H.

Freedom of Religion

380. Aglipay v Ruiz

Facts:

Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against respondent Ruiz, the Director of Post,
enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the
Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature,
contemplates religious purpose – for the benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?

Held/Reason:

The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does not contemplate any favor upon a
particular sect or church, but the purpose was only ‘to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist’ and the government just took
advantage of an event considered of international importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation of
the Church and State. Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound
reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs’. Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino people ‘implored the aid of
Divine Providence’, they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of
religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to
religious sects and denominations.’

381. Manosca V CA GR 106440

SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; INHERENT POWER OF THE STATE; EMINENT DOMAIN; CONCEPT. - Eminent domain, also often referred to
as expropriation and, with less frequency, as condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It
need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to
regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so described as the highest and most exact
idea of property remaining in the government that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature of a
forced purchase by the State. It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public use or to meet a
public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of governance even in its most primitive form and thus inseparable from
sovereignty. The only direct constitutional qualification is that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. This proscription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual
against whose property the power is sought to be enforced.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE GUIDELINES SET BY THE SUPREME COURT IN GUIDO VS. RURAL PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION WHERE
NOT MEANT TO BE PRECLUSIVE IN NATURE AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN SHOULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD
AS BEING CONFINED ONLY TO EXPROPRIATION OF VAST TRACTS OF LAND AND LANDED ESTATES. -  The court, in
Guido, merely passed upon the issue of the extent of the Presidents power under Commonwealth Act No. 539
to, specifically, acquire private lands for subdivision into smaller home lots or farms for resale to bona fide tenants or occupants. It
was in this particular context of the statute that the Court had made the pronouncement. The guidelines in Guidowere not meant
to be preclusive in nature and, most certainly, the power of eminent domain should not now be understood as being confined only
to the expropriation of vast tracts of land and landed estates.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF PUBLIC USE EXPANDED. - The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain
for traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public use should thereby be restricted to such
traditional uses. The idea that public use is strictly limited to clear cases of use by the public has long been discarded.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SIGNIFICANT FACTOR TO BE CON-SIDERED IN EMINENT DOMAIN IS THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF THE
EXERCISE OF THE POWER AND NOT THE CASUAL CONSEQUENCES THAT MIGHT FOLLOW FROM SUCH EXERCISE.
- The attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the
principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from the exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the
marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than
to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni  Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by
members of the Iglesia  ni Cristo  than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely
incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not
necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.
Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo,
the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. Petitioners moved to
dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act
would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity,
contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.

 Issue: Whether or not the expropriation of the land whereat Manalo was born is valid and constitutional.

Held: Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to
such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise,
expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain
comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what public use is. One is the
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of
this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.

382. Garces v Estenzo

FACTS:
Pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City, a wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired by
the barangay council with funds raised by means of solicitations and cash, duly ratified by the barangay assembly in a plebiscite,
reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration of the feast day of the saint. As per Resolution No. 6, the image was brought to the
Catholic parish church during the saint's feast day which also designated the hermano mayor as the custodian of the image. After the
fiesta, however, petitioner parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña, refused to return custody of the image to the council on the
pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were used for its acquisition until after the latter, by resolution, filed
a replevin case against the priest and posted the required bond. Thereafter, the parish priest and his co-petitioners filed an action for
annulment of the council's resolutions relating to the subject image contending that when they were adopted, the barangay council was
not duly constituted because the chairman of the Kabataang Barangay was not allowed to participate; and that they contravened the
constitutional provisions on separation of church and state, freedom of religion and the use of public money to favor any sect or church.

ISSUE:
Whether the barangay council's resolution providing for purchase of saint's image with private funds in connection with barangay fiesta,
constitutional.

HELD:
Yes. Resolution No. 5 of the barangay council of Valenzuela, Ormoc City, "reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth
day of April "of the feast day of Señor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valenzuela", and providing for: (I) the acquisition of the
image of San Vicente Ferrer; and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's projects, funds for which would be obtained
through the "selling of tickets and cash donations", does not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor
appropriate money for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money.
The construction of the waiting shed is entirely a secular matter. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration
of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion or interfering with
religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint
had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and
having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and
display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is
an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.

Austria v. NLRC. 312 S 410

FACTS:

Pastor Dionisio V. Austria worked with the Seventh-Day Adventists (SDA) for twenty eight (28) years from 1963 to 1991. He started as
a literature evangelist and worked his way up until he became District Pastor of the Negros Mission of the SDA. In January 1991,
Austria was transferred to Bacolod City. He held the position of District Pastor until his services were terminated on October 31, 1991.
Before his termination, Austria had received communications from Mr. Eufronio Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking
Austria to admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife, Mrs. Thelma Austria, in his
district which amounted to P15,078.10, and to remit the same to the Negros Mission. Austria reasoned in his written explanation dated
October 11, 1991 that he should not be made accountable for the unremitted collections since it was Pastor Gideon Buhat and Mr.
Eufronio Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since Pastor Austria was very sick to do the collecting at that
time. On October 16, 1991, Austria went to the office of Pastor Buhat, who was the president of the Negros Mission, to persuade Buhat
to convene the Executive Committee to settle a dispute between Pastor Austria and Pastor David Rodrigo. But that meeting ended in a
heated altercation between Austria and Buhat. The next day, the Austria couple received an invitation to attend the Executive
Committee meeting on October 21, 1991 to discuss the non-remittance of the church collection and the events that transpired on
October 16, 1991. A fact-finding committee was created to investigate Austria. Sensing that the investigation would be one-sided,
Pastor Austria wrote to Pastor Rueben Moralde, president of the SDA and chairman of the fact-finding committee, to request that
certain members of the fact-finding committee be excluded in the investigation and resolution of the case. Out of the six (6) members
requested to inhibit, only two (2) were actually excluded, namely: Pastor Buhat and Pastor Rodrigo. On October 29, 1991, Austria
received a letter of dismissal citing misappropriation of denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and
habitual neglect of duties, and commission of an offense against the person of employer’s duly authorized representative as grounds
for the termination of his services. Austria filed a complaint on November 14, 1991 before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal against
the SDA and its officers and prayed for reinstatement with back wages and benefits, moral and exemplary damages and other labor law
benefits. On February 15, 1993, Labor Arbiter Cesar D. Sideo rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. The SDA appealed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC which vacated the findings of the Labor Arbiter on August 26,1994 and dismissed the case
for lack of merit. Austria filed a motion for reconsideration but the NLRC issued a Resolution reversing its original decision. The SDA
filed a motion for reconsideration saying that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the complaint due to the constitutional provision
on the separation of church and state since the case allegedly involved an ecclesiastical affair to which the State cannot interfere. The
NLRC, without ruling on the merits of the case, reversed itself once again, sustained the argument posed by SDA and, accordingly,
dismissed the complaint of Austria. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a manifestation and motion saying it cannot sustain
the resolution of the NLRC and submitting that the termination of petitioner of his employment may be questioned before the NLRC as
the same is secular in nature, not ecclesiastical.

ISSUE:

Was the termination of Pastor Austria’s services an ecclesiastical affair and, as such, involved the separation of church and state?

HELD:

No. An ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and its members and relates to matters of faith, religious
doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation. Examples of so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot meddle
are proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers, and administration of sacraments. While the matter at hand
relates to the church and its religious minister, it does not give the case a religious significance. What is involved is the relationship of
the church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of
faith, worship or doctrines of the church. Pastor Austria was not excommunicated or expelled from the membership of the SDA but was
terminated from employment. As pointed out by the OSG in its memorandum, the grounds invoked for Austria’s dismissal are all based
on Article 282 of the Labor Code which enumerates the just causes for termination of employment. It is palpable by this alone that the
reason for Austria’s dismissal from the service is not religious in nature. Coupled with this is the act of the SDA in furnishing NLRC with
a copy of Austria’s letter of termination which again is an eloquent admission by the SDA that NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.
Aside from these, SDA admitted in a certification issued by Mr. Ibesate that Austria has been its employee for twenty-eight (28) years.
SDA even registered petitioner with the Social Security System (SSS) as its employee. As a matter of fact, the worker’s records of
Austria have been submitted by SDA as part of their exhibits. It is clear from all of these that when the SDA terminated the services of
Austria, it was merely exercising its management prerogative to fire an employee which it believes to be unfit for the job. As such, the
State, through the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, has the right to take cognizance of the case and to determine whether the SDA, as
employer, rightfully exercised its management prerogative to dismiss an employee. This is in consonance with the mandate of the
Constitution to afford full protection to labor.

Gerona, et. al v SEC. OF EDUCATION

106 Phil 2 Aug. 12, 1959

FACTS: 
1. Petitioners belong to the Jehova’s Witness whose children were expelled from their schools when they refused to salute, sing the
anthem, recite the pledge during the conduct of flag ceremony. DO No. 8 issued by DECS pursuant to RA 1265 which called for the
manner of conduct during a flag ceremony. The petitioners wrote the Secretary of Education on their plight and requested to reinstate
their children. This was denied. 

2. As a result, the petitioners filed for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Secretary and Director of Public Schools to restrain
them from implementing said DO No. 8.

3. The lower court (RTC) declared DO 8 invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not DO 8 is valid or constitutional

DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual and it is for the courts to determine, not a religious group, whether or not a certain
practice is one.

1. The court held that the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of
national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete
separation of church and state in our system of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag
consequently does not involve any religious ceremony. 

After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a
religious group or sect, much less to a follower of said group or sect; otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding for
there might be as many interpretations and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or sects
or followers.

2. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption form or non-compliance with
reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority. In enforcing the flag salute on the
petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute
they were not being persecuted. Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion. If they chose not to obey
the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens,
nothing more. According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave it. Having elected not to comply with the regulations about
the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend public schools.

3. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it is symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, of
sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity; that the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession
of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for; that by authority of the legislature, the Secretary
of Education was duly authorized to promulgate Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement of observance of the flag
ceremony or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8, does not violate the Constitutional provision about freedom of religion
and exercise of religion; that compliance with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and school discipline,
including observance of the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate
in the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from the public school they were attending.

Ebralinag, et al vs. Div. Supt. of Schools of Cebu G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993
Ebralinag, et al vs. Div. Supt. of Schools of Cebu

G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993

Facts:

In 1989, DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the Jehovah’s Witness, and
enrolled in various public and private schools, which refused to sing the Phil. National Anthem, salute the flag and recite the patriotic
pledge.

Division Superintendent of schools, Susana B. Cabahug of the Cebu Division of DECS and her Assistant issued Division Memorandum
No. 108, dated Nov. 17, 1989, directing District Supervisors, High School Principals and Heads of Private Educational institutions to
remove from service, after due process, teachers and school employees, and to deprive the students and pupils from the benefit of
public education, if they do not participate in daily flag ceremony and doesn’t obey flag salute rule.
Members of the Jehovah’s Witness sect find such memorandum to be contrary to their religious belief and choose not to obey. Despite
a number of appropriate persuasions made by the Cebu officials to let them obey the directives, still they opted to follow their conviction
to their belief. As a result, an order was issued by the district supervisor of Daan Bantayan District of Cebu, dated July 24, 1990,
ordering the ‘dropping from the list’ in the school register of all Jehovah’s Witness teachers and pupils from Grade 1 to Grade 6 who
opted to follow their belief which is against the Flag Salute Law, however, given a chance to be re-accepted if they change their mind.

Some Jehovah’s Witness members appealed to the Secretary of Education but the latter did not answer to their letter.

On Oct. 31, 1990, students and their parents filed special civil actions for Mandamus, Certiorari and prohibition, alleging that the
respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in ordering their expulsion without prior
notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due process, their right to free public education and their right to freedom of
speech, religion and worship. Petitioners prayed for the voiding of the order of expulsion or ‘dropping from the rolls’ issued by the
District Supervisor; prohibiting and enjoining respondent from barring them from classes; and compelling the respondent and all
persons acting for him to admit and order their(Petitioners) re-admission I their respective schools.

On November 27, 1990, Court issued a TRO and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, commanding the respondents to immediately
re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes until further orders.

On May 31, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the petitions defending the expulsion orders issued by the
respondents.

Petitioners stressed that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in ‘external acts’ or behavior
that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through observance of the flag ceremony. They
quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn
proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.

Issue:

Whether or not the expulsion of the members of Jehovah’s Witness from the schools violates right receive free education.

Held:

The expulsion of the members of Jehovah’s Witness from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine
citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the state to ‘protect and promote the right of all
citizens to quality education, and to make such education accessible to all (Sec. I, Art XIV). Nevertheless, their right not to participate in
the Flag Ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. If they quietly stand at attention during flag ceremony
while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such
conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose ‘a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public
health or any legitimate public interest that the state has a right and duty to prevent.

It is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our country in 1942-1944 when every Filipino, regardless of religious persuasion,
in fear of the invader, saluted the Japanese flag and bowed before every Japanese soldier, perhaps if petitioners had lived through that
dark period of our history, they would not quibble now about saluting the Phil. Flag.

The petitions for certiorari and prohibition are granted and expulsion orders are hereby annulled and set aside.

Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves
the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to
believe and freedom to act on one’s belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought.
The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. The only
limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health and interests
where State has right to prevent.

Estrada vs. Escritor

AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

FACTS:

Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City.  Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge
Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been
living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritor’s husband, who had lived with
another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary.  On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another
woman.  Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite.   According to the
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her
conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs.  After ten years of living together, she executed on July
28, 1991 a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” which was approved by the congregation.  Such declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.  Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses since
1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration
which was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapio’s in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in
Watch Tower Central Office.       

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of “gross and immoral conduct” and be penalized by the
State for such conjugal arrangement.

HELD:

A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends
only to public and secular morality.

The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious
exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on
religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.

The state’s interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and
decency.  “There is nothing in the OCA’s (Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this
interest is so compelling that it should override respondent’s plea of religious freedom.  Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a
private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper
agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General”.

In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an opportunity to demonstrate the compelling
state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent’s position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it
is within the scope of free exercise protection.  The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause
protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom.  Furthermore, the court cannot simply
take a passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom but must also apply the “compelling state interest” test.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in
the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and
practice; (b) to present evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to
show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing
should be concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision.
G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:

Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs),as a party list based on moral grounds. In the elevation of the case to
the Supreme Court, Comelec alleged that petitioner made misrepresentation in their application.

Issue:

Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list

Ruling:

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party’s application for registration should be granted.

Comelec’s citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioner’s application was a violation of the non-establishment clause laid
down in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution. The proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a secular purpose
(that is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is “detrimental or dangerous to those conditions upon which depend the
existence and progress of human society"), rather than out of religious conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation
that allowing registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to society.

The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested rights on the basis of their sexual orientation.
Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the
same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors. Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by
our own laws nor by any international laws to which we adhere.

FACTS:

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered
individuals (LGBTs). Ang Ladlad applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application was first denied on the ground that
it has no substantial membership base and on second, was dismissed based on moral grounds.

ISSUE:

Whether COMELEC erred in denying Ang Ladlad as Party-List Representative.

RULING:

Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s
moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang
Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong
Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlad’s morality, or lack thereof.

The Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.” Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on
whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise
stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects.

From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating in the
party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome.
Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on
the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.

The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioner’s application for party-list accreditation.

Cantwell v. Connecticut 310 U.S. 296 May 20, 1940

KTA: The statute gives the Council too much discretion in its application and is thus obnoxious to the free exercise of religion. It also
amounts to prior restraint. The functions of the Council (in approving or denying authorization) were not merely ministerial but were
discretionary. As regards the breach of public peace/order, it is a situation analogous to a conviction under a statute sweeping in a
great variety of conduct under a general and indefinite characterization, leaving to the executive and judicial branches too wide a
discretion in its application.

Facts:

The petitioners, Newton Cantwell and his two sons, Jesse and Russell, are members of the religion Jehovah’s Witness. They were
arrested in New Haven, Connecticut, and were convicted for the third and fifth count.

Section 294 of the General Statutes of Connecticut states that:

No person shall solicit money, services, subscriptions or any valuable thing for any alleged religious, charitable or philanthropic cause,
from other than a member of the organization whose benefit such person is soliciting or within the county in which such person or
organization is located unless such cause shall have been approved by the secretary of the public welfare council.

The facts adduced to sustain the convictions on the third count follow.

1. The appellants went from house to house in New Haven equipped with a bag containing books and pamphlets on religious subjects,
a portable phonograph, and a set of records, all of which were used to proclaim their religion, Jehovah’s Witness.

2. They asked the people they would interview if they could play their record. If permission was granted, he asked the person to buy the
book described, and, upon refusal, he solicited such contribution towards the publication of the pamphlets, as the listener was willing to
make. If a contribution was received, a pamphlet was delivered upon condition that it would be read.

3. 90% of the residents in the neighborhood are Roman Catholics. The phonograph record was entitled “Enemies” included an attack
on the Catholic religion.

The facts adduced to sustain the conviction of Jesse Cantwell on the fifth count.

1. Jesse Cantwell stopped two men in the street, asked, and received, permission to play a phonograph record. He played the record
“Enemies”, which contained lyrics that attacked the Catholic religion, the religion of the two men.

2. Enraged by the contents of the record, they were tempted to strike Cantwell unless he went away. On being asked to leave, Jesse
Cantwell left. There was no evidence that he was personally offensive or entered into any argument with those he interviewed.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Section 294 of the General Statutes of Connecticut is invalid and unconstitutional for violating the freedom of religion.

2. Whether or not the defendant’s conviction of the common law offense of breach of the peace violated the constitutional guarantees of
religious liberty and freedom of speech.

Held/Ratio:

1. Yes. In this case, the statute deprives the appellants of their liberty without due process of law. The statute does not impose a mere
ministerial duty on the secretary of the welfare council, but a discretionary one.

2. Yes. The conviction of Jesse Cantwell on the fifth count must be set aside. The offense known as breach of the peace embraces a
great variety of conduct destroying or menacing public order and tranquility. It includes not only violent acts, but acts and words likely to
produce violence in others.

Having these considerations in mind, we note that Jesse Cantwell had a right to be where he was and had a right to peacefully impart
his views to others. There is no showing that his deportment was noisy, truculent, overbearing or offensive. He requested of two
pedestrians permission to play to them a phonograph record. The permission was granted. It is not claimed that he intended to insult or
affront the hearers by playing the record. It is plain that he wished only to interest them in his propaganda. The sound of the
phonograph is not shown to have disturbed residents of the street, to have drawn a crowd, or to have impeded traffic. Thus far, he had
invaded no right or interest of the public, or of the men accosted.

CANTWELL V. CONNECTICUT (1940)

In this case, the Court held that the government has no role in determining religious truth. Furthermore, the Court also held that the
peaceful expression of beliefs—including religious views that might offend some listeners—is protected by the First Amendment from
infringement by the federal government as well as state governments.

Activity

Jesse Cantwell, walked with two family members along Cassius Street in New Haven, Connecticut. It was a Roman Catholic
neighborhood. The Cantwells were Jehovah’s Witnesses, so they believed they had a sacred duty to bring their message to others.
They carried religious materials with them, including pamphlets, books, and records. They also had a portable record player, which
played an anti-Catholic message called “Enemies.” Jesse Cantwell stopped two Catholic men on the street. The men agreed to listen to
the record, but reacted angrily when they heard it. They said they were tempted to hit him and told him to leave. Thereafter, the
Cantwells were arrested for solicitation without a permit and for inciting a breach of the peace.

The Supreme Court unanimously overturned Cantwell’s convictions. First, the Court found Connecticut’s solicitation permit law
unconstitutional. The law required anyone soliciting for charitable or religious purposes to have a permit. Before issuing a permit, the
government would decide if the purpose was, “a religious one or is a bona fide object of charity or philanthropy” and whether it
“conforms to reasonable standards of efficiency and integrity.” Because the local ordinance allowed officials to determine what causes
should be considered religious, it violated the First Amendment. The Supreme Court recognized “the [First] Amendment embraces two
concepts—freedom to believe and freedom to act.” The Court recognized an absolute freedom of belief, placing questions of religious
truth outside the Court system.

In addition, the Court threw out Cantwell’s arrest for a breach of the peace. Cantwell had a First Amendment right to express his
religious message. The Court held, “[Cantwell] had a right peacefully to impart his views to others.” Since there was no evidence that
Cantwell personally insulted the men or argued with them, he could not be prosecuted for inciting breach of peace. Justice Roberts
delivered the opinion and wrote of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, “Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such
religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law … and [they] safeguard the free
exercise of the chosen form of religion.”

This case is also important because in it holding, the Court incorporated (or applied) the First Amendment’s free exercise to the states.
Neither federal nor state governments could unduly infringe on the right to freely exercise religion without a compelling state interest.

Questions

What events led up to Jesse Cantwell’s arrest?

How did the Supreme Court rule in Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940)?
What two religious concepts did the Court find were protected by the First Amendment?
How did the Cantwell v. Connecticut ruling impact state governments?
Why do you think this case is considered one of the most important freedom of religion cases in US history?

Answer Key
1) Cantwell, a Jehovah’s Witness, played an anti‐Catholic message to two men, who reacted angrily.
2) The Court overturned Cantwell’s convictions, ruling that 1) Connecticut could not require permits specifically for religious solicitation,
and that 2) Cantwell had a First Amendment right to peacefully express his views.
3) Freedom to believe and freedom to act.
4 )States were now bound by the First Amendment’s limitation on government to interfere with free religious exercise. After the ruling,
neither federal nor state governments could unduly infringe on the right to freely exercise religion without a compelling state interest.
5) Accept reasoned answers. Students should note that the case put questions of religious truth outside the legal system. The ruling
helped ensure that individuals have an absolute freedom of belief and government may not identify which causes are “religious” versus
causes that are not. Further, the ruling affirmed that the peaceful expression of view—including religious ones—is a fundamental
freedom that federal or state law may not restrict. Students may also note that the case is a landmark because it incorporated the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, expanding protection from infringement on free exercise from the federal government to state
governments as well.

Office of Administrative Services-Office of the Court Administrator, complainant, vs. Judge Ignacio B. Macarine, Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Gen. Luna, Surigao Del Norte, respondent.

Facts:

On August 13, 2009, the respondent wrote then Court Administrator, now Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez, requesting for
authority to travel to Hongkong with his family for the period of September 10 - 14, 2009 where he would celebrate his 65th birthday.
The respondent stated that his travel abroad shall be charged to his annual forced leave. However, he did not submit the corresponding
application for leave. For his failure to submit the complete requirements, his request for authority to travel remained unacted upon. The
respondent proceeded with his travel abroad without the required travel authority from the OCA. On January 28, 2010, the respondent
was informed by the OCA that his leave of absence for the period of September 9-15, 2009 had been disapproved and his travel
considered unauthorized by the Court. His absences shall not be deducted from his leave credits but from his salary corresponding to
the seven days that he was absent, pursuant to Section 50 of the Omnibus Rules on Leave. The respondent was also required to
submit his explanation on his failure to comply with OCA Circular No. 49-2003.

Issue: Whether or not there exists a violation to the right to travel.

Ruling: There is no violation on the right to travel. True, the right to travel is guaranteed by the Constitution. However, the exercise of
such right is not absolute. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on one’s right to travel provided that such
restriction is in the interest of national security, public safety or public health as may be provided by law. This, however, should by no
means be construed as limiting the Court’s inherent power of administrative supervision over lower courts. OCA Circular No. 49-2003
does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by judges and court personnel, before they can go on
leave to travel abroad. To "restrict" is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing something; to "regulate" is to govern or direct according
to rule.
True, the right to travel is guaranteed by the Constitution. However, the exercise of such right is not absolute. Section 6, Article III of the
1987 Constitution allows restrictions on one's right to travel provided that such restriction is in the interest of national security, public
safety or public health as may be provided by law. This, however, should by no means be construed as limiting the Court's inherent
power of administrative supervision over lower courts. OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing
guidelines to be complied by judges and court personnel, before they can go on leave to travel abroad. To "restrict" is to restrain or
prohibit a person from doing something; to "regulate" is to govern or direct according to rule.

To ensure management of court dockets and to avoid disruption in the administration of justice, OCA Circular No. 49-2003 requires a
judge who wishes to travel abroad to submit, together with his application for leave of absence duly recommended for approval by his
Executive Judge, a certification from the Statistics Division, Court Management Office of the OCA, as to the condition of his docket,
based on his Certificate of Service for the month immediately preceding the date of his intended travel, that he has decided and
resolved all cases or incidents within three (3) months from date of submission, pursuant to Section 15(1) and (2), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution.

For traveling abroad without having been officially allowed by the Court, the respondent is guilty of violation of OCA Circular No. 49-
2003. Under Section 9(4), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, violation of Supreme Court directives and circular is considered a
less serious charge and, therefore, punishable by suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1)
month nor more than three (3) months; or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.[8]

Section 53, Rule IV of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service grants the disciplining authority the discretion to
consider mitigating circumstances in the imposition of the proper penalty. The Court had in several instances refrained from imposing
the actual penalties in the presence of mitigating facts, such as the employee's length of service, acknowledgement of his or her
infractions and feelings of remorse for the same, advanced age, family circumstances, and other humanitarian and equitable
considerations.In the present case, the respondent, after learning that his daughter had already booked him and his family in a hotel in
Hongkong, immediately went to Manila to secure his travel authority from the Court. However, with the short period of time from their
arrival in Manila on September 9, 2009 up to the time of their booking in Hongkong from September 13 to 15, 2009, he was pressed for
time and opted not to complete the required travel authority, with the intention of securing one after his travel. The respondent regretted
his failure to comply with the requirements of OCA Circular No. 49-2003. He acknowledged his mistake and promised not to commit the
same infraction in the future.

We consider the outlined circumstances as mitigating. Following judicial precedents, the respondent deserves some degree of leniency
in imposing upon him the appropriate penalty.

Francisco I. Chavez vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government et al

Categories: Information Disclosure

Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information, demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and
agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. Respondents' opposite view is that the
constitutional provisions refer to completed and operative official acts, not to those still being considered. The Court said that the
recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest, and there is no
question that petitioner has a right to respondents' disclosure of any agreement that may be arrived at concerning the Marcoses'
purported ill-gotten wealth.
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information, demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and
agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. Respondents' opposite view is that the
constitutional provisions refer to completed and operative official acts, not to those still being considered. The Court said that the
recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest, and there is no
question that petitioner has a right to respondents' disclosure of any agreement that may be arrived at concerning the Marcoses'
purported ill-gotten wealth. The question that remains is whether the constitutional provision likewise guarantee access to information
regarding ongoing negotiations or proposals prior to the final agreement. Reviewing the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission,
the Court held that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient
public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth.
Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in
the "exploratory" stage.

Francisco Chavez vs Presidential Commission on Good Government

FACTS: Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated the prosecution of the
Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the countrys
economy, alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports[2] bannered in a number of broadsheets
sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited
in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG)
and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.

A provision in the compromise agreement provides:

xxx the FIRST PARTY shall determine which shall be ceded to the FIRST PARTY, and which shall be assigned to/retained by the
PRIVATE PARTY. The assets of the PRIVATE PARTY shall be net of, and exempt from, any form of taxes due the Republic of the
Philippines. Xx

ISSUE: Whether or not such provision in the compromise agreement exempting the Marcoses from the taxes due to the government in
valid

RULING: The PCGG has a limited life in carrying out its tasks and time is running short. It is thus imperative that the Court must hold
even now, and remind PCGG, that it has indeed exceeded its bounds in entering into the General and Supplemental Agreements. The
agreements clearly suffer from Constitutional and statutory infirmities,to wit: 1) The agreements contravene the statute in granting
criminal immunity to the Marcos heirs; 2) PCGG’s commitment to exempt from all forms of taxes the property to be retained the Marcos’
heirs controverts the Constitution; and 3)the government’s undertaking to cause the dismissal of all cases filed against the Marcoses
pending before the Sandiganbayan and other courts encroaches upon judicial powers.

Bel Air Village Association, Inc. vs Virgilio Dionisio

G.R. L-383454 June 30, 1989

Facts:

The Transfer Certificate of Title covering the subject parcel of land issued in the name of Virgilio Dionisio, the petitioner contains an
annotation to the effect that the lot owner becomes an automatic member of Bel-Air Village Association, the respondent, and must
abide by such rules and regulations laid down by the Association in the interest of the sanitation, security and the general welfare of the
community.

The petitioner questioned the collection of the dues on the following grounds: the questioned assessment is a property tax outside the
corporate power of the association; the association has no power to compel the petitioner to pay the assessment for lack of privity of
contract; the questioned assessment should not be enforced for being unreasonable, arbitrary, oppressive, confiscatory and
discriminatory; the respondent association is exercising governmental powers which should not be sanctioned.

Issue:

Whether or not the association can lawfully collect dues

Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It held that the purchasers of a registered land are bound by the
annotations found at the back of the certificate of title covering the subject parcel of land. The petitioner’s contention that he has no
privity with the respondent association is not persuasive. When the petitioner voluntarily bought the subject parcel of land it was
understood that he took the same free of all ecumbrances except annotations at the back of the certificate of title, among them, that he
automatically becomes a member of the respondent association. One of the obligations of a member is to pay certain amounts for the
operation and activities of the association.

The mode of payment as well as the purposes for which the dues are intended clearly indicates that the dues are not in the concept of
a property tax as claimed by the petitioner. They are shares in the common expenses for necessary services. A property tax is
assessed according to the value of the property but the basis of the sharing in this case is the area of the lot. The dues are fees which
a member of the respondent association is required in hiring security guards, cleaning and maintaining streets, street lights and other
community projects for the benefit of all residents within the Bel-Air Village. These expenses are necessary, valid and reasonable for
the particular community involved.

The limitations upon the ownership of the petitioner do not contravene provisions of laws, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy. The constitutional proscription than no person can be compelled to be a member of an association against his will applies only
to governmental acts and not to private transactions like the one in question.

The petitioner cannot legally maintain that he is compelled to be a member of the association against his will because the limitation is
imposed upon his ownership of property. If he does not desire to comply with the annotation or lien in question, he can at any time
exercise his inviolable freedom of disposing of the property and free himself from the burden of becoming a member of the association.

BARLIN V. RAMIREZ
F: The def., Ramirez, having been appointed by the pltff parish priest, took possession of the church on 7/5/01. He administered if as
such under the orders of his superiors until 11/14/02. His successor having been then appointed, the latter made a demand on this def.
for the delivery to him of the church, convent, and cemetery, and the sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money, and other prop. of the
church. The def., by a written document of that date, refused to make such delivery, stating that "the town of Lagonoy, in conjunction w/
the parish priest of thereof, has seen fit to sever connection w/ the Pope at Rome and his representatives in these Islands, and to join
the Filipino Church, the head of w/c is at Mla.

In 1/4, the pltff. brought this action against def., alleging in his amended complaint that the Roman Catholic Church was the owner of
the church bldg, the convent, cemetery, the books, money, and other prop. belonging thereto, and asking that it be restored to the
possession thereof and that the def. render an account of the prop. w/c he had received and w/c was retained by him, and for other
relief. The CFI-Ambos Camarines ruled in favor of the pltff.

HELD: It is suggested by the appellant that the Roman Catholic Church has no legal personality in the Philippine Islands. This
suggestion, made with reference to an institution w/c antedates by almost a thousand years any other personality in Europe, and w/c
existed "when Grecian eloquence still flourished in Antioch, and when idols were still worshipped in the temple of Mecca," does not
require serious consideration.

Eminent Domain

The partidas defined minutely what things belonged to the public in general and what belonged to private persons. In the first group
churches are not named. The present Civil Code declares in article 338 that property is of public or private ownership. Article 339,
which defines public property, is as follows:

Property of public ownership is - chanrobles virtual law library

1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges constructed by the State, and banks,
shores, roadsteads, and that of similar character.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
2. That belonging exclusively to the state without being for public use and which is destined to some public service, or to the
development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and mines, until their
concession has been granted.
The code also defines the property of provinces and of pueblos, and in defining what property is of public use, article 344 declares as
follows:
Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public
waters, the promenades, and public works of general service supported by the said towns or provinces.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

All other property possessed by either is patrimonial, and shall be governed by the provisions of this code, unless otherwise prescribe in
special laws.
It will be noticed that in either one of these articles is any mention made of churches. When the Civil Code undertook to define those
things in a pueblo which were for the common use of the inhabitants of the pueblo, or which belonged to the State, while it mentioned a
great many other things, it did not mention churches.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It has been said that article 25 of the Regulations for the Execution of the Mortgage Law indicates that churches belong to the State
and are public property. That article is as follows:

There shall be excepted from the record required by article 2 of the law: chanrobles virtual law library

First. Property which belongs exclusively to the eminent domain of the State, and which is for the use of all, such as the shores of the
sea, islands, rivers and their borders, wagon roads, and the roads of all kinds, with the exception of railroads; streets, parks, public
promenades, and commons of towns, provided they are not lands of common profit to the inhabitants; walls of cities and parks, ports,
and roadsteads, and any other analogous property during the time they are in common and general use, always reserving the
servitudes established by law on the shores of the sea and borders of navigable rivers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Second. Public temples dedicated to the Catholic faith.

A reading of this article shows that far from proving that churches belong to the State and to the eminent domain thereof, it proves the
contrary, for, if they had belonged to the State, they would have been included in the first paragraph instead of being placed in a
paragraph by themselves.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The truth is that, from the earliest times down to the cession of the Philippines to the United States, churches and other consecrated
objects were considered outside of the commerce of man. They were not public property, nor could they be subjects of private property
in the sense that any private person could the owner thereof. They constituted a kind of property distinctive characteristic of which was
that it was devoted to the worship of God.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

But, being material things was necessary that some one should have the care and custody of them and the administration thereof, and
the question occurs, To whom, under the Spanish law, was intrusted that possession and administration? For the purposes of the
Spanish law there was only one religion. That was the religion professed by the Roman Catholic Church. It was for the purposes of that
religion and for the observance of its rites that this church and all other churches in the Philippines were erected. The possession of the
churches, their care and custody, and the maintenance of religious worship therein were necessarily, therefore, intrusted to that body. It
was, by virtue of the laws of Spain, the only body which could under any circumstances have possession of, or any control over, any
church dedicated to the worship of God. By virtue of those laws this possession and right of control were necessarily exclusive. It is not
necessary or important to give any name to this right of possession and control exercised by the Roman Catholic Church in the church
buildings of the Philippines prior to 1898. It is not necessary to show that the church as a juridical person was the owner of the
buildings. It is sufficient to say that this right to the exclusive possession and control of the same, for the purposes of its creation,
existed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The right of patronage, existing in the King of Spain with reference to the churches in the Philippines, did not give him any right to
interfere with the material possession of these buildings.

Title 6 of book 1 of the Compilation of the laws of the Indies treats Del Patronazgo Real de las Indias. There is nothing in any one of the
fifty-one laws which compose this title which in any way indicates that the King of Spain was the owner of the churches in the Indies
because he had constructed them. These laws relate to the right of presentation to ecclesiastical charges and offices. For example,
Law 49 of the title commences as follows:

Because the patronage and right of presentation of all archbishops, bishops, dignitaries, prevents, curates, and doctrines and all other
beneficiaries and ecclesiastical offices whatsoever belong to us, no other person can obtain or possess the same without our
presentation as provided in Law 1 and other laws of this title.

Title 15 of the first partida treats of the right of patronage vesting in private persons, but there is nothing in any one of its fifteen laws
which in any way indicates that the private patron is the owner of the church.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

When it is said that this church never belonged to the Crown of Spain, it is not intended to say that the Government and had no power
over it. It may be that by virtue of that power of eminent domain which is necessarily resides in every government, it might have
appropriated this church and other churches, and private property of individuals. But nothing of this kind was ever attempted in the
Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It, therefore, follows that in 1898, and prior to the treaty of Paris, the Roman Catholic Church had by law the exclusive right to the
possession of this church and it had the legal right to administer the same for the purposes for which the building was consecrated. It
was then in the full and peaceful possession of the church with the rights aforesaid. That these rights were fully protected by the treaty
of Paris is very clear. That treaty, in article 8, provides, among other things, as follows:

And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, can not in
any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, or provinces,
municipalities, public or private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal capacity to acquire
and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, or whatsoever nationality such
individuals may be.

It is not necessary, however, to invoke the provisions of that treaty. Neither the Government of the United States, nor the Government
of these Islands, has ever attempted in any way to interfere with the rights which the Roman Catholic Church had in this building when
Spanish sovereignty ceased in the Philippines. Any interference that has resulted has been caused by private individuals, acting
without any authority from the Government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

No point is made in the brief of the appellant that any distinction should be made between the church and the convent. The convent
undoubtedly was annexed to the church and, as to it, the provisions of Law 19, title 2, book 1, of the Compilation of the Laws of the
Indies would apply. That law is as follows:

We command that the Indians of each town or barrio shall construct such houses as may be deemed sufficient in which the priests of
such towns or barrios may live comfortably adjoining the parish church of the place where that may be built for the benefit of the priests
in charge of such churches and engaged in the education and conversion of their Indian parishioners, and they shall not be alienated or
devoted to any other purpose.

The evidence in this case makes no showing in regard to the cemetery. It is always mentioned in connection with the church and
convent and no point is made by the possession of the church and convent, he is not also entitled to recover possession of the
cemetery. So, without discussing the question as to whether the rules applicable to churches are all respects applicable to cemeteries,
we hold for the purpose of this case that the plaintiff has the same right to the cemetery that he has to the church.

(4) It is suggested by the appellant that the Roman Catholic Church has no legal personality in the Philippine Islands. This
suggestion, made with reference to an institution which antedates by almost a thousand years any other personality in Europe, and
which existed "when Grecian eloquence still flourished in Antioch, and when idols were still worshiped in the temple of Mecca," does
not require serious consideration. In the preamble to the budget relating to ecclesiastical obligations, presented by Montero Rios to the
Cortes on the 1st of October 1871, speaking of the Roman Catholic Church, he says:

Persecuted as an unlawful association since the early days of its existence up to the time of Galieno, who was the first of the Roman
emperors to admit it among the juridicial entities protected by the laws of the Empire, it existed until then by the mercy and will of the
faithful and depended for such existence upon pious gifts and offerings. Since the latter half of the third century, and more particularly
since the year 313, when Constantine, by the edict of Milan, inaugurated an era of protection for the church, the latter gradually entered
upon the exercise of such rights as were required for the acquisition, preservation, and transmission of property the same as any other
juridical entity under the laws of the Empire. (3 Dictionary of Spanish Administration, Alcubilla, p. 211. See also the royal order of the
4th of December, 1890, 3 Alcubilla, 189.)

The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. After the expiration of twenty days
from the date hereof let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter the record be remanded to the court
below for execution. So ordered.

HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO v. MACTAN - CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, GR No. 156273, 2003-10-15

Facts:

THE HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO AND MARIA ROTEA, petitioners herein, are the successors-in-interest of the former registered
owners of two (2) parcels of land situated in Lahug, Cebu City,... In 1949 the National Airport Corporation as the predecessor agency of
respondent Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) wanted to acquire Lots Nos. 916 and 920 above described among
other parcels of land for the proposed expansion of Lahug Airport.
To entice the landowners to cede their properties, the government assured them that they could repurchase their lands once Lahug
Airport was closed or its operations transferred to Mactan Airport.

On 29 December 1961 the trial court promulgated its Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 condemning Lots Nos. 916 and 920 and other
lots for public use upon payment of just compensation.

At the end of 1991, or soon after the transfer of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 to MCIAA, Lahug Airport ceased operations as the Mactan
Airport was opened for incoming and outgoing flights.

In fact, no expansion of Lahug Airport was undertaken by MCIAA and its predecessors-in-interest.[10] Hence, petitioners wrote then
President Fidel V. Ramos and the airport manager begging them for... the exercise of their alleged right to repurchase Lots Nos. 916
and 920.[11] Their pleas were not heeded.

On 11 March 1997 petitioners filed a complaint for reconveyance and damages with RTC of Cebu City against respondent MCIAA to
compel the repurchase of Lots Nos. 916 and 920, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-20015.

On 12 April 1999 the trial court found merit in the claims of petitioners and granted them the right to repurchase the properties at the
amount pegged as just compensation in Civil Case No. R-1881 but subject to the alleged property rights of Richard E. Enchuan and the
leasehold... of DPWH.

Respondent MCIAA appealed the Decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals

On 20 December 2001 the Court of Appeals reversed the assailed Decision on the ground that the judgment of condemnation in Civil
Case No. R-1881 was unconditional so that the rights gained therefrom by respondent MCIAA were indicative of ownership in fee...
simple.

Issues:

Petitioners argue that Fery v. Municpality of Cabanatuan does not apply to the case at bar since what was involved therein was the
"right of reversion" and not the "right of repurchase" which they are invoking.

Respondent asserts that the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 is absolute and without conditions, thus, no repurchase could be
validly... exercised.

Ruling:

In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority, respondent Chiongbian sought to enforce an alleged right of repurchase over her
properties that had been expropriated in Civil Case No. R-1881. This Court did not allow her to adduce evidence of her claim, for to do
so would... unsettle as to her properties the judgment of condemnation in the eminent domain proceedings.

Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority[36] is correct in stating that one would not find an express statement in the Decision in Civil
Case No. R-1881 to the effect that "the [condemned] lot would return to [the landowner] or that [the landowner]... had a right to
repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other than as
the Lahug Airport."

No doubt, the return or repurchase of the condemned properties of petitioners could be readily justified as the manifest legal effect or
consequence... of the trial court's underlying presumption that "Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation" when it granted the
complaint for eminent domain and the airport discontinued its activities.

In the case at bar, petitioners conveyed Lots Nos. 916 and

920 to the government with the latter obliging itself to use the realties for the expansion of Lahug Airport; failing to keep its bargain, the
government can be compelled by petitioners to reconvey the parcels of land to them, otherwise, petitioners would be denied the use
of... their properties upon a state of affairs that was not conceived nor contemplated when the expropriation was authorized.

Hence, respondent MCIAA as representative of the State is obliged to reconvey Lots Nos. 916 and 920 to petitioners who shall hold the
same subject to existing liens thereon, i.e., leasehold right of DPWH.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64456 dated 20
December 2001 and its Resolution of 28 November 2002 denying reconsideration of the Decision are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals G.R. Nos. 89898-99 October 1, 1990
Facts:

Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc.
After hearing, the RTC fixed the appraised value of the property at P5,291,666.00, and ordered petitioner to pay this amount minus the
advanced payment of P338,160.00 which was earlier released to private respondent. It then issued the corresponding writ of execution
accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in
the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law. The RTC denied the motion. CA affirmed;
hence, petitioner filed a petition for review before the SC

Issue:

1. Are the funds of the Municipality of Makati exempt from garnishment and levy upon execution?

2. If so, what then is the remedy of the private respondents?

Held:

1. Yes. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for
by statute. More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be
attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes,
licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and
functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an
ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision, no levy under
execution may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner.

2. Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses,
without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of
mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding
disbursement of municipal funds therefor.

For three years now, petitioner has enjoyed possession and use of the subject property notwithstanding its inexcusable failure to
comply with its legal obligation to pay just compensation. Petitioner has benefited from its possession of the property since the same
has been the site of Makati West High School since the school year 1986-1987. This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal
to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation proceedings it had in fact initiated. The State's power of eminent domain should
be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice. (Municipality of Makati vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 89898-99, October 1, 1990)

MIAA vs. Joaquin Rodriguez

G.R. No. 161836, February 28, 2006

(Constitutional Law, Expropriation)

FACTS

Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), a GOCC operating the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Complex,
implemented expansion programs for its runway in the 70’s. So it bought and occupied some of the properties surrounding the area
through expropriation. In 1996, respondent lot owner proposed to sell to MIAA at P2,350.00 per square meter one of the lots already
occupied by the expanded runway. No deal was made. So respondent Rodriguez bought the bigger lot, a portion of which was
occupied by the runway, as well as all the rights to claim reasonable rents and damages for the occupation, from its owner then, Buck
Estate, Inc., for P4 million.

Rodriguez demanded from the MIAA full payment for the property and back rentals for 27 years, amounting to P468.8 million. Failing to
reach an agreement with MIAA, Rodriguez filed a case for accion reinvindicatoria with damages. Finding that the MIAA had illegally
taken possession of the property, the trial court ruled respondent’s favor. The Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s decision,
holding that Rodriguez is entitled to back rentals only from the time he became the registered owner of the property in 1996.

ISSUES
1.) Was Rodriguez a buyer in bad faith for having bought the subject lot in a highly speculative and scheming manner, and in
anticipation of a grossly disproportionate amount of profit at the expense of the Government?

2.) Is Rodriguez entitled to exemplary damages and attorney’s fees?

RULING

The petition is partly meritorious.

There is “taking” when the expropriator enters private property not only for a momentary period but for a more permanent duration, or
for the purpose of devoting the property to a public use in such a manner as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment thereof. In this context, there was taking when the MIAA occupied a portion thereof for its expanded runway. Where actual
taking was made without the benefit of expropriation proceedings, and the owner sought recovery of the possession of the property
prior to the filing of expropriation proceedings, the Court has invariably ruled that it is the value of the property at the time of taking that
is controlling for purposes of compensation.

Thus, in Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos, wherein it took the owner of a parcel of land thirty-five (35) years before she filed
a case for recovery of possession taken by the local government unit for a road-right-of-way purpose, this Court held:

…there being no other legal provision cited which would justify a departure from the rule that just compensation is determined
on the basis of the value of the property at the time of the taking thereof in expropriation by the Government, not the increased
value resulting from the passage of time which invariably brings unearned increment to landed properties, represents the true
value to be paid as just compensation for the property taken.

The reason for the rule, as pointed out in Republic v. Lara, is that —

". . . (W)here property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced by the
public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or,
there may have been a natural increase in the value of the property from the time the complaint is filed, due to general
economic conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses.

The subject lot was occupied as a runway of the MIAA starting in 1972. Thus, the value of the lot in 1972 should serve as the basis for
the award of compensation to the owner.

On actual damages for the occupation of the subject lot, undeniably, the MIAA’s illegal occupation for more than 20 years has resulted
in pecuniary loss to Rodriguez and his predecessors-in-interest. Such pecuniary loss entitles him to adequate compensation in the form
of actual or compensatory damages, which in this case should be the legal interest (6%) on the value of the land at the time of taking,
from said point up to full payment by the MIAA. This is based on the principle that interest runs as a matter of law and follows from the
right of the landowner to be placed in as good position as money can accomplish, as of the date of the taking. Case laws ruled that the
indemnity for rentals is inconsistent with a property owner’s right to be paid legal interest on the value of the property, for if the
condemnor is to pay the compensation due to the owners from the time of the actual taking of their property, the payment of such
compensation is deemed to retroact to the actual taking of the property, and hence, there is no basis for claiming rentals from the time
of actual taking.

On buyer in bad faith, the point is irrelevant. Regardless of whether or not Rodriguez acted in bad faith, all that he will be entitled to is
the value of the property at the time of the taking, with legal interest thereon from that point until full payment of the compensation by
the MIAA. There is nothing wrongful or dishonest in expecting to profit from one’s investment. However, Rodriguez can fault but only
himself for taking an obvious risk in purchasing property already being used for a public purpose. To our mind, these are wanton and
irresponsible acts which should be suppressed and corrected. Hence, the award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees is in order.

LECA REALTY CORPORATION vs. MANUELA CORPORATIONG.R. No. 166800 September 25, 2007
FACTS:1. Manuela Corporation (Manuela) is a duly registered domestic corporation, principally engagedin the business of leasing
commercial spaces in shopping malls to retailers. At the time, re-spondent owned and operated M Star One, M Star, Starmall,
Metropolis Star, and Pacific Mall.2. Manuela obtained several loans from two syndicates of lenders to finance the costs of two ofits
buildings. Aside from its Php2.174 billion loan from banks, the company also had Php1.476billion indebtedness to Hero Holdings, Inc.
and its trade suppliers, and other parties.3. The region was then beset by the 1997 Asian financial crisis which prompted banks to
stoptheir lending activities. This severely affected Manuela whose malls did not operate sufficiently,causing serious losses to the
company. The adjusted interest rates on Manuela’s loans werearound 18% to 30%, which contributed to its liquidity problems.4. The
company, however, exerted all efforts to cushion the financial blow by “closing down non-income generating businesses, concentrating
on its business of leasing commercial spaces,intensifying collection efforts, reducing personnel, negotiating for restructuring of
loan withcreditors, and working out a viable payment scheme without giving undue preference to anycreditor.” In spite of all these
initiatives, Manuela still failed to pay its financial obligations.5. This forced the company to ask the court to issue a Stay Order and
approve its proposed Re-habilitation Plan, which if successfully implemented will “enable it to settle its remaining obliga-tions in an
orderly manner, restore its financial viability, and allow it to resume its normal opera-tions.” The trial court subsequently issued the Stay
Order, which stated:’a) a stay in the enforcement of all claims, whether for money or otherwise and whethersuch enforcement is by
court action or otherwise, against petitioner MANUELA, its guar-antors and sureties not solidarily liable with it; …e) directing the
payment in full of all administrative expenses incurred after the issuanceof this Stay Order.6. The trial court appointed Marilou Adea as
rehabilitation receiver. Adea recommended the ap-proval of Manuela’s Rehabilitation Plan and convened with Manuela’s creditors for
the latter toair their concerns.7. Leca Realty Corporation (Leca) filed its Comment and/or Formal Claim against
Manuelaamounting to Php193.7 million, comprised of unpaid rentals, security deposits, interests, andpenalty charges. After Leca’s
receipt of Adea’s Report and Recommendation, petitioner ques-tioned the reduction of Manuela’s liability, “considering its contractual
nature which cannot beimpaired during the process of rehabilitation.” The trial court eventually approved the Rehabili-tation Plan.
Leca’s appeal to the Court of Appeals was dismissed for lack of merit.8. The disagreement is grounded on the fact that the rental rates
agreed upon by Leca andManuela were reduced in the Rehabilitation Plan. There was a gross discrepancy between theamounts of
rent agreed upon by the parties and those provided in the Rehabilitation Plan.9. Leca filed another petition before the appellate court
alleging violation of its constitutional rightto non-impairment contract and the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation.The Court of Appeals, in denying the petition, ruled: The pendency of the rehabilitation proceedings cannot be interpreted
to impair the con-tractual obligations previously entered into by the contracting parties because the auto-matic stay of all actions is
sanctioned by P.D. [No.] 902-A which provides that “all actionsfor claims against corporations, partnerships or associations under
management or re-ceivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accord-ingly.”10. Thus, Leca filed a
petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Cabangis v Lopez
IMPERIAL, J .:
In his request for mandamus, the appellant asks that the defendant, as Municipal Judge of the City of Manila, be compelled to register,
process and decide for free the civil suit filed in the Municipal Court against Narcisa Diaz claiming the sum of P17. 50 I stop paying him.
On August 20, 1940, the appellant, through his lawyer, filed a motion in the Municipal Court chaired by the respondent and requested
that the claim he attached for the sum of P17.50 against Narcisa Diaz be admitted, registered and processed free of rights, in
accordance with the provisions of Article 17, Rule 4, of the Regulations of the Courts. The respondent, in order of the 21st of the same
month, denied the motion and refused to give free recourse to the claim or demand for the reason that Article 17 of Rule 4 invoked by
the appellant applies only to poor litigants who do not count with means to pay the registration fees that Article 6 (b), Rule 130, provides
that is charged for the registration of each civil claim in the Municipal Court of the City of Manila. In view of this result, the appellant filed
this writ of mandamus.

The legal provision invoked by the appellant reads as follows:

SEC. 17 (Rule 4). Procedure on minor matters. - Where a claim does not exceed twenty weights, no written or formal pleadings need to
be filed, but the judge shall note the claim, and in such form he may deem best and convenient under the circumstances shall
summons the parties and hear them as well as their witnesses. If the defendant fails to appear at the first informal call, a formal
summons with an information as to the claim against him may be issued. After the hearing, both parties shall be informed of the
judgment, which may be oral, but shall be noted in the corresponding docket together with the claim, defense and all the proceedings
had thereon. No fees shall be charged or costs allowed in such proceedings.

The other provisions that are related to the controversial point are the following:

SEC. 22 (Rule 3). Pauper litigant. - Any court may authorize a litigation to prosecute his action or defense as a pauper upon a proper
showing that he has no means to that effect by affidavits, certificate of the corresponding provincial or municipal treasurer, or otherwise.
Such authority eleven shall include an exemption from payment of legal fees and from filing appeal bond, printed record and printed
brief. The legal fees shall be taken to any judgment rendered in the case favorably to the pauper, unless the court otherwise provides.

SECTION 1 (Rule 130). Persons authorized to collect legal fees. - Except as otherwise provided in this rule, the officers and persons
hereinafter mentioned, together with their assistants and deputies, may demand, receive, and take the several fees hereinafter
mentioned and allowed for any business by them respectively done by virtue of their several offices , and no more.

SEC. 6 (Rule 130). Justice of the peace and municipal judges. - (a) For each criminal proceeding, including preliminary investigation,
five pesos, to be paid by the respective municipality. In prosecution for infractions of municipal ordinances, however, the fee shall be
one peso and fifty cents.
(b) For each civil action, three pesos.

As will be seen, Articles 1 and 6 (b) of Rule 130 provide that the one who exercises a civil action in the Municipal Court of the City of
Manila must pay as registration fee of the claim the sum of P3; this rule recognizes as an exception, in the first place, the one
expressed in Article 22 of Rule 3 when it is a poor litigant and this meets the conditions in the imposed. Another exception to the rule is
that provided in Article 17 of Rule 4 when dealing with a claim whose amount does not exceed P20. If this last exception is applicable to
all claims that do not exceed P20, without taking into account the financial status of the claimant, it is the controversial point that will be
resolved later.

The appellant maintains that the wording of Article 17, Rule 4, is clear and conclusive in the sense that it includes all claims or claims
whose amount does not exceed P20 without taking into account the financial condition of the claimant or claimant. We do not believe
that this is the case because if Article 17 were applied according to its letter indicates, without it being necessary to interpret its precept
to know the intention of it, then it would be in conflict with Article 22 of Rule 3 which, as has been said, it provides that only the poor are
exempt from paying the registration fees for the demand that they submit without taking into account the nature or amount of their
claim.

Reading Article 17, it will be observed that its primary purpose is to exempt the parties from filing formal pleadings, dispense the formal
summons and allow the Justice of the Peace or Municipal Court to orally promulgate the judgment, when it is a claim that is not exceed
P20. Incidentally and in its last part, the article provides that in such cases no fees or costs will be charged. There is no philosophical or
moral reason to support the theory that Article 17 is applicable to all claimants, whether rich, wealthy or poor. If the general principle
that informs the Regulations of the Courts is that the plaintiffs in civil cases in the Courts of Peace or Municipal must pay rights for the
registration of the demand (Art. 6 [b], Rule 130), that presented the demand must be issued (Art. 5, Rule 4), and that the sentence must
be issued in writing (Art. 15, Rule 4), there must be some reason not to apply said principle in civil matters whose amount does not
exceed P20 and that reason can not be other than that the plaintiff or claimant is poor in the sense in which the word is used by Article
22 of Rule 3.

Article 17 of Rule 4 recognizes as source of origin the precept of Article 1 (21), Title III, of the Constitution, which provides that "No
person shall be denied access to the courts for reasons of poverty. . " The article has been adopted for those disinherited litigants of the
fortune who can not pay registration fees or costs, in case their action fails. Within this concept can be mentioned to small employees,
domestic workers and workers to collect their low wages and wages had to go to court and did not have resources to cover the costs of
registration, attorney fees that would have to prepare the claim and the Sheriff's fee to serve the site. It would be ridiculous to think that
within the concept of Article 17 are also included the rich, wealthy, corporations and merchants who have money to meet the
reasonable expenses prior to the exercise of the action. For these the article would not find justification if it were interpreted that its
benefits reach them. We conclude, therefore, that the provision of Article 17 of Rule 4 that exempts the payment of fees and costs
refers only to poor claimants who do not have the resources to incur such expenses.

It has been suggested that if article 17 were interpreted as referring only to the poor, it would be unconstitutional because it would
violate Article 1 (1), Title III, of the Constitution that guarantees equal protection of the laws. A law that establishes a classification and
provides equal protection to all persons within the class and in the same situation is not illegal or discriminatory and does not violate the
constitutional provision of equal protection of the laws (Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660, People vs. Cayat, 38 Off
Gaz., No. 30, p.710, Tinsley v. Anderson [Tex. 1898], 171 U. s 106, 18 S. Ct. 805 , 43 L. ed. 91; Williams, v. Arkansas [Ark. 1910], 217
US 79, 30 S. Ct. 493, 54 L. ed., 673, 18 Ann., Cas. 865; Field v. Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. [Mo. 1904], 194 US 621, 24 S. Ct. 784, 48 L.
ed. 1142, Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Coachman [1910], 59 Fla. 130, 52 So. 377, 20 Ann., Case 1047, Owen County Burley Tobarro
Soc. V. Brumback [1908], 128 Ky., 137, 107 SW 710, State v. Taylor [1909], 224 Mo. 393, 123 s. 892; State v. Standard Oil Co. [1909],
218 Mo. 1,116 SW 902, 32 S. Ct. 406, 224 US 270 56 L.E. 700, Ann.Case 1913D, 936; State v. Texas, etc. R. Co. [T former. Civ. App.
1912], 143 S. W. 223; Marshall v. Foote [Cal. App. 1927], 252 P. 7075; I provide Tp. High School No. 209 Board of Education v. Oak
Park and River Forest Tp. High School Dist No. 200, Board of Education [1926], 153 N. E. 369, 322 Ill. 217; Stone v. City of Jefferson
Mo. [1927], 293 S. W. 780; and Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n. v. Haston [1926], 284 S. W. 905, 153 Tenn. 675.)

Since the appellant has not shown to the satisfaction of the respondent and in the manner required by Article 22 of Rule 3 that it is
poor, the appeal, as denied, with the costs to said appellant must be denied. This is how it is ordered.

Avanceña, Pres., Diaz and Horrilleno, MM., Are satisfied

FELIPE ACAR v. INOCENCIO ROSAL, GR No. L-21707, 1967-03-18

Facts:
A suit was filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental on February 21, 1963 by ten persons for their own behalf and that of
9,000 other farm laborers working off and on in sugar cane plantations at the Bais milling district, Negros Oriental, against Compania

General de Tabacos de Filipinas, Central Azucarera de Bais, Compafuia Celulosa de Filipinas, Ramon Barata, Aurelio Montinola, Sr.,
and Miguel Franco. Plaintiffs sought to recover their alleged participations or shares amounting to the aggregate sum of...
n4,031,836.74, in the sugar, molasses, bagasse and other derivatives based on the provisions of Republic Act 809 (The Sugar Act of
1952), particularly Sections 1 and 9 thereof:

"SECTION 1. In the absence of written milling agreements between the majority of planters and the millers of sugar-cane in any milling
district in the Philippines, the unrefined sugar produced in that district from the milling by any sugar central... of the sugar-cane of any
sugar-cane planter or plantation owner, as well as all by-products and derivatives thereof, shall be divided between them as follows:

"Sixty per centum for the planter, and forty per centum for the central in any milling district the maximum actual production of which is
not more than four hundred thousand piculs: Provided, That the provisions of this section shall not... apply to sugar centrals with an
actual production of less than one hundred fifty thousand piculs;

Sixty-two and one-half per centum for the planter, and thirty-seven and one-half per centum for the central in any milling district the
maximum actual production of which exceeds four hundred thousand piculs but does not exceed six hundred thousand... piculs;

"Sixty-five per centum for the planter, and thirty-five per centum for the central in any milling district the maximum actual production of
which exceeds six hundred thousand piculs but does not exceed nine hundred thousand piculs;

"Sixty-seven and one-half per centum for the planter, and thirty-two and one-half per centum for the central in any milling district the
maximum actual production of which exceeds nine hundred thousand piculs but does not exceed one million two hundred thousand...
piculs;

"Seventy per centum for the planter, and thirty per centum for the central in any milling district the maximum actual production of which
exceeds one million two hundred thousand piculs.

Furthermore, plaintiffs asked thereunder as well as by separate motion, that the aforementioned court authorize them to sue as pauper
litigants, under Sec. 22, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court:

"SEC. 22. Pauper litigant. - Any court may authorize a litigant to prosecute his action or defense as a pauper upon a proper showing
that he has no means to that effect by affidavits, certificate of the... corresponding provincial, city or municipal treasurer, or otherwise,
Such authority once given shall include an exemption from payment of legal fees and from filing appeal bond, printed record and
printed brief. The legal fees shall be a lien to any judgment... rendered in the case favorably to the pauper, unless the court otherwise
provides."... invoking Sec. 1, subsec. (21) of Art. III of the Constitution of the Philippines. They alleged that they had no means to pay
the docket fee of P14,500.00, being laborers dependent solely on their daily wages for livelihood and possessed of... no properties.
And in support of the foregoing, the ten named plaintiffs submitted certificates of the municipal treasurers of their places of residence
stating that they have no real property declared in their names in said municipalities.

Acting on the petition to litigate in forma pauperis, the Court of First Instance issued an order on May 27, 1963 denying the same upon
the ground that the plaintiffs have regular employment and sources of income... and, thus, cannot be classified as poor or paupers.

Plaintiffs sought reconsideration of said order but reconsideration was denied in an order dated June 11, 1963. Assailing said two CFI
orders and asserting their alleged right not to be denied free access to the courts by reason of poverty, plaintiffs in... said case filed
herein, on August 1, 1963, the present special civil action for certiorari and mandamus. Petition to litigate as pauper in the instant case
before Us was also filed. And on August 16, 1963, We allowed... petitioners herein to litigate in this Court as paupers and required
respondent to answer. Respondent's answer was filed on November 2, 1963. After hearing on February 10, 1964 this case was
submitted for decision.

It is further argued that the docket fee of P14,500 could very well be shouldered by petitioners since there are around 9,000 of them. It
must be remembered, however that the action in question was filed by way of a class suit. And the Rules of Court allowing such
procedure state under Sec. 12, Rule 3:

"SEC. 12. Class suit. - When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons, and the
parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the... court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all.
But in such case the court shall make sure that the parties actually before it are sufficiently numerous and representative so that all
interests concerned are fully protected. Any... party in interest shall have a right to intervene in protection of his individual interest."

So that in the suit before respondent Judge the ten named petitioners herein are the ones suing, albeit for the benefit of all the others. It
follows that the payment of docket fee would be directly charged upon them, not upon the unnamed "9,000 other laborers." And even
if... the 9,000 other laborers should later bear the payment of said docket fee of P14,500, the same would be spread among them at
about 1.60 each. Said cost of pressing their respective average demand of P1,600 each is, to Our... mind, a substantial imposition on a
seasonal farm laborer earning barely subsistent wages. And as pointed out, this is only the initial fee; subsequent fees and charges
would have to be paid. The philosophy underlying the Constitutional... mandate of free access to the courts notwithstanding poverty,
therefore, calls for exemption of herein petitioners from payment of the aforesaid legal fees in their assertion and claim of substantial
rights under the Sugar Act of 1952.

Returning to the purpose of all Constitutions, as mentioned earlier, We find this course the most sensible, logical and practical
construction demanded by the free access clause of the Constitution. For a contrary interpretation could not make said... provision the
living reality that it is designed to be.

As regards the fact that the supporting certifications of indigence refer only to the ten named plaintiffs, suffice it to reiterate that this
involves a class suit, where it is not practicable to bring all the other 9,000 laborers before the court. This

Court finds the supporting evidence of indigence adequate, showing in petitioners' favor, as plaintiffs in the suit before respondent
Judge, the right not to be denied free access to the courts by reason of poverty. Since they were excluded from the use and...
enjoyment of said right, mandamus lies to enforce it. Appeal was unavailing, since they were not even accorded the status of litigants,
for non-payment of docket fee; and perfecting an appeal would have presented the same question of exemption from legal fees,...
appeal bond and similar requisites.

WHEREFORE, petitioners are declared entitled to litigate as paupers in their class suit before respondent Judge and the latter is
hereby ordered to grant their petition to litigate in forma pauperis. No costs.

Issues:

plaintiffs have regular employment and sources of income... and, thus, cannot be classified as poor or paupers.

The sole issue herein is whether petitioners were deprived, by the orders in question, of free access to the courts by reason of poverty.

Ruling: In denying petitioners' motion to litigate as paupers, respondent Judge adopted the definition of "pauper" in Black'

Law Dictionary (at p. 1284) as "a person so poor that he must be supported at public expense". And, as afore-stated, he ruled that
petitioners are not that poor.

Such interpretation, to our mind, does not fit with the purpose of the rules on suits in forma pauperis and the provision of the
Constitution, in the Bill of Rights, that: "Free access to the courts shall not be denied to any person by... reason of poverty." As applied
to statutes or provisions on the right to sue in forma pauperis, the term has a broader meaning. It has thus been recognized that: "An
applicant for leave to sue in... forma pauperis need not be a pauper; the fact that he is able-bodied and may earn the necessary money
is no answer to his statement that he has not sufficient means to prosecute the action or to secure the costs" (14 Am. Jur. 31). It suf-
fices... that plaintiff is indigent (Ibid.), tho not a public charge. And the difference between "paupers" and "indigent" persons is that the
latter are "persons who have no property or source of income sufficient for their support aside from their own labor,... though self-
supporting when able to work and in employment" (Black's Law Dictionary, p. 913, "Indigent", citing Peo. v. Schoharie County, 121 NY
345, 24 NE 830). It is therefore in this sense of being indigent that "pauper" is taken when referring to suits... in forma pauperis.
Black's Law Dictionary in fact defines pauper, thus: "A person so poor that he must be supported at public expense; also a suitor who,
on account of poverty, is allowed to sue or defend without... being chargeable with costs" (p. 1284, underscoring supplied)

Miranda v. Arizona

Facts

The Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona addressed four different cases involving custodial interrogations. In each of these
cases, the defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the
outside world. In none of these cases was the defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation
process. In all the cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions and, in three of them, signed statements that were admitted at trial.

Miranda v. Arizona: Miranda was arrested at his home and taken in custody to a police station where he was identified by the
complaining witness. He was then interrogated by two police officers for two hours, which resulted in a signed, written confession. At
trial, the oral and written confessions were presented to the jury. Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape and was sentenced
to 20-30 years imprisonment on each count. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that Miranda’s constitutional rights were not
violated in obtaining the confession.
Vignera v. New York: Vignera was picked up by New York police in connection with the robbery of a dress shop that had occurred three
days prior. He was first taken to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters. He was then taken to the 66th Detective Squad, where he
orally admitted the robbery and was placed under formal arrest. He was then taken to the 70th Precinct for detention, where he was
questioned by an assistant district attorney in the presence of a hearing reporter who transcribed the questions and answers. At trial,
the oral confession and the transcript were presented to the jury. Vignera was found guilty of first degree robbery and sentenced to 30-
60 years imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals.

Westover v. United States: Westover was arrested by local police in Kansas City as a suspect in two Kansas City robberies and taken
to a local police station. A report was also received from the FBI that Westover was wanted on a felony charge in California. Westover
was interrogated the night of the arrest and the next morning by local police. Then, FBI agents continued the interrogation at the
station. After two-and-a-half hours of interrogation by the FBI, Westover signed separate confessions, which had been prepared by one
of the agents during the interrogation, to each of the two robberies in California. These statements were introduced at trial. Westover
was convicted of the California robberies and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment on each count. The conviction was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

California v. Stewart: In the course of investigating a series of purse-snatch robberies in which one of the victims died of injuries inflicted
by her assailant, Stewart was identified as the endorser of checks stolen in one of the robberies. Steward was arrested at his home.
Police also arrested Stewart’s wife and three other people who were visiting him. Stewart was placed in a cell, and, over the next five
days, was interrogated on nine different occasions. During the ninth interrogation session, Stewart stated that he had robbed the
deceased, but had not meant to hurt her. At that time, police released the four other people arrested with Stewart because there was no
evidence to connect any of them with the crime. At trial, Stewart’s statements were introduced. Stewart was convicted of robbery and
first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that Stewart should have been advised
of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel.

Issues

Whether “statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation” are admissible against him in a
criminal trial and whether “procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself” are necessary.

Supreme Court holding

The Court held that “there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and
serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to
incriminate themselves.” As such, “the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”

The Court further held that “without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime
contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he
would otherwise do so freely.” Therefore, a defendant “must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent,
that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.”

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona in Miranda, reversed the judgment of the New York Court
of Appeals in Vignera, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Westover, and affirmed the judgment of the
Supreme Court of California in Stewart.

Argued: Feb. 28, March 1 and 2, 1966

Decided: June 13, 1966

Vote: 5-4

Majority opinion written by Chief Justice Warren and joined by Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and Fortas.

Dissenting opinion written by Justice Harlan and joined by Justices Stewart and White.
Dissenting in part opinion written by Justice Clark.

Follow-Up

Miranda v. Arizona: After Miranda’s conviction was overturned by the Supreme Court, the State of Arizona retried him. At the second
trial, Miranda’s confession was not introduced into evidence. Miranda was once again convicted and sentenced to 20-30 years in
prison.

G.R. No. L-69210July 5, 1989

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- appellee,

vs.
GUILLERMO LAYUSO, accused-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 153, convicting the accused, Guillermo Layuso
of the crime of ROBBERY with HOMICIDE and imposing on him the supreme penalty of death.

The information reads: that on or about the 14th day of October 1980, in the municipality of Pateros, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of
the owner thereof, that is by then and there entering the residence of one Cesar C. Avila, thru an opening not intended for egress or
ingress, thru which he gained entrance, and once inside, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry
away the following articles, to wit: all in the total amount of P 4,810.00 belonging to said Cesar C. Avila, to the damage and prejudice of
the owner thereof in the aforementioned amount of P4,810.00.

That on the said occasion, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
one Lucresia R. Dagsaan with bladed weapons (knives), thereby inflicting upon the latter stab wounds which directly caused her death.

Upon arraignment on April 22, 1981, the accused assisted by a counsel-de-oficio, pleaded "NOT GUILTY." Trial on the merits ensued
and a decision was subsequently rendered on September 12, 1984. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered and it appearing that the commission of the crime was attended by the aggravating circumstances
of dwelling, lack of respect due the victim on account of her sex and that the accused took advantage of his superior strength, without
having been off-set by any mitigating circumstance, the Court hereby sentences the accused Guillermo M. Layuso to suffer the penalty
of Death, to indemnify the heirs of Lucresia Dagsaan in the sum of Twelve Thousand (P l2,000.00) Pesos; to return to Cesar C. Avila
the things robbed and/or their value, as follows:

From the evidence adduced by prosecution, it has been duly established that the accused Guillermo Layuso was one of the carpenters,
who worked in the construction of Cesar C. Avila's house, located at Agujo St., Pateros, Metro Manila. After completion of the house,
Cesar Avila used to hire Guillermo Layuso to do carpentry work in said house. The last work done by Guillermo Layuso was the
construction of the garage.

At about noontime of October 14, 1980, somebody entered into the house of Cesar Avila and killed his maid named Lucresia Dagsaan.
The injuries sustained by Lucresia Dagsaan, who was pronounced dead on arrival by the doctors at the Rizal Provincial Hospital, were
established thru the testimony of Dr. Ruben M. Angobung, who conducted the autopsy, post mortem examination.

xxx xxx xxx

In a follow-up investigation, the police found out that the culprit is Guillermo Layuso. Upon physical investigation and examination of the
house by the police investigators accompanied by Cesar Avila, they found the following articles or things missing from the house: 'A
digital alarm clock worth P2,310.00; a unisex watch worth P500.00; a radio tape recorder worth Pl,500.00, and silver coin collection of
P500.00. They also found bloodstains in the sala; in the kitchen; in the master's bedroom, particularly on the carpets; on the handle of
the door knob to the office on the ground floor of the house; and in the carpet inside the bedroom at the second floor. A kitchen knife
was found in the sala and another was found in the kitchen. There were broken bottles in front of the bar and a broken bottle of catsup
was also found in the kitchen.
Sometime after the incident, Cesar Avila received a letter from the accused. This letter although previously marked as Exhibit "A, could
not be found in the record of the case. Neither was the same turned over to the Minutes Clerk when the Prosecuting Fiscal made an
oral offer of evidence on April 9, 1984.

Through the testimony of tricyle drivers Lorenzo S. Bagang and Restituto Castillo, it has been established that the accused Guillermo
Layuso, stripped of clothes from the waist up, with blood on the left shoulder and wound on the hand, boarded the tricycle, first of
Lorenzo Bagang, at the place near the house of Cesar Avila at about noontime of October 14, 1980. He was bringing something in a
plastic bag, the height of which was demonstrated to be about twenty four inches. The contents of the plastic bag were not seen by
these witnesses because it was closed and the accused placed the same between his legs. The accused asked Lorenzo Bagang to
take him to Rosario but the latter refused because he had to fetch a passenger from the Municipal Hall. The accused disembarked from
the tricycle of Lorenzo Bagang at Morcilla Street.

The accused, who was described by witness Restituto Castillo as 'sporting a long hair' with 'a high bridged nose' and 'bringing along a
plastic bag', boarded the latter's (witness) tricycle at P. Herrera Street and alighted near a basketball court, near the river, in Buting. The
plastic bag, according to this witness, has blood all over it.

Both Lorenzo Bagang and Restituto Castillo categorically identified the accused in open court as the person who boarded their
respective tricycles on October 14, 1980. (Rollo, pp. 74-78)

The appellant admits he is guilty of homicide but assigns the following errors:

1. THAT THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE HEREIN APPELLANT FOR A SERIOUS CRIME OF
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE.

2. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONVICTING APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF SIMPLE HOMICIDE. (Rollo, p.
103; Appellee's Brief, p. 5)

The only issue raised in the case at bar is whether or not the appellant should be convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide
instead of the crime of simple homicide.

The accused-appellant contends that the prosecution has failed to prove that the articles allegedly stolen were in fact in the house of
Cesar Avila and it was the appellant who took them. He states that the finding was based on his extra-judicial statement which he
claims was extracted through the use of force and intimidation.

The appellant admits that the confession was taken in the presence of counsel, a certain Atty. Casiano Atuel, Jr. However, he states
that the counsel was not present during the custodial interrogation which preceded the taking down of his statement. He also questions
the sufficiency of the lawyer's representation. He states in his appeal that the lawyer should have participated by also asking him
questions.

The alleged coercion and maltreatment are not sustained by the records. There was a lawyer present while the statement was being
taken. The appellant did not complain to the Fiscal before whom the oath was administered. In fact, the allegations are in the form of
general conclusions. There is no specific statement as to what constituted the coercion and maltreatment. (People v. Canete, 129
SCRA 451 [1984]; People v. Villanueva, 128 SCRA 488 [1984]; and People v. Dejaresco, 129 SCRA 576 [1984]).

We rule that the constitutional requirement on assistance of counsel was fulfilled. There is no claim or showing that the accused asked
for a lawyer from the moment he was apprehended or that he was not informed of his right to counsel from the time that the warning or
information should have been given to him or that the alleged earlier questioning was already part of his confession. The appeal is hazy
on these points.

What is established was the presence of counsel during the taking of the confession. The attempt to now discredit him has no merit. If
the lawyer decided against advising the accused not to admit the crime, he was only complying with his oath as a lawyer to abide by the
truth and with the expressed desire of the accused to unburden his conscience of the load it was carrying.

This Court denounces in the strongest terms possible the widespread misconception that the presence of a lawyer under the "right to
counsel" provision of the Constitution is intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him. The right to
counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should
never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Whether it is an extra-judicial statement or testimony in open
court, the purpose is always the ascertainment of truth.

Moreover, the judgment of conviction was not made solely on the basis of the disputed extra-judicial confession. Layuso admits the
killing. The physical evidence such as the ten stab wounds and three lacerated wounds; the bloodied plastic bag and the testimonies of
Cesar Avila and two other disinterested persons, namely Lorenzo Bagang and Restituto Castillo are all consistent with robbery with
homicide. In fact, even if an extrajudicial confession is disregarded, the accused may still be convicted if there is enough evidence aside
from the confession itself. (People v. Nillos, 127 SCRA 207 [1984]).

The narration of the appellant as to how he appropriated for himself the items mentioned as well as the sequence of the struggle could
not have been supplied by any of those interviewed by police investigators and neither by the police themselves because it is replete
with details known only to the appellant. As held in People v. Ribadajo (142 SCRA 637 [1986]), confessions replete with details only the
appellants could have known are presumably voluntary.

In the accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession, he admitted taking the things from Cesar Avila's house. Avila, in turn, identified
these as the items which were lost. Avila's testimony closely interlocks with the appellant's statement on how he took the missing items.
In his court testimony, the appellant denied taking anything. This inconsistency cannot be given credence on account of the
uncontradicted testimonies of the two tricycle drivers who saw him bringing a bloodied plastic bag containing items inside. (tsn., July
20,1981, p. 23).

There is no evidence on record which would show that Lorenzo Bagang and Restituto Castillo were actuated by improper motives.
Their testimonies should, therefore, be entitled to full faith and credit (People v. Patog, 144 SCRA 429 [1986]; People v. Adones, 144
SCRA 364 [1986]). Their testimonies were also corroborated by the testimony of Cesar Avila and by Layuso himself. The credibility of
the appellant suffers when taken against the testimonies of the other witnesses. The appellant merely resorts to denial as to the robbery
and a claim of self-defense as to the killing.

The fact that no one saw the accused take the items is of no consequence. There is credible testimony regarding the loss. It is
established that there were such articles of value. He ran away and boarded two tricycles carrying a plastic bag with items inside it. The
extra-judicial confession of the accused discloses that he took the missing items.

The appellant's contention of self-defense must fail. His narration of the sequence of events is clearly illogical and unconvincing
primarily on account of its inconsistency. The testimony of the accused cited by the trial judge in eleven (11) pages of his decision
(Rollo, pp. 325-336) clearly shows its lack of credibility. In his testimony in court, Layuso claims that he and the victim were sweethearts
and that after telling her he was going abroad to work, she got mad, tore his shirt, and the struggle ensued. On the other hand, he
likewise claims in his extrajudicial confession that when he was on his way down, he met the victim who must have suspected that he
had stolen something and that when he went near her to bid her goodbye, she suddenly stabbed him.

Assuming that they were sweethearts, the victim's alleged violent objections to his trip to Saudi Arabia was correctly held unbelievable.
Under the same circumstances, a sweetheart would normally have welcomed the idea for the sake of a better future for both of them.
Granting that the victim objected, the objection could not have taken such a violent form as to move the victim to resort to stabbing the
appellant to prevent him from leaving. It is likewise unbelievable that the victim would suddenly stab him when he came near her only to
say goodbye. And it is even more inexplicable why he would inflict so many multiple wounds on various parts of her body under the
circumstances that he alleges.

In the case of People v. Pineda and Garcia (157 SCRA 71, January 15, 1988), this Court once more recognized the necessity of
resorting to circumstantial evidence. We quote:

Crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions where concealment is highly probable. To require direct testimony in all
cases would result in the acquittal of guilty parties leaving them free to once more wreak havoc on society.

We find the circumstantial evidence attending this case sufficient to warrant a conviction. Rule 134, Sec. 5 of the Rules of Court states
that there is sufficiency in circumstantial evidence when: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The
requirements are satisfied in this case.

The record further shows that not only dwelling aggravated the commission of the crime, but there was also a very patent display of
lack of respect due the victim on account of her sex and the viciousness of the wounds inflicted upon her.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty of death is commuted to
reclusion perpetua in accordance with the Constitution, Section 19, Article III. The indemnity to the heirs of Lucresia Dagsaan is also
increased to THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) in consonance with the latest rulings of this Court.

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE VS GAMBOA

Rights against self-incrimination

FACTS:

Petitioner herein, John Gabriel Gamboa, with Miguel Celdran were charged of murder and were sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua.
However, Celdran was discharged of the charges.

While while one of the witnesses, Cristina Soledad was talking with the deceased, and his common law husband of Rene Impas, the
petitioner with Celdran kicked open the door and shot the victim hitting the latter on his shoulder. The accused, then shot another hitting
the latter into his abdomen that made him fall face down on bed that immediately caused his death. Soledad, shouted for help and then,
one of the tenants, Rico Acre responded. Upon seeing the victim on bed with difficulty on breathing, he shouted for help and then their
neighbor, Gascon came together with Acre to lift the victim and loaded him in the car of police Maj. Impas, the father of the victim.

The victim, was then subjected to paraffin test without the presence of a counsel, and he invoked his right to self incrimination.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the paraffin testing conducted is violative of the Constitutional Right of the accused and is equivalent to self
incriminatiion

HELD:

No. What is protected by the constitution is the compulsory exaction of testimonies from the accused that may be used against himself
and not the body evidence which may be used as evidence if material.

Wherefore the decision appealed from is affirmed.

Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, 24 July 2012

FACTS

Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations
against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a Private Army Group (PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of
data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her
inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her
reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their
capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the right to privacy is invoked as opposed to the
state’s interest in preserving the right to life, liberty or security.

RULING

NO.

The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to
protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected
through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted,
there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.

In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals
maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard,
respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was
implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome. [T]he state interest of dismantling
PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of
information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.

G.R. No. L-50103 November 24, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle, vs. LEONARDO TOLENTINO, accused, HAMID DUMA, accused-appellant.

FERNAN, J.:

In Criminal Case No. 151 of the then Court of First Instance of Basilan, Hamid Duma, Leonardo Tolentino and Romeo Palermo were
accused of the crime of robbery with homicide said to have been committed as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of February, 1977 and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, viz., at the Office of the Zamboanga
Coconut Planters Trading, Inc., Municipality of Isabela, Province of Basilan, Philippines, the above-named accused, taking advantage
of the night to better accomplish their purpose and forming a group of three [3] persons armed with axe, bolo and knife, conspiring and
confederating together, aiding and assisting one another and by means of violence and treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, take, steal and carry away cash money in the amount of FOUR THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN
PESOS [P4,437.80] and EIGHTY CENTAVOS, Philippine Currency, which money was placed inside a steel cabinet, belonging to the
Zamboanga Coconut Planters Trading, Inc.; that in the commission of the crime above-described, the said accused did wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, hack, stab and hit with said axe, bolo and knife one Benjamin Pollisco, thereby inflicting
hacked and stabbed wounds upon his body which caused his death. 1

In a decision promulgated on January 8, 1979, Romeo Palermo was acquitted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence while Hamid
Duma and Leonardo Tolentino were found guilty as charged and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to
indemnify the relatives of the victim the sum of P12,000.00 and the Zamboanga Coconut Planters Trading, Inc. the amount of
P4,437.80 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, in either case, and to pay the costs.

The judgment of conviction against Leonardo Tolentino has become final since he did not appeal therefrom. 2 On the other hand, the
Court accepted on arch 21, 1979 the appeal interposed by Hamid Duma. Thus, this review will deal only with said appeal.

The People narrates the facts as follows:

The Zamboanga Coconut Planters Trading, Inc. was a corporation engaged in copra buying with branch office at Isabela, Basilan [pp.
4-5, tsn., June 3, 1977; p. 145, tsn, June 9, 1977]. It had only two security guards-deceased Benjamin Pollisco and accused Leonardo
Tolentino [pp. 4-5, 8-9, tsn, June 3, 1977; p. 149, tsn, June 9, 1977; p.197, tsn, July 6, 1977]. Appellant Hamid Duma and accused
Romeo Palermo were laborers of the corporation [p. 5, tsn, June 3, 1977; p.201, tsn, July 6, 1977].

At about 6:45 p.m., on February 23, 1977, the security guard on duty was the deceased whose shift was from 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.
[p. 14, tsn, June 3, 1977; p. 149, tsn, June 9, 1977; p. 198, tsn, July 6, 1977]. The shift of accused Tolentino was from 11:00 p.m. of the
same day to 7:00 a.m. of the following day, February 24, 1977 [pp. 14, 29, tsn, June 3, 1977; p. 150, tsn, June 9, 1977; p. 198, tsn, July
6, 1977].

At about 10:45 o' clock in the evening of February 27, 1977, Rasul Alibasa, the corporation's branch manager, and his assistant,
Domingo Araneta, arrived at the office f the corporation where they also resided. They had just come from a conference with Benjie
Arsenia at Pardo's residence [pp. 17-18, 20, tsn, June 3, 1977]. Upon entering the door of their office, they saw a body sprawled on the
floor. When the light inside the building was switched on, they Identified the victim as Benjamin Pollisco whose body was full of blood.
They also saw the steel cabinet in their office with its first drawer forced open and deformed. The steel cabinet was pushed to the floor
so that its handles were facing upward [pp. 20-25, 28, 63-65, tsn, June 3, 1977; pp. 191-192, 221, tsn, July 6, 1977]. Immediately, they
reported the to the nearby army detachment. Araneta called up by telephone the Integrated National Police [pp. 27-28, 65, 67, tsn,
June 3, 1977; pp. 192, 221, tsn, July 6, 1977; p. 359, tsn, Oct. 6, 1977].

In a few moments, military personnel and policemen arrived. During their investigation, the police found the steel cabinet of the
corporation pushed down the floor with its handles up and its top drawer forcibly opened. Of the amount of P9,437.80 inside it,
P4,437.80 was gone [pp. 23-24, 43, 65, 67, tsn, June 3, 1977; p. 92, tsn, June 8, 1977; pp. 147-148, 177, 182, tsn, June 9, 1977; p.
199, tsn, July 6, 1977; pp. 362, 364, tsn, Oct. 6, 1977].

While the police authorities were still inside the building investigating and searching the premises for possible clues, at about 11:45
o'clock that night, appellant Hamid Duma appeared at the scene of the crime with bloodstains on his shirt [pp. 30, 68, tsn, June 3, 1977;
pp. 193, 221, tsn, July 6, 1977; p. 366, tsn, Oct. 6, 1977]. Cpl. Conrado Francisco of the Integrated National Police investigated him.
Appellant Duma dmitted having participated in the commission of the crime [Exh. "J", pp. 5-7, Folio of Exhs.; pp. 30, 33, 35, 68-69, tsn,
June 3, 1977; pp. 84, 86-87, 91, 100, tsn, June 8, 1977; pp. 194, 227-234, tsn, July 6, 1977; pp. 366-367, 381, tsn, Oct. 6, 1977]. His
shirt was found to be positive of human blood [Exh. "L,", p. 52, rec; p. 257, tsn, July 7, 1977].

A few minutes later, at about 12:10 a.m., of the following day, February 24, 1977, accused Tolentino also arrived at the scene of the
crime without uniform and slippers and appeared drunk and aggressive [pp. 36-37, 69-70, tsn, June 3, 1977; pp. 119-120, tsn, June 8,
1977; p. 194, 198-199, tsn, July 6, 1977; p. 369, tsn, Oct. 6, 1977]. Immediately, appellant Duma pointed at him as one of those who
killed the deceased [pp. 36, 70, tsn, June 3, 1977; p. 95, tsn, June 8, 1977; p. 195, tsn, July 6, 1977; pp. 371, 418, tsn, Oct. 6, 1977]. In
the course of the investigation of Tolentino by Cpl. Francisco, Tolentino likewise admitted having participated in the commission of the
crime[Exh. "B," p. 46, rec.; pp. 37-39, 70, tsn, June 3, 1977]. His shirt was also found to be positive of human blood [Exh. "K", p. 52,
rec.; pp. 39-40, tsn, June 3, 1977; p. 256, tsn, July 7, 19771]. When Tolentino was searched, the police found a Knife [Exh. E] tucked to
his waist[pp. 42-43, tsn, June 3, 1977]. Tolentino led the lawmen to his room and showed an ax and bolo [Exh. D] under his bed [p. 39,
tsn, Id.].

Both appellant Duma and accused Tolentino implicated accused Romeo Palermo as their companion in the commission of the crime.
Palermo, however, denied participation [p. 53, tsn, June 5, 1978; pp. 96, 99, tsn; June 6, 1978]. When searched, Palermo had P100.00
in cash in his possession [pp. 376, 394, tsn, Oct. 6, 1977]. His shirt which was full of blood was found in the house of his parents (pp.
16-19, tsn, June 3, 1977; pp. 373-375, tsn, Oct. 6, 1977]. On the night of the incident instead of sleeping in his parent's house, Palermo
slept in the house of Mrs. Selsa Montez [pp. 373-374, 393, tsn, Oct. 6, 1977; p. 23, tsn, May 16, 1978; p. 6, tsn, June 5, 1978].

During the preliminary investigation before the Provincial Fiscal of Basilan, both appellant Duma and accused Tolentino confessed
participation in the commission of the crime [Exhs. "P" and "Q", pp. 33-66 and 9-26, respectively, Folio of Exhs.; pp. 304-316, tsn, Aug.
10, 1978]. Accused Palermo, however, refused to confess and denied having participated in it [p. 64, tsn, June 6, 1978].

A certification issued by Dr. Purita Suson, Municipal Health Officer of Isabela, Basilan, showed that the deceased suffered the following
injuries:

1. Hacked wound, multiple, face, right.

His death was instantaneous due to "Hemorrhage secondary to multiple hack, lacerated and stab wounds [Exhs. "G-2" and "H-3", pp. 2
and 3 respectively, Folio of Exhs.; p. 141, tsn, June 9, 1977; p.361, tsn, Oct. 6, 1977].

The amount of P5,000.00 was found by Rasul Alibasa and the police officers in the first drawer of the steel cabinet mixed with other
documents. It was subsequently deposited with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer [pp. 43-46, tsn, June 7, 1977].3

On the other hand, appellant's version of the incident is as follows:

On February 23, 1977, at or about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, appellant and some of the laborers thereof were still in the premises of
the Coconut Planters at Weyerheauser, Isabela, Basilan on account of management's order that it was expecting delivery of copra from
the coconut producers from Sumisip, Basilan Province[testimony of Fausta Tagud, t.s.n., page 181, Volume 1].

When management was certain that no copra delivery was forthcoming, most of the laborers, including the herein appellant, went home
or at least, left the premises of the Coconut Planters compound leaving the manager, Rasul Alibasa alone with the deceased, Benjamin
Pollisco, in the office of the Coconut Planters, Isabela, Basilan [testimony of Fausta Tagud, t.s.n. pages 175 and 184, Volume 1].

At or about 7:30 o'clock in the evening, Rasul Alibasa together with Domingo Araneta left the office of the Coconut Planters on board a
motorcycle and proceeded to Sariling Atin, a restaurant located at the poblacion of Isabela, for their supper, and the only persons who
were left in the office of the Coconut Planters were Benjamin Pollisco and Romeo Palermo. After taking their supper thereat, they went
back to the office of the Coconut Planters for Alibasa's jacket and, thereupon, they saw Benjamin Pollisco and Romeo Palermo therein.
The time was 8:10 o'clock in the evening. A little later, Alibasa and Araneta, on board a motorcycle went to Pardo's residence, a place
situated nearby, on the invitation of one Benjie Arsenia for a conference. At 10:45 o'clock in the evening, or thereabout, Alibasa and
Araneta went back to the office at the Coconut Planters, a place which was used by Alibasa as his sleeping quarter, and therein found
Benjamin Pollisco, a security guard thereof, dead. [Testimony of Rasul Alibasa, t.s.n., pages 18-25, Volume 1].

Having found the dead body of Benjamin Pollisco thereat, said Alibasa and Araneta immediately sought the assistance of the police
and the army soldiers at a nearby military detachment, which was only a few meters distance from the scene of the crime. Pursuant
thereto, Sgt. Mabalot of the Philippine Army and his men responded [sic] the call and about half an hour later, a team of policemen
headed by homicide investigator, Corporal Conrado Francisco arrived thereat and who, thereupon, made his ocular inspection of the
crime scene and other police routinary investigation thereof.
The investigation of Conrado Francisco revealed that the top drawer of the steel filing cabinet therein was forcibly opened and the
money inside in the sum of P4,437.80 was missing but the sum of P5,000.00 was not, however, taken and remained inside the drawer
mixed with other papers and other documents therein.

In the meantime, the appellant, whose house is situated within the Weyerheauser compound, has to pass through the gate of the said
compound in going to and from the poblacion of Isabela, Basilan. Incidentally, at or about 11:00 o'clock in the evening of February 23,
1977, appellant, while on his way home from a drinking joint at Tondo, Isabela, Basilan, and upon reaching the gate of the
Weyerheauser compound, for no apparent reason and without provocation on his part, was mauled and assaulted by a group of
soldiers there and, who thereafter, brought him to the office of the Coconut Planters for investigation in connection with the death of
Benjamin Pollisco, with his mouth splattered with blood and other body injuries sustained by him as a result thereof [Testimony of
Hamid Duma, t.s.n. pages 10-20, Volume II].

Appellant was immediately pointed to by Rasul Alibasa apparently on account of the blood stains splattered on appellant's shirt as a
result of the body injuries sustained by him from the foregoing beatings. By reason thereof, the appellant was immediately placed under
custodial investigation and focusing on him as the principal suspect in the killing and robbery of February 23, 1977 mentioned above.
From 12:00 o'clock midnight of February 23, 1977 till 2:00 o'clock of the following day, appellant, in the course of the interrogation, had
vomited blood and left unconscious for a period of one hour as a result of the continuous beatings and assault upon his person by
Conrado Francisco, PC Rebollos and a certain Sammy. When appellant can no longer sustain the beatings, assault, maltreatment and
intimidations of death upon him by Francisco and his men, he was finally compelled to falsely admit and make untruthful statements
incriminating himself and his two other coaccused.[Testimony of Hamid Duma, t.s.n. pages 13-20, Volume II].

After having falsely admitted participation in the killing of Benjamin Pollisco and the robbery therein, appellant was immediately brought
to the police station by Corporal Francisco and his men after passing by the Army Battalion at Menzi; Isabela wharf; Tondo and Sta.
Cruz, Isabela, Basilan.

At the police station, appellant's right hand was handcuffed by Corporal Francisco and thereafter, hanged by his right hand until only his
toes were touching the floor of the police station. Appellant's statement, however, was taken at the police station by Corporal Francisco
at 2:20 o'clock in the morning of February 24, 1977 as borne out in Exhibit "J" for the prosecution and admission of Corporal Conrado
Francisco [Cross-examination on Conrado Francisco, t.s.n. page 4-8, Volume 1]. On the same date, appellant was brought before
Ruben Ramos, Clerk of Court II, Municipal Court of Isabela, Basilan before whom the statement of appellant was sworn to and
subscribed. The appellant simply did not register his complaint to the said clerk of court indicating the circumstances under which
Exhibit "J" was taken for fear of his life and other forms of intimidations by Corporal Francisco should appellant show the slightest sign
of non-conformity in affixing his signature in the prepared statement[Exhibit "J"] before Ruben Ramos [Testimony f Hamid Duma, t.s.n.
pages 4-30, Volume 2]. Thereafter, appellant was held incommunicado (sic) for the period of one week.

On March 5, 1977, in a preliminary investigation conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of Basilan, the appellant and his co-accused were
not assisted by counsel or informed of such right nor were they informed of their right to remain silent pursuant to Section 20, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution [Cross-examination on [sic] Pelagio Santos, t.s.n., pages 325, Volume 1, S. Manzanaris]. And while the
Provincial Fiscal had not intimidated appellant and his two other co-accused into submitting themselves to preliminary investigation, the
presence of Corporal Conrado Francisco, who remained outside of the Fiscal's Office and monitoring the proceedings therein to the
mind of the appellant, was enough intimidation to himself into repeating the untruthful statements treated in Exhibit "J" during the
preliminary investigation.4

Since there was no eyewitness to the commission of the crime, the trial court, in assessing the evidence, accorded importance to [a] the
in-custody confession of appellant which it characterized as voluntary; [b] the circumstance that appellant's shirt [Exhibit "O"]) was
"found to be with human blood"; and [c] the circumstance that appellant, who was an ordinary laborer of the Zamboanga Coconut
Planters Trading, Inc. "appeared at the office at 11:45 in the evening of February 23, 1977 when it was not his duty to go to the office at
that time for as stated by witnesses both for the prosecution and the defense, that at 6:45 p.m., the laborers were informed that no
copra would be forthcoming and that they could go home. 5

The main thrust of appellant Duma's arguments is that the trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of his extra-judicial confession
[Exhibit "J"] allegedly obtained in violation of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:

SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation,
or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be in
admissible in evidence.

Appellant claims that his confession should have been ruled out as evidence as it was extracted "as a result of torture, intimidation,
force, threats, violence and coercion upon his person" and without the assistance of counsel.
After a careful review of the records, we find for the appellant. We hold that this in-custody confession is not admissible in evidence and
that the remaining circumstantial evidence does not fulfill the degree of moral certainty required to sustain the judgment of conviction.

It appears that in giving credence to the confession, the trial court applied the rule in People vs. Castro, 6 where it was stated that the
burden of proof to show the involuntariness of a confession rests on the accused. The trial court concluded that since herein appellant
failed "to adequately meet or put up convincingly this burden of proof," the presumption of voluntariness stands and the fact that the
same was obtained from him while under arrest does not affect its admissibility. However, the Castro ruling, which is premised on the
presumption of regularity of official acts, is no longer controlling in so far as it concerns the application of Section 20, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution.

In People vs. Duero, 7 the Court en banc pronounced that the rights enumerated in Section 20, except the first sentence, where
adopted from Miranda vs. Arizona,8 a case decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 13, 1966. This Court then ruled that
"inasmuch as the prosecution failed to prove that before Duero made his alleged oral confession he was informed of his rights to
remain silent and to have counsel and because there is no proof that he knowingly and intelligently waived those rights, his confession
is inadmissible in evidence." In effect, the Court not only abrogated the rule on presumption of regularity of official acts related to
admissibility of statements taken during in-custody interrogation but likewise dispelled in doubt as to the full adoption of the Miranda
doctrine in this jurisdiction. It is now incumbent upon the prosecution to prove during a trial that prior to questioning, the confessant was
warned of his constitutionality protected rights.

In Miranda Chief Justice Warren, who delivered the opinion of the Court, laid own the rule on admissibility of statements, i. e., that the
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless
it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. 9 The heavy burden is on
the prosecution because the State is responsible for establishing the isolated circumstance under which the interrogation takes place
and has the only means of making available corroborated evidence of warnings given during incommunicado interrogation. 10
Precisely, the Miranda doctrine was formulated to counteract the incommunicado police-oriented atmosphere during custodial
interrogation and the evils it can bring. 11

Prescinding from these principles, the U.S. Supreme Court enumerated the procedural safeguards which must be adhered to
as follows:

At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he
has the right to remain silent.

The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the
individual in court. This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of
foregoing it.

An individual need not make a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer. While such request affirmatively secures his right to have one, his
failure to ask for a lawyer does not constitute a waiver. No effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized
unless specifically made after the warnings we here delineate have been given. The accused who does not know his rights and
therefore does not make a request may be the person who most needs counsel.

In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights under this system then, it is necessary to warn him not only that
he has the right to consult with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.

Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at anytime prior to or
during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease ... If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he
indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent.

If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.
12

The admission of appellant Duma's in-custody confession having been based on an abandoned doctrine, there is a need to re-evaluate
the evidence of the prosecution.

The Solicitor General maintains that the appellant was duly informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel.
However, the following revealing testimonies of at least three of the prosecution witnesses indicate otherwise:

Assuming that the foregoing questions were propounded to appellant despite the latter's assertion to the contrary, still, it is not the kind
of waiver contemplated in Miranda, which dictates that it must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Moreover, appellant was
not informed of another absolute prerequisite-that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. Without the additional
warning, the admonition of the right to consult with counsel would often be understood as meaning only that he can consult with a
lawyer if he has one or has the funds to obtain one. The warning of a right to counsel would be hollow if not couched in terms that
would convey to the indigent-the person most often subjected to interrogation-the knowledge that he too has a right to have counsel
present and only by effective and express explanation to the indigent of this right can there be assurance that he was truly in a position
to exercise it. 14

Since the prosecution utterly failed to demonstrate compliance with the procedural safeguards, the Court finds the extrajudicial
confession objectionable and therefore in admissible in evidence for being in violation of the inhibition against compulsory self-
incrimination.

With the exclusion of the cofession of Duma, there is no necessity to deliberate on the appellant's allegations of intimidation and
maltreatment which attended its execution.

The prosecution inferred that the appelant must be guilty of the crime charged because of the bloodstains on his shirt. However, this
circumstance merits scant consideration, there being no other evidence to support the inference. Prosecution witness Oliva Perez, the
forensic chemist of the PC Criminal Laboratory, who conducted a test on the bloodstains, testified that she failed to ascertain the blood
type on the shirt. 15 She further testified that the blood type of the deceased was also not determined because when the specimen
reached the laboratory, it was already "putrified and rendered unsuited for xamination." 16 Hence, the tests neither confirmed nor
refuted appellant's claim that the blood stains were that of his own.

While flight, when unexplained, is preesumptive evidence of guilt, mere presence of the accused within the vicinity of the scene of the
crime barely three hours after its commission raises no such presumption. This proposition is supported by Duma's explanation that at
or about 11 o'clock in the evening of February 23, 1977, upon reaching the gate of the Weyerheauser compound on his way home, he
was spottted by the investigators and then mauled. Moreover, it has not ben disputed that appellant's house is situated within the
Weyerheauser compound and that he has to pass through the gate of the said compound in going to and from the poblacion of Isabela,
Basilan.

Even assuming that appellant at the office at the time when the investigation was goin on, although he had no business to be there, as
claimed by the prosecution, still, this has no probative value. Guilt is not imputable to Duma for his actuation is susceptible of two
interpretations. Thus the time honored principle in criminal law that if the inculpatory facts are capable of two or more explanations, one
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other with his guilt, the Court should adopt that which is more favorable to the
accused for then the evidence does not fulfill the rest of moral certainty, finds application in this case. 17 This is rightly so as every
circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence not sway judgment, for well-established is the rule that the prosecution must rely
on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. 18

Finally, in People vs. Peralta, 19 it was held that the presence of the accused in the place in question shortly after the commission of
the offense is a circumstance favorable to him, because, as a generalrule, the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the righteous are
as bold as a lion.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Basilan in Criminal Case No. 151 is hereby REVERSED and the appellant
Hamid Duma is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on grounds of reasonable doubt, with costs de oficio. In view of the circunstances
obtaining in the case which cast doubt on the validity and admissibility of the statements of the co-accused Leonardo Tolentino who
was likewise convicted by the trial court but who for reasons not shown in the record failed to appeal, let a copy of this decision be
furnished the Honorable Minister of justice for possible recommendaation of executive clemency.20

SO ORDERED.