Professional Documents
Culture Documents
(Shapiro). For example, McDonald’s introduced the Egg McMuffin in 1973 to bolster
their dwindling morning sales, a move that now accounts for over 20 percent of total
revenues (Shapiro). In similar hopes, their Pizza planned to aid McDonald’s in crafting a
“dinner menu” offered after 4pm that would bring in families and adults in the evening
hours. Targeting an adult market was also a conscious decision made by the firm in
order to shift association away from McDonald’s being a children’s restaurant. An
impression left after the historic success of children’s happy meals, introduced in 1979
(Berss, 232). Targeting adults and families was a bold but necessary move in the eyes
of management, especially considering that “The introduction of salads in 1987 and
growth in breakfast sales were important elements in helping the company achieve its
23rd consecutive year of record sales” (Shapiro). With pressure so high to perform, it is
clear that McDonald’s was looking to expand its menu options with the hopes of
attracting a different demographic of customers. The main question remains whether
their newly targeted ‘pizza-lover’ demographic would willingly make the switch to
McDonald’s Pizza. Aiding them in their decision is McDonald’s proven track record in
providing meals at great value, in the shortest time possible, combined with their
unparalleled access across the country. McDonald’s was confident that the combination
of value and ease of access would be more than enough to turn customers away from
their favourite pizza parlours: their competition however, had other ideas.
II ) Main Competition
McDonald’s faced competition on various levels. Firstly, they pitted themselves
against the frozen-pizza take out market, competition that holds both value for money,
and ease of purchase, all while operating within its own $7 billion industry. Secondly,
McDonald’s aims to compete against small independent pizza parlours, although these
establishments may have a lower market share than their franchised counterparts,
convincing these specific customers to switch may prove most difficult. Their last, and
most prevalent competition are the nations’s leading pizza parlours. Pizza Hut heads
this category as the nations largest pizza chain with 6,300 domestic outlets, while
Dominos takes second place with 4,800 (Shapiro). No one seemed to take McDonald’s
move into the pizza business more seriously than these chains, which retaliated with a
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string of aggressive advertising campaigns. This was best encapsulated by Jack Levy,
president of Pizza Hut’s marketing firm, who said “Every place you see a McDonald’s
pizza, you’re going to see a war.” And he was not joking either, as Pizza Hut quickly
released prime time television advertisements ridiculing McDonalds pizza dough as
“McFrozen” and saying things such as “Don’t make a McStake. Come to Pizza Hut for a
real pizza” (Parasuraman, 214). These scathing campaigns highlight just how
concerned the competition was of McDonald’s presence within their market.
the negative consequences of various public opinions of that time. McDonald’s was
especially struggling in the domestic market, showing a pattern of progressively weaker
sales growth that began in 1988 after peeking at 11.6% in 1987 (AP, 13). These figures
could have potentially caused McDonald’s to rush into securing an additional revenue
stream without fully exploring every consequence of this action.
The social climate of this decade was one of newfound activism. Large
corporations were beginning to feel the negative public backlash in the wake of social
and environmental externalities caused by increased global operations, and McDonald’s
was no different. Environmental groups berated the firm for switching to the styrofoam
‘clamshell’ packaging in 1975 after decades of paper and cardboard packaging all
because it “kept the burger hot, the tomato and lettuce cold, and did not show grease
stains” (Kline, 2). And as links began to emerge between the plastic packaging and a
suspected carcinogenic, a grassroots organization launched the “McToxins” campaign,
which called the public to “Picket, lobby, and boycott McDonald’s to stop their use of
plastic packaging.” (Kline, 2). The social unrest did not stop their however, as parents
and adults began to chastise McDonald’s for coercing children into unhealthy lifestyles
from a young age. McDonald’s was entering a new, consumer-savvy, health conscious
era that would eventually lead to a total re-branding in 2007.
Although the macro-technological climate of the time was expanding
exponentially, the technological advances specific to McDonald’s and their pizza caused
more headaches than breakthroughs. Just creating a fast food pizza was a major
technical obstacle for McDonald’s, “Several years of work by equipment development
engineers at the company's headquarters produced a patented oven that bakes pizza in
just 5 1/2 minutes with superheated air” (Shapiro). The main obstruction was the
infrastructure needed to support a quick service Pizza delivery system. Test stores
reported having to remodel entire kitchens to accommodate pizza ovens while “Some
older drive through windows had to be widened so that's a boxed pizza could fit through
the opening” (Shapiro). These technological advances were not cheap either, excluding
the millions spend on research and development, each individual pizza oven costed up
to $50,000 (Berss, 233). With sunk costs so high, and kitchen efficiency coming into
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question, McDonald’s had a lot of people to prove wrong before their new product
implementation.
could do was watch their customers become frustrated by long wait times and confused
by inconsistent menu items, all while silently destroying the brand McDonald’s spent
decades, and billions on building: a fast-service burger restaurant chain.
The consumer was equally underwhelmed by the product launch. They were
being asked to do things they just were not accustomed to in a fast service food
restaurant, such as parking their car and waiting for 10 mins when going through a
drive-thru, or getting cold burgers and fries while waiting for their pizza, or having your
children finish all their food before yours even arrives (Notman, 20). Clearly all of these
situations would be frustrating for any consumer, and with so many alternative, more
reliable options available patrons did not stay for long.
Media attention surrounding the launch was electric. Building up to the event,
there was a lot of talk about whether McDonald’s would be able to weather the domestic
slump faced in the late 1980s and early 1990s, so by the time of product launch news
outlets were tripping over each other to give free airtime in order to get the story. The
media are instrumental in shaping public opinion, and will generally always propagate
the views of the majority. For this reason they can either greatly help or hinder firms,
purely by intensifying public opinion, for good or worse. Once they felt that the product
may not fair well, they greatly increased the negative impact against the McDonald’s
brand by magnifying the public’s discontent regarding wait times and menu confusion.
The Research and Development portion of the McDonald’s value chain was
probably the department who worked most closely with launching McDonald’s pizza.
They worked in headquarters to create special patented pizza ovens that could cook a
pizza perfectly in 5 minutes, while conducting extensive test marketing. The McDonald’s
pizza had been tested extensively since the early 1980s, with a drive thru pizza market
test dating as far back as 1975. McDonald’s has clearly been mindful of this option for
over a decade, yet they take so long to bring it to market. And still insist on investing
heavily in start up technology far before a national distribution plan has even been
considered. After examining the factors that attributed to the troubled launch, then
seeing how it failed from varying perspectives, finally we can look why it failed and what
could have been done to manage the situation better.
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asset is its distribution network, and it was going completely under-utilized. They also
grossly underused the press attention surrounding the launch. The media were literally
giving out free interviews on the matter and still McDonald’s fails to adequately promote
their product.
Recommendation #2. Rather than slowly introducing the pizza through a network of
various test markets, I would be sure to have fully tested the product (as privately as
possible) and then utilize McDonald’s presence by implementing a nation-wide
distribution chain. After investing so much in research and development funds need to
also be allocated to distribution and marketing, otherwise it doesn't matter how good the
product is, the consumer will never see it. Most reviews of the pizza were positive in
regards to taste, it was just logistical issues and a lack of national presence that
stopped McDonald’s Pizza solidifying its position on their menu. I would also advocate
for more thorough media presence, as touched on earlier, the media takes the public
opinion and amplifies it, either in favour of the firm or not. This potential marketing
channel could be instrumental in turing good news into great news, while easily and
accessibly being able to update your customers on any new developments, with a main
goal of creating excitement surrounding the product launch.
Perhaps even more disastrous than the launch itself, was that McDonald’s
allowed the unsuccessful item to struggle on for another 10 years before it was finally
stamped out in 2000. This stubbornness to cut their losses shows nearsightedness on
the part of management. Not only were the public subjected to a slow and arduous
testing phase, once the public rejected the product, it remained on some menus for
almost a decade! This constant reminder of a failed product is unacceptable to show to
your customers, and will have far more negative affect on your brand than any potential
loss on start-up investment.
Recommendation #3. Even after McDonald’s ruined testing and distribution, it should
have at least had the common sense to try and limit the brand damage. Continuing to
keep McDonald’s Pizza after a failed launch only with hopes of recuperating a portion of
your loss on investment is madness. The damage you are dealing to your brand each
day customers remain unsure of your core competency is far greater than any loss on
investment. I would have removed every sign and trace of this mistake as soon as I
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could after it was apparent the product launch was a failure. Next I would shift focus
heavily on main core-functions of the business and improve on these until your
customer places trust in you again. The sooner the product is off the menu, the sooner it
is gone from the public’s mind, and the sooner you can get working on re-building your
brand.
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VI ) Executive Summary
Appendix
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Works Cited
MacArthur, Kate. "McD's Aims to Get Happy with Pizza." Crain's Chicago Business.
Crain's Chicago Business, 04 Mar. 2000. Web. 01 Feb. 2015.
Notman, David, and Jack Wilson. The World of Marketing: A Canadian Perspective.
Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2003. 18-21. Print.
P., Nicholas. "Why You Don't Have Pizza Anymore?" McDonalds, Our Food. Your
Questions. McDonald's.com, 28 Sept. 2012. Web. 01 Feb. 2015.
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Bradley, Nigel. Marketing Research: Tools and Techniques. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006.
33-34. Print.
Associated Press. "COMPANY NEWS; McDonald's Begins Testing of Pizza." New York
Times 15 July 1989: n. pag. Print.
Shapiro, Eben. "McDonald's Hopes Pizza Will Be the Next McHit" New York Times 20
Sept. 1989: n. pag. Print.
Parasuraman, A., Dhruv Grewal, and R. Krishnan. Marketing Research. 2nd ed. N.p.:
Houghton Mifflin, 2007. Print.
Berss, Marcia. "Empty Tables." Forbes Magazine 6 Dec. 1993, 152nd ed., sec. 13:
232-35. Print.