Case Digest No.

69

PEOPLE vs. LEILA JOHNSON

G.R. No. 138881, December 18, 2000, 348 SCRA 526

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Leila Reyes Johnson arrived in the Philippines to visit her son’s
family. She was due to fly back to the United States on July 26. On that day, when Ramirez
frisked Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the United States, she felt something hard
on the latter’s abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Johnson explained she needed to wear two
panty girdles as she had just undergone an operation. Unsatisfied with the explanation,
Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, Embile, and was directed to take the accused
to the rest room. The latter then brought out three plastic packs that were later found to be
shabu. Embile took the accused and the plastic packs to the arrival area of NAIA where her
passport and ticket were taken and her luggage opened. Pictures were also taken and her
personal belongings were itemized.

The trial court found Johnson guilty of violation of Section 16, R.A. 6425 (Dangerous
Drugs Act) as amended by R.A. 7659. On appeal, the accused contends that she was
arrested and detained in gross violation of her constitutional rights. She argues that the
shabu confiscated from her is inadmissible as she was forced to affix her signature on the
plastic bags without the assistance of counsel and without having been informed of her
constitutional rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional right of the accused against warrantless searches
and seizures is violated.

RULING: NO. The constitutional right of the accused against warrantless searches and
seizures is not violated.

This case involves an arrest in flagrante delicto pursuant to a valid search made on
her person. The accused was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to Section 5, Rule
113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. The latter provides that a peace officer or a
private person may arrest a person without a warrant: (a) when in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of
their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
Such searches are implicit in airport security procedures and are reasonable considering
the gravity of the safety interests involved. Thus, the shabu seized from Johnson during the
routine frisk was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures. Travelers
are also notified that they are subject to search and any prohibited materials or substances
would be subject to seizure. Clearly, they are informed that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures.

However, the confiscation of Johnson’s passport, airline ticket, luggage, personal

effects, girdle, and the pictures taken during that time are inadmissible as evidence
according to Rule 126, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Such provision
authorizes the search and seizure only of the personal property (a) subject of the offense,
(b) stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense and (c) used or
intended to be used as means of committing an offense.

Case Digest No. 70

PEOPLE vs. SALVADOR ALOLOD

G.R. Nos. 117506-07 January 7, 1997 (266 SCRA 154)

FACTS:

On 13 December 1991, while on board in a jeepney, accused Alolod pushed one Jose
Robert Caamic and took a seat facing Romeo de Vera. All of a sudden Alolod grabbed the
plastic bag which de Vera was holding. The latter resisted. Alolod then pulled out a gun and
shot de Vera point-blank. Despite De Vera’s wound, he insisted on wrestling with Alolod for
the possession of the bag until the latter fired a second shot. As they grappled they fell from
the jeepney while passengers Caamic and one Marcos Nobio jumped off and ran for safety.
As Alolod and de Vera continued to struggle, SPO1 Eduardo Liberato arrived but Alolod
succeeded in running away with the bag. Liberato pursued Alolod until he caught up with
him at Palupasi St., Midway Park, Amparo Village. Seized from the accused was a .38 cal.
paltik revolver still smelling of gunpowder, with four (4) live bullets and two (2) empty
shells. Also found in his possession was a plastic bag containing P17,800.00 in various
denominations. Meanwhile, Romeo de Vera who was brought to the East Avenue Medical
Center expired shortly after due to gunshot wound.

An Information for Robbery with Homicide and an Information for Illegal

Possession of Firearm were filed against the accused. The Regional Trial Court found the
accused guilty as charged. Hence, the appeal contending that the police officers did not
observe his constitutional rights in effecting his arrest and that trial court erred in
appreciating evidence for the prosecution that were manifestly "fruits of the poisonous
tree.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the searches and seizures were valid, and the items confiscated are
admissible as evidence.

RULING: YES. The searches and seizures were valid, and the items confiscated are
admissible as evidence.
 The police officers, particularly SPOI Liberato, appropriately responded to the call of
duty by immediately chasing the suspected criminal. There is no persuasive proof that
Liberato had any ill motive in pointing criminal responsibility to the accused. The arrest
was made pursuant to pars. (a) and (b), Sec. 5, of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which
provide that a peace officer may effect warrantless arrest when in his presence the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
or, an offense has just in fact been committed, and he has reasonable knowledge of the facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

SPOI Liberato arrived when accused Alolod and victim Romeo de Vera were still
wrestling with each other. As the officer approached them Alolod ran away so that Liberato
had no recourse but pursue him until he was arrested. That was a legitimate arrest without
warrant. Alolod was actually committing a crime in the presence of the police officer or at
least had just committed it, and the police officer had personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that Alolod had committed the crime. In this case, the warrantless arrest being
legal, any evidence gathered as a result thereof cannot be considered "fruit of a poisonous
tree;" consequently, it is admissible.

Case Digest No. 71

PEOPLE vs. RUBEN BURGOS

G.R. No. L-68955. September 4, 1986 (144 SCRA 1)

FACTS:

On May 12, 1982, Cesar Masamlok voluntarily surrendered to the authorities at

Digos, Davao del Sur Constabulary Headquarters claiming that Ruben Burgos forcibly
recruited him to be part of the NPA. Burgos allegedly threatened him with a firearm. The
following day, a joint team of PC-INP units, was dispatched to arrest Burgos. The team
found him plowing his field. He was questioned regarding the firearm in which he denied
possession thereof. However, Burgos’ wife pointed to where the gun was hidden. Pat. Bioco
then verified the place pointed by accused’s wife and dug the grounds, after which he
recovered the firearm, Caliber .38 revolver. After the recovery of the firearm, accused
Burgos likewise pointed to the team, subversive documents which he allegedly kept in a
stock pile of cogon. Then Sgt. Taroy accordingly verified beneath said cogon grass and
likewise recovered documents consisting of notebook; a pamphlet with the front and back
covers entitled Ang Bayan, Pahayagan ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, Pinapatnubayan
ng Marxismo, Leninismo, Kaisipang Mao Zedong, dated December 31, 1980, and another
pamphlet Asdang Pamantalaang Masa sa Habagatang Mindanao, March and April 1981
issue. Accused, when confronted with the firearm, admitted possession of the gun but
claimed that it was issued to him by Nestor Jimenez.

Burgos was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Illegal Possession of Firearms in
Furtherance of Subversion. The RTC reasoned that Burgos’ arrest without warrant was
justified since the authorities received an urgent report of his involvement in subversive
activities from a reliable source. The trial court also justified the search as valid since it was
incidental to a lawful arrest.

On appeal, the accused argues that the trial court erred in holding that his arrest
without valid warrant is lawful and that the search in his house for firearm without valid
warrant is likewise lawful.

ISSUE: Whether or not the searches and seizures were valid, and the items confiscated are
admissible as evidence.

RULING: NO. The searches and seizures were invalid, and the items confiscated are not
admissible as evidence.

The conclusions reached by the trial court are erroneous.

Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge
of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v.
Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was
possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished
by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the appellant’s wife.
At the time of the appellant’s arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm
or subversive document. Neither was he committing any act which could be described as
subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and
any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule
which allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any
exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd
or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule
on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided
by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often
violated and so deserving of full protection.

Case Digest No. 72

 PABLITO V. SANIDAD vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 90878, January 29, 1990 (181 SCRA 529)

FACTS:

On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region" was enacted into law. Pursuant to said
law, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, shall take part in a plebiscite for the ratification
of said Organic Act.

By virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code
(BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and other pertinent election laws, the Commission on Elections
promulgated Resolution No. 2167 to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said
Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.

In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who
claims to be a newspaper columnist of the "Overview" for the Baguio Midland Courier, a
weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the
constitutionality of Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167, which provides:

“Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. —

During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day,
no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his
column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.”

It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it

violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press
enshrined in the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is constitutional.

RULING: NO. Sec. 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional.

Respondent COMELEC has relied much on Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 11 of R.A. 6646 as the basis for the promulgation of the questioned Section 19 of
COMELEC Resolution 2167. However, it is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that
what was granted to the COMELEC was the power to supervise and regulate the use and
enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation
or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal
opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates
therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. The
evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may
favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or
television time.
 However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A.
6646 can be construed to mean that the COMELEC has also been granted the right to
supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to
expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of
expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates.
In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.