1. Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No.

133250 (July 9, 2002)

Facts: When the late President Marcos enacted Presidential Decree No. 1084, it created the Public
Estates Authority (PEA) which is tasked "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and
"to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." But more importantly,
Presidential Decree No. 1085 was also enacted which mandates the transfer of the "lands reclaimed in
the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay,” or better known as the Freedom Islands, to PEA.

On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with AMARI, a private
corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands to which the Board of Directors of PEA have confirmed and
was subsequently approved by then President Ramos.

On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant
petition for mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order. Petitioner argues, inter alia, that it violates prohibition of sale of alienable lands of the
public domain to private corporations that is enshrined in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the Amended JVA which transfers to AMARI the Freedom Islands from the State
an unconstitutional transaction.

Held: Yes. Private corporations are banned from acquiring lands of the public domain and are only
allowed to lease those lands. Only qualified individuals could acquire alienable lands of the public
domain. The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

The rationale behind this constitutional prohibition is that since individuals are allowed to acquire lands
of the public domain with the limitation of not more than 12 hectares, they could easily circumvent this
limitation by creating holding corporations to acquire more than what is allowed.

Furthermore, the provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the reclaimed lands could be
transferred by PEA to the "contractor or his assignees" would not apply to private corporations but only
to individuals because of the constitutional ban. Otherwise, the provisions of PD No. 1085 would violate
both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

20. Ong v. Imperial, G.R. No. 197127 (July 15, 2015)

Facts: Petitioners Noel L. Ong, Omar Anthony L. Ong, and Norman L. Ong (petitioners) are registered
owners of a parcel of land under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-17045 located in Barangay
Dogongan, Daet, Camarines Norte (subject property). The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)
issued a Notice of Coverage to petitioners pertaining to the subject property and that it is covered
pursuant to the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. This prompted the
petitioners to protest and object the said issuance because, as they contended, the subject property was
used as a grazing area for cattle and carabao long before the passage of R.A. 6657, hence, exempted
from the said law. To which the MARO replied in the negative as the subject property was not actually,
directly and exclusively used for livestock.
Subsequently, the petitioners filed an application of exemption with the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) on the grounds that the subject property had already been reclassified as residential built-up area,
not agricultural, before the effectivity of R.A. 6657 pursuant to a Town Plan and a Zoning Ordinance
which was certified and was further clarified by the Department of Zoning Authority as to its inclusion in
the Town Plan. Nevertheless, the DAR rejected the said application because according to them, the
built-up area for residential areas provided in the Town Plan has long been exhausted, hence, the
subject property cannot fit or has no room in the built-up area.

Then, the petitioners appealed the decision to the Office of The President. In granting the appeal and
reversing the decision of the DAR, the Office of the President ruled that the findings of Department of
Zoning Authority should have been given more weight as they have the rightful jurisdiction and
expertise on the matters of classification of lands. The respondents herein appealed in the Court of
Appeals and ruled in their favour. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the subject property is exempted from R.A. 6657.

Held: No. The Supreme Court had already held that "to be exempt from CARP, all that is needed is one
valid reclassification of the land from agricultural to non-agricultural by a duly authorized government
agency before June 15, 1988, when the CARL took effect." Moreover, it is worthy to note that "the
power of the local government to convert or reclassify lands [from agricultural to non-agricultural lands
prior to the passage of RA 6657] is not subject to the approval of the [DAR]."

20. Rom v. Roxas & Company, Inc., G.R. No. 169331 (September 5, 2011)
Facts: Respondent herein are the landowners of the subject properties which sought for an exemption
from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, pursuant to DAR Administrative
order No. 6, Series of 1994. Respondents claim that the subject properties was reclassified as part of the
residential cluster area pursuant to a zoning ordinance prior to the effectivity of R.A. 6657.

The DAR rejected the application for exemption because it was not accompanied by proof of
disturbance compensation that are to be paid to the farmer-beneficiaries occupying the land. This was
later remedied by respondent upon fixing of the compensation by the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board. The DAR then granted the exemption.

The petitioners then filed a review in the Court of Appeals alleging that the respondent should have
been estopped from filing for exemption because it had already voluntarily offered to sell the subject
properties to the DAR and that the farmer-beneficiaries were not given the disturbance compensation
pursuant to Section III(B), paragraph 8 of DAR Admin. Order 6-1994.

Issue: Whether or not the subject properties be covered by R.A. 6657 through estoppel and/or failure to
comply with the exemption requirements.

Held: No. The Supreme Court ruled that respondent is not bound by its previous voluntary offer to sell
because the subject properties cannot be the subject of a voluntary offer to sell because it is clearly
beyond the CARP's coverage. Furthermore, the respondents failure to submit proof of disturbance
compensation or by petitioner’s waiver of such would not render the exemption as invalid because the
records show that the respondent offered to pay but no agreement was reached, hence the fixing of
compensation by the PARAD. The efforts of respondents and along with the documents submitted by
them in complying with the requirements of the department order appears to have been substantially
complied, hence, valid.

12. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. v. Secretary of DAR
G.R. No. 183409 (June 18, 2010)
Facts: Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA for brevity) seeks for the stoppage
of the implementation of DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended by DAR AO No. 05-07, and DAR Memorandum
No. 88, 2 for having been issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as some provisions of the aforesaid administrative issuances
are illegal and unconstitutional.

The Secretary of DAR issued rules and procedures which would govern the conversion of agricultural
lands to non-agricultural lands. The issued rules embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lots
reclassified by LGUs into non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988. The said issuance was later amended
to include (1) those to be converted to residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and other non-
agricultural purposes; (2) those to be devoted to another type of agricultural activity such as livestock,
poultry, and fishpond — the effect of which is to exempt the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) coverage; (3) those to be converted to non-agricultural use other than that
previously authorized; and (4) those reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-
agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657.

In Feb. 28, 2002, the Secretary of DAR issued DAR AO 01-02, the challenged rule herein, to amend the
aforesaid rules and procedures and repeal all issuances inconsistent therewith. This rule now covers all
applications for conversion of agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural use. This
new rule defined agricultural lands as "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or
other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" which in effect, means that lands reclassified from
agricultural to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988 are
considered to be agricultural lands for purposes of conversion, redistribution, or otherwise.

Subsequently, DAR AO 05-07, which is also one of the challenged rule herein, was issued to amend
certain provisions pertaining to land conversion in time of exigencies. As a result of these rules,
memorandum no. 88 was issued to suspend all continuing or in-progress conversion of prime
agricultural land for real estate development.

Petitioners herein contend that it slowed down the development of housing projects that resulted to
unemployment, illegal squatting problems which prejudiced them and more so of the whole nation.

Issue: Whether or not the reclassified non-agricultural lands is within the jurisdiction of the DAR
Secretary.

Held: Yes, the definition of agricultural lands under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, merely refers to the
category of agricultural lands that may be the subject for conversion to non-agricultural uses and is not
in any way confined to agricultural lands in the context of land redistribution as provided for under
Republic Act No. 6657. In so doing, the DAR Secretary merely acted within the scope of his authority
stated in Section 4 (K) and Section 5(1) of Executive Order No. 129-A, which is to promulgate rules and
regulations for agrarian reform implementation and that includes the authority to define agricultural
lands for purposes of land use conversion.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has previously held that agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to
go through the process of conversion, jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR. However, agricultural
lands, which are already reclassified before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 which is 15 June
1988, are exempted from conversion because it was the cut-off period for automatic reclassifications or
rezoning of agricultural lands that does not require any clearance from DAR.

52. Monico Ligtas v. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 200751 (August 17, 2015)
Facts: Petitioner herein was charged with theft under Art. 308 of the RPC. The information alleged that
he entered the abaca plantation and harvested 1,000 kilos of abaca fibers without the consent of the
owner and with intent to gain. The petitioner pleaded not guilty.

According to five (5) prosecution witnesses, they went to the abaca plantation with the plantation’s
administrator and several other men upon the orders of the owner. There, they saw the petitioner with
3 unidentified men already harvesting the abaca fibers. Acting upon seeing them, the petitioner
threatened them if they keep on harvesting.

On July 3, 2000, the owner, in the name of Anecita Pacate, confronted the petitioner before the Police
Station where the latter admitted on harvesting the said abaca fibers but claimed that he was the owner
of the plantation. According to the petitioner, he had been a tenant of Pacate since 1993 and that
Pacate’s late-husband had installed him as tenant of the portion of the land that is involved in the
criminal case. In his defense, Petitioner was only defending his land in preventing Pacate’s workmen in
harvesting the abaca in which he rightfully owns.

Petitioner filed a complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
which later on decided in his favour in ruling that he was a bona fide tenant of the land.

The RTC convicted him of the crime of theft and ruled that Ligtas' defense of tenancy was not supported
by concrete and substantial evidence nor was his claim of harvest sharing between him and Anecita
Pacate duly corroborated by any witness. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and held that
findings or certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or its authorized representatives
concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties are
merely preliminary or provisional and not binding upon the courts.

Issue: Whether or not the DARAB decision on the existence of tenancy relationship is conclusive and
binding upon the courts.

Held: Yes. The findings of the DARAB were supported by substantial evidence. Requiring petitioner to
prove tenancy relationship through evidence other than the DARAB Decision and the testimonies of the
witnesses is absurd and goes beyond the required quantum of evidence, which is substantial evidence.
Notwithstanding the fact that decisions in administrative cases are not binding on criminal proceedings,
in this case, the decision of the DARAB should be given respect because of the tenancy relationship is a
factor in determining whether all the elements of theft were proven by the prosecution. Findings of fact
of administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers are entitled to respect if
supported by substantial evidence.

53. Department of Agrarian Reform v. Igmidio Robles, et al.

G.R. No. 190482 (December 9, 2015)
Facts: The subject parcels of land is owned by Eduardo Reyes which he later sold to the respondents
herein. The DAR then filed a petition to annul the deeds of absolute sale on account of the lack of prior
clearance from the DAR pursuant to DAR AO No. 01-89 and in violation of Section 6, par. 4, of R.A. 6657.
The heirs of Eduardo then filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature
of the subject matter of the case. The DARAB Provincial Adjudicator denied the motion for lack of merit.
The CA reversed and set aside the decision in ruling that the DARAB acted beyond its jurisdiction
because there is no tenurial arrangement/relationship which is necessary in order for a case to be
classified as an agrarian dispute within the jurisdiction of the DARAB or its adjudicators.

The DAR filed a motion for reconsideration that was later on denied by CA.

Issue: Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over the annulment of deeds of absolute sale and the
subsequent cancellation of titles involving agricultural lands.

Held: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that there are two jurisdiction of DAR which are the essentially
executive that pertains to the enforcement and administration of the laws, carrying them into practical
operation that enforces their due observance and the other is the quasi-judicial which involves the
determination of rights and obligations of the parties.

Although no tenancy or agrarian relationship between the parties is alleged in the petition in order to be
considered an agrarian dispute within the DARAB's jurisdiction, the Court notes that the issue in this
case is based on the absence of a clearance for the sale and registration of the subject agricultural lands
in favor of respondents, as required by DAR’s rules and procedures governing land transactions.

The general rule is that DARAB's jurisdiction is limited to agrarian disputes where tenancy relationship
between the parties exists but Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 and Section 17 of E.O. No. 229 both plainly
state that the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters. R.A. 6657 defined “agrarian disputes” but it did not define “agrarian reform matters.”

In light of the foregoing, this Court cannot restrict the DARAB's quasi-judicial jurisdiction only to those
involving agrarian disputes where tenancy relationship exists between the parties, for it should also
include other "agrarian reform matters" which do not fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Office of
the Secretary of DAR, the Department of Agriculture and the DENR, as well as the Special Agrarian
Courts.