LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

General principles
Modes of acquiring title to public office
Kinds of appointment
Eligibility and qualification requirements
Disabilities and inhibitions of public officers
X was elected provincial governor for a term of three years. He was subsequently
appointed by the President of the Philippines serving at her pleasure, as concurrent
Presidential Assistant for Political Affairs in the Office of the President, without additional
compensation. Is X's appointment valid?
The appointment of X is not valid, because the position of Presidential Assistant
for Political Affairs is a public office. Article 9-B Section 7 of the Constitution provides that
no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure. As held, since an elective official is ineligible for
an appointive position, his appointment is not valid.

Rights and liabilities of public officers

A City Mayor in Metro Manila was designated as Member of the Local Amnesty Board
(LAB) as allowed under the Rules and Regulations Implementing Amnesty Proclamation
Nos. 347 and 348. as amended by Proclamation No. 377. The LAB is entrusted with the
functions of receiving and processing applications for amnesty and recommending to the
National Amnesty Commission approval or denial of the applications. The term of the
Commission and, necessarily, the Local Amnesty Boards under it expires upon the
completion of its assigned tasks as may be determined by the President. May the City
Mayor accept his designation without forfeiting his elective position in the light of the
provision of Sec. 7, 1st par. Art. 9-B of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that
"No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure?" Discuss fully.
No, the City Mayor may not accept his designation without forfeiting his elective
positions. As stated, it is the intention of Section 7, Article 9-B of the 1987 Constitution
that local elective officials should devote their full time to their constituents. While second
paragraph of Section 7, Article 9-B of the 1987 Constitution allows appointive officials to
hold other offices when allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, no
such exception is made in the first paragraph, which deals with elective officials. It is the
Intention of the 1987 Constitution to be more stringent with elective local officials.

Assume that under the charter of the City of Manila, the City Mayor has the power to
investigate city officials and employees appointed by him and in connection therewith,
administer oath, take testimony and issue subpoenas. The mayor issued an executive
order creating a committee, chaired by "X", to investigate anomalies involving licensed
inspectors of the License Inspection Division of the Office of the City Treasurer, In the
course of its investigation, "X" subpoenaed "Y", a private citizen working as bookkeeper
of Asia Hardware. "Y" refused to appear contending that the Committee of "X" has no
power to issue subpoenas. Decide.
 Yes, the committee has no power to issue subpoenas according to a decided case.
In creating the committee, the mayor did not grant it the power to issue subpoenas.
Besides, the mayor cannot delegate his power to issue subpoenas.

A, an employee of the National Treasurer, retired on January 10, 1996. Before she could
collect her retirement benefits, the National Treasurer discovered that A had been
negligent in the encashment of falsified treasury warrants. It appears, however, that A
had received all money and property clearances from the National Treasurer before her
retirement. Can the National Treasurer withhold the retirement of A pending determination
of her negligence in the encashment of the falsified treasury warrants? Explain.
In accordance with a decided case, the National Treasurer cannot withhold the
payment of the retirement benefits of A pending determination of her liability for
negligence in the encashment of the falsified treasury warrants, because her retirement
benefits are exempt from execution.

De facto vs. de jure officers

In the elections of May 1992, Cruz and Santos were the candidates for the office of
Municipal Mayor, the term of which was to expire on June 30, 1995. Finding that he won
by a margin of 20 votes, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Cruz as the duly
elected Mayor. Santos filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
which decided that it was Santos who had the plurality of 30 votes and proclaimed him
the winner. On motion made, the RTC granted execution pending the appeal of Cruz to
the Comelec and on this basis. Santos assumed office and served as Municipal Mayor.
In time, the Comelec reversed the ruling of the RTC and instead ruled that Cruz won by
a margin of 40 votes and proclaimed him the duly elected Municipal Mayor. It is now
beyond June 30, 1995. Can Cruz still hold office for the portion of the term he has failed
to serve? Why?
Cruz can no longer hold office for the portion of the term he failed to serve since
his term has expired.

Was Santos a usurper and should he pay back what he has received while holding the
office as Municipal Mayor? Why?
Santos was not a usurper. He was a de facto officer, since he had a color of
election to the office of Municipal Mayor by virtue of the decision in the election protest.
Hence, he is entitled to the emoluments of the office.

AVE ran for Congressman of QU province. However, his opponent, BART, was the one
proclaimed and seated as the winner of the election by the Comelec. AVE filed
seasonably a protest before HRET (House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal). After
two years, HRET reversed the Comelec’s decision and AVE was proclaimed finally as the
duly elected Congressman. Thus, he had only one year to serve in Congress. Can AVE
collect salaries and allowances from the government for the first two years of his term as
Congressman? Should BART refund to the government the salaries and allowances he
had received as Congressman? What will happen to the bills that BART alone authored
and were approved by the House of Representatives while he was seated as
Congressman? Reason and explain briefly.
 AVE cannot collect salaries and allowances from the government for the first two
years of his term, because in the meanwhile BART collected the salaries and allowances.
BART was a de facto officer while he was in possession of the office. To allow AVE to
collect the salaries and allowances will result in making the government pay a second
time.
BART is not required to refund to the government the salaries and allowances he
received. As a de facto officer, he is entitled to the salaries and allowances because he
rendered services during his incumbency.
The bills which BART alone authored and were approved by the House of
Representatives are valid because he was a de facto officer during his incumbency. The
acts of a de facto officer are valid insofar as the public is concerned.

Termination of official relation

The Civil Service
Personnel actions
Accountability of public officers
Suppose Congress passed a law to Implement the Constitutional principle that a public
office is a public trust, by providing as follows: "No employee of the Civil Service shall be
excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, records, correspondence,
documents or other evidence in any administrative investigation concerning the office in
which he is employed on the ground that his testimony or the evidence required of him
may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture; but his testimony or
any evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in criminal prosecution
based on the transaction, matter or thing concerning which is compelled, after invoking
his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence. Provided, however,
that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment
for perjury committed in so testifying nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal
from office. Any employee who refuses to testify or produce any documents under this
Act shall be dismissed from the service," Suppose further, that Ong, a member of the
Professional Regulatory Board, is required to answer questions in an investigation
regarding a Leakage in a medical examination. Can Ong refuse to answer questions on
the ground that he would incriminate himself?
No, Ong cannot refuse to answer the question on the ground that he would
incriminate himself, since the law grants him immunity and prohibits the use against him
in a criminal prosecution of the testimony or evidence produced by him. As stated by the
United States Supreme Court, what the constitutional prohibition against self-
incrimination seeks to prevent is the conviction of the witness on the basis of testimony
elicited from him. The rule is satisfied when he is granted immunity.

Suppose he refuses to answer, and for that reason, is dismissed from the service, can he
plausibly argue that the Civil Service Commission has inferred his guilt from his refusal to
answer in violation of the Constitution?
No Ong cannot argue that the Civil Service Commission inferred his guilt from his
refusal to answer. He was not dismissed because of his involvement in the leakage in the
medical examination but for his refusal to answer. This is a violation of the law. He could
be compelled to answer the question on pain of being dismissed in case of his refusal,
because he was granted immunity. The United States Supreme Court held: "Furthermore,
the accommodation between the interest of the State and the Fifth Amendment requires
that the State have means at its disposal to secure testimony if immunity is supplied and
testimony is still refused. This is recognized by the power of courts to compel testimony,
after a grant of immunity, by use of civil contempt and coerced imprisonment. Also, given
adequate immunity the State may plainly insist that employees either answer questions
under oath about the performance of their job or suffer the loss of employment."

Suppose, on the other hand, he answers the question and on the basis of his answers,
he is found guilty and is dismissed. Can he plausibly assert that his dismissal is based on
coerced confession?
Yes Ong can argue that his dismissal was based on coerced confession. The
United States Supreme Court held: "We now hold the protection of the individual under
the Fourteenth Amendment against coerced statements prohibits use in subsequent
criminal proceedings of statements obtained under threat of removal from office, and that
it extends to all, whether they are policemen or other members of the body politic."

Discipline
Alfonso Beit, a supply officer in the Department of Science and Technology (DOST), was
charged administratively. Pending investigation, he was preventively suspended for 90
days. The DOST Secretary found him guilty and meted him the penalty of removal from
office. He appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). In the meantime, the decision
was executed pending appeal. The CSC rendered a decision which modified the
appealed decision by imposing only a penalty of reprimand, and which decision became
final. Can Alfonso Belt claim salary for the period that his case was pending investigation?
Why?
Alfonso Beit cannot claim any salary for the period of his preventive suspension
during the pendency of the investigation. As held, under Section 52 of the Civil Service
Law, the provision for payment of salaries during the period of preventive suspension
during the pendency of the investigation has been deleted. The preventive suspension
was not a penalty. Its imposition was lawful, since it was authorized by law.

Can he claim salary for the period that his case was pending appeal? Why?
Yes. If the penalty was modified because Alfonso Beit was exonerated of the
charge that was the basis for the decision ordering his dismissal, he is entitled to back
wages, otherwise, this would be tantamount to punishing him after exoneration from the
charge which caused his dismissal. If he was reprimanded for the same charge which
was the basis of the decision ordering his dismissal, Alfonso Belt is not entitled to back
wages, because he was found guilty, and the penalty was merely commuted.

Grounds
Alcantara was elected barangay chairman and later president of the Association of
Barangay Councils in his municipality. In that capacity, he was appointed by the President
as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of his municipality. Later, the Secretary of Interior
and Local Governments appointed Alcantara as member of the Sanggunlang
Panlalawigan of their province to meet a reorganizational contingency, and Mendoza took
his place in the Sangguniang Bayan. Alcantara then wrote a letter of resignation from the
Sangguniang Bayan addressed to the Mayor of the municipality, ceased functioning as
member thereof and assumed office and performed his functions as member of the
Sanggunlang Panlalawigan. Later, the reorganization of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
and the appointment of Mendoza were voided. Can Alcantara reassume office as member
of the Sangguniang Bayan or has he lost it because of resignation? abandonment?
Explain.
Alcantara cannot reassume office as member of the Sangguniang Bayan. As held,
Alcantara should be deemed to have abandoned his position as member of the
Sangguniang Bayan. His intention to abandon his position is shown by his failure to
perform his function as member of the Sangguniang Bayan, his failure to collect the salary
for the position, his failure to object to the appointment of his replacement, and his failure
to initiate any act to reassume his post after the reorganization of the Sangguniang Bayan
was voided.

Suppose a public officer has committed a violation of Section 3 (b) and (c) of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act {RA No, 3019), as amended, by receiving monetary and
other material considerations for contracts entered into by him in behalf of the government
and in connection with other transactions, as a result of which he has amassed illegally
acquired wealth. Does the criminal offense committed prescribe?
A violation of Section 3(b) and (c) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
prescribes. As held, Article 11, Section 15 of the Constitution does not apply to criminal
cases for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Does the right of the government to recover the illegally acquired wealth prescribe?
Article 11, Section 15 of the Constitution provides that the right of the State to
recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, or from them or
from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription.

Jurisdiction
CTD, a Commissioner of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), sports a No.
10 car plate. A disgruntled litigant filed a complaint against him for violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Ombudsman. CTD now seeks to enjoin the
Ombudsman in a petition for prohibition, alleging that he could be investigated only by the
Supreme Court under its power of supervision granted in the Constitution. He contends
that under the law creating the NLRC, he has the rank of a Justice of the Court of Appeals,
and entitled to the corresponding privileges. Hence, the OMB has no jurisdiction over the
complaint against him. Should CTD's petition be granted or dismissed? Reason briefly.
The petition of CTD should be dismissed. Section 21 of the Ombudsman Act vests
the Office of the Ombudsman with disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the government, except officials who may be removed only by impeachment,
Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. While CTD has the rank of a Justice of the
Court of Appeals, he does not belong to the Judiciary but to the Executive Department.
This simply means that he has the same compensation and privileges as a Justice of the
Court of Appeals. If the Supreme Court were to investigate CTD, it would be performing
a non-judicial function. This will violate the principle of separation of powers.
Dismissal, preventive suspension, reinstatement and back salaries
In 1986, F, then the officer-in-charge of Botolan, Zambales, was accused of having
violated the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. Before he
could be arrainged, he was elected Governor of Zambales, After his arraignment, he was
put under preventive suspension by the Sandiganbayan "for the duration of the trial".
Can F successfully challenge the legality of his preventive suspension on the ground that
the criminal case against him involved acts committed during his term as officer-in-charge
and not during his term as Governor?
No, F cannot successfully challenge the legality of his preventive suspension on
the ground that the criminal case against him involve acts committed during his term as
OIC and not during his term as governor because suspension from office under Republic
Act 3019 refers to any office that the respondent is presently holding and not necessarily
to the one which he hold when he committed the crime with which he is charged.

Can F validly object to the aforestated duration of his suspension?

Yes, F can validly object to the duration of the suspension. It was held that the
imposition of preventive suspension for an indefinite period of time is unreasonable and
violates the right of the accused to due process. The people who elected the governor to
office would be deprived of his services for an indefinite period, and his right to hold office
would be nullified. Moreover, since under Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree the
duration of preventive suspension should be limited to ninety days, equal protection
demands that the duration of preventive suspension under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act he also limited to ninety days.

Simeon Valera was formerly a Provincial Governor who ran and won as a Member of the
House of Representatives for the Second Congressional District of lloilo. For violation of
Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No.3019), as amended,
allegedly committed when he was still a Provincial Governor, a criminal complaint was
filed against him before the Office of the Ombudsman for which, upon a finding of
probable cause, a criminal case was filed with the Sandiganbayan. During the course of
trial, the Sandiganbayan issued an order of preventive suspension for 90 days against
him. Representative Valera questioned the validity of the Sandiganbayan order on the
ground that, under Article 6, Section 16(3) of the Constitution, he can be suspended only
by the House of Representatives and that the criminal case against him did not arise from
his actuations as a member of the House of Representatives. Is Representative Valera's
contention correct? Why?
The contention of Representative Valera is not correct As held, the suspension
contemplated in Article VI, Section 16(3) of the Constitution is a punishment that is
imposed by the Senate or House of Representatives upon an erring member, it is distinct
from the suspension under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which
is not a penalty but a preventive measure. Since Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and
Corruption Practices Act does not state that the public officer must be suspended only in
the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts which he has been charged, it
applies to any office which he may be holding.
The Secretary of Public Works, after an investigation, ordered the demolition of the
fishpond of X as a nuisance per se on the ground that it encroached on navigable rivers
and impeded the use of the rivers. The Secretary submitted to the President of the
Philippines a report of said investigation, which report contained clearly libelous matters
adversely affecting the reputation of X, a well- known civic and religious leader in the
community. The Supreme Court later found that the rivers were man-made and were
constructed on private property owned by X. May X recover damages from the Secretary
of Public Works for the cost involved in rebuilding the fishponds and for lost profits? State
your reason.
No, X cannot recover damages from the Secretary of Public Works. The Secretary
of Public Works ordered the demolition of the fishpond in the performance of his official
duties. He did not act in bad faith or with gross negligence. He issued the order only after
due investigation. It was held that the members of the Ad Hoc Committee created to
implement Presidential Decree No. 296 and Letter of Instruction No, 19, which ordered
the demolition of structures obstructing public waterways, could' not be sued for damages
although they ordered the demolition of a building that encroached upon a creek, because
the public officers concerned did not act in bad faith.

Suppose X files a libel suit against the Secretary of Public Works. Will the said libel suit
prosper? Explain your answer.
No, the libel suit will not prosper. The report submitted by the Secretary of Public
Works to the President constitutes privileged communication, as it was sent in the
performance of official duty.

Maximo, an employee of the Department of education, is administratively charged with

dishonesty and gross misconduct. During the formal investigation of the charges, the
Secretary of Education preventively suspended him for a period of 60 days. On the 60th
day of the preventive suspension, the Secretary rendered a verdict, finding Maximino
guilty, and ordered his immediate dismissal from the service. Maximino appealed to the
Civil Service Commission which affirmed the Secretary’s decision. Maximo then elevated
the matter to the Court of Appeals. The CA reversed the CSC decision, exonerating
Maximino. The secretary of education then petitions the Supreme Court for the review of
the CA decision. Is the Secretary of Education a proper party to seek the review of the
CA decision exonerating Maximino? Reasons.
The Secretary of Education is not the proper party to seek review of the decision
of the Court of Appeals, because he is the one who heard the case and imposed the
penalty. Being the disciplinary authority, the Secretary of Education should be impartial
and should not actively participate in prosecuting Maximino.

If the SC affirms the CA decision, is Maximino entitled to recover back salaries

corresponding to the entire period he was out of the service? Explain your answer.
As a general rule, Maximo is not entitled to recover back salaries corresponding to
the entire period he was out of the service because of the no work no pay rule. But if it is
found that he is illegally dismissed or suspended he is entitled to back wages and other
monetary benefits from the time of his illegal dismissal or suspension up to his
reinstatement.
Condonation doctrine
A provincial governor duly elected to office was charged with disloyalty and suspended
from office pending the outcome of the formal investigation of the charges against him.
The Secretary of Interior and Local Governments found him guilty as charged and
removed him from office. He filed a petition before the Supreme Court questioning his
removal. While the case was pending before the Supreme Court, he filed his certificate
of candidacy for the position of Governor and won, and was proclaimed Governor. He
claims his reelection to the position of Governor has rendered the pending administrative
case against him moot and academic. Is he correct? Explain.
No. The Supreme Court, in a recent ruling abandoned the condonation doctrine
because it simply finds no legal authority to sustain it in our jurisdiction. It ruled that, “the
concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to
the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent
with the idea that an elective local official’s administrative liability for a misconduct
committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second
term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an
administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our
jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved
of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term.” As such,
the Collegiate Body ruled that, “it cannot be said that the electorate’s will had been
abdicated.”

A City Assistant Treasurer was convicted of Estafa through falsification of public

document. While serving sentence, he was granted absolute pardon by the President.
Assuming that the position of Assistant City Treasurer has remained vacant, would he be
entitled to a reinstatement without the need of a new appointment? Explain.
As held, pardon merely frees the individual from all the penalties and legal
disabilities imposed upon him because of his conviction. It does not restore him to the
public office relinquished by reason of the conviction.

If later the same position becomes vacant, could he reapply and be reappointed? Explain.
The Assistant City Treasurer can reapply and be appointed to the position, since
the pardon removed the disqualification to hold public office.

Impeachment
Is cronyism a legal ground for the impeachment of the President? Explain.
Yes, cronyism is a legal ground for the impeachment of the President. Under
Section 2, Article 11 of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust is one of the grounds for
Impeachment. This refers to violation of the oath of office and includes cronyism which
involves unduly favoring a crony to the prejudice of public interest.

What are the grounds for impeachment. Explain.

Under Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution, the grounds for impeachment are
1. Culpable violation of the Constitution - means intentional violation of the Constitution
and not violations committed in good faith.
2. Treason – by levying war against the Philippines or aiding or giving comfort to enemies.
3. Bribery – by accepting any consideration on account of his position.
4. Graft and Corruption – by committing the prohibited acts enumerated in the Anti- Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
5. other High Crimes - refer to offenses that strike at the very life or orderly working of the
government.
6. and Betrayal of Public Trust - refers to any violation of the oath of office.

What is impeachment, what are the grounds therefor, and who are the high officials
removable thereby?
Impeachment is a method by which the President, Vice President, the Members of
the Supreme Court, Members of the Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman
may be removed from office for culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust. (Art. 11, Sec. 2).

Presidential Decree No. 1606 provides that Justices of the Sandiganbayan may be
removed only by impeachment. Is this Presidential Decree still valid? Why?
No. A law cannot add the impeachable officers provided by the Constitution.
Further, the Constitution vest to the Supreme Court the power to discipline Judges.

Pedro Cruz, the City Engineer of Baguio, retired. To fill the vacant position, the City Mayor
appointed Jose Reyes, a civil engineer who formerly worked under Cruz but had been
assigned to the Office of the Mayor for the past five years. Vicente Estrada, the Assistant
City Engineer filed a protest with the Civil Service Commission claiming that being the
officer next in rank he should have been appointed as City Engineer. Who has a better
right to be appointed to the contested position?
Jose Reyes has a better right than Vicente Estrada provided he possess the
qualification and none of the disqualification. The claim of Estrada that being the officer
next in rank he should have been appointed as City Engineer is without basis. It is a
settled rule that the appointing authority is not limited to promotion in filling up vacancies
but may choose to fill them by the appointment of persons with civil service eligibility
appropriate to the position. Even if a vacancy were to be filled by promotion, the concept
of "next in rank" does not import any mandatory requirement that the person next in rank
must be appointed to the vacancy. What the civil service law provides is that if a vacancy
is filled by promotion, the person holding the position next in rank thereto "shall be
considered for promotion."

As a leading member of the Lapiang Mandirigma in the House of Representatives, you

were tasked by the party to initiate the moves to impeach the President because he
entered into an executive agreement with the US Ambassador for the use of the former
Subic Naval Base by the US Navy, for free, i.e., without need to pay rent nor any kind of
fees as a show of goodwill to the U.S. because of the continuing harmonious RP- US
relations. Cite at least two grounds for impeachment and explain why you chose
them.
The President can be impeached for culpable violation of the Constitution and
betrayal of public trust. The Supreme Court has already ruled that the provision in Article
18, Section 25 of the Constitution requires a treaty even for the mere temporary presence
of foreign troops in the Philippines. The President cannot claim, therefore, that he acted
in good faith. Betrayal of public trust includes violation of the oath of the office of the
President. In his oath of office, the President swore to preserve and defend the
Constitution (Article 7, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution).

A verified impeachment complaint was filed by two hundred members of the House of
Representatives against Madam Chief Justice Blue. The complaint was immediately
transmitted to the Senate for trial. Madam Chief Justice Blue challenges such immediate
transmittal to the Senate because the verified complaint 1) not included in the order of
business of the House, 2) was not referred to the House Committee on Justice for hearing
and consideration for sufficiency in form and substance, and 3) was not submitted to the
House Plenary for consideration as enumerated in Paragraph (2), Section 3, Article 11 of
the 1987 Constitution. Decide with reasons.
Since the verified complaint was filed by 200 Members of the House of
Representatives and they constituted at least one third of its Members, it need not
undergo the procedure in Paragraph 2, Section 3, Article 11 of the Constitution. The
verified complaint constitutes the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate should
proceed forthwith (Section 3(4), Article 11 of the Constitution).

What is the purpose of Impeachment? Does conviction prevent further prosecution and
punishment? Explain.
The purpose of impeachment is not to punish but only to remove a public officer to
secure the people against gross political misdemeanors. Conviction does not prevent
further prosecution and punishment. The person convicted is subject to prosecution and
punishment according to law. (Section 3(7), Article 11 of the Constitution)

Enumerate the grounds for impeachment. Is graft and corruption a ground for
impeachment?
The following are the grounds for impeachment:
1) Culpable violation of the Constitution;
2) Treason;
3) Bribery;
4) Graft and Corruption;
5) Other high crimes; and
6) Betrayal of public trust.

The Ombudsman
Functions
Judicial review in administrative proceedings
Judicial review in penal proceedings
Office of the Special Prosecutor
The Sandiganbayan

Director WOW failed the lifestyle check conducted by the Ombudsman's Office because
WOWs assets were grossly disproportionate to his salary and allowances. Moreover,
some assets were not included in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities. He was charged
of graft and corrupt practices and pending the completion of investigations, he was
suspended from office for six months. Aggrieved, WOW petitioned the Court of Appeals
to annul the preventive suspension order on the ground that the Ombudsman could only
recommend but not impose the suspension. Moreover, according to WOW, the
suspension was imposed without any notice or hearing, in violation of due process. Is the
petitioner's contention meritorious? Discuss briefly.
The contention of Director WOW is not meritorious. The suspension meted out to
him is preventive and not punitive. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770 grants the
Ombudsman the power to impose preventive suspension up to six months. Preventive
suspension maybe imposed without any notice or hearing. It is merely a preliminary step
in an administrative investigation and is not the final determination of the guilt of the officer
concerned.

For his part, the Ombudsman moved to dismiss WOWs petition. According to the
Ombudsman the evidence of guilt of WOW is strong, and petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. WOW admitted he filed no motion for reconsideration, but only
because the order suspending him was immediately executory. Should the motion to
dismiss be granted or not? Discuss briefly.
The motion to dismiss should be denied. Since the suspension of Director WOW
was immediately executory, he would have suffered irreparable injury had he tried to
exhaust administrative remedies before filing a petition in court.

A group of losing litigants in a case decided by the Supreme Court filed a complaint before
the Ombudsman charging the Justices with knowingly and deliberately rendering an
unjust decision in utter violation of the penal laws of the land. Can the Ombudsman validly
take cognizance of the case? Explain.
No, the Ombudsman cannot entertain the complaint. Pursuant to the principle of
separation of powers, the correctness of the decisions of the Supreme Court as final
arbiter of all justiciable disputes is conclusive upon all other departments of the
government; the Ombudsman has no power to review the decisions of the Supreme Court
by entertaining a complaint against the Justices of the Supreme Court for knowingly
rendering an unjust decision.

An administrative complaint for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
against X was filed with the Ombudsman. Immediately after taking cognizance of the case
and the affidavits submitted to him, the Ombudsman ordered the preventive suspension
of X pending preliminary investigation. X questioned the suspension order, contending
that the Ombudsman can only suspend preventively subordinate employees in his own
office. Is X correct? Explain.
No, X is not correct. As held under Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770, the
Ombudsman can place under preventive suspension any officer under his disciplinary
authority pending an investigation. The moment a complaint is filed with the Ombudsman,
the respondent is under his authority. Congress intended to empower the Ombudsman
to suspend all officers, even if they are employed in other offices in the Government. The
words "subordinate" and "in his bureau" do not appear in the grant of such power to the
Ombudsman.
Decisions of the Ombudsman imposing penalties in administrative disciplinary cases are
merely recommendatory.
FALSE. Under Section 15(3) of the Ombudsman Act, the Ombudsman has the
power to ensure compliance with the imposition of penalty on public officers it finds at
fault by virtue of its disciplinary authority.

The fundamental notion that one's tenure in government springs exclusively from the trust
reposed by the public means that continuance in office is contingent upon the extent to
which one is able to maintain that trust.

As a final note, this Court has repeatedly emphasized the time-honored rule that a "public
office is a public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act
with patriotism and justice and lead modest lives." This high constitutional standard of
conduct is not intended to be mere rhetoric and taken lightly as those in the public service
are enjoined to fully comply with this standard or run the risk of facing administrative
sanctions ranging from reprimand to the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service.
Thus, public officers, as recipients of public trust, are under obligation to perform the
duties of their offices honestly, faithfully, and to the best of their ability.

It is hornbook doctrine in administrative law that administrative cases are independent

from criminal actions for the same acts or omissions. Thus, an absolution from a criminal
charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa. Given the differences
in the quantum of evidence required, the procedures actually observed, the sanctions
imposed, as well as the objective of the two proceedings, the findings and conclusions in
one should not necessarily be binding on the other. Hence, the exoneration in the
administrative case is not a bar to a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts
which were the subject of the administrative complaint or vice versa.

In the case at bar, the administrative case for grave misconduct filed against petitioner
and the present case for simple robbery are separate and distinct cases, and are
independent from each other. The administrative and criminal proceedings may involve
similar facts but each requires a different quantum of evidence. In addition, the
administrative proceeding conducted was before the PNP-IAS and was summary in
nature. In contrast, in the instant criminal case, the RTC conducted a full blown trial and
the prosecution was required to proffer proof beyond reasonable doubt to secure
petitioner's conviction. Furthermore, the proceedings included witnesses who were key
figures in the events leading to petitioner's arrest. Witnesses of both parties were cross-
examined by their respective counsels creating a clearer picture of what transpired, which
allowed the trial judge to have a better appreciation of the attendant facts and
determination of whether the prosecution proved the crime charged beyond reasonable
doubt.

Clearly, whether or not a person is a director or an officer of a corporation, so long as he

or she is the party responsible for the offense, he or she is the party that ought to be
charged. Thus, while the Board of Directors is primarily responsible for the sale,
respondents may still be held liable for offenses if they knowingly entered into, facilitated,
or participated in their execution and ensured their implementation.

The complaint charging the petitioner with the violations was filed only on October 28,
2004, or 13 years after the April 30, 1991 deadline for the submission of the SALN for
1990, and 12 years after the April 30, 1992 deadline for the submission of the SALN for
1991. With the offenses charged against the petitioner having already prescribed after
eight years in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326, the information filed against the
petitioner were validly quashed.

This Court's ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan cannot exonerate petitioners from criminal
liability. Arias laid down the doctrine that heads of offices may, in good faith, rely to a
certain extent on the acts of their subordinates "who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or
enter into negotiations." This is based upon the recognition that heads of offices cannot
be expected to examine every single document relative to government transactions. xxx.
The application of the doctrine is subject to the qualification that the public official has no
foreknowledge of any facts or circumstances that would prompt him or her to investigate
or exercise a greater degree of care. In a number of cases, this Court refused to apply
the Arias doctrine considering that there were circumstances that should have prompted
the government official to inquire further.

In the present case, the Arias doctrine cannot exonerate petitioners Abubakar, Baraguir,
or Guiani from criminal liability. There were circumstances that should have prompted
them to make further inquiries on the transactions subject of this case.

Quo warranto and impeachment are, thus, not mutually exclusive remedies and may even
proceed simultaneously. The existence of other remedies against the usurper does not
prevent the State from commencing a quo warranto proceeding.

The causes of action in the two proceedings are unequivocally different. In quo warranto,
the cause of action lies on the usurping, intruding, or unlawfully holding or exercising of a
public office, while in impeachment, it is the commission of an impeachable offense.
Stated in a different manner, the crux of the controversy in this quo warranto proceedings
is the determination of whether or not respondent legally holds the Chief Justice position
to be considered as an impeachable officer in the first place. On the other hand,
impeachment is for respondent's prosecution for certain impeachable offenses. To be
sure, respondent is not being prosecuted herein for such impeachable offenses
enumerated in the Articles of Impeachment. Instead, the resolution of this case shall be
based on established facts and related laws. Simply put, while respondent's title to hold
a public office is the issue in quo warranto proceedings, impeachment necessarily
presupposes that respondent legally holds the public office and thus, is an impeachable
officer, the only issue being whether or not she committed impeachable offenses to
warrant her removal from office.
Likewise, the reliefs sought in the two proceedings are different. Under the Rules on quo
warranto, "when the respondent is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully
holding or exercising a public office, xxx, judgment shall be rendered that such
respondent be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, xxx.ǁ In short, respondent in a
quo warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to cease from holding a public office, which
he/she is ineligible to hold. On the other hand, in impeachment, a conviction for the
charges of impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of the respondent from the
public office that he/she is legally holding. It is not legally possible to impeach or remove
a person from an office that he/she, in the first place, does not and cannot legally hold or
occupy.

Respondent anchors her position that she can be removed from office only by
impeachment on the Court's ruling in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Fernan, In
Re Gonzales, Jarque v. Desierto and Marcoleta v. Borra. It should be stressed, however,
that none of these cases concerned the validity of an impeachable officer's appointment.
Lecaroz involved a criminal charge against a mayor before the Sandiganbayan, while the
rest were disbarment cases filed against impeachable officers principally for acts done
during their tenure in public office. Whether the impeachable officer unlawfully held his
office or whether his appointment was void was not an issue raised before the Court. The
principle laid down in said cases is to the effect that during their incumbency, impeachable
officers cannot be criminally prosecuted for an offense that carries with it the penalty of
removal, and if they are required to be members of the Philippine Bar, to qualify for their
positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment. The proscription does not extend to
actions assailing the public officer's title or right to the office he or she occupies. The ruling
therefore cannot serve as authority to hold that a quo warranto action can never be filed
against an impeachable officer. In issuing such pronouncement, the Court is presumed
to have been aware of its power to issue writs of quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules
of Court.

In fact, this would not be the first time the Court shall take cognizance of a quo warranto
petition against an impeachable officer. In the consolidated cases of Estrada v. Desierto,
et al. and Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court took cognizance and assumed
jurisdiction over the quo warranto petition filed against respondent therein who, at the
time of the filing of the petition, had taken an oath and assumed the Office of the
President. Petitioner therein prayed for judgment confirming him to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his
office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath and to be holding the Office of
the President, only in an acting capacity. In fact, in the said cases, there was not even a
claim that respondent therein was disqualified from holding office and accordingly
challenged respondent's status as de jure 14th President of the Republic. By entertaining
the quo warranto petition, the Court in fact determined whether then President Estrada
has put an end to his official status by his alleged act of resignation.

The provision uses the permissive term "may" which, in statutory construction, denotes
discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect. We have consistently
held that the term "may" is indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.
The grantee of that opportunity is vested with a right or faculty which he has the option to
exercise. An option to remove by impeachment admits of an alternative mode of effecting
the removal.

We hold, therefore, that by its tenor, Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution allows the
institution of a quo warranto action against an impeachable officer. After all, a quo
warranto petition is predicated on grounds distinct from those of impeachment. The
former questions the validity of a public officer's appointment while the latter indicts him
for the so-called impeachable offenses without questioning his title to the office he holds.

Further, that the enumeration of "impeachable offenses" is made absolute, that is, only
those enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent to
saying that the enumeration likewise purport to be a complete statement of the causes of
removal from office.

The courts should be able to inquire into the validity of appointments even of impeachable
officers. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the appointment of an
impeachable officer cannot be questioned even when, for instance, he or she has been
determined to be of foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar membership is a
qualification, when he or she fraudulently represented to be a member of the Bar. Unless
such an officer commits any of the grounds for impeachment and is actually impeached,
he can continue discharging the functions of his office even when he is clearly disqualified
from holding it. Such would result in permitting unqualified and ineligible public officials to
continue occupying key positions, exercising sensitive sovereign functions until they are
successfully removed from office through impeachment. This could not have been the
intent of the framers of the Constitution.

A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine a person's right or
title to a public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is the proper action to
inquire into a public officer's eligibility or the validity of his appointment. Under Rule 66 of
the Rules of Court, a quo warranto proceeding involves a judicial determination of the
right to the use or exercise of the office. Impeachment, on the other hand, is a political
process undertaken by the legislature to determine whether the public officer committed
any of the impeachable offenses, namely, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. It does not
ascertain the officer's eligibility for appointment or election, or challenge the legality of his
assumption of office. Conviction for any of the impeachable offenses shall result in the
removal of the impeachable official from office.

Respondent, however, argues that quo warranto petitions may be filed against the
President and Vice-President under the PET Rules "only because the Constitution
specifically permits" them under Section 4, Article VII. According to respondent, no
counterpart provision exists in the Constitution giving the same authority to the Court over
the Chief Justice, the members of the Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman.
Respondent, thus, asserts that the Constitution made a distinction between elected and
appointive impeachable officials, and limited quo warranto to elected impeachable
officials. For these reasons, respondent concludes that by constitutional design, the Court
is denied power to remove any of its members. The Court is not convinced. The argument,
to begin with, acknowledges that the Constitution in fact allows quo warranto actions
against impeachable officers, albeit respondent limits them to the President and Vice-
President. This admission refutes the very position taken by respondent that all
impeachable officials cannot be sued through quo warranto because they belong to a
"privileged class" of officers who can be removed only through impeachment. To be sure,
Lecaroz, etc. did not distinguish between elected and appointed impeachable officers.
Furthermore, that the Constitution does not show a counterpart provision to paragraph 7
of Section 4, Article VII for members of this Court or the Constitutional Commissions does
not mean that quo warranto cannot extend to non-elected impeachable officers. The
authority to hear quo warranto petitions against appointive impeachable officers
emanates from Section 5(1) of Article VIII which grants quo warranto jurisdiction to this
Court without qualification as to the class of public officers over whom the same may be
exercised.

By its plain language, however, Section 2 of Article XI does not preclude a quo warranto
action questioning an impeachable officer's qualifications to assume office. These
qualifications include age, citizenship and professional experience - matters which are
manifestly outside the purview of impeachment under the above-cited provision.
Furthermore, Section 2 of Article XI cannot be read in isolation from Section 5(1) of Article
VIII of the Constitution which gives this Court its quo warranto jurisdiction, or from Section
4, paragraph 7 of Article VII of the Constitution which designates the Court as the sole
judge of the qualifications of the President and Vice-President.

Section 2 of Article XI provides that the impeachable officers may be removed from office
on impeachment for and conviction of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. Lack of
qualifications for appointment or election is evidently not among the stated grounds for
impeachment. It is, however, a ground for a quo warranto action over which this Court
was given original jurisdiction under Section 5(1) of Article VIII. The grant of jurisdiction
was not confined to unimpeachable officers. In fact, under Section 4, paragraph 7 of
Article VII, this Court was expressly authorized to pass upon the qualifications of the
President and Vice-President. Thus, the proscription against the removal of public officers
other than by impeachment does not apply to quo warranto actions assailing the
impeachable officer's eligibility for appointment or election.

Determining title to the office on the basis of a public officer's qualifications is the function
of quo warranto. For this reason, impeachment cannot be treated as a substitute for quo
warranto.

To disabuse wandering minds, there is nothing violative or intrusive of the Senate's power
to remove impeachable officials in the main Decision. In fact, in the said assailed
Decision, We recognized that the Senate has the sole power to try and decide all cases
of impeachment. We have extensively discussed therein that the Court merely exercised
its Constitutional duty to resolve a legal question referring to respondent's qualification as
a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. We also emphasized that this Court's action never
intends to deprive the Congress of its mandate to make a determination on impeachable
officials' culpability for acts committed while in office. We even explained that
impeachment and quo warranto may proceed independently and simultaneously, albeit a
ruling of removal or ouster of the respondent in one case will preclude the same ruling in
the other due to legal impossibility and mootness.

It is undisputed that petitioner is a low-ranking public officer having a salary grade below
27, whose appeal from the RTC's ruling convicting him of six (6) counts of Malversation
of Public Funds Through Falsification of Public Documents falls within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, pursuant to Section 4 (c) of RA 8249 (prior to its
amendment by RA 10660). Thus, since petitioner's case properly falls within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, his appeal was erroneously taken to the CA.

This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the foregoing error is not primarily attributable
to petitioner, since the duty to transmit the records to the proper court devolves upon the
RTC. xxx. Hence, all things considered, the Court finds that petitioner's filing of the Motion
to Endorse beyond the original fifteen (15)-day period - much more the erroneous
transmittal of the case to the CA by the RTC - should not be taken against him, else it
result in the injudicious dismissal of his appeal.

It must be noted at the outset that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court over the decisions
and final orders of the Sandiganbayan is limited to questions of law.

Nevertheless, in as early as 1959, forfeiture in favor of the State of any property in an

amount found to have been manifestly out of proportion to a public officer or employee's
salary or to the latter's other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired
property, has been sanctioned under Republic Act No. 1379 (R.A. 1379). Forfeiture
proceedings under R.A. 1379 are civil in nature and actions for reconveyance, revision,
accounting, restitution, and damages for ill-gotten wealth, as in this case, are also called
civil forfeiture proceedings. Similar to civil cases, the quantum of evidence required for
forfeiture proceedings is preponderance of evidence.

To recover the unexplained or ill-gotten wealth reputedly amassed by then President

Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, former President Corazon Aquino issued
Executive Order No. l and thereby gave birth to the PCGG with the task of recovering "all
ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or
abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities
owned or controlled by them during his administration, directly or through nominees, by
taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority,
influence, connections or relationship." The recovery of the reputed ill-gotten wealth was
both a matter of urgency and necessity and the right of the State to recover unlawfully
acquired properties eventually found flesh under Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution.
Jurisprudence has so far settled that dismissal based on the grounds provided under
Section 20 is not mandatory and is discretionary on the part of the evaluating Ombudsman
or Deputy Ombudsman evaluating the administrative complaint. Clearly, as the law, its
implementing rules, and interpretative jurisprudence stand, the dismissal by the
Ombudsman on grounds provided under Section 20 is applicable only to administrative
complaints. Its invocation in the present criminal case is therefore misplaced

Upon receipt of the complaint, the same shall be evaluated to determine whether the
same may be dismissed outright for any of the grounds stated under Section 20 of
Republic Act No. 6770, provided, however, that the dismissal thereof is not mandatory
and shall be discretionary on the part of the Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsman
concerned. (Note Administrative Order No. 17, amending Administrative Order No. 7,
clarifying Section 20 of RA 6770, which, provides: The Office of the Ombudsman may not
conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of
if it believes that: (1) The complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or
quasi-judicial body; (2) The complaint pertains to a matter outside the jurisdiction of the
Office of the Ombudsman; (3) The complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad
faith; (4) The complainant has no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the
grievance; or (5) The complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or
omission complained of.)

Contrariwise, the procedure in criminal cases requires that the Ombudsman evaluate the
complaint and after evaluation, to make its recommendations in accordance with Section
2, Rule II of the Administrative Order No. 07 xxx. Thus, the only instance when an outright
dismissal of a criminal complaint is warranted is when Orders would show that the
Ombudsman found the complaint to have suffered from utter lack of merit. In fact, the
assailed Orders are empty except for the citation of Section 20 as basis for outright
dismissal. It is thus inaccurate and misleading for the Ombudsman to profess that the
criminal complaint was dismissed only after the conduct of a preliminary investigation,
when the complaint never reached that stage to begin with. Clearly, the Ombudsman
committed grave abuse of discretion when it evaluated and consequently dismissed a
criminal complaint based on grounds peculiar to administrative cases and in an
unexplained deviation from its own rules of procedure.

It must be stressed that the Office of the Ombudsman is not a constitutional commission.

To the point of being monotonous, Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution refers exclusively to
the constitutional commissions; thus, such proscription as to the appointment or
designation in a temporary or acting capacity of a member applies only to the
constitutional commissions and cannot extend to the Ombudsman and the deputies.
Indeed, Art. XI of the Constitution does not provide for such a prohibition.

In our review of Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770, we note that in case of death, resignation,
removal or permanent disability of the Ombudsman, the new Ombudsman shall be
appointed for a full term. Undoubtedly, Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 is consistent with sec.
11, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution in so far as it provides to the Ombudsman and the
deputies shall serve for a term of seven years.

In Dimayuga v. Office of the Ombudsman, we held that the Office of the Ombudsman
may, for every particular investigation, decide how best to pursue each investigation. This
power gives the Office of the Ombudsman the discretion to dismiss without prejudice a
preliminary investigation if it finds that the final decision of the COA is necessary for its
investigation and future prosecution of the case. It may also pursue the investigation
because it realizes that the decision of the COA is irrelevant or unnecessary to the
investigation and prosecution of the case. Since the Office of the Ombudsman is granted
such latitude, its varying treatment of similarly situated investigations cannot by itself be
considered a violation of any of the parties' rights to the equal protection of the laws. Nor
in the present case, can it be considered a violation of petitioner's right to due process.

Thus, no matter the identity of the complainant, the Ombudsman may act on the matter.
Moreover, it may, on its own, inquire into illegal acts of public officials, which may be
discovered from any source. However, if the "the complainant has no sufficient personal
interest in the subject matter of the grievance," the Ombudsman may choose not to
investigate the administrative act complained of. xxx. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6770
uses the word "may" which signifies that it is permissive and not imperative. The power
of the Ombudsman to act on an administrative complaint by a person without any personal
interest in the case is, thus, discretionary. xxx. Thus, the Ombudsman may prosecute or
investigate the complaint with or without the complainant's personal interest in the
outcome of the case. Thus, the law allows the filing of cases to the Ombudsman against
public officers by any complainant. The Ombudsman is a tool to maintain this faith.

... not all may appeal to question a decision of the Ombudsman.

In administrative cases filed under the Civil Service Law, an allowed appeal may only be
brought by the party adversely affected by the decision.

Thus, the Ombudsman's decision may not be appealed if it dismisses the complaint or
imposes the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1)
month, or a fine equivalent to one (1)-month salary. Otherwise, it may be appealed to the
Court of Appeals under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court.

In the case at bar, the Office of the Ombudsman's October 12, 2010 Decision exonerated
respondents. Thus, Canlas has no right to appeal this Decision. He has no other recourse.
―The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the
manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of law. There must then be
a law expressly granting such right."

Generally, a decision by the Ombudsman absolving respondents is unappealable.

However, if it is shown that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion, then
the complainant may file a Rule 65 Petition with the proper court.