LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Principles of local autonomy

On May 17, 1988, the position of Provincial Budget Officer of Province X became vacant.
Pedro Castahon, governor of the province, pursuant to Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 112, submitted
the names of three nominees for the aforesaid position to the Department of Budget
Management (DBM), one of whom was that of Marta Mahonhon. A month later, Castahon
informed the DBM that Mahonhon had assumed the office of PBO and requested that she
be extended the appropriate appointment. The DBM Secretary appointed Josefa Kalayon
instead. Castahon protested the appointment of Kalayon insisting that it is he who had
the right to choose the PBO by submitting the names of his three nominees and Kalayon
was not one of them. The DBM countered that none of the governor's nominees have the
necessary qualifications for the position. Specifically, Mahonhon lacked the five-year
experience in budgeting. Hence, the DBM was left with no alternative but to name one
who possesses all the requisite qualifications in the person of Kalayon. It cited Section
6.0 of the DBM Local Budget Circular No. 31 which states, "The DBM reserves the right
to fill up any existing vacancy where none of the nominees of the local chief executive
meet the prescribed requirements." Was the DBM's appointment valid?
Under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112, the Provincial Budget Officer must
be recommended by the Governor. Since Josefa Kalayon was not recommended by the
Governor, her appointment is not valid. As held, if the person recommended by the
Governor is not qualified, what the Secretary of Budget and Management should do is to
ask him to recommend someone who is eligible.

What can you say regarding the above- quoted Section 6.0 of DBM's Local Budget
Circular No. 31? Explain your answers.
DBM Local Budget Circular No. 31 is not valid, since it is inconsistent with
Executive Order No. 112, which requires that the appointee for Provincial Budget Officer
be recommended by the Governor. (Under the Local Government Code, it is now the local
chief executive who is empowered to appoint the budget officer).

The MMDA is authorized to confiscate a driver’s license in the enforcement of traffic

regulations.
False. Since Republic Act No. 7924 does not grant the Metropolitan manila
Development Authority to enact ordinances, the grant to it by Section 5(f) of Republic Act
No. 7924 of the power to confiscate driver’s license without the need of any other law is
an authorized exercise.

The Provincial Governor of Bataan requested the Department of Budget and

Management (DBM) to release its Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA) of P100 million for
the current budget year. However, the General Appropriations Act provided that the IRA
may be released only if the province meets certain conditions as determined by an
Oversight Council created by the President. Is this requirement valid?
No, this requirement is not valid. Under the 1987 Constitution, it is provided that
“local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national
taxes which shall be automatically released to them.” As held, a basic feature of local
fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal
revenue. The Local Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made
directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and “shall
not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government
for whatever purpose.”

The Provincial Governor is a party-mate of the President. May the Bataan Representative
instead file a petition to compel the DBM to release the funds?
Yes. A congressman from a particular LGU may validly have standing to demand
that IRA for his province be released in accordance with the Constitution and the Local
Government Code. As a representative of his province, he has a responsibility towards
his constituencies who can expect no less than faithful compliance with the Constitution.
Moreover, the issue presented could be characterized as involving transcendental
importance to the people and the local government units which had been guaranteed
greater local autonomy.

Autonomous regions and their relation to the national government

Local government units
Powers
MADAKO is a municipality composed of 80 barangays, 30 west of Madako River and 50
east thereof. The 30 western barangays, feeling left out of economic initiatives, wish to
constitute themselves into a new and separate town to be called Masigla. Granting that
Masigla’s proponents succeed to secure a law in their favor, would a plebiscite be
necessary or not? If it is necessary, who should vote or participate in the plebiscite?
Discuss briefly.
A plebiscite is necessary, because this is required for the creation of a new
municipality. (Section 10, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution.) The voters of both Madako
and Masigla should participate in the plebiscite, because both are directly affected by the
creation of Masigla. The territory of Madako will be reduced.
Define devolution with respect to local government units.
Section 17(e) of the Local Government Code defines devolution as the act by
which the National Government confers power and authority upon the various local
government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.

Macabebe, Pampanga has several barrios along the Pampanga river. To service the
needs of their residents the municipality has been operating a ferry service at the same
river, for a number of years already. Sometime in 1987, the municipality was served a
copy of an order from the Land Tansportation Franchising and Regulatory Board
(LTFRB), granting a certificate of public convenience to Mr. Ricardo Macapinlac, a
resident of Macabebe, to operate ferry service across the same river and between the
same barrios being serviced presently by the municipality's ferry boats. A check of the
records of the application of Macapinlac shows that the application was filed some months
before, set for hearing, and notices of such hearing were published in two newspapers of
general circulation in the town of Macabebe, and in the province of Pampanga. The
municipality had never been directly served a copy of that notice of hearing nor had the
Sangguniang Bayan been requested by Macapinlac for any operate. The municipality
immediately filed a motion for reconsideration with the LTFRB which was denied. It then
went to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari to nullify the order granting a
certificate of public convenience to Macapinlac on of failure of Macapinlac to secure
approval of the Sangguniang Bayan for him to operate a ferry service in Macabebe.
Resolve the two points in the petition with reasons.
It has been held that where a ferry operation lies entirely within the municipality,
the prior approval of the Municipal government is necessary. Once approved, the operator
must then apply with the LTFRB for a certificate of public convenience and shall be
subject to LTFRB supervision.

Mayor Alfredo Lim closed the funhouses in the Ermita district suspected of being fronts
for prostitution. To determine the feasibility of putting up a legalized red light district, the
city council conducted an inquiry and invited operators of the closed funhouses to get
their views. No one honored the Invitation. The city council issued subpoenas to compel
the attendance of the operators but which were completely disregarded. The council
declared the operators guilty of contempt and issued warrants for their arrest.
The operators come to you for legal advice, asking the following questions: Is the council
empowered to issue subpoenas to compel their attendance?
The city council is not empowered to issue subpoenas to compel the attendance
of the operators of the fun-houses In the Ermita district. There is no provision in the
Constitution, the Local Government Code, or any law expressly granting local legislative
bodies the power to subpoena witnesses. As held, such power cannot be implied from
the grant of delegated legislated power. Such power is Judicial. To allow local legislative
bodies to exercise such power without express statutory basis would violate the doctrine
of separation of powers.

Does the council have the power to cite for contempt?

The city council does not have the power to cite for contempt. There is likewise no
provision in the Constitution, the Local Government Code, or any other laws granting local
legislative bodies the power to cite for contempt. Such power cannot be deemed implied
in the delegation of legislative power to local legislative bodies, for the existence of such
power poses a potential derogation of individual rights.

Can a Barangay Assembly exercise any police power?

No, the Barangay Assembly cannot exercise any police power. Under Section 398
of the Local Government Code, it can only recommend to the Sangguniang Barangay the
adoption of measures for the welfare of the barangay and decide on the adoption of an
initiative.

Can the Liga ng mga Barangay exercise legislative powers?

The Liga ng Mga Barangay cannot exercise legislative powers. As held, it is not a
local government unit and its primary purpose is to determine representation of the mga
in the sanggunians; to ventilate, articulate, and crystallize issues affecting barangay
government administration; and to secure solutions for them through proper and legal
means.
The Municipality of Sibonga, Cebu, wishes to enter into a contract involving expenditure
of public funds. What are the legal requisites therefor?
The following are the legal requisites for the validity of a contract to be entered into
by the Municipality of Sibonga, which involves the expenditure of public funds:
(1) The contract must be within the power of the municipality;
(2) The contract must be entered into by the proper officer, i.e., the mayor, upon resolution
of the Sangguniang Bayan pursuant to Section 142 of the Local Government Code;
(3) In accordance with Sec. 606 of the Revised Administrative Code, there must be an
appropriation of the public funds; and in accordance with Sec. 607, there must be a
certificate of availability of funds issued by the municipal treasurer; and
(4) The contract must conform with the formal requisites of written contracts prescribed
by law.

What are the conditions under which a local executive may enter into a contract in behalf
of his government unit?
1. The following are the conditions under which a local executive may enter into a
contract in behalf of the government until:
(1) The local government unit must have the power to enter into the particular contract;
(2) Pursuant to Section 22(c) of the Local Government Code, there must be a prior
authorization by the sangguniang concerned, and a legible copy of the contract shall be
posted at a conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or the city, municipal or barangay
hall.
(3) In accordance with Sections 46 and 47, Chapter 8, Subtitle B. Book V of the 1987
Administrative Code, if the contract Involves the expenditure of public funds, there must
be an appropriation therefore and a certificate of availability of funds by the treasurer of
the local government unit.
(4) The contract must conform with the formal requisites of written contracts prescribed
by law.
(5) Pursuant to Section 2068 of the Revised Administrative Code, if a province is a party
to a contract conveying title to real property, the contract must be approved by the
President. Under Section 2196 of the Revised Administrative Code, if a municipality is a
party to a contract conveying real property or any Interest in it or creating a lien upon it,
the contract must be approved by the provincial governor.

XYZ, a corporation organized under the laws of Hongkong, with 100% foreign equity,
obtained from the Securities and Exchange Commission a license to operate a prawn
hatchery project on a piece of land leased from the City of Dagupan. The land was
formerly a park and plaza belonging to the City and was converted by the City to derive
much needed funds. May the City of Dagupan lawfully convert the park to prawn ponds
and lease the same? Explain your answer.
Yes, the City of Dagupan may lawfully convert the park into prawn ponds and lease
them. A city may close a park and plaza and once the property has been withdrawn from
public use, it falls within the commerce of man and may be leased. Section 10 of the Local
Government Code provides: "A local government unit may likewise, through its head
acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian and in accordance with existing law and
the provisions of this Code, close any barangay, municipal, city or provincial road, street,
alley park or square. No such way or place or any part thereof shall be closed without
indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby. A property thus withdrawn from public use
may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the
local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed."
It was held that the City of Baguio could close a street and lease it since it had
become patrimonial property. Likewise, it was held that the City of Cebu could close a
street and sell it thereafter.

May the City of Dagupan and XYZ corporation validly enter into the lease contract for the
prawn ponds? Answer with reasons.
Since the City of Dagupan has the power to convert the park into prawn ponds it
can also lease it to XYZ even though XYZ is a 100%- foreign corporation. The operation
of a prawn hatchery does not involve exploitation of natural resources within the meaning
of Sections 2 and 3, Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution. (Secretary of Justice, Op. No. 3,
s. 1988) Since the portion of the park had been withdrawn from public use, it could be
disposed for any lawful purpose including leasing it to a foreign corporation.

Police power (general welfare clause)

The Municipality of Binangonan, Rizal, passed a resolution authorizing the operation of
an open garbage dumpsite in a 9-hectare land in the Reyes Estate within the
Municipality's territorial limits. Some concerned residents of Binangonan filed a complaint
with the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) to stop the operation of the dumpsite
due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents. The LLDA conducted an on-site
investigation, monitoring, testing and water sampling and found that the dumpsite would
contaminate Laguna de Bay and the surrounding areas of the Municipality. The LLDA
also discovered that no environmental clearance was secured by the Municipality from
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the LLDA as
required by law. The LLDA therefore issued to the Binangonan municipal government a
cease and desist order to stop the operation of the dumpsite. The Municipality of
Binangonan filed a case to annul the order issued by the LLDA. Can the Municipality of
Binangonan invoke police power to prevent its residents and the LLDA from interfering
with the operation of the dumpsite by the Municipality? Explain.
No, the Municipality of Binangonan cannot invoke its police power. According to
the Supreme Court, under Republic Act No, 4850, the Laguna Lake Development
Authority is mandated to promote the development of the Laguna Lake area, including
the surrounding Province of Rizal, with due regard to the prevention of pollution. The
Laguna Lake Development Authority is mandated to pass upon and approve or
disapprove all projects proposed by local government offices within the region.

Can the LLDA justify its order by asserting that the health of the residents will be adversely
affected. Explain.
Yes, the Laguna Lake Development Authority can justify its order. Since it has
been authorized by Executive Order No. 927 to make orders requiring the discontinuance
of pollution, its power to issue the order can be inferred from this. Otherwise, it will be a
toothless agency. Moreover, the Laguna Lake Development Authority is specifically
authorized under its Charter to issue cease and desist orders.
Typhoon Bangis devastated the Province of Sinagtala. Roads and bridges were
destroyed which impeded the entry of vehicles into the area. This caused food shortage
resulting in massive looting of grocery stores and malls. There is power outage also in
the area. For these reasons, the governor of the province declares a state of emergency
in their province through Proclamation No. 1. He also invoked Section 465 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) which vests on the provincial governor the
power to carryout emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and
calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to
suppress disorder and lawless violence. In the same proclamation, the governor called
upon the members of the Philippine National Police, with the assistance of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general
searches and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public
safety. Was the action of the provincial governor proper? Explain.
No, the action of the governor is not proper. Under the Constitution, it is only the
President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided
under Section 23, Article VI, as well as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII
thereof. In the case at bar, the provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call
upon the state forces at his own bidding. It is an act which is ultra vires and may not be
justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.

Eminent domain
The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Santa, Ilocos Sur passed Resolution No.
1 authorizing its Mayor to initiate a petition for the expropriation of a lot owned by Christina
as site for its municipal sports center. This was approved by the Mayor. However, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Sur disapproved the Resolution as there might still
be other available lots in Santa for a sports center. Nonetheless, the Municipality of Santa,
through its Mayor, filed a complaint for eminent domain. Christina opposed this on the
following grounds: (a) the Municipality of Santa has no power to expropriate; (b)
Resolution No. 1 has been voided since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved it
for being arbitrary; and (c) the Municipality of Santa has other and better lots for that
purpose. Resolve the case with reasons
Under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, the power of eminent domain is explicitly
granted to the municipality, but must be exercised through an ordinance rather than
through a resolution.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Sur was without the authority to
disapprove Resolution No. 1 as the municipality clearly has the power to exercise the
right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said
resolution. The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal
resolution, ordinance or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance or order is
beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same. Such is not
the situation in this case.
The question of whether there is genuine necessity for the expropriation of
Christina's lot or whether the municipality has other and better lots for the purpose is a
matter that will have to be resolved by the Court upon presentation of evidence by the
parties to the case.
Re-classification of land by a local government unit may be done through a resolution.
FALSE. Re-classification of land must be done through an ORDINANCE ( Section
2, Local Government Code).

Taxing power
The Province of X required the National Development Company to pay real estate taxes
on the land being occupied by NDC and the latter argued that since it is a government-
owned corporation, its properties are exempt from real estate taxes. If you were the
Judge, how would you decide the case? Reason out.
The Supreme Court held that the National Development Company was not liable
for real estate tax on the property belonging to the government which it occupy. However,
Section 234 of the Local Government Code subsequently withdrew the exemption from
real property taxes of government-owned or controlled corporations. If I were the Judge,
I would hold the National Development Company liable for real estate taxes.

Under the Constitution, what are the three main sources of revenues of local government
units?
The following are the main sources of revenues of local government units under
the Constitution:
1. Taxes, fees, and charges. (Section 5, Article 10)
2. Share in the national taxes. (Section 6, Article 10)
3. Share in the proceeds of the utilizations and development of the national wealth within
their areas. (Section 7, Article 10)

Legislative power
Requisites for valid ordinance
Due to over-crowding in the public market in Paco, Manila, the City Council passed an
ordinance allowing the lease to vendors of parts of the streets where the public market is
located, provided that the lessees pay to the city government a fee of P50 per square
meter of the area occupied by the lessees. The residents in the area complained to the
Mayor that the lease of the public streets would cause serious traffic problems to them.
The Mayor cancelled the lease and ordered the removal of the stalls constructed on the
streets. Was the act of the Mayor legal?
The cancellation of the lease and the removal of the stalls are valid. As held, the
lease of public streets is void, since they are reserved for public use and are outside the
commerce of man.
An aggrieved resident of the City of Manila filed mandamus proceedings against the city
mayor and the city engineer to compel these officials to remove the market stalls from
certain city streets which they had designated as flea markets. Portions of the said city
streets were leased or licensed by the respondent officials to market stallholders by virtue
of a city ordinance. Decide the dispute.
The petition should be granted. According to the Supreme Court, since public
streets are properties for public use and are outside the commerce of man, the City Mayor
and the City Engineer cannot lease or license portions of the city streets to market
stallholders.
Johnny was employed as a driver by the Municipality of Calumpit, Bulacan. While driving
recklessly a municipal dump truck with its load of sand for the repair of municipal streets,
Johnny hit a jeepney. Two passengers of the jeepney were killed. The Sangguniang
Bayan passed an ordinance appropriating P300,000 as compensation for the heirs of the
victims. Is the municipal ordinance valid?
The ordinance appropriating P300,000 for the heirs of the victims of Johnny is void.
This amounts to appropriating public funds for a private purpose. Under Section 335 of
the Local Government Code, no public money shall be appropriated for private purposes.

State whether or not the following city ordinances are valid and give reasons in support
of your answers: An ordinance on business establishments to raise funds for the
construction and maintenance of roads in private subdivisions, which roads are open for
use by segments of the public who may have business inside the subdivision.
The ordinance is valid. The charge on the business establishments is not a tax but
a SPECIAL ASSESSMENT. Hence, public funds cannot be appropriated for the
construction of roads in a private subdivision, does not apply. As held, special
assessments may be charged to property owners benefited by public works, because the
essential difference between a tax and such assessment is precisely that the latter is
based wholly on benefits received.
However, if the ordinance levies a tax on all business establishments located
outside the private subdivision, then it is objectionable on the ground that it appropriate
private funds for a public purpose.

An ordinance prohibiting barbershop operators from rendering massage service to their

customers in a separate room.
The ordinance is valid. In a case, such ordinance was upheld on the ground that it
is a means of enabling the City of Manila to collect a fee for operating massage clinics
and of preventing immorality which might be committed by allowing the construction of
separate rooms in barber shops.

The province of Palawan passes an ordinance requiring all owners/operators of fishing

vessels that fish in waters surrounding the province to invest ten percent of their net
profits from operations therein in any enterprise located in Palawan. NARCO Fishing
Corp., a Filipino corporation with head office in Navotas, Metro Manila, challenges the
ordinance as unconstitutional. Decide the case.
The ordinance is invalid. The ordinance was apparently enacted pursuant to Article
10, Sec. 7 of the Constitution, which entitles local governments to an equitable share in
the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth within their
respective areas. However, this should be made pursuant to law. A law is needed to
implement this provision and a local government cannot constitute itself unto a law. In the
absence of a law the ordinance in question is invalid.

Jose Y. Sabater is a real estate developer. He acquires raw lands and converts them into
subdivisions. After acquiring a lot of around 15 hectares in Cabanatuan City, he caused
the preparation of a subdivision plan for the property. Before he was able to submit the
subdivision plan to the Bureau of Lands and/or Land Registration Commission for
verification and/or approval, he was informed that he must first present the plan to the
City Engineer who would determine whether the zoning ordinance of the Cabanatuan City
had been observed. He was surprised when he was asked to pay the city government a
service fee of P0.30 per square meter of land, covered by his subdivision plan. He was
even more surprised when informed that a fine of P200 and/or imprisonment for not
exceeding six months or both, have been fixed in the ordinance as penalty for violation
thereof. Believing that the city ordinance is illegal, he filed suit to nullify the same.
Decide the case with reasons.
The ordinance is null and void. The Supreme Court held that a municipal ordinance
cannot amend a national law in the guise of implementing it. In this case, the requirement
actually conflicts with Sec. 44 of Act No. 496 because the latter does not require
subdivision plans to be submitted to the City Engineer before they can be submitted for
approval to, and verification by, the Land Registration Commission and/or the Bureau of
Lands.

PAGCOR decided to operate a casino in Tacloban City under authority of P.D. No. 1869.
It leased a portion of a building belonging to Ellen McGuire renovated and equipped it in
preparation for its inauguration. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tacloban City enacted
an ordinance prohibiting the operation of casinos in the City and providing penalty for its
violation. Ellen McGuire and PAGCOR assailed the validity of the ordinance in court. How
would you resolve the issue? Discuss fully.
The ordinance should be declared invalid. As held, such an ordinance contravenes
Presidential Decree No. 1869, which authorizes the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation to operate casinos within the territorial Jurisdiction of the Philippines,
because it prevents the said corporation from exercising the power conferred on it to
operate a casino in Tacloban City. The power of Tacloban City to suppress gambling and
prohibited games of chance excludes of chance permitted by law. Implied repeals are not
favored.

The municipality of Alcoy, Cebu, passed Ordinance No. 10, series of 1991, requiring
owners, administrators, or tenants of buildings and premises to keep and maintain them
in sanitary condition, and should they fail to do so, cause them to be cleared and kept in
sanitary condition and the cost thereof to be assessed against the owner, administrator
or tenant, as the case may be, which cost shall constitute a lien against the property. It
further penalizes violation thereof with a fine not exceeding One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000) or imprisonment for one year at the discretion of the court. Is the ordinance
valid?
The ordinance is valid insofar as it requires owners, administrators, or tenants of
buildings and premises to keep and maintain them in sanitary condition and provides that
should they fail to do so, the municipality shall cause them to be cleaned and the cost
shall be assessed against the owner, administrator, or tenant and shall be a lien against
the property. This is expressly authorized by Sec. 149(kk) of the Local Government Code.
However, the penalty for the violation of the ordinance is invalid, because it is excessive.
The penalty in this case is a fine not exceeding P1,000 or imprisonment for one year, in
the discretion of the court. Under Sec. 149 (c) of the Local Government Code, however,
the penalty for the violation of a municipal ordinance cannot exceed a fine of P1,000 or
Imprisonment for six months, or both at the discretion of the court.

How does the local legislative assembly override the veto by the local chief executive of
an ordinance?
Under Sections 54 (a) and 55 (c) of the Local Government Code, the local
legislative assembly can override the veto of the local chief executive by two-thirds vote
of all its members.

On what grounds can a local chief executive veto an ordinance?

Under Section 55[a] of the Local Government Code, the local chief executive may
veto an ordinance on the ground that it is ULTRA VIRES or PREJUDICIAL TO THE
PUBLIC WELFARE.

How can an ordinance vetoed by a local chief executive become a law without it being
overridden by the local legislative assembly?
Pursuant to Section 54(b) of the Local Government Code, an ordinance vetoed by
the local chief executive shall be deemed approved if he does not communicate his veto
to the local legislative assembly within 15 days in the case of a province and 10 days in
the case of a city or a municipality. Likewise, if the veto by the local executive has been
overridden by the local legislative assembly, a second veto will be void. Under Section
55(c) of the Local Government Code, the local chief executive may veto an ordinance
only once.

The Municipality of Bulalakaw, Leyte, passed ordinance no. 1234, authorizing the
expropriation of two parcels of land situated in the poblacion as the site of a freedom park,
and appropriating the funds needed therefor. Upon review, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Leyte disapproved the ordinance because the municipality has an
existing freedom park which, though smaller in size, is still suitable for the purpose, and
to pursue expropriation would be needless expenditure of the people’s money. Is the
disapproval of the ordinance correct? Explain you answer.
The Local Government Unit can exercise the power of eminent domain only
pursuant to an ordinance. Ordinances passed by legislative body of a municipality are
subject to review by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The review by the SP is only to
determine whether or not the ordinance is beyond the power conferred upon the
Sanguniang Bayan (Municipality). The SP will declare the ordinance invalid if it goes
beyond the power granted to it.
The power of eminent domain is granted to the Municipality and it is within their
competence to determine the necessity to expropriate private property for public purpose.
This determination is not within the review powers of the SP.
Therefore, the disapproval of the ordinance is incorrect.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Pasay City passed an ordinance requiring all disco pub
owners to have all their hospitality girls tested for the AIDS virus. Both disco pub owners
and the hospitality girls assailed the validity of the ordinance for being violative of their
constitutional rights to privacy and to freely choose a calling or business. Is the ordinance
valid? Explain.
The ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. The right to privacy yields to
certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the exercise of police power. The
ordinance is not prohibiting the disco pub owners and the hospitality girls from pursuing
their calling or business but is merely regulating it. This ordinance is a valid exercise of
police power, because its purpose is to safeguard public health.

A law converted the component city of Malumanay, Laguna into a highly urbanized city.
The Local Government Code (LGC) provides that the conversion "shall take effect only
after it is approved by the majority of votes cast in a plebiscite to be held in the political
units directly affected." Before the COMELEC, Mayor Xenon of Malumanay City insists
that only the registered voters of the city should vote in the plebiscite because the city is
the only political unit directly affected by the conversion. Governor Yuri asserts that all the
registered voters of the entire province of Laguna should participate in the plebiscite,
because when the LGC speaks of the "qualified voters therein," it means all the voters of
all the political units affected by such conversion, and that includes all the voters of the
entire province. He argues that the income, population and area of Laguna will be
reduced. Who, between Mayor Xenon and Governor Yuri, is correct? Explain your
answer.
Gov. Yuri is correct. In the conversion of a component city into a highly urbanized
city, the registered voters of the entire province should participate in the plebiscite, not
just the residents of the concerned city. In converting a city into a highly urbanized city,
Sec. 453 of the LGC calls for the conduct of a plebiscite by the "qualified voters therein."
Meanwhile, Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution mandates that no LGU shall be created,
divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered without approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the "political units directly affected." Construing
the law in harmony with the Constitution, the phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in
Sec. 453 of LGC means the qualified voters not only in the city proposed to be converted
to a highly urbanized city but also the voters of the political units directly affected by such
conversion.
As the income, population and area of Laguna will be reduced, it will certainly be
directly affected by the conversion of Malumanay into a highly urbanized area. Therefore,
the province of Laguna as well as the qualified voters in Malumanay should participate in
the plebiscite called for its conversion.

On August 15, 2015, Congresswoman Dina Tatalo filed and sponsored House Bill No.
5432, entitled "An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone District of the City of
Pangarap." The bill eventually became a law, R.A. No. 1234. It mandated that the lone
legislative district of the City of Pangarap would now consist of two (2) districts. For the
2016 elections, the voters of the City of Pangarap would be classified as belonging to
either the first or second district, depending on their place of residence. The constituents
of each district would elect their own representative to Congress as well as eight (8)
members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod. R.A. No. 1234 apportioned the City's
barangays. The COMELEC thereafter promulgated Resolution No. 2170 implementing
R.A. No. 1234.
Piolo Cruz assails the COMELEC Resolution as unconstitutional. According to him, R.A.
No. 1234 cannot be implemented without conducting a plebiscite because the
apportionment under the law falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of cities under Section 10, Article X o f the
1987 Constitution. Is the claim correct? Explain.
No, Piolo Cruz’s claim in incorrect. While the Constitution and the Local
Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division,
merger, abolition or alteration of the boundary of a local government unit, no plebiscite
requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision (Bagabuyo v.
COMELEC). In the case at bar, RA 1234 merely increased its representation in the House
of Representatives. There was no creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of a
local government unit that took place. RA 1234 did not bring about any change in the City
of Pangarap’s territory, population and income classification. Hence no plebiscite is
required.

Local initiative and referendum

Ultra vires acts
Liability
MADAKO is a municipality composed of 80 barangays, 30 west of Madako River and 50
east thereof. The 30 western barangays, feeling left out of economic initiatives, wish to
constitute themselves into a new and separate town to be called Masigla. A law is passed
creating Masigla and a plebiscite is made in favor of the law. Suppose that one year after
Masigla was constituted as a municipality, the law creating it is voided because of defects.
Would that invalidate the acts of the municipality and/or its municipal officers? Explain
briefly.
Although the municipality cannot be considered as a de facto corporation, because
there is no valid law under which it was created, the acts of the municipality and of its
officers will not be invalidated, because the existence of the law creating it is an operative
fact before it was declared unconstitutional. Hence, the previous acts of the municipality
and its officers should be given effect as a matter of fairness and justice.

De facto municipal corporation is a public corporation that exists although it has not
complied with the statutory requirements like:
a. Authorization by a valid law
b. A colorable and bona fide attempt to organize under a valid law
c. An assumption of powers conferred under the law
It primarily attends to the needs of the general welfare.

A municipal corporation by estoppels is a corporation which is so defectively formed as

not to be a de facto corporation but is considered a corporation in relation to someone
who dealt with it and acquiesced in its exercise of its corporate functions or entered into
a contract with it.

Settlement of boundary disputes

There was a boundary dispute between Duenas, a municipality, and Passi, an
independent component city, both of the same province. State how the two local
government units should settle their boundary dispute.
Boundary disputes between local government units should, as much as possible,
be settled amicably. After efforts at settlement fail, then the dispute may be brought to the
appropriate Regional Trial Court in the said province. Since the Local Government Code
is silent as to what body has exclusive jurisdiction over the settlement of boundary
disputes between a municipality and an independent component city of the same
province, the Regional Trial Courts have general jurisdiction to adjudicate the said
controversy.

What body or bodies are vested by law with the authority to settle disputes involving: two
or more towns within the same province.
Under Section 118(b) of the Local Government Code, boundary disputes involving
two or more municipalities within the same province shall be settled by the sangguniang
panlalawigan concerned.

Two or more highly urbanized cities.

Under Section 118(d) of the Local Government Code, boundary disputes involving
two or more highly urbanized cities shall be settled by the sangguniang panlungsod of the
parties.

Boundary disputes between and among municipalities in the same province may be filed
immediate with the RTC.
FALSE. Should be referred for settlement to the SANGGUNIANG
PANLALAWIGAN concerned (Sec. 118, RA No.7160)

Vacancies and succession

Recall
Term limits
State whether or not the law is constitutional. Explain briefly. A law fixing the terms of
local elective officials, other than barangay officials, to 6 years.
The law is invalid. Under Article 10, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution, "the term
of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms." The law clearly goes against the aforesaid constitutional requirement of three year
terms for local officials except for barangay officials.

Gandang Bai filed her certificate of candidacy (COC) for municipal mayor stating that she
is eligible to run for the said position. Pasyo Maagap, who also filed his COC for the same
position, filed a petition to deny due course or cancel Bai's COC under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code for material misrepresentation as before Bai filed her COC, she
had already been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Hence, she is
disqualified perpetually from holding any public office or from being elected to any public
office. Before the election, the COMELEC cancelled Bai's COC but her motion for
reconsideration (MR) remained pending even after the election. Bai garnered the highest
number of votes followed by Pasyo Maagap, who took his oath as Acting Mayor.
Thereafter, the COMELEC denied Bai's MR and declared her disqualified for running for
Mayor. P. Maagap asked the Department of Interior and Local Government Secretary to
be allowed to take his oath as permanent municipal mayor. This request was opposed by
Vice Mayor (1) Umaasa, invoking the rule on succession to the permanent vacancy
in the Mayor's office. Who between Pasyo Maagap and Vice Mayor Umaasa has the right
to occupy the position of Mayor? Explain your answer.
Explain.
Vice Mayor Umaasa has the right to occupy the position of Mayor. This was settled in
Talaga v. COMELEC. where the court upheld that the disqualification of Bai created a
situation of a permanent vacancy in the office of the Mayor. A permanent vacancy is filled
pursuant to the law on succession defined in Section 44 of the LGC which states the “If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or
vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. “
Pasyo Maagap who garnered only the second highest number of votes lost to Gandang
Bai. Applying the Labo case cited in Talaga, Maagap could not assume office for he was
only second placer despite the disqualification of the Gandang Bai because the second
placer was "not the choice of the sovereign will."60 Surely, the Court explained, a minority
or defeated candidate could not be deemed elected to the office.61 There was to be no
question that the second placer lost in the election, was repudiated by the electorate, and
could not assume the vacated position.62 No law imposed upon and compelled the
people of Lucena City to accept a loser to be their political leader or their representative.
The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a disqualified winning
candidate is when two requisites concur, namely: (a) the candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes is disqualified; and (b) the electorate was fully aware in fact and
in law of that candidate’s disqualification as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety but the electorate still cast the plurality of the votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate.64 Under this sole exception, the electorate may be said to have waived the
validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing
away their votes, in which case the eligible candidate with the second highest number of
votes may be deemed elected.65 The facts of the case at bar did not state the existence
of such exception, thus it cannot apply in favor of Maagap simply because the second
element was absent.

How do you differentiate the petition filed under Section 68 from the petition filed under
Section 78, both of the Omnibus Election Code?
The two remedies available to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral
race are under Section 68 and under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The
candidate who is disqualified based on the grounds under Section 68 (i.e., prohibited acts
of candidates, and the fact of a candidate’s permanent residency in another country when
that fact affects the residency requirement of a candidate) is merely prohibited to continue
as a candidate. On the other hand, a candidate whose certificate is cancelled or denied
due course based on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that
is false under Section 78, is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a
Certificate of Candidacy.
Sec. 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that no elective official shall serve for
more than three (3) consecutive terms. Rule and explain briefly the reason if the official
is prohibited to run for another term in each of the following situations: (a) if the official is
a Vice-Mayor who assumed the position of Mayor for the unexpired term under the Local
Government Code;
The Vice Mayor who assumed the position of Mayor may still be eligible to run for
the position of Mayor because when he occupied the post of the mayor upon the
incumbent’s death and served for the remainder of the term, he cannot be construed as
having served a full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional provision. The
term "served" must be one "for which [the official concerned] was elected."

(b) if the official has served for three consecutive terms and did not seek a 4th term but
who won in a recall election;
The official may still run for another term since the principle behind the three-term
limit rule is to prevent consecutiveness of the service of terms, and that there was in his
case a break in such consecutiveness after the end of his third term and before the recall
election.

(c) if the position of Mayor of a town is abolished due to conversion of the town to a city;
The official may no longer run for another term because the framers of the
Constitution specifically included an exception to the people's freedom to choose those
who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive
power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of prolonged stay in the same
office. For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two
conditions must concur: (1) the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive
terms in the same local government post; and (2) he has served three consecutive terms.
In this case, while the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct
from that of the municipality, this does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying
the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be
construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. The
territorial jurisdiction of the city is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the
inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are
the same group of voters who elected the official concerned to be their municipal mayor
for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held
power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.

(d) if the official is preventively suspended during his term but was exonerated;
The official concerned cannot anymore run for another term in violation of the
prohibited fourth term as preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective official’s
term because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from
exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period.

and (e) if the official is proclaimed as winner and assumes office but loses in an election
protest.
 The official may still run for another term because he cannot be considered as
having been duly elected to the supposed third term, and that he did not fully serve such
term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office.

Incidentally, in People v. Pantaleon, Jr., et al., the Court held that a municipal mayor,
being the chief executive of his respective municipality, is deemed an accountable officer,
and is thus responsible for all the government funds within his jurisdiction.

It is settled that an ordinance's validity shall be upheld if the following requisites are
present: First, the local government unit must possess the power to enact an ordinance
covering a particular subject matter and according to the procedure prescribed by law.
Second, the ordinance must not contravene the fundamental law of the land, or an act of
the legislature, or must not be against public policy or must not be unreasonable,
oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right.

Under the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, a municipality is bereft of authority to
levy and impose franchise tax on franchise holders within its territorial jurisdiction. That
authority belongs to provinces and cities only. A franchise tax levied by a municipality is,
thus, null and void. The nullity is not cured by the subsequent conversion of the
municipality into a city.

The doctrinal rule on the matter still rings true to this day - that the conversion of the
municipality into a city does not remove the original infirmity of the subject ordinance.
Such doctrine, evoked in Arabay and SMC, is squarely relevant in the case at bar. In
these two separate cases, the sales taxes were paid by the petitioners pursuant to
ordinances enacted prior to the conversion of the respondents into cities, or at which time,
the latter were without authority to levy the said taxes. Finding the municipal ordinances
to be void, the Court minced no words in declaring the payments of taxes under the
ordinances to be without basis even if subsequently the respondents became cities.
Fittingly, the Court ordered the refund of the said taxes to the petitioners.

We find the instant case no different from Arabay and SMC. As in those cases, the
cityhood law (R.A. No. 7829) of Pasig cannot breathe life into Section 32 of Municipal
Ordinance No. 25, ostensibly by bringing it within the ambit of Section 151 of the LGC
that authorizes cities to levy the franchise tax under Section 137 of the same law. It is
beyond cavil that Section 32 of Municipal Ordinance No. 25 is an act that is null and void
ab initio. It is even of little consequence that Pasig sought to collect only those taxes after
its conversion into a city. A void ordinance, or provision thereof, is what it is - a nullity that
produces no legal effect. It cannot be enforced; and no right could spring forth from it. The
cityhood of Pasig notwithstanding, it has no right to collect franchise tax under the
assailed ordinance.
Besides, the City of Pasig had apparently misunderstood Arabay. In that case, the taxes
subject of the refund claim included those paid after the conversion of Dipolog into a city.
Thus, while the creation of the City of Dipolog was effective on 1 January 1970, the
petitioner, Arabay, Inc., applied for the refund of taxes paid under the questioned
ordinance for the period from December 1969 to July 1972.
As we see it, the cited law does not lend any help to the City of Pasig's cause. It is crystal
clear from the said law that what shall continue to be in force after the conversion of Pasig
into a city are the municipal ordinances existing as of the time of the approval of R.A. No.
7829. The provision contemplates ordinances that are valid and legal from their inception;
that upon the approval of R.A. No. 7829, their effectivity and enforcement shall continue.
To 'continue' means (1) to be steadfast or constant in a course or activity; (2) to keep
going: maintain a course, direction, or progress; or (3) to remain in a place or condition.
It presupposes something already existing. A void ordinance cannot legally exist, it cannot
have binding force and effect. Such is Section 32 of Municipal Ordinance No. 25 and,
being so, is outside the comprehension of Section 45 of R.A. No. 7829.

Neither can the bare invocation of the principle of local autonomy provide succor to settle
any ambiguity in Section 42 of R.A. No. 7829 if doubt as to its meaning may even be
supposed. While we can agree that an ambiguity in the law concerning local taxing
powers must be resolved in favor of fiscal autonomy, we are hampered by the nullity of
Section 32 of Municipal Ordinance No. 25. At the risk of being repetitive, the said
ordinance cannot be given legal effect. It must be borne in mind that the constitutionally
ordained policy of local fiscal autonomy was not intended by the framers to be absolute.
It does not provide unfettered authority to tax objects of any kind. The very source of local
governments' authority to tax also empowered Congress to provide limitations on the
exercise of such taxing powers. Precisely, Congress' act of withdrawing from
municipalities the power to levy franchise tax by virtue of Section 142 of the LGC is a valid
exercise of its constitutional authority In this case, the validity of the municipal ordinance
imposing a franchise tax cannot be made to rest upon the ambiguity of a provision of law
(Section 42, R.A. No. 7829) operating supposedly, albeit mistakenly, under the context of
promoting local autonomy. Regard, too, must be made for the equally important doctrine
that a doubt or ambiguity arising out of the term used in granting the power of taxation
must be resolved against the local government unit.