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Abstract
The Macondo blowout highlights the need for well designs capable of consistently obtaining
commercial and technical well objectives while improving safety for personnel and the environment.
But in order to identify a problem, it must be recognized that there is a problem.
This paper discusses key issues concerning setting and aligning safety objectives to achieve an
acceptable balance among a plethora of risks and maintaining a healthy deep-water drilling industry.
In particular we focus on how this impacts performance and, more importantly, safe well designs.
It is important to fully realize how well-drilling objectives and their associated uncertainties are
linked to the safe drilling margin. At first blush, this issue may be viewed as a purely technical matter
but it is primarily a human one, grounded in the forces that inspire to create false choices in risk and
reward.
This paper illustrates how just one key uncertainty can lead to an unsafe well design, e.g., how
the Rig Schedule plays into routinely ignoring warning signs and how risk-taking behavior can
insidiously infect a risk-adverse goal. The symptoms of this infection of an otherwise healthy safety
management system can lead to operator manipulation of both company design practices and also
regulatory requirements under the assumption that any increase in risk or error in judgment is
manageable by „last resort‟ safety systems. Inevitably, in this environment, „black swan‟ disasters will
eventually occur.iii
i David M. Pritchard, Owner, Successful Energy Practices International, LLC. Mr. Pritchard is a Registered Professional
Petroleum Engineer associated with the Petroleum industry since 1970. He has extensive experience managing,
planning and supervising worldwide drilling and production operations.
ii Kenneth J. Kotow, Successful Energy Practices International, LLC. He has a B.Sc. in Mineral Engineering from the
University of Alberta, with a specialization in Petroleum Engineering, and is a professional engineer with the
Association of Professional Engineers, Geologists and Geophysicists of Alberta (APEGGA). Mr. Kotow is a SEPI
associate.
iii “Black Swan Theory is a philosophical and mathematical theory founded by Nassim Nicholas Taleb. It describes
randomness and uncertainty. The theory was described in Taleb's book The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly
Improbable. Its name originates in the assumption in Medieval Europe that black swans could not exist, when in fact,
they are rare, but do exist.”
From http://www.mahalo.com/black-swan-theory.
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Deepwater Horizon Study Group – Working Paper
The New Domain in Deepwater Drilling: Applied Engineering and Organizational Impacts on Uncertainties and Risk
Table of Contents
1. Forward ........................................................................................................................................................ 3
2. Rig Schedule and the Macondo Prospect ............................................................................................... 4
3. The Rig Schedule and Compromised Designs – A Design Example............................................... 11
4. What Are the Solutions to the Rig Schedule Dilemma? ..................................................................... 13
5. What Are the Options for the Rig Schedule Dilemma? ..................................................................... 14
6. More On Casing Seat Depth Fundamentals......................................................................................... 14
7. How Did Casing Seats Influence the Completion of the Macondo Well – A Story Not Heard . 16
8. Understanding Wellbore Instability – Well Listening and the Rig Team Interactive Factors ...... 23
9. Discussion of Key Hazards Leading to Wellbore Instability ............................................................. 24
10. Analyzing the Risk of Deepwater Drilling – The Metrics of Wellbore Instability ......................... 28
11. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................. 31
12. Acronyms and Definitions ...................................................................................................................... 32
13. References .................................................................................................................................................. 36
Figures
Figure 2.1 – The difference between long casing and liner: the 13⅝ in liner. ................................................... 5
Figure 2.2 – First mistake, fewer barriers to gas flow............................................................................................ 6
Figure 3.3 – Second mistake,, fewer centralizers to evenly distribute the cement. ........................................... 7
Figure 2.4 – Third mistake, a bond log was dismissed as being unnecessary. ................................................... 7
Figure 2.5 – Fourth mistake, the pressure test results were misinterpreted....................................................... 8
Figure 2.6 – Fifth mistake, the mud barrier to well pressure was removed early. ............................................ 9
Figure 2.7 – Sixth mistake, the blowout preventer failed to close the well. ..................................................... 10
Figure 3.1 – Acona WellPro Macondo mini seminar, August 2010.................................................................. 11
Figure 3.2 – Type Dodson MRI 5 deepwater well. .............................................................................................. 12
Figure 6.1 – Typical deepwater riserless casing seat rationale. ........................................................................... 15
Figure 6.2 – Fundamentals of casing seat optimization. ..................................................................................... 15
Figure 7.1 – Acona WellPro Macondo mini seminar, August 2010.................................................................. 16
Figure 7.2 – Hydrocarbon Zones and Potential Flow Paths. ............................................................................. 21
Figure 7.3 – BP knew they had a tight margin...................................................................................................... 22
Figure 9.1 – Downhole pressure during fluid feedback from formation. ........................................................ 27
Figure 10.1 – Graphic of total days of wellbore instability. ................................................................................ 29
Figure 10.2 – NPT for 263 wells drilled in less than 600 ft of water. ............................................................... 30
Figure 10.3 – NPT for 99 non-subsalt wells drilled in greater than 3000 ft of water. ................................... 30
Figure 10.4 – NPT for 65 wells subsalt wells drilled in greater than 3000 ft of water. .................................. 31
Tables
Table 3.1 – Summary table for the Dodson deepwater Mechanical Risk Index ............................................. 12
Table 3.2 – A caption from a deepwater well program. ...................................................................................... 13
Table 7.1 – Deepwater well example...................................................................................................................... 17
Table 8.1 – Interpretive well listening: the human factors. ................................................................................ 23
Table 9.1 – Deepwater ballooning case history. ................................................................................................... 25
Table 10.1 – Days of wellbore instability as a percent of total time (exclusive of weather).......................... 29
Table 12.1 – Key drilling acronyms. ....................................................................................................................... 32
Table 12.2 – Key drilling definitions. ..................................................................................................................... 33
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1. Forward
The Macondo blowout highlights the need for well designs capable of consistently obtaining
commercial and technical well objectives while improving safety for personnel and the environment.
In order to identify a problem, it must be recognized that there is a problem. Examining deep
water operations in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) indicate that there are unidentified and,
consequently, reoccurring systemic risk management problems unique to complex deepwater well
development that have not as yet been fully understood or effectively treated by some offshore
operators.1 Fundamentally this stems from a deficient safety culture and a resulting dysfunctional
safety management system.
Professor Andrew Hopkins2 has analyzed high-performing organizations and found that
organizational “mindfulness” is a key leading indicator of such problems, i.e., a mindset that exists in
some organizations that support a culture of denial, as characterized by following:
A belief that it can't happen here. It usually will, especially when in denial.
A tendency to dismiss warning signs. Many deepwater well operators experience an
frequent subsurface problems that have risk implications that are not fully
analyzed or appreciated.
A tendency to normalize warning signs. At what point are abnormal operations
considered routine and safe? Recognizing a conditioned behavioral response by
the crew due to frequency of occurrence is a function of a successful safety
management system.
Rather than proving that an activity is unsafe, there is a tendency to prove that an activity is
safe (important distinction). The safety of the complex operations should not be
assumed.
Group think. The tendency to ignore the dissenting voice and move towards the
loudest or more popular choice without fully regard of the issue. How many
times does this happen?
“It is clear to me that drilling management is related closely to risk management”… and… “The
correct assessment of all risks involved in drilling operations will provide better planning and will
consequentially improve operational results.” Furthermore, “A proficient drilling–management
process is now more important than ever. This process must permeate all phases of a project, from
early planning to final execution. Risk assessment of all operations must become a routine.”
Indeed, risk assessment of all operations must become routine; however, it must also be
performed in a mindful-manner – NOT as a matter of routine or with a “compliance-mentality.”
Drilling performance and safety is a multidisciplinary responsibility. Managing risks begins with well
planning and clearly stated objectives agreed to by all stakeholders and by setting forth clear lines of
responsibility and accountability in the decision-making process.4
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The New Domain in Deepwater Drilling: Applied Engineering and Organizational Impacts on Uncertainties and Risk
This paper discusses key issues concerning setting and aligning objectives, and how this impacts
performance and, more importantly, safe well designs. It is important to fully realize how well-
drilling objectives and their associated uncertainties are linked to the safe drilling margin. At first blush,
this issue may be viewed as a purely technical matter. However, that would be a mistake -- it is not
and this paper illustrates how just one key uncertainty can lead to an unsafe well design, e.g., How
the Rig Schedule plays into routinely ignoring warning signs and how risk-taking behavior can
insidiously infect a risk-adverse goal. The symptoms of this infection of an otherwise healthy safety
management system can lead to operator manipulation of both company design practices and also
regulatory requirements and complacency. Schedule driven decisions create a dynamic characterized
by a tendency to overlook or possibly ignore essential design requirements to ensure a safe drilling
margin and properly manage uncertainties and ancillary risks. Like a virulent virus, as the
contagion spreads, it can and has escalated into an unhealthy co-dependent relationship between
operators and regulators, contaminating the intended system of checks and balances in favor of
doing it cheaper and faster.
The record shows that BP Macondo well rig schedule and budget over-runs influenced the
casing design decision to forego a tied-back string of 13⅝ in casing to the wellhead in favor of a
single long-string5 as well as other questionable decisions (all of which increased the risk of a
blowout) were more than causal to the failure. If the 13⅝ in casing had been tied back and
successfully cemented, then the prolonged consequence of the catastrophe could have been avoided
as pointed out in Figure 2.1 on the next page.6 That is, if the ability to conduct "bullheading"
operations had been possible the well could have been killed with confidence by removing the riser
at the BOP and rigging up high pressure equipment to pump at high pressure without risk of
breaching the 18” and 16” liners and there would be no issues regarding compromising or breaching
the integrity of those shallower string casings.
Investigators are now seeking answers to many questions, including why was the decision made
to use a 9⅝ in long string to complete the well instead of an inherently more secure tie-back liner?
On this issue the record speaks clearly – time and money.7
A review of the events that occurred during the drilling of the Macondo well reveals that
incidents and gas-kicks were encountered and well control was problematic before the catastrophe
occurred. Various deficiencies in casing seats exacerbated well bore instability events and
complicated equivalent circulating density (ECD) control, making it difficult to manage from the
18 in casing downward. This inability to manage ECD may have contributed to the decision to
nitrify the cement – a typical procedure used to minimize ECD management in the very narrow
annuli between casings. Nitrified cement is less dense, therefore lighter and has less resistance to
friction forces while circulating. However, it should be noted that using this type of cement is rare
for these kinds of operations as it also has lower yield strength. The risk of using the nitrogen
foamed cement has been highlighted in the investigation into the Macondo blowout as different
mixtures of the nitrogen foamed cement failed several tests before it was ultimately used to cement
the final casing in the well.8
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The New Domain in Deepwater Drilling: Applied Engineering and Organizational Impacts on Uncertainties and Risk
Figure 2.1 – The difference between long casing and liner: the 13⅝ in liner.iv
A summary of the several key factors are highlighted in the following six graphics (Figure 2.2,
Figure 2.3, Figure 2.4, Figure 2.5, Figure 2.6, and Figure 2.7) published in the Times Picayune, New
Orleans, LA.9 These illustrate the string of six major mistakes that culminated in the well blowout:
fewer barriers to gas flow were used than was prudent,
fewer centralizers that are necessary to keep the cement distributed around the
casing were placed,
no bond log was taken to measure the integrity of the cement,
the well pressure test results were misinterpreted as acceptable when not,
the mud in the well and riser was removed early and enabled gas to uplift, and
the blowout preventer failed to close the well.
Additional details on the Macondo well drilling design plan and additional risk-exacerbating
decisions are described in “The Macondo Well” by Paul Parsons.10
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v David Hammer, “6 Fateful Missteps,” The Times Picayune, New Orleans, LA, September 5, 2010.
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The New Domain in Deepwater Drilling: Applied Engineering and Organizational Impacts on Uncertainties and Risk
Figure 3.3 – Second mistake,, fewer centralizers to evenly distribute the cement. vi
Figure 2.4 – Third mistake, a bond log was dismissed as being unnecessary.vii
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Figure 2.5 – Fourth mistake, the pressure test results were misinterpreted.viii
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The New Domain in Deepwater Drilling: Applied Engineering and Organizational Impacts on Uncertainties and Risk
Figure 2.6 – Fifth mistake, the mud barrier to well pressure was removed early.ix
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The New Domain in Deepwater Drilling: Applied Engineering and Organizational Impacts on Uncertainties and Risk
Figure 2.7 – Sixth mistake, the blowout preventer failed to close the well.x
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With respect to ECD Management, delineates many of the problems encountered in the drilling
of the Macondo well and illustrates many failures in regard to ECD management, most notably fluid
losses and kicks (well control). The failure to fully honor the pore pressure fracture gradient
relationship in this well resulted in a exceptional amount of casing strings and actually intensified the
drilling risks and mechanical difficulties of dealing with small hole and casing diameters, and narrow
annuli at the extraordinary depths associated with deepwater operations.
Increased risk stemming from liner and cementing decisions results from increasingly high ECD,
which exacerbates the ability to obtain viable cement integrity. The management of ECD is critical
and the failure to do so has resulted in an excessive amount of Non-Productive Time (NPT) and
caused unsafe incidents. In addition11, there are many wells that simply fail to meet technical
objectives and are abandoned. Such wells never become part of the drilling database that is used to
measure drilling performance, thus the industry metrics are worse than reported.
Failure to maximize leak off tolerance12 with each casing string against the overburden gradient
renders successive hole sections more difficult to manage, shortens the hole section and reduces well
control capabilities. This problem is compounded with each successive casing string. The net result
is that casing sizes are ineffective and diminishes the ability to manage ECD top to bottom,
negatively impacts wellbore stability, and causes other operational issues such as cementing integrity.
In the GOM deepwater environment, wells are ranked by the James K. Dodson & Company
from data supplied the operators. A summary of the ranking is shown in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1 – Summary table for the Dodson deepwater Mechanical Risk Indexxii
Key Well Factors - Median
WD
Complexity Well Depth Number of Percent of Population
ft ss
Level ft KBxiii Casing Strings penetrating salt
(ocean depth)
1 3,200 19,000 5 78
2 4,300 23,000 5 72
3 4,400 28,000 5.5 81
4 6,000 29,500 6 85
5 6,700 30,000 7.5 100
The following example in Figure 3.2 portrays estimated pressures and fracture gradient
(overburden) profiles from a typical deepwater well. This well is not the Macondo and in fact is
much more complex than the Macondo but nonetheless highlights design gaps based on rig
incapability. This example well would represent the highest degree of complexity (Dodson MRI 5)
encountered in current deepwater drilling operations. A rig suitability evaluation follows using the
data provided in Table 3.2.
xii The Mechanical Risk Index is an algorithm developed and owned by the James K. Dodson Company.
xiii Kelly Bushing, The heavy bushing at the rotary table, through which the Kelly passes, which transmits the rotary
motion of the rotary table to the drill pipe. The top of the bushing is often taken as a depth datum.
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Reach objective casing point of 15,000’ to set 16” as deep as possible with respect to hookload
limitations of the drilling rig
Question 1: How can this rig be rated for 35,000 ft when the actual safe margin load requires
much more hookload capacity? This design rating also does not apply a safety factor, and usually
that is 80% of load, or 1,200,000 lb.
Answer 1: It cannot. This rating is overstated for this example well, and more than likely many
of the more complex wells (Dodson MRI‟s 3-5).
The hookload requirements for the safest possible well design which honors the complete
uncertainty of the drilling margin is not possible with this rig: the 16 in casing is not deep enough
and the rig is incapable of hoisting deeper loads of 16 in or the 13⅜ in, that is unless the design is
compromised. (Note the planned depth of 15,000 ft.)
Question 2: Is this rating compromised for the most complex of deepwater of wells?
Answer 2: Most probably, depending on the pore pressure and fracture gradient relationship
which determines the safe drilling margin. At the minimum, this rating denies the capability of
managing risk by failing to enable optimization of all casing string depths to bottom. (Note: this is
not the fault of the contractor, rather the operator must ensure that all design criteria are met and
aligned with the capacity of the rig.)
One of the problems with the current design philosophy is that acceptance of P50 pore pressure
criteria (See Figure 3.2) only has chance of becoming the actual well condition and does not honor
the outer boundary of risk and well control. If in fact the P50 pore pressure midpoint noted in
Figure 3.2 for design calculations is exceeded, which is entirely possible, this design is inadequate
and unsafe regarding kick tolerance, burst, and safe load requirements.
First, the rig schedule should not drive front end loading or the design, especially if it is deemed
necessary to utilize an under-rated rig just to meet the schedule. This is clearly an organizational
issue and requires objectives alignment from the onset.
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Second, the design itself (See Figure 3.2) must recognize the outer boundary of drilling margin
uncertainty, which at its worst case scenario is equivalent to the overburden gradient itself. This can
be either in pore pressure prediction or stress, which acts like pore pressure in that it requires mud
weight to counter. Stress can be no greater than overburden itself. Recognizing the maximum outer
boundary of the drilling margin relationship honors the greatest risk possible and that is where risk
management begins.
Third, casing seats design must not be compromised in: 1) seat designs which honor the
maximum uncertainties and 2) casing string weights or grades, again just to accommodate an
underrated rig.
Fourth, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE)
could consider modifying lease expiration criteria to accommodate operator‟s sincere efforts to meet
the terms of leases.
If the rig schedule cannot be met for the safe and necessary design, then the well should be moved off the schedule
without compromise. Failure to do so violates the essence of risk management.
Another solution that might be considered is to batch-set all casing strings down to salt with rigs
of lesser capacity and completing the drilling operation by later moving in a large capacity rig as
available.
In fact, this option could have an industry advantage as over time as it would optimize the
available fleet, especially since development drilling will become more common place. Rigs of lesser
capacity can be used for shallower batch setting and the more capable rigs used for the deeper and
more complex environments.
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Casing seat optimization requires that the first string of casing to not only provide the structural
integrity necessary to support the axial loading the second string of casing, but also takes advantage
of the growth of the fracture gradient below the mud line. This affects leak-off tolerance to continue
drilling for the subsequent drilling and installation of the second string of casing. This rationale
extends to each casing seat to total depth (TD). Figure 6.2 illustrates the rational of setting the casing
seats as a function of the fracture gradient.
The design begins with the premise that casing seat placements must all meet not only pore
pressure and fracture gradient leak off requirements, specifically providing an acceptable leak-off for
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all subsequent casing string drilling operations, but must also meet structural requirements beginning
with the first casing string.
It has already been established by BP that the setting of the 16 in casing was too shallow.
It is not possible to determine the exact cause of this shallow setting depth (other than wellbore
instability while drilling), and the data is not available to evaluate the exact cause. The events of
wellbore instability and ballooning (Section 9.1) are not unique in any of these complex wells.
Table 7.1 below details such an example (from another operator) where instability, and the
misinterpretation of ballooning, not only caused the early setting of casing string but also resulted in
the failure to execute the objectives of the well. This of course resulted in a shallow set of the
13⅝ in and the 11⅞ in. It is not physically possible to be any other way from an engineering
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perspective as each section can only be drilled as deep as the prior hole-section kick tolerance will
allow.
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For the Macondo, the net result was a string of 11⅞ in casing set ± 2000 ft above the reservoir.
The following should be considered as a conclusion given we do not have pore pressure (PP) or
fracture strength (FG) data, but with at least 14.6 ppg mud weight (MW):
There was a pressure regression into reservoir of 12.8 (not uncommon in this
earth model environment
This is a differential of 1.8 lb/gal (ppg): up to 1800 psi across the cement into a
highly porous and permeable reservoir
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xvi BP, “Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, September 8, 2010, 54.
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Early sets including 11⅞ in failed to protect up to 1.8 ppg of pressure ramp
reversal into reservoir.
This also begs the question of what was the correct drill out weight below 11⅞ in. Was it 14.6
ppg? This was probably too high.
Other questions in the execution process remain as well. What was the stable mud weight
immediately prior to setting the 11⅞ in casing? Was this 14.6 ppg applied mud weight an arbitrary
weight? Why were drilling conditions not used to determine an at balance weight? Would a
mitigating technology be Controlled Pressure Drilling on choke to enable correct mud weight
applications?
The 14.6 ppg mud weight created unavoidable differential across the cement – a minimum of
1800 psi while curing. Consequently, we cannot discount that honey-combed cement exacerbated
creating micro-annulus resulting in a flow path for nitrogen separation.
Although not an exhaustive list of drilling hazards, the following discussion does represent a
major portion of nonproductive time (NPT) in drilling operations.
Best practices used while drilling is a fundamental principle of ensuring wellbore stability. Some
drilling hazards can be induced by failure to recognize or misinterpreting the dynamics of the drilling
margin.
Well listening engages the human factor and requires considerable skill and training to
understand what drilling operations related to the well conditions are communicating.
Understanding these basic drilling conditions are critical to safe and successful operations.
Table 7.1 lists several key indicators of well drilling „state‟ that the driller must track, interpret,
and respond to in order to maintain well control.
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The following is an abbreviated discussion of key hazards leading to wellbore instability. The
reason why understanding these hazards is so crucial is that any event of wellbore instability has a
high likelihood of becoming a well control event.
The following discussions regarding drilling hazards are not meant to comprise an exhaustive
list. These hazards are the primary precursors of wellbore instability. However, through good drilling
practices such as outlined, these hazards can be recognized, understood, managed, and either
avoided or effectively mitigated.
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Failure to recognize ballooning versus well control is a common mistake made in drilling
operations. It is one of the leading causes of unnecessarily expending casing strings in narrow
margin drilling operations.
Table 8.1 represents an actual deepwater example where high ECD resulted in ballooning and
raising the mud weight resulted in fracturing the formation. The higher ECD further complicating
correct wellbore stability conditions by increasing the cyclic bleed offs. Ultimately, the mud weight
was increased to where fracturing occurred and massive and unsafe losses were sustained before
regaining control of the well. The misinterpretation of ballooning required setting casings before
their time.
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Static
16.5” hole section MW
ECD
Open annular, C&C, ECD 11.86 ppg and surge back. Raised the
dropped to 11.83 ppg. Gas levels increasing mud weight again. Why
during C&C. Shut in drill pipe pressure, 0 would well control be
PSIG. Start well kill operations w/ 11.7 ppg. initiated with zero
pressure on annulus and
drill pipe?
Continue circulating and increasing MW to
11.8 ppg due to gas levels. While raising the Heavy gas is from the
mud weigh during well control, had fluid cumulative reaction of
losses. Lowered circ rate starting pumped ballooning the shale
LCM. Lost 323 bbls during well kill, heavy gas section, then flow back
11.80
cut mud to 11.1 Pump LCM in sweep. Had of all of the gas
excess torque at 11,475 – 11,529‟. C&C work entrained in the cuttings
tight spots, gas down to 150 units, mud cut to of swelled gumbo. This
11.6 ppg. FC – OK. Continue C&C at reduced hazard was induced.
flow rate.
Continued C&C w/ 319 bbls losses. POH to
10323‟, 15 bbls over displacement. FC – static.
RIH on trip tank, 35 bbls over. W&R to
11,505‟. Set down 20K. W&R to 11,529‟. CYC,
loss of 82 bbls. Pump 440 bbls 14 ppg pill and 11.80
spot. No losses. POH to 10343‟, displaced
OK. C&C and FC at shoe – OK. Pump 100
bbls LCM, spot at shoe, total loss 102 bbls.
POH.
These mud losses are
Continued to Pull Out of Hole (POH). Ran sever and created by
16” casing – total mud losses, 2474 bbls. Run 11.80 high mud weight too
& cement casing. No returns while cementing. high from the beginning
of the hole section.
Hole section mitigants: The risk mitigation for these hole sections are much the same as the above. Furthermore,
well control was initiated for all the wrong reasons resulting in fracturing of the wellbore.
When ballooning is recognized, care must be taken to avoid unnecessarily weighting up.
Bleeding back trapped pressure as a result of ballooning is critical.
Best Practice
The best practice revolves around "well listening" and integrating all drilling dynamic factors to
make the correct hazard management and avoidance decisions. Interpreting ballooning is crucial to
narrow margin drilling operations and ensuring safe and efficient drilling operations.
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Best Practice
The best practice and first line of defense is to avoid overweighting the hole and avoiding
ballooning events. Typical fluid-loss, decision-tree processes can and should be created.
Primary Causes:
Differential sticking - most common
Key seating and hole geometry
Pack-off / bridging
Reactive formations (swelling shale)
Secondary Causes:
Coal sections
Tar
Under gauge hole and pseudo stresses.
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Recognition and avoidance of stuck pipe requires some of the same “well listening‟ techniques:
Best Practice
The best practices to avoid stuck pipe are much the same as ballooning and fluids loss, that is,
recognizing the conditions within the drilling margins and events and reacting correctly. In addition,
other factors such as Bottom Hole Assembly (BHA)xxi and drill string configuration and the
inhibitive characteristics of the formations being drilled should be considered.
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Table 10.1 – Days of wellbore instability as a percent of total time (exclusive of weather).
Events related to General Populations: 263 65 subsalt wells: 99 non subsalt
Wellbore Instability wellbores< 600 ft of water WD > 3000 ft wells WD > 3000 ft
Stuck pipe 2.20% 2.90% 0.70%
Wellbore stability 0.70% 2.90% 0.90%
Loss circulation 2.30% 2.40% 2.00%
Kick 1.20% 1.90% 0.80%
Total (%) 6.40% 10.10% 4.40%
Total Wellbore 2.24 days 9.797 days 2.376 days
Instability (days)
Total NPT Days 4 29 9
Instability % of NPT Days 56.00% 33.78% 26.40%
Average Days to Drill 35 97 54
Kick Days 0.42 1.843 0.432
Over four times as much time is spent on the more complex wells combating wellbore instability
events. Even more revealing is that over four times as much time is also spent on the blowout
preventer (BOP) combating kicks.
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Figure 10.2 – NPT for 263 wells drilled in less than 600 ft of water.xxii
Figure 10.3 – NPT for 99 non-subsalt wells drilled in greater than 3000 ft of water.xxiii
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Deepwater Horizon Study Group – Working Paper
The New Domain in Deepwater Drilling: Applied Engineering and Organizational Impacts on Uncertainties and Risk
Figure 10.4 – NPT for 65 wells subsalt wells drilled in greater than 3000 ft of water.xxiv
Any event of wellbore instability has the potential of becoming a well control event.
11. Conclusion
The BP tragedy in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) has clearly revealed two major categories of the
consequences of risk – the incident itself and the resultant environmental disaster. These risk
consequences are quite obvious. Risk in any endeavor cannot be eliminated entirely, but it can be
successfully managed if it is recognized and the consequences are fully understood.
In order to have a meaningful outcome for future deepwater drilling, the mindsets identified by
Andrew Hopkins must be addressed, and one must first understand that there is a problem, and
then focus on solving the problem.
This paper offers design improvement suggestions through applied engineering, considering risk
as the first step towards developing a safer and more reliable deepwater drilling environment. This
begins with recognizing the metrics of drilling operations and looking at the common denominator
of failures: the design itself in regard to how casing seats are determined and the consequential
hazards of failing to adequately determine casing seats.
This design weakness begins with the very first Conductor string and is compounded with
depth. If kick tolerance is not maximized at each casing seat, by definition it cannot be maximized in
the next hole section and subsequent casing seat. This in and of itself leads to many direct well
control events and execution failures, including deeper ECD management and subsequent
operations such as cementing liners or casing..
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The New Domain in Deepwater Drilling: Applied Engineering and Organizational Impacts on Uncertainties and Risk
Industry efforts to tweak execution systems include enlarging the well hole, fluids
improvements, and efforts to improve critical issues like ECD management in these difficult narrow
margin drilling environments. Although some industry professionals will disagree with how risk
should be managed, the failure to recognize the design as critical to the facts of the metrics denies
what a high-performance, high-reliability organization should represent.
Avoiding a repeat of the current situation and changing the climate of denial can be achieved
with a dose of common sense. Solutions must consider and actively apply the following:
The current design model must be challenged. Sound and unbiased engineering design is the
fundamental precursor to safety, sustained success and full life cycle reliability. If we solve the
problem wells, then by definition of risk management, the rest of the well population is mitigated.
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The New Domain in Deepwater Drilling: Applied Engineering and Organizational Impacts on Uncertainties and Risk
Acronym Definition
HES Health, Environment, Safety
HPHT High Pressure, High Temperature
ILT Invisible Lost Time
JSA Job Safety Analysis
KOP Kick Off Point
LCM Lost Circulation Material
LWD Logging While Drilling
M&E Mechanical and Efficiency
MOC Management of Change
MPD Managed Pressure Drilling
MWD Measurement While Drilling
NPT Non Productive Time
PDC Polycrystalline Diamond Compact (bit)
PT Productive Time
PWD Pressure While Drilling
RA Risk Assessment
RLT Removable Lost Time
ROP Rate of Penetration
TVD True Vertical Depth
UE Unscheduled Events
VSP Velocity Seismic Profile
WT Wasted Time
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Deepwater Horizon Study Group – Working Paper
The New Domain in Deepwater Drilling: Applied Engineering and Organizational Impacts on Uncertainties and Risk
Term Definition
Drilling Operations and completion operations with the steps necessary to
successfully drill and complete an oil and gas well
A drilling hazard is any rotating or flat time incident
Drilling Hazard
that causes a deviation from the critical operating path
Drilling Hazards Engaging the designs, practices, or technologies
Management necessary to mitigate the risks of drilling operations
The boundaries for the safe application of
Equivalent Circulating Density between in situ pore
Drilling Margin pressure and/or stress equivalence, and the fracture
gradient resulting from the overburden at true vertical
depth.
Drill the Well On A detailed exercise to communicate and vet the
Paper Basis of Design with stakeholders
The effective mud density expressed in pounds per
square inch (or similar units such as metrics) per true
vertical foot of well depth (psi/foot) exhibited by a
Equivalent circulating fluid at a certain circulating rate in gallons
Circulating Density per minute (or similar units such as metrics) against the
formation that takes into account the pressure drop in
the annulus above the point of circulation due to
friction and hydrostatic pressure
The amount of pressure, expressed in pounds per
square inch (or similar units such as metrics) per true
Fracture Gradient
vertical foot of well depth (psi/foot) that is required to
induce fractures in rock at a given true vertical depth
The maximum kick volume of fluid that can be
taken into the wellbore and circulated out without
fracturing the formation at a weak point (shoe), thereby
Kick Tolerance
exceeding the leak-off, given a difference between the
pore pressure and equivalent circulating mud density in
use
The amount of pressure, expressed in pounds per
square inch (or similar units such as metrics) per true
vertical foot of well depth (psi/foot) that is exerted by
a column of drilling fluid on the formation being drilled
Leak Off
whereby fluid will continue to enter the formation, or
“leak off.” This is the maximum pressure of equivalent
circulating density mud density that may be applied to
the well during drilling operations
Management of A process that is designed to manage changes to:
Change approved well objectives, Basis of Design, program, or
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The New Domain in Deepwater Drilling: Applied Engineering and Organizational Impacts on Uncertainties and Risk
Term Definition
procedure
A mitigant is any proactive use of best practices
and/or technologies which reduces the risk of
occurrence the hazard with an improved risk profile
Mitigant and risk adjusted cost benefits to the drilling operation.
For the purpose of a risk assessment, mitigants are
relegated to what is currently being done in an
operation
Morning Report The daily report summary of prior day operations
The risk event is represented by any added or new
mitigation which reduces the probability or likelihood
New Mitigant
of occurrence of any indicated risk and corresponding
consequence, or the risk event
The amount of pressure or stress, expressed in
pounds per square inch (or similar units such as
Overburden metrics) per true vertical foot of well depth below the
ocean floor mud line (psi/foot) imposed on a layer of
soil or rock by the weight of overlying material
The amount of pressure or stress, expressed in
pounds per square inch (or similar units such as
Pore Pressure metrics) per true vertical foot of well depth (psi/foot)
transmitted through the interstitial fluid of a soil or
rock mass
Any event or condition if it occurs has a positive or
Risk
negative effect on well objectives
Since each risk can have several consequences, a
risk event is the risk evaluated by each discrete
Risk Event consequence. Considering the individual consequence
of each risk is the only way a risk can be fully ranked,
evaluated, and then managed
Risk mitigation is the implementation of any new
mitigant to reduce the likelihood of the identified risk
event. New mitigants could include changes in well
Risk Mitigation design, equipment, technology, training, personnel,
practices and procedures. Risk mitigation procedures
and safeguards should be reflected in the execution
programs
Represents the collective identified risks and
Risk Register
associated consequences
Stakeholders Any person or group that is impacted by or has
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Deepwater Horizon Study Group – Working Paper
The New Domain in Deepwater Drilling: Applied Engineering and Organizational Impacts on Uncertainties and Risk
Term Definition
influence on an opportunity or decision
The pore spaces within sand grains – like “sugar”
Sucrosic
as a comparison.
Routine meetings with rig crews and service
Toolbox Meeting
provider t discuss forward activities.
The practice of removing drilling tools from the
Tripping
hole to the surface and back
Any unknown as it relates to the well construction
Uncertainty
process
Large pore spaces in limestone typically leached
Vuggy
over time.
13. References
1. David Pritchard and Kenneth Kotow, “Deepwater Well Complexity: The New Domain,”
DHSG White Paper, Successful Energy Practices International, LLC, September 2010.
2. Andrew Hopkins, biography, http://www.professorandrewhopkins.com/biography.
3. J.C. Cunha, Drilling Management, Society of Petroleum Engineers, JPT, September 2010, 72.,
4. David M. Pritchard, et al., “Drilling Hazard Management: Excellent performance begins with
planning,” World Oil, August 2010.
5. David Hammer, “5 key human errors, colossal mechanical failure led to fatal Gulf oil rig
blowout,” The Times Picayune, September 5, 2010.
6. Totte Lager and Terje Magnussen, “The Deepwater Horizon accident on well “Macondo #1,”
Acona Wellpro, Mini Seminar, August, 2010,
http://www.aconawellpro.com/@api/deki/files/251/=MiniSeminar_Macondo_August_2010.p
df.
7. Wikipedia, “Deepwater Horizon Explosion,”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deepwater_Horizon_explosion.
8. Ben Casselman and Siobhan Hughes, “Contractor Accused of Flawed Job on Rig,” Wall Street
Journal, October 29, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303362404575580420328930294.html?mod=I
TP_pageone_0#project%3DOILRIGS1004%26articleTabs%3Darticle.
9. David Hammer, “6 Fateful Missteps,” The Times Picayune, New Orleans, LA, September 5,
2010.
10. Paul Parsons, “The Macondo Well,” Energy Training Resources, LLC, July 15, 2010,
https://www.energytrainingresources.com/data/default/content/Macondo.pdf.
11. Pritchard, Kotow, op. cit.
12. Kenneth Kotow and David Pritchard, “Casing Optimization and Riserless Drilling,” OTC, May
2009.
13. B. W. Swanson, et al., “Measurement of Hydrostatic and Hydraulic Pressure Changes During
HPHT Drilling on Erskine Field,” Society of Petroleum Engineers, Offshore Europe,
September 9-12, 1997.
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