59 LIM V.

FELIX (194 SCRA 292)

Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr., together with his security escorts were attacked and killed by a
lone assassin at the airport vicinity in Masbate. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman
Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. Herein,
petitioners were alleged to be behind the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection
with the airport incident. After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order
finding probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of herein petitioners. In the same Order,
the court ordered the arrest of the petitioners and recommended the amount of P200,000.00 as bail for
the provisional liberty of each of the accused. Respondent Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane was
designated to review the case containing 261 pages. Fiscal Alfane issued a Resolution which affirmed
the finding of a prima facie case against the petitioners but differed in the designation of the crime in
that the ruled that ". . . all of the accused should not only be charged with Multiple Murder With
Frustrated Murder" but for a case of MURDER for each of the killing of the four victims and a physical
injuries case for inflicting gunshot wound on the buttocks of Dante Siblante." MR’s of the petitioner’s
Lim was also denied. Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate
information of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no bail. Petitioners
Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified petition for change of venue and was granted
to avoid a miscarriage of justice. (from Masbate to Makati RTC). The cases were raffled to Branch 56
presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix. Petitioners questioned the validity of the warrant of
arrest because it was not personally determined by the judge as he relied solely on the certification or
recommendation of a prosecutor that a probable cause exists. RTC dismissed their petition upholding
the validity of the arrest warrants.

ISSUE: WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's
certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.

HELD: NO. If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the
records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause.
The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been
satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion. The records of the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in
Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was no
basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal determination regarding the existence of a
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not
possibly have known what transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the
respondent Judge denied the petitioners' motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground that the
mere certification and recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is
sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.
58 Mata vs. Bayona
(128 SCRA 388)

FACTS: Petitioner is accused under PD 810, as amended by PD 1306 "AN ACT GRANTING THE
PHILIPPINE JAI-ALAI AND AMUSEMENT CORPORATION A FRANCHISE TO OPERATE,
CONSTRUCT AND MAINTAIN A FRONTON FOR BASQUE PELOTA AND SIMILAR GAMES
OF SKILL IN THE GREATER MANILA AREA".
The information against herein petitioner alleged that he offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai
game by "selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from the Philippine Jai
Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned."
During the hearing of the case, the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the
issuance of the warrant is missing from the records of the case.
This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the
articles seized. The court dismissed his motion stating that the court has made a thorough investigation
and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the
Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP and the court made a certification that the
documents were not attached immediately and that there’s nowhere in the rules which specify when
these documents are to be attached to the records. Petitioner’s MR was also denied Hence, this petition
praying, among others, that this Court declare the search warrant to be invalid and all the articles
confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the
matter.

ISSUE: WON the search warrant is valid.

HELD: NO. The search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of the Constitution and the
Rules of Court. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge
may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable
for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. We, therefore,
hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the
essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the
search warrant invalid. Furthermore, While the SC held that the search warrant is illegal, the return of
the things seized cannot be ordered. In Castro v. Pabalan, it was held that the illegality of the search
warrant does not call for the return of the things seized, the possession of which is prohibited.
57 David v. Arroyo (489 SCRA 160)

Facts:President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a state of national emergency. This case covers the
seven consolidated petitions for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of PP1017 and General Order
No. 5 implementing the former. it is alleged that in doing so, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
committed grave abuse of discretion and that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed
efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions are actually trampling upon the very freedom
guaranteed and protected by the constitution.

ISSUE:Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

HELD:The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned
PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the
said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is
constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The Supreme
court ruled based on Factual Basis of its declaration, on the SC on the theory Overbreadth, on the
Calling Out Power Doctrine and the Take Care Doctrine. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial
Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the
president by the president.
56 Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279, GR No L-69401 June 23, 1987

Facts: Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and defense forces raided the
compound occupied by petitioner in search of loose firearms, ammunitions and explosives.  A shoot-
out ensued after petitioners resisted the intrusion by the respondents, killing a number of men. The
following morning, the petitioners were arrested and subjected to finger –printing, paraffin testing  and
photographing despite their objection. Several kinds of rifle, grenades and ammunitions were also
confiscated.
The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items illegally seized returned to them
and invoked the provisions on the Bill of Rights The respondents admitted that the operation was done
without a warrant but reasoned that they were acting under superior orders and that operation was
necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem  due to the assassination of the
city mayor.

Issue: Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the fingerprints and photographs of the
petitioners and subjecting them to paraffin testing are violative of the bill of Rights and are
inadmissible as evidence against them.

Held: Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution: The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons,houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall not be violated,and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized
by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the respondents had against petitioners did not
excuse the former from observing the guaranty provided for by the constitution against unreasonable
searches and seizure. The petitioners were entitled to due process and should be protected from the 
arbitrary actions of those tasked to execute the law. Furthermore, there was no showing that the
operation was urgent nor was there any showing of the petitioners as criminals or fugitives of justice to
merit approval by virtue of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
The items seized, having been the “fruits of the poisonous tree” were held inadmissible as evidence in
any proceedings against the petitioners. The operation by the respondents was done without a warrant
and so the items seized during said operation should not be acknowledged in court as evidence. But
said evidence should remain in the custody of the law (custodia egis).

However, as to the issue on finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of the

provision against self-incrimination, the court held that the prohibition against self-incrimination
applies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 “The
prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of
the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his
body as evidence when it may be material.”
54 Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine National Construction Company And
Pedro Balubal
519 SCRA 432 (2007)

Facts : Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. (Superlines) is engaged in the business of providing
public transportation. One of its buses, while traveling north and approaching the Alabang northbound
exit lane, crashed into the radio room of respondent Philippine National Construction Company
(PNCC). PNCC‘s Sofronio Salvanera, and Pedro Balubal, then head of traffic control and security
department of the South Luzon tollway, investigated the incident. The bus was turned over to the
Alabang Traffic Bureau for its own investigation. Because of lack of adequate space, traffic
investigator Pat. Cesar Lopera requested that the bus be towed by the PNCC patrol to its compound.
Superlines made several requests for the release of the bus but Balubal refused. Instead, Balubal
demanded the sum of P40,000.00 or a collateral with the same value for the reconstruction of the
damaged radio room. Superlines filed a replevin suit with damages against PNCC and Balubal before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The trial court dismissed the complaint and ordered Superlines to pay
PNCC an amount of P40, 320.00, representing actual damages to the radio room. The Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision and concluded that the case should have been brought against
the police authorities.

ISSUE: Whether or not a suit for replevin is proper

HELD: Contrary to PNCC‘s contention, the petition raises questions of law foremost of which is
whether the owner of a personal property may initiate an action for replevin against a depositary and
recover damages for illegal distraint. In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show
that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered, and
that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the same.
In the case at bar, Superlines‘ ownership of the bus being admitted by PNCC, consideration of whether
PNCC has been wrongfully detaining it is in order. The bus was towed by the PNCC on the request of
Lopera in violation of constitutional right against unreasonable seizures. The seizure and impounding
of Superlines‘s bus, on Lopera‘s request, were unquestionably violative of  “the right to be let alone”
by the authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution. Furthermore, the Supreme Court (SC) finds that it
cannot pass upon the same without impleading Lopera and any other police officer responsible for
ordering the seizure and distraint of the bus. The police authorities, through Lopera, having turned over
the bus to PNCC for safekeeping, a contract of deposit was perfected between them and PNCC.
Superlines or the trial court motu proprio may implead as defendants the indispensable parties Lopera
and any other responsible police officers.
53 Central Bank Employees Assn., Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (446 SCRA 299)
The Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc, filed a Petition for Prohibition against BSP
and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further
implementing the last provision in Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, on the ground that it is
unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not the last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, runs afoul of the
constitutional mandate that “No person shall be … denied equal protection of the laws”

HELD: The last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, is unconstitutional.

With the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of the other government financial
institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last provisio of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653,
constitutes invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of Banko Sentral ng
Pilipinas.
The prior view on the constitutionality of RA 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its classification
between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable because there were substantial
distinction that made real differences between the 2 classes.
The subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstance that considerably
alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last provisio of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No
7653. This relates to the constitutionality of classifications between the rank-and-file of the BSP and
the 7 other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to all
members of the class. The provisio may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be
grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjust distinctions between persons
who are without differences.
The inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each exemption rests on the
policy determination by the legislature. The policy determination argument may support the inequality
of treatment between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality
of treatment between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs who are similarly situated.
The issue is not the declared policy of the law per se, but the oppressive results of Congress
inconsistent and unequal policy towards the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs. The
challenge to the constitutionality of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653 is premised precisely on the
irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its treatment of persons similarly situated.
In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that “no person shall be denied the equal protection of the
laws” includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious discrimination, directly or
indirectly.
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to priveleges conferred and liabilities
enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principles is that equal
protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstance which, if not identical are
analogous.

52 People vs Jalosjos
(324 SCRA 689)

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined
at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and
the need for his constituents to be represented

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House
of Representatives

Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by
law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises
from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The
provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec.
11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged
with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee
meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to
that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

51 Farinas v The Executive Secretary

(417 SCRA 503)

FACTS:
A petition was filed seeking the Court to declare unconstitutional Section 14 of RA 9006 or “The Act
to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections Through
Fair Election Practices” as it repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code mandating the ipso
jure resignation from public office of one who filed his certificate of candidacy, except for President
and Vice-President.
It is the petitioners’ contention that the repeal of Section 67 is a rider on the said law, the same
embracing more than one subject, inconsistent to what the constitution mandates. Further, it violated
the equal protection clause since the said law didn’t repeal provision relating to appointive officials.
Appointive officials would still be considered ipso jure resigned upon filing of their
respective certificates of candidacy.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.
Whether or not Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution.
Whether or not Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its
approval” is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which
require publication of the law before it becomes effective.

HELD:
Section 14 is not a rider. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code,
which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are
holding, to the other provisions of the contested law, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of
media for election propaganda, doesn’t violate the “one subject- one title rule”. The Court has held that
an act having a single general subject, indicated in its title, may contain any number of provisions, no
matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and they may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and
means of carrying out the general subject.
The repeal of Section 67 is not violative of the equal protection clause. Equal protection is not absolute
especially if the classification is reasonable. There is reasonable classification between
an elective official and an appointive one. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of
the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only
upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a
permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the
appointing authority. Another substantial distinction is that by law, appointed officials are prohibited
from engaging in partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote.

49 Telecommunications Broadcasting Authority of the Phil., Inc. v. COMELEC (289 SCRA 337)

FACTS: Section 92 of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 881, as amended, reads as follows:

Sec. 92. Comelec time. — The commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as
“Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area
of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting
and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge,
during the period of the campaign.
Petitioners contend that section 92 of BP Blg. 881 violates the due process clause and the eminent
domain provision of the Constitution by taking airtime from radio and television broadcasting stations
without payment of just compensation. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio
and television stations is the sale of airtime to advertisers and that to require these stations to provide
free airtime is to authorize a taking which is not “a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon
the use of private property.” According to petitioners, in 1992, the GMA Network, Inc. lost
P22,498,560.00 in providing free airtime of one (1) hour every morning from Mondays to Fridays and
one (1) hour on Tuesdays and Thursdays from 7:00 to 8:00 p.m. (prime time) and, in this year’s
elections, it stands to lose P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that radio and
television stations provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for the COMELEC Time.
 
ISSUE: Does GMA Network, Inc. have the standing to bring the constitutional question on the assailed
provision?

HELD: YES. The Supreme court decided to take this case since the other petitioner, GMA Network,
Inc., appears to have the requisite standing to bring this constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates
radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92 of
B.P. Blg. 881 requiring radio and television broadcast companies to provide free airtime to the
COMELEC for the use of candidates for campaign and other political purposes. Petitioner claims that it
suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the
1992 presidential election and the 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should
it be required to do so again this year. Petitioner’s allegation that it will suffer losses again because it is
required to provide free airtime is sufficient to give it standing to question the validity of section 92.

47 Sison v. Ancheta (130 SCRA 654)

Facts:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 135 was enacted. Antero M. Sison, Jr., as a taxpayer alleged that its
provision under Section 1 of it was unduly discriminative against him because it imposes higher rates
upon his income as a professional, it amounts to class legislation, and it transgresses against the equal
protection and due process clauses of the Constitution as well as the rule requiring uniformity in
taxation.

Issue:
Whether or not B.P. Blg. 135 violates the equal protection and due process clauses and the rule on
uniformity in taxation.

Ruling:
The due process clause may be invoked where a taxing statute is so arbitrary that it finds no
support in the Constitution. It has also been held that where the assailed tax measure is beyond the
jurisdiction of the state, or is not for public purpose, or, in case of a retroactive statute is so harsh and
unreasonable, it is subject to an attack on due process grounds. For equal protection clause, the
applicable standard to avoid the charge that there is a denial of this constitutional mandate, of whether
the assailed act is in the exercise of the police power or the power of eminent domain, is to demonstrate
that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was
prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason.
There is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to a conclusion that there
was a violation of the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution. Absent such
showing, the presumption of validity shall prevail. Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all
taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power
has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation. Where the
differentiation conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity, similar to the standards of equal
protection, it is not discriminatory within the meaning of the clause and is therefore uniform.

48 Himagan v. People (237 SCRA 538)

FACTS: Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the
murder of and attempted murder. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension
pending the murder case. The law provides that “Upon the filing of a complaint or information
sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty
imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the
accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall
be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the
suspension averring that  Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should
be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is
contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal
protection of laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.

HELD:  No. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of
persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive
suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to
harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a
suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case
is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus
easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of
preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended
policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
46 Tablarin v. Gutierrez (152 SCRA 730)

Facts: The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-
88. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education and administered by the Center
for Educational Measurement.
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of
Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing a requirement of
taking and passing the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from
proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as
scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denies said petition and the NMAT was
conducted and administered as scheduled.
The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of
applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical
education in the country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the
NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the
Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the
other admission requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the
issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges.

Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2381 or the Medical Act of 1959, as
amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are unconstitutional.

Ruling: Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain “State Policies” which
the government is enjoined to pursue and promote. The petitioners in this case have not seriously
undertake to demonstrate to what extent or in what manner the statute and administrative order they
assail collide with State policies embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have not discharged the
burden of proof which lies upon them.
Petitioners have also failed to demonstrate that the statute and regulation they assail class with the
provision of Article XIV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. On the contrary, the Court noted that the
statute and regulation that were being assailed were in fact designed to promote “quality education” at
the level of professional schools. The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make
quality education “accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wishes to enroll in a
professional school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under “fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.”
The petitioners’ contention that the NMAT prescribed in MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is an
“unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement,” which results in a denial of due process is also
untenable. Petitioners have failed to specify just what factors or features of the NMAT render it
“unfair”, “unreasonable” or “inequitable”. Petitioners’ arguments appear to relate to utility and wisdom
or desirability of the NMAT requirement. But constitutionality is essentially a question of power or
authority.
The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. Thus, legislation and
administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical
board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power which
was also similar with the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements.
The contention that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 is in conflict with the equal protection clause of
the Constitution was found to have no merit. Different cutoff scores for different school years may be
dictated by differing conditions obtaining during those years.

45. Philippine Judges Assn. v. Prado (227 SCRA 703)

Facts:
Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its
Circular No. 92-28 is being assailed as measures which withdraw the franking privilege from the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Register of Deeds along with
certain other government offices. The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their
official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the said measures.

Issue:
Whether or not R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional on the grounds that:
(1) Its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes;
(2) It did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the
bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage;
(3) It is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.

Ruling:
R.A. No. 7354 being unconstitutional on the ground that its title embraces more than one subject
and does not express its purpose is untenable. The Court does not agree that the title of the challenged
act violates the Constitution. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or
to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title
fairly indicates the general subject and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not
calculated to mislead the legislature of the people, then it is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement.
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the
statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation
impossible. The withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal object of R.A. No. 7354. Thus, by virtue of its nature as a repealing
clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
R.A. No. 7354 not passing the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of
the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage was held
unacceptable by the Court. While it is true that a Conference Committee is the mechanism for
compromising differences between the Senate and the House of Representatives, it is not limited in its
jurisdiction to the question. It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee report on the bill
was enrolled with its certification by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives as having been duly passes by both Houses. It was then presented to and approved by
the President. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted.
The third issue was based on the equal protection clause. The allegation that R.A. No. 7354 is
discriminatory was found to have merit. The repealing clause, Section 35, was found to be
discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all
persons similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial
distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.
44 Perez v. Estrada (360 SCRA 248)

FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners’ request for
permission to televise and broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan.  The motion was filed by the Secretary of Justice, as one of the petitioners, who argues
that there is really no conflict between the right of the people to public information and the freedom of
the press, on the one hand, and, on the other, the right of the accused to a fair trial; that if there is a
clash between these rights, it must be resolved in favor of the right of the people and the press because
the people, as the repository of sovereignty, are entitled to information; and that live media coverage is
a safeguard against attempts by any party to use the courts as instruments for the pursuit of selfish
interests. On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his objection to the live TV
and radio coverage of his trial on the ground that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that,
based on his experience with the impeachment trial, live media coverage will only pave the way for so-
called "expert commentary" which can trigger massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring the
Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the other.  Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the
people to information may be served through other means less distracting, degrading, and prejudicial
than live TV and radio coverage.

ISSUE: Whether or not television and radio coverage of plunder case be allowed.

HELD: NO. The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on this important issue and, after
due deliberation, finds no reason to alter or in any way modify its decision prohibiting live or real time
broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the former president. By a vote of nine (9) to six (6) of its
member, the Court denies the motion for reconsideration of the Secretary of Justice.
In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the vote of eight (8) Justices, has
resolved to order the audio-visual recording of the trial for documentary purposes.  Seven (7)
Justices vote against the audio-visual recording of the trial. Considering the significance of the trial
before the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the importance of preserving the records
thereof, the Court believes that there should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings.  The
recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for documentary purposes.  Only later will
they be available for public showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision in
every case to which the recording pertains.  The master film shall be deposited in the National Museum
and the Records Management and Archives Office for historical preservation and exhibition pursuant
to law.

43. People v. Rivera (362 SCRA 163)

Facts:Rivera signed and swore to a complaint accusing Vito and Moreno the crime of theft. According
to the information, the items stolen were a white American suit with one eyeglasses amounting to P30,
one buntal hat which costs P3, and to two buttons which cost P3 each, with the total amount of P39.
The justice of the peace dismissed the case. After which, Vito and Moreno filed complaints against
Rivera, charging him with  incriminating innocent people, which falls under Article 363 of the Revised
Penal Code. Rivera objected and claimed that the facts alleged did not fall under Article 363 of the
Revised Penal Code, and that, Article 363 of the Codigo Penal does not appear in the Revised Penal
Code.  Hence, there is no offense embracing acusacion o denuncia falsa.

Issue: Whether or not Rivera can be charged guilty of incriminating innocent people under Article 363
or the RPC?

Held: This Court takes pride in upholding a most fundamental constitutional right which is the right of
an accused in criminal prosecutions to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, in order to justify the conviction of an accused, the prosecution must adduce that quantum
of evidence sufficient to overcome this constitutional presumption of innocence.

The non-presentation as witnesses of other persons such as the other police officers forming a buy-bust
team is not a crucial point against the prosecution since the matter of presentation of witnesses by the
prosecution is not for the court to decide. It is the prosecution which has the discretion as to how to
present its case and it has the right to choose whom it wishes to present as witnesses.  Moreover, the
testimony of a single prosecution witness, if credible and positive and satisfies the court as to the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, is enough to sustain a conviction.

Truth is established not by the quantity of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies. The
testimony only needs to establish sufficiently: (1) the identity of the buyer, seller, object and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof.

The categorical and convincing testimonies of the policemen, backed up by physical evidence,
overcome the unsubstantiated claim of ill-motive by appellant. Accused-appellant's guilt having been
established beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence in his favor is overturned.

42. Republic v. Gingoyon (478 SCRA 474)

FACTS: NAIA 3, a project between the Government and the Philippine International Air Terminals
Co., Inc (PIATCO) was nullified. Planning to put NAIA 3 facilities into immediate operation, the
Government, through expropriation filed a petition to be entitled of a writ of possession contending
that  a mere deposit of the assessed value of the property with an authorized government depository is
enough for the entitlement to said writ (Rule 67 of the Rules of Court). However, respondents avers
that before an entitlement of the writ of possession is issued, direct payment of just compensation must
be made to the builders of the facilities, citing RA No. 8974 and a related jurisprudence (2004
Resolution).

ISSUE: WON expropriation can be conducted by mere deposit of the assessed value of the property.

HELD: No, in expropriation proceedings, entitlement of writ of possession is issued only after direct
payment of just compensation is given to property owner on the basis of fairness. The same principle
applied in the 2004 Jurisprudence Resolution and the latest expropriation law (RA No. 8974).

41. Webb v. People (276 SCRA 243)

FACTS: On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of
Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano
and six (6) other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother
Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W.
Vinzons, St., BF Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991. Forthwith, the Department of
Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to
conduct the preliminary investigation.

Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the credibility of Jessica
Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995
and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it
did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.
Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino
issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary examination.
Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their
right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their
preliminary investigation.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable
cause to charge them with the crime of rape and homicide
2. Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they
failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them
3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their
preliminary investigation
4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge
Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused.

HELD:
1. NO.
2. NO.
3. NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities to be
heard.
4. NO.

The Supreme Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
found probable cause against the petitioners. A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing
that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable
cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing
guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their discretion. In arrest cases, there
must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed
it. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that “upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court
may issue a warrant for the accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the submission of petitioners that
respondent judges should have conducted “searching examination of witnesses” before issuing
warrants of arrest against them.
The DOJ Panel precisely allowed the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel
to study the evidence submitted more fully.
Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to
prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of the courts and beyond executive and legislative
interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government
whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary
component of this power is the right to prosecute their violators (See R.A. No. 6981 and section 9 of
Rule 119 for legal basis).
With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of Jessica Alfaro, the Court believes that
these have been sufficiently explained and there is no showing that the inconsistencies were
deliberately made to distort the truth.
With regard to the petitioners’ complaint about the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary
investigation, the Court finds nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the
publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of
the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of
fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing.

40. Zambales Chromite Mining Co. v. Court of Appeals (94 SCRA 261)
FACTS: ZCM filed an administrative case before the Director of Mines Gozon to have them be
declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors of 69 mining claims in Sta. Cruz, Zambales.
They are asserting their claim against the group of Martinez and Pabilona. Gozon decided in favor of
Martinez et al. ZCM appealed the case before the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
During pendency, Gozon was assigned as the Sec of Agriculture and Natural Resources. He did not
inhibit himself from deciding on the appeal but he instead affirmed his earlier decision when he was
still the director of mines. ZCM then appealed before the CFI of Zambales. The CFI affirmed the
decision of Gozon. It held that the disqualification of a judge to review his own decision or ruling (Sec.
1, Rule 137, Rules of Court) does not apply to administrative bodies; that there is no provision in the
Mining Law, disqualifying the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from deciding an appeal
from a case which he had decided as Director of Mines; that delicadeza is not a ground for
disqualification; that the ZCM did not seasonably seek to disqualify Gozon from deciding their appeal,
and that there was no evidence that Gozon acted arbitrarily and with bias, prejudice, animosity or
hostility to ZCM. ZCM appealed the case to the CA. The CA reversed Gozon’s finding and declared
that ZCM had the rights earlier attributed to Martinez et al by Gozon. Martinez et al appealed averring
that the factual basis found by Gozon as Director of Mines be given due weight. The CA reconsidered
after realizing that Gozon cannot affirm his own decision and the CA remanded the case to the Minister
of Natural Resources. Now both parties appealed urging their own contentions; ZCM wants the CA’s
earlier decision to be reaffirmed while Martinez et al demanded that Gozon’s finding be reinstated. The
CA denied both petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gozon can validly affirm his earlier decision w/o disturbing due process.

HELD: No. The SC annulled the decision of Gozon calling it as a mockery of justice. Gozon had acted
with grave abuse of discretion. In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might
not turn out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision
is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the
case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same
view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. The SC
affirmed the 2nd decision of the CA.

38. Martinez v. Gironella (65 SCRA 245)

FACTS: In Criminal Case No. 21 of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch II, Cresencio
Martinez, as principal, and Viernes Duclan and Arnold Bayongan, as accessories after the fact, were
charged with the murder of one Alfredo Batoon. As the first two were not apprehended, trial proceeded
with respect to the third, Arnold Bayongan. In the decision of the respondent judge, Arnold Bayongan
was ACQUITTED to the effect, based on the wordings of the decision, that the “crime was committed
by Cresencio Martinez”, the petitioner. Subsequent to the acquittal of Bayongan, petitioner surrendered
to the authorities and later was arraigned before the same CFI. After having pleaded "not guilty" to the
charge, and before the prosecution started to present its evidence, counsel for accused Cresencio
Martinez moved that the trial Judge inhibit himself from hearing the case on its merits on the grounds
"(1) that the respondent had the chance to pass upon the issue and has formed an opinion as to who
committed the crime of murder; (2) that it would not be fair that he would sit, hear and pass judgment;
and (3) that the respondent is no longer impartial," and prayed that the case be transferred to Branch I
of the same Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge should be allowed to decide petitioner’s case.

HELD: NO. A Judge has the duty not only to render a just and impartial decision, but also render it in
such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality, and also as to the
judge's integrity. 2 While we grant respondent's capacity to render a just and impartial decision, his
statement in the decision acquitting Arnold Bayongan to the effect that the "crime was committed by
Cresencio Martinez" renders it impossible for respondent to be free from the suspicion that in deciding
petitioner's case, respondent will be biased and prejudiced. We therefore hold that under these
circumstances petitioner has the right to have his case decided by another Judge. WHEREFORE, the
petition for prohibition is granted. Respondent is ordered to transmit the records of Criminal Case No.
21 of the Court of First Instance of Abra to Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, and
the Judge presiding the said court will decide the same.

37. Guzman v. National University (142 SCRA 699)

FACTS: Diosdado Guzman and two others complained that the National University (NU) barred them
from enrolling in the said university. NU argued that their failure to enroll was due to the students’
fault. It was alleged that, Guzman et al spearheaded illegal mass actions within the university premises;
that such mass actions were violative of school policies; that due to their mass actions, Guzman et al
incurred bad grades; that Guzman et al hated NU anyway so why should they be allowed to enroll; that
it is in the best interest of both parties for the students not to be enrolled.

ISSUE: WON the petitioners were denied due process by the school.

HELD: YES. Guzman et al were deprived of due process. In the first place, NU never showed which
school policies or duly published rules did Guzman et al violate upon which they may be expelled
from. NU failed to show that it conducted any sort of proceedings (not necessarily a trial-type one) to
determine Guzman et al’s liability or alleged participation in the said mass actions.
Under the Education Act of 1982, Guzman et al, as students, have the right among others “to
freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to
graduation, except in case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.” Guzman et
al were being denied this right, or being disciplined, without due process, in violation of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools which provides that “no penalty shall be imposed upon any student
except for cause as defined in the Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly
promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted.”
Therefore, in effect, NU, by barring the enrollment of Guzman et al imposed a sanction upon the
students without due investigation – such act is illegal.
The Supreme Court also emphasized the minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the
demands of procedural due process, and these are:
1. That the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them;
2. That they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if
desired;
3. That they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
4. That they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
5. That the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by
the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

35. Sto. Domingo v. Ordoñez (166 SCRA 123)

Facts : Petitioner Edgardo L. Sto. Domingo, a civil service eligible, was the municipal planning and
development officer of Boac, Marinduque holding a permanent position until his employment was
terminated by respondent OIC Mayor Pedrito Nepomuceno pursuant to section 3 of Executive Order
No. 17 dated May 28, 1986. In this notice of termination dated November 24, 1986 addressed to Sto.
Domingo, it was stated therein: "Effective upon receipt of this notice, your services as Municipal
Development and Planning Coordinator of this municipality is (sic) hereby terminated. In reply to the
notice of termination, the petitioner through counsel Manuel S. Laurel wrote respondent OIC Mayor
alleging that "there is absolutely no written specification of charges that has been served upon him for
any charge or charges whatsoever, that he has not been... afforded the opportunity to answer said
charge or charges, if any; that he has not been afforded the opportunity to examine the documents that
have been used as basis for any charge or charges against him, if any; that he has not been afforded the
opportunity to confront and... cross-examine the witnesses who testified against him, if any; that he has
not been afforded the opportunity to defend himself before you summarily and you arbitrarily
terminated his services." (Rollo, p. 21) In short, the petitioner averred that his employment was...
terminated without due process of law. Hence, in this same letter, the petitioner demanded that he be
furnished "with a written specification of the charge or charges" in order to afford him the opportunity
to defend himself. In addition, the petitioner filed a letter-petition for reconsideration with the Civil
Service Commission which the latter transmitted to the Review Committee The Review Committee
required him to file a sworn petition for reconsideration including such documents he might deem
necessary to support his petition. On March 24, 1987, the Review Committee received the petitioner's
verified petition for reconsideration with attached... documents. In a Resolution dated May 15, 1987,
the Review Committee dismissed the petition for reconsideration for lack of merit. The petitioner then
filed a motion for leave to cross-examine witnesses which was, however, denied by the Review
Committee. "No formal hearing shall be conducted nor shall examination... of witnesses be allowed."
The petitioner now questions the validity of section 5 of the Rules of Procedure of the Review
Committee erroneously stated in the petition as section 5 of Executive Order No. 17 on the ground that
it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution.

Issue: The resolution of this case actually revolves on whether or not the petitioner was dismissed from
his office in violation of his right to due process of law and on whether or not the OIC Mayor had the
authority to dismiss him.
Held: Executive Order No. 17 states that "in order to obviate unnecessary anxiety and demoralization
among the deserving officials and employees, particularly in the career civil service, it is necessary to
prescribe the rules and regulations for implementing the said... constitutional provision to protect career
civil servants whose qualifications and performance meet the standards of service demanded by the
New Government, and to ensure that only those found corrupt, inefficient and undeserving are
separated from the government service." Pursuant to this provision, the Review Committee
promulgated its own rules and regulations, section 5 of which states that "No formal hearing can be
conducted nor shall examination of witnesses be allowed". The petitioner contends that his right to
cross-examine the witnesses against him is a requirement of due process. Trial type hearings in
administrative investigations are not always necessary. Summary proceedings are not per se violations
of the principle of due process. Necessarily, the fundamental rule in the principle of due process is the
opportunity to be heard. In the case at bar, the petitioner was heard on his petition for reconsideration
filed with the Review Committee. He was accorded every opportunity to present evidence in his behalf.
The charges against him are easily refuted with documentary evidence regarding the completion. There
is absolutely no evidence of arbitrariness or caprice in the questioned act of the respondents. Hence, he
cannot claim that he was deprived of his right to due process of law.

32. Telan v. Court of Appeals (202 SCRA 534)

Facts: Petitioner, Spouses Pedro and Angelina Telan, availed of the aid of one “Attorney” Palma in
their appeal for recovery of a parcel of land where their home and business enterprises is located.
Believing that their petition was filed and being processed, the petitioner was surprised when they
learned that the Court of Appeals declared their petition abandoned and dismissed, for their failure to
file an appeal brief within the reglementary period, pursuant to Section I(f), Rule 50 of the Rules of
Court. Pedro Telan immediately verified the facts. "Atty. Palma" could no longer be found. PEDRO
engaged the services of the new counsel, Peter Donnely A. Barot, who filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Attached Appellants' Brief. Atty. Barot assisted PEDRO in
verifying the existence of "Atty. Palma" in the Roll of Attorneys with the Bar Confidant's Office. This
was followed by the filing of Criminal Case No. 389-90 for Estafa against "Atty. Palma." By now
PEDRO had realized that "Atty. Palma" was a fake.

Issue: Whether or not the representation of the petitioner by a fake lawyer amounts to a deprivation of
his right to counsel and hence a lack of due process.

Held: Yes. Petitioners had not been accorded due process of law because they lost their right to appeal
when they were deprived of the right to counsel. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that
“[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.”

The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as forcefully as in criminal cases, especially so when
as a consequence, life, liberty, or property is subjected to restraint or in danger of loss.

In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable.
Otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due process. Thus, even if the judgment had become final
and executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself
and counsel. The preeminent right to due process of law applies not only to life and liberty but also to
property. There can be no fair hearing unless a party, who is in danger of losing his house in which he
and his family live and in which he has established a modest means of livelihood, is given the right to
be heard by himself and counsel.

33. Aris (Phil.), Inc. v. NLRC (200 SCRA 246)

FACTS: ILLEGAL DISMISSAL OF EMPLOYEES
On 11 April 1988, private respondents, who were employees of petitioner, aggrieved by management’s
failure to attend to their complaints concerning their working surroundings which had become
detrimental and hazardous, requested for a grievance conference. Private respondents lost no time in
filing a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner with NLRC of NCR. After due trial, Aris
(Phils.), Inc. is hereby ordered to reinstate within ten (10) days from receipt private respondents to their
former respective positions or any substantial equivalent positions if already filled up, without loss of
seniority right and privileges but with limited backwages of six (6) months. Private respondents filed a
Motion For Issuance of a Writ of Execution pursuant to Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715. Petitioner and
complainants filed their own Appeals. Petitioner filed an Opposition to the motion for execution
alleging that Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 on execution pending appeal cannot be applied retroactively
to cases pending at the time of its effectivity because it does not expressly provide that it shall be given
retroactive effect and to give retroactive effect to Section 12 thereof to pending cases would not only
result in the imposition of an additional obligation on petitioner but would also dilute its right to appeal
since it would be burdened with the consequences of reinstatement without the benefit of a final
judgment.

ISSUE: WON the provision under Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 is constitutional.

HELD: Yes. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners. The validity of the
questioned law is not only supported and sustained by the foregoing considerations. As contended by
the Solicitor General, it is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. Certainly, if the right of an
employer to freely discharge his employees is subject to regulation by the State, basically in the
exercise of its permanent police power on the theory that the preservation of the lives of the citizens is
a basic duty of the State, that is more vital than the preservation of corporate profits. Then, by and
pursuant to the same power, the State may authorize an immediate implementation, pending appeal, of
a decision reinstating a dismissed or separated employee since that saving act is designed to stop,
although temporarily since the appeal may be decided in favor of the appellant, a continuing threat or
danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed or separated employee and its family. Moreover,
the questioned interim rules of the NLRC can validly be given retroactive effect. They are procedural
or remedial in character, promulgated pursuant to the authority vested upon it under Article 218(a) of
the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended. Settled is the rule that procedural laws may be given
retroactive effect. There are no vested rights in rules of procedure. A remedial statute may be made
applicable to cases pending at the time of its enactment