Prog. Enercly Combust Sci., Vol. 2, pp, 181 238, 1977. Pergamon Press.
Printed in Great Britain
GEOTHERMAL ENERGY D E V E L O P M E N T
H. CHRISTOPHERH. ARMSTEAD
Rock House, Ridge Hill, Dartmouth, South Devon, England
1. T H E SPECTRE OF AN ENERGY FAMINE
Ever since the dawn of the industrial revolution
Man's appetite for energy has grown at a steadily
increasing rate. The human way of life has become
such that dislocation or even disaster can threaten if
that growing appetite is not satisfied. The political
events of 1973 in the Middle East have shown that
dislocation, at any rate in the highly industrialized
countries, can occur almost overnight at the crack of
the Arab whip, and there is no lack of prophets who
foretell disaster within a few decades or even sooner. It
is important to examine the historical pattern of this
energy appetite and to speculate about its future
trends, so that we may better understand the urgent
r61e which geothermal energy may be expected to play.
From the year 1900 to 1950 the total world pro-
duction of energy grew at an average annual com-
pound rate of 2.6%. From 1950 to 1960 this growth
rate rose to an average of 4%. From 1960 to 1970 it
rose further to about 5.5% per a n n u m ) These figures
show that the energy demand has not merely been
continuously growing, but that the rate of growth has
been accelerating; that is to say, energy growth has
been more rapid than in accordance with simple
exponential law.
The implications of this profligacy are alarming.
Even allowing for the fact that the world population .
rose during the first 70 years of this century by a factor
of more than 2.311 the figures are still disturbing; for
the energy consumption during the same interval of
time increased more than nine-fold. Thus the energy
consumption per capita rose nearly four-fold in 70
years.
Until 1973 no difficulty had been experienced in
matching the supply of energy to the demand: the
world growth in energy consumption until that year
could be regarded as uninhibitbd and subject to
normal market forces. In 1973, however, the Middle
Eastern oil crisis occurred and a very marked, politi-
cally inspired, rise in the price of oil fuel, which has not
been without influence upon the prices of alternative
fuels such as coal. The pattern of energy growth
suddenly became disturbed, and it is still too early to
say with any certainty whether that disturbance was
temporary or permanent: (it takes about 3 years or so
for world statistics to be collected and published). For
the purpose of the argument which follows, 1972 will
be taken as the last year of "natural" energy growth.
About 98% of the world's energy demands were,
until the 1950s, satisfied by fossil fuels. The remainder
was mainly accounted for by hydro power. By 1972,
partly owing to the advent of nuclear power and a
miniscule contribution from geothermal energy, the
i
JP.r:.c.s. 24 A 181
share of fossil fuels had very slightly fallen to about
97.5%. We still rely almost entirely upon fossil fuels.
The World Power Conference estimates of world
energy resources published in 1968 showed a total
believed stock of fossil fuels--proved and inferred---of
about 8.8 x 1012 tonnes of coal equivalent. The world
energy demand in 1972 was 7566 × 106 tonnes of coal
equivalent.2 The estimated fossil fuel resources would
therefore have sufficed to keep the world supplied with
its energy needs for 1163 years at the 1972 level of
demand. On the face of it, this would seem to give no
cause for immediate alarm, especially when it is re-
membered that fossil fuels are not the only available
sources of energy ; but the figure of 1163 years makes
no allowance for growth.
In order to see the effect of growth upon this
preliminary evidence it is first necessary to assume
some growth law. Now despite the accelerating growth
in energy consumption during the first 70 years of this
century it was a fact that the average annual growth
from 1970 to 1972 was only about 4%. This could well
be due to inevitable short-term fluctuations lacking
long-term significance, or perhaps to the first rum-
blings of the economic troubles that were to assail the
world only a year or two later; on the other hand it
could be indicative of the beginning of an end to
accelerating growth--perhaps of the establishment of
something nearer to simple exponential growth. End-
less speculation could be devoted to such con-
siderations ; but just in order to illustrate the alarming
effects even of simple exponential growth, let it here be
assumed that from 1972 onwards energy growth will
be maintained at a steady rate of 5% per annum
(compound).
Allowing for 5% p.a. exponential growth as from
1972, it can be shown that the 1968 estimated world
stock of fossil fuels, unsupported by other energy
sources, would last only 82 years until the year 2054~-
little more than three-quarters of a century from now.
Our 1163 years have shrunk to about 1/14th of the
time! Now of course the 1968 World Power Con-
ference estimates were only estimates, which could
have been wildly inaccurate. But let it be supposed that
the estimates were ten times too low--a rather improb-
able assumption--then all we should gain would be a
further 47 years, i.e. until just after the year 2100, or
about four or five generations from now. Even if the
estimated fuel stocks were 100 times too low we should
only gain a further 47 years.
Now these periods assume that fossil fuels would
remain available, as though at the turn of a tap, until
they finally became exhausted. In practice, as they
become scarcer they would become less accessible,
prices would soar, there would be keener international