British Labor and the International during the Great War

Author(s): Carl F. Brand

Source: The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Mar., 1936), pp. 40-63
Published by: University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1881639
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 BRITISH LABOR AND THE INTERNATIONAL
DURING THE GREAT WAR
CARL F. BRAND

URING the early years of the presentcenturythe

organizedworkingclass centeredits hopes forthepre-
ventionofwar upon the Second International.It was
believed that an organizationwhich claimed ten million ad-
herents in twenty-eightcountries,possessed at Brussels a
permanentexecutiveand secretariat,held annual meetingsof
its council,and summonedtriennialcongressesthat constituted
a world-parliament oflabor and socialismwouldprovethe most
effectivemeansof avertingarmedconflictbetweenthe nations.
This optimisticconfidencewas unwarranted,and cherished
hopes were doomed to disappointment,because the clouds of
1914gatheredoveran Internationalthathad neithercompleted
its structurenor settledits tactics. It was stillbut a loose fed-
erationlinkedby a powerlessexecutive.Its programhad pro-
gressedno furtherthan an ambiguousresolutioncommitting
the nationalsectionsto make everyeffortto preventwar and,
if unsuccessful,to endeavorto put an end to the conflictand
utilizethe crisisto hasten the fall of capitalisticclass rule. No
methodswereprescribed,however,and no machineryprovided.
These wereto be consideredat a congressat Vienna,whichwas
unfortunately postponeduntilAugust23, 1914,in orderto cele-
bratefittinglythefiftiethanniversary oftheFirstInternational.
Beforethe delegatescould assemble,however,the stormbroke
and revealedthe many vital weaknesses.The componentsec-
tions,isolatedby censorshipand martiallaw, foundconcerted
action impossiblebut, until actually drawn into hostilities,
stroveto fulfiltheirobligations.Demonstrationsin everycapi-
tal voiced an abhorrenceof war and a desire for a peaceful
settlement.Once involved in the conflict,however,members
40

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 BRITISH LABOR AND THE INTERNATIONAL 41

ralliedto theirrespective nationalstandardsand thecause of

theInternational was servedby onlya remnant ofitsmillions.
To thesegeneralizationsBritishlaborwasno exception.The
movement dividedintoa largemajority, mainlytrade-unionist,
whichafterAugust4 sawno roadto peaceexceptthrough war,
and a smallminority, mainlysocialist,whichsearchedforan
alternativeroute.The former soughttounitelaborinthecause
oftheEntente,whilethelattercontinually pressedfora meet-
ing ofthe International and negotiated leftgroupsofboth
with
neutralsand belligerents. Until1917thisalignment remained
unchanged;but the unrestof thatyear,in largepartdue to
thefirstRussianrevolution, brought a revivalofinternational-
ismin thetrade-union center.The entirelabormovement, ex-
ceptfortheextreme thenjoinedin supportoftheStock-
right,
holmconference plan,whereby thelaborandsocialist groupsof
theworld,belligerent and neutralalike,mightmeetand point
thewayto peace. This attemptat democratic diplomacy was
defeatedby thegovernments, and all subsequent efforts
ofthe
Britishmovement to salvagethecause wereineffective. After
thearmistice, whenit was possiblefortheforcesoflaborand
socialismto meet,it wasdiscovered thatoutofwar-time differ-
enceshad comea permanent divisionand a rivalcommunist
organization. The storyoftheSecondInternational duringthe
war,accordingly, is largelyoneoffrustrated effortsand disap-
pointedhopes.It wasnotentirely ineffective,however;and,so
faras Britishlaborwas concerned, something usefulwas ac-
complishedin the formulation of a peace programand the
mobilization ofopinionin itssupport.
Untilthe veryday of the empire'sentryintothe war the
Britishlabormovement unitedlystroveforpeaceandlookedto
theInternational forguidance.In response to thecalloftheIn-
ternational,KeirHardie,J.BruceGlasier, andDan Irvingwent
to Brusselsto pleadeloquently forpeaceon thesameplatform
withcomradesfromwhomtheywereto be separatedforover
fouryears.At hometheBritishsectionorganized huge"Stop
theWar" meetings, climaxedby an impressive demonstration
at TrafalgarSquare. Even afterGreatBritain'sentryintowar

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42 CARL F. BRAND

the Labor party,on August5, reaffirmed its oppositionto the

policiesofSir Edward Greyand proclaimedthedutyofsecuring
peace at the earliestpossiblemoment.A riftappeared on the
same day, however,when the majorityof the parliamentary
party opposed the proposal of J. Ramsay MacDonald, their
chairman,to read that resolutionin his speech to the house of
commons.MacDonald thereuponresignedand was succeeded
by ArthurHenderson.1
Fromthatmomentzeal formilitarysuccessdisplacedreliance
upon the International.The Labor partyacceptedthe political
truce,lent its machineryfor recruitingcampaigns,and ulti-
matelyjoined thecoalitiongovernments.On the industrialside
the Trade Union Congress(the T.U.C.) suspendedthe strike
weapon. There could be no question of Labor's loyalty and
patriotism.Some, indeed,like the veteranSocialist Henry M.
Hyndman,became violentlynationalistic.Only in the Inde-
pendentLabor party (the I.L.P.) and in the BritishSocialist
party (the B.S.P.) did any considerablesectionmaintainfaith
and interestin internationalism. Their devotion to principle
did not waver. "Out of the darknessand the depth," ran the
manifestoof the I.L.P., "we hail our working-classcomradesof
every land. Across the roar of guns, we send sympathyand
greetingto the GermanSocialists..... They are no enemies
of ours but faithfulfriends."2The dissidentminorityviewed
the war as a tragicblunderfor which the responsibilitywas
widelydiffused, and soughtits causes in thepolicyofbalance of
power,the systemofalliances,the practiceofsecretdiplomacy,
and the chauvinistmilitarismwhichafflictedall Europe. The
1 Socialist review,Oct.-Dec., 1914, pp. 312-16; Daily Citizen,July 27-31, 1914;
Labour leader,July 30-Aug. 6, 1914; Reportof thefifteenth of the
annual conference
Labourparty(1916), pp. 3-4. The InternationalSocialistBureau (the I.S.B.) consisted
of threedelegatesfromthe nationallabor and socialistorganizationsof affiliatedcoun-
tries. The connectionbetweenthe bureau and the constituentpartiesin Great Britain
was maintainedby a joint committee,knownas the BritishSectionof the I.S.B., com-
posed of fivedelegatesfromthe Labor party,two fromthe IndependentLabor party,
one fromthe Fabian Society,and the threeBritishdelegatesto the I.S.B.
The materialsused in the preparationofthisarticleare in the Hoover War Library,
StanfordUniversity,Calif.
2 Labourleader,Aug. 13, 1914.

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 BRITISH LABOR AND THE INTERNATIONAL 43

militants labeledthempro-German, but thetermwas onlyan

epithetand neveraccurately descriptive.
Shortlyafterthe Germaninvasionof Belgiumthe head-
quartersoftheInternational weremovedfromBrusselsto The
Hague,whereCamilleHuysmans,whokepthis international
outlookin spiteofhisfeelings thatBelgiumhadbeenwronged,
strovetomendthebroken threads.Fromtheradicalleft,includ-
ing the Britishminorities, he was continually besetwithde-
mandsto call together thefullbureau.Although sympathetic,
herefused onthegroundthat,so longas theBritishandFrench
majoritieswouldnot attend,a meetingwouldbe futile.The
president, 1mile Vandervelde, absorbedin the defenseof his
country as a member oftheBelgiangovernment, exertedlittle
effortto maketheInternational effective.Thefirst movesfora
conference, camenotfromtheI.S.B. butfromthe
accordingly,
neutrals.An appeal fromtheAmericanpartyprovedineffec-
tive;butin September, 1914,a groupofItaliansand Swissmet
at Lugano,and in the following Januarydelegatesfromthe
Dutch and Scandinavianpartiesassembledat Copenhagen.
Withhostilearmieson the soil of Franceand Belgium,how-
ever,theBritish majority,likeAlliedsocialists
generally,looked
uponsuchconferences withsuspicionand wereinclined to cast
aspersions ofpro-Germanism upontheirpromoters.3
The leadersof the Britishmajoritythereupon initiateda
moveto secureunityamongsocialists oftheAlliedPowers,with
the resultthat,on February14, 1915,aboutfortyprominent
socialists
fromFrance,Belgium, Russia,and GreatBritainmet
at Londonunderthepresidency ofKeirHardieto makea pro-
nouncement on the war. The outcomewas a compromise be-
tweentheviewsofthemilitants and theleft.The invasionof
Franceand Belgiumwas condemned, but it was emphasized
thattheAlliedsocialistswereat waronlywiththegovernments
3Daily Citizen,Jan. 14, Feb. 9, 1915; Labour leader,Oct. 22, 1914-Feb. 25, 1915;
Forward(Glasgow),Jan.28, 1915; Clarion,Dec. 11, 1914,Feb. 26, 1915; New statesman,
Jan. 16, 1915; Socialistreview,Jan.-Mar., 1915,p. 408, May, 1915,pp. 516-18; Report
oftheannualconference oftheIndependent
Labourparty(1915), p. 12; AlbertoMalatesta,
I socialistiitaliani durantela guerra (Milan, 1926), p. 82; smile Vandervelde,La
Belgiqueenvahieet le socialismeinternational(Paris, 1918), p. 228.

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44 CARL F. BRAND

and not the peoples of the CentralPowers. They stood forthe

liberationofBelgiumand Poland and fortherightofall forcibly
annexedpeoples,fromAlsace-Lorraineto the Balkans, freelyto
dispose of themselves.A resolveto fightto victoryover Ger-
many, characterizedas the worst enemy of freedom,was
coupledwitha determination that the defensivewar shouldnot
be transformed into one of conquest. Its conclusionmust see
thepeacefulfederationofEurope and the worldand therevival
of the International.These resolutionsstated fairlythe views
ofBritishlabor as theywereearlyin 1915. They supportedthe
war, but franklyinsistedupon a more concreteexpressionof
theirideals than wereto be foundin the vague pronouncements
of Allied statesmen.They anticipatedthe language of Wood-
row Wilsonand the peace programsof the last year of the war.
The Britishright,like the Frenchand Belgian delegates,would
undoubtedlyhave preferreda more outspokencondemnation
of Germanaggressionand "barbarism." The leftwould have
omittedall directreferences that mightlaterprove an impedi-
ment to German and Austrianparticipationin a conference,
and regrettedthe absence of any provisionforan International
untilthe close of the war.4
At The Hague CamilleHuysmansimpartiallystroveto keep
in contact with his constituents.Althoughaverse to calling
togetherthefullbureauuntilassuredoftheco-operationofeach
country,he proposedto hold meetingswithrepresentatives of
the national sectionsseparatelyon the understanding that be-
tween delegates of enemy countriesthere should be no ex-
changeof views exceptthroughthe bureau. Under theseterms
the Germanand Belgian parties went to The Hague, but the
Frenchrefusedoutrightto deal even indirectlywithenemyna-
tionals. When in May the British were approached, it was
agreedthatArthurHendersonand Ramsay MacDonald, repre-
sentingthe militantand pacifistsections,respectively,should
conferwith Huysmans. Withina few days, however,came a
of theLabour party(1916), p. 31; Clarion,
annual conference
4Report of thefifteenth
Feb. 26, 1915; Britishcitizenand empireworker,Mar. 9, 1918; Socialistreview,May,
1915, pp. 518-19, 576; Forward,Jan. 23-30, Feb. 27, 1915, May 19, Sept. 29, 1917;
Bradfordpioneer,Feb. 19, 1915.

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 BRITISH LABOR AND THE INTERNATIONAL 45

cabinetcrisisand Henderson'sentryintothe firstcoalition. As

it appeared inadvisablefora memberof the governmentto go
to The Hague, even as a Labor official,Hendersonrelinquished
the position. John Hodge was appointed,but refused.From
the outset,however,the Britishmovementhas been divided
on theproposal. The militantsclamoredthatit wouldplay into
the hands of MacDonald's pacifistfollowingand have a bad
effectupon French opinion. The executivewavered and, be-
cause of the opposition,reversedits decision. It later agreed,
however,to inviterepresentatives of the I.S.B. to England to
confer,and respondedto an appeal of Huysmansforfinancial
supportwitha loan of ?800.5
The pacifistinitiativewas assumed,meantime,by the Italian
socialists,who turnedto the leftminoritiesand the neutralsas
the materialout of whicha new conference mightbe fashioned.
The I.L.P. and the B.S.P. were favorable;but theirhopes of
representationvanished when the governmentrefusedpass-
portsto theirdelegates,J. Bruce Glasier and E. C. Fairchild.
The British were conspicuouslyabsent, therefore,when on
September5-8, 1915,about fortyanti-warsocialistsmet at the
village of Zimmerwald,near Berne. This group was a pacifist
and not a revolutionary one, whichpassed anti-warresolutions
and drew up a manifestocontainingthe peace formulaof no
annexations,no indemnities, and the rightofnationsto dispose
of themselves.The Zimmerwaldiansconceived of theirfunc-
tion as that of a "gingergroup" withinthe Internationaland
the sponsorsof a world-widepeace campaign. To thisend they
established a permanentcommissionwith headquarters at
Berne. A small minorityfollowingLenin wouldhave preferred
a revolutionary program,withthe aim of convertingthe "im-
perialist"war into the social revolutionand the establishment
of a new International.They signedthe majorityappeal but
set up alongsidetheBernecommissiona bureauofthe Zimmer-
5Reportofthefifteenthannual conferenceoftheLabourparty(1916), p. 33; Reportof
theforty-seventhannual conferenceof the Trade Union Congress(1915), pp. 327-28;
Clarion, June 11, 1915; New statesman,June 12, 1915; Labour leader,June 17, Sept.
9-16, 1915,Feb. 10, 1916.

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46 CARL F. BRAND

wald left,which contained the germ of the Third Interna-

tional.6
Some time elapsed beforeaccurate reportsof Zimmerwald
penetratedthe censorshipto the interestedBritishgroups. A
Dutch memberof the conference, HenriettaRoland-Holst,was
denied a Britishvisa; but untimatelytwo agents who made
theirmissionless obvious arrived.With much of the program
the socialistsocietieswerein agreement,and the prospectof an
organizedpeace driveraisedtheirhopes. The I.L.P. executive,
however,disapproved of the condemnationof the action of
othersocialistson the war and affirmed that the I.S.B., even
thoughremissin its duty,was stillthe properauthorityto call
an Internationalcongress.The B.S.P., over the protestof the
Hyndman wing,appointed a corresponding secretaryto keep
in touch withthe Berne commission.While the partydeclared
it would resistany attemptto supersedethe I.S.B., it believed
the Zimmerwaldcommissionnecessaryto compel the official
body to take action. The attitude of the socialist societies,
therefore,did not indicate complete adherenceto the Berne
commission,but only an endorsementas a temporaryagency
to forcethe pace of the International.7
The existenceof rival bureaus at The Hague and Berne in-
evitablyled to friction.As the formerstillfailedto move, the
latter sponsored a second meeting,April 24-30, 1916, at
Kienthal in Switzerland,whereagain the refusalof passports
preventedrepresentationfrom the two British socialist so-
cieties. This conferenceshowed a decided trend toward the
left,and in its manifestothe hand of Lenin was apparent. The
policies of the war socialistsand bourgeoispacifistsalike were
denounced. Such proposedguaranteesof peace as compulsory
arbitration,limitationof armaments,and the democratization
offoreignpolicywereridiculed,because peace and the existence
works,Vol. XVIII, The imperialistwar (New York, 1930),
6 V. I. Lenin, Collected
pp. 340-46, 473-81; R. Palme Dutt, The twoInternationals(Westminster, 1920), pp.
4-7; RaymondW. Postgate,Theworkers'international (London,1921), pp. 96-97; Jean
Maxe (pseud.), De Zimmerwaldau bolchevisme (Paris, 1920), pp. 33-44; Malatesta, pp.
41-58; Avanti!,July30, 1915; Labourleader,Aug. 5-Sept. 16, 1915.
7Report oftheannual conference of theIndependent Labourparty(1916), pp. 10, 32-
33; Socialist review,Jan.-Mar., 1916, pp. 57-58; Labour leader,Sept. 23-30, 1915;
Forward,Oct. 9, 1915; Call, Feb. 24, Mar. 23, Apr. 6, 1916.

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 BRITISH LABOR AND THE INTERNATIONAL 47

ofcapitalism wereincompatible. The onlywayto endthewar,

accordingly, was fortheworkers to ceaseall collaborationwith
governments, resumethe class war,and seize controlthem-
selves.To overtures fromKienthalthe I.L.P. reiterated its
interestin a moveforpeace,but also its loyaltyto theI.S.B.
Developments within theB.S.P.,however, madetheseorthodox
Marxiansevenmoreresponsive thanbefore.The riftbetween
theHyndmanwingand thepacifist majority,longin evidence,
nowbecamea split.At theannualconference, heldon theeve
of Kienthal,the minority withdrew. The conference then,al-
thoughstillprofessing to
allegiance theInternational, gave its
supportto theBernecommittee.8
The Britishlabormajoritylookeduponthisactivityof the
leftwithindifference or dislike.Coincident withtheprepara-
tionsoftheBernecommission forKienthal,however, theBritish
sectionof thebureaureverted to the decisiontakenalmosta
yearearlierto invitetheI.S.B. executives to Londonforcon-
sultation.The arrivalofVandervelde and Huysmanswas the
signalforan outburstfromthelaborrightand the warpress
generally,which,ignorantof the viewsof the two Belgians,
scentedGermanintrigue at thefaintestsuggestion oftheInter-
national.Vanderveldeand Huysmansmet separatelyrepre-
sentativesoftheparliamentary partyand theexecutives ofthe
Labor party,the Fabian Society,the I.L.P., and the B.S.P.,
to whomin turntheyexplained thedifficultiesin thewayofan
assemblyduringthe warand theirbeliefthat,so longas the
Britishand Frenchmajorities abstained,no usefulresultcould
follow.The socialistmovement wasnotstrongenoughto force
thepeace issue,but it couldmobilizeopinionupontheterms
ofthetreaty;so theyurgedeachsectionto studytheproblems
involvedand to preparereports forthebureau.9
8 Malatesta, pp. 101-5, 251-55; Maxe, pp. 52-55; Postgate, p. 97; Dutt, pp. 8-9;
Reportoftheannualconference oftheIndependent Labourparty(1916), pp. 32-33; Labour
leader,Apr. 20-27, June15, 1916; Call, Apr. 20-Sept. 7, 1916.
9 Reportofthefifteenth
annual conference oftheLabourparty(1916), p. 136; Reportof
thesixteenthannual conferenceoftheLabourparty(1917), pp. 6, 44; Reportoftheannual
conferenceof theIndependentLabour party(1916), pp. 8-10; New statesman,Apr. 29,
1916; Forward,Apr. 15, 1916; Labourleader,Apr.6, May 11,25, 1916. The I.S.B. execu-
tive sponsoreda conference ofneutralsocialists,July31 -August 2, 1916,at The Hague,
whichupheld the policyof Huysmans and disapprovedthat of the Zimmerwaldians.

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48 CARL F. BRAND

With the opportunistviews of the I.S.B. executivesconcern-

ing an assemblythe Labor partymajorityhad muchsympathy.
They refused,nevertheless,to forwarda peace program,and
emphasizedtheiropinionthatany considerationoftermswas at
presentpremature,that it would be susceptibleto misinterpre-
tationas defeatismby ally and enemyalike,and that theywere
concernedonly withthe prosecutionof the war to a victorious
conclusion.The Fabians, the I.L.P., and the B.S.P. on thecon-
traryapproved and soon forwardedtheirrespectiveprograms
to The Hague. In otherrespectsthe two leftsocietieswereless
amenable to the suggestionsof Huysmans and Vandervelde.
The I.L.P. bluntlytold them they had failed in their duty,
wherefore the I.L.P. approved of Zimmerwaldand would sup-
portany bona fidepeace movement.The B.S.P. was even more
caustic in its criticism.Aftertwentymonthsof silencethe best
the officialsofthe Internationalcould do, theysaid, was a lame
attempt to justifya deplorablefailure.There were many in
bothpartieswho feltthat the cause ofpeace and international-
ismshouldbe takenup by moreinspired,evenifless authorized,
standard-bearers of socialism.10
Trials ofstrengthbetweenmajorityand minorityviewswere
offeredby the annual meetingsof the Trade Union Congress
and the Labor party. On September5, 1916, at Birmingham
the formerby a vote of 1,486,000to 723,000rejectedan Ameri-
can Federationof Labor proposal fora labor conferencecon-
temporarywiththe peace congress.In a debate wherefeeling
ran high the majoritymanifestedits oppositionto any parley
withGermanSocial Democratsevenat theconclusionofhostili-
ties. On January23-25, 1917, the Labor party, meetingat
Manchester,again showeditselfprimarilyconcernedwithwin-
ning the war. On the last day of the session occurredits first
full-dressdebate on the International.An I.L.P. resolution
called for a conferenceand the speedy reconstitutionof the
International.The oppositiondeniedthe practicalityof such a
gathering.To put Frenchand Germansor Serbsand Bulgarians
10 Reportoftheannual conferenceoftheIndependent Labourparty(1917), pp. 29-31;
Clarion,Mar. 31-Apr. 14, Sept. 17, 1916; New statesman,Apr. 1, 29, 1916; Labour
leadler,Apr. 6-May 25, Oct. 12, 1916; Call, May 18, July27, 1916.

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 BRITISH LABOR AND THE INTERNATIONAL 49

together,said J. R. Clynes, would produce a "frightful bear

garden." By a vote of 1,498,000to 696,000 the Labor party
majorityonce moreemphasizedits faithin theAlliedcause and
its distrustof the GermanSocial Democrats. This ballot,how-
ever, revealed a minorityunexpectedlylarge. Contraryto a
widespread impression,not all the active forcesof interna-
tionalismresided in the socialist societies. Pacifist socialists
were its prominentadvocates, but over nine-tenthsof the
minoritycame fromthe ranks of trade-unionism.In spite of
the defeatthe lefthad some groundforencouragement.11
A proposal fromanotherquarterwas, meantime,broached
to the British sections. The French party, alarmed at the
activity of the Zimmerwaldians,promoted a conferenceof
inter-Alliedsocialiststo be held March 10, 1917, at Paris. As
that date drewnear,however,the sponsorsbecame dubiousof
the result. If the meetingwerecalled accordingto the constitu-
tion of the International,controlmightpossiblyfall into the
hands of the leftgroups;and, instead of closingranksagainst
the enemy, it might develop into a demonstrationof the
strengthof the peace movement.Of the twentyvotes assigned
to Great Britain,half went to the Labor party, four to the
I.L.P., fourto the B.S.P., and two to the Fabians. Historically
and constitutionally the socialistsocietieshad a rightto that
representation, but it gave thema votingstrengthutterlydis-
proportionateto their numbers.The governmentsocialists
could expectno aid fromthe Italian and Russian sections;and,
to cap the climax,the Frenchpartyconference ofDecember25,
1916, revealed a sudden and startlinggrowthof the minority.
The French majority,with the acquiescence of Vandervelde,
then attemptedto weightthe proposedconferencein its favor
by givinga part of the Italian vote to the social patriotsection
of Mussoliniand one of fourB.S.P. votes to Hyndman'snewly
formedNational Socialist party. Protestsnow arose on both
sides with mutual accusationsof a gerrymander. The Italian
11Reportofthe8ixteenth annual conference
oftheLabourparty(1917), pp. 98, 125-29;
Federationist,Oct., 1916; Britishcitizenand empireworker,Aug. 25, Sept. 8, Dec. 2,
1916, Feb. 3, 1917; Clarion,Sept. 8, 1916; Labour leader,Aug. 31, Sept. 14, Nov. 9,
1916, Feb. 1, 1917.

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50 CARL F. BRAND

partyrecalledits decisionto participate,and Russian groupsde-

claredtheirpreference fora conference ofZimmerwaldians.The
I.L.P. and the B.S.P. objected to any tamperingwiththe con-
stitution,but were willingto attend any meetingthat would
bringsocialiststogether.The Labor party,however,onlya few
days beforethe date set,gave theplan a fatalblowby reversing
its decisionto send delegatesand pronouncingan inter-Allied
conferenceat the momentinopportune.The conservativelead-
ers ofBritishtrade-unionism stillupheldthe officialview ofthe
war and would not allow controlof the movementto pass into
the hands of the socialistand pacifistwing.12
Events wereoccurring,however,whichduringthe year 1917
produceda significant change in the outlook of Britishlabor.
There was widespreaddiscontentdue to war-weariness, food
scarcity,high prices,the resortto conscription,and the fear
that trade-unionregulations,once surrendered, mightneverbe
restored. The dubious inadequacy of war
official aims and the
failureto take advantage of the Germanpeace offerof Decem-
ber,1916,arouseda feelingofdistrusttowardthegovernments.
Above all, the firstRussian Revolutionstirredthe labor world.
The resultwas a quickeningand strengthening of all left-wing
tendenciesand a shiftof the trade-unioncenter toward the
positionofthe socialistleft. This trendwas apparentespecially
in the proposal of the Stockholmconference,the supremeef-
fortof the internationalistsduringthe war.
The tremendouseventin Russia inspiredmanywiththe con-
victionthat the long-awaitedmomenthad come forconvoking
the International.A committeeof Dutch and Scandinavian
socialists was formedwhich, togetherwith SecretaryHuys-
mans, issued a call fora congressat Stockholmto whichboth
majoritiesand minoritiesof all affiliatedsectionswould send
delegates. Shortlythereafterthe executivecommitteeof the
Petrogradsoviet paralleledthe Dutch-Scandinavianinitiative
12 Malatesta, pp. 132-37; Call, Mar. 15-29, 1917; Labour leader,Feb. 1, 15, Mar.

15, 1917; Forward,Mar. 17, 1917; Bradfordpioneer,Mar. 23, 1917; Britishcitizenand

empireworker,Feb. 24, Mar. 10, 17, Apr. 28, 1917; Federationist, Mar., 1917; Times
(London), Mar. 6,1917.

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 BRITISH LABOR AND THE INTERNATIONAL 51

by appealing independentlyfor a conference,the decisionsof

whichshouldbe bindinguponall participants.Aftersomenego-
tiationsthe Russians wereinducedto fusetheirplan withthat
of Stockholm.Matters were somewhatconfused,however,by
the ZimmerwaldianBerne commissionwhich,because "social-
patriots" were invitedto Stockholm,refusedto co-operatein
preparatoryworkand, instead,planneda conference ofits own
adherentson the eve of, and at the same place as, the general
one.13
The Labor party executive,bound by the decision of the
Manchesterconference, at firstdecisivelyrejectedtheinvitation
fromthe Dutch-Scandinaviancommittee,but the actionof the
Petrogradsoviet demandedmoreseriousconsideration.Active
participationin the war by Russia was as importantas it was
uncertain;so, in ordernot to alienate an ally, the executive
consentedto send to Petrograda deputationrepresentative of
all sectionsof the movementto securefurther information.On
the contrary,the responseof the minoritiesto the Stockholm
proposalwas immediateand enthusiastic.On June3 theyspon-
soreda conference at Leeds to greettheRussianRevolution.As
a demonstration of left-wing strengthit was impressive,but it
had an unfortunate aftermath.It rebuffed an effort
of the sea-
men s union to delete a motionfavoringa peace withoutan-
nexationsor indemnities.The seamen,whosesufferings from
Germanmethodsof warfaredrovethemto assume a verymili-
tantpositionon the laborright,wereso incensedthatin retalia-
tion they refusedto allow J. Ramsay MacDonald and Fred
Jowett,I.L.P. representatives on the delegationto Russia, to
sail and so began a feudthat lasted throughoutthe war. The
deputation thereuponbroke up, as the majorityrepresenta-
tives refusedto go on withoutthe I.L.P. men. Upon wordof
this action the Labor party executive,beforeproceedingfur-
ther, decided to await the returnfromPetrogradof Arthur
13 Camille Huysmans' preface to "Comite organisateur de la conferencesocialiste
Internationalede Stockholm," Stockholm(Stockholm,1918), pp. iv-xx; Malatesta,
pp. 147-51; Labour leader,May 17, 1917; Call, May 31, Aug. 23, 1917.

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52 CARL F. BRAND

Henderson,who a few weeks beforehad gone thereupon an

officialmission.'4
Henderson,Labor member of the War Cabinet, went to
Russia opposed to a meetingof the International.Soon after
his arrival he joined with Smile Vandervelde and Albert
Thomas in an attemptto dissuade the Petrogradsoviet from
theirproject. They arguedthenecessityofa preliminary agree-
ment among Allied socialistsand the dangerof any common
action withthe Germans,but the Russians wereso set in pur-
pose that Hendersonand his colleaguesyielded. Since a con-
ferenceappeared inevitable,the sensiblecourse seemed to be
to join and seek to guide it. Any otherprocedurewould in all
probabilitythrowRussians and Germanstogetherunchecked
by otherinfluences.Henderson,moreover,began to see posi-
tive advantagesin a conference.Usefulcontactmightbe made
therewiththe growingGermanminorityand the Allied posi-
tionplaced clearlybeforethem. If the conferencewerelimited
to an exchangeof views, much good mightresult. Aftersix
weeksin Russia, he was fullyconvincedthat the BritishLabor
partyshouldbe representedat Stockholm."5
On July24 Hendersonreturnedto London in companywith
four delegates of the Petrogradsoviet. He immediatelycon-
vokedthepartyexecutiveand prevailedupon it to call a special
partyconferenceand recommendthe acceptanceof the Stock-
holm proposal, provided that the latter was only of a con-
sultativenature. It was furtherdecided to call an inter-Allied
conferenceand to come to a preliminaryagreementwith the
Frenchpartyon the Stockholmplan. ArthurHenderson,G. J.
Wardle, and J. Ramsay MacDonald, accordingly,proceeded
withthe fourRussians to Paris, wherethe Frenchand British
14 Reportof theseventeenth of the Labour party (1918), pp. 3-4;
annual conference
Reportof theannual conference of theIndependentLabour party(1918), pp. 9-10; Call,
Jan. 11, Apr. 12-July 19, 1917; Labour leader,May 17-July 19, 1917; Bradford
pioneer,June 15-July 6, 1917; Forward,Aug. 11, 1917; Newstatesman, June 23, July
14, 1917; Clarion,June29, 1917; Seaman,June8-22, 1917; Manchester Guardian,June
1-12, 1917. JuliusWest alone went to Stockholmto presentthe views of the Fabian
Society.
16 Manchester Guardian,June 7, 1917; New age, June 14-21, 1917; Labour leader,
June14-21, 1917.

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 BRITISH LABOR AND THE INTERNATIONAL 53

settledthetermsupon whichtheywouldrecommendacceptance
to theirrespectiveparties. It was feltthat conditionswere so
changedfromthoseofthe pre-warlabor worldthat,in addition
to the old International,thereshouldbe ad-
to bodies affiliated
mittedthe minoritieswhichhad formedseparate parties and
trade-unionsconnected with the InternationalTrade Union
Bureau, unless alreadyrepresentedthroughsome organization
affiliated
withtheI.S.B. The conference, insteadofbeingman-
datory,shouldbe consultative,but the nationalsectionsshould
declaredefinitely whateffecttheyintendedto giveits decisions.
Previousto any generalcongresstheAlliedsocialistswouldmeet
in London. The Labor party executive endorsed the action
taken at Paris and set August 10 as the date forthe special
conference.'6
Henderson'sactivitycreated a tremendousstir,and Stock-
holm became the topic of the day. For the firsttime a way
appeared of breakingthe stalemateof the war and saving the
fruitsof the Russian Revolution,and the enthusiasmof the
labor rank and filemountedrapidly. Many liberals,likewise,
saw greatpossibilitiesforgood in a socialistconference,
but the
conservativeswereviolentlyhostile. Stockholmwas denounced
volubly and unsparinglyas a German trap into which the
kaiser's obedient Social Democrats would entice to theirde-
structionthe unwaryAllies. Henderson'stripto Paris brought
roundsof abuse and calls forhis resignation.The labor right
was as vehementand bitteras the conservatives.The cabinet
was uneasy over the policy of the Labor minister.Zimmer-
wald passportsmightbe refusedwithimpunityto weak social-
ist societies,but the demandsof organizedlabor had to be con-
sidered. Lloyd Georgewavered. In May he had been favorable
to Stockholm.His attitudenow was uncertain,althoughthe
remainderof the ministry, includingthe Labor members,were
openly antagonistic. The French and Italian governments,
however,consistentlyopposed Stockholm,and the primemin-
isterfinallyfellinto line. On August 7 a legal opinionwas ob-
tained that the commonlaw forbadeintercoursewith enemy
16 Reportof theSeventeenth
annual conference
of theLabour party(1918), pp. 4, 45
Railwayreview,Aug. 10-17, 1917; Labour leader,July26-Aug. 16, 1917.

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54 CARL F. BRAND

aliens withoutlicense. It was not made public,however,as the

government, not sureofthe extentofthelaborswingto theleft,
thoughtthe partymightrejectStockholm.17
The Labor partyconferenceof August10 held the spotlight,
for to the public the reappearanceof internationalism three
years afterthe announcementof its demisewas as startlingas
it was unexpected.Attentionwas centeredupon ArthurHen-
derson,who quietly and impressivelyexplainedwhy he, who
went to Russia as a memberof the government,came back
convincedas a Labor officialthathispartyoughtto go to Stock-
holm. He told his impressionsof Russia, his anxietylest the
Allies be misunderstoodthere,and his desirethat the German
workersreceivefirst-hand knowledgeof the Britishlabor atti-
tude. He concludedthat the timehad come to use the political
weaponto supplementthe militaryin orderto securean honor-
able and democraticpeace. Such phrases hithertohad come
fromMacDonald, spokesmanof the socialistleft,ratherthan
fromthe leader of the trade-unioncenter. It was a remarkable
personaltriumphfor Hendersonthat largelyon the strength
of his own observation,judgment,and reliabilitythe party
emphatically(1,846,000to 550,000) reversedits decisionof the
previousJanuary.The executivethen recommendeda Stock-
holm delegationof twenty-four, of which the executive,the
parliamentary committeeof the T.U.C., and thepresentspecial
conferencewould appointeighteach. The miners,withthe in-
tentionof preventingseparate socialistrepresentation, offered
an amendmentthat no furtheradditionsbe made to the list.
As this move infringedthe termsof the invitationand raised
many otherproblems,the conferenceadjourned until August
17 Files for June-August,1917, of the New statesmen, New age, Clarion, Labour
leader,Bradfordpioneer,Forward,Call, Federationist,Britishcitizenand empireworker,
ManchesterGuardian, Daily News, London Times; Parliamentarydebates,5th ser.,
XCVI, 2181-2226; Rosalind Travers Hyndman, The last years of H. M. Hyndman
(London, 1923), pp. 118, 148-49; G. N. Barnes, Fromworkshopto War Cabinet(New
York, 1924), pp. 155-59. The Stockholmconferencesuffered fromthe acts of certain
unfriendly newspapercorrespondents therewho deliberatelysoughtto belittleit and
distortits aims. One representativeof an importantnews service boasted that he
killed it. See U.S. Departmentof State, Papers relatingto theforeignrelationsof the
UnitedStates,1917, Suppl. 2, I, 742-43.

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 BRITISH LABOR AND THE INTERNATIONAL 55

21, when also a memorandumon war aims would be con-

sidered.18
To the countrythe decisiveballot came as a surprise.The
conservativepressraged. On the floorofthe house ofcommons
labor was denouncedas unfitmentallyand by trainingto deal
withsuch questionsas would come underdiscussionat Stock-
holm. The cabinet now announcedits decisionto refusepass-
ports. Hendersonwas the targetof attacks fromall sides,and
withintwenty-four hourshe was out of the government.19
It is difficultto comprehendthe prime minister'scharges
that Hendersonhad deceivedhis colleaguesas to his intention
to exerthis influenceat the Labor partyconferencein favorof
Stockholmand that he had misled the conferenceas to the
attitude of the Russian government.Even beforeHenderson
leftRussia, he had announcedhis supportof the proposal,and
afterhis returnto England every day had been devoted to
open preparationsforit. His versionof the Russian attitude
was correct,and withina week was confirmedby word from
Kerensky.As Labor resented his expulsion,the affaircon-
tributedmuchto theparty'sresumption ofindependenceand its
determination to have a sharein shapingthe peace.
As the Labor executivefeltit had not the powerto alterthe
compositionof the Stockholmdelegation,its resolution,sub-
mitted to the adjourned conferenceon August 21, admitted
minorityrepresentationas heretofore.In these termsit was
carriedby the narrowestof majorities,1,234,000to 1,231,000.
The oppositionhailed the vote as a virtual defeatforStock-
holm,and many werethe editorialson the supposed landslide
frominternationalism and the complimentsto the partyupon
its soundnessand good sense. Withfewexceptionsthe factwas
overlookedthat the shiftin the vote was chieflyupon a condi-
tion and not upon the principleof the conference.The real
18 Report theseventeenth annualconference
of oftheLabourparty(1918),pp. 4-6,47-51;
Miners' Federationof Great Britain,Reportof the8pecialconferenceheldat theCentral
Hall, Westminster, August9thand 10th,1917; filesforAugust,1917, of the New states-
man, New age, Clarion,Labour leader,Forward,Bradfordpioneer,Call, Shop assistant,
Dockers'record.
19 Parl. debates,
5th ser.,XCVII, 909-23, 1510.

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56 CARL F. BRAND

issuewas thatof unityofpolicyin thenationaldelegation or

separatesocialistrepresentation.It wason thispointthatsev-
eral large unions,includingthe minerswith 600,000votes,
turnedagainstthe executive.Whenimmediately afterward a
resolutionon the composition of the delegationincorporating
the miners'amendment was offered, it was overwhelmingly
carriedby 2t,124,000to 175,000.20
Beforeproceeding withtheelectionofdelegatestheexecutive
awaitedtheoutcomeoftheinter-Allied socialistconference.On
August28-29it metin Londonunderthepresidency ofArthur
Hendersonto deal withthe problemsof Stockholm and war
aims. It was foredoomed to failure,however,by a condition
imposedby the former French"majority"thatno resolution
shouldbe bindingunlesspassedunanimously. How farAllied
socialismhad movedwas shownby the unanimousprotest
againstthe refusalof passportsand by the scantsupportac-
cordedHyndman'smotionagainstanyconsultation so longas
GermanarmiesoccupiedAlliedsoil. Unityon themainissues,
however,was unobtainable.CommitteesunderJ. Ramsay
MacDonaldand SidneyWebbstroveto obtainagreement, re-
spectively,on Stockholm and war aims. A largemajority fa-
voredthereportoftheformer forStockholm, butthenecessary
unanimity was prevented by the Belgians,the Frenchright,
and thesingleGreek.On waraimstherewas muchagreement
insubstance, butthedifferences weresuchthatseveralseparate
statements wereplacedon record.It was apparentthatmore
timeand anotherconference wouldbe necessaryto achieve
Alliedsocialistunity.Upon invitation of the I.L.P. afterthe
conference adjourned,the leftgroupsof the Italians,French,
20 Reportof theseventeenthannual conference of the Labour party(1918), pp. 6-8;
Reportof the annual conference of the IndependentLabour party (1918), pp. 11-12;
Socialistreview,Apr.-June,1918, pp. 192-93; Labour leader,Aug. 16-23, 1917; Brad-
fordpioneer,Aug. 31, 1917; Call, Aug. 16, 1917; Shop assistant,Sept. 1, 1917; Railway
review,Aug. 17, 1917; New statesman,Aug. 25, 1917; Spectator,Aug. 25, 1917. Under
the block vote the miners'delegatesdeterminedby only 376 to 360 that their600,000
votesshouldbe cast againstthe executives'resolution.See MinersFederationof Great
Britain,Reportof thespecial conference held at theWestminster Hall, London,August
20th,1917.

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 BRITISH LABOR AND THE INTERNATIONAL 57

Russians, and Britishremainedfora day to discuss theirown

pointsof view and arrangeforconcertedaction in the future.'
The failureof the inter-Alliedconferenceto achieve unity,
togetherwith the refusalof passports,sealed the fate of the
Stockholmproject. Labor still felt confidentthat if it spoke
unitedlythe governmentswould ultimatelyyield; but, so long
as not even the Allied groups were in agreement,it seemed
futileto go to Stockholm.Even many ardentI.L.P. men were
convincedby the eventsofthosesessionsthat somepreliminary
stepsweredesirablebeforesittingdownwithsocialistsof enemy
states. Some new tactic was necessary.An immediateoppor-
tunityto debate it was affordedby the annual meetingof the
T.U.C., scheduledforSeptember3-8 at Blackpool.
The T.U.C. was neitheraffiliatedto the Internationalnor,
heretofore, activelyinterestedin it. Such matterswereleftto
the Labor party. Uneasinessover the war-timerelinquishment
of hard-wonconditionsof labor and the generalunrestof 1917,
however,produceda significant changeof outlookand reversal
of policy. When HendersonreturnedfromRussia with views
so profoundlyaltered, the parliamentarycommitteeof the
T.U.C. decided it oughtto participatein internationalgather-
ings,and proceededto establishclose relationswiththe Labor
partyexecutive.It was ready to send delegatesto Stockholm,
and it shared in the inter-Alliedconference.Afterthe disil-
lusionmentof that meeting,the parliamentarycommitteepre-
pared a compromiseresolutionwhich,it was hoped, all trade-
unionistscould support.Its substance was that, since a con-
ferenceat Stockholmat the presentmomentcould not be suc-
cessful,generalagreementshouldbe soughtamongthe working
classes of the Allied nationsas the fundamentalconditionof a
successfulInternational;and in these conferencesthe national
minoritiesshould eitherbe governedby majorityrule or else
be givena votingpoweraccordingto thenumberofpersonsactu-
ally represented.At Blackpool, Henderson,presentas a fra-
21 Reportof theseventeenth annual conference
of theLabour party (1918), pp. 8-11;
filesforSept., 1917, of the New statesman,New age, Labour leader,Forward,Bradford
pioneer,Call.

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58 CARL F. BRAND

ternal delegate of the Labor party, was welcomed with un-

precedentedwarmthas he restatedthe case fora conference.
Such oppositionas existedcame fromthe uncompromising sea-
men on the right and from the extreme left. In the end the
resolutionwas adopted by a vote of 92,849,000 to 91,000. The
Labor party executive immediatelyassimilatedits policy to
that of the T.U.C. Out of this co-operationdeveloped the
policyof drawingup a peace programwhichwould becomethe
basis, successively,of national, Allied, and ultimately,inter-
nationalagreement.22
To avert a schism in the ranks of labor, accordingly,the
Stockholmproject was, in effect,shelved. Never again during
the war was such a meetingso near realizationas in thosedays
of August, 1917. The agitation,however,achieved almost as
much as an actual meeting.It revivedthe internationalspirit,
broughtit intoview,and compelledthe attentionofmanywho
had never beforegiven it a thought.It gave currencyto the
that the governmentsand diplo-
ideals of labor so effectively
mats could not ignorethem. Yet the failureof the moderates
to forcethe issue drove the revolutionariesto the acceptance
of Lenin's view and ultimatelyto the decisionin favorof the
Third or CommunistInternational.
The new policyinauguratedby Britishlabor was not one to
be accomplishedspeedily;but the party'smemorandumon war
aims progressedsteadilyand, on December 28, 1917, was sub-
mittedto a joint conferenceof societiesaffiliatedto the party
and the T.U.C. Withvirtualunanimitythisfamousdocument
was accepted,so that nationalunitywas achievedon the basis
of a peace programremarkableforits practicalidealism. The
next step was to place the memorandumbeforethe partiesof
the Allies at a meetingarrangedfor February 20, 1918, at
London. This inter-Alliedconference, the thirdsince the war,
was called by the two committeesof the Britishlabor move-
22 Reportof theproceedings at theforty-ninthannual Trades Union Congress(1917),
ofthe
annual conference
pp. 54-58, 69-90, 95, 182, 272-77, 337; Reportoftheseventeenth
Labourparty(1918), pp. 11-21; Edinburghreview,CCXXVI (1917), 209-34; Socialit
review,Nov.-Dec., 1917, pp. 297-98; filesforSeptember,1917, of the Labour leader,
Forward,Call, Shop assistant,Post, New statesman,New age, Britishcitizenand empire
worker.

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 BRITISH LABOR AND THE INTERNATIONAL 59

ment,insteadof the Britishsectionof the I.S.B. This made it

possibleto ignorethe International'srulesgoverningthe com-
positionofcongresses,to omitsomebodies usuallyinvited,and
to includeothersunaffiliated.In spite of vigorousproteststhe
Britishsocialistswererefusedseparaterepresentation.The abo-
litionof the liberumvetomade obstructivetactics fromeither
the rightor the leftimpossible,and preliminary conversations
betweenthe Britishand Frenchpartiesaccomplishedso much
that agreementwas comparativelyeasy. With some changes
and additionsthewaraims ofBritishlaborbecametheplatform
of Alliedlabor and socialism,on the basis of whichtheywould
once moreapproachthe socialistsof the CentralPowers.23
To establishcontactbetweenthe democracies,however,was
easier said than done. Four copies of the inter-Alliedmemo-
randum sent directlyto the German Social Democrats never
penetratedthe censorship,so thatit was the end ofMay before
FriedrichEbert could announcethe indirectreceiptof a text.
When repliesfinallycame throughfromthe partiesof Bulgaria
and Hungary,the GermansocialistsofAustria,and the German
minority,they werehighlyencouragingto the Britishleaders.
On such generalprinciplesas the evacuationof occupiedterri-
tories,no annexationsor indemnities,disarmament,and the
restorationof Belgium,and even upon the more contentious
territorialquestions, there was a willingnessto accept the
memorandum.The monthswore on, however,with no direct
responsefromthe Germanmajority,withoutwhose adherence
nothingcould be done. Hopes roseor fellaccordingto thetenor
of an editorialin Vorwiirtsor remarksof Muller or Scheide-
mann. In Junethe Dutch Socialist,Troelstra,afterconversa-
tions with the German leaders, attemptedto bring a verbal
statementbut was blockedby the refusalof a Britishvisa. An
effortof ArthurHendersonand C. W. Bowerman,secretaries,
23 Reportoftheeighteenth
annualconference oftheLabourparty(June,1918), pp. 7-8;
Reportof the annual conference of the IndependentLabour party (1918), pp. 14-17;
Socialistreview,Apr.-June,1918, pp. 98-108; J. R. MacDonald in Forward,Dec. 29,
1917-Mar. 2, 1918; Labour leader,Jan. 17-Feb. 21, 1918; Bradfordpioneer,Mar. 15,
1918; New statesman,Feb. 23-Mar. 2, 1918; Clarion,Jan. 18, Feb. 22, 1918; British
citizenand empirewrker, Mar. 9, 1918; ArthurHenderson,"A new international
order,"Yale review,VII (1918), 676-87.

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60 CARL F. BRAND

respectively,of the Labor party and the T.U.C., to go to

Switzerlandand learn the truthfromTroelstra'sown lips was
similarlythwartedby therefusalofpassports. It ultimatelyap-
peared that the Germans were willingto accept the general
principlesbut that they balked at the territorialproposals,
whichto theireyes coincidedin many respectswith the aims
of Allied imperialism.It became clear that the followersof
Ebert and Scheidemannwould never entera conferencecom-
mittedto a programdisadvantageousto the Central Powers.
They, too, like the Entente socialists,had to face the wrathof
their conservatives,for the Pan-Germans were accusing the
Internationalofbeinga tool oftheirenemies. It was, moreover,
forthose who had pledgedtheirsupportto the war to
difficult
ask forpeace just at the momentwhendecisivevictoryon the
easternfrontand advancingarmieson the westernpromisedto
put an end to the militarystalemate. The peace-by-negotia-
tions movement was, accordingly,brought to a standstill.
When, duringthe springand summerof 1918, attentionwas
absorbed in the mightyGermanthrustsand the great Allied
offensive,the Labor partyand the trade-unionsmightcontinue
to discuss the Internationalbut they could not advance its
cause.24
In an effortto bringAmericanlabor into line,anotherinter-
Allied conference,the fourthand last, was held at London,
September17-20, 1918, but on the Internationalthe disagree-
ment was hopeless. The British laid beforethe delegates an
analysisof the repliesfromthe socialistsof the enemypowers,
but the onlyconferencethat interestedthe Americanswas one
of trade-unionswith very limited objectives and concurrent
with the officialpeace congress.Samuel Gomperswas, never-
24Labor partypamphlet,The repliesof thesocialistpartiesof theCentralPowersto
thememorandum on war aims (1918); Reportof thenineteenth of the
annual conference
Labour party(1919), pp. 3-7; Reportof theproceedings annual conference
of thefiftieth
oftheTradesUnion Congress(1918), pp. 55-56, 67-69, 196-211,236-37; New statesman,
Mar. 9, June29, July20, 27, Aug. 24, 1918; Labour leader,Mar. 2, May 9, July18-
Sept. 12, 1918; Bradfordpioneer,July5-Aug. 23, 1918; Forward,Mar. 16-30, June
15-29, Aug. 17-Sept. 28, 1918; War and peace,Aug., 1918; Clarion,Aug. 16-Sept.
Mar. 9, Sept. 7-14, 1918; Seaman,Aug. 16,
27, 1918; Britishcitizenand empireworker,
1918.

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 BRITISH LABOR AND THE INTERNATIONAL 61

theless,added to a previouslyappointedcommitteeof three-

Henderson,Vandervelde,and AlbertThomas-to preparefor
a congresswhich,as Allied victorywas now in sight,could not
be faroff.The partiesof the left,meantime,disgustedwitha
summerof inactionand compromiseand piqued at continued
exclusionfromthe councilsofthe movement,began to question
the value of an Internationalcontrolledby the moderates.
I.L.P. membersdemanded its thoroughreconstitution.The
B.S.P. openlydebated the desirabilityof a new revolutionary
Internationaland kept close watchon eventsat Moscow.25
Victoryand the armisticecenteredattentionon the proposed
labor conferenceconcurrentwith the officialpeace congress.
Vanderveldestill hesitated,but the insistenceof the British
partyled to the call. At Berne, February3-9, 1919,the forces
of labor and socialismwould meet to formulateworking-class
opinionforthe benefitof those at Paris and begin the recon-
structionof the International,whilea separatetrade-unionas-
semblywas arrangedforthe same time and place. The A. F.
of L. and the Belgians refusedto attend, as did also certain
leftsections,includingthe officialpartiesof Italy, Switzerland,
Norway, Serbia, and Rumania, whichregardedthis group as
reactionary.The Russian bolsheviki,meanwhile,wereprepar-
ing for a communistconferencein March at Moscow. The
absence of the two extremesbetteredthe possibilityof agree-
mentat Berne.
To thisconferencecame ArthurHenderson,J. Ramsay Mac-
Donald, Mrs. Philip Snowden,C. T. Cramp, and J. McGurk
forthe Labor partyand J. H. Thomas, G. H. Stuart-Bunning,
MargaretBondfield,T. Greenall,and R. Shirkieforthe T.U.C.
From theiractions at Berne one may gatherwhat wouldhave
been the Britishroleifthe Stockholmprojecthad materialized.
It became theirfunctionto keep the conference on an evenkeel
and movingforwardin spite of the dangerof beingswamped
by squalls of nationalism.At the veryoutsetit was confronted
25
Reportoftheeighteenthannualconference oftheLabourparty(June,1918),pp. 8-10;
Reportof thenineteenth annual conference of theLabour party (1919), pp. 3-11; New
statesman,Sept. 28, 1918; Labourleader,Sept. 19-26, Dec. 26, 1918; Bradfordpioneer,
Oct. 4, 1918; Forward,Mar. 9, May 11, Sept. 28, 1918; Po8t, Oct. 4, 1918; New age,
June13, Sept. 26, 1918; Call, Apr. 4, May 9, Aug. 8, 29, 1918.

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62 CARL F. BRAND

by the war-guiltcontroversy,whichrevealed what an actual

meetingat Stockholmwouldhave facedin nationalfeeling.For
two days, as Albert Thomas and Renaudel strove to forcea
humiliatingconfessionfromthe Germans,the two sides raged
violentlyat one another.It was due largelyto the even temper
and diplomaticskillofHendersonand Stuart-Bunning that the
conference was recalledto its purposeand a way out foundby a
formulain whichthe Germanmajorityaffirmed the complete
separation of the new revolutionaryGermanyfromthe old
systemresponsibleforthe war, and the questionof guilt was
leftfora futurecongressto be held undermorenormalcondi-
tions.
With harmonyrestored,the conferenceproceededwith its
constructivework. The reporton a league ofnationswas intro-
duced by J. H. Thomas and supportedby Hendersonand Mrs.
Snowden,but most impressiveof all the speecheswas that of
MacDonald. His forcefuland eloquent appeal foran effective
league was one of the highpointsof the conference.In the dis-
cussion of territorialquestionsMacDonald expressedthe will-
ingnessof Britishlabor to supportan applicationof the prin-
ciple of self-determination that wouldnot be one-sided.In be-
halfof the internationallabor charter,workedout jointlywith
the trade-unionconference,Henderson,Shirkie,and McGurk
helped lay foundationsforan internationallabor office.In the
last importantdiscussionon "Democracy versusdictatorship"
two resolutionsplaced beforethe conferencewere hotly de-
bated. The Britishdefendedthe Brantingor majorityresolu-
tion; and MacDonald wonhis secondovationby an able speech
fora socialismgained by parliamentarymethods,based upon
libertyand democracy,and opposed to anythinglike a perma-
nent dictatorship.The minorityobjected to the impliedcon-
demnationof Russian methods.All agreed in favorof a com-
missionof inquiryto Russia, but this proposalwas later frus-
tratedby the refusalofpassports. In conclusionthe conference
accepted a plan of the Britishdelegation,somewhatmodified,
for an executiveof three,namely,Branting,Henderson,and
Huysmans,assisted by a commissionof two fromeach organ-
ization,to continuethe workof the conference, endeavorto in-
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 BRITISH LABOR AND THE INTERNATIONAL 63

fluencethe officialcongressat Paris in favorofits findings,and

furtherthe reconstitution of the International.26
Berne showed that the Internationalcould be rebuilt. In
spite of prophesiesof disasterthe forcesof labor and socialism,
separated by fouryears of war, effecteda meeting.One year
laterat Geneva the Second Internationalwas formallyrevived.
There were, however,great gaps in the ranks. The Russian
communistsin March, 1919, foundedthe Third International,
committedto the abandonmentof parliamentaryaction and
the dictatorshipof the proletariat.In Great Britainthe B.S.P.
was fora time drawninto its orbit,and many of its members
remainedcommunists.A groupof centerparties,includingthe
I.L.P., leftto formthe InternationalWorkingUnion of Social-
ist Parties,whichdeclaredagainst both the moderationof the
Second Internationaland the radicalismofthe Third. Reunion
of this "Two-and-a-half"as it was humorouslystyled,withthe
Second was effectedin 1923 at Hamburg,but the antipathyof
the socialistSecond towardthe ideals of the communistThird
remained as strongas duringthe debate on dictatorshipat
Berne.
The effortexpendedon internationalism duringthe war did
farmorethan prepareforthe revivalof the organization.The
greatStockholmmovement,and the numerousconferences and
informalmeetings,with their memorandaand exchangesof
view, crystallizedopinion and united the forcesof labor and
liberalism.When PresidentWilson went to the peace confer-
ence,thesepowerfulsectionswerealreadymarshaledin support
of the principlestheysharedwithhim. So, althoughpowerless
to preventthe war,the Britishlabor movementand the Inter-
national did make a contributionto the peace.
STANFORD UNIVERSITY

26 Reportof thenineteenth annual conferenceof theLabour party(1919), pp. 13-19,

196-205; Reportof thetwenty-seventh annual conferenceoftheI.L.P. (1919), pp. 10-12,
44-45, 67-70; filesforJan.-Mar., 1919, of the Labour leader,Forward,New statesman,
Railway review,Workers'dreadnought, Seaman, and Britishcitizenand empireworker;
Socialistreview,Apr.-June,1919,pp. 108-14; Nation (London), Feb. 22, 1919; Atlantic
mont/dy, CXXIII (1919), 707-13; Johnde Kay, The spiritoftheInternationalat Berne
(n.p., 1919); Mrs. Philip Snowden,A politicalpilgrimin Europe (New York, 1921),
pp. 11-36.

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