State v. Martin, 156 Ohio St.

3d 503, 2019-Ohio-2010

Facts: On the day of Danielle K. Martin’s arrest she did not waive her rights to a speedy trial.
After her first court appearance she wanted to dismiss the case based on her rights to a speedy
trial being violated. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Martin then pleaded no
contest and was sentenced. After sentencing she then attempted to appeal, the appellate court
held that because the trial court did not record journal entries that had Martin’s statement of a
continuance, that made the court delays chargeable with the court. It was made to be the
court’s error.
Issue: Martin’s right be brought to trial within 90 days of her arrest pursuant to the speedy-trial
provisions contained in R.C. 2945.71 et seq. The trial court then denied Martin’s motion to
dismiss the charges against her for violation of her right to a speedy trial. The court determined
that the 90 days had not elapsed from the date of her arrest to the date she filed her motion to
dismiss. On appeal, the eleventh district court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgement
and vacated Martin’s convictions in doing so, the court held that the continuances, although
entered on behalf of the defendant must be charged against the state because the trial court’s
journal entries either failed to identify Martin as the requesting party or failed to explain the
precise reasons for the delay.
Is speedy trial time charged to the state when the defendants request a continuance are not
recorded in trial journal entries?
Holding: No. The appellate court erred by reversing the trial court’s finding that no speedy-trial
violation under R.C. 2945.71 et seq. occurred because the underlying source of the delay was
attributable to defendant. The pre-trial hearing transcripts affirmatively showed that defense
counsel requested all the continuances between December 14, 2015, and March 14, 2016, the
speedy-trial time was tolled during that time pursuant to R.C. 2945.72; The appellate court’s
alternative reasoning was also error. The March 28-to-May-2nd continuance resulted not from
the trial court’s sua sponte decision to delay trial but from either defense counsel’s request for,
or consent to, a reasonable delay to preserve defendant’s right to representation by competent
counsel, the 35-day delay from March 28th to May 2nd was not attribute to the State.
Reasoning: Judgement was reversed, and the convictions were reinstated. Martin ordered a
motion, so it was the reasoning behind not having her own case heard in that 90-day time
frame. Plus, she never exercised her speedy-trial rights.