Psychology of Religion and Spirituality © 2014 American Psychological Association

2014, Vol. 6, No. 3, 188 –197 1941-1022/14/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0036344

The Relationship Between Mock Jurors’ Religious Characteristics and

Their Verdicts and Sentencing Decisions

Monica K. Miller Jonathan Maskaly

University of Nevada, Reno East Carolina University

Clayton D. Peoples and Alexandra E. Sigillo

University of Nevada, Reno
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Two mock jury studies investigated whether jurors’ religious characteristics relate to verdicts and
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

sentencing decisions. In Study 1, adding religious characteristics to a model with only demographics and
authoritarianism increased the model’s explanatory power. Scoring high on devotionalism was signifi-
cantly related to not guilty verdicts; scoring high on fundamentalism was significantly related to guilty
verdicts. In both studies, being on a religious quest was significantly related to prodefendant legal
decisions. Lawyers can use this information in jury selection. Further, authoritarianism was a mediator
of the relationship between some religious variables and legal decisions, helping explain the underlying
reasons for such relationships.

Keywords: jury decision-making, religious characteristics, attributions, authoritarianism, fundamental-

ism, Questism, devotionalism

During jury selection, lawyers occasionally exclude potential
jurors based on their religious characteristics (Miller & Hayward,
2008). Appellate courts have upheld exclusion of potential jurors
with strong religious beliefs (United States v. DeJesus, 2003) or
who belonged to certain religious groups (e.g., State v. Purcell,
2001). Others have objected to exclusions based on religious
affiliation (e.g., Highler v. State, 2006). Trial consulting articles
offer suggestions for how to use religion as a basis for selecting
jurors (e.g., Lindsey et al., 2008). A question remains, however, as
to whether this is an effective practice. Specifically, does removing
jurors with certain religious characteristics improve the chances of
a favorable legal decision?
Two studies determined whether jurors’ religious characteristics
(e.g., fundamentalist beliefs) relate to their verdicts and sentencing
decisions. Previous studies investigated relationships between re-
ligious characteristics and attitudes toward various punishments,
but used a limited number of religious scales and/or did not
measure verdicts or sentences specifically (Grasmick, Bursik, &
Blackwell, 1993; Young, 1992). Some studies only focused on
affiliation, while ignoring variation in religious beliefs (Songer &
Tabrizi, 1999). Other research studied the impact of religious
This article was published Online First April 21, 2014.
Monica K. Miller, Department of Criminal Justice and Interdisciplinary
PhD Program in Social Psychology, University of Nevada, Reno; Jonathan
Maskaly, Department of Criminal Justice, East Carolina University; Clay-
ton D. Peoples, Department of Sociology, University of Nevada, Reno;
Alexandra E. Sigillo, Interdisciplinary PhD Program in Social Psychology,
University of Nevada, Reno.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Monica
K. Miller, Department of Criminal Justice, University of Nevada, Reno.
E-mail: mkmiller@unr.edu
characteristics in limited contexts (e.g., death penalty; Miller &
Hayward, 2008). The current study involved two legal contexts
(i.e., guilt verdicts and sentencing decisions in criminal cases) and
implement previously unused religious scales (e.g., being on a
religious quest) to determine relationships between a variety of
religious characteristics and legal decisions.
How Lawyers Select Jurors Based on Their Religious
Characteristics
Before the start of jury trials, attorneys use peremptory chal-
lenges to dismiss potential jurors who might favor the opposing
side. The U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that jurors cannot be
excluded based on their race (Batson v. Kentucky, 1986) or gender
(J.E.B. v. Alabama, 1994); however, the Court decided not to rule
on religion-based exclusions (Davis v. Minnesota, 1994). Some
lower courts have decided that it is unacceptable to exclude jurors
based on any religious characteristic (e.g., State v. Hodge, 1999;
United States v. DeJesus, 2003), while other courts allow the
practice (e.g., State v. Fuller, 2004; State v. Purcell, 2001).
In jurisdictions that allow it, some lawyers select jurors based on
religious characteristics (see Bornstein & Miller, 2009). Lawyers
have excluded jurors who are Catholic (State v. Purcell, 2001),
Islamic (State v. Hodge, 1999), Jehovah’s Witness (People v.
Martin, 1998), Pentecostal (Casarez v. State, 1995), or highly
religious (e.g., State v. Fuller, 2004). Trial consulting guides and
legal scholars discuss the practice of selecting jurors based on their
characteristics (Fulero & Penrod, 1990; Hans & Jehle, 2003;
Lieberman & Sales, 2006), but note that relationships between
personal characteristics and verdicts are typically small (Bornstein
& Miller, 2009). Though lawyers use this practice, there is little
research that tests relationships between religion and juror deci-
sions (but see Kerr, Hymes, Anderson, & Weathers, 1995; Miller

188
 RELIGIOUS INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
& Hayward, 2008). The current research investigated whether
jurors’ religious beliefs are related to verdicts (Study 1) and
sentencing decisions (Study 2), and whether these religious char-
acteristics predict juror behavior above and beyond basic demo-
graphics.
Religion and Legal Judgments
It is a widely held belief that peoples’ religious backgrounds
affect their legal attitudes (e.g., verdicts, sentencing; see Bornstein
& Miller, 2009). For instance, a judge allegedly advised a prose-
cutor to remove Jewish potential jurors because they are unlikely
to give the death penalty (Kravets, 2006). Although lawyers might
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remove jurors based on their religion, research has not yet fully
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determined which religious characteristics might affect legal out-
comes.
Relationship Between Religious Characteristics and
Legal Judgments
Differences between religious groups often predict attitudes
toward punishment or verdicts. For instance, Jewish mock jurors
are less likely to convict than Christian jurors in a child molesta-
tion case (Kerr et al., 1995) and Southern Baptists tend to support
the death penalty more than other Christian groups (e.g., Catholics;
Uelmen, 2005). Even so, some studies have failed to find differ-
ences among religious affiliations (e.g., Miller, 2006). Overall,
affiliation generally predicts legal attitudes best when the affilia-
tion has a specific doctrine about that legal issue (see generally
Bornstein & Miller, 2009). For example, the Catholic Church has
an official position against the death penalty. Even so, just because
a person is a member of that religious group does not mean she
follows all its tenets (e.g., Justice Scalia is a devout Catholic but
also a supporter of the death penalty). It is possible, therefore, that
religious characteristics (e.g., fundamentalist beliefs) are actually
more strongly related to legal judgments (e.g., verdicts) than
affiliation (e.g., Sigillo, Miller, & Weiser, 2012).
The characteristics most often studied are evangelism, funda-
mentalism, and devotionalism (Bornstein & Miller, 2009). Evan-
gelism is the desire to convert others to Christianity (Young,
1992). Those high in evangelism are typically less supportive of
the death penalty (Young, 1992; but see Miller, 2006; Miller &
Hayward, 2008). This is perhaps because putting someone to death
makes it impossible to convert them to Christianity (Young, 1992)
and showing lenience might encourage the wrongdoer to covert
(Miller, 2013). As such, participants high in evangelism may be
“prodefendant” in terms of verdicts and sentencing decisions.
Fundamentalism is often described as religious conservatism
(Applegate, Cullen, Fisher, & Vander Ven, 2000; Putney &
Middleton, 1961). Fundamentalists believe crime and immorality
result from sin that needs to be punished so that individuals will
take responsibility for their actions and change their ways (Apple-
gate et al., 2000; Ellison & Sherkat, 1993; Young, 1992). Gener-
ally, fundamentalists subscribe to the Hammurabi type “eye for an
eye” codes and promote retribution, regardless of the rehabilitative
or deterrent value of punishment (Grasmick, Davenport, Chamlin,
& Bursik, 1992). Fundamentalists generally have more favorable
attitudes toward the death penalty (Grasmick et al., 1992; Miller &
Hayward, 2008; Vogel, 2003; but see Britt, 1998); no study (we
189
are aware of) has found that fundamentalists are less punitive than
nonfundamentalists. Punitiveness might translate into fundamen-
talists being more likely to convict and believe a defendant de-
serves prison.
Devotionalism is essentially how important religion is to a
person. In general, the more devout individuals are, the less fa-
vorable their attitudes toward the death penalty. For instance,
persons who pray and read the Bible more frequently (Young,
1992), have “stronger” religious experiences (Unnever & Cullen,
2006), or attend religious services more frequently (Baumer,
Messner, & Rosenfeld, 2003) are less supportive of the death
penalty. Meanwhile, other studies have found no relationship
between devotionalism and support for harsher courts (Applegate
et al., 2000), more punitive treatment of criminals (Applegate et
al., 2000), or mock jurors’ verdicts (Miller, 2006; Miller & Hay-
ward, 2008). Only one study has found that devotionalism is
related to greater punitiveness; specifically, mock jurors in a child
abuse case who went to church more often were more likely to
convict than those who attended less often (Johnson, 1985).
Four other religious measures were included in the current
research; these have been used much less frequently to predict
legal judgments. Two concern extrinsic religiosity (social or prac-
tical) and one concerns intrinsic religiosity. Extrinsically religious
persons use religion to find, “security and solace, sociability and
distraction, status and self-justification” (Allport & Ross, 1967, p.
434). Intrinsically religious people are said to bring all other things
in their lives “into harmony with the[ir] religious beliefs and
prescriptions” (Allport & Ross, 1967, p. 434). In essence, extrin-
sically religious people use their religion to fill a void in their life,
while intrinsically religious people live their life according to their
religious beliefs. Although intrinsic and extrinsic religiosities have
not been studied for possible relationships to verdicts or sentences,
the scales have been associated with other attitudes. Extrinsic
religiosity is positively correlated with Altemeyer’s (1996) right-
wing authoritarian scale, which is related to punitiveness (i.e.,
extrinsically religious people tend to be more authoritarian; au-
thoritarians tend to be more punitive; Wink, Dillon, & Prettyman,
2007). Further, people who are more intrinsically religious score
higher on fundamentalism (Genia, 1996). It is possible that indi-
viduals with high levels of both intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity
may be more likely find the defendant guilty or agree that a
defendant deserves prison, simply because these characteristics are
related to other characteristics (e.g., fundamentalism, authoritari-
anism).
The next religious characteristic used in the current study is the
Quest Scale (Batson & Shoenrade, 1991) that measures if a person
is “honestly facing existential questions in their complexity, while
at the same time resisting clear-cut, pat answers. An individual
who approaches religion in this way recognizes that he or she does
not know, and probably never know the absolute truth about such
matters” (Batson & Shoenrade, 1991, p. 417). Being on a religious
quest is characterized by a questioning, doubting, open, and flex-
ible approach to religion (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). No study
we could find related Quest to convictions or sentences, however
Quest scores were weakly but negatively related to punitive jury
sentences, authoritarianism, and fundamentalism (e.g., Altemeyer
& Hunsberger, 1992). Thus, it is possible that individuals on a
quest will be more prodefendant than those who are not.
 190 MILLER, MASKALY, PEOPLES, AND SIGILLO
Relationship Between Other Variables and Legal
Judgments
Three additional variables measured in this study could affect a
person’s legal judgments: authoritarianism, gender, and race. Le-
gal authoritarianism was first measured with the Legal Attitudes
Questionnaire designed by Boehm (1968) and includes three sub-
scales that assess a person’s authoritarian, antiauthoritarian, and
equalitarian attitudes. In the original scale, Boehm indicated that
authoritarian questions, “expressed right-wing philosophy, en-
dorsed indiscriminately the acts of constituted authority, or were
essentially punitive in nature” (p. 740). Authoritarian mock jurors
were more likely to convict defendants (e.g., Boehm, 1968;
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Cowan, Thompson, & Ellsworth, 1984). Later Kravitz, Culter, and
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Brock (1993) created the Revised Legal Attitudes Questionnaire,
which is also positively related to punitiveness.
Some studies indicate that gender could relate to juror decisions
(Bottoms, Davis, & Epstein, 2004; O’Neil, Patry, & Penrod, 2004;
Whitehead & Blankenship, 2000), although other studies failed to
find this relationship (Lester, Maggioncalda-Aretz, & Stark, 1997;
Valliant & Oliver, 1997). Similarly, race is associated with puni-
tiveness in studies of the death penalty (Unnever, Cullen, &
Johnson, 2008; Young, 1992).
Indirect Relationships
While religious characteristics might directly affect verdict,
there also might be an indirect (i.e., mediated) relationship. Spe-
cifically, authoritarianism may be a mediator such that certain
religious characteristics are related to authoritarianism, and author-
itarianism is related to verdict or sentence. High authoritarian
individuals report that their religious experiences and beliefs led
them to respect authority, reject sinners, and support strict rules
about behavior (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). These authori-
tarianism beliefs relate to punitiveness.
Past research has confirmed such mediating relationships. Spe-
cifically, authoritarianism mediates the relationship between reli-
giosity and attitudes toward out-groups (Johnson Shen, Haggard,
Strassburger, & Rowatt, 2013), democratic values (Canetti-Nisim,
2004), and racism (Johnson et al., 2011). Mediating analyses
reveal why religion is related to other constructs: because of the
relationship with authoritarianism. Mediation analyses clarify re-
lationships by revealing that religion is only related to other
constructs because of authoritarianism—thus, furthering knowl-
edge of how religion relates to other constructs.
This study furthers those just mentioned by investigating
whether authoritarianism mediates relationships between religious
variables and verdicts/sentences. As discussed above, many reli-
gious beliefs relate to authoritarianism, such as extrinsic religiosity
(Wink et al., 2007), Quest (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992), and
fundamentalism (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). In turn, author-
itarianism is related to punitiveness (Kravitz et al., 1993). Thus,
authoritarianism possibly mediates the relationship between reli-
gious variables and verdicts/sentences.
Overview and Hypotheses for Both Studies
The current studies expand on previous research regarding gen-
eral attitudes or sentencing verdicts by determining whether vari-
ous religious characteristics are related to a juror’s guilt verdict
(Study 1) and sentencing decision (Study 2). Another difference
between current and previous studies is the use of multiple reli-
gious measures. Previous researchers used a limited number of
scales (e.g., Bjarnason & Welch, 2004; Miller & Hayward, 2008).
The current study includes seven religious measures, including
four less-often used scales.
Based on extant research, several hypotheses are offered. First,
in accordance with Young (1992), we predict that mock jurors who
score higher on an evangelism scale or devotionalism scale will be
prodefendant (i.e., less likely to convict in Study 1 and agree less
that the defendant deserves a prison sentence in Study 2). Second,
in accordance with Miller and Hayward (2008), mock jurors who
score higher on the fundamentalism measure will be less prode-
fendant. We have no specific predictions for the intrinsic religios-
ity scale, extrinsic religiosity scale (Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989),
or Quest Scale (Batson & Shoenrade, 1991) as there is little
previous research. However, as mentioned above, individuals low
in intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity or high in Quest may be more
prodefendant. Similarly, we do not make any hypotheses about the
mediation models because of the scarcity of existing related re-
search.
Other variables (i.e., gender, race, religious affiliation, and au-
thoritarianism) are “control variables” to statistically account for
factors that are not of direct interest to the current analysis but may
affect verdicts. Thus, we do not offer explicit hypotheses for these
variables. We should note that religious affiliation is a control
variable because the sample is relatively homogenous and because
we are more interested in religious characteristics, rather than
affiliation.
Study 1
Study 1 Method and Procedure
Participants. Participants were 304 undergraduate students
who received course credit; 49.5% were female, 71.7% were
White, and they ranged in age from 18 to 59 (M ⫽ 21.8). The
majority was Christian (31.9% Catholic, 21.5% Protestant). The
rest were Atheist, Agnostic, expressed a belief in a God but had no
particular affiliation or were “Other” (e.g., six Jews, one Bud-
dhist).
Trial summary and questionnaire. Participants read a 1,200
word trial summary depicting an attempted bombing.1 The trial
1
This study was conducted in conjunction with another study that had a
completely different purpose: to test the effectiveness of a particular alibi.
Participants read one of three scenarios that differed only on the defen-
dant’s alibi. The manipulation of alibi is not the focus of the current article,
but it is statistically controlled in the analyses to ensure any effects are
accounted for. The other study has entirely different aims than this study,
and thus only the aspects of that study that are related to this study are
noted here. Because the two studies had completely different purposes,
none of the data reported here is reported in that article or elsewhere. All
data in this article is unique and unpublished. The data in this article
concerns whether mock jurors’ individual religious characteristics affect
their individual verdict preference. The data in the other article concerned
whether the manipulated variables affected individual perceptions and
individual/group verdicts—and whether these variables were affected by
the deliberation process. Thus, there is no overlap in the studies because of
their different purposes. That article is available from the first author.
 RELIGIOUS INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
summary included case facts of a trial for attempted use of weap-
ons of mass destruction in which the 27-year-old male defendant is
accused of leaving a bomb at a train station. The summary in-
cluded testimonies from prosecution witnesses (i.e., security guard
who found the bomb and an eyewitness who saw the defendant
leave the bomb) and a defense witness (i.e., the defendant’s friend
who provided an alibi). The evidence included security camera
video, a sweatshirt found in the defendant’s apartment that resem-
bled the one worn by the bomber in the security video, and
fertilizer found in the defendant’s apartment that could be used in
making a bomb. Finally, the trail summary included judge’s in-
structions to the jury and a photo of the defendant. After reading
the trial stimuli, participants indicated their verdict (guilty or not
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guilty) and completed seven religious scales, the legal authoritar-
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ianism scale, and demographic questions.
Variables. Brief descriptions of the variables as well as de-
scriptive statistics are in Table 1.
Dependent variable. Participants were asked “How do you
find the defendant?” and chose “guilty” or “not guilty.”
Main independent variables. The main independent variables
measure religious characteristics. All scales were created by aver-
aging the participant’s responses. First, Gorsuch and McPherson’s
(1989) Extrinsic/Intrinsic Revised Scale consists of three extrinsic-
practical religiosity items (e.g., “I pray mainly to gain relief and
protection”), three extrinsic-social religiosity items (e.g., “I go to
church because it helps me to make friends”), and eight intrinsic
religiosity items (e.g., “I enjoy reading about my religion”). Items
are rated on a Likert scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly
agree).2 Interitem reliability for all subscales was acceptable
(Cronbach’s ␣ ⫽ .841, .842, and .717, respectively).
Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s (2004) Revised Fundamentalism
Scale asks 12 questions such as “The basic cause of evil in this
world is Satan, who is still constantly and ferociously fighting
against God.” Items are rated on a Likert scale of 1 (strongly
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Interitem reliability was quite high
(Cronbach’s ␣ ⫽ .907).
We utilized two 6-item scales from Putney and Middleton
(1961): evangelism (e.g., “I have a duty to help those who are
confused about religion”) and devotionalism (e.g., “I very often
think about matters relating to religion”). The original scales were
called fanaticism and importance, respectively, though more recent
literature commonly uses the terms evangelism and devotionalism
(Bornstein & Miller, 2009). Items were rated on a Likert scale of
1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).3 Interitem reliabilities
were acceptable (Cronbach’s ␣ ⫽ .687 and .870, respectively).
Finally, Batson and Shoenrade’s (1991) Quest Scale contained
12 items (e.g., “I am constantly questioning my religious beliefs”)
rated on a Likert scale, from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly
agree). The interitem reliability was acceptable (Cronbach’s ␣ ⫽
.798).
Control variables. Control variables4 measure mock jurors’
demographic characteristics and legal attitudes. Participants were
categorized as either White or non-White and as either Catholic or
Other. The 23-item Revised Legal Attitudes Questionnaire
(RLAQ23; Kravitz et al., 1993) measured authoritarianism on a
Likert scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Interi-
tem reliability was good (Cronbach’s ␣ ⫽ .746).
191
Study 1 Results
We ran two logistic regression models using a “nested models”
approach. First, we ran a logistic regression model (“Model 1”) of
verdict on only the control variables. Then, in Model 2, we added
the main independent variables to determine their impact on ver-
dicts net of the control variables (via examining their coefficients)
and assess how much they explain verdicts beyond the control
variables (via comparing the model R2s of Models 1 and 2).5 For
both models, we conducted colinearity diagnostics and confirmed
that there were no highly correlated estimates. Approximately 38%
of our jurors found the defendant guilty.
The findings from the models are in Table 2. Model 1 shows the
results of the analyses using only the control variables as predic-
tors. The R2 for Model 1 suggests that these control variables
account for 11.5% of the variance in juror verdicts. There are no
significant differences in verdicts based on gender, race, or reli-
gious affiliation. However, those who are more authoritarian are
significantly more likely to find the defendant guilty (p ⬍ .05,
two-tailed).
Model 2 adds the main independent variables to the equation.
The R2 suggests that this “full model” accounts for 17.7% of the
variance in verdicts. More importantly, this marks a significant
improvement over Model 1 (F ⫽ 2.873). The main independent
variables—religious characteristics—account for ⬃35.0% of the
overall explanatory power of the model. Put differently, their
addition results in a 53.9% improvement in power over Model 1
(i.e., the model with only control variables).
Among religious characteristics, fundamentalism significantly
increases the likelihood of conviction (p ⬍ .05, two-tailed), which
is consistent with the literature (e.g., Miller & Hayward, 2008).
The odds ratio score suggests that those who are more fundamen-
talist are 70.5% more likely to find the defendant guilty than those
who are less fundamentalist.
The religious characteristics that decrease the odds of a guilty
verdict are devotionalism and being on a religious quest. Devo-
tionalism significantly decreases the likelihood of conviction (p ⬍
.05, two-tailed) such that those who are more devotional are 38.9%
(1-.611) less likely to find the defendant guilty than those who are
less devotional. Being on a religious quest significantly decreases
the odds of finding the defendant guilty as well (p ⬍ .05, two-
tailed). Those who are more actively engaged in a religious quest
are 36.8% (1–.632) less likely to find the defendant guilty than
those less engaged in a religious quest.
Authoritarianism as a mediator. While the analyses above
indicate that religious variables affect verdicts, they do not specifically
2
The rule for case inclusion with this and all subsequent scales was that
the juror must have provided an answer to at least one of the items
composing the scale— but jurors typically answered most or all items.
3
We recognize that some items on these scales are targeted toward
Christians; thus, members of different affiliations may respond differently.
By including both affiliation and these religious measures in the model, we
hope to minimize this effect.
4
Also included in analyses is a control for condition (trial summary
read), as noted earlier.
5
We recognize that logistic regression models do not produce genuine
R2 statistics; but the many “pseudo” R2 statistics produced by statistical
packages are reliable proxies of logistic regression models’ overall explan-
atory power. We are using SPSS, and utilize the Cox/Snell pseudo-R2
statistic because it is the most conservative.
 192 MILLER, MASKALY, PEOPLES, AND SIGILLO

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Study 1

Variable type/name Brief description N ␣ Mean SD

Dependent variable
Verdict Dummy (0, 1): “Guilty” ⫽ 1 279 — .380 .486
Main independent variables
Extrinsic religiosity: Practical Likert scale (1–5), 3 items 279 .841 2.545 1.175
Extrinsic religiosity: Social Likert scale (1–5), 3 items 279 .842 1.584 .794
Intrinsic religiosity Likert scale (1–5), 8 items 279 .717 2.561 .847
Fundamentalism Likert scale (1–5), 12 items 279 .907 2.319 .894
Evangelism Likert scale (1–5), 6 items 279 .687 2.363 .779
Devotionalism Likert scale (1–5), 6 items 279 .870 2.898 1.096
On a religious quest Likert scale (1–5), 12 items 279 .798 2.588 .728
Control variables
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Gender (Ref: Male): 279

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Female Dummy (0, 1): “Yes” ⫽ 1 138 — .495 .501

Race (Ref: White): 279
Non-White Dummy (0, 1): “Yes” ⫽ 1 79 — .283 .145
Religion (Ref: Protestant/other): 279
Catholic Dummy (0, 1): “Yes” ⫽ 1 89 — .319 .467
Legal attitudes:
Legal authoritarianism Likert scale (1–5), 23 items 279 .746 3.000 .466
Note. ␣ denotes Cronbach’s ␣.

explain the decision-making mechanism behind these relationships.
Authoritarianism may be a mediator such that religious characteristics
are related to authoritarianism, which is related to the dependent
variable (see also Shen et al., 2013). Fundamentalism, devotionalism,
and Quest are significant predictors of verdict; thus, the following
analyses will see if authoritarianism mediates any of these relation-
ships. A series of regressions and Sobel tests was conducted (Mack-
innon & Dwyer, 1993). Mediation has four required steps: (Step 1) the
IV must be related to the DV; (Step 2) the IV must be related to the
mediator; (Step 3) the mediator must be related to the DV; and (Step
4) when controlling for the mediator, the IV must no longer be related
to the DV. All four steps must be satisfied. A Sobel test indicates
whether the mediation is significant (Baron & Kenny, 1986; MacK-
innon, Warsi, & Dwyer, 1995).

Table 2
Unstandardized Coefficients and Odds Ratio Scores From Logistic Regression of Verdict
(Guilty ⫽ 1, Not Guilty ⫽ 0) on Religious Characteristics and Control Variables

Model 1 Model 2
Unstandardized Unstandardized
coefficients Odds ratios coefficients Odds ratios

Main independent variables

Extrinsic religiosity: Practical — — .097 1.102
Extrinsic religiosity: Social — — .168 1.183
Intrinsic religiosity — — .429 1.536
Fundamentalism — — .533ⴱ 1.705b
Evangelism — — ⫺.468 .626
Devotionalism — — ⫺.492ⴱ .611b
On a religious quest — — ⫺.459ⴱ .632b
Control variablesa
Gender (Ref: Male):
Female ⫺.417 .659 ⫺.498 .608
Race (Ref: White):
Non-White .255 1.291 .083 1.086
Religion (Ref: Protestant/other):
Catholic .232 1.261 .314 1.369
Legal attitudes:
Legal authoritarianism 1.649ⴱ 5.202 1.432ⴱ 4.187
Cox & Snell R2 .115 .177
N 279 279
a
Also included in analyses, but not presented in the table for the sake of brevity, is a control for condition (trial
summary read). b The 95% confidence intervals of the odds ratio scores for significant religious characteristics
are as follows: Fundamentalism 1.035, 2.809; devotionalism .393, .950; religious quest .403, .991.
ⴱ
p ⬍ .05 (two-tailed test).
 RELIGIOUS INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
The first mediation analysis determined whether the relationship
between fundamentalism (IV) and verdict (DV) was mediated by
authoritarianism. The above analyses indicate that fundamentalism
(IV) is significantly related to verdict (DV; satisfying Step 1) and
authoritarianism (mediator) is related to verdict (DV; satisfying
Step 3). A linear regression indicated that there was a significant
positive relationship between authoritarianism and fundamental-
ism (R2 ⫽ .05, F(1, 337) ⫽ 16.0, p ⬍ .001; ␤ ⫽ .213 satisfying
Step 2). Finally, when authoritarianism and fundamentalism are
both used as predictors in the binary logistic regression model, the
overall model is still significant (R2 ⫽ .09, p ⬍ .001), and author-
itarianism remains significant (p ⬍ .001); however, the p value for
fundamentalism is p ⫽ .051 (satisfying Step 4). A Sobel test
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confirmed a significant indirect effect from fundamentalism to
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authoritarianism to verdict, Sobel Z ⫽ 3.35, p ⬍ .001, indicating
that authoritarianism is a partial mediator of the relationship be-
tween fundamentalism and verdict.
The second mediation analysis determined whether the relationship
between devotionalism (IV) and verdict (DV) was mediated by au-
thoritarianism. The above analyses indicate that Steps 1 and 3 were
satisfied; however, a linear regression indicated that there was not a
significant relationship between authoritarianism and devotionalism
(R2 ⫽ .006, F(1, 338) ⫽ 2.21, p ⫽ .139; Step 2). Because Step 2 was
not satisfied, there is no mediating relationship.
The third mediation analysis determined whether the relation-
ship between the Quest measure (IV) and verdict (DV) was me-
diated by authoritarianism. A linear regression indicated that there
was a significant negative relationship between authoritarianism
and Quest (R2 ⫽ .014, F(1, 337) ⫽ 4.64, p ⫽ .032; ␤ ⫽ ⫺.117
satisfying Step 2). However, when authoritarianism and Quest are
both used as predictors in the binary logistic regression model, the
overall model is still significant (R2 ⫽ .11, p ⬍ .001), and both
authoritarianism (p ⬍ .001) and Quest (p ⫽ .022) remain signif-
icant (Step 4). Step 4 is not satisfied, however the Sobel test is
significant, indicating partial mediation, Sobel Z ⫽ 4.16, p ⬍ .01.
Study 1 Discussion
In all, Study 1 found that some individual differences (funda-
mentalism, devotionalism, Quest, and authoritarianism) were re-
lated to jurors’ verdicts, and that the overall model had moderate
predictive power. More importantly, the model containing reli-
gious characteristics had greater predictive power than the model
with only the “control” variables, indicating that some religious
characteristics can be useful predictors of verdict for lawyers who
are choosing jurors based on their characteristics. Further, author-
itarianism was a partial mediator between verdict and both quest
and fundamentalism. This is not surprising however, because
many studies have found that authoritarianism mediates relation-
ships between religion and other constructs (e.g., Johnson et al.,
2011). To generalize these findings, a second study was conducted.
Study 2
The main goal of Study 2 was to determine whether the Study
1 findings generalize to another legal decision (i.e., sentencing
decision) concerning another type of crime (i.e., a woman who
uses marijuana during pregnancy). A limitation of Study 1 in-
volves the case scenario: an attempted bombing at a train station.
193
It is possible that some participants associate a bombing with an
act of terrorism, which may elicit thoughts of extreme religious
groups. Such a scenario could essentially prime participants to
respond differently to questions on the religious scales than if the
content of the scenario was related to another type of crime.
Furthermore, it is possible that some participants associate the
scenario with thoughts of death, dying, and an afterlife. According
to Terror Management Theory (Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Green-
berg, 2003), making mortality salient affects individuals’ beliefs
and behaviors. As such, the bombing scenario may influence
participants’ verdict decision or responses to items on the religious
scales. Thus, it is important to examine the relationship between
religious characteristics and juror decision-making in another con-
text (i.e., a different trial type and decision type).
In Study 2, participants indicated whether a woman who uses
marijuana during pregnancy should receive prison time. Many
state governments have sought both criminal and civil sanctions
against women for use of drugs during pregnancy (see, e.g.,
Coleman & Miller, 2007). This scenario was chosen because the
outcome was relatively minor (i.e., the baby was born healthy) and
might be less affected by jurors’ emotions. Finally, Study 1 used a
scenario in which guilt is in question, while Study 2 uses a scenario
in which guilt is not in question, but rather participants indicate
whether she should receive a prison sentence. In summary, Studies
1 and 2 are different in many ways; testing the same model with
the same religious characteristics can demonstrate that the effects
are generalizable across different legal decisions.
Study 2 Method and Procedures
Participants. Of the 215 undergraduate student participants,
most were female (60.9%) and White (74.0%). The majority was
Christian (57.7% total: 38.6% Catholic, 19.1% Protestant). The rest
were Atheist, expressed a belief in a God but no particular affiliation,
were Agnostic or were another minority religion (e.g., Jews, Bud-
dhists).
Materials. Participants read a brief scenario describing a
woman who had used marijuana while pregnant, but her baby was
born healthy. The fact that the woman used marijuana was undis-
puted; she was described as clearly guilty of using drugs while
pregnant. Participants indicated their agreement that she should
receive prison time. Participants then completed the same seven
religious scales, legal authoritarian scale, and demographic ques-
tions as in Study 1.
Variables. Brief descriptions of the variables and descriptive
statistics are presented in Table 3.
Dependent variable. The DV, sentencing decision, was a Lik-
ert scale measuring agreement that “the woman should receive
prison time” (1 ⫽ strongly disagree, 5 ⫽ strongly agree).
Main independent variables. As in Study 1, our main inde-
pendent variables measured religious characteristics: Extrinsic/
Intrinsic Revised Scale subscales of extrinsic-practical, extrinsic-
social, and intrinsic religiosity (Cronbach’s ␣ ⫽ .887, .803, and
.708, respectively), fundamentalism (Cronbach’s ␣ ⫽ .892), evan-
gelism (Cronbach’s ␣ ⫽ .736) devotionalism (Cronbach’s ␣ ⫽
.864), and Quest (Cronbach’s ␣ ⫽ .814).
Control variables. Control variables were identical to Study 1,
including: gender, race, religious affiliation, and authoritarianism
(RLAQ23; Cronbach’s ␣ ⫽ .733).
 194 MILLER, MASKALY, PEOPLES, AND SIGILLO

Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Study 2

Variable type/name Brief description N ␣ Mean SD

Dependent variable
Sentencing decision Likert scale (1–5), 1 item 215 — 2.600 1.139
Main independent variables
Extrinsic Religiosity: Practical Likert scale (1–5), 3 items 215 .857 2.904 .984
Extrinsic Religiosity: Social Likert scale (1–5), 3 items 215 .883 2.194 .827
Intrinsic religiosity Likert scale (1–5), 8 items 215 .708 2.812 .636
Fundamentalism Likert scale (1–5), 12 items 215 .892 2.617 .719
Evangelism Likert scale (1–5), 6 items 215 .736 2.647 .702
Devotionalism Likert scale (1–5), 6 items 215 .864 2.962 .882
On a religious quest Likert scale (1–5), 12 items 215 .814 2.771 .611
Control variables
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Gender (Ref: Male): 215

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Female Dummy (0, 1): “Yes” ⫽ 1 131 — .609 .489

Race (Ref: White): 215
Non-White Dummy (0, 1): “Yes” ⫽ 1 56 — .260 .160
Religion (Ref: Protestant/other): 215
Catholic Dummy (0, 1): “Yes” ⫽ 1 83 — .386 .488
Legal attitudes:
Legal authoritarianism Likert scale (1–5), 23 items 215 .733 3.015 .355
Note. ␣ denotes Cronbach’s ␣.

Study 2 Results
We ran two ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models
using a “nested models” approach, as in Study 1. First, we ran
an OLS regression model (“Model 1”) using only the control
variables; we then added the main independent variables
(“Model 2”) to determine their impact on sentencing decision
net of the control variables (via examining their coefficients)
and determine the extent to which they explain sentencing
decision beyond the simpler Model 1. For both models, we
conducted colinearity diagnostics and revealed no highly cor-
related variables.
Findings are in Table 4. Model 1 shows results using only
control variables. The R2 for Model 1 suggests that control vari-
ables account for 8.3% of the variance in sentencing decision.
Although none of the demographic control variables have a sig-
nificant impact on sentencing decision, jurors who are more au-

Table 4
Unstandardized and Standardized Coefficients From Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression
of Sentencing Decision (Scale: Higher Score ⫽ Greater Agreement Person Should Go to Prison)
on Religious Characteristics and Control Variables

Model 1 Model 2
Unstandardized Standardized Unstandardized Standardized
coefficients coefficients coefficients coefficients

Main independent variables

Extrinsic religiosity: Practical — — .024 .021
Extrinsic religiosity: Social — — .042 .031
Intrinsic religiosity — — .163 .091
Fundamentalism — — .108 .068
Evangelism — — .093 .057
Devotionalism — — ⫺.209 ⫺.162
On a religious quest — — ⫺.302ⴱ ⫺.162
Control variables
Gender (Ref: Male):
Female .092 .040 .151 .065
Race (Ref: White):
Non-White .175 .068 .103 .040
Religion (Ref: Protestant/other):
Catholic .126 .054 .177 .076
Legal attitudes:
Legal authoritarianism .913ⴱ .284 .854ⴱ .266
Adjusted R2 .083 .097
N 215 215
ⴱ
p ⬍ .05 (two-tailed test).
 RELIGIOUS INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
thoritarian are significantly more apt to indicate that the defendant
should receive prison time (p ⬍ .05, two-tailed), which parallels
the finding concerning authoritarianism and guilty verdicts in
Study 1.
Model 2 adds our main independent variables. The R2 for Model
2 suggests that this “full model” accounts for 9.7% of the variance
in sentencing decision, but this does not constitute statistically
significant improvement over Model 1 (F ⫽ .450).
In Study 2, being on a religious quest significantly decreases
agreement that the defendant should receive a prison sentence (p ⬍
.05, two-tailed) as shown in Table 4.
Authoritarianism as a mediator. While the analyses above
indicate that Quest affects sentencing decision, they do not spe-
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cifically explain the decision-making mechanism behind these
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
relationships. The following analysis will see if authoritarianism
mediates the relationship between sentencing decision and Quest.
As described in Study 1, mediation has four required steps that
must be satisfied, and a Sobel test indicates whether the mediation
is significant. A linear regression indicated that there was not a
significant relationship between authoritarianism and Quest (R2 ⫽
.003, F(1, 213) ⫽ .69, p ⫽ .41). Because Step 2 is not satisfied,
there is no mediating relationship.
Study 2 Discussion
In all, Study 2 found that some individual differences (Quest and
authoritarianism) were related to jurors’ sentencing decision, and
that the overall model had moderate predictive power. Authoritar-
ianism was not a mediator for Quest.
General Discussion
These findings both confirm and expand on previous studies.
While some work shows similar patterns with fundamentalism
(e.g., Miller & Hayward, 2008) and devotionalism (Unnever &
Cullen, 2006), most only investigated attitudes toward punish-
ments (e.g., general support for the death penalty; for review, see
Bornstein & Miller, 2009). This study is the first (that we know of)
that found significant effects for fundamentalism and guilt ver-
dicts. In addition, this is the first study to illustrate that being on a
religious quest is associated with prodefendant verdicts and sen-
tences. A previous study (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) found
that individuals on a quest gave lighter sentences, but researchers
did not assess actual verdicts. Perhaps individuals on a religious
quest are more forgiving or more likely to give someone the
benefit of the doubt. Thus, the two current studies add to the
growing body of research generally indicating that being on a
religious quest, being high in devotionalism, and being low in
fundamentalism are related to prodefendant legal decisions (i.e.,
verdicts, sentences).
The second purpose of this study was to investigate one possible
underlying mechanism that could help explain why religious vari-
ables are related to legal decisions. Authoritarianism partially
mediated the relationship between verdict and both Quest and
fundamentalism (Study 1). Specifically, the higher participants
were in fundamentalism, the higher they were in authoritarianism;
this heightened authoritarianism increased the likelihood of a
guilty verdict. The lower participants were in Quest, the higher
they were in authoritarianism, and this heightened authoritarianism
increased agreement that the defendant deserved a prison sentence.
195
This furthers past studies finding that authoritarianism is a medi-
ator (e.g., Johnson et al., 2011). Future studies should investigate
other possible mediators such as attributions (e.g., attributing an
actor’s behavior to the situation or the actor’s personality), belief
in a just world, or locus of control. These topics are beyond the
scope of this article, but the finding that authoritarianism is a
mediator suggests other possible mediators that could be investi-
gated in future studies.
Although this study found some interesting effects, it also failed
to find others. The intrinsic/extrinsic religiosity scale has not
previously been used to predict any sort of legal decision, and it
looks as if this scale is not a significant predictor of verdicts or
sentences. Evangelism also was not related to verdict or sentences.
Previous studies finding relationships between evangelism and
legal decisions were largely in the context of the death penalty
(Young, 1992). Perhaps a belief in converting others is more
predictive in death penalty decisions precisely because death is
involved. It is impossible to convert someone who receives a death
penalty; thus, those high in evangelism are lenient in this context.
However, in a nondeath situation, evangelism is not predictive of
legal decisions.
It is also important to note the findings related to the model’s
predictive power, particularly in Study 1, which is greater than
what is often found in research investigating the effects of attitudes
and characteristics on jury verdicts. Most studies find that individ-
ual differences only account for only 2–16% of the total variance
(for review, see Bornstein & Miller, 2009; Hans & Jehle, 2003;
Lieberman & Sales, 2006). Perhaps the current study achieved
greater explanatory power because of the type and number of
scales chosen, or because of the nature of the trial stimuli.
Implications
As a whole, findings indicate that some religious characteristics
affect verdicts and sentencing decisions in criminal trials. Thus, it
might be beneficial for defense lawyers and/or prosecutors to
remove potential jurors based on certain religious characteristics,
at least in some trials. This practice is allowed in many jurisdic-
tions, as evidenced by a myriad of cases in which judges have
allowed exemptions based on a potential juror’s religious denom-
ination (e.g., State v. Purcell, 2001), previous service as a mis-
sionary (State v. Fuller, 2004), occupation as a pastor (Highler v.
State, 2006), and strong religious beliefs (United States v. DeJesus,
2003). While it is difficult to determine how often lawyers exclude
prospective jurors based on religion, there are many cases in which
appellate courts have upheld the practice (see Bornstein & Miller,
2009). Thus, most lawyers would be allowed to do so. The current
research suggests that criminal defense lawyers should exclude
fundamentalist jurors, while prosecutors should eliminate jurors
who are on a religious quest or are higher in devotionalism.
Social scientists will find the results of interest because they
suggest how and why religious characteristics relate to legal
decision-making. The general finding that religious characteristics
affect decision-making is not that surprising to scientists who
study how religion (or other characteristics) affects various aspects
of one’s life. The specific findings of why certain religious char-
acteristics impact decisions further this general literature. The
findings that authoritarianism is a partial mediator for some reli-
gious variables is a starting point for future studies designed to
 196 MILLER, MASKALY, PEOPLES, AND SIGILLO
study the reasons why religious characteristics are related to legal
decisions.
Limitations
These studies have some notable limitations. As with other
similar studies (Miller & Bornstein, 2006; Miller & Hayward,
2008), these studies investigated a limited number of contexts: an
attempted bombing of a train station and a woman using drugs
during pregnancy. As such, these studies cannot address all trial
types. Second, participants were student mock jurors (not real
jurors) from one university who read a brief written trial summary
and made individual judgments (instead of deliberating with other
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
jurors) that had no real world impact. Thus, this study, like many
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
jury decision-making studies lacks verisimilitude and the impact
(e.g., consequences for the defendant) of a real trial. Even so, it is
generally believed that mock juror samples such as this do not
differ greatly from real jurors (Bornstein, 1999). Future studies can
use more realistic stimuli with a broader sample to address these
limitations.
The sample poses another limitation. This research was framed
in a Christian context using Christian-focused measures. This is
generally appropriate, as the United States is a largely Christian
nation. However these measures would not be appropriate for a
non-Christian sample; further, the results themselves might be
different if the study was conducted with more non-Christians.
Controlling for affiliation is important, however in a Christian
sample, this essentially only controls for the differences between
Catholics and non-Catholics, for example. It does nothing to
address differences among other groups in a more diverse sample.
A final limitation concerns the statistical analyses. Both author-
itarianism and religious variables are measured as constructs,
making it difficult to make causal claims about the relationships
studied here. Thus, it is difficult to say that fundamentalism causes
authoritarianism and authoritarianism causes verdict. Such rela-
tionships are merely correlational.
Conclusion
This research determined whether religious characteristics are
related to decisions regarding verdicts and sentencing decisions.
The few past studies that have investigated relationships between
jury decisions and religious characteristics have done so in limited
legal contexts, such as death penalty (Miller, 2006; Miller &
Hayward, 2008) or child abuse (Johnson, 1985). Further, they have
used only a limited number of religious variables (e.g., using only
fundamentalism; Unnever & Cullen, 2006). Thus, this study ex-
pands on previous studies by investigating a broader variety of
legal decisions and religious characteristics.
Based on findings from both studies, some religious character-
istics do influence juror decision-making. Thus, lawyers who use
peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors on the basis of
their religious characteristics might increase their chances of ob-
taining a favorable verdict. Even though studies have indicated that
demographic and attitudinal variables only account for a small bit
of predictive validity (Lieberman & Sales, 2006), many lawyers
continue to use these characteristics as the basis for jury selection.
Even if the effects are small, they will likely affect a few trials.
Thus, knowledge of how religious characteristics are related to
legal decisions is important for lawyers and trial consultants.
Finally, the finding that authoritarianism is a partial mediator is a
first step in studying the reasons why religion affects legal atti-
tudes. Future studies can more fully flesh out such relationships.
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Received May 3, 2013
Revision received February 11, 2014
Accepted February 19, 2014 䡲