diaspora organisations faced financial


constraints especially from the government side to implement programs.
Given this constraint, their ability to mobilize becomes less efficient because
they have ideas and projects that they could execute but are are unable to
do so because of limited funds. Some also expressed the opinion that
projects that the diaspora executed with far-reaching impact received little
or no media attention at all. An interviewee was of the opinion that “money
can be an issue. We have have a lot of ideas and are able to organise
ourselves, but we still need some funding and media attention.” another

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interviewee observed, “one of the biggest challenges i see is that projects
from the African diaspora always depend on funding from Dutch or European
institutions. This funding is often of low level and limited to short time
frame, which makes it difficult to plan long-term activities that might have a
greater impact”. Here the diaspora is not denying that they receive some
funding from the Dutch government. What they seek to communicate is that
the funding is not adequate to enable them execute projects that have long
term durations which are more likely to have an impact on beneficiaries and
transform their lives.

A free-lance consultant for instance stated how he won first price for Oxfam
organised programme for African enterprenuers. The program was organised
with funding from the European Union. Although this consultant won the first
price, he was of the opinion that he could not implement his ideas because
he received no funding to bring them to reality. Another interviewee was of
the opinion that generally, the African diaspora may not be able to write
good proposals to secure funding for projects. However, they tend to be
better at implementing the projects than those who come up with good
proposals when given the opportunity. She stated

“there is funding opportunities for matchmaking between Dutch and


African enterpreneurs via the Netherlands Enterprise Agency, ROV.nl,
but these arrangements are not very accessible. In my experience,
many African diaspora generally lack the education needed to write
these proposals, but are, in practice, often better able to perform the
tasks required than those who write good proposals.”

She only states one reason for which funds are not accessible, being that
most African diaspora lack education. But her observation that the funds are
not very accessible could also imply other constraints aside the challenge
faced by diaspora in writing good proposals. But this also throws light on the
need for interactive and functional forms of participation by the diaspora.
This interviewee also added that challenging European policies such as taxes
on imports and exports of agricultural products make it difficult to engage in
“fair trade”. This observation is re-echoed by another interviewee who
indicated that his efforts are geared towards an outcome where Africa can
say it does not need development aid. When the writers of good proposals
are paired with the diaspora who are better at implementing projects that
benefit local communities in their home countries, the it would be expected
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that projects would result in benefits that are satisfying to the diaspora, the
Dutch government and local communities.

4.5 Added Value of African Diaspora

The African diaspora has explicit and tacit knowledge. Comments of


participants at the consultation meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
attest to the explicit and tacit knowledge of the diaspora. They lack in some
cases specific-explicit-knowledge, but they are able to facilitate the
interpretation and implementation of explicit knowledge. They possess
organization-specific knowledge and recognize the knowledge of others.
Participants stated 'We know how to communicate” and “how to adjust
knowledge to the context.” When it comes to participating via lobby-ing
participants indicated that they had the knowledge, facts. Participants note
“We should engage with strong lobby organizations. They need facts. We
have this experience.” and “We have to cooperate with civil society
organizations and provide them with knowledge on our countries of origin.”
This added value of the diaspora was also alluded to by an interviewee from
Ethiopia in the short stories compiled, she was of the opinion that the
“African diaspora are the right partners to mediate as they are familiar with
both contexts and have the relevant knowledge and financial resource.”
Perhaps financially, the diaspora may not be that sound, but her use of the
phrase “familiar with both contexts” is an expression of the social learning
bit that the diaspora can add to policy discourses which most diasporans
believe is lacking in policy discourses.

This Ethiopian interviewee was of the opinion that the diaspora, especially
the youth are becoming educated and this places them in a better position to
blend their knowledge acquired in the Dutch system with that coming from
association with kith and kin here in the Netherlands and also in the home
country.Through their interaction with the host country, the diaspora learn
or acquire new skills; they become part of the society and also give back in
the form of rendering services and participating in the economy of the host
country. Meanwhile, with the country of origin, they would have interacted
and still continue to interact, sharing with each other valuable information
resources that keep them constantly in touch with the home country and in
tune with the host country. This disposition of the diaspora enables them to
learn and acquire values, norms, ethics, and social practices that are
valuable to both host and home country.
EE
The sister-city relationships are political decisions taken to boost
international cooperation among the Netherlands and its partners in
developing countries. The Ghanaian diaspora was not involved in the
decisions that led to the cooperation. However, when implementation started
in Ghana and they begun to run into difficulties, they found it prudent to
include representatives of the diaspora in the programs. International
cooperation has since been smooth, and projects are on-going as intended,
with inputs from the diaspora.

The engagement of a diaspora in Almere for instance made an impact on the


international cooperation of the municipality. This diasporan brought an
added value of knowledge in communication practices, through which he was
able to bridge communication gaps between Kumasi and the municipality of
Almere. As was stated in an interview concerning the difficulties Almere
faced from the onset,

“So later they realized that they were not getting the results they
wanted. So they brought me in. so I became the chairman of the
project organization then. So since I came, I said well, you give us the
budget, we make the policy you make the project, we make the
decision where it is needed. So what I did was to go in 2007, to go
with a delegation to Kumasi, to find out which projects the people
themselves want in Ghana. What they needed. Not what we want from
here, we bring it there, no. so we went to Ghana and then we talked to
all the 12 assemblies in Kumasi.”

The result has been a project that brings satisfaction to both supply and the
demand side. As an interviewee from the municipality noted concerning
engaging a Ghanaian in the sister-city relationship,

“He is very helpful because, ya he’s been here for many many years.
Of course he is a Ghanaian, but I think some Ghanaians also find him
Dutch. He is living here, his children are growing up here, so he is
used to the Dutch system. And he can look a little bit more neutral at
both sides. He understands the Ghanaian situation; of course that is
his homeland.”

From the participation of the diaspora in this relation, results turned out to
be mutually beneficial to both the municipality of Almere and also to the

FF
Kumasi metropolitan assembly. The shift in type of public participation from
passive participation to one of functional and interactive particpation yielded
the desired results.

5.0 Discussion and conclusion

The findings regarding the added value of the diaspora seem to confirm the
reasons behind the request by Africa in Motion (AIM) for this research on
contribution of the African diaspora to policy discourses here in the
Netherlands, and by extension Europe. AIM was convinced that the diaspora
was not consulted regarding the EU policy on raw materials initiative on
Africa and other multilateral agreements. On one occasion, the AIM
discusses such a development as unfair, because the diaspora still played a
crucial role in the socio-economic and political landscapes of the African
continent. Any backlash in terms of bilateral or multilateral policies has a
boomeranging effect on diasporas who already have enough stress with
making remittance transfers to the continent. The AIM thought it would be
mutually beneficial to the EU and Africa for the African diasporas to be
involved in matters of policy at the multilateral level. This thinking is in place
with theory of public participation which suggests that involvement of
citizenry in policy discourses to ensure that outcomes are reflective of
citizens’ positions. Citizen participation in policy discourses and
implementation will also absolve policy makers of such accusations of
unfairness, the rationale being that citizens would have been duly engaged
in the process.

Africa does not need aid is what most scholars have in recent times sought
to put forward. What Africa needs is fair trade policies, that would steer the
international relations and multilateral agreements to the benenefit of all
parties . “Africans do not want aid”, as an interviewee puts it “Africans are
not beggars”. Kimber (2005) shows that aid has reduced drastically in the
21st century as compared to the 1960s. The diaspora’s claims for policy
space seems to justify this observation by Kimber since aid will eventually
have failed to produce its intended impact if the amounts keep reducing. The
way forward is to help place on a different scale a continent that will be less
reliant on aid.

Africans want equal opportunities on the world market. They want to be able
to influence relations to the mutual benefit of the global north and the global
GG
south. However,the diaspora would only be able to influence policies on the
internal scale only when they are given the opportunity to influence policies
in the host countries.

The diaspora is not seeking to dismiss the contribution of aid to the African
continent. Aid has been beneficial to many countries like Ghana. However,
the diaspora envisages an Africa in which jobs will be created, where kith
and kin would have the opportunity to decent living conditions. The effect
would be a reduction in pressure on the diaspora, and probably a reduction
in stress related health problems that most of them suffer.

The African diaspora is not just concerned about trade, migration or


development policies. It also perceives itself as that bridge between the
global north and the global south and is rightly positioning itself for that role.
Formation of diasporic associations such as the African Diaspora Youth
Network in Europe (ADYNE) and their interconnectedness expresses a zeal
that cannot be overemphasized.

The developed north, working with the African diaspora also fosters trust
from the home countries. Africans are willing to disclose information more to
the diaspora than they would to any other party. This is particularly through
with research that is conducted by the African diaspora on Africans.

The diaspora is engaged in policy discourses and framing at the


municipalities. Especially where they have numbers and recognized contact
bodies. These policy discourses must however fit into a large policy
framework, for which they have no influence over. This is akin to Cornwall
(2008) p. 272 participation by consultation category, which states that

“People participate by being consulted or by answering


questions. External agents define problems and information-
gathering processes, and so control analysis. Such a consultative
process does not concede any share in decision-making, and
professionals are under no obligation to take on board people’s
views”.

The diaspora’s double engagement in host country and home country makes
them equally interested in the socio-economic fortunes of both countries.
Improvement in the economic situations in the home country would ease
financial burden on diasporans in host countries.
HH
Integration policies overlook the fact that diasporans still have some
connection with home country. Complete integration is almost entirely
impossible, as diasporans continue to express feelings of alienation from
both host and home countries.

The African diaspora is very much affected by policies that affect the
continent. They are the ones who send the remittances; they are the ones
who have to take extra jobs. They are the ones who establish direct contacts
with kith and kin in the home country. “The power of the African diaspora is
that they can visualize the consequences of Dutch, European policies in their
home countries. They know the impact of agreements”.

The diaspora is involved in some form of participation at the municipality


level; especially with diasporas that have more organized representation and
numbers in some municipalities like the Amsterdam zuid-oost. Increasingly
however, there is the call by most African diaspora segments for
opportunities to add realistic voices to policy discourse. They are so used to
the type of participation in which they are invited or consulted. They want to
play a more functional or interactive participatory role, have their voices
heard and see their inputs translated to action.

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