You are on page 1of 12

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1477             January 18, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 


vs.
JULIO GUILLEN, defendant-appellant.

Mariano A. Albert for appellant.


Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor
Francisco A. Carreon for appellee.

PER CURIAM, J.:

This case is before us for review of, and by virtue of appeal


from, the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Manila in case No. 2746, whereby Julio Guillen y Corpus, or Julio
C. Guillen, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder and multiple frustrated murder, as charged in the
information, and is sentenced to the penalty of death, to indemnify
the of the deceased Simeon Valera (or Barrela) in the sum of P2,000
and to pay the costs.

Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of not guilty to


the charges contained in the information.

Then the case was tried in one of the branches of the Court of
First Instance of Manila presided over by the honorable
Buenaventura Ocampo who, after the submission of the evidence of
the prosecution and the defense, rendered judgment as above
stated.

In this connection it should be stated that, at the beginning of


the trial and before arraignment, counsel de oficiofor the accused
moved that the mental condition of Guillen be examined. The court,
notwithstanding that it had found out from the answers of the
accused to questions propounded to him in order to test the
soundness of his mind, that he was not suffering from any mental
derangement, ordered that Julio Guillen be confined for Hospital,
there to be examined by medical experts who should report their
findings accordingly. This was done, and, according to the report of
the board of medical experts, presided over by Dr. Fernandez of the
National Psychopathic Hospital, Julio Guillen was not insane. Said
report (Exhibit L), under the heading "Formulation and Diagnosis,"
at pages 13 and 14, reads:

FORMULATION AND DIAGNOSIS

Julio C. Guillen was placed under constant observation


since admission. There was not a single moment during his
whole 24 hours daily, that he was not under observation.

The motive behind the commission of the crime is stated


above. The veracity of this motivation was determined in the
Narcosynthesis. That the narco-synthesis was successful was
checked up the day after the test. The narco-synthesis proved
not only reveal any conflict or complex that may explain a
delusional or hallucinatory motive behind the act.

Our observation and examination failed to elicit any sign


or symptom of insanity in Mr. Julio C. Guillen. He was found
to be intelligent, always able to differentiate right from wrong,
fully aware of the nature of the crime he committed and is
equally decided to suffer for it in any manner or form.

His version of the circumstances of the crime, his


conduct and conversation relative thereto, the motives,
temptations and provocations that preceded the act, were all
those of an individual with a sound mind.

On the other hand he is an man of strong will and


conviction and once arriving at a decision he executes,
irrespective of consequences and as in this case, the
commission of the act at Plaza Miranda.

What is of some interest in the personality of Julio C.


Guillen is his commission of some overt acts. This is seen not
only in the present instance, but sometime when an employee
in la Clementina Cigar Factory he engaged in a boxing bout
Mr. Manzano, a Span-wanted to abuse the women cigar
makers, and felt it his duty to defend them. One time he ran
after a policeman with a knife in hand after being provoked to
a fight several times. He even challenged Congressman Nueno
to a fight sometime before when Mr. Nueno was running for a
seat in the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, after hearing
him deliver one of his apparently outspoken speeches.

All these mean a defect in his personality characterized


by a weakness of censorship especially in relation to
rationalization about the consequences of his acts.

In view of the above findings it is our considered opinion


that Julio C. Guillen is not insane but is an individual with a
personality defect which in Psychiatry is termed,
Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority.

Final Diagnosis

Not insane: Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority, without


psychosis.

In view of the above-quoted findings of the medical board, and


notwithstanding the contrary opinion of one Dr. Alvarez, who was
asked by the defense to give his opinion on the matter, the court
ruled that Guillen, not being insane, could be tired, as he was tired,
for the offenses he committed on the date in question.

THE FACTS

Upon careful perusal of the evidence and the briefs submitted


by counsel for the accused, the Solicitor General and their
respective memoranda, we find that there is no disagreement
between the prosecution and the defense, as to the essential facts
which caused the filing of the present criminal case against this
accused. Those facts may be stated as follows:

On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio Guillen y


Corpus, although not affirmed with any particular political group,
has voted for the defeated candidate in the presidential elections
held in 1946. Manuel A. Roxas, the successful candidate, assumed
the office of President of the Commonwealth and subsequently
President of the President of the Philippine Republic. According to
Guillen, he became disappointed in President Roxas for his alleged
failure to redeem the pledges and fulfill the promises made by him
during the presidential election campaign; and his disappointment
was aggravated when, according to him, President Roxas, instead of
looking after the interest of his country, sponsored and campaigned
for the approval of the so-called "parity" measure. Hence he
determined to assassinate the President.

After he had pondered for some time over the ways and means
of assassinating President Roxas, the opportunity presented itself
on the night of March 10, 1947, when at a popular meeting held by
the Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila attended by a
big crowd, President Roxas, accompanied by his wife and daughter
and surrounded by a number of ladies and gentlemen prominent in
government and politics, stood on a platform erected for that
purpose and delivered his speech expounding and trying to
convince his thousand of listeners of the advantages to be gained by
the Philippines, should the constitutional amendment granting
American citizens the same rights granted to Filipino nationals be
adopted.

Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the


accomplishment of his purpose, but having lost said firearm, which
was duly licensed, he thought of two hand grenades which were
given him by an American soldier in the early days of the liberation
of Manila in exchange for two bottles of whisky. He had likewise
been weighing the chances of killing President Roxas, either by
going to Malacañan, or following his intended victim in the latter's
trips to provinces, for instance, to Tayabas (now Quezon) where the
President was scheduled to speak, but having encountered many
difficulties, he decided to carry out his plan at the pro-parity
meeting held at Plaza de Miranda on the night of March 10, 1947.

On the morning of that he went to the house of Amando


Hernandez whom he requested to prepare for him a document
(Exhibit B), in accordance with their pervious understanding in the
preceding afternoon, when they met at the premises of the Manila
Jockey Club on the occasion of an "anti-parity" meeting held there.
On account of its materially in this case, we deem it proper to quote
hereunder the contents of said document. An English translation
(Exhibit B-2) from its original Tagalog reads:

FOR THE SAKE OF A FREE PHILIPPINES

I am the only one responsible for what happened. I


conceived it, I planned it, and I carried it out all by myself
alone. It took me many days and nights pondering over this
act, talking to my own conscience, to my God, until I reached
my conclusion. It was my duty.

I did not expected to live long; I only had on life to spare.


And had I expected to lives to spare, I would not have
hesitated either ton sacrifice it for the sake of a principle
which was the welfare of the people.

Thousands have died in Bataan; many more have


mourned the loss of their husbands, of their sons, and there
are millions now suffering. Their deeds bore no fruits; their
hopes were frustrated.

I was told by my conscience and by my God that there


was a man to be blamed for all this: he had deceived the
people, he had astounded them with no other purpose than to
entice them; he even went to the extent of risking the heritage
of our future generations. For these reasons he should not
continue any longer. His life would mean nothing as compared
with the welfare of eighteen million souls. And why should I
not give up my life too if only the good of those eighteen million
souls.

These are the reasons which impelled me to do what I did


and I am willing to bear up the consequences of my act. I t
matters not if others will curse me. Time and history will
show, I am sure, that I have only displayed a high degree of
patriotism in my performance of my said act.

Hurrah for a free Philippines.


Cheers for the happiness of every Filipino home.

May God pity on me.

Amen.

JULIO C. GUILLEN

A copy (Exhibit B-1) of the original in Tagalog (Exhibit B),


made at the request of Guillen by his nephew, was handed to him
only at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of March 10, 1947, for
which reason said Exhibit B-1 appears unsigned, because he was in
a hurry for that meeting at Plaza de Miranda.

When he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen was carrying two


hand grenades concealed in a paper bag which also contained
peanuts. He buried one of the hand grenades (Exhibit D), in a plant
pot located close to the platform, and when he decided to carry out
his evil purpose he stood on the chair on which he had been sitting
and, from a distance of about seven meters, he hurled the grenade
at the President when the latter had just closed his speech, was
being congratulated by Ambassador Romulo and was about to leave
the platform.

General Castañeda, who was on the platform, saw the


smoking, hissing, grenade and without losing his presence of mind,
kicked it away from the platform, along the stairway, and towards
an open space where the general thought the grenade was likely to
do the least harm; and, covering the President with his body,
shouted to the crowd that everybody should lie down. The grenade
fell to the ground and exploded in the middle of a group of persons
who were standing close to the platform. Confusion ensued, and the
crowd dispersed in a panic. It was found that the fragments of the
grenade had seriously injured Simeon Varela (or Barrela ) — who
died on the following day as the result of mortal wounds caused by
the fragments of the grenade (Exhibits F and F-1) — Alfredo Eva,
Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang.

Guillen was arrested by members of the Police Department


about two hours after the occurrence. It appears that one Angel
Garcia, who was one spectators at that meeting, saw how a person
who was standing next to him hurled an object at the platform and,
after the explosion, ran away towards a barber shop located near
the platform at Plaza de Miranda. Suspecting that person was the
thrower of the object that exploded, Garcia went after him and had
almost succeeded in holding him, but Guillen offered stiff
resistance, got loose from Garcia and managed to escape. Garcia
pursued him, but some detectives, mistaking the former for the real
criminal and the author of the explosion, placed him under arrest.
In the meantime, while the City Mayor and some agents of the
Manila Police Department were investigating the affair, one Manuel
Robles volunteered the information that the person with whom
Angel Garcia was wrestling was Julio Guillen; that he (Manuel
Robles) was acquainted with Julio Guillen for the previous ten years
and had seen each other in the plaza a few moments previous to the
explosion.

The police operatives interrogated Garcia and Robles, and


Julio Guillen was, within two hours after the occurrence, found in
his home at 1724 Juan Luna Street, Manila, brought to the police
headquarters and identified by Angel Garcia, as the same person
who hurled towards the platform the object which exploded and
whom Garcia tried to hold when he was running away.

During the investigation conducted by the police he readily


admitted his responsibility, although at the same time he tried to
justify his action in throwing the bomb at President Roxas. He also
indicated to his captors the place where he had hidden his so called
last will quoted above and marked Exhibit B, which was then
unsigned by him and subsequently signed at the police
headquarters.

Re-enacting the crime (Exhibit C), he pointed out to the police


where he had buried (Exhibit C-1) the other hand grenade (Exhibit
D), and, in the presence of witnesses he signed a statement which
contained his answers to question propounded to him by Major A.
Quintos of the Manila Police, who investigated him soon after his
arrest (Exhibit E). From a perusal of his voluntary statement, we
are satisfied that it tallies exactly with the declarations and made
by him on the witness stand during the trial of this case.
THE ISSUES

In the brief submitted by counsel de oficio for this appellant,


several errors are assigned allegedly committed by the trial court,
namely: first, "in finding the appellant guilty of murder for the
death of Simeon Varela"; second, "in declaring the appellant guilty
of the complex crime of murder and multiple frustrated
murder"; third, "in applying sub-section 1 of article 49 of the
Revised Penal Code in determining the penalty to be imposed upon
the accused"; and fourth, "in considering the concurrence of the
aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and of contempt of public
authorities in the commission of crime."

The evidence for the prosecution, supported by the brazen


statements made by the accused, shows beyond any shadow of
doubt that, when Guillen attended that meeting, carrying with him
two hand grenades, to put into execution his preconceived plan to
assassinate President Roxas, he knew fully well that, by throwing
one of those two hand grenades in his possession at President
Roxas, and causing it to explode, he could not prevent the persons
who were around his main and intended victim from being killed or
at least injured, due to the highly explosive nature of the bomb
employed by him to carry out his evil purpose.

Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, in answer to questions


propounded by the trial judge (page 96 of transcript) supports our
conclusion. He stated that he performed the act voluntarily; that his
purpose was to kill the President, but that it did not make any
difference to him if there were some people around the President
when he hurled that bomb, because the killing of those who
surrounded the President was tantamount to killing the President,
in view of the fact that those persons, being loyal to the President
being loyal to the President, were identified with the latter. In other
word, although it was not his main intention to kill the persons
surrounding the President, he felt no conjunction in killing them
also in order to attain his main purpose of killing the President.

The facts do not support the contention of counsel for


appellant that the latter is guilty only of homicide through reckless
imprudence in regard to the death of Simeon Varela and of less
serious physical injuries in regard to Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro
Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang, and that he should be sentenced to
the corresponding penalties for the different felonies committed, the
sum total of which shall not exceed three times the penalty to be
imposed for the most serious crime in accordance with article 70 in
relation to article 74 of the Revised Penal Code.

In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention


of killing him, the appellant acted with malice. He is therefore liable
for all the consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with
article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by
any person committing felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended. In criminal
negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it
being simply the incident of another act performed without malice.
(People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939.) In the words of Viada, "in order that
an act may be qualified as imprudence it is necessary that either
malice nor intention to cause injury should intervene; where such
intention exists, the act should qualified by the felony it has
produced even though it may not have been the intention of the
actor to cause an evil of such gravity as that produced.' (Viada's
Comments on the Penal Code, vol. 7, 5th ed., p.7.) And, as held by
this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially
inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. (People vs.
Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232.) Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a
mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered
as reckless imprudence. (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605)

Squarely on the point by counsel is the following decision of


the Supreme Court of Spain:

Cuestion 62. Se presenta A, a las ocho de la noche, en el


estanco de B a comprar tabaco, y habiendose negado este a
darselo al fiado, se retira a quel sin mediar entre ambos
disputa alguna; pero; trnscurrido un cuarto de hora,
hallandose el estanquero despachando a C, se oye la
detonacion de un arma de fuego disparada por A desde la
calle, quedando muertos en el acto C y el estanquero;
supuesta la no intencion en A de matar a C y si solo al
estanquero, cabe calificar la muerte de este de homicidio y la
de c de imprudencia temeraria? — La Sala de lo Criminal de la
Auudiencia de Granada lo estimo asi, y condeno al procesado
a catorse anos de reclusion por el homivcidio y a un año de
prision correctional por la imprudencia. Aparte de que la
muerte del estanquero debio calificarse de assesinato y no de
homicidio, por haberse ejecutado con aleviosa. es evidente que
la muerte de C, suponiendo que no se propusiera ejecutaria el
procesado, no pudo calificarse de imprudencia teme raria, sino
que tambien debio declararsele responsable de la misma, a
tenor de lo puesto en este apartado ultimo del articulo; y que
siendo ambas muertes producidas por un solo hecho, o sea
por un solo disparo, debio imponerse al reo la pena del delito
de asesinato en el grado maximo, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el
art. 90 del Codigo, o sea la pena de muerte. Se ve, pues,
claramente que en el antedicha sentencia, aparte de otros
articulos del Codigo, se infringio por la Sala la disposicion de
este apartado ultimo del articulo muy principalmente, y asi lo
declaro el Tribunal Supremo en S. de 18 junio de 1872.
(Gaceta de 1,0 de agosto.) (I Viada, 5th Ed., p. 42.)

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:

Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. — When a single act


constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when
an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same
to be applied in its maximum period.

We think it is the above-quoted article and not paragraph 1 of


article 49 that is applicable. The case before us is clearly governed
by the first clause of article 48 because by a single act, that a
throwing highly explosive hand grenade at President Roxas, the
accused committed two grave felonies, namely: (1) murder, of which
Simeon Varela was the victim; and (2) multiple attempted murder,
of which President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo
and Emilio Maglalang were the injured parties.

The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying


circumstance of treachery. In the case of People vs. Mabug-at,
supra, this court held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery
may be properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was
not the one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears from
the evidence that neither of the two persons could in any manner
put up defense against the attack, or become aware of it. In the
same case it was held that the qualifying circumstance of
premeditation may not be properly taken into the account when the
person whom the defendant proposed to kill was different from the
one who became his victim.

There can be no question that the accused attempted to kill


President Roxas by throwing a hand grenade at him with the
intention to kill him, thereby commencing the commission of a
felony by over acts, but he did not succeed in assassinating him "by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance." For the same reason we qualify the injuries caused on
the four other persons already named as merely attempted and not
frustrated murder.

In this connection, it should be stated that , although there is


abundant proof that , in violation of the provisions of article 148 of
the Revised Penal Code, the accused Guillen has committed among
others the offense of assault upon a person in authority, for in fact
his efforts were directed towards the execution of his main purpose
of eliminating President Roxas for his failure to redeem his electoral
campaign promises, by throwing at him in his official capacity as
the Chief Executive of the nation the hand grenade in question, yet,
in view of the appropriate allegation charging Guillen with the
commission of said offense, we shall refrain making a finding to
that effect.

The complex crimes of murder and multiple attempted murder


committed by the accused with the single act of throwing a hand
grenade at the President, was attended by the various aggravating
circumstances alleged in the information, without any mitigating
circumstance. But we do not deem it necessary to consider said
aggravating circumstances because in any event article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code above-quoted requires that the penalty for the
most serious of said crimes be applied in its maximum period. The
penalty for murder is reclusion temporalin its maximum period to
death. (Art. 248.)
It is our painful duty to apply the law and mete out to the
accused the extreme penalty provided by it upon the facts and
circumstances hereinabove narrated.

The sentence of the trial court being correct, we have no


alternative but to affirm it, and we hereby do so by a unanimous
vote. The death sentence shall be executed in accordance with
article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, under authority of the Director
of Prisons, on such working day as the trial court may fix within 30
days from the date the record shall have been remanded. It is so
ordered.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason,


Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.

You might also like