Javellana vs.

Executive Secretary, G.R NO. L36142

Planas vs.
comelec G.R. NO. L-35925

Fact:

A Constitutional Constitution was enacted to propose changes to the Philippine Constitution on June 1,
1971. While the Convention was in session on 21 September 1972, the entire Philippines was subjected
to martial law by virtue of Proclamation No. 1081. The Convention approved the draft Constitution on
November 1972. The next day, the President of PD No. 73 "submission to the Filipino people for
ratification or rejection of the Constitution of the republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention, and allocation of funds for it", as well as the Plebiscite setting for such
ratification. On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas petitioned the Court to order the respondents from
the implementation of PD No. 73 for the reason that calling for a plebiscite and allocating funds for the
public is exclusively placed in Congress and there is no freedom of speech, press and assembly. and
there is not enough time to inform the people of its contents, there is no proper submission to the
people of the said proposed Constitution. On December 17, 1972, the President temporarily suspended
the effects of PD 1080 for the purpose of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution. Plebiscite
was postponed until further notice by the President. On December 23, 1972, Thus the Court restrained
to decide the cases, The petitioners filed an "urgent motion" praying for the settlement of the cases "as
soon as possible", On January 12, 1973.

Issues:
1. WON the validity of PD 73 is justiciable on the ground that the question at hand is political in
nature.
2. WON PD 73 is valid.
3. WON the Constitutional Convention have the authority to pass the proposed Constitution.
4. WON martial law affected the proper submission of the proposed Constitution to a plebiscite.

Held:
Yes, The Court found that the issue mentioned was justified because the attack of the law meant to
have the force and effect of the law, not only because of the long list that the Court had decided on the
actions of the Executive, but also of Subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution.

The Court held that the Constitutional Constitution would legally describe any amendment it may deem
appropriate to propose as long as they complied with Section 1 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution.

The question of the fact that the truth cannot be determined, and that martial law does not necessarily
hinder the fact that it is a possibility of sufficient freedom.

The validity of PD 73 was declared moot and academic by the Court because the plebiscite ordered in
the said Decision was postponed.
Gonzales vs.

COMMELEC

Facts: the petitioners accused in their action entitled Declaratory Relief with Preliminary Injunction,

filed on July 22, 1967, commenced trial in the Court of First Instance but were treated by this Court as

one of prohibition in view of the seriousness and the urgency of the constitutional issue raised. The

Petitioners challenged the validity of two new sections now included in the Revised Election Code.

Under Republic Act No. 4880, which was approved and took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too

early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity.

Petitioner Cabigao was an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party

official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected on November 11,

1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private individual, a registered voter in the City of

Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. It is their claim that “the enforcement of said Republic

Act No. 4880 in question [would] prejudice [their] basic rights…, such as their freedom of speech, their

freedom of assembly and their right to form associations or societies for purpose not contrary to law,

guaranteed under the Philippine Constitution, ”and that therefore said act is unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether or not the Right of Expression of Speech is susceptible of any limitation

Held: Yes, The Court spoke of two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible
restriction. Freedom of expression is not an absolute.
The danger must not only be clear but also present. The term clear seems to point to a causal
connection with the danger of the substantially evil arising from the utterance questioned. Present
refers to the time element. It used to be identified with imminent and immediate danger. This test then
as a limitation on freedom of expression is justified by the danger or evil a substantive character that the
state has a right to prevent, Unlike the dangerous tendency doctrine.

The danger to be guarded against is the ‘substantive evil’ sought to be prevented.” It has the advantage
of establishing according to the above decision “a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the
criterion as to what words established.”