THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT (ARTICLE VII, 1987 CONSTITUTION)

The executive power shall be vested in the President of the

Philippines. (Section 1, Article VII, 1987 Constitution)

It has already been established that there is one repository of executive

powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section
1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the
President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the President, as Chief
Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under
Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the
calling-out powers under Section 18, Article VII thereof. (Jamar Kulayan v. Gov.
Abdusakur Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012, En Banc [Sereno, CJ]),

The duty to protect the State and its people must be carried out earnestly
and effectively throughout the whole territory of the Philippines in accordance
with constitutional provision on national territory. Hence, the President of the
Philippines, as the sole repository of executive power, is the guardian of the
Philippine archipelago, including all the islands and waters embraced therein
and all other territories over which the Philippines and sovereignty or
jurisdiction. X x x

To carry out this important duty, the President is equipped with authority
over the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), which is the protector of the
people and the state. X x x. In addition, the Executive is constitutionally
empowered to maintain peace and order, protect life, liberty, and property, and
promote the general welfare. In recognition of these powers, Congress has
specified that the President must oversee, ensure, and reinforce our defensive
capabilities against external and internal threats and, in the same vein, ensure
that the country is adequately prepared for all national and local emergencies
arising from natural and man-made disasters.

To be sure, this power is limited by the Constitution itself. X x x (Rene

A.V. Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No.
212426, Jan. 12, 2016, En Banc [Sereno, CJ])
The Faithful Execution Clause

This Court has interpreted the faithful execution clause as an obligation

imposed on the President, and not a separate grant of power. Section 17, Article
VII of the Constitution, expresses this duty in no uncertain terms and includes it
in the provision regarding the President’s power of control over the executive
department x x x.

Xxx

Hence, the duty to faithfully execute the laws of the land is inherent in
executive power and is intimately related to the other executive functions. X x x

These obligations are as broad as they sound, for a President cannot

function with crippled hands, but must be capable of securing the rule of law
within all territories of the Philippine Islands and be empowered to do so within
constitutional limits. Congress cannot, for instance, limit or take over the
President’s power to adopt implementing rules and regulations for a law it has
enacted.

More important, this mandate is self-executory by virtue of its being

inherently executive in nature. X x x
The import of this characteristic is that the manner of the President’s
execution of the law, even if not expressly granted by the law, is justified by
necessity and limited only by law, since the President must “take necessary and
proper steps to carry into execution the law.” X x x

In light of this constitutional duty, it is the President’s prerogative to do

whatever is legal and necessary for Philippine defense interests. It s no
coincidence that the constitutional provision on the faithful execution clause was
followed by that on the President’s commander-in-chief powers, which are
specifically granted during extraordinary events of lawless violence, invasion, or
rebellion. And this duty of defending the country is unceasing, even in times
when there is no state of lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. At such times,
the President has full powers to ensure the faithful execution of the laws.

It would therefore be remiss for the President and repugnant to the

faithful-execution clause of the Constitution to do nothing when the call of the
moment requires increasing the military’s defensive capabilities, which could
include forging alliances with states that hold a common interest with the
Philippines or bringing an international suit against an offending state.

Xxx

This approach of giving utmost deference to presidential initiatives in

respect of foreign affairs is not novel to the Court. The President’s act of treating
EDCA as an executive agreement is not the principal power being analyzed x x x.
Rather, the preliminary analysis is in reference to the expansive power of foreign
affairs. We have long treated this power as something the Courts must not
unduly restrict. X x x

Xxx

Understandably, this Court must view the instant case with the same
perspective and understanding, knowing full well the constitutional and legal
repercussions of any judicial overreach. (Rene A.V. Saguisag, et al. v. Executive
Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 212426, Jan. 12, 2016, En Banc
[Sereno, CJ])

The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency

Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single

executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies
of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through
the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumably the acts of the
Chief Executive. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait,
et al. v. Secretary Angelo Reyes, et al., GR Nos. 180771 and 181527, April 21, 2015, En
Banc [Leonardo-De Castro])
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait, et al. v.
Secretary Angelo Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015, En Banc
(Leonardo-De Castro)

The constitutionality of the Service Contract Agreement for the large-scale

exploration, development and utilization of oil and petroleum gasses in Tanon
Strait entered into between a Japanese petroleum corporation and the Philippine
Government was challenged in this case. The one who signed this Agreement on
behalf of the Philippine government was the Secretary of Energy. Was the
Agreement valid?
The SC said “No.” It violated Section 2, 4th par., Article XII of the
Constitution (National Economy and Patrimony) which states that it is the
President who should enter into that kind of contract with foreign corporations.
Public respondents, in trying to justify their action, however, invoked the
doctrine of qualified political agency since the Secretary of Energy is an alter-ego
of the President. The SC clarified that this doctrine of qualified political agency
may not be validly invoked if it is the Constitution itself that provides that the act
should be performed by the President no less, especially since what are involved
are natural resources.

The Appointing Power of the President

Not All Officers Appointed by the President under Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution Shall Require Confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments

Conformably, as consistently interpreted and ruled in the leading case of

Sarmiento III v. Mison, and in the subsequent cases of Bautista v. Salonga, Quintos-
Deles v. Constitutional Commission, and Calderon v. Carale, under Section 16, Article
VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the government to be
appointed by the President:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other

public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments

are not otherwise provided for by law;
 Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress

may by law vest in the President alone.

It is well-settled that only presidential appointees belonging to the first

group require the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. (Manalo
v. Sistoza, 312 SCRA 239, Aug. 11, 1999, En Banc [Purisima])

The Nature of an Ad Interim Appointment

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes

effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The
Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by
making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of Congress. X x x Thus, the ad interim appointment
remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it
can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President.

Xxx

More than half a century ago, this Court had already ruled that an ad
interim appointment is permanent in character. In Summers v. Ozaeta, decided on
October 25, 1948, we held that:

“x x x an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of paragraph

(4), Section 10, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides that the
‘President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess
of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.’ It is an appointment permanent in nature, and
the circumstance that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character. An ad interim
appointment is disapproved certainly for a reason other than that its
provisional period has expired. Said appointment is of course
distinguishable from an ‘acting’ appointment which is merely temporary,
good until another permanent appointment is issued.”
 The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad interim
appointment, and thus an ad interim appointment takes effect immediately. The
appointee can at once assume office and exercise, as a de jure officer, all the
powers pertaining to the office. X x x

Thus, the term “ad interim appointment”, as used in letters of appointment

signed by the President, means a permanent appointment made by the President
in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a temporary
appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time. The term, although
not found in the text of the Constitution, has acquired a definite legal meaning
under Philippine jurisprudence. The Court had again occasion to explain the
nature of an ad interim appointment in the more recent case of Marohombsar v.
Court of Appeals, where the Court stated:

“We have already mentioned that an ad interim appointment is not

descriptive of the nature of the appointment, that is, it is not indicative of
whether the appointment is temporary or in an acting capacity, rather it
denotes the manner in which the appointment was made. In the instant
case, the appointment extended to private respondent by then MSU
President Alonto, Jr. was issued without condition nor limitation as to
tenure. The permanent status of private respondent’s appointment as
Executive Assistant II was recognized and attested to by the Civil Service
Commission Regional Office No. 12. Petitioner’s submission that private
respondent’s ad interim appointment is synonymous with a temporary
appointment which could be validly terminated at any time is clearly untenable.
Ad interim appointments are permanent appointment but their terms are only
until the Board disapproves them.”

An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at

that moment a government employee and therefore part of the civil service. He
enjoys the constitutional protection that “[n]o officer or employee in the civil
service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.”
(Section 2[3], Article IX-B of the Constitution) Thus, an ad interim appointment
becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into office. X
x x Once an appointee has qualified, he acquires a legal right to the office which
is protected not only by statute but also by the Constitution. He can only be
removed for cause, after notice and hearing, consistent with the requirements of
due process. (Matibag v. Benipayo, 380 SCRA 49, April 2, 2002, En Banc
[Carpio])
Limitations on the Appointing Power of the President

Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and

up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety. (Section 15, Article VII, 1987 Constitution)

In Re: Honorable Mateo Valenzuela and Placido Vallarta

De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council

The Calling-out Power of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed

Forces

While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the

Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the
military, making the civilian president the nation’s supreme military leader. The
net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a
civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed
forces. The Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of
military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to
direct military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he
would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces to
military experts, but the ultimate power is his. (Jamar Kulayan v. Gov.
Abdusakur Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012, En Banc [Sereno, CJ])

The Calling out Power is exclusive to the President

In Jamar Kulayan v. Gov. Abdusakur Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012,
En Banc (Sereno, CJ), the Court held:

Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call
upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation,
Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and
called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own civilian Emergency Force.
The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the
President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive,
is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the
Local Government Code.

Is the President’s power to call out the armed forces as their Commander-in-
Chief in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion
subject to judicial review, or is it a political question?

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power
solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from
the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to
overrule the President's wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not
prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full
discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it
is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President's decision is totally
bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden
as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification
for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the
proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was
exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian
supremacy over the military. In the performance of this Court's duty of
“purposeful hesitation” before declaring an act of another branch as
unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown
shall the Court interfere with the President's judgment. To doubt is to sustain.
(Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284,
Aug. 15, 2000, En Banc [Kapunan])

The Pardoning Power of the President

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this

Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.
 He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of all the Members of the Congress. (Section 19, 1987
Constitution)

Was the Pardon granted to former President Estrada an Absolute Pardon?

Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully

restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to
seek public office. The wording of the pardon extended to former President
Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and
constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact
conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. (Atty. Alicia Risos-
Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015, En Banc [Leonardo-De
Castro])

The 1987 Constitution specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of

Article IX-C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power
to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency.

It is apparent that the only instances in which the President may not
extend pardon remain to be: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet
resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws,
rules and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming
from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by
way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.

It is unmistakably the long-standing position of this Court that the

exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in the President and may not be
interfered with by Congress or the Court, except only when it exceeds the limits
provided for by the Constitution.

This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the President’s

power of pardon by acts of Congress, specifically through legislation, was
strongly adhered to by an overwhelming majority of the framers of the 1987
Constitution when they finally rejected a proposal to carve out an exception from
the pardoning power of the President in the form of “offenses involving graft
and corruption” that would be enumerated and defined by Congress through the
enactment of a law. (Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666,
January 21, 2015, En Banc [Leonardo-De Castro])
 The foregoing pronouncements solidify the thesis that Articles 36 and 41
of the Revised Penal Code cannot, in any way, serve to abridge or diminish the
exclusive power and prerogative of the President to pardon persons convicted of
violating penal laws.

Xxx

A rigid and inflexible reading of the above provisions of law is

unwarranted, especially so if it will defeat or unduly restrict the power of the
President to grant executive clemency.

It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that where the words of a statute

are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. Verba legis non est recedendum. From
the words of a statute there should be no departure (Republic v. Camacho, G.R. No.
185604, June 13, 2013, 698 SCRA 380, 398). It is this Court’s firm view that the
phrase in the presidential pardon at issue which declares that former President
Estrada “is hereby restored to his civil and political rights” substantially
complies with the requirement of express restoration.

Xxx

For this reason, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code should be
construed in a way that will give full effect to the executive clemency granted by
the President, instead of indulging in an overly strict interpretation that may
serve to impair or diminish the import of the pardon which emanated from the
Office of the President and duly signed by the Chief Executive himself/herself.
The said codal provisions must be construed to harmonize the power of
Congress to define crimes and prescribe penalties for such crimes and the power
of the President to grant executive clemency. All that said provisions impart is
that the pardon of the principal penalty does not carry with it the remission of
the accessory penalties unless the President expressly includes said accessory
penalties in the pardon. It still recognizes the Presidential prerogative to grant
executive clemency and, specifically, to decide to pardon the principal penalty
while excluding its accessory penalties or to pardon both. Thus, Articles 36 and
41 only clarify the effect of the pardon so decided upon by the President on the
penalties imposed in accordance with law.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon to former President Estrada

shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory
penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive
clemency extended to former President Estrada who was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment.
The sentence that followed, which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil
and political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to
the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon
that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua.

In this jurisdiction, the right to seek public elective office is recognized by

law as falling under the whole gamut of civil and political rights.

Xxx

No less than the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to

which the Philippines is a signatory, acknowledges the existence of said rights. X
xx

Recently, in Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 198742,

August 10, 2012, 678 SCRA 267, 292), the Court unequivocally referred to the
right to seek public elective office as a political right x x x.

Thus, from both law and jurisprudence, the right to seek public elective
office is unequivocally considered as a political right. Hence, the Court reiterates
its earlier statement that the pardon granted to former President Estrada admits
no other interpretation other than to mean that, upon acceptance of the pardon
granted to him, he regained his FULL civil and political rights – including the
right to seek elective office. (Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
206666, January 21, 2015, En Banc [Leonardo-De Castro])

Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the

pardon, i.e., “[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no
longer seek any elective position or office,” neither makes the pardon
conditional, nor militates against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s
rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored. This is
especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or
limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term “civil and political rights”
as being restored.
 Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as
it is an introduction or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the
enactment, usually introduced by the word “whereas.” (People v. Balasa, 356 Phil.
362, 396 [1998]) Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly
speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute (Llamado v.
Court of Appeals, 256 Phil. 328, 339 [1989]). In this case, the whereas clause at
issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not
by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity
contingent upon the fulfillment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit
the scope of the pardon. (Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
206666, January 21, 2015, En Banc [Leonardo-De Castro])

The Diplomatic and Treaty-Making Power of the President

No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective

unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(Section 21, Article VII, 1987 Constitution)

After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic

of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military
Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in
the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and,
when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by
the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized
as a treaty by the other contracting State. (Section 25, Article XVIII, 1987
Constitution)

The Power and Duty to Conduct Foreign Relations

The President also carries the mandate of being the sole organ in the
conduct of foreign relations. Since every state has the capacity to interact with
and engage in relations with other sovereign states, it is but logical that every
state must vest in an agent the authority to represent its interests to those other
sovereign states.

Xxx
 The role of the President in foreign affairs is qualified by the Constitution
in that the Chief Executive must give paramount importance to the sovereignty
of the nation, the integrity of its territory, its interest, and the right of the
sovereign Filipino people to self-determination. X x x(Rene A.V. Saguisag, et al.
v. Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 212426, Jan. 12,
2016, En Banc [Sereno, CJ])

The Relationship between the Two Major Presidential Functions and the Role of
the Senate

Clearly, the power to defend the State and to act as its representative in
the international sphere inheres in the person of the President. This power,
however, does not crystallize into absolute discretion to craft whatever
instrument the Chief Executive so desires. As previously mentioned, the Senate
has a role in ensuring that treaties or international agreements the President
enters into, as contemplated in Section 21 of Article VII of the Constitution,
obtain the approval of two-thirds of its members.

Xxx

The responsibility of the President when it comes to treaties and

international agreements under the present Constitution is therefore shared with
the Senate. X x x (Rene A.V. Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 212426, Jan. 12, 2016, En Banc [Sereno, CJ])

Who has the Power to Ratify a Treaty?

In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not,
as commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to
giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. (BAYAN
[Bagong Alyansang Makabayan] v. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, G.R.
No. 138570, Oct. 10, 2000, En Banc [Buena])
With respect to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) entered into between the
Philippines and the USA in 1998, Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution
applies, it being a special provision

Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in

general, in which case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the
Members of the Senate is required to make the subject treaty, or international
agreement, valid and binding on the part of the Philippines. This provision lays
down the general rule on treaties or international agreements and applies to any
form of treaty with a wide variety of subject matter, such as, but not limited to,
extradition or tax treaties or those economic in nature. All treaties or
international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject
matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the
concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective.

In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to

treaties which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities
in the Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only
one of the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional requirements
and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Section 25, Article
XVIII further requires that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” may be
allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for
that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other
contracting State.

Xxx

On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of

United States troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the
guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the
rights of the United States and the Philippine government in the matter of
criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessels and aircraft, importation and
exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.

Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with

treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the
instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions
of Section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for
the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid
concurrence of the Senate x x x.

It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory construction that a special

provision or law prevails over a general one. Lex specialis derogat generali.
(BAYAN [Bagong Alyansang Makabayan] v. Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora, G.R. No. 138570 and Companion Cases, Oct. 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449,
481-492, En Banc [Buena])

Despite the President’s roles as defender of the State and sole authority in
foreign relations, the 1987 Constitution expressly limits his ability in instances
when it involves the entry of foreign military bases, troops or facilities. The
initial limitation is found in Section 21 of the provisions on the Executive
Department x x x. The specific limitation is given by Section 25 of the Transitory
Provisions x x x.

It is quite plain that the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution

intended to add to the basic requirements of a treaty under Section 21 of Article
VII. This means that both provisions must be read as additional limitations to
the President’s overarching executive functions in matters of defense and foreign
relations. (Rene A.V. Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa,
Jr., G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016, En Banc [Sereno, CJ])

The Power of the President to Enter into Executive Agreements

The power of the President to enter into binding executive agreements

without Senate concurrence is already well-established in this jurisdiction. That
power has been alluded to in our present and past Constitutions, in various
statutes, in Supreme Court decisions, and during the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission. X x x

As the sole organ of our foreign relations, and the constitutionally

assigned chief architect of our foreign policy, the President is vested with the
exclusive power to conduct and manage the country’s interface with other states
and governments. Being the principal representative of the Philippines, the
Chief Executive speaks and listens for the nation; initiates, maintains, and
develops diplomatic relations with other states and governments; negotiates and
enters into international agreements; promotes trade, investments, tourism and
other economic relations; and settles international disputes with other states.
 As previously discussed, this constitutional mandate emanates from the
inherent power of the President to enter into agreements with other stats,
including the prerogative to conclude binding executive agreements that do not
require further Senate concurrence. The existence of this presidential power is so
well-entrenched that Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII of the Constitution, even
provides for a check on its exercise. X x x

In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading (113 Phil. 333 [1961])

executive agreements are defined as “international agreements embodying
adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national polices and
traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary
nature.” In Bayan Muna v. Romulo, this Court further clarified that executive
agreements can cover a wide array of subjects that have various scopes and
purposes. They are no longer limited to the traditional subjects that are usually
covered by executive agreements as identified in Eastern Sea Trading. X x x

One of the distinguishing features of executive agreements is that their

validity and effectivity are not affected by a lack of Senate concurrence. This
distinctive feature was recognized as early as in Eastern Sea Trading (1961) x x x
(Rene A.V. Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No.
212426, January 12, 2016, En Banc [Sereno, CJ])

Discuss the Binding Effect of Treaties and Executive Agreements in International

Law.

In international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive

agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the
functionaries have remained within their powers. International law continues to
make no distinction between treaties and executive agreements: they are equally
binding obligations upon nations. (BAYAN [Bagong Alyansang Makabayan] v.
Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, Oct. 10, 2000, En Banc
[Buena])
The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)

The fear that EDCA is a reincarnation of the U.S. bases so zealously

protested by noted personalities in Philippine history arises not so much from
xenophobia but from a genuine desire for self-determination, nationalism, and
above all a commitment to ensure the independence of the Philippine Republic
from any foreign domination.

Mere fears, however, cannot curtail the exercise by the President of the
Philippines of his Constitutional prerogatives in respect of foreign affairs. They
cannot cripple him when he deems that additional security measures are made
necessary by the times. X x x In the future, the Philippines must navigate a
world in which armed forces fight with increasing sophistication in both strategy
and technology, while employing asymmetric warfare and remote weapons.

Additionally, our country is fighting a most terrifying enemy: the

backlash of Mother Nature. X x x

In order to keep the peace in its archipelago in this region of the world,
and to sustain itself at the same time against the destructive forces of nature, the
Philippines will need friends. Who they are, and what form the friendships will
take, are for the President to decide. The only restriction is what the Constitution
itself prohibits. It appears that this overarching concern for balancing
constitutional requirements against the dictates of necessity was what led to
EDCA.

As it is, EDCA is not constitutionally infirm. As an executive agreement,

it remains consistent with existing laws and treaties that it purports to
implement. (Rene A.V. Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa,
Jr., G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016, En Banc [Sereno, CJ])

Powers relative to Appropriation measures

The President shall submit to the Congress within thirty days from
the opening of every regular session, as the basis of the general
appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing,
including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures. (Sec.
22, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)
 The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended
by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the
budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall
be prescribed by law. (Sec. 25[1], Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)

Emergency Power

In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by

law, authorizing the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof. (Section 23[2], Article VI, 1987 Constitution)