See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/317946008

Food fraud vulnerability and its key factors

Article  in  Trends in Food Science & Technology · June 2017

DOI: 10.1016/j.tifs.2017.06.017

CITATIONS READS

6 1,109

3 authors, including:

Saskia van Ruth Pieternel A Luning

Wageningen University & Research Wageningen University & Research
190 PUBLICATIONS   3,634 CITATIONS    150 PUBLICATIONS   3,599 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

Assessing risk of acrylamide in French fries production in Malaysian food service establishments from a techno-managerial approach
View project

Risk-based auditing in the food chain View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Pieternel A Luning on 02 October 2017.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

 Trends in Food Science & Technology 67 (2017) 70e75

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Trends in Food Science & Technology

journal homepage: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/trends-in-food-science-
and-technology

Commentary

Food fraud vulnerability and its key factors

Saskia M. van Ruth a, b, *, Wim Huisman c, Pieternel A. Luning a
a
Food Quality and Design Group, Wageningen University and Research, P.O. Box 8129, 6700 EV Wageningen, The Netherlands
b
RIKILT Wageningen University and Research, P.O. Box 230, 6700 AE Wageningen, The Netherlands
c
Faculty of Law, VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Background: Food fraud prevention and fraud vulnerability reduction are the first steps to combat food
Received 6 April 2017 fraud and require a recurrent effort throughout the food supply chain. Due to the intentional nature of
Received in revised form fraud, it requires different tactics than the common food safety approaches. However, knowledge on
13 June 2017
what determines food fraud vulnerability is limited.
Accepted 15 June 2017
Available online 26 June 2017
Scope and approach: In the current study a new food fraud vulnerability concept is explored. The concept
is based on the criminological routine activity theory and key food fraud vulnerability factors are sub-
sequently extracted and identified.
Keywords:
Counterfeiting
Key findings and conclusions: Opportunities, motivations and control measures are defined in this
Criminology concept as the three main elements of food fraud vulnerability. They can be subdivided into technical
Food adulteration opportunities, opportunities in time and place, economic drivers, culture and behavior, as well as
Fraud risk technical and managerial control measures. They are further detailed in 31 fraud vulnerability factors.
Vulnerability assessment Food fraud vulnerability threats may originate from both the external and the internal environment of a
business which means that several vulnerability factors need to be considered at multiple environmental
levels, i.e. the level of the business itself, its suppliers, its customers, the wider chain and at the (inter)
national level. The concept was further developed into a practical food fraud vulnerability self-
assessment tool with 50 questions and answering grids. This will be a valuable first step towards
fraud prevention and will assist in the global combat on food fraud.
© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Food fraud
Food fraud, food adulteration, counterfeiting and food crime are
terms that resurface in the press frequently. Most organizations in
this area, such as the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI), the Gro-
cery Manufacturers Association (GMA) in the United States (US),
the US Pharmacopia (USP)and reports of the European Parliament
consider food fraud as an intentional, deceptive misrepresentation
of foods for financial gain (Spink, Ortega, Chen, & Wu, 2017). Food
fraud is broader than (economically motivated) adulteration only.
Food fraud usually comprises misrepresentation (e.g. counter-
feiting) as well as adulteration and in some definitions also theft,
tampering, diversion, tax evasion, grey market and overrun. In the
current study we will focus on the food fraud aspects related to
adulteration and misrepresentation only, which is in line with the
* Corresponding author. Food Quality and Design Group, Wageningen University
and Research, P.O. Box 8129, 6700 EV Wageningen, The Netherlands.
E-mail addresses: saskia.vanruth@wur.nl (S.M. van Ruth), w.huisman@vu.nl
(W. Huisman), pieternel.luning@wur.nl (P.A. Luning).
commonly used working definitions of food fraud in the EU (EU,
2014).
Recent food fraud scandals have further increased the need to
combat fraud across supply chains (Manning & Soon, 2014). How-
ever, current food safety management systems are not specifically
designed for fraud control or mitigation. Due to the intentional
nature of fraud, it requires an approach that differs from the
common safety ploys (Spink et al., 2017). In the usual current food
management approaches honesty is presumed. This presumption
makes us generally vulnerable to deception (Levine, 2014), but in
addition we have to consider that food fraudsters will put all efforts
on disguising their illegal activities. Therefore, in order to tackle
food fraud we need to shift from the safety-based approach to the
fraud prevention and vulnerability reduction approach and take
into account these deliberate and disguising aspects. Fraud
vulnerability can be defined as a weakness or flaw that creates
opportunities for undesirable events related to the system (Spink
et al., 2017). However, so far little has been reported on which as-
pects impact on food fraud vulnerability. In the current study, we
aim to unravel these aspects by framing food fraud vulnerability

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tifs.2017.06.017
0924-2244/© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
 S.M. van Ruth et al. / Trends in Food Science & Technology 67 (2017) 70e75
with a criminological theory and by identifying key factors that add
to the vulnerability (susceptibility) to fraud. Since knowledge on
what is driving potential food fraudsters is merely lacking, some
factors are extrapolated from research on other (corporate) crimes.
2. The routine activity theory and main food fraud
vulnerability concept
Fraud is a form of criminal behavior in any definition of crime.
Two types of definitions of crime exist: the legal (acts forbidden by
law) and the non-legal definition. Although these two do not fully
overlap, they share crucial defining elements: i.e. criminal behavior
is harmful and morally reprehensible (Passas, 2005). Food fraud
will qualify for both.
A criminological theory that has integrated the relevant vari-
ables for explaining crime and that has gained great popularity in
criminology and received much validation is the routine activity
theory of Cohen and Felson (1979). The routine activity theory sees
crime as the outcome of the convergence in time and place of (1)
motivated offenders and (2) suitable targets in (3) the absence of
capable guardians. A routine activity approach seems particularly
appropriate for the study of corporate crime, as it is committed at
the workplace and thus directly arises out of the routines of
everyday life. Furthermore, because of their job and position many
white-collar offenders have a specialized access to their targets
(Felson & Boba, 2010). Corporate crime involves illegal acts
committed by or on behalf of corporations, which operate in
legitimate branches of industry (Clinard & Yeager, 1980). For them
this is, so to say, criminal business on the side. Since the majority of
food fraud occurs in the regular supply chain, food fraud shows
similarities with other corporate crimes (Lord, Flores Elizondo, &
Spencer, 2017). Therefore, the routine activity theory principles
are fairly suitable to describe the concept of food fraud vulnerability
in order to get insights into the ‘what’ and the ‘who’, but also
especially the ‘why’ of food fraud.
In accordance with the routine activity theory, food fraud
vulnerability can be defined by the three elements: opportunities
(suitable target), motivations (motivated offender)and control
measures (guardianship) as presented in Fig. 1. The opportunities
point out why offenders are able to commit fraud and motivations
detail why offenders would want to commit fraud (Coleman, 1987).
The control measures in place may counteract the vulnerability
resulting from opportunities and motivations.
3. Food fraud vulnerability elements and detailed factors
The three elements opportunities, motivations and control
measures can be subdivided into six groups. These six groups
comprise (1) technical opportunities, (2) opportunities in time and
place; (3) economic drivers, (4) culture and behavior, (5) technical
control measures and (6) managerial control measures. Each group
is composed of a number of fraud factors and will be described and
explained in the following paragraphs (Fig. 2).
Research has established that people have the psychological
tendency to place threats of crime outside the social group or the
organization they belong to (‘the alien conspiracy’). However, of-
fenders are employees in most cases in which companies are
Fig. 1. Schematic presentation of the food fraud vulnerability concept based on the routine activity theory.
71
victimized by fraud (Holtfreter, 2014). Therefore, food fraud
vulnerability threats from both the external and the internal
environment of a business should be considered, which means that
one needs to be receptive to external threats as well as to the dark
side of the own organization. The external environmental dimen-
sion consists of different layers, i.e. (A) the direct suppliers and
customers, (B) the wider chain/industry network and (C) the (inter)
national environment. Along this dimension of environmental
layers, the span of control of a company decreases as well as its
ability to obtain reliable data.
3.1. Opportunities
3.1.1. Technical opportunities
The ease of adulteration/counterfeiting of certain types of
products and the general availability of knowledge and technology
to adulterate in a particular chain will increase the vulnerability to
fraud. For instance products in a specific physical state, e.g. liquids,
are more susceptible to fraud than others (Jack, 2015). The avail-
ability or absence of detection methods affects the general fraud
vulnerability as well. Fraudulent products may not be visually
recognizable or detected with simple methods (T€ ahka
€pa a, Maijala,
€€
Korkeala, & Nevas, 2015). With more advanced analytical charac-
terization being needed for certain aspects and product groups, the
susceptibility to fraud increases. Complexity of the foods or raw
material and natural variability of the composition of products adds
to the analytical testing complexity (Moyer, DeVries, & Spink, 2017;
Pustjens, Weesepoel, & van Ruth, 2015).
3.1.2. Opportunities in time and place
Fraud opportunities increase when potential fraudsters have
legitimate access to the location in which the fraud can be
committed, i.e. access to the product, processing lines, etc. (Benson
& Simpson, 2009). Similar to food defense, access of unauthorized
personnel and lack of physical safeguards will increase opportunity
(Buckhoff, 2002). Furthermore, opportunities increase when the
offender is spatially separated from the victim (Benson & Simpson,
2009). Thus increase of the complexity and of a supply chain
network will enhance fraud vulnerability, since it usually decreases
the transparency of the network (Sarpong, 2014).
3.2. Motivations
3.2.1. Economic drivers
Supply and pricing, product attributes resulting in added value,
differences in pricing due to regulatory diversity in countries,
economic health of businesses, level of competition and financial
strains imposed on suppliers are economic aspects that affect fraud
vulnerability.
3.2.1.1. Supply and pricing. Since food fraud always involves the
substitution of a higher value product with one or more of less
expensive or lower quality alternative(s), a high value per kilogram
product will add temptation to fraudsters (Johnson, 2014). When
gaps exist between physical product availability and market de-
mand (Manning & Soon, 2014)and prices shift due to regional or
global supply shortages (Moyer et al., 2017) fraud vulnerability will
72 S.M. van Ruth et al. / Trends in Food Science & Technology 67 (2017) 70e75
Fig. 2. Overview of the food fraud vulnerability main elements and detailed factors.
also increase. Shortages may not only lead to increase of pricing but
can also lead to a failure of fulfilling contracts with customers with
fraud becoming a last resort for economic survival (Manning &
Soon, 2014).
3.2.1.2. Value adding product attributes. Attributes adding value to
products involve products from defined provenance or production
systems (e.g. organic), or particular processing (e.g. artisanal
products). Food quality labels, such as PDO (protected designation
of origin), PGI (protected geographical indication) and TSG (tradi-
tional specialties guaranteed) have been introduced in the EU in
order to protect producers of food with special qualities (Grunert &
Aachmann, 2016). Since they retail at higher prices than their
counterparts, these special attributes may also increase fraud
vulnerability. Moreover, in some cases particular constituents add
value to products, since they are used in payment schemes. For
instance, payment in the milk supply chain is based on the protein
and fat contents of milk (Bijl, Kooistra, & Hogeveen, 2007). This may
invite certain people to artificially increase the (apparent) content
of these payment markers and thus increase fraud vulnerability.
3.2.1.3. Economic health and level of competition. Research shows
that economic aspects influence the vulnerability to fraud in gen-
eral (Simpson & Rorie, 2016). Depending on both the person and
the situation, economic motivation can take two very different
forms: profit maximization or loss minimization, in other words
the drive for more material gain versus the fear of losing what was
already gained (Benson & Simpson, 2009; Coleman, 1987). The
motivation for committing white-collar crime e greed or need e
strongly depends on the situation: e.g. situations in which criminal
opportunities that are too strong to resist and situations in which
law breaking is perceived as unavoidable for economic survival
(Huisman, 2016). With regard to the latter, the economic health of a
business and level of competition are important factors in fraud
vulnerability. Under economically severe weather conditions, a
company may seek for manners to cut costs and become creative in
regard to meeting product specifications. Examples of ways to cut
costs are the removal of the traceability system, elimination of
controls and buying ingredients or products from cheaper or un-
known suppliers (Ryan, 2015). This will all add to the vulnerability
to fraud.
3.2.1.4. Financial strains. Powerful customers may also impose
considerable financial strains on their suppliers. At individual
company scale, the demand may exceed the supply of the supplier
at a certain stage. For instance, there is limited availability of
organic eggs on the market in the periods before Easter and
Christmas but a customer may demand large volumes of organic
eggs and has put severe punishments in place if demands are not
met. If the supplier is fairly dependent on the customer, the sup-
plier may feel the need to fill the gap with alternative (fraudulent)
products to meet the customer's demand for its own economic
survival (Waters, 2011).
3.2.2. Culture and behavior
The business strategy as well as the ethical business culture of
organizations, former offences, corruption levels in countries in
which organizations operate and victimization are factors that in-
fluence cultural and behavioral aspects of fraud vulnerability.
3.2.2.1. Business strategy. Individual potential fraudsters may be
influenced by the business strategy of their organization, as has
been shown for other corporate crimes (Huisman, 2016). Em-
ployees may perceive business strategies that involve hard-to-
reach (short term) financial goals that are being put forward by
their organizations as a threat. For the sake of saving themselves
from being fired, the employees may decide to reside to unethical
behavior, especially if there are no specific requirements given in
regard to how the goals should be achieved (Nyaga, Whipple, &
Lynch, 2010).
 S.M. van Ruth et al. / Trends in Food Science & Technology 67 (2017) 70e75
3.2.2.2. Ethical business culture. Companies with a stronger ethical
corporate environment have employees who are more willing and
are more strongly committed to adhere to the organizations’ rules
and regulations (Rae & Subramaniam, 2008). This in turn limits the
risk of unethical behavior. On the contrary, a culture characterized
by demotivation, mistrust and dissatisfaction can be a breeding
ground for unethical behavior (Kaptein, 2011a). Furthermore, un-
ethical business cultures generate processes of the normalization of
fraud, which again reinforces longer-term fraudulent activity
(Coleman, 1987).
3.2.2.3. Former offences. Criminal offences that have occurred
previously have a higher risk of reoccurring. The history of prior
violations of the law indicates firm engagement in a pattern of
wrongdoing, such as illegal activities, which can result in repeated
violations. Event history analysis on illegal corporate behavior has
elucidated that a history of prior violations implies a 19 times
higher likelihood of illicit behavior in the future (Baucus & Near,
1991). The relationship between prior violations and illegal
behavior appears to indicate that some companies have a culture
that reinforces illegal activities (Baucus & Near, 1991). Moreover,
companies which are in certain industries rife with wrong-doing
behaviors are more likely to commit crime or are being influ-
enced (Simpson, 2011). Therefore, former criminal offences of or-
ganizations and individuals potentially increase the vulnerability to
fraud.
3.2.2.4. (Inter)national corruption level. The risk of food fraud de-
pends not only on company practices, but also on general global
practices. A factor, which can influence food fraud risk is the cor-
ruption level in a given country (Spink & Moyer, 2011); which is
affected by the geopolitical situation (Food Chemical Codex, 2014).
In countries with a high level of corruption, firms have been shown
to choose more often illegal or immoral means to gain profits
(Martin, Cullen, Johnson, & Parboteeah, 2007).
3.2.2.5. Victimization. Although companies may not be directly
involved in food fraud, they may be victimized by activities of
others in the chain or sector of industry. Those victimized are more
likely to become (in)directly involved in future frauds again. Repeat
victimization is often the result of factors that were already present
and which were not mitigated after the first victimization.
Frequently it is impossible to change these factors by the victimized
company since they are out of its span of control. If it has become a
certain culture to commit fraud in a particular supply chain
network, law-abiding businesses in the same chain are affected as
well. When major competitors of a company perform well, in part
as a result of illegal methods, it becomes difficult for other com-
panies to choose only legal actions (Baucus & Near, 1991). In some
cases these businesses are affected to the extent that they have to
choose between ‘being driven out of business’ or ‘swim with the
tide’ to survive the severe and unfair competition (Callmann, 1940).
This will influence the odds of repeated victimization and thus
affect fraud vulnerability.
3.3. Control measures
Fraud control measures can counteract the vulnerability arising
from opportunities and motivations. Food safety management
systems commonly involve preventive, intervention and moni-
toring strategies together with assurance activities such as valida-
tion and verification to ensure food safety (Luning et al., 2009).
Fraud controls require a similar generic approach but need to be
focused on fraud issues taking into account its intentional nature.
73
3.3.1. Technical measures
Technical measures (hard controls) refer to those aimed at
detection of fraud by generating data and actual information on the
prevalence of adulterated products. Fraud monitoring systems are
essential tools for organizations and should be in place in order to
evaluate, remedy and improve organization's fraud prevention and
detections techniques (Crain, Hopwood, Pacini, & Young, 2016). The
effectiveness of such systems depends on the use of scientific
knowledge, specific information, being structured and procedural
driven and on independency (Luning et al., 2009). For fraud con-
trols this means that the monitoring systems for incoming material
control that include systematic sampling plans, accurate and spe-
cific fraud detection methods, clear fraud monitoring produces and
strict documentation will enhance the odds of detecting fraudulent
products. Advancing towards effective fraud monitoring systems
require the development of specific and effective analytical
methods and widespread access to screening methods (Everstine,
Spink, & Kennedy, 2013). Furthermore, the use of indirect data,
such as those from mass balance control and tracking and tracing
systems (Everstine et al., 2013; Manning & Soon, 2014) can
contribute to fraud control. Because of the ability to find informa-
tion on the history, process as well as the location of a product or
ingredient, traceability tools can be used to prevent or eliminate
illegal, unreported and unregulated products (Charlebois &
Haratifar, 2015) which will help to reduce fraud vulnerability.
3.3.2. Managerial measures
The managerial measures (soft controls) are more preventive in
nature and aim at reducing opportunities and or motivations in the
management system and the chain environment. Typical mana-
gerial measures that can be implemented at company level include
ethical codes of conducts, integrity screening and whistle blowing
systems. At supply chain level, measures such as contractual re-
quirements with suppliers addressing specifically fraud prevention,
extensive self-regulation and social control across the supply chain
with transparent feedback/actions on criminal behavior and sector/
branch guidelines to enhance fraud awareness and support fraud
mitigation measures can contribute to the reduction of fraud
vulnerability. At the wider environmental level, national food laws
and their enforcement are pivotal in fraud control (Spink, Fortin,
Moyer, Miao, & Wu, 2016).
3.3.2.1. Code of conduct. A code of conduct is a written, distinct,
formal document, which consists of moral standards and which
help guide employees or corporate behavior. Codes of conduct are
generally favorable toward the creation of a stronger ethical
corporate climate and relate to positive ethical behavior (Kaptein,
2011b) and thus will reduce fraud vulnerability.
3.3.2.2. Employee integrity screening. Effective and extensive
screening of prospective employees generally reduce the rate of
employee theft and other illegal behavior (Anderton & Kiely, 1988).
Similarly, a proper screening method adopted by companies in the
process of employee recruitment is assumed to be effective in
reducing the rate of committing fraud by employees and therefore
helps to control fraud in the own organization.
3.3.2.3. Whistle-blowing. Whistle-blowing has been shown a
powerful tool in the uncovering of fraudulent practices in the food
sector (De Lange, 2013). Often fraud has been reported by whistle-
blowers. Whistle blowing requires a safe environment for reporting
frauds that otherwise may go undetected.
3.3.2.4. Social control/self-regulation/guidance. In food businesses,
formal, informal contacts play an important role in preventing or
74 S.M. van Ruth et al. / Trends in Food Science & Technology 67 (2017) 70e75

Opportunities Motivations Control measures

1 12 32
3 31 3 13 50 3 33
11 2 30 14 49 34
2 29 2 15 2
48 35
10 3
1 28 1 16 47 1 36
0 27 0 17 46 0
37
9 4
26 18 45 38
8 5 25 19 44 39
24 20 43 40
7 6 23 21 42 41
22

Fig. 3. Example spider web diagrams for opportunities, motivations and control measures from the SSAFE food fraud vulnerability self-assessment tool for an olive oil procuring
food manufacturer. Numbers in black refer to the 50 questions of the tool and numbers in grey refer to low, medium and high vulnerability situations. For opportunities and
motivations a score of 1, 2, 3 refers to low, medium and high vulnerability, respectively. For control measures the order is reversed.

condoning of illegal behavior (May 2004). Social control is usually
taking place in the form of joint problem solving, participatory
decision making, thorough information exchange and fulfillment of
promises (Li, Xie Teo, & Peng, 2010). However, when the complexity
of food supply chains grows, social control in the supply chain di-
minishes, which add to the vulnerability to fraud. Since food
authenticity has hardly any priority in legislation, the authenticity
of food heavily depends on self-regulation and social control across
supply chains (Elliot, 2014). Communication of industry-wide best
practices and guidelines are also valuable to ensure the food
quality/authenticity within the whole supply chain (Lummus &
Vokurka, 1999).
3.3.2.5. Laws and enforcement. Food fraud has never been a key
priority for legislation and enforcement in the EU and on national
level (De Lange, 2013). Food fraud laws, regulations, standards and
certifications are underdeveloped but the topic is beginning to be
addressed (Spink et al., 2017). Ambiguous, vague laws and little
enforcement create opportunities for fraudsters to commit fraud
(Gussow & Kuiper, 2014). More legislation or increasing sanctions
can help reducing fraud vulnerability (De Lange, 2013).
3.3.2.6. Contingency plans. Contingency plans are plans devised for
dealing with emergencies and focus on the development of effec-
tive policies and procedures. Although risk is unavoidable, contin-
gency plans are formulated to ensure that incidents do not escalate
and are investigated in a consistent and uniform manner across an
organization (Iyer & Samociuk, 2006). Therefore, contingency plans
may also play an important role in the protection of businesses
from fraud threats and associated avoidable damage, as a last
resort.
4. From concept to practical tool
presented in spider web diagrams for a first impression of the re-
sults of the assessment (Luning et al., 2011). Spider web diagrams
for an olive oil procuring food manufacturer from a preliminary
study are shown in Fig. 3 as an example. Larger red areas for op-
portunities and motivations indicate increased vulnerability,
whereas the larger green area is associated with a higher number or
more adequate control measures. For further details and practical
use of the tool we refer to the SSAFE website (SSAFE, 2017).
5. Conclusions
Food fraud vulnerability is arising from the elements opportu-
nities, motivations and control measures which can be subdivided
into technical opportunities, opportunities in time and place, eco-
nomic drivers, culture and behavior, technical control measures
and managerial control measures. Various factors contributing to
food fraud have been identified and were collated in a practical
food fraud vulnerability assessment, which adds to fraud preven-
tion. Due to the dynamic nature of food fraud and widespread
occurrence, fraud prevention is not a once-off activity by a single
player but will need to become a recurrent effort at multiple levels
in the food supply chain. The approach will help businesses to
control food fraud, but it will also assist to develop knowledge on
what is driving food fraud. With the approach the prime fraud
drivers, enhancers and relevant control measures across chains and
actors can be identified and compared in future research.
Acknowledgements
Authors acknowledge financial support from SSAFE for the
development of the practical tool from the fraud vulnerability
concept and thank SSAFE and industry/authorities/scientists
involved for the fruitful collaboration.

Appendix A. Supplementary data

From the food fraud vulnerability concept and key factors
described above a tool was developed by the organization SSAFE
and the authors of this publication. SSAFE is a global non-profit
membership organization to help integrate food safety, animal
health and plant health across food supply chains to improve public
health and wellbeing (SSAFE, 2017). Through an interactive and
iterative process with representatives from the global food in-
dustry, retail, authorities and scientific community a food fraud
vulnerability self-assessment comprising 50 questions and associ-
ated answering grids was developed and globally tested. The 50
questions have arisen from the fraud vulnerability factors described
in this publication, 9 of which relate to opportunities, 20 to moti-
vations and 21 to control measures. The answering grids present
descriptions of low, medium and high vulnerability situations for
each question and link to a score system. The scores (1,2,3) can be
Supplementary data related to this article can be found at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tifs.2017.06.017.
References
Anderton, B., & Kiely, J. (1988). Employee theft. Personnel Review, 17(5), 37e43.
Baucus, M. S., & Near, J. P. (1991). Can illegal corporate behavior be predicted? An
event history analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 34(1), 9e36.
Benson, M. L., & Simpson, S. S. (2009). White collar crime: An opportunity perspective
(criminology and justice studies). New York: Routledge.
Bijl, R., Kooistra, S. R., & Hogeveen, H. (2007). The profitability of automatic milking
on Dutch dairy farms. Journal of Dairy Science, 90(1), 239e248.
Buckhoff, T. A. (2002). Preventing employee fraud by minimizing opportunity. The
CPA Journal, 72, 64e66.
Callmann, R. (1940). What is unfair competition. The Georgetown Law Journal, 28(5),
585e607.
 S.M. van Ruth et al. / Trends in Food Science & Technology 67 (2017) 70e75
Charlebois, S., & Haratifar, S. (2015). The perceived value of dairy product trace-
ability in modern society: An exploratory study. Journal of Dairy Science, 98(5),
3514e3525.
Clinard, M. B., & Yeager, P. C. (1980). Corporate crime. New York: Free Press.
Cohen, L. E., & Felson, M. (1979). Social change and crime rate trends: A routine
activity approach. American Sociological Association, 44, 588e608.
Coleman, J. W. (1987). Toward an integrated theory of white-collar crime. American
Journal of Sociology, 93, 406e439.
Crain, M. A., Hopwood, W. S., Pacini, C., & Young, G. R. (2016). Essentials of forensic
accounting. New York: Wiley.
De Lange, E. (2013). Food crisis, fraud in the food chain and the control thereof. Eu-
ropean Parliament report 2013/2091(INI). Brussels: European Parliament.
Elliot, C. (2014). Elliot review into the integrity and assurance of food supply networks
e final report. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/350726/elliot-review-final-report-july2014.pdf.
EU. (2014). European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) briefing (16/01/2014) on
fighting food fraud. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/
briefing/2014/130679/LDM_BRI(2014)130679_REV1_EN.pdf.
Everstine, K., Spink, J., & Kennedy, S. (2013). Economically motivated adulteration
(EMA) of food: Common characteristics of EMA incidents. Journal of Food Pro-
tection, 4, 560e735.
Felson, M., & Boba, R. (2010). Crime and everyday life. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Food Chemical Codex. (2014). Appendix XVII: Guidance on food fraud mitigation (Vol
2015, pp. 723e735) (December).
Grunert, K. G., & Aachmann, K. (2016). Consumer reactions to the use of EU quality
labels on food products: A review of the literature. Food Control, 59, 178e187.
Gussow, K. E., & Kuiper, L. H. (2014). De bestrijding van voedselfraude in Nederland.
ele Verkenningen, 40(2), 8e27.
Justiti€
Holtfreter, K. (2014). Fraud victimization. In G. J. N. Bruinsma, & D. Weisburd (Eds.),
Encyclopedia of criminology and criminal justice (pp. 1829e1836). New York:
Springer.
Huisman, W. (2016). Criminogenic organizational properties and dynamics. In
S. R. Van Slyke, M. L. Benson, & F. T. Cullen (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of white-
collar crime (pp. 435e462). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Iyer, N. K., & Samociuk, M. (2006). Fraud and corruption: Prevention and detection.
Farnham: Gower Publishing.
Jack, L. (2015). Risk modelling of food fraud motivation: ‘NSF fraud protection model’
intelligent risk model scoping project FS 246004: Final report. London: Food
Standards Agency.
Johnson, R. (2014). Food fraud and ‘economically motivated adulteration’ of food and
food ingredients. Congressional Research Report R43358 https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/R43358.pdf.
Kaptein, M. (2011a). Understanding unethical behavior by unraveling ethical cul-
ture. Human Relations, 64(6), 843e869.
Kaptein, S. P. (2011b). Towards effective codes: Testing the relationship with un-
ethical behavior. Journal of Business Ethics, 99(2), 233e251.
Levine, T. R. (2014). Truth-Default Theory (TDT). A theory of human deception and
deception detection. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 33(4), 378e392.
Li, Y., Xie, E., Teo, H.-H., & Peng, M. W. (2010). Formal control and social control in
domestic and international buyer-supplier relationships. Journal of Operations
Management, 28(4), 333e344.
Lord, N., Flores Elizondo, C. J., & Spencer, J. (2017). The dynamics of food fraud: The
interactions between criminal opportunity and market (dys)functionality in
legitimate business. Criminology & Criminal Justice, 1e19.
Lummus, R. R., & Vokurka, R. J. (1999). Defining supply chain management: A
View publication stats
75
historical perspective and practical guidelines. Industrial Management & Data
Systems, 99(1), 11e17.
Luning, P. A., Jacxsens, L., Rovira, J., Ose "s, S. M., Uyttendaele, M., & Marcelis, W. J.
(2011). A concurrent diagnosis of microbiological food safety output and food
safety management system performance: Cases from meat processing in-
dustries. Food Control, 22(3e4), 555e565.
Luning, P. A., Marcelis, W. J., Rovira, J., Van der Spiegel, M., Uyttendaele, M., &
Jacxsens, L. (2009). Systematic assessment of core assurance activities in
company specific food safety management systems. Trends in Food Science &
Technology, 20, 300e312.
Manning, L., & Soon, J. M. (2014). Developing systems to control food adulteration.
Food Policy, 49, 23e32.
Martin, K. D., Cullen, J. B., Johnson, J. L., & Parboteeah, K. P. (2007). Deciding to bribe:
A cross-level analysis of firm and home country influences on bribery activity.
Academy of Management Journal, 50(6), 1401e1422.
May, P. J. (2004). Compliance motivations: Affirmative and negative bases. Law and
Society Review, 38(1), 41e68.
Moyer, D. C., DeVries, J. W., & Spink, J. (2017). The economics of a food fraud incident
e case studies and examples including melamine in wheat gluten. Food Control,
71, 358e364.
Nyaga, G. N., Whipple, J. M., & Lynch, D. F. (2010). Examining supply chain re-
lationships: Do buyer and supplier perspectives on collaborative relationships
differ? Journal of Operations Management, 28(2), 101e114.
Passas, N. (2005). Lawful but awful: ‘Legal corporate crimes’. Journal of Socio-eco-
nomics, 34(6), 771e786.
Pustjens, A. M., Weesepoel, Y., & van Ruth, S. M. (2015). Chapter 5: Food fraud and
authenticity: Emerging issues and future trends. In C. Leadley (Ed.), Innovation
and future trends in food manufacturing and supply chain technologies (pp. 3e20).
Cambridge: Woodhead Publishing.
Rae, K., & Subramaniam, N. (2008). Quality of internal control procedures: Ante-
cedents and moderating effect on organisational justice and employee fraud.
Managerial Auditing Journal, 23(2), 104e124.
Ryan, J. M. (2015). Food fraud. London: Academic Press.
Sarpong, S. (2014). Traceability and supply chain complexity: Confronting the issues
and concerns. European Business Review, 26(3), 271e284.
Simpson, S. S. (2011). Making sense of white collar crime: Theory and research. The
Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, 8, 481e502.
Simpson, S. S., & Rorie, M. (2016). Economic fluctuations and crises. In S. R. Van
Slyke, M. L. Benson, & F. T. Cullen (Eds.), Oxford handbook of white- collar crime
(pp. 326e344). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Spink, J., Fortin, N. D., Moyer, D. C., Miao, H., & Wu, Y. (2016). Food fraud prevention:
Policy, strategy, and decision-making e implementation steps for a government
agency or industry. CHIMIA International Journal for Chemistry, 70(5), 320e339.
Spink, J., & Moyer, D. C. (2011). Defining the public health threat of food fraud.
Journal of Food Science, 76(9), R157eR163.
Spink, J., Ortega, D. L., Chen, C., & Wu, F. (2017). Food fraud prevention shifts the
food risk focus to vulnerability. Trends in Food Science & Technology, 62,
215e220.
SSAFE (2017). http://www.ssafe-food.org/. Last accessed 13-06-2017.
Ta
€hka€pa€€a, S., Maijala, R., Korkeala, H., & Nevas, M. (2015). Patterns of food frauds
and adulterations reported in the EU rapid alarm system for food and feed and
in Finland. Food Control, 47, 175e184.
Waters, D. (2011). Supply chain risk management: Vulnerability and resilience in lo-
gistics. London: Kogan Page Publishers.