Psychological Inquiry
2005, Vol. 16, No. 4, 162–167
The Nonobvious Social Psychology of Happiness
Ed Diener
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and The Gallup Organization
Shigehiro Oishi
University of Virginia
There are several classic findings in social psychol-
ogy that behavioral scientists recognize as having ex-
erted a profound influence on people’s understanding
of the world. The stars of our field, such as Milgram,
Zimbardo, Darley, and Latane, have demonstrated the
power of social situations to influence behavior, for ex-
ample in obedience, bystander intervention, confor-
mity, and altruism. Another classic set of findings of
social psychology describes in-group biases, and how
group membership profoundly influences people’s
perceptions of events. The “They Saw a Game” study
by Hastorf and Cantril (1954)—which showed how
Dartmouth and Princeton fans recalled two very differ-
ent football games, although they viewed the same
game—is a wonderful example in this area. John Bargh
and others have begun a research tradition on
nonconscious influences that has had a startling impact
on our understanding of motivation. Yet another area
where social psychology has made true progress is in
our conception of stereotyping and prejudice. Al-
though all of these areas deserve mention as major ad-
vances in social psychology, we wanted to avoid re-
peating the studies mentioned by others in this issue.
Thus, we have chosen to describe the social psycholog-
ical findings that have had a large influence on our own
field, the understanding of well-being, because we sus-
pect that the ties of social psychology to well-being re-
search might be less self-evident to most readers, ex-
cept for the important program of research on
well-being judgments of Norbert Schwarz and Fritz
Strack (1999). Because the link between their research
and well-being research is well known to social psy-
chologists, we do not review it here (see Schwarz &
Strack, 1999, for review). One motive behind our
building the bridge from social psychology to well-be-
ing research is to extend the field of social psychology
beyond the traditional bounds.
We will briefly touch on five sets of findings in so-
cial psychology, discuss the implications of these
findings to well-being, and describe studies con-
ducted by well-being researchers that follow directly
from the social psychological studies. Although lay
people might guess some aspects of these findings
correctly, we believe the conclusions are nonobvious
to most nonpsychologists. First, we discuss the fa-
Copyright © 2005 by
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
mous article of Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman
(1978) in which they maintain that people adapt
hedonically to both positive and negative conditions.
The idea of adaptation has arguably been the most in-
fluential concept guiding conceptions of well-being.
We discuss the current state of our knowledge about
whether the hedonic treadmill (Brickman & Camp-
bell, 1971) of adaptation is adequate. The second area
we review is the importance of social relationships to
adequate human functioning. Social psychologists
such as Baumeister and Leary (1995) reviewed the
negative impact of ostracism and a lack of social sup-
port on people’s functioning. Evidence has shown
that close social relationships might also be necessary
to the subjective experience of well-being, not simply
beneficial to it.
The third topic we cover relates to the second, and it
concerns the fact that negative stimuli are more power-
ful than positive stimuli (e.g., Rozin & Royzman,
2001). In social relationships, as with other stimuli,
negative episodes seem to be weighted more heavily
than positive ones. This helps explain why good social
relationships are essential to well-being. Our fourth
topic is concerned with the power of culture. Social
psychologists have demonstrated the dramatic influ-
ence of culture on thinking and behavior (e.g., Markus
& Kitayama, 1991; Nisbett, 2003; Triandis, 1989). We
describe how culture can also influence the definition,
experience, and causes of happiness. Finally, we de-
scribe evidence showing that memory is reconstructive
rather than an exact replica of the original experience
(e.g., Ross, 1989). In the domain of well-being this has
implications not only for how people recall their
moods and emotions, but also for how memory influ-
ences people’s future choices. The findings from each
of these five lines of social psychological research have
strongly influenced our understanding of well-being
and ill-being, extending our scientific conceptions far
beyond self-evident popular notions of happiness.
The Hedonic Treadmill Revisited:
Adaptation to Circumstances
Brickman and Campbell (1971) advanced the idea
that we all live on a hedonic treadmill because good
 HAPPINESS

things make us only temporarily happy and bad Implications

things make us only temporarily unhappy. In the long
Although the idea of the hedonic treadmill has not
run, we are fixed at hedonic neutrality, and our efforts
been supported in all of its particulars (see Diener,
to make ourselves happier by gaining good life cir-
Lucas, & Scollon, 2005), it still provides a fundamen-
cumstances are only short-term solutions. Brickman
tal insight—over time good things and bad things usu-
and Campbell asserted that efforts to be happier than
ally lose their power to strongly affect us. Although
neutral in the long run are doomed to failure. A slave
there are some extreme conditions that can lower our
with chronic emphysema living alone in a hovel next
well-being, many of the good and bad events provide
to his master’s mansion ought to be no less happy
only short boosts and downdrafts. Receiving a raise at
than the healthy and wealthy master. Although this
work, buying a new car, or winning an award are not
conclusion is shocking, it has informed our thinking
usually the road to long-term happiness. Instead, fresh
about what causes happiness.
involvement in activities, relationships, and goals can
In 1978 Brickman et al. presented evidence from
be a continuous source of happiness. In this sense, the
paraplegics and lottery winners to offer empirical
aphorism, “Happiness is a process, not a place,” seems
support for the idea that adaptation brings us all back
to be accurate. This does not mean that our circum-
down to hedonic neutrality, irrespective of how good
stances have no influence whatsoever on our happi-
or bad the event was originally experienced. It should
ness; they do. Rather it means that we should not rely
be noted, however, that in a closer inspection, the evi-
on circumstances alone to give us long-term feelings of
dence of Brickman et al. for adaptation was mixed
well-being. Continued involvement in new goals,
(i.e., paraplegics were not as happy as others). Our
meaningful social interactions, and interesting activi-
recent studies offer stronger support for adaptation, as
ties is required to maintain a flourishing sense of hap-
well as the modifications that must be made to the
piness (Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, & Schkade, in press).
original theory. First, it appears that people adapt
Another important implication of the findings on
over time, but not always completely back to the
adaptation is that we often mispredict what will make
point where they started. For instance, we found that
us happy and unhappy (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson,
both widowhood (Lucas, Clark, Georgellis, & Diener,
Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998). We believe that if we
2003) and unemployment (Lucas, Clark, Georgellis,
become wealthy we will be happier than we will in fact
& Diener, 2004) led to lower levels of life satisfaction
be, and we believe that if we do not obtain tenure we
even many years after the event. Although people
will be more miserable than we will in fact be. These
showed adaptation over time after the event occurred,
mispredictions demonstrate that we probably count too
they had not adapted completely back to their former
much on conditions to make us happy. It follows, for
levels of life satisfaction even after 5 years. Despite
example, that it would be a mistake to sacrifice close
the fact that people may not adapt to all conditions,
relationships or interesting work to pursue a job that
we have found that they adapt to the smaller rewards
was uninteresting but lucrative. The mispredictions
and setbacks of everyday life (Suh, Diener, & Fujita,
people make reveal that the full effects of adaptation
1996).
are not understood by laypeople.
Given that adaptation occurs but seems incom-
plete, are people living in harsher conditions less
happy than others? The answer seems to be that
sometimes they are, and sometimes they are not. For Close Social Relationships Are
example, we found that the African Maasai are rela- Essential to Well-Being
tively happy, although they live in dung huts without
indoor plumbing or electricity, and the Inuit of Bradburn (1969), in his classic seminal work on
Northern Greenland are relatively satisfied with well-being, found that social relationships were one of
their lives despite living in a very harsh climate the strongest correlates of positive emotions. In the
(Biswas-Diener, Vittersø, & Diener, 2004). How- past decades evidence has accumulated showing that
ever, we have found that street prostitutes, the home- lack of social support and close social relationships can
less, and people in mental hospitals are unhappy, far have far-reaching effects. Baumeister and Leary
below neutral, even when their conditions have per- (1995) reviewed the evidence showing that people
sisted over some period of time (e.g., Biswas-Diener seem to have a fundamental need for close social rela-
& Diener, 2001). Perhaps such social variables as tionships. Social connectedness and support are asso-
lack of respect and lack of trusted friends make ciated with better levels of autonomic activity, better
these conditions more persistently difficult than pov- immunosurveillance, and lower basal levels of stress
erty. This idea can be substantiated by the fact that hormones (Uchino, Cacioppo, & Kiecolt-Glazer,
impoverished individuals in the slums of Calcutta, 1996). Other recent work by Williams (2001) reveals
who live in shacks with their families, score in the impaired cognitive functioning in people who have
positive zone on life satisfaction. been ostracized from a group.

163
 DIENER & OISHI
Newer evidence now suggests that close social re-
lationships are not simply correlates of well-being,
but may have causal force. For example, research on
widows (Lucas et al., 2003; Stroebe, Stroebe,
Abakoumkin, & Schut, 1996) and divorced people
(Clark, Diener, Georgellis, & Lucas, 2004) shows
substantial declines in well-being right before and af-
ter the loss of a significant other. When we examined
the characteristics of the happiest individuals, we
found without exception that they reported strongly
positive social relationships (Diener & Seligman,
2002). Thus, Bradburn’s (1969) early findings on the
importance of social relationships to well-being have
now been extensively supported. Although laypeople
probably understand that close friends and family are
correlated with happiness, they may not realize that
they are necessary for happiness, as well as for health
and optimal cognitive functioning.
Implications
Many people focus on wealth when they pursue
happiness, but research on social relationships sug-
gests that they can be more important than material
prosperity to subjective well-being. The word needs to
be spread—it is important to work on social skills,
close interpersonal ties, and social support to be happy.
It is a mistake to value money over social relationships.
For instance, we found that students who value money
more than love are dissatisfied with their lives (Diener
& Oishi, 2000).
The Power of the Negative
Close personal relationships are essential to
well-being, but we are made miserable by tyrannical
supervisors, abusive spouses, and vindictive friends.
Without social relationships, it may be very difficult or
impossible to reach high levels of happiness. However,
because negative events affect our well-being more
than positive events, relationships can also be a power-
ful force for unhappiness. An important insight of so-
cial and experimental psychologists is that we are built
to react more strongly to negative events than to posi-
tive ones. Thus, social relationships are a necessary
cause for happiness, but they must contain a prepon-
derance of positive interactions to serve this function.
In “Prospect Theory,” Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) hypothesized that losses loom larger than gains.
In later work, losses and gains were reframed in a
broader way to include all bad and good events
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001;
Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Summing up this view,
Baumeister et al. (2001) wrote that “bad is stronger
than good.” In a related vein, Taylor (1991) maintained
that we react quickly and strongly to negative events,
164
although our system is designed to shut down these
negative reactions relatively quickly. Thus, we react
strongly to negative events, according to Taylor, but we
also adapt to them.
Gottman (1994) extended to social relationships the
idea that negative is stronger than positive. In his re-
search on marriage, Gottman found that marital part-
ners who have an equal number of positive and nega-
tive interactions perceive their marriage in negative
terms. Indeed, the Gottman ratio suggests a ratio of five
or six positive interactions for every negative interac-
tion for a marriage to be considered satisfying. Obvi-
ously, the specific ratio will change, depending on the
nature of the interactions, but the point is the same—
that one usually needs more positive interactions than
negative ones to experience a relationship as desirable.
Fredrickson and Losada (2004) recently extended the
Gottman ratio to positive and negative emotions as
they relate to global well-being, and found that a ratio
of 2.9 or above was needed for flourishing.
Implications
Much more research is needed on the Gottman ratio
in other types of social relationships. However, for the
time being it would be wise in one’s relationships to re-
member the dictum that negative is stronger than posi-
tive. If one criticizes or corrects a friend or family
member, one must work to have many positive interac-
tions to make up for that. The findings in this area sug-
gest that with our friends and family members, giving
compliments, helping them at tasks, interacting in in-
teresting conversations with them, and expressing af-
fection are necessary to keep the relationships in the
positive zone. Occasionally, of course, we need to offer
criticisms, advice, and corrections because a behavior
of a friend, colleague, or family member should be
changed. But we then need to work on our Gottman ra-
tio to keep the relationship in the positive zone.
Culture and Well-Being
Anthropologists such as Mead, Benedict, and
Malinowski made famous the dramatic differences that
exist between cultures. It was left to social and person-
ality psychologists to measure and quantify the differ-
ences in a much more rigorous way than had occurred
before. Furthermore, pioneers such as Hofstede,
Triandis, Markus, Kitayama, and Nisbett showed that
even when people live in similar ways in industrialized
nations, there are clear differences in the ways they
think, feel, and behave.
Recently cultural differences have been found for
the form and shape of happiness, as well as what
causes it. Kitayama and Markus (2000) emphasized
that what it means “to be well” differs across cultures.
 HAPPINESS
For instance, in eastern Asia, happiness results from
taking a disciplined and critical view of the self, and in
so doing, exchanging sympathy for each other.
Kim-Prieto, Fujita, and Diener (2004) have found that
certain emotions, such as pride and worry, cluster dif-
ferently across cultures. Although pride clusters with
the positive emotions in the United States, it clusters
with the negative emotions in many cultures. Although
we found a universal patterning of certain core emo-
tions across all cultures, we found that other, second-
ary, emotions changed positions across cultures (see
also Eid & Diener, 2001). Tsai, Knutson, and Fung
(2004) found that Americans valued high activation
positive states, whereas Chinese valued low activation
positive states. Thus, certain emotions are considered
valuable and appropriate in some cultures, and less so
in other cultures. This reinforces the contention of
Markus and Kitayama (1991) that what emotions feel
good depends to some extent on culture.
Besides the nature and patterning of well-being, we
also have found that the causes and correlates of happi-
ness vary across cultures. For example, Diener and
Diener (1995) found that self-esteem was a much
stronger predictor of the life satisfaction of women in
individualistic than in collectivistic societies. On the
other hand, financial satisfaction was a stronger predic-
tor of life satisfaction in poor than in wealthy nations.
Similarly, Suh (2002) found that personal consistency
was a stronger predictor of both self-rated well-being
and peer-rated likability in the United States than in
Korea (see Diener, Oishi, & Lucas, 2003; Diener &
Tov, in press; for review).
What we do not yet know is whether the outcomes
of happiness differ across cultures. We find that happy
people are more successful in many areas of life; but al-
most all of the relevant research has been conducted in
modern Westernized nations (Lyubomirsky, King &
Diener, in press). We suspect that the relation of happi-
ness to success might differ in other societies.
Implications
An essential insight of social psychology is that
what it means to be happy is not identical around the
globe. Certain feelings can be valued in one culture
and not in another. Furthermore, although there are
undoubtedly universals across cultures in what causes
happiness, there are also correlates of happiness that
are culture specific. This knowledge should help us
decenter from our own worldview, and realize that
not all peoples are motivated by identical concerns
and that specific moods and emotions might serve as
differential guides to behavior in various societies.
Thus, people’s judgments about what feelings are de-
sirable can vary, as well as can the causes of pleasant
feelings.
Memory for Everyday Life
Pioneering social and experimental psychologists
have shown that our memories do not completely map
onto the original experience. Instead, they are transfor-
mations of the experience that are reconstructed based
on current motives and beliefs, as well as other factors
(e.g., Bartlett, 1932; Loftus, 1992; Roediger & Gallo,
2002). The practical implications of this work have
been far reaching in the legal arena, where eyewitness
testimony is now known to be less reliable than for-
merly believed (e.g., Wells & Olson, 2003).
Michael Ross (1989) reviewed a diverse array of
findings that suggest that people often reconstruct their
memory to fit their implicit theories or current views.
For instance, women often reported having experi-
enced more pain during their menstrual periods, al-
though their daily reports proved otherwise. More re-
cent work (e.g., Wilson & Ross, 2001) indicates that
people degrade their personality in the past so as to
view themselves as having improved over time. Robin-
son and Clore (2002) concluded that retrospective
judgments of emotions are influenced by beliefs and
self-concepts, and are based on different kinds of evi-
dence than are “online” judgments. Levine’s (1997)
study on the memories of Ross Perot supporters in the
1992 presidential election is a classic in this field.
When Perot withdrew from the election, respondents
reported their emotional reactions to this event. When
they later recalled their reactions, their memories were
tainted by their current views of Perot.
In the area of well-being, the experience sampling
method (ESM) has improved researchers’ ability to ex-
amine the accuracy of self-reported experiences of
emotions. For instance, the ESM studies revealed that
people overestimate the intensity of emotions, whereas
they underestimate the absolute frequency of emotions
(e.g., Schimmack, 1997; Thomas & Diener, 1990).
Retrospective judgments of emotions are also biased
toward peak and end experiences (Fredrickson &
Kahneman, 1993). European Americans’ retrospective
judgments of well-being move in a more positive direc-
tion than do Asians’ (e.g., Oishi, 2002). Of importance,
although retrospective judgments of affective experi-
ences deviate from actual experiences, they seem to
predict future choices better than the aggregate of on-
line experiences (Wirtz, Kruger, Scollon, & Diener,
2003).
Implications
Memory for emotional experiences is not static, but
dynamic (Kim-Prieto, Diener, Tamir, Scollon, &
Diener, in press). It sometimes goes through a dramatic
transformation (e.g., a first kiss to a boyfriend might be
recalled as happy rather than fearful now). Online and
recalled experiences are both “real” and capture impor-
165
 DIENER & OISHI
tant aspects of emotion, and therefore there are two
separable aspects of happiness—that which we feel
online and that which we recall feeling. Memory re-
search suggests that people can feel happy in several
ways: (a) by seeing themselves grow through negative
experiences, (b) by positively reappraising past nega-
tive experiences, and/or (c) by downplaying the
positivity of past positive events relative to current
ones.
Concluding Remarks
Social psychology has had an enormous impact on
subjective well-being research over the years. Now
we know a substantial amount about various aspects
of happiness such as the course of adaptation, errone-
ous predictions about future happiness, memory ac-
curacy for happiness, different forms of happiness,
and cultural differences in what correlates with hap-
piness. One emerging agenda is how subjective
well-being, including moods and emotions, influ-
ences objective life outcomes (e.g., longevity, health,
job performance, income, and marriage), prosocial
behaviors (e.g., donating to charity and volunteering),
and interpersonal and intergroup behaviors (e.g., inti-
macy and cooperation). Social psychology can be
proud of the large and rapid advances made in under-
standing well-being, but there is still much exciting
work ahead.
Note
Correspondence should be sent to Ed Diener, De-
partment of Psychology, University of Illinois, Cham-
paign, IL 61820. E-mail: ediener@uiuc.edu
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