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Ecological Economics 58 (2006) 850 – 861

www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolecon

ANALYSIS

Analysing the social benefits of soil conservation measures using


stated preference methods
Sergio Colombo a,*, Javier Calatrava-Requena a, Nick Hanley b
a
Department of Agricultural Economics, Instituto Andaluz de Investigación Agraria (IFAPA), Andalucı́a Government,
Camino de Purchil s/n, 18004 Granada, Spain
b
Department of Economics, University of Stirling, Stirling FK94LA, Scotland, UK
Received 29 March 2005; received in revised form 13 September 2005; accepted 18 September 2005
Available online 2 November 2005

Abstract

The paper estimates the benefits of programmes to mitigate the off-site impacts of soil erosion for a watershed in Andalusia,
Spain. Two stated preference methods are used, namely choice experiments and contingent valuation, to obtain estimates of the
social benefit from soil erosion reductions under two different methodologies. We emphasise the relative merits of the choice
experiment method to provide useful inputs to policy design. However, employing both methods allows us to undertake a
convergent validity test and thus to provide more defensible social benefit estimates. The attributes used in the choice
experiment include water quality impacts (which we find to have the highest marginal values), impacts on wildlife and the
area subject to a control programme. The contingent valuation design includes an attempt to reduce bias by reminding
respondents about substitutes. Results are used to suggest upper limits on per hectare payments for soil conservation
programmes.
D 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Convergent validity test; Choice experiments; Contingent valuation; Soil erosion

1. Introduction employed in many olive groves, a cultivation style


that cause severe land degradation yet which occupies
Soil is a non-renewable resource which is indis- most of the cultivated area of the eastern part of
pensable for life. In the south of Spain, soil erosion Andalusia region (MAPA, 2000). One reason for
rates are extremely high due to climatic conditions, high soil erosion rates is the fact that all olive groves
soil characteristics and the nature of tillage systems are privately owned, and farmers are not rewarded by
the market for reducing soil erosion rates to the level
which society demands. This is for several reasons.
* Corresponding author. First, since the effects of soil erosion occur with a time
E-mail address: scolombo@ugr.es (S. Colombo). lag, farmers may not perceive these effects, or may
0921-8009/$ - see front matter D 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2005.09.010
S. Colombo et al. / Ecological Economics 58 (2006) 850–861 851

discount future losses more highly than society would 2. Methodological framework
choose to. Third, many of the off-site impacts of soil
erosion have environmental effects which go un- Stated preference approaches rely on direct ques-
priced by markets. These off-site impacts include tioning of the affected population to estimate the
deteriorations in water quality, desertification of the economic value, measured as either Willingness to
landscape, and loss of wildlife habitat. Pay or Willingness to Accept Compensation, for a
Rational responses on the part of government change in the level of supply of some environmental
require, from the economist’s viewpoint, information good. The main difference between the two methods
on the costs of these environmental consequences, and used here is how they approach this problem. Con-
of peoples’ preferences for soil conservation pro- tingent Valuation takes a bwhole goodQ approach, and
grammes which reduce these costs. However, there asks WTP/WTAC for a discrete change in some
are relatively few studies worldwide on the economic environmental good—such as water quality. Whilst
costs of the off-farm effects of soil erosion (Clark et al., the nature of this change may be explained with
1985; Feather et al., 1999, Hansen et al., 2002). In reference to the attributes of this good (such as eco-
Spain, some valuations of the off-farm effects of soil logical quality, or pesticide levels), the method does
erosion have been undertaken, for example ICONA not estimate values for these individual attributes. In
(1982), Almansa and Calatrava-Requena, 2002 and contrast, the Choice Experiment method is based on
Colombo et al., 2003. Almansa and Calatrava-Requena Lancaster’s characteristics theory of value (Lancaster,
(2002) studied a case specific to a reforestation project 1966). An environmental good is characterised as a
in a small municipality of Almeria. The study of collection of attributes, and the levels these take.
Colombo et al. (2003) investigated the off-site effects Experiment design methods are then used to construct
of soil erosion in the same watershed1 considered in choice tasks through which respondents reveal the
this study, but was based on a pilot study sample, and marginal values they place on each attribute. To
did not include a choice experiment exercise. value a programme which changes the levels of
This paper adds to this literature by comparing many of these attributes simultaneously–such as
estimates of the value of soil erosion control pro- with a soil erosion control programme–the compen-
grammes obtained using contingent valuation (CV) sating surplus (WTP or WTAC) must be evaluated by
and choice experiments (CE), and by estimating effectively summing over attribute values.
values for different attributes of soil conservation Since the underlying methodology of both CV and
plans using the latter technique. This is felt to be CE is now well-known and widely discussed, we do
particularly valuable in helping policy makers re- not present it here (see, for example, Bateman et al.,
design soil erosion control programmes which can 2002). Rather, we briefly summarise how the existing
increase social benefits. Finally, we use our results literature has compared the application of CV and CE
to suggest upper bounds on the per hectare pay- to the same environmental change, before explaining
ments that the government should offer to farmers how the CV and CE exercises were defined in our
in the watershed. The rest of the paper is structured study.
as follows: a brief description of CV and CE under- Previous authors have sought to compare CV and
pinnings and a summary of the studies that have CE estimates of the same underlying utility change as
carried out convergent validity tests using these a test of bconvergent validityQ (Mitchell and Carson,
techniques is presented in Section 2. The question- 1989). This test asks whether two valuation methods,
naire design is then presented in Section 3 and applied to the environmental change, produce signifi-
results are shown in Section 4. Some conclusions cantly different estimates of value. bPassingQ the con-
are offered in Section 5. vergent validity test would mean a failure to reject the
null hypothesis of no significant difference between
the two estimates, and is seen by many as a useful
measure of the validity of stated preference estimates
1
For a description of the watershed and the erosion rates in it, see (although, as Hanley and Spash pointed out many
Colombo et al. (2003). years ago, both answers could be equally wrong:
852 S. Colombo et al. / Ecological Economics 58 (2006) 850–861

Hanley and Spash, 1994). As Mitchell and Carson soil erosion were identified. Subsequently, by means
themselves noted, b. . .neither measure (that is, neither of focus groups and informal interviews, we identified
estimate) is assumed to be a truer measure of the the best subset of soil erosion effects to be used as CE
construct than the otherQ (p. 204). attributes. The attribute levels described the likely
In the literature there are actually rather few studies future conditions with and without the implementation
that compare Willingness to Pay estimates derived of soil erosion reduction projects, and were selected
from CE and CV methods. Examples can be found using the geographic information systems, experts’
in Boxall et al. (1996), Hanley et al. (1998), Adamo- advice and existing empirical studies. By means of
wicz et al. (1998), Christie and Azevedo (2002) and the geographic information system, we obtained a
Lehtonen et al. (2003). Differences emerge in terms of detailed description of the areas in which the project
the relative magnitude of CE and CV estimates. For had to be implemented, and used this to predict
instance, Boxall et al. (1996) and Adamowicz et al. changes in attribute values. For instance, providing
(1998) found that WTP estimated from the CV experts with information regarding the number of
method was higher than that obtained from CE. Han- hectares that would be reforested and with which
ley et al. (1998) and Christie and Azevedo (2002) trees or bush species, we predicted the expected den-
found a reverse relation, with CE welfare estimates sity of flora and fauna with and without project execu-
higher than the CV ones. Only Christie and Azevedo tion. The number of jobs created was obtained by
(2002) and Lehtonen et al. (2003) report formal tests relating the expected rise in agricultural production
for the statistical significance of these differences: in due to soil erosion reduction (Pastor et al., 1999) to
the former paper, the authors concluded that they were the increase in farm work of olive collection, using the
not able to support the equality hypothesis between formula of Lopez (1992). A particular effort was
CV and CE value estimates, although a significant dedicated in the definition of the monetary attribute
difference was found in the latter study. level, due to its central role in the welfare analysis. A
contingent valuation pilot study, details of which can
be seen in Colombo and Calatrava-Requena (2002),
3. Study design allowed the definition of the mean value of the mone-
tary level and its range. The attributes and attribute
The main objective of the study was to identify levels finally chosen are shown in Table 12. By the
people’s preferences towards reducing the off-farm inclusion of the barea of the project execution (km2)Q
effects of soil erosion in the Alto Genil watershed in attribute, we tested the hypothesis of sensitivity to
Andalusia. The questionnaire consisted of three parts. spatial scope in the CE estimates. A positive and
The first part contained two questions aimed at elicit- significant regression coefficient of this attribute
ing the relative importance that respondents attributed would indicate that respondents prefer a larger area
to the environment with respect to other four areas of to be covered by the soil conservation plan, other
public interest (education, health, crime, and cultural things being equal. Other attributes included land-
heritage), and the relative importance that respon- scape impacts, wildlife impacts, effects on water qua-
dents’ gave to the reduction of soil erosion among lity, and effects on rural employment.
three other areas of environmental concern (water, air This set of attributes and levels forms a universe of
and biota). The information gathered in these ques- 1,062,153 possible combinations. By means of the
tions was used in the CV exercise to reduce the effect experimental design techniques (Louviere, 1988) an
of budgetary substitutes bias, as noted below. orthogonal fraction of the complete factorial3 was
The second part of the survey contained the CV drawn, yielding 108 combinations to be presented to
and CE exercises (it is important to note that each
respondent was asked to complete both the CV and 2
CE tasks). The design of the CE exercise followed The description of the attributes and attribute levels were pro-
vided with in much greater detail to respondents in a colour booklet.
several steps. At the beginning, through a wide bib- 3
108 profiles is the smallest orthogonal and balanced design that
liographic review of the agronomic, geological and allows the estimation of the 15 main effects plus the 90 two-way
environmental literature, the main off-site effects of attribute interactions (Louviere et al., 2000).
S. Colombo et al. / Ecological Economics 58 (2006) 850–861 853

Table 1 of 100 jobs and the area of project implementation


Attributes and attribute levels used in the study of 330 km2. This is one of the scenarios which we
Attributes Levels can simulate in the choice experiment. The refer-
Landscape change: desertification Degradation ence situation, which would result if no hypotheti-
of the semiarid areas Small improvement cal payment was forthcoming, was the status quo
Improvement
option as in the CE. The two stated preference
Surface and ground water quality Low
Medium methods were thus designed to be directly compar-
High able with each other in terms of valuing a given
Flora and fauna quality Poor policy scenario. The CV design followed the
Medium scheme used in Colombo et al. (2003). A bdouble
Good
stepQ process used to account for possible budgetary
Rise of agricultural productivity: 0
jobs created (number) 100 substitute bias was used. Respondents who stated a
200 positive WTP for the erosion process (WTP 1)
Area of project execution (km2) 330 were then asked to express a WTP for three pos-
660 sible environmental bsubstitute projectsQ in the
990
watershed. These were (I) reducing sewage pollu-
Extra tax (euros) 6.01
12.02 tion in their town, (II) reducing local urban air
18.03 pollution and (III) conserving local biodiversity. In
24.04 a second step, respondents were then informed
30.05 about their combined WTP (i.e. the sum of the
36.06
four WTP values, considered as an benvironmental
WTPQ). They were then reminded about their
responses earlier in the questionnaire to questions
respondents. Since it is unrealistic that a respondent concerning the importance that they assigned to
can complete 108 choice tasks and considering that environment issues in general relative to other
soil erosion might be an unfamiliar issue to respon- demands on public funds, and to soil erosion rela-
dents, we decided to present only four choice sets to tive to other environmental problems faced in the
each respondent. The 108 profiles were therefore split region. They were then asked to reconsider/restate
into 27 blocks, taking care to minimise both the the WTP for the four environmental projects (their
number of blocks and intra block correlation. The environmental WTP), and finally to reconsider/
status quo option described the expected environmen- restate their WTP value for the soil erosion project
tal situation in the watershed in 50 years if no soil (WTP 2).
conservation measures are implemented (Table 2). The third part of the questionnaire gathered socio-
Alternatives A and B represented the expected envir- economic information. The survey was administered
onmental situation in the watershed in 50 years with to 345 citizens selected so as to be representative of
different soil conservation measures. An example of the watershed population in terms of their residence
choice set is shown in Table 34.
In the CV exercise, respondents are asked to
state their maximum WTP to have, in 50 years
time, an environmental situation characterised by a Table 2
reduction of landscape desertification, a bmedium The status quo attributes and levels
qualityQ of the surface and ground waters, a Attributes Levels
bmedium quality of flora and faunaQ, the creation Landscape change: desertification Degradation
of the semiarid areas
Surface and ground water quality Low
Flora and fauna quality Poor
4
To reduce complexity at the choice stage and to avoid fatigue Agricultural productivity: job created (number) 0
effects, the description of the status quo option was dropped from Area of project execution (km2) 0
the choice set and provided to respondents on a separate sheet. Extra tax (euros) 0
854 S. Colombo et al. / Ecological Economics 58 (2006) 850–861

Table 3
Example of choice set card presented to respondents
Situation A Situation B Status quo
Landscape change: desertification of Worsening Improvement Neither situation A nor situation B
the semiarid areas is worth the extra tax payment.
Surface and ground water quality Low High
Flora and fauna quality Medium High
Agricultural productivity: job created (number) 200 100
Area of project execution (km2) Two third All I choose the Status Quo option 5
Extra tax (euros) 18.03 24.04
I choose situation A 5 I choose situation B 5

municipality. The survey format was face to face probability of choice of Eq. (3) is satisfied by the
interviews. conditional logit model (McFadden, 1973):
X  
Probin ¼ expðkVin Þ= exp kVjn 8jaC ð2Þ
j
4. Results
where k is a scale parameter which is inversely pro-
portional to the standard deviation of the error terms
Of the 345 citizens who were interviewed, 19 did
and Vin and V jn are conditional indirect utility func-
not complete the questionnaire and were excluded from
tions assumed to be linear in parameters,
the analysis, 74 expressed a protest answer and did not X X  
respond to the CE cards; 51 displayed a zero WTP in Vjn ¼ Cj þ bjk Xjk þ cjn Sn TCj ð3Þ
their CE response by choosing always the status quo
option. Some 201 persons thus fully completed the where: C j is an alternative specific constant, X jk is the
survey, providing 1008 (252 * 4) valid observations k attribute value of the alternative j; b jk is the coeffi-
for choice model estimation, and (201 + 51) responses cient associated to the k attribute, S n is the socio-
for the CV analysis. Sample characteristics were com- economic characteristics vector of individual n and c jn
pared to the general Andalusian population character- is the vector of the coefficients associated to the
istics on the basis of the distribution of age, gender and individual socioeconomic characteristics6. Having
urban–rural area of residence, and were found to be estimated these parameters, the marginal rate of sub-
representative of the regional population. stitution (MRS) between any pair of attributes a and b
can be calculated by the formula (4)
4.1. Analysis of choice experiment data MRS ¼  ðbattribute a =battribute b Þ ð4Þ
In a random utility context, the probability that In addition, willingness to pay measures relative to
individual n will choose option i over any other option different environmental scenarios can be obtained by
j belonging to the complete choice set C is given by: applying (5) where V 0 is the utility associated to the
  binitial stateQ, V 1 is the utility associated to an
Probin ¼ Prob Vin þ ein NVjn þ ejn 8jaC ð1Þ improved state encompassed in the study and b m is
where V is the deterministic component of utility, and e the monetary attribute coefficient, interpreted as the
is a random component. A typical assumption is that marginal utility of income.
this random component is independently and identi- Economic surplus ¼  1=bm ðV0  V1 Þ ð5Þ
cally distributed (IID) with and extreme-value distribu-
tion5. Under this hypothesis an explicit form of the We began by estimating a conditional logit
model: results are shown in Table 4. Model I
5
This assumption leads to the IIA axiom (Louviere, 2000). If the
6
IIA property does not hold the analyst can use other models (nested Since respondents’ characteristics do not vary across alterna-
logit model, random parameters logit model, multinomial probit tives, singularities arise in model estimation unless the socioeco-
model) that, despite a higher level of analytical complexity, relax nomic characteristics are introduced as interactions with either the
the IID assumption. attributes or the alternative specific constants.
S. Colombo et al. / Ecological Economics 58 (2006) 850–861 855

Table 4
Choice model results
Model I Model II Model III
Coefficients Std. Coefficients Std. Coefficients Std.
error error error
Coefficients
Constant  2.899* 0.287  7.590* 0.681  9.821* 1.459
Landscape desertification: small improvement 0.939* 0.143 1.017* 0.148 1.527* 0.245
Landscape desertification: improvement 1.367* 0.142 1.516* 0.149 2.520* 0.288
Surface and ground water quality: medium 0.910* 0.154 1.052* 0.162 1.704* 0.281
Surface and ground water quality: high 1.348* 0.148 1.502* 0.155 2.349* 0.299
Flora and fauna quality: medium 0.656* 0.145 0.774* 0.152 1.179* 0.237
Flora and fauna quality: good 0.882* 0.141 1.049* 0.148 1.426* 0.250
Jobs created 0.006* 0.001 0.007* 0.001 0.010* 0.001
Degraded area treated 0.001* 0.0002 0.001* 0.0002 0.001 0.0004
Tax  0.046* 0.006  0.057* 0.007  0.108* 0.014
Constant * solidaritya 0.014* 0.005 0.025* 0.007
Constant * enjoymentb 0.016* 0.008 0.016 0.012
Constant * erosionc 0.003* 0.002 0.004** 0.002
Constant * genderd 0.039* 0.023 0.052 0.032
Constant * agee  0.072* 0.027  0.109* 0.039
Constant * marital statusf 0.063* 0.026 0.071** 0.037
Constant * occupationg 0.109* 0.026 0.199* 0.041
Constant * incomeh 0.00013* 0.00004 0.00018* 0.0001

Standard deviation
Landscape desertification: small improvement 0.832** 0.416
Landscape desertification: improvement 0.676 0.522
Surface and ground water quality: medium 0.830** 0.420
Surface and ground water quality: high 1.193* 0.375
Flora and fauna quality: medium 0.133 0.566
Flora and fauna quality: good 1.033** 0.431
Jobs created 0.009* 0.002
Degraded area treated 0.003* 0.0004
Number of observations 1008 1008 1008
Log likelihood at constant  1049.50  1049.50  1049.50
Log likelihood at convergence  912.70  821.945  755.397
LR 273.60 455.11 588.206
Pseudo R 2 130 258 318
a
Importance that respondents assigned to solidarity (likert scale 1–10).
b
Importance that respondents assigned to leisure activities in a natural environment (likert scale 1–10).
c
Percentage share of 1 public pound that respondents gave to the funding of soil erosion reduction projects among other natural resource care
projects (improve air, water and biodiversity quality).
d
Respondents’ gender (female: 0; male: 1).
e
Respondents’ age (less than 50: 0; more than 50: 1).
f
Respondents’ marital status (not married: 0; married: 1).
g
Respondents’ occupation (not active worker: 0; active worker: 1).
h
Respondents’ income.
* Significant at 1% confidence level.
** Significant at 5% confidence level.
856 S. Colombo et al. / Ecological Economics 58 (2006) 850–861

represents the regression coefficients of an attri- tables. It is interesting that the coefficient representing
butes-only7 conditional logit model; whilst model II the area included in the project (the number of square
includes socioeconomic and attitudinal characteristics kilometres of the watershed in which will be imple-
of respondents8. The significance of the regression mented in the soil erosion reduction project) is sig-
coefficients in model II implies that it is the preferred nificant, showing that a scope effect is present in the
model to be used for welfare estimation. Model II is data.
highly significant (LRTest = 455.11, significant at the The negative sign of the constant reveals the pre-
0.000 level), and when tested for the IIA assumption sence of a status quo bias, i.e. the utility associated
passed the Hausmann and McFadden (1984) test with with moving away from the current situation is nega-
a v 2 value of 10.60 ( p = 0.91). tive and significant. As Adamowicz et al. (1998)
All regression coefficients are significant at the 1% pointed out status quo bias is a common economic
level. The signs of all the utility function parameters phenomenon that may happen because respondents
are theoretically consistent. In all cases, the highest (1) find the task of selecting the preferred option too
attribute level has associated with it the highest utility. complex; (2) they are uncertain about the trade-off
The three qualitative environmental attribute coeffi- they would be willing to make; and (3) do not trust the
cients (landscape desertification, surface and ground government to actually implement any of the soil
water quality and flora and fauna quality) suggest erosion control projects. Soil erosion is a rather tech-
increasing utility as respondents are offered better nical issue about which people are often unfamiliar.
environmental conditions. The coefficients of these The rather small amount of information given in the
qualitative environmental attributes are calculated survey may have been insufficient for some respon-
from dummy variables: they reflect the relative utility dents to feel comfortable to make a positive choice
with respect to the status quo situation. So, in the case about the design of soil erosion control policy, whilst
of the landscape desertification, the coefficient of the the status quo offered an easy opt-out.
bmediumQ improvement level represents the average The socioeconomic interactions with the constant
change in the utility that respondents experience in show that people who assigned higher importance to
going from the worse level (reference) to the medium community solidarity, or who enjoy activities closely
improvement level. The differences between the med- related with the natural environment, have a greater
ium and the high levels of the qualitative attributes probability of choosing either alternative A or B.
were also checked fitting the model with the medium People who allocated a higher share of the public
level of each attribute used as reference. Again, the budget to reducing soil erosion among the other
difference between the attribute’ levels were found to three areas of environmental care (water, air and
be significant at a 1% confidence level, except for biota) were also more likely to chose options A or
flora and fauna quality where the difference between B rather than the status quo. Residents older than 50
the medium and the highest level were found to be years were more likely to choose the no change
significant at the 5% confidence level. The signifi- option relative to younger people. Marital status
cance of the social attribute (jobs created) reveals that and occupation influences choice of the preferred
respondents care about employment: this is not sur- alternative as well, in the sense that married and
prising considering that there are a lot of seasonal active worker people are the groups that have a
workers in the Andalusia region whose incomes greater probability of choosing either alternative A
depend on the collection of olives, almonds and vege- or B. The income coefficient shows that the higher
the income the higher the probability of opting for
soil erosion control.
Including socioeconomic characteristics as in
7
The inclusion of the second order interactions, although permit- model II is also one way of incorporating preference
ting a better fit, did not provide significant changes in the regression heterogeneity in the model. A further step to include
coefficients of attributes or in the welfare measures.
8
Initially all the socioeconomic characteristics gathered in the
respondents’ heterogeneity is to use the random para-
survey were considered in the model. Subsequently, the non-sig- meters logit model (Train, 1998). In this approach, the
nificant ones at 10% level were dropped from the model. utility function described in (3) is augmented with a
S. Colombo et al. / Ecological Economics 58 (2006) 850–861 857

Table 5
Implicit prices and confidence intervals
Model IIa Model IIIa
Implicit price (o) Implicit price (o)
Attribute coefficients
Landscape desertification: small improvement 17.78 (12.02; 25.21) 14.09 (9.67; 19.87)
Landscape desertification: improvement 26.51 (20.05; 35.76) 23.25 (18.53; 29.79)
Surface and ground water quality: medium 18.39 (12.67; 25.96) 15.72 (11.03; 21.47)
Surface and ground water quality: high 26.27 (20.10; 34.67) 21.67 (17.02; 27.26)
Flora and fauna quality: medium 13.53 (7.96; 19.54) 10.87 (6.87; 15.56)
Flora and fauna quality: good 18.34 (13.11; 24.57) 13.16 (8.86; 18.26)
Jobs created 0.119 (0.088; 0.160) 0.089 (0.065; 0.123)
Degraded area treated 0.014 (0.007; 0.023) 0.005 ( 0.004; 0.013)
a
95% Confidence interval in parenthesis.

vector of parameters g that incorporate individual’s model, mean effects are very similar to those of
preference deviations with respect to the mean pre- model II, with the exception that the parameter esti-
ference values expressed by the vector b: mate for the degraded area of project execution is no
longer significant. Among the socioeconomic and
X X X   attitudinal variables, enjoyment and gender are no
Vjn ¼ Cj þ bjk Xjk þ gnk Xjk þ cjn Sn TCj
longer significant determinants of choice. Coefficient
ð6Þ values of model III are consistently bigger than those
of model II. This reflects the fact that in the RPL
where g is a vector of deviation parameters which model the variance in parameters is treated explicitly
represents the individual’s tastes relative to the as a separate component of the error (g nk , X jk ) such
average (b) and the other terms are as previously that the remaining error (e nj ) is free of this variance.
defined. The researcher can estimate b and g; the This does not happen in the conditional logit model,
g nk terms, as they represent personal tastes, are where the error term encompasses all the variance not
assumed constant for a given individual across all explained by the model itself.
the choices they make, but not constant across The standard deviation terms in the random
people. This implies that IIA is not a property of parameter model are significant for six attributes,
the RPL model. In order to estimate the model it is suggesting that preferences do indeed vary among
necessary to make an assumption over how the b respondents. Their magnitudes are reasonable relative
coefficients are distributed over the population: to the mean coefficient values, the exception being
Train (1998) assumes them to be distributed either for the job attribute and especially for the degraded
log-normally or normally. area attribute, where the standard deviation is three
Model III (Table 4) gives results from this random times the mean attribute value. This high heterogene-
parameter set-up. By incorporating heterogeneity the ity could explain the big difference between the impli-
model fitting rises significantly. The attributes-only cit price of the degraded area treated attribute in model
model has a pseudo-rho square (q 2) of 0.13; by add- II and model III.
ing the socioeconomic and taste characteristics the q 2 Table 5 shows the implicit prices for all the attri-
rises to 0.258, and, in the random parameter logit butes considered. Overall, the confidence intervals of
model it assumes a value of 0.3189. In the RPL the implicit prices overlap considerably, so that, at
least in this case, allowing for heterogeneous prefer-
ences makes little difference to welfare estimates.
9
Simulations conducted by Domenich and McFadden (1975)
These implicit prices for all the attributes are positive,
compare values of q 2 between 0.2 and 0.4 to values between 0.7 implying that respondents have a positive WTP for
and 0.9 of the R 2 in the case of the ordinary linear regression. increases in the quality or quantity of each attribute. In
858 S. Colombo et al. / Ecological Economics 58 (2006) 850–861

Table 6 of the medium level, that the implicit prices of moving


Compensating surplus for three possible scenarios from a medium to a high improvement are around 1/2
Scenarios Model IIa Model IIIa of those expressed to move from the low to the
Compensating Compensating medium level.
surplus (o) surplus (o) Using the choice model parameters, it is also pos-
Scenario 1 10.77 14.56 sible to obtain compensating surplus estimates for a
(16.87; 4.37) (19.40; 9.67) wide range of policy scenarios. As an example, the
Scenario 2 36.11 34.20
following three scenarios have been used to illustrate
(43.75; 29.75) (40.69; 28.57)
Scenario 3 53.48 44.03 the overall willingness to pay for improvements with
(62.33; 45.68) (51.53; 36.81) respect to the status quo conditions in the environ-
a
95% Confidence interval in parenthesis. mental and social quality of the watershed.

Scenario 1: Landscape desertification is charac-


case of quantitative attributes, the implicit prices terised by a small improvement; water quality is
represent the WTP to achieve one unit more (one improved to a medium level; flora and fauna qual-
more job, one more square kilometre) of the attribute ity is improved to medium; jobs created are 100
considered. If the attributes are qualitative, the impli- and the watershed degraded area treated is equal to
cit prices reflect the WTP for a discrete change in the 330 km2. This scenario corresponds to that used in
attribute level, for example to change from the blowQ the CV exercise.
to the bmediumQ level of surface and ground water Scenario 2: Landscape desertification is charac-
quality. The implicit prices afford some understanding terised by a larger improvement; water quality is
of the relative importance of the attributes and can be high; flora and fauna quality is improved to a
used by policy makers to assign more resources in medium level; jobs created are 200 and the
favour of the attributes which have higher implicit watershed degraded area treated is equal to 660
prices. For models II and III, the reduction of land- km2.
scape desertification is the effect that produces the Scenario 3: Landscape desertification is charac-
highest marginal impact on WTP, followed by the terised by a larger improvement; water quality is
improvement of water quality to a bhighQ level. Note- high; flora and fauna quality is good; jobs created
worthy is that, according to the economic principle of are 200 and the watershed degraded area treated is
decreasing marginal utility, the marginal WTP for the equal to 990 km2.
environmental attributes decreases as one moves
toward higher attribute levels. In Table 5 it is possible Estimated compensating surplus (willingness to pay)
to observe, by subtracting the marginal WTP asso- and 95% confidence intervals for the three scenarios
ciated with the highest level from the marginal WTP described above are calculated by means of Eq. (5)

Table 7
Mean and median WTP before and after the iterative process
Statistics WTP 1 WTP 2
WTP for the erosion project WTP for all projects WTP for the erosion project WTP for all projects
Mean 26.58 76.46 16.18 41.06
Median 12.02 30.05 6.01 24.04
Standard deviation 38.24 124.93 25.07 52.12
95% Confidence intervals 21.86–31.30 61.03–91.89 13.08–19.28 34.62–47.50

Null hypothesis for medians WTP 1 = medians WTP 2 v2 Prob. value of accepting null
Erosion control project 7.773 0.000
All environmental projects 8.152 0.000
S. Colombo et al. / Ecological Economics 58 (2006) 850–861 859

Table 8
Comparison between CV and CE mean estimates
Statistics CV estimate CE (model II) CE (model III)
WTP erosion project WTP Scenario 1 WTP Scenario 1
Mean 16.18 10.77 14.56
95% Confidence interval (13.08; 19.28) (4.37; 16.87) (9.67; 19.40)

95% Confidence interval of the difference (o) Sign


Poe et al. (1997) testa CV-CE(model II) 1.37, 12.77 0.065
CV-CE(model III) 18.13, 6.71 0.177
a
H0: WTP CV = WTP CE; H1: WTP CV N WTP CE.

and are shown in Table 610. Estimated compensating and 30.05 o to 41.06 o and 24.04 o. There exists a
surplus for the change from the status quo to the significant difference (a z 0.01) between these two
scenarios are consistent across the range of policy op- measures as indicated by the Wilcoxon matched-pair
tions used in this study and as expected, WTP in- signed-rank test. This reveals the presence of an em-
creases as we move towards better environmental and bedding effect in the WTP estimates before we asked
social conditions in the watershed. For example, sce- respondents to consider the substitute projects. This
nario 2 compared to scenario 1 presents a lower land- result underlines the importance of considering in CV
scape desertification, a higher water quality, 100 more questionnaires a specific ddexerciseTT to deal with the
jobs and 330 km2 of degraded area treated more. All embedding problem to reduce the risk of biased esti-
these changes bring an increase of 25.34 o in the mates. The omission of the double step procedure in
case of model II and 19.64 o in the case of model III our case would have led to an over-estimation of WTP
in the average respondent’s WTP. Allowing for pre- for the soil erosion project of 64%.
ference heterogeneity does not appear to influence
significantly the compensating surplus estimates, and 4.3. A convergent validity test
there is no clear pattern of differences in magnitude
between model II and model III estimates. What In this study, the significance of the difference
is observable is that the RPL estimates are more sta- between the two sets of stated preference estimates
tistically precise than the conditional logit model were tested following the convolution test proposed
estimates. by Poe et al. (1997) in which we took a series of 1000
random draws from the asymptotic distribution of the
4.2. The contingent valuation exercise parameters. The results of the comparison of CV and
CE estimates in terms of estimated WTP are shown in
Basic statistics for positive CV WTP bids are shown Table 811. In the case of model II there is rather weak
in the second column of Table 7. Some 11% of the evidence to support the convergent validity of the CV
sample stated a genuine zero answer; whilst the per- and CE exercises, since the mean WTP from the CE
centage of protest bidders was 23%. Mean and median exercise lies outside the 95% confidence interval of
WTP for the erosion project before considering the the CV WTP mean. The Poe et al. (1997) approach
substitute projects were 26.58 o and 12.02 o, suggests that the CV and CE mean do not differ at
whereas after considering these substitutes, WTP fell 95% confidence levels, but only permits a weak,
to 16.18 o and 6.01 o respectively. The statistics for borderline acceptance of mean equality. This is not
benvironmental WTPQ, i.e. referring to WTP for all four the case of model III, where the null hypothesis of
environmental projects (air, water, soil and biodiver- mean equality test can be more strongly accepted. So,
sity), show the same trend, decreasing from 76.46 o
11
For comparability, 1000 draws of the open-ended WTP welfare
10
In the estimation, the socioeconomic characteristics were set at measure were also simulated from the mean and standard error of
the population mean level. the sample distribution, assuming normality.
860 S. Colombo et al. / Ecological Economics 58 (2006) 850–861

Table 9 We found that both CE and CV were suitable to


CV and CE aggregate WTP evaluate the off-site effects of soil erosion. We also
CV CEscenario 1 CEscenario 2 CEscenario 3 found that the welfare estimates did not differ markedly
Aggregate 4,691,275 between the two approaches. In the CV method, we
WTP (o) employed a means of reducing bias by reminding
Model II 3,123,766 10,466,305 15,502,583
respondents of substitute environmental goods: this
Model III 4,222,522 9,915,053 12,765,068
Per hectare 142.15 proved to have a large effect on stated WTP. The CV
value method gave estimates of the benefits of a pre-defined
(o ha1) package of potential improvements from a soil conser-
Model II 94.66 158.58 156.59 vation strategy. In contrast, the CE approach allowed us
Model III 127.95 150.22 128.94
to assign economic values to different attributes of
strategy that policy-makers can fine-tune. Water quality
allowing for taste heterogeneity using the random and landscape benefits were valued highly relative to
parameter approach seems to aid convergent validity. wildlife and employment benefits. However, a status
These individual welfare estimates can be aggre- quo bias was detected that may suggest that the choice
gated to determine the WTP of the population to deter- task proved difficult for some respondents.
mine the social value of the soil erosion off-farm effects Individual WTP for the reduction of the external
in the watershed12. Table 9 shows the aggregate WTP effects of soil erosion extend over the 11–53 o inter-
for the CV method and for the CE for the three val, depending on the magnitude of the environmental
scenarios considered. Depending on the magnitude and social improvement achieved with project imple-
of the improvement of the environmental and social mentation, and the area of project execution. By aggre-
conditions in the watershed that can be achieved by gating this value to the population we estimate that the
the implementation of the soil erosion reduction pro- social value of reducing the off-farm effects of soil
ject, the social benefits of reducing soil erosion are erosion in the catchment lie in the 3.1–15.5 million o
between 3.1 and 15.5 million euros per year. interval, i.e. about 95–160 o per hectare. The per-
hectare welfare estimates obtained in this study span
the current subsidy that the Andalusia’s Government
5. Conclusions gives to farmers that adopt soil conservation measures
(132.22 o ha 1 year 1). Thus, public administration
Soil erosion produces both on-site and off-site is currently paying a subsidy to farmers that is in
impacts, which particularly in the Mediterranean consonance with what society is willing to pay.
regions of Europe are serious enough to warrant policy Another way of thinking about this is to say that
action. However, to ensure costs are not bexcessiveQ payments above o160 per hectare might lead to nega-
relative to benefits, and to aid the optimal design of soil tive net social benefits—although recall that we have
conservation policy, policy makers need information not included benefits to visitors and non-residents in
on public preferences for this policy intervention. our study. However, it is not clear that even very high
payments would lead benoughQ farmers to adopt soil
conservation strategies to achieve the kinds of benefits
12
The watershed population is 375,002 people. In the aggregation included in Scenario 3. This is not only because the
we added the people who state a bprotestQ answer (the 22.7% of the opportunity costs per hectare might exceed this value
population) considering them as they would have expressed a zero
WTP, as recommended by the NOAA panel (Arrow, 1993). By
in some parts of the region, but also because the lack of
including protest answers as zero WTP and by considering only the up-take of soil conservation adoption measures is not
people living in the watershed, the aggregate WTP values shown are only due to financial issues13 but also to social, cul-
under-estimates of total economic value for the reductions in soil tural and institutional matters. Further research is
erosion impacts, because (1) people that expressed a bprotestQ
answer might have a positive value on reducing soil erosion and
13
(2) people living outside the catchments (especially downstream) The average costs of implementing and maintaining the soil
might well derive utility from these improvements, i.e. have a erosion reduction systems hypothesised in this paper are actually
positive WTP. not that much greater than the costs of traditional tillage system.
S. Colombo et al. / Ecological Economics 58 (2006) 850–861 861

needed in these fields to fully understand the reasons contingent valuation method in the Alto Genil basin of southern
that bring farmers to the decisions on adopting soil Spain. J. Soil Water Conserv. 58, 367 – 371.
Feather, P., Hellerstein, D., Hansen L., 1999. Economic Valuation of
conservation measures. Environmental Benefits and the Targeting of Conservation Pro-
gram: The case of the CRP. AER-778. United States Dept. of
Agr., Economic Research Service.
Acknowledgements Hanley, N., Spash, C., 1994. Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Envir-
onment. Edwarg Elgar.
Hanley, N., Wright, R., Adamowicz, W., 1998. Using choice experi-
The authors would like to thank the Spanish Minis- ment to value the environment. Environ. Resour. Econ. 11 (3–4),
terio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación (Project 413 – 428.
INIA RTA01-128), and the Consejerı́a de Agricultura Hansen, L.T., Breneman, V.E., Davison, C., Dicken, W., 2002. The
y Pesca of the Andalucian Government (Project, PIA cost of soil erosion to downstream navigation. J. Soil Water
8.01-01) for financial support. We are grateful to Pro- Conserv. 57 (4), 205 – 212.
Hausman, J.A., McFadden, D., 1984. Specification tests for the
fessor Jordan Louviere for his assistance in the devel- multinomial logit model. Econometrica 52, 1219 – 1240.
opment of the experimental design used in this study. ICONA, 1982. bPaisajes erosivos en el Sureste español: ensayo de
metodologı́as para el estudio de su cualificación y
cuantificaciónQ. Ministerio de Agricultura Pesca y Alimentación,
Monografı́a, Madrid.
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