NAME: ROHAN PANDA

PRN: 19010126140

DIVISION: B

COURSE: BBA. LL. B (IIND YEAR)

CASE ANALYSIS: PRABHA MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIAL

COOPERATIVE SOCIETY V. BANWARI LAL. IRL (1980) 2 Del 1330.
Facts of the case:

A certain evacuee property was allotted to the appellant by the Custodian Evacuee Property on
28th March, 1949, whose gist was that a reference to the application already dated by the appellant
was allotted to him on Hamilton Road with 25 front and 50 deep together with all the machinery
and accessories kept there, and also mentioned was that the possession of the factory/ workshop/
industrial establishment would be delivered to him after he fulfilled certain conditions. The
conditions that were laid down were as follows:

1. To deliver, the undertaking to pay the deposit and rent as had been assessed and to pay to
execute the lease on the prescribed form, a communication addressed to the custodian.
2. To fill the already attested affidavit.
3. The possession of stocks of consumable goods and other stores, would be given to the
appellant for its safe custody.
4. The assistant Custodian would from then on be required to deliver the possession of
factory/workshop/Industrial Establishment and other moveable property that has been kept
there in the above named allottee after satisfying himself that he has fulfilled conditions
laid down above and if circumstances lead to it, then, the enforcement section would help
the Assistant Custodian and the allottee of the property in accordance with the procedure
prescribed under law.

Then, as time went by, the property was auctioned on the 15th of July, 1960 and one Dina Nath
went on to purchase it. On the 20th of December, 1962. Dina Nath ended up filing an eviction
petition under Section 14(1)(g) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 against the appellant, which
he then failed to establish the ground for and by judgment dated 16th January, 1967, then Additional
Rent Controller, dismissed the petition.

Further, in 1964, the appellant filed a suit, against the respondent, Dina Nath seeking permanent
injunction against interference in enjoyment of the property. Further in response to the injunction
filed, in a written statement by Shri Dina Nath, it was averred that the suit was not

maintainable as the property in suit was ‘premises’ within the meaning of Section 2(i) of the Delhi
Rent Control Act, 1958. Thereafter, Dina Nath filed a suit against the appellant in the Court of the
Additional Rent Controller, for injunction.
Eventually the appellant filed an application against the respondent. This application was filed
under Section 44 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and tried by the Additional Rent Controller.
The respondent Dina Nath stuck to the preliminary objection to the maintainability of this
application on the ground that the property in question was an open plot of land and was not
‘premises’ within the meaning of Section 2(i) of the Act.

Issues Involved:

In the appeal at hand, the important issues involved were:

1. Whether or not the suit property with tin sheds comes under the word “premises” with
respect to its meaning given in Section 2(i) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
2. Whether the respondent could approbate and reprobate as and when it suits him, hence
dismissing the appeal.
3. Whether the appellant is the tenant of the open plot of land or of the land together with the
superstructures thereon.

Laws Involved:

1. According to Sec 2(i) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, which reads as under:

“( i ) "premises" means any building or part of a building which is, or is intended to be, let
separately for use as a residence or for commercial use or for any other purpose, and
includes. -

( i ) the garden, grounds and outhouses, if any, appertaining to such building or part of the
building;

(ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or part of the building;

but does not include a room in a hotel or lodging house;”

2. According to Sec 14 (1)(g) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, which reads as under:

“(g) That the premises are required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose building or
re-building or making thereto any substantial additions or alterations and that such building
or re-building or addition or alteration cannot be carried out without the premises being
vacated;”
 3. According to Sec 44 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, which reads as under:

“44. Landlords duty to keep the premises in good repair. -

(1) Every landlord shall be bound to keep the premises in good and tenantable repairs.

(2) If the landlord neglects or fails to make, within a reasonable time after notice in writing,
any repairs which he is bound to make under sub-section (1) the tenant may make the same
himself and deduct the expenses of such repairs from the rent or otherwise recover them
from the landlord:

3) Where any repairs without which the premises are not habitable or usable except with
undue inconvenience are to be made and the landlord neglects or fails to make them after
notice in writing, the tenant may apply to the Controller for permission to make such repairs
himself and may submit to the Controller an estimate of the cost of such repairs, and,
thereupon, the Controller may, after giving the landlord an opportunity of being heard and
after considering such estimate of the cost and making such inquires as he may consider
necessary, by an order in writing, permit the tenant to make such repairs at such cost as
may be specified in the order and it shall thereafter be lawful for the tenant to make such
repairs himself and to deduct the cost thereof, which shall in no case exceed the amount so
specified, from the rent or otherwise recover it from the landlord:”

Analysis:

In light of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a regular second appeal against the
decree and the judgement given prior was passed by the Additional District Judge whereby he
affirmed and upheld the decree and judgment passed by a Sub-Judge, First Class, decreeing the
eviction of the appellant.

Even though the memorandum of the appeal is set out to be in a series of eight questions, all of
which claiming to be “substantial questions of law”, the most important point at issue here was
whether or not the suit property was “premises” within the meaning of the same in accordance to
Sec 2(i) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, because on that depended if or not the bar of Section
50 of the Act will come into play and the if the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is barred. On this
issue, i.e., whether the property was under the tenancy is ‘premises’ or not, the evidence provided
by the appellant was that primarily to the effect there was a tin shed on the plot of land when it
was allotted to the appellant. Apart from the oral testimony, the statement of its secretary, to the
effect that there was a shed built in the premises but the other portion was an open plot when it
was allotted and as against this, the case was that of what was allotted was just an open compound
and thus, not ‘premises’ within the meaning in the Act. With regard to the evidence and concurrent
findings of fact of the courts below, it was held that an open land had been allotted to the appellant
by the Custodian of Evacuee Property, who then went on to put up a temporary shed and then the
property was sold by the Custodian to the respondent, as a result of which, the right, title and
interest only in the open land was transferred to the respondent who then became its owner, but
not of the superstructure. It was further held that such a plot of land, that is not covered under the
definition of ‘premises’ under Sec 2(i) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and thus the appellant
was not entitled to protection under this act.

Reference to property as ‘industrial premises’ in Custodian’s allotment cannot be construed as

reference to ‘premises’ within its meaning under Sec 2(i) of the same, thus, the eviction
proceedings under the Act was inapplicable, leading to the suit for recovery of possession filed by
the respondent in the civil court under Transfer of Property Act, 1882 read along with Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908, maintainable. Further, the tenant’s application under Section 44 of the same
act asking for permission to make repairs was dismissed by the Rent Controller on the grounds
that the property was not under the per-view of the word ‘premises’ defined under Section 2(i) of
the Act; hence the appellant was not entitled to the benefits of the Act and after the findings of the
Rent Controller was allowed to become final, the tenant was barred by the principle analogous to
res judicata to take a contrary stand in subsequent proceedings, as detailed narration of the facts
end u showing that the appellant had not been consistent on the stand and had tried to blow hot
and cold as the occasion suited him.

The appellant also went on to plead on the grounds of estoppel by election, but it was held by the
court that in the scenario at hand, the plea of estoppel by election was not available to the appellant.

Conclusion and Observation:

Throwing further light into the doctrine of election, on which the defense was substantially rested,
it is the principle where the exercise of a choice by a person left on his own free will to do one
thing or another binds himself to the choice which he has voluntarily made and is founded on the
equitable doctrine that he who accepts benefit under instrument or transaction of his choice must
adopt the whole of it and renounce everything inconsistent with it. The court that exercises the
jurisdiction in equity end up binding him to his election and preclude him from going behind the
same, and as already stated, the plea of estoppel by election in this case was not available to the
appellant.

This doctrine is not however confined to instruments. A person cannot go on to say at one time
that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage due to it, that he would have been
entitled to only if the footing had been valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose
of securing some other advantage. That is to approbate and reprobate the transaction. On the
principle that a person may not approbate and reprobate, a species of estoppel has arisen which
seems to be intermediate between estoppel by record and estoppel in pair, and may conveniently
be referred to here. Hence, a party cannot, after taking an advantage under an order be heard to say
that whatever had happened prior to then to deem as invalid and then ask to set it aside, or to set
up to the prejudice of persons who have relied upon it a case inconsistent with that upon which it
was founded; nor will he be allowed to go behind an order made in ignorance of the true facts to
the prejudice of third parties who have acted on it. Here it was held that, the plaintiff having
obtained no advantage against the appellants by pleading the suit prior to the one at hand were
collusive, the plaintiff was not estoppled on seeking the same relief, i.e., entitlement to the suit
properties, on a different ground.

In the case at hand, a suit had been filed to recover possession of the land from a certain tenant.
The concurrent finding of the two courts on the facts was that the plot of land had only been allotted
to the society. The Honorable Supreme Court then went on to hold that under ordinary
circumstances, they do not interfere to reevaluate evidence but it did in this specific case because
if the decision goes in the favor of the respondent, then several members of the society who were
then in possession of the said property would have been thrown out.