Agra Reviewer 1

UPDATES ON THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF 1988
(RA 6657, as amended by RAs 7881, 7905, 8532 and 9700)
By Gefer R. Mancol
Chapter I (Preliminary Chapter)
1. The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of police power and the power of
eminent domain.
In Roxas & Co., Inc. v. CA (1999), citing Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform (1989), the Court declared that “[t]o the extent that the CARL
prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the
regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such
regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed,
there is also a taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not a mere
limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and physical
possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer
beneficiary.” (Roxas & Co., Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 127876, December 17, 1999, 321 SCRA 106, 134 [Per J. Puno, En Banc], citing
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform , G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343,
373-374 [Per J. Cruz, En Banc])
1.1. What is police power?
In Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. DOLE (2018), it was ruled that
police power, called “the most essential, insistent and illimitable” of the powers of the
State, is the “authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare.” In the negative, it is the “inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of society.” (Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. DOLE, G.R. No. 202275,
July 17, 2018, 872 SCRA 50, 121-122 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc])
1.2. What is the power of eminent domain?
According to the Court in Apo Fruits Corporation v. LBP (2010), “[e]minent domain is the
power of the State to take private property for public use. It is an inherent power of State
as it is a power necessary for the State’s existence; it is a power the State cannot do
without. As an inherent power, it does not need at all to be embodied in the Constitution;
if it is mentioned at all, it is solely for purposes of limiting what is otherwise an unlimited
power. The limitation is found in the Bill of Rights—that part of the Constitution whose
provisions all aim at the protection of individuals against the excessive exercise of
governmental powers. (Apo Fruits Corporation v. LBP, G.R. No. 164195, October 12, 2010, 632 SCRA 727, 739 [Per
J. Brion, En Banc])
In the 2011 ruling of the same case, it was held that “Section 9, Article III of the 1987
Constitution expresses the constitutional rule on eminent domain—'Private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation. ’ While confirming the State’s
inherent power and right to take private property for public use, this provision at the same
time lays down the limitation in the exercise of this power. When it takes property pursuant
to its inherent right and power, the State has the corresponding obligation to pay the
owner just compensation for the property taken. For compensation to be considered ‘just,’
it must not only be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken; it must also be paid
to the landowner without delay.” (Apo Fruits Corporation v. LBP, G.R. No. 164195, April 5, 2011, 647 SCRA 207,
218 [Per J. Brion, En Banc])
Updates on CARL_GRM_v1 1
2. The CARL is aimed at promoting social justice.
In Heirs of Augusto Salas, Jr. v. Cabungcal (2017), the Court held that the CARL was “enacted as
social legislation, pursuant to the policy of the State to pursue a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program. Agrarian reform is the means towards a viable livelihood and, ultimately, a decent life
for the landless farmers.” (Heirs of Augusto Salas, Jr. v. Cabungcal, G.R. No. 191545, March 29, 2017, 822 SCRA 1, 47 [Per J.
Leonen, Second Division])
In DAR v. Woodland Agro-Development (2015), citing Secretary of Agrarian Reform v. Tropical

Homes, Inc. (2001), the CARL has been recognized as a “bastion of social justice of poor landless
farmers, the mechanism designed to redistribute to the underprivileged the natural right to toil
the earth, and to liberate them from oppressive tenancy.” The Court added that “[t]o those who
seek the law’s benefit, it is the means towards a viable livelihood and ultimately, a decent life.”
(DAR v. Woodland Agro-Development, G.R. No. 188174, June 29, 2015, 760 SCRA 503, 510 [Per CJ. Sereno, First Division], citing
Secretary of Agrarian Reform v. Tropical Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 136827, July 31, 2001, 362 SCRA 115, 122 [Per J. De Leon, Jr., Second
Division])
Further, in Heirs of Arcadio Castro, Sr. v. Lozada (2012), the Court reiterated its declaration that
“in the construction of laws that find its origin in the social justice mandate of the Constitution,”
the constant policy is “to assure that its beneficient effects be enjoyed by those who have less in
life.” (Heirs of Arcadio Castro, Sr. v. Lozada, G.R. No. 163026, August 29, 2012, 679 SCRA 271, 289 [Per J. Villarama, Jr., Second
Division], citing Tañag v. The Executive Secretary , G.R. No. L-30223, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 806, 811 [Per J. Fernando, En Banc])
2.1. What is social justice?
Social justice, in the words of Justice Laurel in Calalang v. Williams, means the
“humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so
that justice in the rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated.” (Alfanta v. Noe, G.R. No. L-32362, September 19, 1973 [Per J. Antonio, En Banc], citing Calalang v.
Williams, 70 Phil. 726 [Per J. Laurel, First Division])
Its significance was popularized by the late President Magsaysay, saying: “He who has less
in life should have more in law.” (Del Rosario v. De los Santos, G.R. Nos. L-20589-90, March 21, 1968 [Per J.
Fernando, En Banc])
2.2. Social justice also applies to landowners.
In Samahan ng Magsasaka at Mangingisda ng Sitio Naswe, Inc. v. Tan (2016), it was held
that “[s]ocial justice in the land reform program also applies to landowners, not merely to
farmers and farmworkers. This is precisely why the law — RA No. 6657 — and the
applicable rules provide for the procedure for determining the proper beneficiaries and
grantees or awardees of the lands covered or to be covered under the CARP. These
procedures ensure that only the qualified, identified, and registered farmers and/or
farmworkers-beneficiaries acquire the covered lands which they themselves actually till
(subject to the landowners retention rights as protected by the law). Conversely, these
procedures likewise ensure that landowners do not lose their lands to usurpers and other
illegal settlers who wish to take advantage of the agrarian reform program to acquire lands
to which they are not entitled.” (Samahan ng Magsasaka at Mangingisda ng Sitio Naswe, Inc. v. Tan, G.R. No.
196028, April 18, 2016, 789 SCRA 573, 585 [Per J. Brion, Second Division])
In Lajom v. LBP (2014), the Court emphasized that “while the agrarian reform program was
undertaken primarily for the benefit of our landless farmers, this undertaking should,
however, not result in the oppression of landowners by pegging the cheapest value for
their lands. Indeed, although the taking of properties for agrarian reform purposes is a
revolutionary kind of expropriation, it should not be carried out at the undue expense of
landowners who are also entitled to protection under the Constitution and agrarian reform
laws.” (LBP v. Lajom, G.R. No. 184982, August 20, 2014, 733 SCRA 511, 526 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division])
2.3. Likewise, social justice should never be taken as a toll to justify let alone
commit injustice.
In LBP v. Estate of J. Amado Araneta (2012), the Court ruled that “[a]grarian reform finds
context in social justice in tandem with the police power of the State. But social justice
itself is not merely granted to the marginalized and the underprivileged. But while the
concept of social justice is intended to favor those who have less in life, it should never be
taken as a toll to justify let alone commit an injustice. The Court also borrowed from Justice
Isagani Cruz in Gelos v. CA (1992) that: “[S]ocial justice––or any justice for that matter––is
for the deserving whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is
true that, in a case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of
the poor simply because they are poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its
sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they
are poor, or to eject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served,
for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.” (LBP v. Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R.
No. 161796, February 8, 2012, 665 SCRA 310, 348 [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division], citing Gelos v. CA, G.R. No. 86186, May
8, 1992, 208 SCRA 608, 616 [Per J. Cruz, First Division])
The Court in Agabon v. NLRC (2004) has also categorically ruled that “[s]ocial justice, as
the term suggests, should be used only to correct an injustice. (Agabon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693,
November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 573, 615 [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc])
Similarly, in Jamer v. NLRC (1997), it was held that “[s]ocial justice ceases to be an effective
instrument for the ‘equalization of the social and economic forces’ by the State when it is
used to shield wrongdoing.” (Jamer v. NLRC, G.R. No. 112630, September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 632, 650 [Per J.
Hermosisima, Jr., First Division])
3. What is the constitutional basis of agrarian reform?
It is Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution, as held in Apo Fruits Corporation v. LBP (2011). The
constitutional mandate provides: “The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the
fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may
prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to
the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right
of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing. (Const.,
Art. XIII, Sec. 4. This is the constitutional basis of our agrarian reform program, as held in Apo Fruits Corporation v. LBP, G.R. No. 164195,
April 5, 2011, 647 SCRA 207, 224-225 [Per J. Brion, En Banc])
In LBP v. Nable (2012), “Section 4, Article XIII, of the Constitution has mandated the
implementation of an agrarian reform program for the distribution of agricultural lands to landless
farmers subject to the payment of just compensation to the landowners…” (LBP v. Nable, G.R. No. 176692,
June 27, 2012, 675 SCRA 253, 259 [Per J. Bersamin, First Division])
4. What is the policy of the CARL?
As held in DAR v. Woodland Agro-Development (2015), “[t]he policy of the law is to pursue a
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program that shall give highest consideration to the welfare of
landless farmers and farmworkers to promote social justice; move the nation toward sound rural
development and industrialization; and establish owner cultivatorship of economic-size farms as
the basis of Philippine agriculture. To this end, a more equitable distribution and ownership of
land shall be undertaken with due regard for the rights of landowners to just compensation and
to the ecological needs of the nation to provide farmers and farmworkers with the opportunity to
enhance their dignity and improve the quality of their lives through greater productivity of
agricultural lands.” (DAR v. Woodland Agro-Development, G.R. No. 188174, June 29, 2015, 760 SCRA 503, 509-510 [Per CJ.
Sereno, First Division])
5. There are salient terms under Section 3 of the CARL. Make sure you have understood
and memorized them, for they have been utilized by the Court in its decisions.
6. Luz Farms v. Secretary of the DAR (1990) excluded agricultural lands devoted to
livestock, poultry and swine from the coverage of the CARP.
The Court in Luz Farms v. Secretary of the DAR (1990) has held:
The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on

the meaning of the word “agricultural,” clearly show that it was never the intention
of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the
coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the
Government… It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A.
6657 which includes “private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock,
poultry and swine raising” in the definition of “commercial farms” is invalid, to the
extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the
agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock
and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform. (Luz Farms v. Secretary of the DAR, G.R.
No. 86889, December 4, 1990, 192 SCRA 51, 56, 58 [Per J. Paras, En Banc])
This was reiterated in DAR v. Sutton (2005), thus:
However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear

intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and
poultry-raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and
poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of
“agriculture” or “agricultural activity.” The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is
different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity.
A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed
assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and
blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators,
extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution
equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete
ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other
technological appurtenances. Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate
livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage
of agrarian reform… (DAR v. Sutton, G.R. No. 162070, October 19, 2005, 473 SCRA 392, 399-400 [Per J.
Puno, En Banc])
Chapter II (Coverage)
7. What lands are covered under the CARL?
In Heirs of Augusto Salas, Jr. v. Cabungcal (2017), it was held that the CARL covers all public and
private agricultural lands, as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No.
229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced. However, a maximum of five (5) hectares of the
landowner’s compact or contiguous landholdings may not be distributed to qualified
beneficiaries, as it is within the landowner’s rights to retain this area. (Heirs of Augusto Salas, Jr. v. Cabungcal,
G.R. No. 191545, March 29, 2017, 822 SCRA 1, 29-30 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division], citing RA 6657, Secs. 4 & 6-A, as amended by
RA 9700)
In particular, the Court said that the CARP covers the following lands: (1) all alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture; (2) all lands of the
public domain exceeding the total area of five hectares and below to be retained by the
landowner; (3) all government-owned lands that are devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and (4)
all private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture, regardless of the agricultural products
raised or can be raised on these lands. (Id. at 30-31, citing RA 6657, Sec. 4, as amended by RA 9700)
7.1. The acquisition and distribution of all private agricultural lands covered
under Sec. 4 of RA 6657 is implemented under DAR AO 07-11 (Revised Rules
and Procedures Governing the Acquisition and Distribution of Private
Agricultural Lands Under RA 6657, as amended)
7.2. The identification, validation, segregation, transfer and distribution of all

government-owned lands (GOLs) – devoted to or suitable for agriculture and
which are no longer actually, directly and exclusively used or necessary for
the purpose for which they have been reserved or acquired for the purpose
of eventual distribution to qualified beneficiaries – is by virtue of EO 75,
s.2019, and its IRR under Joint DAR-DOJ AO 07-19.
8. What is a right of retention?
In Danan v. CA (2005), the Court declared that “[t]he right of retention is a constitutionally
guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by the legislature. It serves to mitigate the
effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant
and by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice
against the landowner. A retained area, as its name denotes, is land which is not supposed to
anymore leave the landowner’s dominion, thus sparing the government from the inconvenience
of taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards, which would be a pointless process.”
(Danan v. CA, G.R. No. 132759, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 113, 128 [Per J. Tinga, Second Division])
8.1. The right of retention is implemented under DAR AO 02-03 (2003 Rules and
Procedures Governing Landowner Retention Rights).
In Heirs of Leonilo P. Nuñez, Sr. v. Heirs of Gabino T. Villanoza (2017), the Court discussed
the right of retention under the CARL in relation to DAR AO 02-03. (Heirs of Leonilo P. Nuñez, Sr.
v. Heirs of Gabino T. Villanoza, G.R. No. 218666, April 26, 2017, 825 SCRA 264 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division])
Section 4.1 of [DAR AO 02-03] gives the landowner the option to exercise the right of
retention at any time before he or she receives a [NOC]. (Id. at 301, citing DAR AO 02-03, Sec. 4.1)
The right to choose the area to be retained belongs to the landowner, subject to the
condition that the area must be (a) a “private agricultural land” that is (b) compact and
contiguous, and (c) “least prejudicial to the entire landholding and the majority of the
farmers” of that land. (Id., citing DAR AO 02-03, Secs. 7.1 & 2.1)
Landowners who voluntarily sold or transferred their land must have exercised the right of
retention simultaneous with the offer for sale or transfer. If the land was compulsorily
acquired by the government, the right of retention must have been exercised “within sixty
(60) days from receipt of notice of coverage.” (Id. at 302, citing DAR AO 02-03, Secs. 4.3 & 4.2)
Section 7 of [DAR AO 02-03] provides that the landowner seeking to exercise his or her
retention right must submit an affidavit stating “the aggregate area of his [or her]
landholding in the entire Philippines” and “the names of all farmers . . . actual tillers or
occupants, and/or other persons directly working on the land,” thus: … (Id., citing DAR AO 02-
03, Sec. 7)
If the area selected by the landowner for retention is tenanted, “the tenant shall have the
option to choose whether to remain . . . as lessee or be a beneficiary in the same or another
agricultural land with similar or comparable features.” Section 9 of [DAR AO 02-03] states
that the tenant must exercise this option within one (1) year from the time the landowner
manifests his or her choice of the area for retention, as follows: … (Id. at 303, citing DAR AO 02-03,
Sec. 9)
If the landowner fails to manifest an intention to exercise the right to retain within 60
calendar days after receiving the [NOC], he or she is considered to have waived the right
of retention as explained in Section 2.2 of DAR AO 02-03: … (Id. at 304, citing DAR AO 02-03, Sec.
2.2)
Section 6 of [the CARL] gives the landowner the option to choose the area to be retained
only if it is compact or contiguous. The Department of Agrarian Reform, the Office of the
President, and the Court of Appeals have consistently found that the land subject of the
dispute is neither compact nor contiguous. (Id. at 310) Section 6 also provides that if the area
selected for retention is tenanted, it is for the tenant to choose whether to remain in the
area or be a beneficiary in the same or a comparable agricultural land… (Id.) The
landowner’s retention right is subject to another condition. Under Section 3.3 of [DAR AO
02-03], the heirs of a deceased landowner may exercise the retention right only if the
landowner signified his or her intention to exercise the right of retention before August
23, 1990. Section 3.3 states: … (Id. at 310-311) Section 6.1 provides that the landowner’s
“[f]ailure to manifest an intention to exercise his right to retain within sixty (60) calendar
days from receipt of [NOC]” is a ground for losing his or her right of retention. (Id. at 311,
citing DAR AO 02-03, Sec. 6.1)
In Vda. De Dayao v. Heirs of Robles, this Court has held that the Department of Agrarian
Reform “has no authority to decree a retention when no application was in the first place
ever filed.” (Id. at 312, citing Vda. De Dayao v. Heirs of Robles, G.R. No. 174830, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 620 [Per J.
Quisumbing, Second Division])
While all agrarian reform programs have always accommodated some forms of retention
for the landowner, all rights of retention have always been subject to conditions.
Unfortunately in this case, the landowner has miserably failed to invoke his right at the
right time and in the right moment. The farmer-beneficiary should not, in equity, be made
to suffer the landowner’s negligence. (Id.)
8.2. But the landowner’s retention rights under RA 6657 are restricted by the
conditions set forth in LOI 474 issued on October 21, 1976.
In Heirs of Romulo D. Sandueta v. Robles (2013), the Court, citing Heirs of Aurelio Reyes v.
Garilao (2009), held that a landowner’s retention rights under RA 6657 are restricted by
the conditions set forth in LOI 474 issued on October 21, 1976… “[I]t may be readily
observed that LOI 474 amended PD 27 by removing any right of retention from persons
who own: (a) other agricultural lands of more than seven (7) has. in aggregate areas; or (b)
lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from which they
derive adequate income to support themselves and their families.” The Court also stated,
citing Santiago v. Ortiz-Luis (2010), that “while landowners who have not yet exercised
their retention rights under PD 27 are entitled to new retention rights provided for by RA
6657, the limitations under LOI 474 would equally apply to a landowner who filed an
application under RA 6657.” (Heirs of Romulo D. Sandueta v. Robles, G.R. No. 203204, November 20, 2013, 710
SCRA 491, 500-503 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division], citing Heirs of Aurelio Reyes v. Garilao, G.R. No. 136466,
November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 294, 304 [Per J. Peralta, Third Division]; and Santiago v. Ortiz-Luis, G.R. Nos. 186184 & 186988,
September 20, 2010, 630 SCRA 670, 681 [Per J. Carpio-Morales, Third Division])
8.3. Retention limits under the CARL constitutes as statutory lien, as held in DAR
v. Robles (2015). (DAR v. Robles, G.R. No. 190482, December 9, 2015, 777 SCRA 141 [Per J. Peralta, Third
Division])
8.4. Sale of landholdings (first 5 hectares) without DAR clearance is an exercise of

retention right under DAR AO 05-06 (Guidelines on the Acquisition and
Distribution of Agricultural Lands Subject of Conveyance Under Sections 6,
70 and 73[a] of RA 6657)
In DAR v. Carriedo (2018), the Court found merit in DAR’s contention that the objective of
DAR AO 05-06 is equitable—that in order to ensure the effective implementation of the
CARL, previous sales of landholding (without DAR clearance) should be treated as the
exercise of retention rights of the landowner, as embodied in Item No. 4 of the said
administrative order. According to the Court, “[t]he equity in this policy of [DAR] AO 05-
06 is apparent and easily discernible. By selling his landholdings, it is reasonably presumed
that the landowner already received an amount (as purchase price) commensurate to the
just compensation conformable with the constitutional and statutory requirement. At this
point, equity dictates that he cannot claim anymore, either in the guise of his retention
area or otherwise, that which he already received in the previous sale of his land.” The
Court also applied the principle in Delfino, Sr. v. Anasao (2014). (DAR v. Carriedo, G.R. No. 176549,
October 10, 2018 [Per J. Jardeleza, Third Division]. This reversed the Court’s Decision dated January 20, 2016, citing Delfino,
Sr. v. Anasao, G.R. No. 197486, September 10, 2014, 734 SCRA 672 [Per J. Villarama, Jr., Third Division])
8.5. What is the stewardship doctrine?
The Court in DAR v. Carriedo (2018) likewise held that “[DAR] AO 05-06 is in consonance
with the Stewardship Doctrine, which has been held to be the property concept in Section
6, Article II of the 1973 Constitution. Under this concept, private property is supposed to
be held by the individual only as a trustee for the people in general, who are its real owners.
As a mere steward, the individual must exercise his rights to the property not for his own
exclusive and selfish benefit but for the good of the entire community or nation. Property
use must not only be for the benefit of the owner but of society as well. The State, in the
promotion of social justice, may regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and
disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits. It
has been held that Presidential Decree No. 27, one of the precursors of the CARL,
embodies this policy and concept.” The Court added that “[t]his interpretation is consistent
with the objective of the agrarian reform program, which is, of course, land distribution to
the landless farmers and farmworkers. The objective is carried out by Item No. 4 of AO 05-
06 as it provides for the consequences in situations where a landowner had sold portions
of his/her land with an area more than the statutory limitation of five hectares. In this
scenario, Item No. 4 of AO 05-06 treats the sale of the first five hectares as the exercise of
the landowner's retention rights. The reason is that, effectively, the landowner has already
chosen, and in fact has already disposed of, and has been duly compensated for, the area
he is entitled to retain under the law.” (DAR v. Carriedo, G.R. No. 176549, October 10, 2018 [Per J. Jardeleza,
Third Division]. This reversed the Court’s Decision dated January 20, 2016.)
9. What are the lands exempted and excluded from the CARL?
In Heirs of Augusto Salas, Jr. v. Cabungcal (2017), it was held that Section 10 of the CARL provides
the types of lands that are excluded therefrom:
1. Lands that are actually, directly and exclusively used for parks, wildlife, forest reserves,
reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, and watersheds and mangoes;
2. Private lands that are actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds;
3. Lands that are actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for:
a. National defense;
b. School sites and campuses including experimental farm stations operated by
public or private schools for educational purposes;
c. Seeds and seedling research and pilot production center;
d. Church sites and convents appurtenant thereto;
e. Mosque sites and Islamic centers appurtenant thereto;
f. Communal burial grounds and cemeteries;
g. Penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates; and
h. Government and private research and quarantine centers.
4. All lands where the topography is hilly, i.e., with at least eighteen percent (18%) slope and
over, and are not developed for agriculture. (Heirs of Augusto Salas, Jr. v. Cabungcal, G.R. No. 191545, March
29, 2017, 822 SCRA 1, 31-33 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division], citing RA 6657, Sec. 10)
In Milestone Farms, Inc. v. OP (2011), the Court ruled that “issues of Exclusion and/or Exemption
are characterized as Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) cases which are well within the DAR
Secretary’s competence and jurisdiction… Precisely, it is the DAR Secretary who is vested with
such jurisdiction and authority to exempt and/or exclude a property from CARP coverage based
on the factual circumstances of each case and in accordance with law and applicable
jurisprudence.” (Milestone Farms, Inc. v. OP, G.R. No. 182332, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 217, 239-240 [Per J. Nachura, Second
Division])
9.1. DAR AO 07-11 enumerates the lands excluded (Sec. 7) and exempted (Sec. 8)
from the coverage.
Excluded from coverage are:

a. All undeveloped lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over;
b. All lands duly classified by the proper Local Government Unite (LGU) as
commercial, industrial, or residential as of 15 June 1988;
c. All ancestral lands/domains that may be identified in accordance with rules that
may be jointly issued by the DAR, DENR, LRA, and the National Commission on
Indigenous People;
d. Retention areas granted to LOs who exercised their retention rights; and
e. All agricultural landholdings of a LO with an aggregate size of five (5) hectares or
less. (DAR AO 07-11, Sec. 7)
Exempted from coverage are lands actually, directly, and exclusively used, and found to be
necessary for, the following purposes:
a. Parks;
b. Wildlife;
c. Forest reserves;
d. Reforestation;
e. Fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds;
f. Watersheds;
g. Mangroves;
h. National defense;
i. School sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by
public or private schools for educational purposes;
j. Seeds and seedlings research and pilot production centers;
k. Church sites and Islamic centers appurtenant thereto;
l. Communal burial grounds and cemeteries;
m. Penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates;
n. Government and private research and quarantine centers;
o. Fish ponds and prawn farms; and
p. Livestock, poultry, and swine raising since 15 June 1988. (DAR AO 07-11, Sec. 8)
10. Who approves or disapproves applications for exemption/exclusion from CARP
coverage?
It is the Land Use Cases Committee (LUCC), which was created under DAR AO 06-19
(Creation of a Collegial Body on Land Use Conversion and Exemption/Exclusion from CARP
Coverage).
10.1. What is the purpose of the LUCC?
In the interest of the service and in line with the directive of the President to streamline
the Conversion, Exemption and Exclusion processes for speedy resolution of the same,
there is a need to create or constitute a collegial body, which shall approve or disapprove
applications for conversion, exemption and exclusion and all other incidents or matters
related thereto. (DAR AO 06-19, Item I)
10.2. What is the composition of the LUCC?
A Land Use Cases Committee (LUCC) is hereby created which shall be composed of a
Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson and three (3) members for Land Use Conversion
Committee, another three (3) members for Exemption Committee and another three (3)
for Exclusion Committee to be designated by the Secretary.
The LUCC shall be supported by a Land Use Cases Secretariat (LUCS), Technical Working
Group (TWG), On-Site Inspection and Investigation (OSII) Teams and a Public Consultation
Committee (PCC). (DAR AO 06-19, Item III)
10.3. What are the functions of the LUCC?
The LUCC Chairperson, or in his absence, the Vice-Chairperson shall preside over
Committee deliberation constituting a quorum. A vote of three (3) who are present during
the deliberation shall be sufficient for the approval or disapproval of the application for
conversion, exemption or exclusion.
After deliberation, the concerned Committee shall issue decisions, resolutions and/or
orders pertaining to the following:
1. Application for Conversion pursuant to A.O. No. 01, Series of 2002, as amended;
2. Application for Extension of the development period;
3. Petition for Revocation of the conversion order;
4. Application for Exemption pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 44 covered by A.O. No. 4,
Series of 2003;
5. Application for Exclusion based on Luz Farms Case pursuant to A.O. No. 01, Series of
2004;
6. Petition for Revocation of the exemption/exclusion orders;
7. Application/Lifting of Cease and Desist Order (CDO); and
8. Appeal from the decision of the Regional Directors (RDs) relative to the aforesaid
application/petition involving lands with an area of 5 hectares and below.
The Head of LUCS shall be responsible for the promulgation and issuance of Notices of
Decisions, Resolutions, Orders and CDOs, as well as Certificates of Finality (COF) to all
concerned applicants, oppositors, parties and counsels, as the case may be. Likewise, the
LUCS shall be responsible for the assignment of cases to the concerned Committee, which
shall be categorized by case type (Conversion, Exemption and Exclusion). Upon approval
of the LUCC Chairperson in order manage the caseload or for meritorious circumstances,
the LUCS may assign cases to the Committee that may be different from its designation.
The LUCC shall be assisted by the LUCS and TWG in the deliberation, as well as in the
assignment of cases. The Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance (BALA) Land Use Cases
Division (LUCD) shall act as the TWG of LUCS.
The TWG shall be responsible, among others, for the presentation of case briefs and OSII
reports during the Committee deliberation. It shall perform a complete staff work in the
pre-evaluation of the application. It shall conduct an OSII and prepare OSII reports,
through the OSII Teams subject to Memorandum Circular No. 07, Series of 2011 on
confidentiality.
Finally, cases cognizable by A.O. No. 05, Series of 2018, the PCC shall be responsible for
the conduct of public consultation. (DAR AO 06-19, Item IV)
10.4. What is the remedy from the decision, resolution and orders of the LUCC?
1. The Decisions, Resolutions and Orders of the concerned Committee is not appealable
to the Secretary.
2. Any aggrieved party may file a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) within a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision, resolution and order
of the concerned Committee.
3. The filing of the MR shall suspend the running of the fifteen (15) day period to appeal.
If denied, the aggrieved party has a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days within
which to file an Appeal to the Office of the President. (DAR AO 06-19, Item V)
10.5. Is DAR AO 06-19 applicable to all pending and subsequent applications?
This A.O. shall apply to all pending, as well as subsequent applications for conversion,
exemption, exclusion and to all other incidents or matters pertaining thereto as
enumerated under paragraph IV hereof. (DAR AO 06-19, Item VI)
Chapter III (Improvement of Tenurial and Labor Relations)
11. Distinguish an agricultural lease and from a civil lease.
In Jusayan v. Sombilla (2015), citing Gabriel v. Pangilinan (1974), the Court held that the lease of
an agricultural land can be either a civil law or an agricultural lease, thus:
Yet, the lease of an agricultural land can be either a civil law or an agricultural lease.
In the civil law lease, one of the parties binds himself to give to another the
enjoyment or use of a thing for a price certain, and for a period that may be definite
or indefinite. In the agricultural lease, also termed as a leasehold tenancy, the
physical possession of the land devoted to agriculture is given by its owner or legal
possessor (landholder) to another (tenant) for the purpose of production through
labor of the latter and of the members of his immediate farm household, in
consideration of which the latter agrees to share the harvest with the landholder,
or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in
both. Specifically, in Gabriel v. Pangilinan, this Court differentiated between a
leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease in the following manner, namely: (1) the
subject matter of a leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land, but that of a
civil law lease may be rural or urban property; (2) as to attention and cultivation,
the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to and cultivate the
agricultural land; the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or work the thing
leased; (3) as to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to
agriculture; in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits; and
(4) as to the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code, but
the leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws.
The sharing of the harvest in proportion to the respective contributions of the

landholder and tenant, otherwise called share tenancy, was abolished on August 8,
1963 under Republic Act No. 3844. To date, the only permissible system of
agricultural tenancy is leasehold tenancy, a relationship wherein a fixed
consideration is paid instead of proportionately sharing the harvest as in share
tenancy. (Jusayan v. Sombilla, G.R. No. 163928, January 21, 2015, 746 SCRA 437, 445-446 [Per J. Bersamin, First
Division], citing Gabriel v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. L-27797, August 26, 1974, 58 SCRA 590, 596 [Per J. Zaldivar, Second
Division])
11.1. Agricultural leasehold contract, agricultural leasehold relation, agricultural

lessor, agricultural lessee, lease rental, provisional lease rental, agricultural
year, and tenant have been defined under DAR AO 02-06 (Revised Rules and
Procedures Governing Leasehold Implementation in Tenanted Agricultural
Lands) and DAR AO 05-16 (Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Lease
Rental Payments Which the Landowner-Lessor Refuses to Accept or Fails to
Receive).
Agricultural Leasehold Contract is a tenurial arrangement, whether written or verbal,

express or implied, between the agricultural-lessor and agricultural-lessee the former
consents to the latter’s personal cultivation of piece of agricultural land in consideration
of a fixed rental either in money or produce or both. (DAR AO 05-16, Sec. 2.1)
Agricultural leasehold relation is limited to the person who furnishes the landholding,
wither as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor, and the person who
personally cultivates the same. (DAR AO 02-06, Item III[3], citing RA 3844, Sec. 6)
Agricultural-Lessor – refers to a person, natural or juridical, who, either as owner, civil law
lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, lets or grants to another the cultivation and the
use of his land for a price certain. (DAR AO 05-16, Sec. 2.5, citing RA 3844, Sec. 166[3])
Agricultural-Lessee – refers to a person who, by himself and with the aid available from
within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land, belonging to or possessed by
another, with the latter’s consent for purposes of production, for a price certain in money
or in produce or both. It is distinguished from civil lessee as understood in the Civil Code
of the Philippines. (Id., Sec. 2.8, citing RA 3844, Sec. 166[2])
Lease Rental – refers to the value of rent to be paid by the agricultural-lessee to the
agricultural-lessor which shall not be more than the equivalent of twenty-five percent
(25%) of the average normal harvest during the three (3) agricultural years immediately
preceding the date the leasehold was established after deducting the amount used for
seeds and the cost of harvesting, threshing, loading, hauling and processing, whichever is
applicable, pursuant to R.A. No. 3844. (Id., Sec. 2.6)
Provisional Lease Rental (PLR) – refers to a document reflecting the lease rental payment
which is prepared and issued by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Program Officer (MARPO)
and subject to the affirmation of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Program Officer (PARPO).
This document is prepared in case of disagreement between the agricultural-lessor and
agricultural-lessee on the administrative findings on the existence of tenancy and fixing of
lease rental payment based on records filed at DAR. (Id., Sec. 2.7)
Agricultural Year – refers to the period of time required for raising a particular agricultural
product, including the preparation of the land, sowing, planting and harvesting of crops
and, whenever applicable, threshing of said crops: Provided, however, That in case of crops
yielding more than one harvest from planting, “agricultural year” shall be the period from
the preparation of the land to the first harvest and thereafter, from harvest to harvest. In
both cases, the period may be shorter or longer than the calendar year. (Id., Sec. 2.2, citing RA
3844, Sec. 166[4])
Tenant – A person himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm
household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by another, with the latter’s
consent for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the
share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in
produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system. (DAR AO 02-06, Item III[19],
citing RA 1199, Sec. 5[a])
11.2. Agricultural leasehold is based on tenancy relationship.
Under DAR AO 02-06, agricultural leasehold shall be based on a tenancy relationship. (DAR
AO 02-06, Item IV[1])
In Caballes v. DAR (1988), the Court enumerated the essential requisites of a tenancy
relationship, thus: (1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) The subject is
agricultural land; (3) There is consent; (4) The purpose is agricultural production; (5) There
is personal cultivation; and (6) There is sharing of harvests. All these requisites must concur
in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not
make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de
jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant,
he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of
the Government under existing tenancy laws. (Caballes v. DAR, G.R. No. L-78214, December 5, 1988, 168
SCRA 247, 254 [Per J. Sarmiento, Second Division]; and DAR AO 02-06, Item IV[1])
11.3. Agricultural leasehold relation is not extinguished by the expiration of

period, etc.
Under Section 10 of RA 3844 and Item IV(2) of DAR AO 02-06, the agricultural leasehold
relation… shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold
contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding.
In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of the
landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and
substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor. (RA 3844, Sec. 10; and DAR AO 02-06, Item
IV[2])
11.4. What is cultivation?
Cultivation is not limited to the plowing and harrowing of the land, but also the advancing
of the ground to forward the products of the earth by general industry, taking care of the
land and fruits grown thereon, fencing of certain areas, and the cleaning thereof by
gathering of coconuts, their pilings, husking, and harvesting as well as the proceeding
thereof go into copra, although at times with the aid of hired laborers. (DAR AO 02-06, Item IV[3])
11.5. What is the consideration for the lease?
The consideration for the lease shall not be more than the equivalent of 25% of the average
normal harvest (ANH) during the three (3) agricultural years immediately preceding the
date the lease was established. If the land has been cultivated for less than 3 years, the
initial consideration shall be based on the average normal harvest of the preceding year/s
when the land was actually cultivated. (DAR AO 02-06, Item IV[4])
If the land has been cultivated for a period of less than three (3) years, the initial
consideration shall be based on the average normal harvest during the preceding years
when the land was actually cultivated, or on the harvest of the first year in the case of
newly cultivated lands, if the harvest is normal. (Id., citing RA 3844, Sec. 34, 1st proviso)
For auxiliary crops, the lease shall not be more than the equivalent of 20% following the
principles provided for principal crops on the use of average normal harvest provided that
all expenses shall be born by the tenant pursuant to Sec. 30 of R.A. No. 1199, as amended.
(Id. See Item III[8] thereof, which defines auxiliary crop to refer to any product raised other than the crop to which the
cultivation of the land is principally devoted in each agricultural year, and excluding the produce of the homelot.)
After the laps of the first three (3) normal harvest, the final consideration shall be based
on the average normal harvest during these three (3) preceding agricultural years. (Id., citing
RA 3844, Sec. 34, 2nd proviso)
11.6. What are the rights of the agricultural lessee?
It shall be the right of agricultural lessee to:

1. Have possession and peaceful enjoyment of the land;
2. Manage and work on the land in a manner and method of cultivation and harvest
which conform to proven farm practices;
3. Mechanize all or any phase of his farm work;
4. Deal with millers and processors and attend to the issuance of quedans and
warehouse receipts for the produce due him;
5. To be afforded and/or continue the exclusive possession and enjoyment of a
homelot;
6. Be indemnified for the cost and expenses incurred in the cultivation, planting or
harvesting and other expenses incidental to the improvement of his crop in case
he surrenders or abandons his landholding for just cause or rejected therefrom.
In addition, he has the right to be indemnified for one-half of the necessary and
useful improvements made by him on the landholding. Provided, That these
improvements are tangible and have not yet lost their utility at the time of
surrender and/or abandonment of the landholding, at which time their value
shall be determined for the purpose of the indemnity for improvements;
7. Terminate the leasehold during the agricultural year for any of the following
causes:
7.1. Cruel, inhuman or offensive, treatment of the agricultural lessee or any
member of his immediate farm household by the agricultural lessor or
his representative with the knowledge and consent of the lessor;
7.2. Non-compliance on the part of the agricultural lessor with any of the
obligations imposed upon him by the provisions of R.A. No. 3844 or by
his contract with the agricultural lessee;
7.3. Compulsion of the agricultural lessee or any member of his immediate
farm household by the agricultural lessor to do any work or render any
service not in any way connected with farm work or even without
compulsion if no compensation is paid;
7.4. Commission of a crime by the agricultural lessor or his representative
against the agricultural lessee or any member of his immediate farm
household; or
7.5. Voluntary surrender due to circumstances more advantageous to him
and his family.
8. Have the preferential right to buy the agricultural landholding under reasonable
terms and conditions in case the agricultural lessor decides to sell the same (Sec.
11 [of] R.A. No. 3844)
9. Redeem the landholding at a reasonable price and consideration in case the
agricultural lessor sold the same to a third person without the agricultural lessee’s
knowledge pursuant to Section 12 of R.A. No. 3844. (DAR AO 02-06, Item VI[A])
11.7. What are the obligations of the agricultural lessee?
It shall be the obligation of the agricultural lessee to:

1. Cultivate and take care of the farm, growing crops, and other improvements on
the landholding as a good father of the family and perform all the work therein
in accordance with proven farm practices;
2. Inform the agricultural lessor within a reasonable time of any trespass committed
by third persons upon the farm, without prejudice to his direct action against the
trespasser;
3. Take reasonable care of the work animals and farm implements delivered to him
by the agricultural lessor and see that they are not used for purposes other than
those intended or used by another without the knowledge and consent of the
agricultural lessor: Provided, however, That if said work animals get lost or die,
or said farm implements get lost or are destroyed, through the negligence of the
agricultural lessee, he shall be held responsible and made answerable therefore
to the extent of the value of the work animal and/or farm implements at the time
of the loss, death or destruction;
4. Keep his farm and growing crops attended to during the work season in case of
unjustified abandonment or neglect of his farm, any or all of his expected
produce may, upon order of the Court, be forfeited in favor of the agricultural
lessor to the extent of the damage caused thereby;
5. Pay the lease rental to the agricultural lessor when it falls due. Provided, that the
non-payment of the rental due to crop failure to the extent of 75% as a result of
a fortuitous event shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the
obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is not thereby extinguished.
(DAR AO 02-06, Item VI[B])
11.8. What are the prohibitions against the agricultural lessee?
It shall be unlawful for the agricultural lessee to:

1. Contract to work additional landholdings belonging to a different agricultural
lessor or to acquire and personally cultivate an economic family-size farm,
without the knowledge and consent of the agricultural lessor with whom he had
entered first into leasehold, if the first landholding is of sufficient size to make
him and the members of his immediate household fully occupied in its
cultivation; or
2. Employ a sub-lessee on his landholding: Provided, however, That in case of illness
or temporary incapacity, he may employ laborers whose services on his
landholding shall be on his account. (DAR AO 02-06, Item VI[C])
11.9. What are the rights of the agricultural lessor?
It shall be the right of the agricultural lessor to:

1. Inspect and observe the extent of compliance with the terms and conditions of
their contract and the provisions of this Chapter;
2. Propose a change in the use of the landholding to other agricultural purposes,
or in the kind of crops to be planted: Provided, That in case of disagreement as
to the proposed change, the same shall be settled by the Court according to the
best interest of the parties concerned. Provided, further, That in no shall an
agricultural lessee be ejected as a consequence of the conversion of the land to
some other agricultural purpose or because of a change in the crop to be
planted;
3. Require the agricultural lessee, taking into consideration his financial capacity
and the credit facilities available to him, to adopt in his farm proven farm
practices necessary to the conservation of the land, improvement of its fertility
and increase of its productivity. Provided, That in case of disagreement as to what
proven farm practices the lessee shall adopt, the same shall be settled by the
Adjudicator or PARO according to the best interest of the parties concerned; and
4. Mortgage expected rentals. (DAR AO 02-06, Item VI[D])
11.10. What are the obligations of the agricultural lessor?
It shall be the obligation of the agricultural lessor to:

1. Keep the agricultural lessee in peaceful possession and cultivation of his
landholding; and
2. Keep intact such permanent useful improvements existing on the landholding at
the start of the leasehold relation as irrigation and drainage system and
marketing allotments, which in the case of sugar quotas shall refer both to
domestic and export quotas, provisions of existing laws to the contrary
notwithstanding. (DAR AO 02-06, Item VI[E])
11.11. What are the prohibitions against the agricultural lessor?
It shall be unlawful for the agricultural lessor to:

1. Dispossess the agricultural lessee of his landholding except upon authorization
by DARAB. Should the agricultural lessee be dispossessed of his landholding
without authorization from the DARAB, the agricultural lessor shall be liable for
damages suffered by the agricultural lessee in addition to the fine or
imprisonment prescribed in R.A. 3844 for unauthorized dispossession;
2. Require the agricultural lessee to assume, directly or indirectly, the payment of
the taxes or part thereof levied by the government on the landholding;
3. Require the agricultural lessee to assume, directly or indirectly, any part of the
rent, “canon” or other consideration which the agricultural lessor is under
obligation to pay to third persons for the use of the land;
4. Deal with millers or processors without written authorization of the lessee in case
where the crop has to be sold in processed form before payment of the rental;
5. Discourage, directly or indirectly, the formation, maintenance or growth of
unions or organizations or agricultural lessees in his landholding, or to initiate,
dominate, assist or interfere in the formation of administration of any such union
or organization. (DAR AO 02-06, Item VI[F])
11.12. When may the agricultural lessee be dispossessed of the landholding in

relation to non-payment of rental?
Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender, of the land, an

agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding
except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final
and executory if after due hearing it is shown that: xxx (6) The agricultural lessee does not
pay the lease rental when it falls due: Provided, That if the non-payment of the rental shall
be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous
event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the obligation
to pay the rental due that particular crop is not thereby extinguished; xxx (RA 3844, Sec. 36[6];
DAR AO 02-06, Item IV[10])
11.13. Who has the obligation to pay the lease rental?
Under agricultural leasehold operations, it is the obligation of the agricultural-lessee to

pay the lease rental to the agricultural-lessor when it falls due as embodied in the
agricultural leasehold contract/PLR pursuant to RA No. 3844 and DAR existing policies.
(DAR AO 05-16, Sec. 3.1)
11.14. What is the remedy if the agricultural-lessor refuses to accept or fails to

receive the lease rental payments for the tenant-lessee?
If the agricultural-lessor refuses to accept or fails to receive the lease rental payments for
the tenant-lessee, the DAR, through its effort, shall provide an effective mechanisms to
facilitate the collection and deposit of rental payments, and withdrawals therefrom in a
Checkless IBCA in the name of the agricultural lessor by: (Name of agricultural-lessee) as
specified in the Order to open the account issued by the PARPO in cases of non-litigated
landholdings. For litigated landholdings, the account shall be opened under the name of
the litigant of the case or case number as contained in the order of the proper
Adjudicator/Board or regular court. (DAR AO 05-16, Sec. 3.2)
11.15. What is a non-litigated case, a litigated case, an interest-bearing current

account (IBCA), and a checkless IBCA?
Non-litigated Case – refers to one where the subject landholding has no pending case
filed or referred to the Adjudicator/Board. (Id., Sec. 2.13) Non-litigated landholdings under
leasehold operations involve situations wherein the agricultural-lessor refuses to accept or
fails to receive the lease rental payments of the agricultural-lessees on lands covered by
agricultural leasehold contract or Provisional Lease Rental (PLR), and there is no pending
case or no case is filed with the Proper Adjudicator/Board. (Id., Sec. 1.1)
Litigated Case – refers to one where the subject landholding has a pending case filed by
either the agricultural lessee or the agricultural-lessor or due to the pendency of a case
filed before the Adjudicator/Board or regular court. (Id., Sec. 2.12) Litigated landholdings
under leasehold operations involve situations wherein the agricultural-lessor refuses to
accept or fails to receive the lease rental payments of the agricultural-lessees on lands
covered by agricultural leasehold contract or PLR and there is a pending case or resolution
of the case before the PARAD/RARAD/DARAB, such as, among others, fixing of lease
rental, ejectment of agricultural-lessee, and supervision of harvest. (Id., Sec. 1.2; See 2009 DARAB
Rules of Procedure, Rule II, Sec. 1[c][d][g])
Interest-Bearing Current Account (IBCA) – also known as “Checking or Demand Deposit”

account, wherein deposits are made over-the-counter and withdrawals are made through
issuance of a check. (Id., Sec. 2.10)
Checkless IBCA – IBCA opened without issuance of a checkbook to the account holder.
Withdrawals are made over-the-counter. (Id., Sec. 2.11)
11.16. What are the features of the IBCA?
Exclusively for DAR Lease Rental, as approved by the LBP, the features of the IBCA are: (1)
no required initial deposit and maintaining balance; (2) to earn interest of 0.25% per
annum (subject to 20% withholding tax) if the average daily balance of the account is
PhP20,000.00 and above; (3) not subject to inter-branch charges; (4) non-drawing account.
Withdrawal shall be subject to presentation of Order from DAR-PARPO/Adjudicator/Board
or regular court, whichever is applicable; and (5) not subject to dormancy fee or automatic
closure. These features may change subject to LBP guidelines. (DAR AO 05-16, Sec. 3.3)
11.17. How are lease rental payments in kind made?
Lease rental payments in kind may be deposited with a bonded warehouse to avoid
spoilage or may be sold and converted to cash by the agricultural-lessee in order to
facilitate the deposit of the lease rental payments with the nearest LBP branch in the
locality or LBP branch convenient to the agrucultural0lessee. In case the lessee pays the
fees and charges of the warehouse, or in case of the said fees and charges are deducted
from the deposited produce, then these shall form part of the rental payments by the
lessee. The agricultural-lessee shall notify the DAR Municipal Office (DARMO) or DAR
Provincial Office (DARPO) concerned, agricultural-lessor, and the Barangay Agrarian
Reform Committee (BARC)/Barangay Council, as may be applicable. (DAR AO 05-16, Sec. 3.6)
Chapter IV (Registration)
12. Who are real parties-in-interest?
In Samahan ng Magsasaka at Mangingisda ng Sitio Naswe, Inc. v. Tan (2016), citing Sumalo
Homeowners Association of Hermosa, Bataan v. Litton (2006), it was held:
In Sumalo Homeowners Association of Hermosa, Bataan v. Litton, et al. , the Court

pointed out that the “CARL is specific in its requirements for registering qualified
beneficiaries.” Those who have not been identified and registered as qualified
beneficiaries are not real parties-in-interest. Thus, Section 15 of the CARL explicitly
provides:… In other words, a claimant may fall under one of the categories of
qualified beneficiaries as enumerated under Section 22 of RA No. 6657, but he or
she does not automatically become a grantee of the covered land. RA No. 6657
specifically requires that not only must he or she be a qualified beneficiary, he or
she must, above everything else, be identified and registered as such in accordance
with the procedures and guidelines laid out in the law and applicable rules. (Samahan
ng Magsasaka at Mangingisda ng Sitio Naswe, Inc. v. Tan, G.R. No. 196028, April 18, 2016, 789 SCRA 573, 586 [Per
J. Brion, Second Division], citing Sumalo Homeowners Association of Hermosa, Bataan v. Litton, G.R. No. 146061,
August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 385 [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division])
Chapter V (Land Acquisition)
13. Proceedings for compulsory land acquisition and distribution are initiated by the
issuance of a Notice of Coverage (NOC).
In Robustum Agricultural Corporation v. DAR (2018), the Court explained:
Land acquisition and distribution under the agrarian reform law is either voluntary
or compulsory. The procedure for compulsory land acquisition and distribution, on
the other hand, is laid out in Section 16 of RA No. 6657, as amended. The full
provision reads:…
Per the provision, a proceeding for compulsory land acquisition and distribution
starts with the identification of the land sought to be placed under the coverage
of the agrarian reform program, as well as of the land’s owner and of the
prospective beneficiaries. It is notable, however, that neither RA No. 6657 nor any
other law, for that matter, makes any mention as to how this identification phase
is to be carried out. To fill in this gap, the DAR formulated regulations that
introduced the issuance of notices of coverage. In Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, we detailed the genesis of these regulations:…
Though more streamlined, the current iteration of these regulations - DAR AO No.
07-11 or the 2011 Revised Rules and Procedure Governing the Acquisition and
Distribution of Private Agricultural Lands Under RA No. 6657, as Amended -
maintains the gist of its predecessors:…
As can be observed from the above regulations, the identification phase is actually
preceded by a preliminary identification and determination by the DAR of the land
or lands covered by the agrarian reform program. The exact manner by which the
DAR performs this preliminary step had, in turn, varied over the years. Since 2009,
however, the DAR primarily bases its preliminary identification from the Land
Acquisition and Distribution database which includes a “ balance” list or a list of all
agricultural landholdings that are supposedly covered by the agrarian reform
program, but have not undergone land acquisition and distribution proceedings
or been made the subject of a voluntary offer.
During the preliminary identification, a formal proceeding for compulsory land

acquisition and distribution cannot be considered to have been commenced as yet.
All that has been done at this point is merely preparatory and, by itself, will not
work any real prejudice to any third party. The real initiation of the identification
phase and, hence, of a proceeding for compulsory land acquisition and distribution
comes after.
After its preliminary identification of a land as subject to the agrarian reform

program, the DAR issues a notice of coverage for that land. (Id.)
A notice of coverage is a document that aims to inform the landowner that his land
has been determined by the DAR, on the basis of the latter’s preliminary
identification, to be under the coverage of the agrarian reform program. Under
DAR AO No. 07-11, a notice of coverage also informs the landowner of:
1. his remedies against the notice - such as filing a protest on coverage or

a petition for exemption or exclusion -and the period within which he
could avail of them;
2. his rights under the agrarian reform law - such as the right to retain and
to nominate preferred beneficiaries - including how and until when can
they be enforced; and
3. his concomitant obligations - such as the submission to the DAR of the

list of agricultural lessees, regular or seasonal farmers and/or tenants of
the land, if any, as well of other documentary requirements - and the
period within which they should be complied.
Under DAR AO No. 01-03 or the 2003 Rules Governing the Issuance of Notice of
Coverage and Acquisition of Agricultural Lands Under RA 6657 , the issuance of a
notice of coverage was recognized as the starting point of a proceeding for
compulsory land acquisition and distribution under the agrarian reform
program:…
The significance thus given to a notice of coverage in compulsory land acquisition

and distribution is easy to understand. In a proceeding for compulsory land
acquisition and distribution, as opposed to a voluntary one, the initiative to place
a landholding within the coverage of agrarian reform comes from the DAR. And a
notice of coverage, as is evident from the regulations enacted by the DAR, is really
the first document that manifests the categorical intent of the DAR to pursue a
land as being subject to the agrarian reform program. The issuance of such notice
cements and formalizes this intent.
It bears stressing that the issuance of a notice of coverage only initiates a

proceeding for compulsory land acquisition and distribution. The date of issuance
of such notice is, thus, useful only in determining the date of commencement of
such proceeding - which is particularly relevant for purposes of applying Section
30 of RA No. 9700.
In order for the DAR to proceed further and acquire jurisdiction over the
landholding identified in a notice of coverage as well as the landowner, however,
there must first be proper service and posting of the notice of coverage in
accordance with Sections 16 to 20 of DAR AO No. 07-11. (Robustum Agricultural Corporation
v. DAR, G.R. No. 221484, November 19, 2018 [Per J. Peralta, Third Division])
13.1. Procedure is strictly construed.
As held in Cabral v. Heirs of Florencio Adolfo (2017), “[l]and acquisition by virtue of P.D.
No. 27 and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 partakes of the nature of expropriation. In fact,
jurisprudence states that it is an extraordinary method of expropriating private property.
As such, the law on the matter must be strictly construed. Faithful compliance with legal
provisions, especially those which relate to procedure for acquisition of expropriated lands
should therefore be observed. In expropriation proceedings, as in judicial proceedings,
notice is part of the constitutional right to due process of law. It informs the landowner of
the State’s intention to acquire private land upon payment of just compensation and gives
him the opportunity to present evidence that his landholding is not covered or is otherwise
excused from the agrarian law.” (Cabral v. Heirs of Florencio Adolfo, G.R. No. 191615, August 2, 2017, 834 SCRA
94, 116 [Per J. Tijam, Third Division])
13.2. What are the remedies of landowner (LO) upon receipt of a Notice of
Coverage (NOC)?
Within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from… receipt of the NOC, the LO may
do the following:
1. Protest against coverage, which must be filed before the PARO and should contain
the substantial bases thereof;
2. Nominate child/ren who may qualify as preferred beneficiary/ies;
3. File a Manifestation for Exemption or Exclusion from CARP coverage before the
PARO; and
4. File a Manifestation to Exercise the Right of Retention before the PARO.
The failure to do any of the foregoing within the abovementioned reglementary periods
shall be construed as a waiver on the part of the LO of the right to protest coverage, to
nominate child/ren as preferred beneficiary/ies, to file a petition for exemption or
exclusion from CARP coverage, and/or to exercise the right of retention, as the case may
be. All protests, nominations, and manifestations/petitions made after this period shall no
longer be accepted. (DAR AO 07-11, Sec. 27)
Chapter VI (Compensation)
14. What is the concept of eminent domain?
In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (1989),
the Court explained that “[e]minent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to
forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the
owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms
also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by
the parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other
conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert
the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must
then yield to the irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as
in the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.” The Court
added: “But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute
(as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that
“private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation” and in the abundant
jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements
for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.” (Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343, 376 [Per J. Cruz, En
Banc])
15. What is just compensation?
According to the Court in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform (1989), just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the
measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word “just” is used to intensify the
meaning of the word “compensation” to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for
the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample. (Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform , G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343, 378-379 [1989] [Per J. Cruz, En Banc])
15.1. In relation to the determination of just compensation, the fair market value
of an expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the
time of taking. Also, the factors enumerated in Section 17 of the CARL, as
amended, as translated in the DAR formulas, must be considered.
In LBP v. Rural Bank of Hermosa [Bataan], Inc. (2017), citing Alfonso v. LBP (2016), the Court
ruled:
“For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of

an expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the
time of taking,” or the time when the landowner was deprived of the use
and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), or Certificates of Land Ownership
Award (CLOAs) are issued in favor of the farmer-beneficiaries. In addition,
the factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, i.e.,
(a) the acquisition cost of the land, (b) the current value of like properties,
(c) the nature and actual use of the property, and the income therefrom, (d)
the owner’s sworn valuation, (e) the tax declarations, (f) the assessment
made by government assessors, (g) the social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government
to the property, and (h) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any
government financing institution on the said land, if any, must be equally
considered.
It is well to emphasize that the determination of just compensation is a

judicial function. Thus, the “justness” of the enumeration of valuation
factors in Section 17, the “justness” of using a basic DAR formula, and the
“justness” of the components (and their weights) that flow into such
formula, are all matters for the courts to decide. Nonetheless, to settle the
perennial objections to the use of Section 17 and the resulting DAR
formulas in the valuation of acquired properties under the CARP, the Court
in Alfonso v. LBP (Alfonso) ruled:
For the guidance of the bench, the bar, and the public, we
reiterate the rule: Out of regard for the DAR’s expertise as
the concerned implementing agency, courts should
henceforth consider the factors stated in Section 17 of RA
6657, as amended, as translated into the applicable DAR
formulas in their determination of just compensation for the
properties covered by the said law. If, in the exercise of their
judicial discretion, courts find that a strict application of said
formulas is not warranted under the specific circumstances
of the case before them, they may deviate or depart
therefrom, provided that this departure or deviation is
supported by a reasoned explanation grounded on the
evidence on record. In other words, courts of law possess
the power to make a final determination of just
compensation. (LBP v. Rural Bank of Hermosa [Bataan], Inc., G.R. No. 181953,
July 25, 2017, 832 SCRA 78, 90-91 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc], citing Alfonso
v. LBP, G.R. Nos. 181912 & 183347, November 29, 2016, 811 SCRA 27 [Per J.
Jardeleza, En Banc])
16. LBP v. Dalauta (2017) abandons Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA (2000), LBP v.
Martinez (2008), Soriano v. Republic (2012) and Limkaichong v. LBP (2016).
“WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DECLARES that the final determination of just
compensation is a judicial function; that the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, sitting
as Special Agrarian Court, is original and exclusive, not appellate; that the action to file
judicial determination of just compensation shall be ten (10) years from the time of the
taking; and that at the time of the filing of judicial determination, there should be no
pending administrative action for the determination of just compensation…” (LBP v. Dalauta,
G.R. No. 190004, August 8, 2017, 835 SCRA 1, 40-41 [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc]. This ruling abandons Philippine Veterans
Bank v. CA, G.R. No. 132767, January 18, 2000, 322 SCRA 139 [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division]; LBP v. Martinez, G.R. No.
169008, July 31, 2008, 560 SCRA 776 [Per J. Nachura, En Banc]; Soriano v. Republic, G.R. No. 184282, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA
354 [Per J. Villarama, Jr., First Division]; and Limkaichong v. LBP, G.R. No. 158464, August 2, 2016, 799 SCRA 139 [Per J.
Bersamin, En Banc])
16.1. Final determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The

jurisdiction of the RTC, sitting as SAC, is original and exclusive, not appellate.
In LBP v. Dalauta (2017), the Court held:
… Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that “[p]rivate

property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.”
In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, the Court ruled that the
valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function
which cannot be vested in administrative agencies. “The executive
department or the legislature may make the initial determination, but when
a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private
property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no
statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination
shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the ‘just-ness’ of the decreed compensation.”
Any law or rule in derogation of this proposition is contrary to the letter
and spirit of the Constitution, and is to be struck down as void or invalid.
These were reiterated in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Montalvan , when
the Court explained:
It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special

Agrarian Court, has “original and exclusive jurisdiction over
all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners.” This “original and exclusive” jurisdiction of the
RTC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in
administrative officials original jurisdiction in compensation
cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of
administrative decisions. Thus, although the new rules speak
of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the
RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Sec.
57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine
such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such
jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original
jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be
contrary to Sec. 57 and therefore would be void. Thus, direct
resort to the SAC by private respondent is valid.
It would be well to emphasize that the taking of property

under R.A. No. 6657 is an exercise of the power of eminent
domain by the State. The valuation of property or
determination of just compensation in eminent domain
proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested
with the courts and not with administrative agencies.
Consequently, the SAC properly took cognizance of
respondent’s petition for determination of just
compensation.
Since the determination of just compensation is a judicial function, the

Court must abandon its ruling in Veterans Bank, Martinez and Soriano that
a petition for determination of just compensation before the SAC shall be
proscribed and adjudged dismissible if not filed within the 15-day period
prescribed under the DARAB Rules.
To maintain the rulings would be incompatible and inconsistent with the

legislative intent to vest the original and exclusive jurisdiction in the
determination of just compensation with the SAC. Indeed, such rulings
judicially reduced the SAC to merely an appellate court to review the
administrative decisions of the DAR. This was never the intention of the
Congress.
As earlier cited, in Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657, Congress expressly granted

the RTC, acting as SAC, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners. Only
the legislature can recall that power. The DAR has no authority to qualify or
undo that. The Court’s pronouncement in Veterans, Martinez, Soriano and
Limkaichong, reconciling the power of the DAR and the SAC essentially
barring any petition to the SAC for having been filed beyond the 15-day
period provided in Section 11, Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules of Procedure,
cannot be sustained. The DAR regulation simply has no statutory basis. (LBP
v. Dalauta, G.R. No. 190004, August 8, 2017, 835 SCRA 1, 31-33 [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc], citing Export
Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay , G.R. No. L-59603, April 29, 1987, 149 SCRA 305 [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr.,
En Banc]; and LBP v. Montalvan, G.R. No. 190336, June 27, 2012, 675 SCRA 380, 391-392 [Per J. Sereno,
Second Division])
16.2. The landowner has 10 years from receipt of NOC to file a petition before the
SAC for the determination of just compensation.
According to the Court in LBP v. Dalauta (2017):
While R.A. No. 6657 itself does not provide for a period within which a
landowner can file a petition for the determination of just compensation
before the SAC, it cannot be imprescriptible because the parties cannot be
placed in limbo indefinitely. The Civil Code settles such conundrum.
Considering that the payment of just compensation is an obligation created
by law, it should only be ten (10) years from the time the landowner
received the notice of coverage. The Constitution itself provides for the
payment of just compensation in eminent domain cases. Under Article
1144, such actions must be brought within ten (10) years from the time the
right of action accrues…
Nevertheless, any interruption or delay caused by the government like

proceedings in the DAR should toll the running of the prescriptive period.
The statute of limitations has been devised to operate against those who
slept on their rights, but not against those desirous to act but cannot do so
for causes beyond their control. (LBP v. Dalauta, G.R. No. 190004, August 8, 2017, 835 SCRA
1, 33-34 [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc])
16.3. The withdrawal of the DAR case by the landowner is necessary before filing
the petition with the SAC.
As held in LBP v. Dalauta (2017):
Nevertheless, the practice should be discouraged. Everyone can only agree

that simultaneous hearings are a waste of time, energy and resources. To
prevent such a messy situation, a landowner should withdraw his case with
the DAR before filing his petition before the SAC and manifest the fact of
withdrawal by alleging it in the petition itself. Failure to do so, should be a
ground for a motion to suspend judicial proceedings until the
administrative proceedings would be terminated. It is simply ludicrous to
allow two procedures to continue at the same time. (LBP v. Dalauta, G.R. No. 190004,
August 8, 2017, 835 SCRA 1, 36-37 [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc])
17. May the landowner insist on just compensation in cash only?
No. In Santos v. LBP (2000), it was held that “… RA 6657 provides that just compensation to
landowners shall be paid in cash and bonds…” (Santos v. LBP, G.R. No. 137431, September 7, 2000, 340 SCRA 59,
61-62 [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division])
The Court reiterated the explanation in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform (1989), thus:
It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment
of just compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just
compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not
deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not
an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area
is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local
purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
xxx xxx xxx
With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner
of the just compensation provided for in the afore-quoted Section 18 of the CARP
Law is not violative of the constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain
degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this
Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the realities and demands of
society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The Court is as acutely anxious
as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after
the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these
disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said section will result
in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer’s hopes even as they
approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of discontent and dissent in the
restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and
that is not what we shall decree today.
Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required
to be made fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to
the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the
basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the
landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money,
primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than the big
landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value.
No less importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance
of the payment are “negotiable at any time.” The other modes, which are likewise
available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because
payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax
credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.
(Id. at 70-71, citing Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform , G.R.
No. 78742, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343 [Per J. Cruz, En Banc])
Chapter VII (Land Redistribution)
18. Qualification of CARP beneficiaries; DAR to identify and select
In DAR v. Polo Coconut Plantation Co., Inc. (2008), the Court, citing Section 22 of the CARL, has
held that the “provision enumerates who are qualified beneficiaries of the CARP. Determining
whether or not one is eligible to receive land involves the administrative implementation of the
program. For this reason, only the DAR Secretary can identify and select CARP beneficiaries. Thus,
courts cannot substitute their judgment unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion…” The Court added that “Section 22 of the CARL does not limit qualified beneficiaries
to tenants of the landowners…” (DAR v. Polo Coconut Plantation Co., Inc., G.R. No. 168787, September 3, 2008, 564 SCRA
78, 90-91 [Per J. Corona, First Division])
18.1. Qualified beneficiary must be identified and registered as such.
The Court in Samahan ng Magsasaka at Mangingisda ng Sitio Naswe, Inc. v. Tan (2016)
has held that “a claimant may fall under one of the categories of qualified beneficiaries as
enumerated under Section 22 of RA No. 6657, but he or she does not automatically
become a grantee of the covered land. RA No. 6657 specifically requires that not only must
he or she be a qualified beneficiary, he or she must, above everything else, be identified
and registered as such in accordance with the procedures and guidelines laid out in the
law and applicable rules.” (Samahan ng Magsasaka at Mangingisda ng Sitio Naswe, Inc. v. Tan , G.R. No. 196028,
April 18, 2016, 789 SCRA 573, 586 [Per J. Brion, Second Division])
18.2. Section 22 and 22-A of the CARL is further explained in Polo Plantation
Agrarian Reform Multipurpose Cooperative v. Inson (2019), in relation to
DAR AOs O7-03 and 03-03. (Note that DAR AO 03-03 has already been amended by DAR AO 03-17)
Upon land acquisition, the Department of Agrarian Reform immediately proceeds to

distribute the land to qualified beneficiaries.
Sections 22 and 22-A of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law provides the order of
priority in the distribution of lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program to landless farmers/farmworkers. The basic qualification for a beneficiary is his or
her “willingness, aptitude, and ability to cultivate and make the land as productive as
possible.”
Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 07-03 provides the

qualifications, disqualifications, and rights and obligations of agrarian reform beneficiaries.
It also provides the operating procedures for their: (1) identification, screening, and
selection; (2) resolution of protests in the selection; and (3) certificate of land ownership
award generation and registration.
The Municipal or Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, together with the Barangay Agrarian
Reform Committee, screens and selects the possible agrarian beneficiaries, under the
criteria in Sections 4 and 5 of Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No.
07-03:
Section 4. Qualifications. Only those who meet the following qualifications

shall be eligible as beneficiaries:
4.1 General Qualifications. All agrarian reform beneficiaries must be:
4.1.1 Landless as defined by R.A. No. 6657;

4.1.2 Filipino citizen;
4.1.3 Permanent resident of the barangay and/or
municipality, if applicable[;]
4.1.4 At least fifteen (15) years of age or head of family at
the time of acquisition of the property (titled in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines), or at least
18 years old as of 15 June 1988 in the case of
Commercial Farms (CFs); and
4.1.5 Willing and have the ability and aptitude to cultivate
and make the land productive.
4.2 Specific Qualifications for Farmworkers in Commercial Farms. In

addition to item 4.1 above, the applicant must have been employed
in the property being covered on June 15, 1988.
Section 5. Grounds for Disqualification/Exclusion. The following shall be the

grounds for disqualification/exclusion as ARBs of the CARP:
5.1. Failure to meet the qualifications as provided for under Section

22 of R.A. No. 6657;
5.2. Non-payment of an aggregate of three (3) annual amortizations
or default in payment of three (3) annual amortizations with the
landowner (LO) that resulted to the foreclosure of mortgage on the
awarded land by the LBP or repossession by the landowners (in the
case of voluntary land transfer/direct payment scheme or VLT/DPS)
of the awarded lands except if the non-payment of the rental is due
to crop failure as a result of fortuitous events per Section 36(6) of
R.A. No. 3844, to the extent of seventy-five percent (75%);
5.3. Misuse or diversion of financial support services extended to

them (Section 37 of R.A. No. 6657);
5.4. Negligence or misuse of the land or any support extended to

them (Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657);
5.5. Material misrepresentation of the ARB's basic qualifications as

provided for under Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, and
other agrarian laws;
5.6. Sale, disposition, or abandonment of the lands awarded by

government under CARP or P.D. No. 27 which is violative of the
agrarian laws;
5.7. Conversion of agricultural lands to non-agricultural use without

prior approval from the DAR;
5.8. Retirement from the service, whether optional or mandatory, or

voluntary resignation, provided this was not attended by coercion
and/or deception, and there is no case questioning said retirement
or voluntary resignation by the applicant as of the date of approval
of this Order;
5.9. Dismissal from the service for cause and there is no case filed
questioning said dismissal as of the approval of this Order and if
there is any such case, the same has been affirmed by the proper
entity of government;
5.10. Obtaining a substantially equivalent and regular employment,

as defined in Section 3 (m) of this A.O.;
5.11. Retrenchment from the farm and receipt of separation pay,

and the retrenchment not having been appealed or questioned in
the proper government entity as of the approval of this A.O.;
5.12. Execution of a waiver of right to become an ARB in exchange

for due compensation and waiver not having been questioned in
the proper government entity as of the approval of this A.O.;
5.13. Refusal to be listed as an ARB and to provide pertinent

information as requested by the DAR in the invitation letter, which
shall be construed as unwillingness on the part of the potential
beneficiary to be listed;
5.14. Forcible entry into the property or illegal detainer (e.g. after
beneficiaries were paid by the LO); and
5.15. Commission of any violation of the agrarian reform laws and
regulations, or related issuances, as determined with finality after
proper proceedings by the appropriate tribunal or agency.
All qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries are then ranked in accordance with the order of
priority under Sections 22 and 22-A. Then, the master list of agrarian reform beneficiaries
is posted for 15 days in at least three (3) conspicuous places in the barangay hall, municipal
hall, and in the community where the property is located.
Written protests for the inclusion/exclusion from the master list must be filed before the
Department of Agrarian Reform's Regional or Provincial Office, as the case may be, not
later than 15 days from the last day of posting of the list. The Regional Director will resolve
the protest through summary proceedings within 30 days from receiving the Beneficiary
Screening Committee’s case records or the Provincial Office’s investigation report and
recommendation. The master list becomes final and executory after the lapse of 15 days
from receipt of the Regional Director's decision on the protest, but such finality is only for
the specific purpose of generating the certificate of land ownership award.
An appeal or motion for reconsideration from the Regional Director’s decision or order for
inclusion/exclusion of potential agrarian reform beneficiaries in/from the master list will
be governed by Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 03-03.
After the issuance of certificates of land ownership award, a petition to reopen the
identification and selection of agrarian reform beneficiaries may be filed on grounds of
duress or threat by the landowner against the petitioner during the identification phase.
Section 14 of Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 07-03 provides:
SECTION 14. Re-Opening of ARB Identification and Selection
14.1 Subsequent to the issuance of CLOAs but prior to the installation of

ARBs, the Regional Director may grant due course to a sworn petition to
re-open the identification, screening and selection process on the grounds
of duress or threat by the landowner against the petitioner during the
identification phase. After installation of the ARBs, only the Secretary may
grant due course to such a petition.
14.2 Any petition to re-open the ARB identification, screening and selection
process subsequent to installation shall be directly filed with the Office of
the Regional Director where the property is located which shall have the
exclusive jurisdiction to act on the petition. The procedures shall be in
accordance with A.O. No. 3, Series of 2003 titled, “2003 Rules for Agrarian
Law Implementation Cases”.
The re-opening of ARB identification, screening and selection shall, however,

subscribe to the provisions for qualification, disqualification, rights and obligations,
and procedures prescribed under pertinent sections of this Administrative Order.
As in protests for inclusion/exclusion of agrarian reform beneficiaries, petitions to reopen

the identification and selection process are governed by Department of Agrarian Reform
Administrative Order No. 03-03. (Polo Plantation Agrarian Reform Multipurpose Cooperative v. Inson, G.R. No.
189162, January 30, 2019 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division]. Note that DAR AO 03-03 has already been amended by DAR AO
03-17 [2017 Rules for Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) Cases])
18.3. The determination of qualified beneficiaries cannot be based on speculation
and conjecture. The DAR must strictly comply with Sec. 22 of RA 6657.
In DAR v. Berenguer (2010), it was held that “[t]he CARL has set forth in mandatory terms
in its Section 22, supra, who should be the qualified beneficiaries.” (DAR v. Berenguer, G.R. No.
154094, March 9, 2010, 614 SCRA 499, 510-512 [Per J. Bersamin, First Division])
18.4. Does the landowner have the right to choose the CARP beneficiary?
No. In Hermoso v. C.L. Realty Corporation (2006), it was held that “[d]enying a landowner
the right to choose a CARP beneficiary is, in context, only proper. For a covered
landholding does not revert back to the owner even if the beneficiaries thus selected do
not meet all necessary qualifications. Should it be found that the beneficiaries are indeed
disqualified, the land acquired by the State for agrarian reform purposes will not be
returned to the landowner but shall go instead to other qualified beneficiaries.” (Hermoso v.
C.L. Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 140319, May 5, 2006, 489 SCRA 556, 564 [Per J. Garcia, Second Division])
18.5. Do children of the landowner automatically qualify as beneficiary?
No. In Malabanan v. Heirs of Alfredo Restrivera (2016), it was held that the law “does not
automatically vest preferential rights upon the children of landowners. To avail themselves
of this right, claimants must show that: (1) their parents owned the subject land; and (2) it
has been determined in the proper proceeding that the claimants are qualified
beneficiaries of the agrarian reform program.” (Malabanan v. Heirs of Alfredo Restrivera, G.R. No. 185312,
December 1, 2016, 811 SCRA 413, 430 [Per CJ. Sereno, First Division])
18.6. Does being an actual occupant or tiller of the land, which make him a
potential CARP beneficiary, give rise to a tenancy relationship?
No. In Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association v. Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (2015), the
Court ruled: “… [T]hat petitioners may have been actual occupants or tillers of the land,
which may make them potential CARP beneficiaries, does not give rise to a tenancy
relationship.” Citing Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation v. Gutierrez
(2006) and Section 22 of the CARL, the Court added that “… agricultural lessees and share
tenants” comprise only one class of qualified beneficiaries, [and that] “even those who do
not enjoy a tenancy relationship with the landowner can become qualified beneficiaries.”
(Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association v. Fil-Estate Properties, Inc., G.R. No. 163598, August 12, 2015, 766 SCRA 313,
339-340 [Per J. Jardeleza, Third Division], citing Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corp. v. Gutierrez , G.R. No. 149764,
November 22, 2006, 507 SCRA 526 [Per J. Austria-Martinez, First Division])
18.7. The one claiming to be a tenant has the burden of proof.
In Heirs of Pacifico Gonzales v. De Leon (2016), citing Quintos v. DARAB, it was held that
“[t]he burden of proof rests on the one claiming to be a tenant to prove his affirmative
allegation by substantial evidence. His failure to show in a satisfactory manner the facts
upon which he bases his claim would put the opposite party under no obligation to prove
his exception or defense. The rule applies to civil and administrative cases.” (Heirs of Pacifico
Gonzales v. De Leon, G.R. No. 210428, December 7, 2016, 813 SCRA 372, 398 [Per J. Perez, Third Division], citing Quintos v.
DARAB, G.R. No. 185838, February 10, 2014, 715 SCRA 592, 601 [Per J. , Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division])
18.8. Is actual cultivation of the farmholding a mandatory condition for the

transfer of rights under the CLT to qualify the transferee as a beneficiary
under Sec. 22 of the CARL?
Yes. In Heirs of Lorenzo Buensuceso v. Perez (2013), it was held that “[a]bandonment is a
ground for the termination of tenancy relations under Section 8 of R.A. No. 3844 , and,
under Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657 as well as under DAR Administrative Order No. 02-94 in
relation to Section 22, R.A. 6657, disqualifies the beneficiary of lots awarded under P.D.
No. 27 from its coverage.” The Court added that “actual cultivation of the farmholding is
a mandatory condition for the transfer of rights under the CLT to qualify the transferee as
a beneficiary under Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657 .” The Court further stated that “[f]or
abandonment to exist, the following requisites must concur: (1) a clear intent to abandon;
and (2) an external act showing such intent. The term is defined as the ‘willful failure of the
ARB, together with his farm household, to cultivate, till, or develop his land to produce any
crop, or to use the land for any specific economic purpose continuously for a period of
two calendar years.’ It entails, among others, the relinquishment of possession of the lot
for at least two (2) calendar years and the failure to pay the amortization for the same
period. ‘What is critical in abandonment is intent which must be shown to be deliberate
and clear.’ The intent must be established by the factual failure to work on the landholding
absent any valid reason as well as a clear intent, which is shown as a separate element.”
(Heirs of Lorenzo Buensuceso v. Perez , G.R. No. 173926, March 6, 2013, 692 SCRA 491, 505-506 [Per J. Brion, Second Division])
19. Are CLOAs and EPs documents evidencing ownership of the land granted or awarded
to the beneficiary by the DAR?
Yes. In DAR v. Carriedo (2018), citing Section 24 of the CARL, as amended, the Court declared that
a “Certificate of Land Ownership Award or CLOA is a document evidencing ownership of the land
granted or awarded to the beneficiary by the DAR, and contains the restrictions and conditions
provided for in the CARL and other applicable laws…” The Court, citing Estribillo v. DAR (2006),
further held that the “EPs themselves, like the [CLOAs] in [the CARL], are enrolled in the Torrens
system of registration. The Property Registration Decree in fact devotes Chapter IX on the subject
of EPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are, in themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates
of title issued in registration proceedings…” (DAR v. Carriedo, G.R. No. 176549, October 10, 2018 [Per J. Jardeleza,
Third Division], citing Estribillo v. DAR, G.R. No. 159674, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 218 [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division]. This reversed
the Court’s Decision dated January 20, 2016.)
19.1. Who has jurisdiction over the cancellation of EPs and CLOAs?
It is the Secretary of the DAR. Section 24 of the CARL, as amended, states: “All cases
involving the cancellation of registered emancipation patents, certificates of land
ownership award, and other titles issued under any agrarian reform program are within
the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Secretary of the DAR.” (RA 6657, Sec. 24, as amended
by RA 9700)
In Sutton v. Lim (2012), it was held that “under the new law, R.A. No. 9700, which took
effect on July 1, 2009, all cases involving the cancellation of CLOAs and other titles issued
under any agrarian reform program are now within the exclusive and original jurisdiction
of the DAR Secretary…” (Sutton v. Lim, G.R. No. 191660, December 3, 2012, 686 SCRA 745, 756 [Per J. Perlas-
Bernabe, Second Division])
In Secretary of the DAR v. Heirs of Redemptor and Elisa Abucan (2019), it was also held
that “[u]nder the new Section 24, all cases involving the cancellation of registered
emancipation patents, certificates of land ownership awards, and other titles issued under
any agrarian reform program are now within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary. He or she takes jurisdiction over cases involving
the cancellation of titles issued under any agrarian reform program, whether registered
with the Land Registration Authority or not.” (Secretary of the DAR v. Heirs of Redemptor and Elisa Abucan,
G.R. No. 186432, March 12, 2019 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]. Note that the Court referred the complaint for cancellation of
OCTs and EPs to the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Leyte for case buildup and decision by the DAR
Secretary pursuant to DAR AO 07-14. However, DAR AO 07-14 has already been repealed by DAR AO 02-18, as amended
by DAR AO 04-18. Referral to the Office of the Secretary may also be made under Section 4, Rule II of the 2009 DARAB Rules
of Procedure.)
19.1.1. Note that under DAR AO 03-17, the Regional Director has primary
jurisdiction over ALI cases, which include the cancellation of EPs or
CLOAs not yet registered with the Register of Deeds.
These Rules shall govern all cases arising from or involving: …

2.4 … the issuance, recall, or cancellation of Emancipation Patents (EPs) or
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) not yet registered with the
Register of Deeds; … (DAR AO 03-17 [2017 Rules of Procedure for ALI Cases], Rule I, Sec. 2.4)
The Regional Director shall exercise primary jurisdiction over all agrarian law
implementation cases except when a separate special rule vests primary
jurisdiction in a different DAR office. (Id., Rule II, Sec. 6)
19.1.2. Note also the 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure on the referral by the
Adjudicator of ALI cases to the Office of the Secretary or his
authorized representative in the locality.
In the event that a case filed before the Adjudicator shall necessitate the
determination of a prejudicial issue involving an agrarian law implementation case,
the Adjudicator shall dismiss the case without prejudice to its re-filing, and, for
purposes of expediency, refer the same to the Office of the Secretary or his
authorized representative in the locality. (2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure, Rule II, Sec. 4)
19.2. 2018 Omnibus Summary Rules for Cancellation Cases of Emancipation

Patents, Certificates of Land Ownership Awards and Other Titles Issued Under
Any Agrarian Reform Program (DAR AO 02-18)
These Omnibus Rules of Summary Procedure shall apply to the cancellation of an EP, CLOA
or other title issued under any Agrarian Reform Program arising from any of the following:
1.1. Any case that does not have any remaining unresolved ALI issues. An ALI case
where the Decision has become final and executory; and is not subject of an
annulment action.
1.2. An ALI case or a Cancellation case where the Petitioner or all the parties would like
to withdraw the said ALI or Cancellation case.
1.3. A Cancellation case to correct erroneous technical descriptions in the EP, CLOA or
other title issued under any Agrarian Reform Program where the correction of the
entries in the title shall not result to any issue regarding the identification or the
number of the ARBs, or the correctness of the coverage of the landholding or any
portion thereof.
1.4. A Cancellation case with an approved land transfer clearance arising from the sale,
donation, assignment of rights, succession as well as any other form of conveyance
approved by the DAR pursuant to Section 27 of R.A. No. 6657, as amended. (DAR AO
02-18, Sec. 1)
All cases under Section 1 hereof shall be commenced by application and no longer by
petition. The party requesting for the cancellation of the title shall accomplish
CANCELLATION FORM NO. 1 attached as Annex A. (Id., Sec. 2.1)
The Application for Cancellation with the requisite documents attached shall be filed with
the PARPO II of the province where the landholding is situated. It is the primary duty of
the PARPO II to determine the correctness of the information contained in the Application
Form. The PARPO II shall not accept the Cancellation Application Form in the following
instances:
2.3.1. The information required to be provided in the Application Form is not supplied or
the applicant(s) failed to sign the Application Form.
2.3.2. The requisite documents are not attached to the Application. (Id., Sec. 2.3.)
Should there be other reliefs necessary for the enforcement of rights based on the newly
issued EP, CLOA or other title issued under any Agrarian Reform Program, the concerned
party shall have recourse through the commencement of the proper ALI case; or through
the commencement of the proper judicial action in the court of competent jurisdiction if
the case is cognizable by regular courts. (Id., Sec. 2.9.)
A person whose rights have been violated as a result of the Cancellation of the EP, CLOA,
or other title issued under any Agrarian Reform Program may ask for a Revocation of the
Order of Cancellation on the ground that the Order of Cancellation was issued due to
extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction, or lack of due process. The aggrieved party shall execute
a sworn affidavit stating the reason(s) or basis for the revocation of the Order of
Cancellation. The person shall immediately file the sworn affidavit to the ULAO which shall
evaluate the affidavit and recommend action to the Office of the Secretary. The Office of
the Secretary shall issue the order on the grant or denial of the request for revocation. (Id.,
Sec. 2.10.)
19.3. Note that under DAR AO 06-18, the Regional Directors no longer have any
participation in the cancellation process.
Finally, the new Administrative Order no longer includes the participation of the Regional
Directors in the cancellation process. These new rules have been issued to ensure faithful
compliance with Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended… (DAR AO 06-18 [Supplement
to DAR Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 2018, As Amended])
20. Transferability of awarded lands, exceptions
In Lebrudo v. Loyola (2011), it was held that “[a] Certificate of Land Ownership or CLOA is a
document evidencing ownership of the land granted or awarded to the beneficiary by DAR, and
contains the restrictions and conditions provided for in RA 6657 and other applicable laws.” Citing
Section 27 of the CARL, as amended, the Court added: “It is clear from the provision that lands
awarded to beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) may not be
sold, transferred or conveyed for a period of 10 years. The law enumerated four exceptions: (1)
through hereditary succession; (2) to the government; (3) to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP);
or (4) to other qualified beneficiaries. In short, during the prohibitory 10-year period, any sale,
transfer or conveyance of land reform rights is void, except as allowed by law, in order to prevent
a circumvention of agrarian reform laws. (Lebrudo v. Loyola, G.R. No. 181370, March 9, 2011, 645 SCRA 156, 161-163
[Per J. Carpio, Second Division]) The Court further stated: “In Maylem v. Ellano, we held that the waiver of
rights and interests over landholdings awarded by the government is invalid for being violative of
agrarian reform laws. Clearly, the waiver and transfer of rights to the lot as embodied in
the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Loyola is void for falling under the 10-year prohibitory
period specified in RA 6657.” (Id. at 163, citing Maylem v. Ellano, G.R. No. 162721, July 13, 2009, 592 SCRA 440, 452 [Per J.
Peralta, Third Division])
In Gua-an v. Quirino (2012), it was likewise held that “upon the promulgation of P.D. 27, farmer-
tenants were deemed owners of the land they were tilling and given the rights to possess, cultivate
and enjoy the landholding for themselves. Thus, P.D. 27 specifically prohibited any transfer of such
landholding except to the government or by hereditary succession. Section 27 of R.A. 6657 further
allowed transfers to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and to other qualified beneficiaries.
Consequently, any other transfer constitutes a violation of the above proscription and is null and
void for being contrary to law.” (Gua-an v. Quirino, G.R. No. 198770, November 12, 2012, 685 SCRA 236, 241-242 [Per J.
Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division])
20.1. Mere issuance of the CLT does not vest full ownership on the holder and does
not automatically operate to divest the landowner of all his rights over the
landholding.
In Heirs of Lorenzo Buensuceso v. Perez (2013), the Court declared that “mere issuance of
the CLT does not vest full ownership on the holder and does not automatically operate to
divest the landowner of all of his rights over the landholding. The holder must first comply
with certain mandatory requirements to effect a transfer of ownership. Under R.A. No.
6657 in relation with P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228, the title to the landholding shall be
issued to the tenant-farmer only upon the satisfaction of the following requirements: (1)
payment in full of the just compensation for the landholding, duly determined by final
judgment of the proper court; (2) possession of the qualifications of a farmer-beneficiary
under the law; (3) full-pledged membership of the farmer-beneficiary in a duly recognized
farmers’ cooperative; and (4) actual cultivation of the landholding.” The Court explained
that “while a tenant with a CLT is deemed the owner of a landholding, the CLT does not
vest full ownership on him. The tenant-holder of a CLT merely possesses an inchoate right
that is subject to compliance with certain legal preconditions for perfecting title and
acquiring full ownership.” The Court further stated that under Section 27 of the CARL,
“lands not yet fully paid by the beneficiary may be transferred, with prior approval of the
DAR, to any heir of the beneficiary who, as a condition for such transfer, shall cultivate the
land for himself.” (Heirs of Lorenzo Buensuceso v. Perez, G.R. No. 173926, March 6, 2013, 692 SCRA 491, 500-502 [Per
J. Brion, Second Division])
Chapter VIII (Corporate Farms)
21. Collective ownership rationale
In Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. PARC (2011), the Court discussed the rationale for collective ownership:
As it were, the principle of “land to the tiller” and the old pastoral model of land
ownership where non-human juridical persons, such as corporations, were
prohibited from owning agricultural lands are no longer realistic under existing
conditions. Practically, an individual farmer will often face greater disadvantages
and difficulties than those who exercise ownership in a collective manner through
a cooperative or corporation. The former is too often left to his own devices when
faced with failing crops and bad weather, or compelled to obtain usurious loans in
order to purchase costly fertilizers or farming equipment. The experiences learned
from failed land reform activities in various parts of the country are lack of
financing, lack of farm equipment, lack of fertilizers, lack of guaranteed buyers of
produce, lack of farm-to-market roads, among others. Thus, at the end of the day,
there is still no successful implementation of agrarian reform to speak of in such a
case.
Although success is not guaranteed, a cooperative or a corporation stands in a

better position to secure funding and competently maintain the agri-business than
the individual farmer. While direct singular ownership over farmland does offer
advantages, such as the ability to make quick decisions unhampered by
interference from others, yet at best, these advantages only but offset the
disadvantages that are often associated with such ownership arrangement. Thus,
government must be flexible and creative in its mode of implementation to better
its chances of success. One such option is collective ownership through juridical
persons composed of farmers. (Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. PARC, G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011 [Per J.
Velasco, Jr., En Banc])
22. Are voluntary land transfer and stock distribution plan options to corporate
landowners still operative?
No. Section 7 of the CARL, as amended by RA 9700, provides that “[a]fter June 30, 2009, the modes
of acquisition shall be limited to voluntary offer to sell and compulsory acquisition…”
23. Who has primary responsibility for the determination of the land valuation and
compensation?
Under EO 405, Series of 1990, the Land Bank of the Philippines shall be primarily responsible for
the determination of the land valuation and compensation for all private lands suitable for
agriculture under either the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) or Compulsory Acquisition (CA)
arrangement as governed by Republic Act No. 6657. The Department of Agrarian Reform shall
make use of the determination of the land valuation and compensation by the Land Bank of the
Philippines, in the performance of its functions. (EO 405, s.1990, Sec. 1)
Chapter IX (Support Services)

and Chapter X (Special Areas of Concern)
24. Who are rural women?
Rural women refer to women who are engaged directly or indirectly in farming and/or fishing as
their source of livelihood, whether paid or unpaid, regular or seasonal, or in food preparation,
managing the household, caring for the children, and other similar activities. (RA 6657, Sec. 3[l] – added
by RA 9700)
25. What are the rights of rural women?
All qualified women members of the agricultural labor force must be guaranteed and assured
equal right to ownership of the land, equal shares of the farm’s produce, and representation in
advisory or appropriate decision-making bodies. (RA 6657, 40[5])
Chapter XI (Program Implementation)
26. Participatory governance right of farmers, farmworkers, landowners, cooperatives,

and other independent farmers’ organizations
The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers, and landowners, as well as
cooperatives, and other independent farmers’ organizations to participate in the planning,
organization, and management of the program, and shall provide support to agriculture through
appropriate technology and research, and adequate financial, production, marketing, and other
support services. (Const., Art. XIII, Sec. 5, cited in RA 6657, Sec. 42)
27. What are the functions of the BARC under EO 229, s.1987?
The functions of the BARC shall be:

a. To participate and give support to the implementation of programs on agrarian reform;
b. To mediate, conciliate or arbitrate agrarian conflicts and issues that are brought to it for
resolution; and
c. To perform such other functions that the PARC, its Executive Committee, or the DAR
Secretary may delegate from time to time. (EO 229, s.1987, Sec. 19)
Chapter XII (Administrative Adjudication)

and Chapter XIII (Judicial Review)
28. What is the two-fold jurisdiction of the DAR under Sec. 50 of the CARL?
Sta Rosa Realty Corporation v. Amante clarifies that Section 50 pertains to both the Department
of Agrarian Reform’s: (1) administrative function, which involves enforcing, administering, and
carrying agrarian reform laws into operation; and (2) quasi-judicial function, which involves the
determination of parties’ rights and obligations in agrarian reform matters. (Polo Plantation Agrarian
Reform Multipurpose Cooperative v. Inson, G.R. No. 189162, January 30, 2019 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division], citing Sta. Rosa Realty
Development Corporation v. Amante , G.R. No. 112526, March 16, 2005, 453 SCRA 432 [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Special First Division])
28.1. What is quasi-judicial power?
Quasi-judicial power is “the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by
the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.” It is limited to the adjudication
of the rights of the parties that are incidental to the agency’s functions under the law. Its
exercise does not amount to the executive’s overreach into or appropriation of actual
judicial competence: “Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power of
the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. The administrative
body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which
is essentially executive or administrative in nature, where the power to act in such manner
is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or
administrative duty entrusted to it.” (Heirs of Eliza Q. Zoleta v. LBP, G.R. No. 205128, August 9, 2017, 836 SCRA
367, 392-393 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division], citing Smart Communications, Inc. (SMART) v. National Telecommunications
Commission, G.R. No. 152063, August 12, 2003, 408 SCRA 678 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division])
Quasi-judicial power is vested in administrative agencies because complex issues call for
“technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be
handled by regular courts.” Congress may, by law, grant administrative agencies the
exclusive original jurisdiction over cases within their competence. Consistent with their
specialized but narrowly limited competencies, the scope of the quasi-judicial power
vested in administrative agencies is delineated in an agency’s enabling statute: “In general,
the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may
exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which
an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the
provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency.” (Id. at 393, citing Antipolo Realty
Corp. v. National Housing Authority , G.R. No. L-50444. August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 399 [Per J. Feliciano, En Banc])
28.2. Sec. 50 of the CARL, in relation to Sec. 17 of EO 229, and EO 129-A, explained
In Union Bank of the Philippines v. Regional Agrarian Reform Officer (2017), citing Heirs of
Candido Del Rosario v. Del Rosario (2012), it was explained:
The jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over the nature and subject matter of
an action is conferred by law. Section 50 of the CARL and Section 17 of EO
No. 229 vested upon the DAR primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters, as well as original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. Through EO No.
129-A, the power to adjudicate agrarian reform cases was transferred to
CARL and Section 17 of EO No. 229 vested upon the DAR primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, as well as
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform. Through EO No. 129-A, the power to adjudicate agrarian
reform cases was transferred to the DARAB, and jurisdiction over the
implementation of agrarian reform was delegated to the DAR regional
offices. In Heirs of Candido Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, we held that
consistent with the DARAB Rules of Procedure, the agrarian reform cases
that fall within the jurisdiction of the PARAD and DARAB are those that
involve agrarian disputes. Section 3(d) of the CARL defines an “agrarian
dispute” as any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture. Given the technical legal meaning of the term “agrarian
dispute,” it follows that not all cases involving agricultural lands
automatically fall within the jurisdiction of the PARAD and DARAB.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the

complaint. For the PARAD and DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the case,
there must be a prima facie showing that there is a tenurial arrangement or
tenancy relationship between the parties. The essential requisites of a
tenancy relationship are key jurisdictional allegations that must appear on
the face of the complaint. These essential requisites are: (1) the parties are
the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there
is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal
cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests.
… Section 17 of EO No. 229, as well as Section 50 of the CARL, conferred

jurisdiction to the DAR — not to the DARAB. In fact, at the time EO No. 229
and the CARL were enacted, the DARAB did not exist. The jurisdiction
conferred to the DAR was two-fold: (1) primary jurisdiction over the
adjudication of agrarian disputes; and (2) original jurisdiction over agrarian
reform implementation. EO No. 129-A effectively split these two
jurisdictions between the newly created DARAB with respect to the former
and to the DAR regional offices as regards the latter.
As previously discussed, the jurisdiction conferred to the DARAB is limited

to agrarian disputes, which is subject to the precondition that there exist
tenancy relations between the parties… (Union Bank of the Philippines v. Regional
Agrarian Reform Officer, G.R. No. 200369, March 1, 2017, 819 SCRA 24, 35-38 [Per J. Jardeleza, Third
Division] citing Heirs of Candido Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 181548, June 20, 2012, 674 SCRA
180 [Per J. Reyes, Second Division])
28.3. What is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction?
Primary jurisdiction is the power and authority vested by the Constitution or by statute
upon an administrative body to act upon a matter by virtue of its specific competence.
(Unduran v. Aberasturi, G.R. No. 181284, April 18, 2017, 823 SCRA 80, 107 [Per J. Peralta, En Banc])
28.4. Will questions that are legal and constitutional in nature oust the DAR of its
jurisdiction on controversies in the implementation of CARP?
No. In DAR v. Cuenca (2004), the Court ruled: “All controversies on the implementation of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), even though they raise questions that are also legal
or constitutional in nature. All doubts should be resolved in favor of the DAR, since the law
has granted it special and original authority to hear and adjudicate agrarian matters…
Thus, the DAR could not be ousted from its authority by the simple expediency of
appending an allegedly constitutional or legal dimension to an issue that is clearly
agrarian.” (DAR v. Cuenca, G.R. No. 154112, September 23, 2004, 439 SCRA 15, 17, 33 [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division],
cited in Antig v. Antipuesto, G.R. No. 192396, January 17, 2018, 851 SCRA 342, 358 [Per J. Martires, Third Division])
28.5. What are the ALI cases within the primary jurisdiction of Regional Director,
per DAR AO 03-17?
The Regional Director shall exercise primary jurisdiction over all agrarian law
implementation cases except when a separate special rule vests primary jurisdiction in a
different DAR office. (DAR AO 03-17 [2017 Rules of Procedure for ALI Cases], Rule II, Sec. 6)
These Rules shall govern all cases arising from or involving:

2.1. Classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under the agrarian
reform program and the initial issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Award
(CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs), including protests or oppositions thereto
and petitions for lifting of such coverage;
2.2. Classification, identification, inclusion, exclusion, qualification, or disqualification of
potential/actual farmer-beneficiaries;
2.3. Subdivision surveys of land under Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP);
2.4. Recall, or cancellation of provisional lease rentals, Certificates of Land Transfers
(CLTs) and CARP Beneficiary Certificates (CBCs) in cases outside the purview of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 816, including the issuance, recall, or cancellation of
Emancipation Patents (EPs) or Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) not
yet registered with the Register of Deeds;
2.5. Exercise of the right of retention by landowner;
2.6. Application for exemption from coverage under Section 10 of RA 6657, as
amended;
2.7. Application for exemption pursuant to Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No.
44 (1990);
2.8. Exclusion from CARP coverage of agricultural land used for livestock, swine and
poultry raising;
2.9. Cases of exemption/exclusion of fishpond and prawn farms from the coverage of
CARP pursuant to RA 7881;
2.10. Issuance of Certificate of Exemption for land subject of Voluntary Offer to Sell
(VOS) and Compulsory Acquisition (CA) found suitable for agricultural purposes;
2.11. Application for conversion of agricultural land to residential, commercial, industrial,
or other non-agricultural uses and purposes including protests or oppositions
thereto;
2.12. Determination of the rights of agrarian reform beneficiaries to homelots;
2.13. Disposition of excess area of the tenant’s/farmer-beneficiary’s landholdings;
2.14. Increase in area of tillage of a tenant/farmer-beneficiary;
2.15. Conflict of claims in landed estates administered by DAR and its predecessors;
2.16. Cases of disputes, arising from the need for continued possession and installation
of agrarian reform beneficiaries;
2.17. Cases or disputes, arising from or regarding the maintenance of possession or
reinstatement of actual tillers not bound by any tenurial relations on landholdings
devoted to agriculture;
2.18. In cases with resolutions, orders or decisions which have attained finality or have
been excluded, the DAR in the exercise of its adjudicatory powers in the resolution
of cases involving ALI is not barred from taking cognizance of new controversies
arising from changes in the conditions of the subject landholdings of parties; and
2.19. Such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred by the Secretary
to the Regional Director, other DAR Officials, or in other cases where the Secretary
assumes jurisdiction. (Id., Rule I, Sec. 2)
28.6. What is the remedy from the decision of the Regional Director, and on what
grounds?
Appeal shall be given due course on the decision of the Regional Director on the following
grounds:
24.1. Serious errors in the findings of fact or conclusion of law which may cause grave
or irreparable damage or injury to the appellant; or
24.2. Coercion, fraud, or clear graft and corruption in the issuance of a decision. (DAR AO
03-17 [2017 Rules of Procedure for ALI Cases], Rule IV, Sec. 24)
Appeals may be taken within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the adverse decision
pursuant to Section 51 of RA 6657, as amended, which provides that “any order or ruling
or decision shall be final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof.”
(Id., Rule IV, Sec. 26)
28.7. What is the remedy from the decision of the DAR Secretary?
A party may file only one (1) motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Secretary
or deciding authority, and may do so only within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the Secretary’s decision, furnishing a copy of the motion to all other
parties. The filing of the motion interrupts the running of the reglementary period within
which to appeal. Upon receipt of the resolution on the motion for reconsideration, the
losing party may elevate the matter to the Office of the President (OP). (DAR AO 03-17 [2017
Rules of Procedure for ALI Cases], Rule V, Sec. 31)
Appeals from the decision of the Secretary may be taken to the OP within fifteen (15) days
from receipt thereof. The filing of an appeal within the proper period does not stay
execution of the subject decision. (Id., Rule V, Sec. 32)
28.8. What is the jurisdiction of the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) and its
Adjudicators (RARADs/PARADs)?
The Board shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under R.A. No. 6657, as amended by
R.A. No. 9700, E.O. Nos. 228, 229, and 129-A, R.A. No. 3844 as amended by R.A. No. 6389,
Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their Implementing Rules and
Regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include but not limited to cases involving
the following:
a. The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical, engaged in the
management, cultivation, and use of all agricultural lands covered by R.A. No. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), as amended,
and other related agrarian laws;
b. The preliminary administrative determination of reasonable and just compensation
of lands acquired under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27 and the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP);
c. Those cases involving the annulment or rescission of lease contracts or deeds of
sale or their amendments involving lands under the administration and disposition
of the DAR or Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), and the amendment of titles
pertaining to agricultural lands under the administration and disposition of the
DAR and LBP; as well as EPs issued under PD 266, Homestead Patents, Free Patents,
and miscellaneous sales patents to settlers in settlement and re-settlement areas
under the administration and disposition of the DAR;
d. Those cases involving the ejectment and dispossession of tenants and/or
leaseholders;
e. Those cases involving the sale, alienation, pre-emption, and redemption of
agricultural lands under the coverage of the CARL, as amended or other agrarian
laws;
f. Those involving the correction, partition, secondary and subsequent issuances such
as reissuance of lost/destroyed owner’s duplicate copy and reconstitution of
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs)
which are registered with the Land Registration Authority;
g. Those cases involving the review of leasehold rentals and fixing of disturbance
compensation;
h. Those cases involving the collection of amortization payments, foreclosure and
similar disputes concerning the functions of the LBP, and payments for lands
awarded under PD No. 27, RA No. 3844, as amended, and R.A. No. 6657, as
amended by R.A. No. 9700, and other related laws, decrees, orders, instructions,
rules, and regulations, as well as payment for residential, commercial, and industrial
lots within the settlement and resettlement areas under the administration and
disposition of the DAR;
i. Those cases involving boundary disputes over lands under the administration and
disposition of the DAR and the LBP, which are transferred, distributed, and/or sold
to tenant-beneficiaries and are covered by deeds of sale, patents, and certificates
of title;
j. Those cases previously falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
defunct Court of Agrarian Relations under Section 12 of PD No. 946 except those
cases falling under the proper courts or other quasi-judicial bodies; and
k. Such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred to it by the
Secretary of the DAR. (2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure, Rule II, Sec. 1.)
28.9. Is the existence of an agrarian dispute, tenancy relations necessary for the
DARAB to acquire jurisdiction?
Yes. In Union Bank of the Philippines v. Regional Agrarian Reform Officer (2017), citing
Heirs of Candido Del Rosario v. Del Rosario (2012), the Court held:
In Heirs of Candido Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, we held that consistent with
the DARAB Rules of Procedure, the agrarian reform cases that fall within
the jurisdiction of the PARAD and DARAB are those that involve agrarian
disputes. Section 3(d) of the CARL defines an “agrarian dispute” as any
controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture. Given the
technical legal meaning of the term “agrarian dispute,” it follows that not
all cases involving agricultural lands automatically fall within the jurisdiction
of the PARAD and DARAB...
As previously discussed, the jurisdiction conferred to the DARAB is limited

to agrarian disputes, which is subject to the precondition that there exist
tenancy relations between the parties… (Union Bank of the Philippines v. Regional
Agrarian Reform Officer, G.R. No. 200369, March 1, 2017, 819 SCRA 24, 37-38 [Per J. Jardeleza, Third
Division] citing Heirs of Candido Del Rosario v. Del Rosario , G.R. No. 181548, June 20, 2012, 674 SCRA
180 [Per J. Reyes, Second Division])
Similarly, in Secretary of the DAR v. Heirs of Redemptor and Elisa Abucan (2019), it was
held:
Still, the controversy must relate to the tenurial arrangement between the
parties for the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board to
properly take cognizance of the case. Here, the controversy does not
involve negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange the
tenurial arrangement’s terms or conditions. Respondents alleged that
emancipation patents should not have been issued to begin with since no
notice of coverage was sent to Cabahug. In other words, they contend that
the property was not properly acquired through the Operation Land
Transfer Program. The controversy involves the administrative
implementation of the agrarian reform program, which, as mentioned, is
under the Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary’s jurisdiction. (Secretary
of the DAR v. Heirs of Redemptor and Elisa Abucan, G.R. No. 186432, March 12, 2019 [Per J. Leonen, En
Banc])
28.10. What is the remedy from resolutions, orders and decisions of

RARADs/PARADs?
The Board shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review, reverse, modify, alter, or
affirm resolutions, orders and decisions of the Adjudicators.
No order of the Adjudicators on an issue, question, matter, or incident raised before them
shall be elevated to the Board until the hearing shall have been terminated and the case
decided on the merits. (2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure, Rule II, Sec. 2)
An appeal may be taken to the Board from a resolution, decision or final order of the
Adjudicator that completely disposes of the case by either or both of the parties within a
period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution/decision/final order appealed
from or of the denial of the movant’s motion for reconsideration by:
a. filing a Notice of Appeal together with the Appellant’s Memorandum with the
Adjudicator who rendered the decision or final order appealed from;
b. furnishing copies of said Notice of Appeal together with the Appellant’s

Memorandum to opposing party/s and counsel/s; and
c. paying an appeal fee of One Thousand Pesos (PhP1,000.00) to the DAR Cashier
where the Office of the Adjudicator is situated or through postal money order,
payable to the DAR Cashier where the Office of the Adjudicator is situated or
through postal money order, payable to the DAR Cashier where the Office of the
Adjudicator is situated, at the option of the appellant.
A pauper litigant shall be exempt from the payment of the appeal fee.
Proof of service of Notice of Appeal to the affected parties and to the Board and payment
of appeal fee shall be filed, within the reglementary period, with the Adjudicator a quo and
shall form part of the records of the case.
Non-compliance with the foregoing shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal. (2009
DARAB Rules of Procedure, Rule XIV, Sec. 1)
The aggrieved party ay appeal to the Board from a final order, resolution or decision of
the Adjudicator on any of the following grounds that:
a. Errors in the findings of fact or conclusions of law were committed which if not
corrected, would cause grave and irreparable damage or injury to the appellant; or
b. The order, resolution or decision was obtained through fraud or coercion. (Id., Rule
XIV, Sec. 2)
28.11. Does DARAB have certiorari power?
No. In Heirs of Eliza Q. Zoleta v. LBP (2017), the Court declared that “[a] perceived abuse
cannot be cured by an abuse. Administrative agencies, such as the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), are not courts of law exercising judicial power. The
power to issue writs of certiorari is an incident of judicial review. Thus, administrative
agencies may not issue writs of certiorari to annul acts of officers or state organs even
when they exercise supervisory authority over these officers or organs.” (Heirs of Eliza Q. Zoleta
v. LBP, G.R. No. 205128, August 9, 2017, 836 SCRA 367, 372 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division])
29. May Sec. 50-A of CARL, an amendment introduced by RA 9700, be applied

retroactively?
Yes. In Chailese Development Company, Inc. v. Dizon (2018), the Court ruled: “In this regard, it
must be said that there is no merit in the contention of petitioner that the amendment introduced
by R.A. No. 9700 cannot be applied retroactively in the case at bar. Primarily, a cursory reading of
the provision readily reveals that Section 19 of R.A. No. 9700 merely highlighted the exclusive
jurisdiction of the DAR to rule on agrarian cases by adding a clause which mandates the automatic
referral of cases upon the existence of the requisites therein stated. Simply, R.A. No. 9700 does
not deviate but merely reinforced the jurisdiction of the DAR set forth under Section 50 of R.A.
No. 6657. Moreover, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, as the amendment is
essentially procedural in nature it is deemed to apply to all actions pending and undetermined at
the time of its passage.” (Chailese Development Company, Inc. v. Dizon, G.R. No. 206788, February 14, 2018 [Per J. Reyes, Jr.,
Second Division])
29.1. What are the requisites for automatic referral of cases by the judge or
prosecutor to the DAR?
In Chailese Development Company, Inc. v. Dizon (2018) it was held:
… Based on the said provision, the judge or prosecutor is obligated to

automatically refer the cases pending before it to the DAR when the
following requisites are present:
a. There is an allegation from any or both of the parties that

the case is agrarian in nature; and
b. One of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant.
In this case, the presence of the first requisite is satisfied by the allegations
made by the respondents in their Answer with Counterclaim.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second requisite, the Court finds that the respondents failed to
prove that they are farmers, farmworkers, or are agricultural tenants.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 6657 defines farmers and farmworkers as follows:
(f) Farmer refers to a natural person whose primary

livelihood is cultivation of land or the production of
agricultural crops, either by himself or primarily with the
assistance of his immediate farm household, whether the
land is owned by him, or by another person under a
leasehold or share tenancy agreement or arrangement with
the owner thereof.
(g) Farmworker is a natural person who renders services

for value as an employee or laborer in an agricultural
enterprise or farm regardless of whether his compensation
is paid on a daily, weekly, monthly or “ pakyaw” basis. The
term includes an individual whose work has ceased as a
consequence of, or in connection with, a pending agrarian
dispute and who has not obtained a substantially equivalent
and regular farm employment.
An agricultural tenancy relation, on the other hand, is established by the

concurrence of the following elements enunciated by this Court in the case
of Chico v. CA:
(1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that there is consent
between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose
of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
(5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant
or agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared
between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee.
Contrary to the CA’s conclusion and as opposed to the first requisite, mere
allegation would not suffice to establish the existence of the second
requirement. Proof must be adduced by the person making the allegation
as to his or her status as a farmer, farmworker, or tenant.
The pertinent portion of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9700 reads: …
If there is an allegation from any of the parties that the case

is agrarian in nature and one of the parties is a farmer,
farmworker, or tenant, the case shall be automatically
referred by the judge or the prosecutor to the DAR x x x.
The use of the word “an” prior to “allegation” indicate that the latter
qualifies only the immediate subsequent statement, i.e., that the case is
agrarian in nature. Otherwise stated, an allegation would suffice only
insofar as the characterization of the nature of the action.
Had it been the intention that compliance with the second element would
likewise be sufficient by a mere allegation from one of the parties that he
or she is a farmer, farm worker, or tenant, the legislature should have used
the plural form when referring to “allegation” as the concurrence of both
requisites is mandatory for the automatic referral clause to operate.
Further instructive is this Court’s ruling in the previously cited case of Chico.
Therein, the Court held that for the purpose of divesting regular courts of
its jurisdiction in the proceedings lawfully began before it and in order for
the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction, the elements of a tenancy relationship
must be shown by adequate proof. It is not enough that the elements are
alleged. Likewise, self-serving statements in the pleadings are inadequate.
Hence, in light of the absence of evidence to show any tenancy agreement

that would establish the relationship of the parties therein, the Court in
Chico granted the petition and reinstated the proceedings before the RTC
of Malolos, Bulacan.
Applying these principles in the matter on hand, in here, respondents

merely alleged in their Answer with Counterclaim that they are previous
tenants in the subject landholdings implying that a tenancy relationship
exists between them and petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest…
Apart from these statements however, respondents failed to elaborate

much less prove the details of such tenancy agreement and the peculiarities
of the subject landholding’s previous ownership. There was no evidence
adduced of the existence of any tenancy agreement between respondents
and the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest. This, as discussed, precludes
the application of Section 50-A of R.A. No. 6657, as amended by R.A. No.
9700, for failure to satisfy the second requisite. (Chailese Development Company, Inc.
v. Dizon, G.R. No. 206788, February 14, 2018 [Per J. Reyes, Jr., Second Division])
30. What is the jurisdiction of the RTCs acting as SACs?
In DAR v. Robles (2015), the Court explained the jurisdiction of the RTCs acting as SACs, thus:
Meanwhile, the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) have not been completely divested of
jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters. Section 56 of RA 6657 confers “special
jurisdiction” on “Special Agrarian Courts,” which are RTCs designated by the Court
— at least one (1) branch within each province — to act as such. As Special Agrarian
Courts (SACs), these RTCs have, according to Section 57 of the same law, original
and exclusive jurisdiction over “all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to land-owners” and “the prosecution of all criminal offenses under
. . . [the] Act.” (DAR v. Robles, G.R. No. 190482, December 9, 2015, 777 SCRA 141, 162 [Per J. Peralta, Third
Division])
30.1. Note the previous discussion regarding LBP v. Dalauta (2017) on the “original
and exclusive” jurisdiction of the RTC acting as SAC to determine of just
compensation, 10-year prescription from time of taking, and the required
absence of pending administrative action for the determination of just
compensation. (LBP v. Dalauta, G.R. No. 190004, August 8, 2017, 835 SCRA 1 [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc])
In LBP v. Herederos De Ciriaco Chunaco Distileria, Inc. (2018), the Court reiterated its
pronouncement in LBP v. Dalauta (2017), to wit:
Indeed, Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657 clearly vests on the RTC-SAC the
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of
just compensation to landowners. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to
the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into
appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Section 57 and therefore would
be void. The DAR has no authority to qualify or undo the RTC-SAC’s
jurisdiction over the determination of just compensation under R.A. No.
6657. Thus, the 15-day reglementary period under Section 11, Rule XIII of
the DARAB Rules cannot be sustained. The RTC-SAC cannot simply be
reduced to an appellate court which reviews administrative decisions of the
DAR within a short period to appeal.
It was also determined in Dalauta that the proper prescriptive period to file
a petition for judicial determination of just compensation under R.A. No.
6657 is ten (10) years pursuant to Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code.
Considering that payment of just compensation is an obligation created by
law, it is only proper that the ten (10)-year period start from the time the
landowner receives the notice of coverage under the CARP. In addition, any
interruption or delay caused by the government, like proceedings in the
DAR, should toll the running of the prescriptive period. The statute of
limitations has been devised to operate against those who slept on their
rights, but not against those desirous to act but cannot do so for causes
beyond their control. (LBP v. Herederos De Ciriaco Chunaco Distileria, Inc., G.R. No. 206992,
June 11, 2018, 866 SCRA 57, 70 [Per J. Gesmundo, Third Division], citing LBP v. Dalauta, G.R. No. 190004,
August 8, 2017, 835 SCRA 1 [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc])
31. What is the remedy from decisions of the DAR Secretary?
A petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is the remedy from decisions of the DAR
Secretary. Sebastian v. Morales (2003) is instructive:
We agree with the appellate court that petitioners’ reliance on Section 54 of R.A.
No. 6657 “is not merely a mistake in the designation of the mode of appeal, but
clearly an erroneous appeal from the assailed Orders.” For in relying solely on
Section 54, petitioners patently ignored or conveniently overlooked Section 60 of
R.A. No. 6657, the pertinent portion of which provides that:
An appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals, or from any

order, ruling or decision of the DAR, as the case may be, shall be by
a petition for review with the Supreme Court, within a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy of said
decision…
Section 60 of R.A. No. 6657 should be read in relation to R.A. No. 7902 expanding
the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to include:
Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,

resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions... except
those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the
Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the
provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section
17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
With the enactment of R.A. No. 7902, this Court issued Circular 1-95 dated May 16,
1995 governing appeals from all quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals by
petition for review, regardless of the nature of the question raised. Said circular
was incorporated in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 61 of R.A. No. 6657 clearly mandates that judicial review of DAR orders or
decisions are governed by the Rules of Court. The Rules direct that it is Rule 43 that
governs the procedure for judicial review of decisions, orders, or resolutions of the
DAR Secretary. By pursuing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 rather
than the mandatory petition for review under Rule 43, petitioners opted for the
wrong mode of appeal. Pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Supreme Court
Circular No. 2- 90, “an appeal taken to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals
by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.” Therefore, we hold that
the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No.
51288 for failure of petitioners to pursue the proper mode of appeal. (Sebastian v.
Morales, G.R. No. 141116, February 17, 2003, 397 SCRA 549, 559-561 [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division])
32. What is the remedy from decisions of the DARAB?
A petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is the remedy from decisions of the
DARAB. Pangilinan v. Balatbat (2012) holds:
Moreover, the decision of the DARAB is appealable to the Court of Appeals,

pursuant to Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657; Section 1, Rule XIV of the DAR New Rules
of Procedure (1994); and Section 1, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended by Administrative Circular No. 20-95. (Pangilinan v. Balatbat, G.R. No. 170787,
September 12, 2012, 680 SCRA 464, 489 [Per J. Peralta, Third Division])
33. What is the remedy from decisions of the RTCs acting as SACs?
A petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is the remedy from decisions of the RTCs
acting as SACs. LBP v. De Leon (2002) explains:
A petition for review, not an ordinary appeal, is the proper procedure in effecting
an appeal from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts acting as Special Agrarian
Courts in cases involving the determination of just compensation to the
landowners concerned. Section 60 of RA 6657 clearly and categorically states that
the said mode of appeal should be adopted. There is no room for a contrary
interpretation. Where the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for
construction, but only application. (LBP v. De Leon, G.R. No. 143275, September 10, 2002, 388 SCRA
537, 543 [Per J. Corona, Third Division]. This was affirmed in the Court’s Decision on March 20, 2003 [Per J. Corona,
En Banc] – “… While we clarify that the Decision of this Court dated September 10, 2002 stands, our ruling therein
that a petition for review is the correct mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts shall apply only
to cases appealed after the finality of this Resolution.”)
Chapter XIV (Financing)
34. Distinguish reclassification from conversion.
Reclassification is the act of specifying how agricultural land shall be utilized for non-agricultural
uses as embodied in the land use plan of the LGU based on Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160.
Conversion is the act of changing the actual use of agricultural land into other uses as approved
by the DAR in accordance with Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, as amended. (DAR AO 01-19 [Streamlining the
Processing of Applications for Land Use Conversion Under DAR Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2002], Sec. 7)
In Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (2010),
citing Alarcon v. CA (2003), it was held:
This Court held in Alarcon v. Court of Appeals that reclassification of lands does
not suffice. Conversion and reclassification differ from each other. Conversion is
the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other
use as approved by the DAR while reclassification is the act of specifying how
agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential,
industrial, and commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the
requirements and procedures for land use conversion. (Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Associations, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform , G.R. No. 183409, June 18, 2010, 621 SCRA 295, 319-320 [Per J.
Perez, First Division], citing Alarcon v. CA, G.R. No 152085, July 8, 2003, 405 SCRA 440 [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First
Division])
35. What is provided under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) on

reclassification?
(a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed by the sanggunian after
conducting public hearings for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural
lands and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases:
(1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes
as determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2) where the land shall have
substantially greater economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as
determined by the sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such reclassification shall be
limited to the following percentage of the total agricultural land area at the time of the
passage of the ordinance:
(1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, fifteen percent (15%);
(2) For component cities and first to the third class municipalities, ten percent (10%);
and
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%): Provided, further, That
agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant to Republic
Act Numbered Sixty-six hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657). otherwise known as
"The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law", shall not be affected by the said
reclassification and the conversion of such lands into other purposes shall be
governed by Section 65 of said Act.
(b) The President may, when public interest so requires and upon recommendation of the
National Economic and Development Authority, authorize a city or municipality to
reclassify lands in excess of the limits set in the next preceding paragraph.
(c) The local government units shall, in conformity with existing laws, continue to prepare
their respective comprehensive land use plans enacted through zoning ordinances which
shall be the primary and dominant bases for the future use of land resources: Provided.
That the requirements for food production, human settlements, and industrial expansion
shall be taken into consideration in the preparation of such plans.
(d) Where approval by a national agency is required for reclassification, such approval shall
not be unreasonably withheld. Failure to act on a proper and complete application for
reclassification within three (3) months from receipt of the same shall be deemed as
approval thereof.
(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing, amending, or modifying in any
manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657. (RA 7160, Sec. 20)
35.1. Will the reclassification of agricultural land automatically allow the

landowner to change its use without conversion?
No. In Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform (2010), it was held:
In view thereof, a mere reclassification of an agricultural land does not

automatically allow a landowner to change its use. He has to undergo the
process of conversion before he is permitted to use the agricultural land
for other purposes.
It is clear from the aforesaid distinction between reclassification and

conversion that agricultural lands though reclassified to residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses must still undergo the
process of conversion before they can be used for the purpose to which
they are intended. (Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, G.R. No. 183409, June 18, 2010, 621 SCRA 295, 319-320 [Per J. Perez, First Division])
Also, DAR AO 01-19 provides that “[a]gricultural lands that are reclassified to non-
agricultural uses do not ipso facto allow the landowner thereof to use the same for such
purpose.” (DAR AO 01-19, Sec. 7)
36. What agency is charged with the mandate of approving or disapproving applications
for conversion?
It is the DAR. As held in Roxas & Co., Inc. v. CA (1999), cited in Ayala Land, Inc. v. Castillo (2016):
… Respondent DAR’s failure to observe due process in the acquisition of

petitioner’s landholdings does not ipso facto give this Court the power to
adjudicate over petitioner’s application for conversion of its haciendas from
agricultural to non-agricultural. The agency charged with the mandate of
approving or disapproving applications for conversion is the DAR. (Roxas & Co., Inc. v.
CA, G.R. No. 127876, December 17, 1999, 321 SCRA 106, 151 [Per J. Puno, En Banc], cited in Ayala Land, Inc. v.
Castillo, G.R. No. 178110, January 12, 2016, 780 SCRA 1, 24 [Per CJ. Sereno, En Banc])
36.1. When can DAR exercise its conversion authority?
DAR’s conversion authority can only be exercised after the effectivity of CARL on June 15,
1988. In Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform (2010), it was emphasized that “DAR’s conversion authority can only be exercised
after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988. The said date served as the
cut-off period for automatic reclassification or rezoning of agricultural lands that no longer
require any DAR conversion clearance or authority. Thereafter, reclassification of
agricultural lands is already subject to DAR’s conversion authority. Reclassification alone
will not suffice to use the agricultural lands for other purposes. Conversion is needed to
change the current use of reclassified agricultural lands.” (Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Associations, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform , G.R. No. 183409, June 18, 2010, 621 SCRA 295, 320 [Per J. Perez, First
Division])
36.2. What is Illegal conversion and land use conversion?
Illegal conversion is the conversion by any landowner of his agricultural land into any non-
agricultural use with the intent to avoid the application of RA 6657 to his landholding and
to dispossess his tenant farmers of the land tilled by them; or the change of nature of lands
outside urban centers and city limits either in whole or in part after the effectivity of RA
6657, as provided in Section 73 (c) and (e) respectively, of the said Act. (DAR AO 01-02 [2002
Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion], Art. I, Sec. 2.8)
Land use conversion refers to the act or process of changing the current physical use of a
piece of agricultural land into some other use or for another agricultural use other than
the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of trees, including harvesting of
produce therefrom, as approved by DAR. (Id., Art. I, Sec. 2.12)
36.3. What are the areas non-negotiable for conversion?
An application involving areas non-negotiable for conversion shall not be given due
course even when some portions thereof are eligible for conversion. The following areas
shall not be subject to conversion:
4.1. Lands within protected areas designated under the NIPAS, including mossy and
virgin forests, riverbanks, and swamp forests or marshlands, as determined by the
DENR;
4.2. All irrigated lands, as delineated by the DA and/or the National Irrigation
Administration (NIA), where water is available to support rice and other crop
production, and all irrigated lands where water is not available for rice and other
crop production but are within areas programmed for irrigation facility
rehabilitation by the government;
4.3. All irrigable lands already covered by irrigation projects and firm funding
commitments, as delineated by the DA and/or NIA; and
4.4. All agricultural lands with irrigation facilities. (Id., Art. II, Sec. 4)
36.4. What are the areas highly restricted from conversion?
The following areas/projects are classified as highly restricted from conversion:

5.1. Irrigable lands not covered by irrigation projects with firm funding commitment;
5.2. Agro-industrial croplands, or lands presently planted to industrial crops that
support the economic viability of existing agricultural infrastructure and agro-
based enterprises;
5.3. Highlands or areas located in elevations of five hundred (500) meters or above and
which have the potential for growing semi-temperate or high value crops;
5.4. Lands issued with notice of land valuation and acquisition, or subject of a perfected
agreement between the landowner and the beneficiaries under the Voluntary Land
Transfer (VLT)/Direct Payment Scheme (DPS) under the CARP; and
5.5. Lands within the Environmentally Critical Area (ECA) or those involving
establishment of an Environmentally Critical Project (ECP)… (Id., Art. II, Sec. 5)
36.5. Is a conversion proceeding a bar to coverage under the CARP?
No. DAR AO 07-11 provides that “[a]bsent any final order granting conversion, no act or
attempt directed to changing the use of the land from agricultural to non-agricultural,
shall affect the land’s coverage pursuant to the CARP.” (DAR AO 07-11, Sec. 10)
36.6. What is the effect of failure to fully implement the conversion plan within 5
years from issuance of DAR conversion order?
Pursuant to Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, as amended, the failure to fully implement the
conversion plan within five (5) years from the issuance of DAR conversion order, or any
violation of the conditions of the conversion order, in the event such failure or violation
was due to the fault of the applicant, shall cause the land subject thereof to automatically
be covered by CARP, subject to the rights of retention. (Id., Sec. 11)
36.7. What are the criteria for conversion?
The following criteria shall guide the resolution of application for conversion:
8.1. Conversion may be allowed if the land subject of application is not among those
considered non-negotiable for conversion as provided in Section 4 hereof.
8.2. Conversion may be allowed, in accordance with Section 65 of RA 6657, when the
land has ceased to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes
or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic
value for residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural purposes.
8.3. Conversion of lands within SAFDZ, as provided in Rule 9.5.2 of DA-AO-6-1998, shall
take into account the following factors:
8.3.1. The conversion of land use is consistent with the natural expansion of the
municipality or locality, as contained in the approved physical framework
and land use plan.
8.3.2. The area to be converted in use is not the only remaining food production
area of the community.
8.3.3. The land use conversion shall not hamper the availability of irrigation to
nearby farmlands.
8.3.4. The areas with low productivity will be accorded priority for land use
conversion.
8.3.5. Sufficient disturbance compensation shall be given to farmers whose
livelihood are negatively affected by the land use conversion as provided
by existing laws and regulations.
8.4. When the agricultural land which is the subject of the application for conversion
has been acquired under RA 6657, its conversion shall be allowed only if the
applicant is the agrarian reform beneficiary thereof, and after he has fully paid his
obligation required under Section 65 of RA 6657. (DAR AO 01-02, Art. III, Sec. 8)
36.8. Streamlined process under DAR AO 01-19 (Streamlining the Processing of

Applications for Land Use Conversion Under DAR Administrative Order No. 1,
Series of 2002)
36.8.1. Personal filing of application for conversion
All application for conversion and its supporting documents shall be personally
filed by the applicant who is the landowner or the duly authorized representative.
(DAR AO 01-19, Sec. 1)
36.8.2. Authentication of application and supporting documents
An application for conversion must be duly verified by the landowner or the duly
authorized representative as to the truthfulness and correctness of all information
contained therein. It must also contain a Certification by the same that all
supporting documents have been issued by the proper agencies or offices. This
provision amends Section 10.3 of the DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 2002. (Id., Sec. 3)
36.8.3. Non-acceptance of incomplete application
Strictly no application shall be accepted, docketed and processed unless the

documentary requirements for conversion grant are complete and sufficient in
form and substance. This provision amends Section 10 of DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of
2002. (Id., Sec. 4)
36.8.4. ARB as applicant for conversion
When the agricultural land which is the subject of the Application for Conversion
has been acquired under R.A. No. 6657, its conversion shall be allowed only if the
applicant is the agrarian reform beneficiary thereof and the applicant upon
conversion shall fully pay the price of the land. This provision amends Section 8.4,
10.23 and 10.24 of DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 2002. (Id., Sec. 5)
36.8.5. Acceptance of E-copy of land title
The electronic copy of an Original or Transfer Certificate of Title shall henceforth

be used as basis for identifying the landholding and its registered owner(s) subject
of the application in lieu of a certified true copy of that title, except for the following
provinces and cities: Sulu (Jolo), Batanes (Basco), Cagayan (Tuao), Basilan (Isabela),
Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Silay City, Negros Occidental, Dapitan City and
Province of Tawi-Tawi (Bongao). This provision amends Section 10.4 of DAR A.O.
No. 1, Series of 2002. (Id., Sec. 6)
36.8.6. HLURB [reconstituted as Human Settlement Adjudication

Commission (HSAC) under the Department of Human Settlements
and Urban Development (DHSUD) per RA 11201] Certification;
SB/SP zoning ordinance; and LGU Certificate of Eligibility for
Reclassification issued by DA
The submission of the Certificate of Reclassification by the … (HLURB) in

application for conversion shall only be required if the landholding is situated in
Highly-Urbanized or Independent Component Cities and the conversion is from an
agricultural use to a non-agricultural use.
In lieu of the HLURB Certification, the Sangguniang Bayan/Panlungsod Zoning

Ordinance and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution approving said Zoning
Ordinance shall be submitted in applications for conversion in case of landholdings
situated in Component Cities and Municipalities and the conversion is from an
agricultural use to a non-agricultural use.
In both instances, the concerned local government unit must have the proper
Certificate of Eligibility for Reclassification of agricultural lands issued by the
Department of Agriculture (DA) in accordance with D.A. A.O. No. 1, Series of 2017.
The DA Certificate must be attached to the HLURB Certificate or the LGU
Resolution, as the case may be, to prove that there is a valid reclassification. (Id., Sec.
7)
36.8.7. DA Certification a requirement for application for land use

reclassification
Matters pertaining to the state of the agricultural activity on the landholding as

well as whether the same is irrigated or irrigable have already been passed upon
by the concerned LGU during the process of reclassification in accordance with
Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160 and Office of the President (O.P.) M.C. No. 54, Series of
1993. Thus, the DA Certificate on such matters will not be required upon an
application for Conversion of a landholding from agricultural use to non-
agricultural use. This provision amends Section 10.16 of DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of
2002. (Id., Sec. 8)
36.8.8. DENR ECC a post-condition for application for land use conversion
The DENR-ECC shall no longer be part of the requirements for the processing of
the Application for Land Use Conversion. The DENR-ECC shall constitute part of
the conditions for the validity of the Conversion Grant when the subject land is
within an Environmental Critical Area (ECA), or will involve the establishment of an
Environmental Critical Project (ECP). The failure to secure the DENR-ECC shall
constitute a ground for the revocation of the conversion grant. This provision
amends Section 10.18 of DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 2002. (Id., Sec. 9)
36.8.9. Clearance for resettlement areas due to declared calamities
A conversion grant shall no longer be necessary if the land shall be actually, directly
and exclusively used as a resettlement area or relocation site of persons displaced
by a nationally declared calamity provided that the Regional Director determines
that the area is not within the SAFDZ, the land is neither irrigated nor irrigable, and
that there are no tenants on the land. The concerned Regional Director must issue
a Clearance Certificate once the said determination is made. The Regional Director
shall monitor the activity and shall render an initial report to the DAR Secretary
within ten (10) days from the commencement thereof and a final report, not later
than five (5) days form its date of completion. In no case shall the duration of the
temporary use thereof for shelter/housing facilities exceed one (1) year from the
date of declaration of normalcy. (Id., Sec. 10)
36.8.10. MARPO Certification
The MARPO within three (3) days upon receipt of the application and the
supporting documents shall personally determine the completion of the works
stated under Section 14 of DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 2002.
In the absence of the assigned MARPO, the Chief Agrarian Reform Program Officer
(CARPO) – Land Tenure Service Program (LTSP), or in the absence of both, the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Program Officer II (PARPO II) shall make the personal
determination. (Id., Sec. 11)
36.8.11. Notice of On-Site Inspection and Investigation (OSII)
Notice of OSII shall be issued within three (3) days form the date of filing of the
application for conversion.
The LUC/RLUC shall immediately notify the MARPO, PARPO and their designated
Provincial Information Officers (PIOs) the date of OSII by the fastest means of
communication including but not limited to electronic mails, facsimile, short-
message service, telephone communications, messaging applications and other
related means pursuant R.A. No. 8792. The notice shall also contain the instruction
to disseminate the same to all farmers, agricultural lessees, share tenants,
farmworkers, actual tillers, or occupants in the property subject of the application.
(Id., Sec. 12)
36.8.12. Conduct of the OSII
The OSII shall be conducted on the property by the Land Use Conversion Division
(LUCD)/Regional Land Use Committee (RLUC) within five (5) days from notice.
The OSII shall be completed within three (3) days. Thereafter, the OSII Team shall
submit an electronic copy of the Field Investigation Report, including photographs
and videos through any appropriate software platform used by the Department
within two (2) days from completion of the OSII. (Id., Sec. 13)
36.9. Public notice
The applicant shall post, in a conspicuous place(s) within the subject property, a public
notice contained in a billboard made of strong weather-resistant material such as plywood,
galvanized iron, tin, panaflex, or other similar durable material measuring 1.22 meters by
2.44 meters (4 feet by 8 feet). If the landholding has an area of more than twenty (20)
hectares, the applicant shall erect one (1) billboard for every twenty (20) hectares, on
strategic and visible points in the landholding, preferably along a road. The billboard shall
be written in the local dialect and shall display all the information mentioned below, to
wit:
11.1. Statement that the applicant is proposing to convert the subject landholding from
agricultural to non-agricultural use;
11.2. Complete name of the landowner(s) and applicant(s) and developer(s);
11.3. Total area and exact location of the conversion proposal;
11.4. Filing date of application for conversion;
11.5. Date of posting of billboard;
11.6. Schedule of ocular inspection;
11.7. Deadline for filing protest;
11.8. Address of the CLUPPI and RCLUPPI and PARO where oppositors may formally file
their protest;
11.9. Address of the approving authority; and
11.10. Date of approval or denial of the application, which shall be left blank, and which
the applicant shall fill up upon approval or denial of the application. (DAR AO 01-02,
Sec. 11)
36.10. The required conduct of public consultation under DAR AO 05-18, which
may be called by the Secretary of the Regional Director, is now the
responsibility of the Public Consultation Committee (PCC), per DAR AO 06-
19.
The Secretary or the concerned Regional Director may call for a public consultation before
acting on an application for land use conversion Resource persons from the public and/or
the private sectors may be invited by the Secretary or the Regional Director during the
public consultation. The holding of the public consultation is to ensure that any interested
persons may be given the opportunity to present comments or air views or sentiments
about the application for land use conversion. Such views, comments, or sentiments may
be utilized as a guide in the processing of the application for conversion by the Secretary
or the Regional Director. The inputs derived from such public consultations do not
necessarily bind the Secretary or the Regional Director in the action on the pending
application(s) for land use conversion. (DAR AO 05-18 [Conduct of Public Consultations in Land Use
Conversion Applications], Sec. 1)
Finally, cases cognizable by A.O. No. 05, Series of 2018, the PCC shall be responsible for
the conduct of public consultation. (DAR AO 06-19, Item IV)
36.11. What are the grounds for protest/denial of conversion?
Protests against the application and denial of the application may be instituted or founded
on any of the following grounds:
20.1. The area under application is non-negotiable for conversion;
20.2. The adverse effects of the displacement to be caused by the proposed conversion
far outweigh the social and economic benefits to the affected communities;
20.3. Misrepresentation or concealment of facts material to the application for
conversion;
20.4. Illegal or premature conversion;
20.5. Existence of proof that conversion was resorted to as a means to evade CARP
coverage and to dispossess the tenant farmers of the land tilled by them;
20.6. The land applied for conversion has not ceased to be economically feasible and
sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality where it is found has not become
urbanized and the land will not have a greater economic value for residential,
commercial or industrial purposes (Section 65 of RA 6657); and
20.7. The applicant has violated, or the application for conversion is violative, of agrarian
laws, rules and regulations as well as other applicable statutes and other
administrative issuances. (DAR AO 01-02, Art. III, Sec. 20)
36.12. Note the previous discussion regarding DAR AO 06-19 [Creation of a

Collegial Body on Land Use Conversion and Exemption/Exclusion from
CARP Coverage] creating the Land Use Cases Committee (LUCC) (Decisions,
resolutions and orders of the Committee are not appealable to the DAR Secretary.)
Additional Provisions from RA 9700
37. RA 9700 and the import of Sec. 30 of the law
Any case and/or proceeding involving the implementation of the provisions of Republic Act No.
6657, as amended, which may remain pending on June 30, 2014 shall be allowed to proceed to
its finality and be executed even beyond such date. (RA 9700, Sec. 30)
In Robustum Agricultural Corporation v. DAR (2018), the Court discussed Section 30 of RA 9700
in this wise:
RA No. 9700 is an amendatory act to RA No. 6657 - the country’s agrarian reform
law. It was enacted in 2009 for the purpose of instituting reforms that aim to
strengthen and accelerate the implementation of the agrarian reform program as
set forth in RA No. 6657. One of the most significant amendments introduced by
RA No. 9700 in this regard is its extension and limitation of the period within which
land may be acquired and distributed under the said program.
Prior to RA No. 9700, the period for land acquisition and distribution under the
agrarian reform program was scheduled to culminate by the end of 2008, pursuant
to Section 1 of RA No. 8532. RA No. 9700, however, extended such period for
another five (5) years - from 2009 up to June 30, 2014. This is apparent under
Section 5 of the law which amended Section 7 of RA No. 6657, to wit:…
Though it is couched in mandatory language, however, the directive in the above

provision requiring the completion, and thus the termination, of all land acquisition
and distribution activities by June 30, 2014 is not absolute. Such directive, it must
be considered, is qualified by another provision in RA No. 9700. That provision is
Section 30 of RA No. 9700:…
Under Section 30 of RA No. 9700, “ [a]ny case [or] proceeding involving the
implementation of the [agrarian reform law]” is allowed to “proceed to its finality
and be executed” even beyond June 30, 2014, so long as such case or proceeding
is already pending as of that date. To our mind, the phrase “ proceeding involving
the implementation of the [agrarian reform law]” is broad enough to include the
entire process of land acquisition and distribution under the agrarian reform
program. The plain text of the provision allows us to believe as much.
The term “proceeding,” in its plain and generic sense, means “ any act or step that
is part of a larger whole.” Hence, when that term is used in conjunction with the
qualifying words "involving the implementation of the [agrarian reform law],” the
resulting phrase can only denote an act or step taken by the DAR pertaining to the
implementation of the agrarian reform law. The process of land acquisition and
distribution, to no controversy, is one such step - if not the core step - in the
implementation of the agrarian reform law.
Appreciated thusly, it can be said that Section 30 of RA No. 9700 essentially clarifies
the parameters of the extension of the period for land acquisition and distribution
granted in the law. RA No. 9700 did not intend to fix June 30, 2014 as an absolute
deadline for the completion and cessation of all land acquisition and distribution
proceedings; the law rather sets the said date as the final date when such
proceedings may be initiated by the DAR. This is the import of Section 30 of RA
No. 9700. (Robustum Agricultural Corporation v. DAR, G.R. No. 221484, November 19, 2018 [Per J. Peralta,
Third Division])
37.1. What is the doctrine of necessary implication?
As explained in Robustum Agricultural Corporation v. DAR (2018):
The grant of authority upon the DAR to conclude a “ proceeding involving

the implementation of the [agrarian reform law]” pending as of June 30,
2014 under Section 30 of RA No. 9700, like any statutory grant of authority,
must be deemed to include all such powers, even those not expressly
stated, that are necessary to effectuate the granted authority. This
construction is justified by the doctrine of necessary implication:
“No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details
involved in its application. There is always an omission that
may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the
time of enactment, to be an all embracing legislation may
be inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the
future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is
enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to
fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The
doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a
part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is
understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as
may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to
make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction
which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary
consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its
terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of
power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental
power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater
includes the lesser, expressed in the maxim, in eo plus sit,
simper inest et minus.” (Robustum Agricultural Corporation v. DAR, G.R.
No. 221484, November 19, 2018 [Per J. Peralta, Third Division])

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UPDATES ON THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF 1988

(RA 6657, as amended by RAs 7881, 7905, 8532 and 9700)

Chapter I (Preliminary Chapter)

1.1. What is police power?

1.2. What is the power of eminent domain?

In DAR v. Woodland Agro-Development (2015), citing Secretary of Agrarian Reform v. Tropical

2.1. What is social justice?

2.2. Social justice also applies to landowners.

3. What is the constitutional basis of agrarian reform?

4. What is the policy of the CARL?

The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on

This was reiterated in DAR v. Sutton (2005), thus:

However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear

7. What lands are covered under the CARL?

7.2. The identification, validation, segregation, transfer and distribution of all

8. What is a right of retention?

8.4. Sale of landholdings (first 5 hectares) without DAR clearance is an exercise of

8.5. What is the stewardship doctrine?

Excluded from coverage are:

10.1. What is the purpose of the LUCC?

10.2. What is the composition of the LUCC?

10.3. What are the functions of the LUCC?

10.5. Is DAR AO 06-19 applicable to all pending and subsequent applications?

Chapter III (Improvement of Tenurial and Labor Relations)

11. Distinguish an agricultural lease and from a civil lease.

The sharing of the harvest in proportion to the respective contributions of the

11.1. Agricultural leasehold contract, agricultural leasehold relation, agricultural

Agricultural Leasehold Contract is a tenurial arrangement, whether written or verbal,

11.2. Agricultural leasehold is based on tenancy relationship.

11.3. Agricultural leasehold relation is not extinguished by the expiration of

11.4. What is cultivation?

11.5. What is the consideration for the lease?

11.6. What are the rights of the agricultural lessee?

It shall be the right of agricultural lessee to:

11.7. What are the obligations of the agricultural lessee?

It shall be the obligation of the agricultural lessee to:

11.8. What are the prohibitions against the agricultural lessee?

It shall be unlawful for the agricultural lessee to:

11.9. What are the rights of the agricultural lessor?

It shall be the right of the agricultural lessor to:

11.10. What are the obligations of the agricultural lessor?

It shall be the obligation of the agricultural lessor to:

11.11. What are the prohibitions against the agricultural lessor?

It shall be unlawful for the agricultural lessor to:

11.12. When may the agricultural lessee be dispossessed of the landholding in

Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender, of the land, an

Under agricultural leasehold operations, it is the obligation of the agricultural-lessee to

11.14. What is the remedy if the agricultural-lessor refuses to accept or fails to

11.15. What is a non-litigated case, a litigated case, an interest-bearing current

Interest-Bearing Current Account (IBCA) – also known as “Checking or Demand Deposit”

11.16. What are the features of the IBCA?

11.17. How are lease rental payments in kind made?

12. Who are real parties-in-interest?

In Sumalo Homeowners Association of Hermosa, Bataan v. Litton, et al. , the Court

Chapter V (Land Acquisition)

In Robustum Agricultural Corporation v. DAR (2018), the Court explained:

During the preliminary identification, a formal proceeding for compulsory land

After its preliminary identification of a land as subject to the agrarian reform

1. his remedies against the notice - such as filing a protest on coverage or

3. his concomitant obligations - such as the submission to the DAR of the

The significance thus given to a notice of coverage in compulsory land acquisition

It bears stressing that the issuance of a notice of coverage only initiates a

13.1. Procedure is strictly construed.