Land Distribution and Acquisition – October 22, 2020

A.  NOC/VOS

 Chapters 4-5, DAR AO 7, s.2011

B.   Selection of Beneficiaries

 Sec. 22-25, R.A 6657, as amended by R.A 9700

SECTION 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. – The lands covered by the CARP shall be distributed as
much as possible to landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence thereof,
landless residents of the same municipality in the following order of priority:

(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;

(b) regular farmworkers;
(c) seasonal farmworkers;
(d) other farmworkers;
(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;
(f) collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and
(g) others directly working on the land.

Provided, however, That the children of landowners who are qualified under Section 6 of this
Act shall be given preference in the distribution of the land of their parents: and Provided,
further, That actual tenant-tillers in the landholdings shall not be ejected or removed therefrom.

Beneficiaries under Presidential Decree No. 27 who have culpably sold, disposed of, or
abandoned their land are disqualified to become beneficiaries under this Program.

A basic qualification of a beneficiary shall be his willingness, aptitude, and ability to cultivate
and make the land as productive as possible. The DAR shall adopt a system of monitoring the
record or performance of each beneficiary, so that any beneficiary guilty of negligence or
misuse of the land or any support extended to him shall forfeit his right to continue as such
beneficiary. The DAR shall submit periodic reports on the performance of the beneficiaries to
the PARC.

If, due to the landowner’s retention rights or to the number of tenants, lessees, or workers on
the land, there is not enough land to accommodate any or some of them, they may be granted
ownership of other lands available for distribution under this Act, at the option of the
beneficiaries.

Farmers already in place and those not accommodated in the distribution of privately-owned
lands will be given preferential rights in the distribution of lands from the public domain.

SECTION 23. Distribution Limit. – No qualified beneficiary may own more than three (3)
hectares of agricultural land.

SECTION 24. Award to Beneficiaries. – The rights and responsibilities of the beneficiary shall
commence from the time the DAR makes an award of the land to him, which award shall be
completed within one hundred eighty (180) days from the time the DAR takes actual
possession of the land. Ownership of the beneficiary shall be evidenced by a Certificate of
 Land Ownership Award, which shall contain the restrictions and conditions provided for in this
Act, and shall be recorded in the Register of Deeds concerned and annotated on the
Certificate of Title.

SECTION 25. Award Ceilings for Beneficiaries. – Beneficiaries shall be awarded an area not
exceeding three (3) hectares which may cover a contiguous tract of land or several parcels of
land cumulated up to the prescribed award limits.\

For purposes of this Act, a landless beneficiary is one who owns less than three (3) hectares of
agricultural land.

The beneficiaries may opt for collective ownership, such as co-ownership or farmers
cooperative or some other form of collective organization: Provided, That the total area that
may be awarded shall not exceed the total number of co-owners or member of the cooperative
or collective organization multiplied by the award limit above prescribed, except in meritorious
cases as determined by the PARC. Title to the property shall be issued in the name of the co-
owners or the cooperative or collective organization as the case may be.

 SECTION 26. Payment by Beneficiaries. – Lands awarded pursuant to this Act shall be paid
for by the beneficiaries to the LBP in thirty (30) annual amortizations at six percent (6%)
interest per annum. The payments for the first three (3) years after the award may be at
reduced amounts as established by the PARC: Provided, That the first five (5) annual
payments may not be more than five percent (5%) of the value of the annual gross production
as established by the DAR. Should the scheduled annual payments after the fifth year exceed
ten percent (10%) of the annual gross production and the failure to produce accordingly is not
due to the beneficiary’s fault, the LBP may reduce the interest rate or reduce the principal
obligation to make the repayment affordable.

The LBP shall have a lien by way of mortgage on the land awarded to the beneficiary; and this
mortgage may be foreclosed by the LBP for non-payment of an aggregate of three (3) annual
amortizations. The LBP shall advise the DAR of such proceedings and the latter shall
subsequently award the forfeited landholdings to other qualified beneficiaries. A beneficiary
whose land, as provided herein, has been foreclosed shall thereafter be permanently
disqualified from becoming a beneficiary under this Act.

“SEC. 22-A. Order of Priority. — A landholding of a landowner shall be distributed first to qualified
beneficiaries under Section 22, subparagraphs (a) and (b) of that same landholding up to a maximum
of three (3) hectares each. Only when these beneficiaries have all received three (3) hectares each,
shall the remaining portion of the landholding, if any, be distributed to other beneficiaries under Section
22, subparagraphs (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g).”

 Sec. 42-49, DAR AO 7, s.2011

 Sec. 39, DAR AO 7, s.2011

DAR in its quasi-judicial function has primary jurisdiction over conflicts/controversy regarding
the implementation of the agrarian reform program.

Special Agrarian Courts has primary jurisdiction over conflicts regarding the compensation for
the land or its valuation.
C.   Land Valuation and Landowner Compensation

 Sec. 17-18, R.A. 6657, as amended by R.A. 9700

 Chap. 8 & 9, DAR AO7, s.2011
 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, GR. No.
78742, July 14, 1989
 Land Bank of the Phils. vs. Natividad, G.R. No. 127198. May 16, 2005
 Land Bank of the Phils. vs. CA, GR No. 118712, Oct. 6, 1995
 Lubrica v. Land Bank of the Phils., G.R. No. 170220. November 20, 2006

D.   CLOA Generation and Distribution

 Section 96-106, DAR AO 7 Series of 2011

 Heirs of Griño vs CA (G.R. No. 165073)
 Estribillo vs DAR (G.R. No. 159674)
 Deleste vs LBP (G.R. No. 169913)

E.   Installation

 Chap, 11, DAR AO 7, s.2011

 ASSOC. OF SMALL LANDOWERS IN THE PHILS INC. v SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM

CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

 ASSOC. OF SMALL LANDOWERS IN THE PHILS INC. v SEC. OF AGRARIAN

REFORM G.R No. 78742  July 14, 1989

 CRUZ, J.:

 FACTS: These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of several measures like E.O. No. 228, P.D. No. 27,
Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229 and R.A. No. 6657 – Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

 In G.R. No. 7977

 The petitioners in the said case are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on the
grounds of separation of powers, equal protection, due process and the constitutional limitation
that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

 In G.R. No. 79310

 The petitioners in this case claim that the power to provide for Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program as provided in the Constitution is lodged in the Congress and not to the
President. The petitioners also seek to prohibit the implementation of Proclamation No. 131
and E.O. No. 229. The petitioners contend that the taking of the property must be
simultaneous with the payment of just compensation which Sec. 5 of E.O. No. 229 does not
provide.
 In G.R. No. 79744
 The petitioner alleges that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President and
that the said E.O.s violate the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken
without due process or just compensation which was denied to the petitioner.

 In G.R. No. 78742

 Petitioner claims that they are unable to enjoy their right of retention because they cannot eject
their tenants due to the fact that the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) has not issued the
implementing rules required under the said decree. The petitioners are therefore asking the
Honorable Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the DAR to issue the said rules

 ISSUE: WON the laws questioned are valid exercise of power of eminent domain.

 RULING: YES. There are traditional distinctions between the power of eminent domain and
police power which logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time involving
the same subject. The property condemned under police power is harmful or intended for
harmful purposes, like a building on the verge of collapse, which needs to be demolished for
public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals.
Under police power, the confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking
done in the exercise of power of eminent domain, which requires the payment of just
compensation to the owner.

 The petitions before the Court present no knotty complication insofar as the question of
compensable taking is concerned. There is an exercise of police power for the regulation of
private property in accordance with the Constitution with regards to the extent that the laws in
question merely prescribe the retention limits for the landowners. However, there is definitely a
taking under power of eminent domain which payment of just compensation is imperative when
in order to carry out the regulation, it is necessary to deprive such land now

Compensation for landowners is a must because it is a

recognition of the State and Law that these lands are from
people and when you take it from them without
compensation is unconstitutional.
 SECOND DIVISION
 [G.R. No. 127198. May 16, 2005.]
 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ELI G. C. NATIVIDAD,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, San Fernando,
Pampanga, and JOSE R. CAGUIAT represented by Attorneys-in-fact JOSE T.
BARTOLOME and VICTORIO MANGALINDAN, respondents.

This is a Petition for Review 1 dated December 6, 1996 assailing the Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court 3 dated July 5, 1996 which ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) and petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) to pay private respondents the
amount of P30.00 per square meter as just compensation for the State's acquisition of private
respondents' properties under the land reform program.

 The facts follow.

 On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the
determination of just compensation for their agricultural lands situated in Arayat, Pampanga,
which were acquired by the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27). The
petition named as respondents the DAR and Land Bank. With leave of court, the petition was
amended to implead as co-respondents the registered tenants of the land.

 After trial, the court rendered the assailed Decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioners and against
respondents, ordering respondents, particularly, respondents Department of Agrarian
Reform and the Land Bank of the Philippines, to pay these lands owned by petitioners
and which are the subject of acquisition by the State under its land reform program, the
amount of THIRTY PESOS (P30.00) per square meter, as the just compensation due
for payment for same lands of petitioners located at San Vicente (or Camba), Arayat,
Pampanga.
 Respondent Department of Agrarian Reform is also ordered to pay petitioners the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as Attorney's Fee, and to pay the
cost of suit.
 SO ORDERED. 4

 DAR and Land Bank filed separate motions for reconsideration which were denied by the trial
court in its Order 5 dated July 30, 1996 for being pro forma as the same did not contain a
notice of hearing. Thus, the prescriptive period for filing an appeal was not tolled. Land Bank
consequently failed to file a timely appeal and the assailed Decision became final and
executory. CDTHSI
 Land Bank then filed a Petition for Relief from Order Dated 30 July 1996, 6 citing excusable
negligence as its ground for relief. Attached to the petition for relief were two affidavits of merit
claiming that the failure to include in the motion for reconsideration a notice of hearing was due
to accident and/or mistake. 7 The affidavit of Land Bank's counsel of record notably states that
"he simply scanned and signed the Motion for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005,
Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice
of hearing" 8 due to his heavy workload.

 The trial court, in its Order 9 of November 18, 1996, denied the petition for relief because Land
Bank lost a remedy in law due to its own negligence.

 In the instant petition for review, Land Bank argues that the failure of its counsel to include a
notice of hearing due to pressure of work constitutes excusable negligence and does not make
the motion for reconsideration pro forma considering its allegedly meritorious defenses. Hence,
the denial of its petition for relief from judgment was erroneous.

 According to Land Bank, private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the
DAR's valuation of their properties. Private respondents thus failed to exhaust administrative
remedies when they filed a petition for the determination of just compensation directly with the
trial court. Land Bank also insists that the trial court erred in declaring that PD 27 and
Executive Order No. 228 (EO 228) are mere guidelines in the determination of just
compensation, and in relying on private respondents' evidence of the valuation of the
properties at the time of possession in 1993 and not on Land Bank's evidence of the value
thereof as of the time of acquisition in 1972.

 Private respondents filed a Comment 10 dated February 22, 1997, averring that Land Bank's
failure to include a notice of hearing in its motion for reconsideration due merely to counsel's
heavy workload, which resulted in the motion being declared pro forma, does not constitute
excusable negligence, especially in light of the admission of Land Bank's counsel that he has
been a lawyer since 1973 and has "mastered the intricate art and technique of pleading."

 Land Bank filed a Reply 11 dated March 12, 1997 insisting that equity considerations demand
that it be heard on substantive issues raised in its motion for reconsideration.

 The Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. 12 Both parties complied. 13

 The petition is unmeritorious.

 At issue is whether counsel's failure to include a notice of hearing constitutes excusable

negligence entitling Land Bank to a relief from judgment.

 Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

 Sec. 1.Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. — When a
judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a
party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file
 a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or
proceeding be set aside.

 As can clearly be gleaned from the foregoing provision, the remedy of relief from judgment can
only be resorted to on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not
have guarded against. 14

 Measured against this standard, the reason profferred by Land Bank's counsel, i.e., that his
heavy workload prevented him from ensuring that the motion for reconsideration included a
notice of hearing, was by no means excusable.

 Indeed, counsel's admission that "he simply scanned and signed the Motion for
Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 48,
not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of hearing" speaks volumes of his arrant
negligence, and cannot in any manner be deemed to constitute excusable negligence.

 The failure to attach a notice of hearing would have been less odious if committed by a
greenhorn but not by a lawyer who claims to have "mastered the intricate art and technique of
pleading." 15

 Indeed, a motion that does not contain the requisite notice of hearing is nothing but a mere
scrap of paper. The clerk of court does not even have the duty to accept it, much less to bring
it to the attention of the presiding judge. 16 The trial court therefore correctly considered the
motion for reconsideration pro forma. Thus, it cannot be faulted for denying Land Bank's
motion for reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment.

 It should be emphasized at this point that procedural rules are designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules.
While in certain instances, we allow a relaxation in the application of the rules, we never intend
to forge a weapon for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberal interpretation
and application of rules apply only in proper cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable
causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is
equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure
to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Party litigants and their counsel are
well advised to abide by, rather than flaunt, procedural rules for these rules illumine the path of
the law and rationalize the pursuit of justice. 17

 Aside from ruling on this procedural issue, the Court shall also resolve the other issues
presented by Land Bank, specifically as regards private respondents' alleged failure to exhaust
administrative remedies and the question of just compensation.

 Land Bank avers that private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the
DAR's valuation instead of filing a petition to fix just compensation with the trial court.

 The records reveal that Land Bank's contention is not entirely true. In fact, private respondents
did write a letter to the DAR Secretary objecting to the land valuation summary submitted by
 the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office and requesting a conference for the purpose of fixing just
compensation. The letter, however, was left unanswered prompting private respondents to file
a petition directly with the trial court.

 At any rate, in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, we declared that there is nothing
contradictory between the DAR's primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation
of agrarian reform, which includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the
second refers to judicial proceedings.

 In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the
DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the
agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The
resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all,
essentially a judicial function.
 
 Thus, the trial did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just
compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice.

 Land Bank's contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on
October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation should be based
on the value of the property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is
likewise erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacañang, Manila v. Court of Appeals, we
ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27
but would take effect on the payment of just compensation.

Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as
the just compensation to be paid private respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the
passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) 22 before the completion of this process, the just
compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the said law. Indeed,
RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect,
conformably with our ruling in Paris v. Alfeche. 23

 Section 17 of RA 6657 which is particularly relevant, providing as it does the guideposts for the
determination of just compensation, reads as follows:

 Sec. 17.Determination of Just Compensation. — In determining just compensation, the

cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use
and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the
assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the
Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from
any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional
factors to determine its valuation.
  It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline
provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR's failure to determine the just
compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined
in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering
that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample. 24

 In this case, the trial court arrived at the just compensation due private respondents for their
property, taking into account its nature as irrigated land, location along the highway, market
value, assessor's value and the volume and value of its produce. This Court is convinced that
the trial court correctly determined the amount of just compensation due private respondents in
accordance with, and guided by, RA 6657 and existing jurisprudence.

 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner. DHSACT

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 118712 Case Digest

G.R. No. 118712, October 6, 1995
Landbank of the Philippines
vs Court of Appeals, Pedro Yap, Heirs of Emiliano Santiago, Agricultural Management and
Development Corp.
Ponente: Francisco

Facts:

Yap and Santiago are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR, subjecting it for
transfer to qualified CARP beneficiaries. Aggrieved by the compensation valuation of DAR and LBP,
respondents filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with a preliminary mandatory injunction. The
case was referred to CA for proper determination and disposition.

Respondents argued that DAR and LBP committed grave abuse of discretion and acted without
jurisdiction when they opened trusts accounts in lieu of the depositing in cash or bonds, before the
lands was taken and the titles are cancelled. Respondents claim that before the taking of the
property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or bonds.

DAR, maintained that the certificate of deposit was a substantial compliance with the rule on taking
and compensation. LBP confirms that the certificate of deposit expresses "reserved/deposited".
CA ruled in favor of Yap and Santiago. DAR filed a petition.  DAR, maintain that the word "deposit"
referred merely to the act of depositing and in no way excluded the opening of a trust account as form
of deposit.

Issue: Whether the opening of trust account tantamount to deposit.

Ruling:
Contention of DAR is untenable. Section 16 of RA 6657 provides: (e)        Upon receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner,
upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in
LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and
shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines. . . . (emphasis supplied)

It is very explicit that the deposit must be made only in cash or LBP bonds, there is no ambiguity.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 170220. November 20, 2006.]

JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA, in her capacity as Assignee of FEDERICO C. SUNTAY,

NENITA SUNTAY TAÑEDO and EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, petitioners, vs. LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the October
27, 2005 Amended Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530, which
vacated its May 26, 2004 Decision affirming (a) the Order of the Regional Trial Court of San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, acting as Special Agrarian Court, in Agrarian Case Nos.
R-1339 and R-1340, dated March 31, 2003 directing respondent Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) to deposit the provisional compensation as determined by the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD); (b) the May 26, 2003 Resolution denying LBP's motion for
reconsideration; and (c) the May 27, 2003 Order requiring Teresita V. Tengco, LBP's Land
Compensation Department Manager, to comply with the March 31, 2003 Order.
The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Josefina S. Lubrica is the assignee 2 of Federico C. Suntay over certain parcels of
agricultural land located at Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, with an area of 3,682.0285
hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-31 (T-1326) 3 of the Registry of Deeds
of Occidental Mindoro. In 1972, a portion of the said property with an area of 311.7682 hectares, was
placed under the land reform program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (1972) 4 and Executive
Order No. 228 (1987). 5 The land was thereafter subdivided and distributed to farmer beneficiaries.
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the LBP fixed the value of the land at P5,056,833.54
which amount was deposited in cash and bonds in favor of Lubrica. IHCacT

On the other hand, petitioners Nenita Suntay-Tañedo and Emilio A.M. Suntay III inherited from
Federico Suntay a parcel of agricultural land located at Balansay, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro
covered by TCT No. T-128 6 of the Register of Deeds of Occidental Mindoro, consisting of two lots,
namely, Lot 1 with an area of 45.0760 hectares and Lot 2 containing an area of 165.1571 hectares or
a total of 210.2331 hectares. Lot 2 was placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27 but only 128.7161
hectares was considered by LBP and valued the same at P1,512,575.05.

Petitioners rejected the valuation of their properties, hence the Office of the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) conducted summary administrative proceedings for determination of
just compensation. On January 29, 2003, the PARAD fixed the preliminary just compensation at
P51,800,286.43 for the 311.7682 hectares (TCT No. T-31) and P21,608,215.28 for the 128.7161
hectares (TCT No. T-128). 7

Not satisfied with the valuation, LBP filed on February 17, 2003, two separate petitions 8 for judicial
determination of just compensation before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro,
acting as a Special Agrarian Court, docketed as Agrarian Case No. R-1339 for TCT No. T-31 and
Agrarian Case No. R-1340 for TCT No. T-128, and raffled to Branch 46 thereof.

Petitioners filed separate Motions to Deposit the Preliminary Valuation Under Section 16(e) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 (1988) 9 and Ad Cautelam Answer praying among others that LBP
deposit the preliminary compensation determined by the PARAD.

On March 31, 2003, the trial court issued an Order 10 granting petitioners' motion, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, Ms. Teresita V. Tengco, of the Land Compensation Department I

(LCD I), Land Bank of the Philippines, is hereby ordered pursuant to Section 16 (e) of
RA 6657 in relation to Section 2, Administrative Order No. 8, Series of 1991, to
deposit the provisional compensation as determined by the PARAD in cash and
bonds, as follows:

1.In Agrarian Case No. R-1339, the amount of P51,800,286.43, minus the amount
received by the Landowner;

2.In Agrarian Case No. R-1340, the amount of P 21,608,215.28, less the amount of P
1,512,575.16, the amount already deposited.
 Such deposit must be made with the Land Bank of the Philippines, Manila within five
(5) days from receipt of a copy of this order and to notify this court of her compliance
within such period.

Let this order be served by the Sheriff of this Court at the expense of the movants.

SO ORDERED. 11

LBP's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution 12 dated May 26, 2003. The following
day, May 27, 2003, the trial court issued an Order 13 directing Ms. Teresita V. Tengco, LBP's Land
Compensation Department Manager, to deposit the amounts.

Thus, on June 17, 2003, LBP filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 77530. 14

On June 27, 2003, the appellate court issued a 60-day temporary restraining order 15 and on October
6, 2003, a writ of preliminary injunction. 16

On May 26, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 17 in favor of the petitioners, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion, the

instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Order dated
March 31, 2003, Resolution dated May 26, 2003, and Order dated May 27, 2003 are
hereby AFFIRMED. The preliminary injunction We previously issued is hereby LIFTED
and DISSOLVED.

SO ORDERED. 18

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly ordered LBP to deposit the amounts
provisionally determined by the PARAD as there is no law which prohibits LBP to make a deposit
pending the fixing of the final amount of just compensation. It also noted that there is no reason for
LBP to further delay the deposit considering that the DAR already took possession of the properties
and distributed the same to farmer-beneficiaries as early as 1972.

LBP moved for reconsideration which was granted. On October 27, 2005, the appellate court
rendered the assailed Amended Decision, 19 the dispositive portion of which reads:

Wherefore, in view of the prescription of a different formula in the case of Gabatin

which We hold as cogent and compelling justification necessitating Us to effect the
reversal of Our judgment herein sought to be reconsidered, the instant Motion for
Reconsideration is GRANTED, and Our May 26, 2004 Decision is hereby VACATED
and ABANDONED with the end in view of giving way to and acting in harmony and in
congruence with the tenor of the ruling in the case of Gabatin. Accordingly, the
assailed rulings of the Special Agrarian Court is (sic) commanded to compute and fix
the just compensation for the expropriated agricultural lands strictly in accordance with
the mode of computation prescribed (sic) Our May 26, 2004 judgment in the case of
Gabatin.
 SO ORDERED. 20

In the Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals held that the immediate deposit of the preliminary
value of the expropriated properties is improper because it was erroneously computed. Citing
Gabatin v.Land Bank of the Philippines, 21 it held that the formula to compute the just compensation
should be: Land Value = 2.5 x Average Gross Production x Government Support Price. Specifically, it
held that the value of the government support price for the corresponding agricultural produce (rice
and corn) should be computed at the time of the legal taking of the subject agricultural land, that is,
on October 21, 1972 when landowners were effectively deprived of ownership over their properties by
virtue of P.D. No. 27. According to the Court of Appeals, the PARAD incorrectly used the amounts of
P500 and P300 which are the prevailing government support price for palay and corn, respectively, at
the time of payment, instead of P35 and P31, the prevailing government support price at the time of
the taking in 1972.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

A.THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED THE CASE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD
WITH THE LATEST DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. ELI G.C. NATIVIDAD, ET AL., G.R. NO.
127198, PROM. MAY 16, 2005; and 22

B.THE COURT A QUO HAS, WITH GRAVE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, SO

FAR DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS, DECIDING ISSUES THAT HAVE NOT BEEN RAISED, AS TO
CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION. 23

Petitioners insist that the determination of just compensation should be based on the value of the
expropriated properties at the time of payment. Respondent LBP, on the other hand, claims that the
value of the realties should be computed as of October 21, 1972 when P.D. No. 27 took effect.

The petition is impressed with merit.

In the case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad, 24 the Court ruled thus:

Land Bank's contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform
on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation
should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not at the time of
possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacañang,
Manila v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take
place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the payment of just
compensation. STcADa

The Natividad case reiterated the Court's ruling in Office of the President v. Court of
Appeals 25 that the expropriation of the landholding did not take place on the
effectivity of P.D. No. 27 on October 21, 1972 but seizure would take effect on the
payment of just compensation judicially determined.
Likewise, in the recent case of Heirs of Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 26 we held that
expropriation of landholdings covered by R.A. No. 6657 take place, not on the effectivity of the Act on
June 15, 1988, but on the payment of just compensation.

In the instant case, petitioners were deprived of their properties in 1972 but have yet to receive the
just compensation therefor. The parcels of land were already subdivided and distributed to the
farmer-beneficiaries thereby immediately depriving petitioners of their use. Under the circumstances,
it would be highly inequitable on the part of the petitioners to compute the just compensation using
the values at the time of the taking in 1972, and not at the time of the payment, considering that the
government and the farmer-beneficiaries have already benefited from the land although ownership
thereof have not yet been transferred in their names. Petitioners were deprived of their properties
without payment of just compensation which, under the law, is a prerequisite before the property can
be taken away from its owners. 27 The transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the
government are conditioned upon the receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or
deposit by the DAR of the compensation with an accessible bank. Until then, title remains with the
landowner. 28

Our ruling in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
29 is instructive, thus:

It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as

October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of
land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him
was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged
member of a duly recognized farmer's cooperative." It was understood, however, that
full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the
constitutional requirement. cDACST

When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:

All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21,
1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27
(Emphasis supplied.)

it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after
proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers’ cooperatives and full payment of just
compensation. . . .

The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the
land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or
the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible
bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of
ownership is contemplated either. EaSCAH

We also note that the expropriation proceedings in the instant case was initiated under P.D. No. 27
but the agrarian reform process is still incomplete considering that the just compensation to be paid to
petitioners has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of R.A. No. 6657 before the completion of
this process, the just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the said
law. Indeed, R.A. No. 6657 is the applicable law, with P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 having only
suppletory effect. 30

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 31 we held that:

RA 6657 includes PD 27 lands among the properties which the DAR shall acquire and
distribute to the landless. And to facilitate the acquisition and distribution thereof,
Secs. 16, 17 and 18 of the Act should be adhered to.

Section 18 of R.A. No. 6657 mandates that the LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount
as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP or as may be finally determined
by the court as the just compensation for the land. In determining just compensation, the cost of the
acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the
sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers and by the government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans
secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional
factors to determine its valuation. 32

Corollarily, we held in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada 33 that the above provision was
converted into a formula by the DAR through Administrative Order No. 05, S. 1998, to wit:

Land Value (LV)=(Capitalized Net Income x 0.6) + (Comparable Sales x 0.3) + (Market Value per
Tax Declaration x 0.1)

Petitioners were deprived of their properties way back in 1972, yet to date, they have not yet received
just compensation. Thus, it would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on
the guideline provided by P.D. No. 227 and E.O. No. 228 considering the failure to determine just
compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined in
accordance with R.A. No. 6657 and not P.D. No. 227 or E.O. No. 228, is important considering that
just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample. 34

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Amended Decision
dated October 27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision dated May 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals affirming (a) the March 31, 2003
Order of the Special Agrarian Court ordering the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines to deposit
the just compensation provisionally determined by the PARAD; (b) the May 26, 2003 Resolution
denying respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration; and (c) the May 27, 2003 Order directing Teresita
V. Tengco, respondent’s Land Compensation Department Manager to comply with the March 31,
2003 Order, is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46,
acting as Special Agrarian Court is ORDERED to proceed with dispatch in the trial of Agrarian Case
Nos. R-1339 and R-1340, and to compute the final valuation of the subject properties based on the
aforementioned formula. aEcSIH

SO ORDERED.
 Heirs of Griño v CA
GR 165073

Facts:
• Griño was the owner of a parcel of agricultural land, covered by TCT No. T-53350 2 of the Register
of Deeds of Iloilo containing an area of 9.35 hectares. He was also the owner of a 50-hectare parcel
of land which he, on February 8,1972, mortgaged to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
to secure the payment of a loan.
• On October 21,1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD
27), "Decreeing The Emancipation OfTenants From The Bondage Of The Soil Transferring To
Them The Ownership Of The Land They Till And ProvidingThe Instruments And Mechanism
Therefor." 
• Griño's 9.35 hectare land was placed under the coverage of PD 27 because it is tenanted riceland.
The CLTs covering a portion thereof was issued in favor of his tenants.

• He later filed for cancellation of the CLTs and died before DAR Regional Director dismissed his
petition pursuant to LOI474, as implemented by MAR Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21,
1978. His heirs sought the exemption of the 9.35 hectare land from the coverage of either PD 27 or
the CARL, contending that Griño had seven children and if a landowner is entitled to 5 hectares as
retention limit, the remaining land of Griño would not be enough for his children, the 50-hectare land
of Griño having already been ceded to the DBP.

• DAR RD dismissed the petition. It was later elevated to DAR Secretary and the CA which also
dismissed their case.

Issue: WON Griño’s heirs have the right to retain subject land.

Ruling

: No, because of the following:

1. The reckoning date for the application of Operation Land Transfer is October 21, 1972, the date of
effectivity of P.D. 27, which is the law applicable in this case. By operation of law, as of October
21, 1972, the subjectland holdings were covered by Operation Land Transfer under Presidential
Decree No. 27 in view of the fact that the landholdings are tenanted and Gri ño has other
 landholdings with an area of 50 hectares. The conveyance of the 50hectares landholdings in favor
of DBP sometime in 1985 has no legal effect of exempting the tenanted landholdings from
Operation Land Transfer considering that the conveyance happened only in 1985, several years
after the subjecting of the said properties under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.

2. Where a landowner is not entitled to retain land under PD 27, he cannot avail of the right of
retention over the sameland under RA 6657. It is established that Griño was not entitled to
exercise his retention right over subject property under PD 27. As such, he is also not entitled to
exercise said right under RA 6657. If Griño had no retention rights under PD 27 and RA 6657, it
follows that his heirs, who are his successors-in-interest, cannot also exercise the same right
under PD 27 and RA 6657.

3. When the heirs of Griño filed their application for retention under RA 6657 in 1997 they had to
contend with an existing adverse ruling by the DAR in 1989.The estate and the individual heirs are
likewise estopped by laches from questioning the denial for retention. The denial was made on
September 25, 1989 and the heirs' present petition was made only on March 17, 1997 or 7
1/2 years later. At this point, laches has set in, laches being “the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier.
 Estribillo v DAR
GR 159674

Facts:
• Private respondent Hacienda Maria Inc. requested that 527.8308 hectares of its landholdings be
placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation therefor, HMI
allowed petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be
covered under Agrarian Reform Program.
• In 1982, a final survey over the entire area was conducted and approved. From 1984 to 1988, the
corresponding TCTs and EPs covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to petitioners,
among other persons.
• In December 1997, HMI filed with RARAD petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage
under Presidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008 hectares of its former landholdings. HMI claimed that
said area was not devoted to either rice or corn, that the area was untenanted, and that no
compensation was paid therefor.
• RARAD rendered a decision declaring as void the TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners because
the land covered was not devoted to rice and corn, and neither was there any established tenancy
relations between HMI and petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the DARAB which affirmed the
RARAD Decision.
• On appeal to the CA, the same was dismissed. Petitioners contended that the EPs became
indefeasible after the expiration of one year from their registration.

Issue:Whether or not EPs have become indefeasible one year after their issuance.

Held:
• After complying with the procedure in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree where the DAR is required to issue the corresponding
certificate of title after granting an EP to tenant-farmers who have complied with Presidential Decree
No. 27, the TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the
same protection accorded to other TCTs. 
• The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year
from the date of the issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent. Lands covered by such title
may no longer be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another
person
 Deleste vs LBP
G.R. No. 169913

FACTS:
• Spouses Gregorio Nanaman and Hilaria Tabuclin – owners of a parcel of agricultural land in Tambo,
Iligan City; they were childless and only had Virgilio Nanaman (son of Gregorio by another woman)
• Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria and Virgilio administered the Iligan property and subsequently sold
this to Dr. Jose Deleste
• Hilaria died in 1954, Gregorio’s brother – Noel was appointed as regular administrator of the estate,
he then filed an action for reversion of the title of the property, this case went up to the SC where it
was ruled that the property was the conjugal property of Nanaman spouses and so Hilaria can only
sell ½ of the land
• Deleste and the intestate estate of Gregorio were then held to be co-owners of the property
• PD 21 was issued in 1972 - DECREEING THE EMANCIPATION OF TENANTS FROM THE
BONDAGE OF THE SOIL, TRANSFERRING TO THEM THE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND THEY
TILL AND PROVIDING THE INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISM THEREFOR – property was
placed under the Operation Land Transfer program, however only the heirs of Gregorio were
identified by Department of Agrarian Reform as landowners
• In 1975, the City of Iligan passed an ordinance -- “Zoning Regulation of Iligan City” which
reclassified the land into commercial/residential
• In 1984, the DAR issued Certificates of Land Transfer in favor of private respondents who were the
tenants and actual cultivators of the land
• In 2001, Emancipation Patents and Original Certificates of Title were issued to the private
respondents
• City of Iligan expropriated a part of the property – as the issue of ownership was pending, the just
compensation was deposited with the Development Bank of the Philippines held in trust for the RTC
of Iligan City
• Petitioners Heirs of Deleste filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) a petition seeking to nullify the EP’s issued to the private respondents
• Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) declared the EP’s null and void, in view of
the pending issues of ownership, the subsequent reclassification of the property into a
residential/commercial land and the violation of petitioner’s constitutional right to due
process of law
• Private respondents filed a Notice of Appeal, while the petitioners filed a Motion for Writ of
Execution
• DARAB reversed the ruling of PARAD and held the EP’s were valid and that the petitioners Heirs of
Deleste should have been the one informed by DAR at the time the property was placed under the
OLT program
• Petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA which was denied for failure to attach the writ of
execution, a subsequent motion for reconsideration was filed and denied
• Petitioners filed with the SC a petition for review which was denied as no reversible error was
shown, they then filed an MR which the SC granted and gave due course – hence this proceeding

ISSUE(S):
1. Were the petitioner’s constitutional right to due process violated by DAR (for failure to send
notice)?
4. Is the property covered by the agrarian reform program?
5. Is the property covered by PD 27?

RULING:
1. YES. DAR violated the petitioner’s right to due process when it failed to notify them that the
property will be covered by the agrarian reform program
6. NO. It is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program in view of the enactment of the local
zoning ordinance.
7. NO. Even if under PD 27, tenant-farmers are deemed owners as of October 21, 1972, this is not
to be construed as automatically vesting upon these tenant-farmers absolute ownership over the
land. They need to comply with certain requirements first.