Tolentino vs

Comelec, G.R No. L34150

Gonzales vs.

COMMELEC

Facts: the petitioners accused in their action entitled Declaratory Relief with Preliminary Injunction,

filed on July 22, 1967, commenced trial in the Court of First Instance but were treated by this Court as

one of prohibition in view of the seriousness and the urgency of the constitutional issue raised. The

Petitioners challenged the validity of two new sections now included in the Revised Election Code.

Under Republic Act No. 4880, which was approved and took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too

early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity.

Petitioner Cabigao was an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party

official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected on November 11,

1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private individual, a registered voter in the City of

Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. It is their claim that “the enforcement of said Republic

Act No. 4880 in question [would] prejudice [their] basic rights…, such as their freedom of speech, their

freedom of assembly and their right to form associations or societies for purpose not contrary to law,

guaranteed under the Philippine Constitution, ”and that therefore said act is unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether or not the Right of Expression of Speech is susceptible of any limitation

Held: Yes, The Court spoke of two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible
restriction. Freedom of expression is not an absolute.

The danger must not only be clear but also present. The term clear seems to point to a causal
connection with the danger of the substantially evil arising from the utterance questioned. Present
refers to the time element. It used to be identified with imminent and immediate danger. This test then
as a limitation on freedom of expression is justified by the danger or evil a substantive character that the
state has a right to prevent, Unlike the dangerous tendency doctrine.
The danger to be guarded against is the ‘substantive evil’ sought to be prevented.” It has the advantage
of establishing according to the above decision “a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the
criterion as to what words established.”