Mabanag vs Lopez Vito (G.R. NO.

 L-1123)

Journal – Adoption of the Enrolled Bill Theory

FACTS: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by
senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower
House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were
not considered in determining the required ¾ vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution
(proposing amendments to the Constitution) – which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At
the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the
Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of
Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been
short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition
of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC
cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill
or resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said
resolution was duly enacted by Congress.

HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and
an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of
the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of
a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The
SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with
considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the
opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy
in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the
copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two
documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would
give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies “shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”
**Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the
proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides:
“Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or
of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals
of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by
the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine
Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding
officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of
the due enactment thereof.”
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In
case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.
CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO. v. PEDRO GIMENEZ, GR No. L-17931, 1963-02-28
Facts:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund of
petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign
Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its
Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign... exchange transactions. To
supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the
procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in said
Republic Act No. 2609. Several times in November and December 1959, petitioner
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin
glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardboard producers-bought
foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde-which are the main raw
materials in the... production of said glues and paid therefor the aforementioned margin fee
aggregating P33.765.42. In May, 1960, petitioner made another purchase of foreign
exchange and paid the sum of P6,345.72 as margin fee therefor.
Issues:
whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of the
aforesaid margin fee.
Ruling:
it is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of
"urea and formaldehyde" is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the
measure... passed by Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61
Phil., 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., I; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-
18684, September 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake in the printing of... the bill
before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive on which
we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and
undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by
amendment or... curative legislation, not by judicial decree."
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
It is so ordered.
Morales vs. Subido; GR No. 1-29658; 27 February 1969
FACTS
In the Senate, the Committee on Government Reorganization, to which House Bill No. 6951 was
referred, reported a substitute measure. It is to this substitute bill that section 10 of the Act owes its
present form and substance. The provision of the substitute bill reads:
“No person may be appointed chief of the city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree and has
served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police
department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years
or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city for at least 8 years with the
rank of captain or higher.”
The petitioner asserted that there were various changes made in House Bill 6951 and according to the
Petitioner the House bill division deleted an entire provision and substituted what is now section 10 of
the Police Act of 1966, which section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. – No person may be appointed chief
of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree from a recognized institution of learning and
has served as chief of police with exemplary record or has served in the police department of any city
with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate
who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain
and/higher.
Petitioner even submitted documents that would appear that the omission of the phrase “who served
the police department of a city” was made not at any stage of the legislative proceedings but only in the
course of engrossment of the bill, more specifically in the proofreading stage and that the change was
not made by Congress but only by an employee.
It is for this reason that the Petitioner would have the court look searchingly into the matter.

ISSUE
Whether the Judiciary can assail the validity of an enrolled bill by investigating the legislative process.

RULING
Negative, the Judiciary cannot be a “sleuth” trying to determine what actually happen in the process of
lawmaking without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the
cornerstone of our democratic system. The investigation which the Petitioner would like the Court to
make can be better done in Congress.
The enrolled bill prevails in any discrepancy.
ASTORGA vs. VILLEGAS

FACTS: RA 4065 was passed which amended the Revised Charter of the of the City of

Manila and provided for the power, duties and rights of the vice-mayor of the city. It tumns
out that the bill which was signed into law contained amendments different form those approved
by the Senate, The President of the Philippines after learning of such, had
already withdrawn his signature therefrom. This being the case, the Mayor of Manila issued
circulars to the various departments of the local govemnment unit to disregard the provisions
ofthe said law. thus, the petitioner, then vice-mayor of Manila filed a petition for Mandamus,
lnjunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction to compel
the necessary parties to comply with the law. Respondents alleged, hovever, that the bill
never became a law as it was not the bill approved by Senate, and in such a case, the entries in
the journal, and not the enrolled bill itself should be the basis for the decision of the Court.

RULING:
ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE
The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on “the respect due to coequal and independent
departments. which requires the judicial department to accept, as having passed Congress, all
bills authenticated in the manner stated. If the attestation is absent and the same is not required
for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress
for proof of its due enactment.
That attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of due enactment of the
law cannot apply in this case because the Senate President himself had already declared his
signature on the bill to be invalid. Thus, the enrolled bill doctrine cannot apply.
CERTIFICATION OF BILLS
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by
the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication.The lawmaking process in Congress
ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity
of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval
by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential.
LEGISLATIVE JOURNALS
While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and
other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. The Court is merely asked to inquire whether the
text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the chief Executive was the same text passed by both
Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do
this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose.
TANADA VS. TUVERA

Facts:

                Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the
disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been
published as required by Law. The government argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon approval.
The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of
the decrees. The court ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette all
unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force and effect. The
petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not. The publication means complete publication, and
that publication must be made in the official gazette. In a comment required by the
solicitor general, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion
and therefore be dismissed. And on the clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2
of the new civil code meant that the publication  required therein was not always
imperative, that the publication when necessary, did not have to be made in the official
gazette.

Issues:

(1)    Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.

(2)    Whether or not publication in the official gazette must be in full.

Held:

(1)    The court held that all statute including those of local application shall be
published as condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

(2)    The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to

inform the public of the content of the laws.
PLAIN MEANING RULE
Republic Vs. Lacap
Facts
The District Engineer of Pampanga, issued and duly published an “invitation to bid”, where
Lacap was awarded as the lowest bidder. Accordingly, the latter undertook the works, made advances for
the purchase of materials and payment for labor costs.
On October 29, 1992 the office of the DE issued Certification of Final Inspection and Acceptance
for 100% completion of project in accordance with specifications. The respondent sought to collect
payment but Department of Public Works and Highways withheld payment after the District Auditor of
Commission on Audit disapproved final release of funds on the ground that contractor’s license had
expired. Opinion of the DPWH Legal Department was sought by the District Engineer. The former then
responded that RA No. 4566 does not provide that a contract entered into after the license has expired is
void and that there is no law which expressly prohibits such a contract void. Furthermore, Cesar D. Mejia,
Director III of the Legal Department in a First Indorsement, recommended the payment should be made
to Carwin Construction. However, no payment was made.
On July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint through Office of the Solicitor General for
Specific Performance and Damages against petitioner before the RTC. Petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint on September 14, 1995 on the grounds that complaint states no cause of action and
RTC had no jurisdiction since respondent did not appeal to COA. RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. The
OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was likewise denied by RTC, in its order on May 23, 1996.
On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking defense of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies and doctrine of non-suability of the State. Following the trial, the RTC rendered on February 19,
1997 its decision ordering the DPWH to pay the contract price plus interest at 12% from demand until
fully paid and the costs of the suit.

Issue: Whether or not a contractor with an expired license at the time of execution of its contract is
entitled to be paid for completed projects?

Held:
Yes. The petitioner must be required to pay the contract price since it has accepted the completed project
and enjoyed the benefits thereof. To allow petitioner to acquire the finished project at no cost would
undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the petitioner to the prejudice of respondent. Such unjust
enrichment is not allowed by law.

The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. 40 This rule derived from
the maxim Index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the
words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intention or will and preclude the court
from construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used
words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by use of such words as are found in the statute. 41 Verba legis
non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.42

The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered
into by a contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment of
the fine prescribed therein. Thus, respondent should be paid for the projects he completed. Such payment,
however, is without prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribed under the law.

Besides, Article 22 of the Civil Code which embodies the maxim Nemo ex alterius incommode debet
lecupletari (no man ought to be made rich out of another’s injury) states: Art. 22. Every person who through an
act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND
GAMING CORPORATION
(PAGCOR), Petitioner,
versus PHILIPPINE GAMING
JURISDICTION INCORPORATED
(PEJI),
ZAMBOANGA CITY SPECIAL
ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY,
et al.,Respondent.
2009-04-24 | G.R. No. 177333
Facts
:
On 23 February 1995, R.A. No.
7903 was enacted into law, to
which it conceived the Zamboanga
City Special Economic Zone
(ZAMBOECOZONE) and the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority.
Among other things, the law gives
the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority
the following power under
Sec. 7 (f)
Section 7.
(f) To operate on its own, either
directly or through a subsidiary
entity,
or license to others, tourism-
related activities, including
games,
amusements and recreational and
sports facilities;
In the exercise of its power granted
under the above provision, public
respondent
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority
approved the application of private
respondent Philippine E-
Gaming Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) to
be a Master Licensor/Regulator of
on-line/internet/electronic
gaming/games of chance within the
economic zone.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) filed the
present petition for
Prohibition which assails the
authority of the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to
operate, license,
or regulate the operation of games
of chance in the
ZAMBOECOZONE.
Issue
: WoN ZAMBOECOZONE
Authority has the mandate of
authorizing a private company,
PEJI, to be a Master
Licensor/Regulator of on-
line/internet/electronic
gaming/games of chance
within the economic zone.
Held:
No. Public respondent
Zamboanga Economic Zone
Authority is DIRECTED to
CEASE and
DESIST from exercising
jurisdiction to operate, license, or
otherwise authorize and regulate
the
operation of any games of chance.
The words "game" and
"amusement" have definite and
unambiguous meanings in law
which are
clearly different from "game of
chance" or "gambling." In its
ordinary sense, a "game" is a sport,
pastime, or contest; while an
"amusement" is a pleasurable
occupation of the senses, diversion,
or
enjoyment. On the other hand, a
"game of chance" is "a game in
which chance rather than skill
determines the outcome," while
"gambling" is defined as "making a
bet" or "a play for value
against an uncertain event in hope
of gaining something of value."
The plain meaning rule or verba
legis, derived from the maxim
index animi sermo est (speech is
the index of intention), rests on the
valid presumption that the words
employed by the legislature
in a statute correctly express its
intention or will, and preclude the
court from construing it
differently. For the legislature is
presumed to know the meaning of
the words, to have used them
advisedly, and to have expressed
the intent by use of such words as
are found in the statute. Verba
legis non est recedendum. From the
words of a statute there should be no
departure.
The spirit and reason of the statute
may be passed upon where a literal
meaning would lead
to absurdity, contradiction, injustice,
or defeat the clear purpose of the
lawmakers.
Using
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND
GAMING CORPORATION
(PAGCOR), Petitioner,
versus PHILIPPINE GAMING
JURISDICTION INCORPORATED
(PEJI),
ZAMBOANGA CITY SPECIAL
ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY,
et al.,Respondent.
2009-04-24 | G.R. No. 177333
Facts
:
On 23 February 1995, R.A. No.
7903 was enacted into law, to
which it conceived the Zamboanga
City Special Economic Zone
(ZAMBOECOZONE) and the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority.
Among other things, the law gives
the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority
the following power under
Sec. 7 (f)
Section 7.
(f) To operate on its own, either
directly or through a subsidiary
entity,
or license to others, tourism-
related activities, including
games,
amusements and recreational and
sports facilities;
In the exercise of its power granted
under the above provision, public
respondent
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority
approved the application of private
respondent Philippine E-
Gaming Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) to
be a Master Licensor/Regulator of
on-line/internet/electronic
gaming/games of chance within the
economic zone.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) filed the
present petition for
Prohibition which assails the
authority of the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to
operate, license,
or regulate the operation of games
of chance in the
ZAMBOECOZONE.
Issue
: WoN ZAMBOECOZONE
Authority has the mandate of
authorizing a private company,
PEJI, to be a Master
Licensor/Regulator of on-
line/internet/electronic
gaming/games of chance
within the economic zone.
Held:
No. Public respondent
Zamboanga Economic Zone
Authority is DIRECTED to
CEASE and
DESIST from exercising
jurisdiction to operate, license, or
otherwise authorize and regulate
the
operation of any games of chance.
The words "game" and
"amusement" have definite and
unambiguous meanings in law
which are
clearly different from "game of
chance" or "gambling." In its
ordinary sense, a "game" is a sport,
pastime, or contest; while an
"amusement" is a pleasurable
occupation of the senses, diversion,
or
enjoyment. On the other hand, a
"game of chance" is "a game in
which chance rather than skill
determines the outcome," while
"gambling" is defined as "making a
bet" or "a play for value
against an uncertain event in hope
of gaining something of value."
The plain meaning rule or verba
legis, derived from the maxim
index animi sermo est (speech is
the index of intention), rests on the
valid presumption that the words
employed by the legislature
in a statute correctly express its
intention or will, and preclude the
court from construing it
differently. For the legislature is
presumed to know the meaning of
the words, to have used them
advisedly, and to have expressed
the intent by use of such words as
are found in the statute. Verba
legis non est recedendum. From the
words of a statute there should be no
departure.
The spirit and reason of the statute
may be passed upon where a literal
meaning would lead
to absurdity, contradiction, injustice,
or defeat the clear purpose of the
lawmakers.
Using
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND
GAMING CORPORATION
(PAGCOR), Petitioner,
versus PHILIPPINE GAMING
JURISDICTION INCORPORATED
(PEJI),
ZAMBOANGA CITY SPECIAL
ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY,
et al.,Respondent.
2009-04-24 | G.R. No. 177333
Facts
:
On 23 February 1995, R.A. No.
7903 was enacted into law, to
which it conceived the Zamboanga
City Special Economic Zone
(ZAMBOECOZONE) and the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority.
Among other things, the law gives
the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority
the following power under
Sec. 7 (f)
Section 7.
(f) To operate on its own, either
directly or through a subsidiary
entity,
or license to others, tourism-
related activities, including
games,
amusements and recreational and
sports facilities;
In the exercise of its power granted
under the above provision, public
respondent
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority
approved the application of private
respondent Philippine E-
Gaming Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) to
be a Master Licensor/Regulator of
on-line/internet/electronic
gaming/games of chance within the
economic zone.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) filed the
present petition for
Prohibition which assails the
authority of the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to
operate, license,
or regulate the operation of games
of chance in the
ZAMBOECOZONE.
Issue
: WoN ZAMBOECOZONE
Authority has the mandate of
authorizing a private company,
PEJI, to be a Master
Licensor/Regulator of on-
line/internet/electronic
gaming/games of chance
within the economic zone.
Held:
No. Public respondent
Zamboanga Economic Zone
Authority is DIRECTED to
CEASE and
DESIST from exercising
jurisdiction to operate, license, or
otherwise authorize and regulate
the
operation of any games of chance.
The words "game" and
"amusement" have definite and
unambiguous meanings in law
which are
clearly different from "game of
chance" or "gambling." In its
ordinary sense, a "game" is a sport,
pastime, or contest; while an
"amusement" is a pleasurable
occupation of the senses, diversion,
or
enjoyment. On the other hand, a
"game of chance" is "a game in
which chance rather than skill
determines the outcome," while
"gambling" is defined as "making a
bet" or "a play for value
against an uncertain event in hope
of gaining something of value."
The plain meaning rule or verba
legis, derived from the maxim
index animi sermo est (speech is
the index of intention), rests on the
valid presumption that the words
employed by the legislature
in a statute correctly express its
intention or will, and preclude the
court from construing it
differently. For the legislature is
presumed to know the meaning of
the words, to have used them
advisedly, and to have expressed
the intent by use of such words as
are found in the statute. Verba
legis non est recedendum. From the
words of a statute there should be no
departure.
The spirit and reason of the statute
may be passed upon where a literal
meaning would lead
to absurdity, contradiction, injustice,
or defeat the clear purpose of the
lawma
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND
GAMING CORPORATION
(PAGCOR), Petitioner,
versus PHILIPPINE GAMING
JURISDICTION INCORPORATED
(PEJI),
ZAMBOANGA CITY SPECIAL
ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY,
et al.,Respondent.
2009-04-24 | G.R. No. 177333
Facts
:
On 23 February 1995, R.A. No.
7903 was enacted into law, to
which it conceived the Zamboanga
City Special Economic Zone
(ZAMBOECOZONE) and the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority.
Among other things, the law gives
the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority
the following power under
Sec. 7 (f)
Section 7.
(f) To operate on its own, either
directly or through a subsidiary
entity,
or license to others, tourism-
related activities, including
games,
amusements and recreational and
sports facilities;
In the exercise of its power granted
under the above provision, public
respondent
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority
approved the application of private
respondent Philippine E-
Gaming Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) to
be a Master Licensor/Regulator of
on-line/internet/electronic
gaming/games of chance within the
economic zone.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) filed the
present petition for
Prohibition which assails the
authority of the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to
operate, license,
or regulate the operation of games
of chance in the
ZAMBOECOZONE.
Issue
: WoN ZAMBOECOZONE
Authority has the mandate of
authorizing a private company,
PEJI, to be a Master
Licensor/Regulator of on-
line/internet/electronic
gaming/games of chance
within the economic zone.
Held:
No. Public respondent
Zamboanga Economic Zone
Authority is DIRECTED to
CEASE and
DESIST from exercising
jurisdiction to operate, license, or
otherwise authorize and regulate
the
operation of any games of chance.
The words "game" and
"amusement" have definite and
unambiguous meanings in law
which are
clearly different from "game of
chance" or "gambling." In its
ordinary sense, a "game" is a sport,
pastime, or contest; while an
"amusement" is a pleasurable
occupation of the senses, diversion,
or
enjoyment. On the other hand, a
"game of chance" is "a game in
which chance rather than skill
determines the outcome," while
"gambling" is defined as "making a
bet" or "a play for value
against an uncertain event in hope
of gaining something of value."
The plain meaning rule or verba
legis, derived from the maxim
index animi sermo est (speech is
the index of intention), rests on the
valid presumption that the words
employed by the legislature
in a statute correctly express its
intention or will, and preclude the
court from construing it
differently. For the legislature is
presumed to know the meaning of
the words, to have used them
advisedly, and to have expressed
the intent by use of such words as
are found in the statute. Verba
legis non est recedendum. From the
words of a statute there should be no
departure.
The spirit and reason of the statute
may be passed upon where a literal
meaning would lead
to absurdity, contradiction, injustice,
or defeat the clear purpose of the
lawma
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND
GAMING CORPORATION
(PAGCOR), Petitioner,
versus PHILIPPINE GAMING
JURISDICTION INCORPORATED
(PEJI),
ZAMBOANGA CITY SPECIAL
ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY,
et al.,Respondent.
2009-04-24 | G.R. No. 177333
Facts
:
On 23 February 1995, R.A. No.
7903 was enacted into law, to
which it conceived the Zamboanga
City Special Economic Zone
(ZAMBOECOZONE) and the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority.
Among other things, the law gives
the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority
the following power under
Sec. 7 (f)
Section 7.
(f) To operate on its own, either
directly or through a subsidiary
entity,
or license to others, tourism-
related activities, including
games,
amusements and recreational and
sports facilities;
In the exercise of its power granted
under the above provision, public
respondent
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority
approved the application of private
respondent Philippine E-
Gaming Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) to
be a Master Licensor/Regulator of
on-line/internet/electronic
gaming/games of chance within the
economic zone.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) filed the
present petition for
Prohibition which assails the
authority of the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to
operate, license,
or regulate the operation of games
of chance in the
ZAMBOECOZONE.
Issue
: WoN ZAMBOECOZONE
Authority has the mandate of
authorizing a private company,
PEJI, to be a Master
Licensor/Regulator of on-
line/internet/electronic
gaming/games of chance
within the economic zone.
Held:
No. Public respondent
Zamboanga Economic Zone
Authority is DIRECTED to
CEASE and
DESIST from exercising
jurisdiction to operate, license, or
otherwise authorize and regulate
the
operation of any games of chance.
The words "game" and
"amusement" have definite and
unambiguous meanings in law
which are
clearly different from "game of
chance" or "gambling." In its
ordinary sense, a "game" is a sport,
pastime, or contest; while an
"amusement" is a pleasurable
occupation of the senses, diversion,
or
enjoyment. On the other hand, a
"game of chance" is "a game in
which chance rather than skill
determines the outcome," while
"gambling" is defined as "making a
bet" or "a play for value
against an uncertain event in hope
of gaining something of value."
The plain meaning rule or verba
legis, derived from the maxim
index animi sermo est (speech is
the index of intention), rests on the
valid presumption that the words
employed by the legislature
in a statute correctly express its
intention or will, and preclude the
court from construing it
differently. For the legislature is
presumed to know the meaning of
the words, to have used them
advisedly, and to have expressed
the intent by use of such words as
are found in the statute. Verba
legis non est recedendum. From the
words of a statute there should be no
departure.
The spirit and reason of the statute
may be passed upon where a literal
meaning would lead
to absurdity, contradiction, injustice,
or defeat the clear purpose of the
lawma
BOLOS V. BOLOS 
634 SCRA 429, [October 20, 2010]
FACTS:
Petitioner Cynthia Bolos(Cynthia)filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code. After trial on the merits, the RTC
granted the petition for annulment. A copy of said decision was received by respondent Danilo and he
thereafter timely filed the Notice of Appeal.
The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the required motion for
reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Thereafter, the RTC issued the order declaring its
decision declaring the marriage null and void as final and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of
Judgment filed by Cynthia. Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition forcertiorari under Rule
65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically
capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of
abandoning him, the family home and their children.
The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC declaring
the nullity of marriage as final and executory. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a
motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this
case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the
Family Code took effect.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before
the effectivity of the Family Code. According to petitioner, the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.” Such that petitions
filed after the effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the A.M. No. even if the marriage was
solemnized before the same. Danilo, in his Comment, counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not
applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its
effectivity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled “Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,” is applicable to the case at bench.
HELD:
No, it does not.
RATIO:
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is
explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
“Section 1. Scope.—This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.”
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt.
The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code
which took effect on August 3, 1988. 7 The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by
the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. 8 The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to
petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to
the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.”
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied due
course to respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to  file a motion for
reconsideration.
G.R. No. L-25326 May 29, 1970
IGMIDIO HIDALGO vs. POLICARPIO HIDALGO

DOCTRINE:
Where the true intent of the law is clear, such intent or spirit must prevail over the letter thereof.
Whatever is within the spirit of a statue is within the statute, since adherence to the letter would result in
absurdity, injustice, and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute.

FACTS:
Policarpio Hidalgo was until the time of the execution of the deeds of sale on September 27, 1963 and
March 2, 1964 in favor of his seven above-named private co-respondents, the owner of the 22,876-square meter
and 7,638-square meter agricultural parcels of land situated in Lumil, San Jose, Batangas.
In Case L-25326, Policarpio sold the 22,876-square meter parcel of land, together with two other parcels
of land for P4,000.00. Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Resales, as tenants thereof, alleging that the parcel worked by
them as tenants is fairly worth P1,500.00, "taking into account the respective areas, productivities, accessibilities,
and assessed values of three lots, seek by way of redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the same amount
of P1,500.00 by Policarpio in their favor.
 In Case L-25327, Policarpio sold the 7,638-square meter parcel of land for P750.00, and Hilario Aguila and
Adela Hidalgo as tenants thereof, seek by way of redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the same price of
P750.00 by Policarpio in their favor.
The Igmidio and others have for several years been working on the lands as share tenants. No 90-day
notice of intention to sell the lands for the exercise of the right of pre-emption prescribed by section 11 of the
Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844, enacted on August 8, 1963) was given by Policarpio to
petitioners-tenants. Subsequently, the deeds of sale executed by Policarpio-vendor were registered by
respondents register of deeds and provincial assessor of Batangas in the records of their respective offices
notwithstanding the non-execution by Policarpio-vendor of the affidavit required by section 13 of the Land Reform
Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs as share tenants are entitled to redeem the parcel of land they are working
form the purchases thereof, where no notice was previously given to them by the vendor, who was their
landholder of the latter's intention to sell the property and where the vendor did not execute the affidavit required
by Section 13 of RA 3844 before the registration of the deed of sale. Or, is the right of redemption granted by
Section 12 of RA 3844 applicable to share tenants?

HELD:
The code intended to afford the farmers' who transitionally continued to be share tenants after its
enactment but who inexorably would be agricultural lessees by virtue of the Code's proclaimed abolition of
tenancy, the same priority and preferential right as those other share tenants, who upon the enactment of the
Code or soon thereafter were earlier converted by fortuitous circumstance into agricultural lessees, to acquire the
lands under their cultivation in the event of their voluntary sale by the owner or of their acquisition, by
expropriation or otherwise, by the Land Authority. It then becomes the court's duty to enforce the intent and will
of the Code, for "... (I)n fact, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof.' (Tañada vs. Cuenco,
L-10520, Feb. 23, 1957, citing 82 C.J.S., p. 526.) A statute 'should be construed according to its spirit or intention,
disregarding as far as necessary, the letter of the law.' (Lopez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil. 855.)
By this, we do not correct the act of the Legislature, but rather ... carry out and give due course to 'its intent.

Therefore, the decision of Agrarian Court is reversed and the petitions to redeem the subject landholdings
are granted. In case L-25326 however the case is remanded to the agrarian court to determine the reasonable
price to be paid by petitioners therein to Policarpio Hidalgo for redemption of the landholding in accordance with
the observations made.

ISSUE:

Was the agrarian court erred in dismissing the petition?

HELD:

The agrarian court erred in dismissing the petition on the basis of its conclusion that the right of
redemption granted by Sec12 of Land Reform Code is available to “leasehold tenants” only and not “shares
tenants” and that their respective rights and obligations are not coextensive or coequal.

The very essence of Agricultural Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share tenancy. It was
error of the agrarian court to state that “the systems of agricultural tenancy recognized in this jurisdiction are
share tenancy and leasehold tenancy” even after the enactment of the Land Reform Code.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:

The Court has consistently held in line with authoritative principles of statutory construction that, it will
reject a narrow and literal interpretation, such as that given by the agrarian court, that would defeat and frustrate
rather than foster and give life to the law's declared policy and intent. Finally, under the established jurisprudence
of the Court, in the interpretation of tenancy and labor legislation, it will be guided by more than just an inquiry
into the letter of the law as against its spirit and will ultimately resolve grave doubts in favor of the tenant and
worker.

“PLEASE CONCENTRATE ON THE DOCTRINE AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION”

There are three well-settled principles of constitutional construction:

first, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution should be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed;

second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima, meaning that the words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers; and

third, ut magis valeat quam pereat, meaning that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.3

VERBA LEGIS = verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation

RATIO LEGIS EST ANIMA = The reason of the law is the soul of the law

UT MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT = referring to a legal concept that stands for trying to coonstrue a law in
a way to make sense, rather than void it. The law should be given effect rather than be
destroyed.

Demafiles vs. Comelec

21 SCRA 1463, G.R. No. L-28396
29 December 1967
Castro, J.
FACTS: The new municipality of Sebaste held its first election of officers with the petitioners Agripino
Demafiles and respondent Benito Galida vying for the mayoralty. Galide questioned the provincial board
to disregard, as “obviously manufactured,” the election return from precinct 7 on the ground that said
return shows that 195 voters were registered, 188 voted, when according to a certificate of the municipal
election registrar, only 182 had registered.
Galido won over Demafiles and was proclaimed mayor-elect. Demafiles protested to the COMELEC
on the board’s rejection of the election returns from precinct 7, the subsequent proclamation of Galide,
and challenging the right of two board members who were reelectionists. The COMELEC annulled the
canvas and proclamation. Upon the motion of Galido, the COMELEC reconsidered its previous decision
and held that the canvas and proclamation made stands.

ISSUES: Whether or not a pre-proclamation election case has become moot because the proclaimed
winner had immediately taken his oath pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. No. 4870 which provides that the
“first mayor, vice-mayor and councillors of the municipality of Sebaste shall be elected in the next
general elections for local officials and shall have qualified.”
RULING: The court, rejecting the argument, ruled: “In our view, the last portion of the provision—‘and
shall have qualified’—is devoid of any meaning, is unmitigated jargon in or out of context, and does not
warrant the respondent’s reading that the term of office of the first municipal officials of Sebaste begins
immediately after their proclamation.
It is quite probable that this is what the legislature meant. Here is a clear case of a failure to express a
meaning, and a becoming sense of judicial modesty forbids the court from assuming and, consequently,
from supplying.

The term of municipal officials shall begin on the first day of January following their election, and so
the assumption of office by the respondent Galido in no way affected the basic issues in this case.

Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

Full Text:

Facts:

Conrado Macabenta was a laborer in the sawmill of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company ate Manay,
Panabo, Davao, about 48 kilometers from his residence in Davao City. Although quarters were provided
by the respondent to its employees at the sawmill  many of them preferred to commute and the deceased
went home about thrice a week, to which the respondent furnished the transportation. On the day
following the accident, Conrado and Leonora were lawfully wedded in a marriage ceremony solemnized
at San Pedro Hospital, Davao City, where the deceased was hospitalized up to his death. Leonora gave
birth to the posthumous daughter at the deceased named Raquel. 

Issue:

Whether or not the widow of a deceased employee whose marriage occurred after the accident as well as
the posthumous child could be considered dependents within the meaning of the Workmen's
Compensation Act.

Held:

Yes, they are dependents whiting that of expressed in the Workmen's Compensation Act. 

From the express language of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a widow living with the deceased or
actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under 18 years of age or
incapable of supporting him or herself, and unmarried, whether or not actually dependent upon the
deceased are considered dependents.

It is also supported in the fundamental principle that once the policy or purpose of the law has been
ascertained, effect should be given to it by judiciary. Even if honest doubts could be entertained,
therefore, as to the meaning of statutory provisions, still respect for such a basic doctrine calls for a
rejection of the plea of DSTC.

Assuming a choice is necessary between conflicting theories, that which best conforms to the language of
the statute and its purpose should prevail. In US v. Toribio, SC held that no construction is to be adopted
that would tend "to defeat the purpose and object of the legislator."

Therefore, the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission of awarding the claimant widow for
herself and in behalf of her minor child the compensation and attorney's fees is affirmed.

People vs. Salas

Facts:

Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the CFI Cebu but before he could be arraigned the case was reinvestigated
on motion of the prosecution. As a result of the reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, with no bail
recommended, to which he pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced, but while it was in progress, the prisoner, escaped. The judge,
learning later of the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's rearrest. Abong, however, was gone.
Nonetheless (Bernardo Salas), the prosecution moved that the hearing continue in accordance with the constitutional provision
authorizing trial in absentia under certain circumstances. the judge denied the motion, however, and suspended all proceedings
until the return of the accused. The order of the trial court is before the Supreme Court on certiorari and mandamus.
Issue: Whether Abong may be tried in absentia, in light of his escape.

Held:

Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides that "In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to
have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustified." The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could in
the past be indefinitely deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because of the defendant's escape.

The old case of People v. Avanceña (32 OG 713) required his presence at certain stages of the trial which as a result, had to be
discontinued as long as the defendant had not reappeared or remained at large.

As his right tobe present at these stages was then held not waivable even by his escape, such escape thus operated to the
fugitive's advantage, and in mockery of the authorities, insofar as the trial could not proceed as long as he had not been
recaptured. The doctrine laid down in that case has been modified by Section 19, which now allows trial in absentia,

 Now, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possibly eventual conviction provided only
that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified.  Thus, the right
to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present witnesses
who will identify the accused. Under Section 19, the defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability
of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to
have received due notice. The same fact of his escape will make his failure to appear unjustified because he has, by escaping,
placed himself beyond the pale, and protection, of the law.

Doctrine:

  their escape should have been considered a waiver of their right to be present at their trial, and the inability of the court to
notify them of the subsequent hearings did not prevent it from continuing with their trial.   They were to be deemed to have
received notice.   The same fact of their escape made their failure to appear unjustified because they have, by escaping, placed
themselves beyond the pale and protection of the law. 

We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its
purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in "the letter that
killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth," which is not really that evanescent or elusive. As judges, we
must look beyond and not be bound by the language of the law, seeking to discover, by our own
lights, the reason and the rhyme for its enactment. That we may properly apply it according to its
ends, we need and must use not only learning but also vision.

Alonzo v. IAC
May 23, 2018

Statutory Construction.  Ratio legis.

Alonzo v. IAC
G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987FACTS:

Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal  pro indiviso shares a parcel of land
registered in the name of their deceased parents. One of them, Celestino Padua,
transferred his undivided share of the herein petitioners by way of absolute sale. One
year later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the
same vendees. The petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to
two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. On February 25, 1976,
Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, sought to redeem the area sold to the spouses
Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it appeared that he was an American
citizen. On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her own
complaint invoking the same right of redemption claimed by her brother.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a written notice is required in relation to Article 1088 of the Civil Code

HELD:
Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are
some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular
case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound,
because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish
obedience to their language. The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines
its construction, hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what
is within the spirit is within the letter but although it is not within the letter thereof, and
that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. In
requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is properly
notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the
30-day period of redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really
necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to begin, to
obviate any problem of alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only a day or two. The
instant case presents no such problem because the right of redemption was invoked
not days  but years  after the sales were made in 1963 and 1964. The complaint was filed
by Tecla Padua in 1977, thirteen years after the first sale and fourteen years after the
second sale. The delay invoked by the petitioners extends to more than a decade,
assuming of course that there was a valid notice that tolled the running of the period of
redemption. The co-heirs, in this case, were undeniably informed of the sales although
no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day
period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the
filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their
right of redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.
Rufino Lopez & Sons vs Court of Tax Appeals GR L-9274
 
FACTS:
1. Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting from Hamburg, Germany. The Manila Collector of
Customs assessed the corresponding customs duties on the importation on the basis of consular and
supplies invoices. Said customs duties were paid and the shipments were released. Subsequently,
however, and freight of said wire netting and as a result of their assessment, additional customs duties
were levied and imposed upon petitioner.2. On May 23, 1955, a motion to dismiss was filed at the Court
of Tax Appeal but was dismissed on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the
Collector of Customs of Manila, citing section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, creating said tax court
ISSUE:
Whether Section 11 of RA 1125 allows the respondent court to review decisions of the Collector of
Customs
RULING:
The court holds that under the law, particularly, the Customs Law and Republic Act No. 1125, the Court
of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction to review by appeal, decisions of the Collector of Customs. The
Commissioner of Customs is purely administrative, whereas, appeal to the Court of Tax Appeal is
manifestly judicial. And it is a sound rule that before one resorts to the Courts, the administrative remedy
provided by law should first be exhausted. In the second place, the two remedies suggested by the
petitioner would result in confusion because a person adversely affected by a decision of a Collector of
Customs could not be sure where to seek the remedy, whether with the Commissioner of Customs or with
the Court of Tax Appeals, and it might even be difficult for him to decide because, if he took the
appeal directly to the Tax Court, that would ordinarily cut off his remedy before the Commissioner of
Customs for the reason that, should the Court of Tax Appeals decide against him, he may not appeal said
decision to the Commissioner of Customs because the Commissioner as an administrative officer may not
review the decision of the Court. On the other hand, if the person affected by a decision of a Collector of
Customs took his appeal to the Commissioner of Customs, and there receives an adverse decision, he may
yet appeal wherefrom to the Court of Tax Appeals. In the third place, even if the person affected by an
adverse ruling of the Collector of Customs took his appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, as advocated by
counsel for the petitioner, under the literal meaning of section 11, the Tax Court may refuse to entertain
said appeal, as was done in the present case, on the ground that under section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125,
it had no jurisdiction to review a decision of the Collector of Customs, section 7 clearly limiting its
appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs.

People vs. duque

PARAS v COMELEC
G.R. No. 123169

Facts:
Petitioner is an elected barangay chairman of Pula, Cabanatuan City in 1994. Sometime in October 1995,
A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by his constituents. Public respondent COMELEC
resolved to approve the petition and set the recall election on November 13. In view of the petitioner’s
opposition, COMELEC deferred the election and rescheduled it on December 16, 1995. To prevent the
recall election from taking place, the petitioner filed a petition for injunction before the RTC. The trial
court issued a TRO. After conducting a summary hearing, the court dismissed the petition and lifted the
restraining order. The public respondent on a resolution date January 5, 1996, rescheduled the recall
election to be held January 13, 1996. Hence, this petition for certiorari. The petitioner argues the
pursuant to Section 74b of the Local Government code: “no recall shall take place within one (1) year
from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local
election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred (SK)
election was set on the first Monday of May 1996.

Issue:
 Whether or not the recall election in question is in violation to the provisions of Section 74b of the Local
Government Code.

Held:
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to
the context, that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Paras’ interpretation of the law is too literal
that it does not accord with the intentions of the authors of the law. The spirit rather that the letters of
a law determines its construction. Hence, it was held that the “regular local election” refers to an
election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled.
 Casela vs. Court of Appeals
35 SCRA 279, G.R. No. 26754
16 October 1970
Castro, J.
FACTS: The Court of Agrarian Relations ordered defendant Mateo Casela ejected in a case against him by Exequiel
Magsaysay. However, he refused to vacate and the court issued two more writs.
Instead of obeying, Casela instituted a civil case asking the respondent to pay him the value of his
house, improvements and damages thereto. Against this, Magsaysay filed for a writ of execution
pending the final outcome of the civil case. Casela filed a countermotion to declare defendant and the
sheriff in contempt of court. The Court of Appeals decided in favor of Magsaysay and said that the issue
should have been brought before the Agrarian Court instead of the Court of First Instance.

Magsaysay then filed a motion of an alias writ of execution to the Agrarian Court but was denied
holding that the first decision as to ejecting Casela was beyond the five year reglamentary period. He
moved for reconsideration which was granted. Hence, this appeal by Casela.
ISSUES: Whether or not Magsaysay’s motion for execution of December 11, 1963 was filed beyond the five-year
reglamentary period and thus prescribed.
RULING: From the date when the decision in question became final and executory (December 17, 1956) until
December 11, 1963 when Magsaysay’s motion for execution was filed, a period of six years, eleven months, and
twenty-four days had elapsed. From this period must be subtracted the time during which the writs of execution
could not be served due to reasons of acts or causes not of Magsaysay’s own making or a period of three years, nine
months and twenty five days. Consequently, only three years, one month and twenty nine days can be charged
against the five year reglamentary period.
Conscience and equity should always be considered in the construction of statutes. The courts are
not hedged in by the literal meaning of the language of the statute; the spirit and intendment thereof
must prevail over its letter. This rule will especially be applicable where adherence to the letter of the
statute would result in absurdity and injustice.
Aisporna v. CA

FACTS:
Petitioner Aisporna was charged for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
Petitioner’s husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna (Rodolfo) was duly licensed by the Insurance Commission as agent to
Perla Compania de Seguros. Thru Rodolfo, a 12- month Personal Accident Policy was issued by Perla with
beneficiary to Ana M. Isidro for P50,000. The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy.
Subsequently, petitioner was charged because the aforementioned policy was issued with her active participation,
which is not allowed because she did not possess a certificate of authority to act as agent from the office of the
Insurance Commission.
Petitioner contended that being the wife of Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, and that the policy was
merely a renewal and was issued because her husband was not around when Isidro called by telephone. Instead,
appellant left a note on top of her husband’s desk.
The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. On appeal, the trial court’s decisions was affirmed by respondent
appellate court, finding petitioner guilty of a violation of the first paragraph of Sec 189 of the insurance act.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance
Act without reference to the second paragraph of the same section.

RULING:
The petition is meritorious. Petition appealed from is reversed, and accused is acquitted of the crime charged.
A perusal of the provision in question shows that the first paragraph thereof prohibits a person from acting as
agent, sub-agent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a
certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, while its second paragraph defines who an
insurance agent is within the intent of this section and, finally, the third paragraph thereof prescribes the penalty
to be imposed for its violation.
The definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is intended to define the
word “agent” mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More significantly, in its
second paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition of an insurance agent is within the intent of Section
189.
Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the agent mentioned in the first and
second paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid three paragraphs of Section 189. Legislative intent must
be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should
not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. A statute must be
so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible.  More importantly
the doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a
statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made
clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found or with which it is associated. 
Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph is also applicable to the
agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive compensation by the agent is an essential element for a
violation of the first paragraph of the aforesaid section.
In the case at bar, the information does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance contracts by the accused
with Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction
of the accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in Our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every
element of the crime must be alleged and proved.
The accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

Republic v. CA and Molina

GR 108763, 13 February 1997
En Banc, Panganiban (p): 8 concur, 3 concur in result

Facts: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year
after. Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” on the early stages of the marriage, observed
from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his dependency from
his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel
became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to
Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple are separated-in-fact for more than three
years.

On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist
of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only
during the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void.
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals  denied the appeals and affirmed in
toto the RTC’s decision. Hence, the present recourse.

Issue: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity

Held: The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the
application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad
range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital
union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the
attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends
to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of
the marriage.

The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity; but appears to be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of
some marital obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof
belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity
must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically
permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be
embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same
code as regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the
State.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision; concluding that the
marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

Lamb v. Phipps
H. LAMB v. W.H. PHIPPS,
G.R. No. L-7806, July 12, 1912

FACTS:
Lamb was the superintendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony until he resigned on Dec. 31, 1911 due to ill health.
Before that he was assigned as provincial treasurer for Marinduque, Mindoro and Laguna. He requested the
Auditor General, Phipps, for his clearance certificate (showing that Lamb has accounted for all property and funds
under his custody) in order that Lamb may be allowed to leave the Philippines without incurring criminal liability.
Phipps, although the records of the Auditor General show that Lamb indeed has settled his accounts, refuses to
issue the certificate because a certain Fernandez may bring a civil suit against the government. However the
records also show that Fernandez signed the receipt acknowledging payment from the government.
The petition for mandamus, asking the SC to compel Phipps to issue the certificate was demurred to by the auditor
because it is a suit against the government and the petition states no cause of action.
The SC initially asked Lamb to amend his petition but the latter did not do so hence the SC decided the case upon
the facts Lamb intended to make.

ISSUE:
Whether or not mandamus may issue to compel the auditor general to issue the certificate of clearance of Lamb.

HELD:
No, the certificate of clearance is needed only for bonded government employees and there is no averment that
Lamb is a bonded employee other than having custody of government property and funds, however, the SC
assumed that Lamb was a bonded officer.
We cannot believe that the legislature intended to limit the jurisdiction of this court in mandamus to the cases
where there was no other adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary courts of law. It is our duty, therefore, to
give the statute a sensible construction; such as will effectuate the legislative intention and, if possible, avoid an
injustice or an absurd conclusion. Clerical errors or misprints, which, if uncorrected, would render the statute
unmeaning or nonsensical or would defeat or impair its intended operation, will not vitiate the act; they will be
corrected by the court and the statute read as amended, provided the true meaning is obvious, and the real
meaning of the legislature is apparent of the face of the whole enactment.
It is confidently contended that the Auditor is not obliged under the law to accept a mere paper accounting as final
and conclusive as to the real responsibility of Government employees and to issue a clearance upon that alone. He
may, it is true, if he is satisfied; but certainly, he may, if he so desires and if he has any doubt about the correctness
of such accounts, make an actual examination of the funds and property represented by such paper accounts or
balances.
Barret v. Union Bridge, Co.

Barret v. Union Bridge, Co. • This suit is instituted to restrain the Union Bridge Company, as sole
defendant, from constructing or maintaining an approach to a public bridge, on a public street, in front
of plaintiff's premises in the City of Albany.
• The case is here upon an appeal by defendant from a decree given upon the final hearing of the
cause, perpetually enjoining the defendant from completing the construction of the approach, and from
maintaining the same in front of plaintiffs' premises.
• Plaintiffs contend that their being deprived of their right to the use of Ellsworth Street as a means of
ingress and egress to and from their property, through the construction and maintenance of the
approach, amounts to a taking of their property without compensation, and therefore violates the
provisions of both the state and federal Constitutions, and entitles them not only to the injunction
prayed for, but to have the structure removed as a common nuisance.
• In this suit the Union Bridge Company is made the sole defendant. Neither the County of Linn, the City
of Albany nor the State Highway Commission were made parties defendant. While engaged in
constructing this approach, the defendant company was acting under a contract with the State Highway
Commission, and it in turn was acting under a contract with the County of Linn and the City of Albany. So
far as the defendant company acted in accordance with the provisions of its contract, it not being
charged with negligence in the construction, or with having acted beyond the terms of its contract, it is
no more liable to suit, or answerable for damages, than the Highway Commission itself would have been
had it performed the work. Whatever the State Highway Commission could itself lawfully do in the
construction or improvement of a State highway, it could lawfully contract with another to do.
• Plaintiffs contend that while the Constitution only requires that compensation shall be made for
private property when taken for public use, it is within the power of the legislature to provide for
making compensation for property damaged, but not taken, and that such provision was made by
Sections 3196, 4561, 4562, 4718 and 4719, Or. L.
• While it is obvious that the legislature does have such power, we think that no such provision has been
enacted, either in the sections referred to or in any other act of the legislature.
• Section 3196 is a mere grant of power, authorizing any county in constructing a bridge located wholly,
or in part, within the limits of an incorporated city, to use such part of any street as may be necessary
for use as an approach to the bridge, and gives such county control over the part thus used. It has no
application to this particular question.
• Neither do Sections 4718 nor 4719.
• Sections 4561 and 4562 are a part of Chapter 295, Laws 1917. When these two sections are carefully
read in connection with the remainder of the act, and are considered in their relation to the history of
road legislation in this state, of which the act itself is in part a re-enactment, we think it will be found
that the legislature has not provided for the payment of compensation for damages caused to property
not included within the limits of a highway, unless in addition to the construction of the highway, there
has been some physical invasion of the property itself, such as that provided for and authorized by
Section 4561, namely, "diverting water or watercourses, or draining swamps, marshes, tide-land, tide-
flats, or ponds, or filling the same."
• For damages resulting from acts of that nature on private property adjacent to a public highway, not
done with the consent of the owner, compensation must be made, for otherwise there would be a
taking without just compensation, in violation of both the state and federal Constitutions. But for the
acts complained of, there is nothing in the statute indicating an intention upon the part of the
legislature to create any liability. Such an intention is not expressly declared in the act, nor can it even
be inferred if such would be sufficient by anything contained therein.