ABANDONMENT

Gua-an et.al v. Quirino

However, while CLT No. 0-025227 remains in Prisco's+ name, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that Prisco+
surrendered possession and cultivation of the subject land to Ernesto, not for a mere temporary period, but for a period
of 11 years without any justifiable reason. Such act constituted abandonment despite his avowed intent to resume
possession of the land upon payment of the loan. As defined in DAR Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1994,
abandonment is a willful failure of the agrarian reform beneficiary, together with his farm household, "to cultivate, till,
or develop his land to produce any crop, or to use the land for any specific economic purpose continuously for a period
of two calendar years." It is a ground for cancellation by the DARAB of an award to the agrarian reform beneficiary.
Consequently, respondent and/or Prisco's+ heirs had lost any right to redeem the subject landholding.

Coderias v. chioco
It must be recalled from the facts that the farm has been placed under the coverage of RA 3844. It is also undisputed
that a tenancy relation existed between Chioco and petitioner. In fact, a CLT had been issued in favor of the petitioner;
thus, petitioner already had an expectant right to the farm.31 A CLT serves as "a provisional title of ownership over the
landholding while the lot owner is awaiting full payment of just compensation or for as long as the tenant-farmer is an
amortizing owner. This certificate proves inchoate ownership of an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn
production. It is issued in order for the tenant-farmer to acquire the land he was tilling."32 Since the farm is considered
expropriated and placed under the coverage of the land reform law,33 Chioco had no right to evict petitioner and enter
the property. More significantly, Chioco had no right to claim that petitioner’s cause of action had prescribed.
o strengthen the security of tenure of tenants, Section 10 of R.A. No. 3844 provides that the agricultural leasehold
relation shall not be extinguished by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. With
unyielding consistency, we have held that transactions involving the agricultural land over which an agricultural
leasehold subsists resulting in change of ownership, such as the sale or transfer of legal possession, will not terminate
the rights of the agricultural lessee who is given protection by the law by making such rights enforceable against the
transferee or the landowner's successor in interest. x x x
In addition, Section 7 of the law enunciates the principle of security of tenure of the tenant, such that it prescribes that
the relationship of landholder and tenant can only be terminated for causes provided by law. x x x Security of tenure is a
legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount
to deprivation of their only means of livelihood. Perforce, the termination of the leasehold relationship can take place
only for causes provided by law.
nder Section 8 of RA 3844, the agricultural leasehold relation shall be extinguished only under any of the following three
circumstances, to wit: "(1) abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor; (2)
voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written notice of which shall be served three months in
advance; or (3) absence of the persons under Section 9 to succeed the lessee x x x." None of these is obtaining in this
case. In particular, petitioner cannot be said to have abandoned the landholding. It will be recalled that Chioco forcibly
ejected him from the property through threats and intimidation. His house was bulldozed and his crops were destroyed.
Petitioner left the farm in 1980 and returned only in 1993 upon learning of Chioco’s death. Two years after, or in 1995,
he filed the instant Petition.
Indeed, Section 38 of RA 3844 specifically provides that "an action to enforce any cause of action under this Code shall
be barred if not commenced within three years after such cause of action accrued." In this case, we deem it proper to
reckon petitioner’s cause of action to have accrued only upon his knowledge of the death of Chioco in 1993, and not at
the time he was forcibly ejected from the landholding in 1980. For as long as the intimidation and threats to petitioner’s
life and limb existed, petitioner had a cause of action against Chioco to enforce the recognition of this juridical tie. Since
the threats and intimidation ended with Chioco’s death, petitioner’s obligation to file a case to assert his rights as
grantee of the farm under the agrarian laws within the prescriptive period commenced. These rights, as enumerated
above, include the right to security of tenure, to continue in possession of the land he works despite the expiration of
the contract or the sale or transfer of the land to third persons, the pre-emptive right to buy the land, as well as the right
to redeem the land, if sold to a third person without his knowledge.
Petitioner’s tenure on the farm should be deemed uninterrupted since he could not set foot thereon. And if he could not
make the required payments to Chioco or the Land Bank of the Philippines, petitioner should not be faulted. And, since
his tenure is deemed uninterrupted, any benefit or advantage from the land should accrue to him as well.

Reclassification of land
Davao New Town Dev corp V. Sps. saliga
We hold that the property had been reclassified to non-agricultural uses and was, therefore, already outside the
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) after it took effect on July 15, 1988.
Considering that the property is no longer agricultural as of June 15, 1988, it is removed from the operation of R.A. No.
6657. By express provision, the CARL covers only those public or private lands devoted or suitable for agriculture,43 the
operative word being agricultural. Under Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 6657, agricultural lands refer to lands devoted to
agricultural activity and not otherwise classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial, or industrial land.44 In its
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1990,45 the DAR further explained the term "agricultural lands" as referring to
"those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and x x x not classified in town plans and zoning
ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent
authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use." If only to emphasize, we reiterate – only
those parcels of land specifically classified as agricultural are covered by the CARL; any parcel of land otherwise classified
is beyond its ambit.
essential requisites of a tenancy relationship, all of which must concur for the relationship to exist, namely:
1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2. The subject is agricultural land;
3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation; and
6. There is sharing of harvests.
The absence of any of these requisites does not make an occupant a cultivator, or a planter, a de jure tenant.51
Consequently, a person who is not a de jure tenant is not entitled to security of tenure nor covered by the land reform
program of the government under any existing tenancy laws.52

Heirs of Enrique Tan V. Pollescas

Petitioners Norma Tan, Jeanette Tan, Julieta Tan, Rommel3 Tan and Enrique Tan, Jr. ("Tan Heirs") are co-owners of a
coconut farmland ("Land") located at Labo, Ozamis City with an area of 25,780 square meters.4
Esteban Pollescas ("Esteban") was the original tenant of the Land. Upon Esteban’s death in 1991, his son Enrique
Pollescas ("Enrique") succeeded him and was appointed as tenant by the landowner Enrique Tan ("Tan").5
However, respondent Reynalda Pollescas ("Reynalda"), Esteban’s surviving second spouse, demanded that Tan recognize
her as Esteban’s successor. Tan did not accede. Thus, Reynalda filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board of Ozamis City ("DARAB-Ozamis") a complaint for Annulment of Compromise Agreement, Quieting of
Tenancy Relationship and damages.6
In its Decision dated 28 April 1993, the DARAB-Ozamis declared Reynalda as the lawful tenant of the Land. The DARAB-
Ozamis apportioned the harvests between the Tan Heirs and Reynalda based on the customary sharing system which is
2/3 to the landowner and 1/3 to the tenant.7
On the following harvest dates, 11 and 19 of June, 9 September, 6 and 13 of December 1993, Reynalda failed to deliver
to the Tan Heirs 2/3 of the harvests amounting to ₱3,656.70. The Tan Heirs demanded Reynalda to pay such amount.8
However, Reynalda ignored the demand.
Consequently, the Tan Heirs filed a complaint for estafa against Reynalda with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Ozamis
City, Branch 2.9 The trial court found Reynalda guilty of estafa10 and sentenced her to five months of arresto mayor
maximum to two years of prision correccional minimum and ordered her to pay the Tan Heirs ₱3,656.70, the amount
which she misappropriated.11
Subsequently, for Reynalda’s continued failure to deliver their share, the Tan Heirs filed with the DARAB, Misamis
Occidental ("DARAB-Misamis Occidental") an ejectment case.12
Ruling

Section 7 of RA 3844 as amended provides that once there is a leasehold relationship, as in the present case, the
landowner cannot eject the agricultural tenant from the land unless authorized by the court for causes provided by
law.27 RA 3844 as amended expressly recognizes and protects an agricultural leasehold tenant’s right to security of
tenure.28
Section 36 of RA 3844 as amended enumerates the grounds for dispossession of the tenant’s landholding, to wit:
SEC. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.—Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender of
the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his
dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown
that: (1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the National Planning
Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes: Provided, That the
agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross
harvests on his landholding during the last five preceding calendar years;
(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the terms and conditions of the contract or any of
the povisions of this Code unless his failure is caused by fortuitous event or force majeure;
(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a purpose other than what had been previously
agreed upon;
(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as determined under paragraph 3 of Section twenty-ine;
(5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is substantially damaged or destroyed or has
unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or negligence of the agricultural lessee;
(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls due: Provided, That if the non-payment of the
rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the non-
payment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is not
thereby extinguished; or
(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of Section twenty-
seven.
In the instant case, the Tan Heirs seek Reynalda’s ejectment from the Land on the ground of non-payment of lease
rental.
The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that for non-payment of the lease rental to be a valid ground to dispossess
the agricultural lessee of the landholding, the amount of the lease rental must first of all be lawful. If the amount of
lease rental claimed exceeds the limit allowed by law, non-payment of lease rental cannot be a ground to dispossess the
agricultural lessee of the landholding.
Section 34 of RA 3844 as amended29 mandates that "not x x x more than" 25% of the average normal harvest shall
constitute the just and fair rental for leasehold. In this case, the Tan Heirs demanded Reynalda to deliver 2/3 of the
harvest as lease rental, which clearly exceeded the 25% maximum amount prescribed by law. Therefore, the Tan Heirs
cannot validly dispossess Reynalda of the landholding for non-payment of rental precisely because the lease rental
claimed by the Tan Heirs is unlawful.
Even assuming Reynalda agreed to deliver 2/3 of the harvest as lease rental, Reynalda is not obliged to pay such lease
rental for being unlawful. There is no legal basis to demand payment of such unlawful lease rental. The courts will not
enforce payment of a lease rental that violates the law. There was no validly fixed lease rental demandable at the time
of the harvests. Thus, Reynalda was never in default.
Reynalda and the Tan Heirs failed to agree on a lawful lease rental. Accordingly, the DAR must first fix the provisional
lease rental payable by Reynalda to the Tan Heirs pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 34 of RA 3844 as
amended.30 Until the DAR has fixed the provisional lease rental, Reynalda cannot be in default in the payment of lease
rental since such amount is not yet determined. There can be no delay in the payment of an undetermined lease rental
because it is impossible to pay an undetermined amount. That Reynalda is not yet in default in the payment of the lease
rental is a basic reason why she cannot be lawfully ejected from the Land for non-payment of rental.31