81.

Chavez vs Romulo gr 157036

This case is about the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence in order to deter the rising
crime rates. Petitioner questions the ban as a violation of his right to property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the revocation of permit to carry firearms is unconstitutional

Whether or not the right to carry firearms is a vested property right

HELD: Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision.

In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life,
liberty or property interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to
enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry,
we ruled that “a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is
not a contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right.” In a more emphatic pronouncement, we
held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that: “Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by
executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of
the Constitution.”

In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is
evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that
“the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions
as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence.” Following
the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right
protected under our Constitution.

Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked
any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under
existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his license
subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of
this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a
contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege
within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights. The US Supreme Court, in Doyle vs.
Continental Ins. Co, held: “The correlative power to revoke or recall a permission is a necessary
consequence of the main power. A mere license by the State is always revocable.”
82 Subido vs Court of Appeals GR216914

Facts: Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
the constitutionality of Section 11 of R.A No. 9160, the Anti-Money Laundering Act, as amended,
specifically the Anti-Money Laundering Council's authority to file with the Court of Appeals (CA) in
this case, an ex-parte application for inquiry into certain bank deposits and investments, including
related accounts based on probable cause. In 2015, a year before the 2016 presidential elections, reports
abounded on the supposed disproportionate wealth of then Vice President Jejomar Binay and the rest of
his family, some of whom were likewise elected public officers. The Office of the Ombudsman and the
Senate conducted investigations and inquiries thereon. From various news reports announcing the
inquiry into then Vice President Binay's bank accounts, including accounts of members of his family,
petitioner Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza & Binay Law Firm (SPCMB) was most concerned with
the article published in the Manila Times on 25 February 2015 entitled "Inspect Binay Bank Accounts"
which read, in pertinent part: xxx The Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) asked the Court of
Appeals (CA) to allow the [C]ouncil to peek into the bank accounts of the Binays, their corporations,
and a law office where a family member was once a partner. xx xx

Also the bank accounts of the law office linked to the family, the Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza &
Binay Law Firm, where the Vice President's daughter Abigail was a former partner.

By 8 March 2015, the Manila Times published another article entitled, "CA orders probe of Binay 's
assets" reporting that the appellate court had issued a Resolution granting the ex-parte application of
the AMLC to examine the bank accounts of SPCMB. Forestalled in the CA thus alleging that it had no
ordinary, plain, speedy, and adequate remedy to protect its rights and interests in the purported ongoing
unconstitutional examination of its bank accounts by public respondent Anti-Money Laundering
Council (AMLC), SPCMB undertook direct resort to this Court via this petition for certiorari and
prohibition on the following grounds that the he Anti-Money Laundering Act is unconstitutional
insofar as it allows the examination of a bank account without any notice to the affected party: (1) It
violates the person's right to due process; and (2) It violates the person's right to privacy.

Issue: Whether Section 11 of R.A No. 9160 is violative of the constitutional right to privacy enshrined
in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.

Held: No. We now come to a determination of whether Section 11 is violative of the constitutional
right to privacy enshrined in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. SPCMB is adamant that the CA's
denial of its request to be furnished copies of AMLC's ex-parte application for a bank inquiry order and
all subsequent pleadings, documents and orders filed and issued in relation thereto, constitutes grave
abuse of discretion where the purported blanket authority under Section 11: ( 1) partakes of a general
warrant intended to aid a mere fishing expedition; (2) violates the attorney-client privilege; (3) is not
preceded by predicate crime charging SPCMB of a money laundering offense; and ( 4) is a form of
political harassment [of SPCMB' s] clientele.
83 Mosqueda v Philippine Banana Growers and Exporters Asso. GR no 189185
FACTS: After several committee hearings and consultations with various stakeholders, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban
against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City.
City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte approved the ordinance on February 9, 2007. The ordinance took
effect on March 23, 2007 after its publication in the newspaper Mindanao Pioneer. Pursuant to Section
5 of the ordinance, the ban against aerial spraying would be strictly enforced three months thereafter.
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its members,
namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (PBGEA,
et al.), filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance, and to seek the
issuance of provisional reliefs through a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.
The residents living within and adjacent to banana plantations in Davao City led by Wilfredo
Mosqueda, joined by other residents of Davao City, (Mosqueda, et al.) submitted their Motion for
Leave to Intervene and Opposition to the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction.
The RTC granted the prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, and subsequently
issued the writ. After trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 valid and
constitutional.
PBGEA, et al. appealed, and applied for injunctive relief from the CA, which granted the
application and consequently issued a TRO to meanwhile enjoin the effectivity of the ordinance.
The CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the RTC. The City of Davao
and the intervenors filed their respective motions for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motions.
Hence, the separate, but now consolidated, appeals by petition for review on certiorari.
Issues: Whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process and equal protection
grounds for being unreasonable and oppressive, and an invalid exercise of police power: (a) in
imposing a ban on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in Davao City under Section 5; (b) in
decreeing a 3-month transition-period to shift to other modes of pesticide application under Section 5;
and (c) in requiring the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under Section 6 thereof in all
agricultural lands in Davao City.
HELD:
The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309-07 under its corporate
powers... the right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an issue of transcendental
importance with intergenerational implications. It is under this milieu that the questioned ordinance
should be appreciated.
Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged health risks due to their
exposure to pesticide drift justifies the motivation behind the enactment of the ordinance. The City of
Davao has the authority to enact pieces of legislation that will promote the general welfare, specifically
the health of its constituents. Such authority should not be construed, however, as a valid license for the
City of Davao to enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge its mandate. A thin but well-defined line
separates authority to enact legislations from the method of accomplishing the same.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause
A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government
and passed according to the procedure prescribed by law.[108] In order to declare it as a valid piece of
local legislation, it must also comply with the following substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be
partial or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable.[109]In the State's exercise of police
power, the property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill
the objectives of the Government. A local government unit is considered to have properly exercised its
police powers only if it satisfies the following requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State; and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive. The first requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution; the
second, to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Substantive due process requires that a valid
ordinance must have a sufficient justification for the Government's action. This means that in
exercising police power the local government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically
enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the ordinance realistically serves a
legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose
without unduly oppressing the individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process
challenge.
The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will consume
considerable time and financial resources given the topography and geographical features of the
plantations. As such, the conversion could not be completed within the short timeframe of three
months. Requiring the respondents and other affected individuals to comply with the consequences of
the ban within the three-month period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even
cancellation of business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power.
The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under Section 6 of the
ordinance violates due process for being confiscatory; and that the imposition unduly deprives all
agricultural landowners within Davao City of the beneficial use of their property that amounts to taking
without just compensation.
The position of the respondents is untenable.
Citing City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., the SC have thoroughly explained that taking only becomes
confiscatory if it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial use of its property
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause
The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public
bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The guaranty equal
protection secures every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the State's duly constituted authorities. The concept of equal justice under the law demands
that the State governs impartially, and not to draw distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to the legitimate governmental objective.
Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things without
distinction, nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed or by the
territory in which it is to operate. The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among equals
determined according to a valid classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another.
In other word, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions; (2) germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all
members of the class.
In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach appropriately applies
herein. Under the rational basis test, we shall: (1) discern the reasonable relationship between the
means and the purpose of the ordinance; and (2) examine whether the means or the prohibition against
aerial spraying is based on a substantial or reasonable distinction. A reasonable classification includes
all persons or things similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.
Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting that the occurrence of drift
causes inconvenience and harm to the residents and degrades the environment. Given this justification,
does the ordinance satisfy the requirement that the classification must rest on substantial distinction?
We answer in the negative.
The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the conduct of
any mode of pesticide application. Even manual spraying or truck-mounted boom spraying produces
drift that may bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks to the
community and to the environment. A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the
ordinance seeks to achieve. In the process, the ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive" because
the classification does not include all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law seeks to
eliminate.[143] A classification that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose or end
appears as an irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly serves the intended purpose of
the law.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari for their lack of
merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January 9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01389-MIN.
declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
84 Villanueva vs Judicial And Bar Council G.R. No. 211833

FACTS : The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province, Region XI,
which is a first-level court. On September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of Presiding
Judge in the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City;
and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur In a letter2 dated December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of
Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, informed the petitioner that he was not included in the list of
candidates for the said stations. On the same date, the petitioner sent a letter, through electronic mail,
seeking reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the list of considered applicants and protesting the
inclusion of applicants who did not pass the prejudicature examination. The petitioner was informed by
the JBC Executive Officer, through a letter3 dated February 3, 2014, that his protest and
reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en banc. However, its decision not to include his name in
the list of applicants was upheld due to the JBC's long-standing policy of opening the chance for
promotion to second-level courts to, among others, incumbent judges who have served in their current
position for at least five years, and since the petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, he
was excluded from the list. This caused the petitioner to take recourse to this Court

ISSUE : WON the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing
its principal function under the Constitution to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC
is not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function

HELD : The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The present Rules of Court uses two
special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and screening applicants, the
JBC neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any performance of
judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the formulation of guidelines and criteria,
including the policy that the petitioner now assails, is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the
JBC's constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on whether the JBC has acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.

Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by virtue of the Court's power of
supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides that the power of supervision is the power of
oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.
Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC is to see to it that the JBC
complies with its own rules and procedures. Thus, when the policies of the JBC are being attacked,
then the Court, through its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the matter
and ensure that the JBC complies with its own rules

The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC's policy. It is essential
to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. The remedy
of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not
a discretionary one.14 Clearly, the use of discretion and the performance of a ministerial act are
mutually exclusive. Clearly, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not properly
compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it involves the exercise of sound discretion by the JBC

The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a
person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are
affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this
remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the
judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties thereunder."

In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy. Rather, the petition
specifically sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the right to be included in the list of
applicants although he failed to meet JBC's five-year requirement policy. Again, the Court reiterates
that no person possesses a legal right under the Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for
vacant judicial positions. The opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not
a judicially enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any person

Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have original
jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.18 The
special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC
pursuant to Section 1919 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A.No. 7691

Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC and in the exercise of its expanded
judicial power, the Court assumes jurisdiction over the present petition. But in any event, even if the
Court will set aside procedural infirmities
 85 People v Cogaed GR. 200334

FACTS: Victor Cogaed was riding a jeepney with a bag from Barangay Lun-Oy and during
acheckpoint, the driver of the jeepney he rode made a signal to the police telling that Cogaed
wascarrying marijuana inside Cogaeds bag! the police officer then approached Cogaed and asked
theaccused about the contents of his bags" Cogaed replied that he did not know what was inside and
thathe was just transporting the bag in favor of #arvin, a barriomate" Cogaed subse$uently opened the
bagrevealing the bricks of marijuana inside" %e was then arrested by the police officer

Issues: (1) Whether there was a valid search and seizure of marijuana as against the appellant; (2)
Whether the evidence obtained through the search should be admitted; and (3) Whether
there was enough evidence to sustain the conviction of... the accused.

HELD:

There are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. Searches
incidental to lawful arrests are allowed even without a separate warrant. Searches incidental
to a lawful arrest require... that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and the search
conducted within the vicinity and within reach by the person arrested is done to ensure that
there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence.

The case of Cogaed was different.  He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling
aboard a jeepney.  There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney
or carrying a bag.  The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer... but by
the jeepney driver.  It was the driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed was
"suspicious."
The Constitution provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding "
Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this rule
prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing
expeditions" evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence
because it is 3the only practical means of enforcing
the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures" ensures that the
fundamental rights to one’s person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon
and are upheld.

87 People vs. Sarap  G.R. No. 132165

A search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a warrant validly issued by a judge
as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. Articles which are the product of unreasonable
searches and seizures are inadmissible as evidence, pursuant to Article III, Section 3 (2) of the
Constitution. Warrantless searches and seizures may be made without a warrant in the following
instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) search of a moving motor vehicle, (3) search in
violation of custom laws, (4) seizure of the evidence in plain view, (5) when the accused himself
waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures, (6) stop and frisk and (7) exigent and
emergency circumstances. These instances, however do not dispense with the requisite of probable
cause before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. In warrantless search cases,
probable cause must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been
committed or is about to be committed.
89 Zulueta vs Court of Appeals

Facts: 
Cecilia Zulueta is the Petitioner who offset the private papers of his husband Dr. Alfredo Martin. Dr.
Martin is a doctor of medicine while he is not in his house His wife took the 157 documents consisting
of diaries, cancelled check, greeting cards, passport and photograph, private respondents between her
Wife and his alleged paramours, by means of forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet. Cecilia Zulueta
filed the papers for the evidence of her case of legal separation and for disqualification from the
practice of medicine against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against
Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X. the trial court rendered judgment for
Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3
of Martin’s Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering
Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to
pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney’s fees; and to pay
the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Zulueta filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Issue:

The papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from unlawful means are
admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical
practice. 

Held:

The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring “the
privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable is no less applicable simply because it
is the wife who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity, who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. 

The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or
when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision
renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The intimacies between
husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and
in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage,
does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection
is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the
spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without
the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the
duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

90 Chavez v Raul Gonzales gr 168338

Facts : Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes where the parties
to the conversation discussed "rigging" the results of the 2004 elections to favor President Arroyo. On
6 June 2005, Presidential spokesperson Ignacio Bunye (Bunye) held a press conference in Malacañang
Palace, where he played before the presidential press corps two compact disc recordings of
conversations between a woman and a man. Bunye identified the woman in both recordings as
President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the second compact disc had been "spliced" to make
it appear that President Arroyo was talking to Garcillano. On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press
release warning radio and television stations that airing the Garci Tapes is a "cause for the suspension,
revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations" issued to them.5 On 14 June 2005,
NTC officers met with officers of the broadcasters group, Kapisanan ng mga Broadcasters sa Pilipinas
(KBP), to dispel fears of censorship. The NTC and KBP issued a joint press statement expressing
commitment to press freedom

Issue : WON the NTC warning embodied in the press release of 11 June 2005 constitutes an
impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression

Held : When expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to only four
categories of expression, namely: pornography, false or misleading advertisement, advocacy of
imminent lawless action, and danger to national security. All other expression is not subject to prior
restrain Expression not subject to prior restraint is protected expression or high-value expression. Any
content-based prior restraint on protected expression is unconstitutional without exception. A protected
expression means what it says – it is absolutely protected from censorship Prior restraint on expression
is content-based if the restraint is aimed at the message or idea of the expression. Courts will subject to
strict scrutiny content-based restraint. If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the
expression, it is content-neutral even if it burdens expression The NTC action restraining the airing of
the Garci Tapes is a content-based prior restraint because it is directed at the message of the Garci
Tapes. The NTC’s claim that the Garci Tapes might contain "false information and/or willful
misrepresentation," and thus should not be publicly aired, is an admission that the restraint is content-
based The public airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression because it does not fall under any
of the four existing categories of unprotected expression recognized in this jurisdiction. The airing of
the Garci Tapes is essentially a political expression because it exposes that a presidential candidate had
allegedly improper conversations with a COMELEC Commissioner right after the close of voting in
the last presidential elections. The content of the Garci Tapes affects gravely the sanctity of the ballot.
Public discussion on the sanctity of the ballot is indisputably a protected expression that cannot be
subject to prior restraint. Public discussion on the credibility of the electoral process is one of the
highest political expressions of any electorate, and thus deserves the utmost protection. If ever there is
a hierarchy of protected expressions, political expression would occupy the highest rank. The rule,
which recognizes no exception, is that there can be no content-based prior restraint on protected
expression. On this ground alone, the NTC press release is unconstitutional. Of course, if the courts
determine that the subject matter of a wiretapping, illegal or not, endangers the security of the State, the
public airing of the tape becomes unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint.
However, there is no claim here by respondents that the subject matter of the Garci Tapes involves
national security and publicly airing the tapes would endanger the security of the State. The alleged
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law is not in itself a ground to impose a prior restraint on the airing
of the Garci Tapes because the Constitution expressly prohibits the enactment of any law, and that
includes anti-wiretapping laws, curtailing freedom of expression. The only exceptions to this rule are
the four recognized categories of unprotected expression. However, the content of the Garci Tapes does
not fall under any of these categories of unprotected expression.

91 People v Dacanay GR no. 216064

Facts:
In an Information filed with the RTC, accused-appellant Antonio T. Dacanay (Antonio) was charged
with the crime of Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),... On October 6, 2007,
Norma E. Dacanay (Norma), the wife of Antonio, was found lifeless with several puncture wounds on
the bathroom floor of their home by their son, Quinn, who was then coming home from school. Quinn
likewise observed that the rest of the house was in disarray, with the clothes and things of Norma
scattered on the floor, as if suggesting that a robbery had just taken place. At that time, Antonio had
already left for work after having allegedly left the house at around six in the morning. Quinn then
rushed to the house of his aunt, one Beth Bautista, to tell her about the fate of Norma, and then
proceeded to the workplace of Antonio, which was only ten (10) minutes away from their house. On
October 8, 2007, PO3 Santos went to Antonio's workplace at PHIMCO Industries, Inc. (PHIMCO) in
Punta, Sta. Ana, Manila, to once again invite Antonio to the precinct. Antonio acceded to such request
and, after fetching Quinn from school, they all proceeded to the police station. When they arrived at the
precinct, Barangay Kagawad Antonio I. Nastor, Jr. and some members of the media were present.
While at the precinct, Barangay Kagawad Antonio I. Nastor, Jr. informed PO3 Santos that Antonio was
already willing to confess to killing Norma. Accordingly, PO3 Santos proceeded to contact a lawyer
from the Public Attorney's Office. In the meantime, PO3 Santos apprised Antonio of his constitutional
rights, including the right to remain silent. However, as determined by both the RTC and the CA,
despite having been apprised of his rights, Antonio nonetheless confessed to the crime before the media
representatives, who separately interviewed him without PO3 Santos, viz:
Per [Antonio]'s account, around 4:00 in the morning, he and his wife had a fight pertaining to the
unaccounted amount of P100,000.00. With extreme anger, he stabbed his wife several times.
Thereafter, he threw all the pieces of evidence to the river. [Antonio] further declared that he set up the
first floor of their house by placing a pitcher of juice, a half-empty glass of juice and cigarette on top of
the table, to make it appear that someone else went to their house and robbed the place. He also
confessed that he took the missing pieces of jewelry and placed them inside his locker at PHIMCO. He
allegedly admitted the killing of his wife as his conscience has been bothering him.
Issues:
The sole issue for our resolution is whether the CA, in affirming the RTC, erred in finding Antonio
guilty of the crime of Parricide on the basis of his extrajudicial confession.
Ruling:
At this juncture, it bears stressing that during the separate occasions that Antonio was interviewed by
the news reporters, there was no indication of the presence of any police officers within the proximity
who could have possibly exerted undue pressure or influence. As recounted by both reporters during
their testimonies, Antonio voluntarily narrated how he perpetrated the crime in a candid and
straightforward manner, "with no trace of fear, intimidation or coercion in him".
Under Article 246 of the RPC, the crime of Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the
deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate spouse of the
accused.[57] Undoubtedly, all elements are present in this case.
To begin with, the fact that Norma was the spouse of Antonio was sufficiently proven by the
prosecution through their Marriage Contract.[58]
Next, as a rule, an extrajudicial confession, where admissible, must be corroborated by evidence of
corpus delicti in order to sustain a finding of guilt.[59] In this connection, extrajudicial confessions are
presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved.[60] Hence, as extensively discussed above,
considering that Antonio failed to rebut such presumption of voluntariness regarding the authorship of
the crime, coupled with the fact of death of his wife, Norma, we find Antonio guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of Parricide.

93 Napoles v Sandiganbayan GR 224162

Facts: On December 20, 2017, petitioner Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) filed a motion for the
reconsideration[1] of the Court's Decision[2] dated November 7, 2017, the dispositive portion of which
reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated October
16, 2015 and March 2, 2016 of the Sandiganbayan in SB-14-CRM-0238 are AFFIRMED, there being
no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
Sandiganbayan.
The assailed decision of this Court upheld the Sandiganbayan's Resolutions dated October 16, 2015
and March 2, 2016 denying Napoles' application for bail, there being no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan.
Napoles now invokes the ruling in Macapagal-Arroyo v. People which was promulgated on July 19,
2016.
According to Napoles, the ruling in Macapagal-Arroyo should have been applied to her case.
In a demurrer to evidence, as in the case of Macapagal-Arroyo, the accused imposes a challenge on the
sufficiency of the prosecution's entire evidence. This involves a determination of whether the evidence
presented by the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The stage at which the accused may demur to the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence is during the
trial on the merits itself-particularly, after the prosecution has rested its case.
This should be distinguished from the hearing for the petition for bail, in which the trial court does not
sit to try the merits of the main case.
Neither does it speculate on the ultimate outcome of the criminal charge.
Issues:
issue that the Court resolved in its Decision dated November 7, 2017 was whether the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion in denying Napoles' application for bail. This involved a preliminary
determination of her eligibility to provisional liberty.
Ruling:
In this hearing, the trial court's inquiry is limited to whether there is evident proof that the accused is
guilty of the offense charged.
This standard of proof is clearly different from that applied in a demurrer to evidence, which measures
the prosecution's entire evidence against the required moral certainty for the conviction of the accused.
The distinction between the required standards of proof precludes the application of Macapagal-Arroyo
to the present case. The Sandiganbayan's denial of the demurrer to evidence in Macapagal-Arroyo was
annulled based on the paucity of the evidence of the prosecution, which failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that former President GMA was the mastermind of the conspiracy to commit plunder.
In other words, there was a final determination of former President GMA's innocence of the crime
charged.
The resolution of this issue does not involve an inquiry as to whether there was proof beyond
reasonable doubt that Napoles, or her co-accused as the case may be, was the main plunderer for whose
benefit the ill-gotten wealth was amassed or accumulated. These are matters of defense best left to the
discretion of the Sandiganbayan in the resolution of the criminal case. It was sufficient that the denial
of her bail application was based on evidence establishing a great presumption of guilt on the part of
Napoles.Lastly, the other issues raised in Napoles' Motion for Reconsideration merely reiterated the
earlier arguments that this Court has already resolved. For this reason, the reconsideration of the
Court's earlier Decision is unwarranted under the circumstances.WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to
DENY the present Motion for Reconsideration.

94 Enrile v Sandiganbayan GR 213847

Facts:
Petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail and annul the resolutions issued by
the Sandiganbayan where he has been charged with plunder following the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund along with several others.
Enrile insists that the resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his Motion For
reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
He argued that he should be allowed to post bail because prosecution had not yet established that the
evidence of his guilt was strong; although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would
only be reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua. He was not a flight risk, and his age and physical
condition must further be seriously considered.
Issues:
Whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial... an incident of the judicial power to
hear and determine his criminal case.
a good measure of the accused’s propensity... for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary
to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.
HELD:
 Petition for certiorari is meritorious. We also do not ignore
that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder, he already... evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal
processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk.
With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public service,
and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail. The currently
fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for his admission to bail, but
which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize. It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to
Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to
by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate
preparation of his... defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.
There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail – whose existence is either admitted by the
Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice – that the courts can already consider in
resolving the application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish.The Court thus balances the scales
of justice by protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial,
and at the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty.Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective
of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear
showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan... gravely abused
its discretion in denying Enrile’s Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari, connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and... despotic manner by reason
of passion or hostility.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

ANACLETO Q. OLVIS, Acquitted, ROMULO
VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS and
DOMINADOR SORELA,
G.R. No. 71092
September 30, 1987
Forced re-enactments, like uncounselled and coerced confessions come within the ban against self-
incrimination. Evidence based on such re-enactment is a violation of the Constitution and hence,
incompetent evidence. Here, accused is not merely required to exhibit some physical characteristics; by
and large, he is likewise made to admit criminal responsibility against his will. It is a police procedure
just as condemnable as an uncounselled confession. The lack of counsel makes statement in
contemplation of law, 'involuntary' even if it were otherwise voluntary.

FACTS: On September 9, 1975, authorities from the Integrated National Police station of Barrio
olanco, in Zamboanga del Norte, received a report that a certain Deosdedit Bagon is missing. Bagon
had been in fact missing since two days before. He was last seen by his wife in the afternoon of
September 7, 1975, on his way home to Sitio Sebaca where they resided. A search party was conducted
by the authorities to mount an inquiry. As a matter of police procedure, the team headed off to Sitio
Sebaca to question possible witnesses. There, they chanced upon an unnamed volunteer, who informed
them that Deosdedit Bagon was last seen together with Dominador Sorela, one of the accused herein.
The authorities then thereafter picked up Sorela for interrogation. Sorela bore several scratches on his
face, neck and arms when the police found him. According to him, he sustained those wounds while
clearing his ricefield. Apparently unconvinced, the police had Sorela take them to the ricefield where
he sustained his injuries. But half way there, Sorela illegally broke down, and, in what would
apparently crack the case for the police, admitted having participated in the killing of the missing
Bagon. Sorela
allegedly confessed having been with Deosdedit Bagon, a friend of his, in the evening of September 7,
1976 in Sitio Sebaca. They were met by Romulo Villarojo and Leonardo Cademas, Sorela's co-accused
herein and likewise friends of the deceased, who led them to a secluded place in the ricefields.
According to their confessions Villarojo attacked Bagon with a bolo, hacking him at several parts of
the body until he, Bagon, was dead. Moments later, Sorela fled, running into thick cogon grasses where
he suffered facial and bodily scratches. The police soon picked up Villarojo and Cademas. Together
with Sorela, they were turned over to the custody of Captain Encabo the Polanco Station Commander.
The police thereafter made the three re-enact the crime. Sorela was directed to lead them to the grounds
where Discredit Bagon was supposed to have been buried. But it was Villarojo who escorted them to a
watery spot somewhere in the ricefields, where the sack-covered, decomposing cadaver of Bagon lay in
a shallow grave. The necropsy report prepared by the provincial health officer disclosed that the
deceased suffered twelve stab and hack wounds, six of which were determined to be fatal. In the re-
enactment, the suspects, the three accused herein, demonstrated how the victim was boloed to death. A
photograph, shows the appellant Villarojo in the posture of raising a bolo as if to strike another, while
Solero
and Cademas look on. Another photograph, portrays Villarojo in the act of
concealing the murder weapon behind a banana tree, apparently after
having done the victim in.

98 Perez vs People G.R. No. 164763, February 12, 2008


Facts:
In the case at bar, Petitioner is assailed and found guilty of malversation of Public funds defined and
penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code being the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon,
Bohol. Petitioner asked the Court on the law relied upon in convicting the petitioner and the sentence
imposed is cruel and therefore violates section 19 of article iii (bill of rights) of the constitution.

Issues: Is there a violation of section 19 of the Bill of Rights?

Held: No.There is no violation of the rights to a speedy disposition of the case and to due process of
law. Petitioner asserts that his right to due process of law and to speedy disposition of his case was
violated because the decision of the Sandiganbayan was handed down after the lapse of more than
twelve years. The years that he had to wait for the outcome of his case were allegedly spent in limbo,
pain and agony. Due process of law as applied to judicial proceedings has been interpreted to mean "a
law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds on inquiry, and renders judgment only after
trial." Petitioner cannot complain that his right to due process has been violated. He was given all the
chances in the world to present his case, and the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision only after
considering all the pieces of evidence presented before it.
Petitioner’s claim of violation of his right to a speedy disposition of his case must also fail. The
1987 Constitution guarantees the right of an accused to speedy trial. Both the 1973 Constitution in
Section 16 of Article IV and the 1987 Constitution in Section 16 of Article III, Bill of Rights, are also
explicit in granting to the accused the right to speedy disposition of his case. Fixed-Time Period - the
Constitution requires a criminal defendant to be offered a trial within a specified time period.  Demand-
Waiver Rule which provides that a defendant waives any consideration of his right to speedy trial for
any period prior to which he has not demanded trial.  Under this rigid approach, a prior demand is a
necessary condition to the consideration of the speedy trial right. Balancing Test, in which the conduct
of both the prosecution and defendant are weighed.

96 Torres vs Sandiganbayan GR 221562-69

Facts: Petitioner Commo. Lamberto R. Torres was the former Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff for
Logistics under the Flag Officer In Command of the Philippine Navy. The Commission of Audit
conducted a special audit pertaining to the procurement of drugs and medicine by emergency mode
purchase, among others. On December 11, 1996, the office of the Ombudsman commenced a
preliminary investigation against petitioner and several others or illegal Use of Public Funds and
Violation of Sec 3(e) of RA 3019, Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. These Cases, however, were
dismissed against petitioner for lack of probable cause. A few years after petitioner's retirement from
the service in 2001, a new Affidavit Complaint was filed by the ombudsman against petitioner and
several others, this time, for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019. Notices of the new
preliminary investigation were, however, sent to petitioner's old address in Kawit, Cavite, which he had
already vacated in 1980. It was only sometime in July 2014, when Petitioner was about to travel to the
United States, that he learned of the pending cases before the Sandiganbayan by virtue of a hold
departure order issued against him.

Issue: Whether or not the right to speedy disposition of his case is violated?

Held: Yes. the Doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the
factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons
for the delay, (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and (4) the prejudice
caused by the delay. The Speedy disposition of cases covers not only the period within which the
preliminary investigation was conducted, by also all stages to which the accused is subjected, even
including fact-finding investigations conducted prior to the preliminary investigation proper. In the
case at bar, Petitioner has undoubtedly been prejudiced by virtue of the delay in the resolution of the
cases filed against him. Even though he was not initially included as a respondent in the investigation
conducted from 1996 to 2006, he has already been deprived of the ability to adequately prepare his
case considering that he may no longer have any access to records of contact with any witness in
support of his defense. This is even aggravated by the fact that petitioner had been retired for fifteen
(15) years. The lapse of time in the conduct of the proceedings is tantamount to a vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delay, which is violation of petitioner's constitutional right to speedy disposition of
cases.

98 People vs. Mercado G.R. No. 116239

FACTS: The defendants were convicted by the trial court with the crime of kidnapping with murder
and sentencing them the punishment of death. The defendants raised the constitutionality of death
penalty and the alleged haste of the trial court in deciding the case resulting in grave and serious errors
committed in convicting the accused.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not death penalty is unconstitutional and "cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment."
2. Whether or not the trial court’s haste in deciding the case resulted to grave and serious
errors to the prejudice of the defendants.

HELD: 1. No the death penalty is not unconstitutional. As settled in People vs. Echagaray, death
penalty is not a "cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment." It is an exercise of the state's power to
"secure society against the threatened and actual evil". Procedural and substantial safeguards to insure
its correct application are established.
2. No, the contention of the defendants that the speed the trial court decided their case resulted
in grave and serious errors to their prejudice. A review of the trial court's decision shows that its
findings were based on the records of this case and the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during
the trial. The speed with which the trial court disposed of the case cannot thus be attributed to the
injudicious performance of its function. Indeed, a judge is not supposed to study a case only after all
the pertinent pleadings have been filed. It is a mark of diligence and devotion to duty that a judge
studies a case long before the deadline set for the promulgation of his decision has arrived. The one-
day period between the filing of accused-appellants' memorandum and the promulgation of the
decision was sufficient time to consider their arguments and to incorporate these in the decision. As
long as the trial judge does not sacrifice the orderly administration of justice in favor of a speedy but
reckless disposition of a case, he cannot be taken to task for rendering his decision with due dispatch.
The trial court in this case committed no reversible errors and, consequently, except for some
modification, its decision should be affirmed.

100 Ivler v San Pedro G.R. no. 172176

FACTS: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner herein, Jason Ivler was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig with two separate offenses: 1. Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries 2. Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property Petitioner pleaded guilty
for the first charge, but moved to quash the second charge invoking double jeopardy having been
convicted for the previous offense. The Metropolitan Trial Court however, refused to quash finding no
identity of offenses in the two cases.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner's conviction in the first offense charged, bars his prosecution in the
second offense charged.

HELD: Reckless imprudence is a Single Crime, its consequences on persons and property are material
only to determine the penalty. The two charges against the petitioner, arising from the same facts were
prosecuted under the same provision of the RPC, as amended, namely Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi offenses. The proposition (inferred from Art 3 of the RPC) that "reckless imprudence"
is not a crime in itself but simple a way of committing it. Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless
Imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi offense. The Court thru Justice JB Reyes:
Reason and precedent both coincide in that ones convicted or acquitted to a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. The gravity of the consequence
is only taken into account to determined the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of an offense.

Tests to determine double jeopardy: 1. Whether or not the second

offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information. 2.Whether the evidence which proves one would
prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the first if proven, would have been sufficient
to support the second charge and vice versa; or whether the crime is an ingredient of the other.

What is the test in determining whether there is a violation of the right to speedy trial?

A. The test for a violation of the right to speedy trial has always been made to begin from the time of the filing of the
information (People v. Orsal, 113 SCRA 262). In Martin v. Ver, 123 SCRA 745, it was said that the conduct of the parties, the
length of delay, the reason for delay, the defendant’s assertion or non-assertion of the right are some of the tests in
determining whether there has been a violation. (See also Hon. Adelina Calderon-Bargas, et al. v. Hon. Padolina, 45 SCAD 165,
G.R. Nos. 103259-61, Oct. 1, 1993)

People Vs. Roberto Esperanza Jesalva

Facts: An Information was filed charging accused-appellant, Ryan Menieva and Junie Ilaw alleging
that accused, conspiring together, feloniously with intent to kill with evident premeditation, treachery
and taking advantage of superior strength, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the
person of Amel Ortigosa, by then and there stabbing him with a sharp bladed instrument hitting him on
the chest, causing his untimely death.

Accused-appellant denied any participation in Ortigosa's stabbing. He claimed that on the night of the
incident, he was waiting for his sister on the corner of Dupax Street. While waiting, he saw and heard
people running and shouting which caused him to leave the place.

RTC and CA held that appellant is liable for murder as he conspired with the other accused.

Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of murder.

Ruling: No. To determine if accused-appellant conspired with Menieva and Ilaw, the focus of the
inquiry should necessarily be the overt acts of accusedappellant before, during and after the stabbing
incident.

In this case, no evidence showing that appellant was purposely waiting for Ortigosa at the time and
place of the incident and that Menieva and Ilaw were on standby, awaiting for accused-appellant's
signal. Surely, appellant could not have anticipated that on September 16, 2007, at around 1:00 a.m.,
Ortigosa and his group would pass by and go to the store to buy cigarettes. Appellant's act of pointing
to the victim and his group is not an overt act which shows that accused-appellant acted in concert with
his coaccused to cause the death of Ortigosa. Mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act,
without the cooperation and the agreement to cooperate, is not enough to establish conspiracy.

Ratio Decidendi: The presentation of proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be
convicted of any crime and deprived of his life, liberty, or even property. The hypothesis of his guilt
must flow naturally from the facts proved and must be consistent with all of them.

Gist: This appeal seeks to reverse and set aside the CA’s Decision, which upheld the Decision of the
RTC, which found appellant Roberto Esperanza Jesalva guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder

Benjamin jesalva

issue

THE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS THE TRIAL COURT, SERIOUSLY ERRED IN

RULING THAT STATEMENTS MADE BY PETITIONER IN THE POLICE STATION WERE
ADMISSIBLE AS HE WAS THEN NOT UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION DESPITE
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT HE WOULD HAVE BEEN DETAINED BY THE
POLICE HAD HIS FISCAL-COMPANION NOT [TAKEN] HIM UNDER HIS CUSTODY