Professional Documents
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Sections 230 to 240 of the Companies Act, 2013 (Earlier Sections 391 to 396A of
the Companies Act, 1956) contain provisions with respect to mergers and
acquisitions (M&A).
Companies Act, 2013 has different provisions in relation to different types of re-
structuring process. These provisions may be discussed under the following four
heads:
5. An order made by the Tribunal under sub-section (6) shall provide for
all or any of the following matters, namely:—
Section 232(1) makes the aforesaid provisions of Section 230 applicable, mutatis
mutandis, in case of:
• a scheme for the reconstruction of the company, or
• a scheme of merger or amalgamation of any two or more companies, or
• division of a company.
The Tribunal, after satisfying itself that the procedure specified in sub-sections
(1) and (2) has been complied with, may, by order, sanction the compromise or
arrangement or by a subsequent order, make provision for the following matters,
namely:—
(a) the transfer to the transferee company of the whole or any part of the
undertaking, property or liabilities of the transferor company from a date to
be determined by the parties unless the Tribunal, for reasons to be
recorded by it in writing, decides otherwise;
(b) the allotment or appropriation by the transferee company of any shares,
debentures, policies or other like instruments in the company which, under
the compromise or arrangement, are to be allotted or appropriated by that
company to or for any person;
(c) the continuation by or against the transferee company of any legal
proceedings pending by or against any transferor company on the date of
transfer;
(d) dissolution, without winding-up, of any transferor company;
(e) the provision to be made for any persons who, within such time and in
such manner as the Tribunal directs, dissent from the compromise or
arrangement;
(f) where share capital is held by any non-resident shareholder under the
foreign direct investment norms or guidelines specified by the Central
Government or in accordance with any law for the time being in force, the
allotment of shares of the transferee company to such shareholder shall be in
the manner specified in the order;
(g) the transfer of the employees of the transferor company to the transferee
company;
(h) where the transferor company is a listed company and the transferee
company is an unlisted company,—
(A) the transferee company shall remain an unlisted company until it
becomes a listed company;
(B) if shareholders of the transferor company decide to opt out of the
transferee company, provision shall be made for payment of the value
of shares held by them and other benefits in accordance with a pre-
determined price formula or after a valuation is made, and the
arrangements under this provision may be made by the Tribunal:
However, it cannot be less than specified by SEBI;
(i) where the transferor company is dissolved, the fee, if any, paid by the
transferor company on its authorised capital shall be set-off against any fees
payable by the transferee company on its authorised capital subsequent to the
amalgamation; and
(j) such incidental, consequential and supplemental matters as are deemed
necessary to secure that the merger or amalgamation is fully and effectively carried
out:
No compromise or arrangement shall be sanctioned by the Tribunal unless a
certificate by the company’s auditor has been filed with the Tribunal to the
effect that the accounting treatment, if any, proposed in the scheme of
compromise or arrangement is in conformity with the accounting standards
prescribed under section 133.
Sub section (6) of Section 232 provides that the scheme shall clearly indicate an
appointed date from which it shall be effective and the scheme shall be deemed
to be effective from such date and not at a date subsequent to the appointed date.
Where Amalgamation/Merger continues beyond One Year
Every company in relation to which the order is made shall, until the
completion of the scheme, file a statement in such form and within such time as
may be prescribed with the Registrar every year duly certified by a chartered
accountant or a cost accountant or a company secretary in practice indicating
whether the scheme is being complied with in accordance with the orders of
the Tribunal or not.
Penalty
Non compliance by the transferor or the transferee company with the
aforesaid provisions will attract a minimum fine of Rs. 1,00,000 which may
extend to 25 lakh rupees and every officer of such transferor or transferee
company who is in default, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to one year or with fine between one lakh rupees to three lakh
rupees, or with both.
Same provisions as discussed above, mutatis mutandis, shall apply with respect to
mergers of an Indian company with a foreign company. Foreign company means a
company incorporated outside India whether having a place of business in India or
not.
The Central Government may, however, make rules, in consultation with
the Reserve Bank of India, in connection with such mergers and amalgamations.
The transferee company may, at any time within two months after the approval
of the Scheme by the holders of not less than nine-tenths in value of the shares,
give notice in the prescribed manner to any dissenting shareholder that it desires
to acquire his shares.
The dissenting shareholder may, within one month of receipt of such notice
apply to the Tribunal against such acquisition. In case Tribunal does not make an
otherwise order, the dissenting shareholder will be bound to sell his shares to the
transferee company at the same price as paid to the majority.
In case of legal successors, the period of one year will stand extended to three
years.
The amalgamating company(ies) shall not dispose of books and papers without
permission from the Central Government.
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activity has always been recognized as one of
the most important means of inorganic growth for corporate world. The swift
globalization and increasing strength and importance of Indian Economy in the
World have created huge interest of world in Indian corporate sector and the
capital market. In the recent past, there has been tremendous increase in the M&As
deals involving Indian companies, both in number and in value terms.
Total value of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) involving
Indian companies surged nearly 63 per cent to $7.8 billion in the first three
months of 2016, primarily spurred by big-ticket disinvestment transactions,
says E & Y Report
The existence of an efficient and smooth–functioning market for takeover plays an
important role in the economic development of a country. It is widely recognized
fact that one of the key elements of a robust corporate governance regime in any
country is the existence of an efficient and well administered set of Takeover
Regulations. In keeping with the forgoing, India also has seen a steady evolution of
a set of capital market regulations in respect of substantial acquisition of shares and
takeovers.
SEBI Takeover Regulations seek to ensure that the takeover markets operate in
a fair, equitable and transparent manner.
The first set of takeover regulations were formulated in 1994, viz., SEBI
(Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeover) Regulations, 1994. These were
later replaced in the year 1997and rechristened as SEBI (Substantial
Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 1997. These regulations also
were amended a number of times to address the changing circumstances and needs
of corporate sector and various clarifications, orders and judgments given to
simplify the complexities involved in these regulations. Thus, a need was felt to
review the SEBI Takeover Regulations to remove the ambiguities involved in the
Regulations which have been one of the major causes of defiance with the
Regulations and to bring it at par with the global practices so as to create a level
playing field.
After taking into account the suggestions of the Achuthan Committee and feedback
from the interest groups and general public on such suggestions, the SEBI finally
notified the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers)
Regulations, 2011 (“Takeover Code of 2011”) on 23 September 2011. The
Takeover Code of 2011 became effective from 22 October 2011.
The Takeover Code of 2011 adheres to the framework and principles of the
Takeover Code of 1997 but the changes it brings about are significant. Some of the
key features of Takeover Code, 2011 are discussed below:
• Acquirer
• Target Company
• Control
• Disclosure Requirements
(A) Any person, who along with PACs crosses the threshold limit of
5% of shares or voting rights, has to disclose his aggregate
shareholding and voting rights to the: (i) Target Company at its
registered office; and (ii) to every Stock Exchange where the
shares of the Target Company are listed within 2 working days of
acquisition as per the format specified by SEBI.
Acquisition by Person B
Scenario I
Scenario II
Objective is to ease the lenders who acquired shares in a distressed company but
could not sell the stake to a new investor because the takeover norms proved
restrictive and reduced the funds available for investment in the stressed firm.
2. Secondly, the shares bought by the new investor will also be locked in for at
least three years.
• Creeping Acquisition
Any acquirer, holding 25% or more but less than the maximum permissible
limit can purchase additional shares or voting rights of up to 5% every financial
year, without being required to make a public announcement for open offer.
Thus, the promoters can increase their shareholding in the company without
necessarily purchasing shares from the stock market.
• Voluntary offer
Takeover Code, 2011, has introduced the concept of voluntary offer by which an
acquirer who holds more than 25% but less than the maximum permissible limit,
shall be entitled to voluntarily make a public announcement of an open offer for
acquiring additional shares subject to their aggregate shareholding after completion
of the open offer not exceeding the maximum permissible non-public
shareholding.
• During the offer period such acquirer shall not be entitled to acquire any
shares otherwise than under the open offer.
• Voluntary offer cannot be made if the acquirer or any person acting in
concert with him had acquired shares of the target company in the
preceding fifty-two weeks.
• An acquirer and persons acting in concert with him, who have made a
public announcement under this regulation to acquire shares of a target
company shall not be entitled to acquire any shares of the target
company for a period of six months after completion of the open
offer. However, the restriction will not apply to acquisition of shares by
way of bonus issue or as a result of split.
• Inter-se Transfers
c) a company, its subsidiaries, its holding company, other subsidiaries of such
holding company;
d) persons holding not less than 50% of the equity shares of such company;
e) persons acting in concert for not less than 3 years prior to the proposed
acquisition, and disclosed as such pursuant to filings under the listing agreement.
To avail exemption from the requirements of open offer under the Takeover Code
of 2011, the following conditions will have to be fulfilled with respect to an inter-
se transfer:
- If the shares of the target company are frequently traded – the
acquisition price per share shall not be higher by more than 25% of the volume-
weighted average market price for a period of 60 trading days preceding the date of
issuance of notice for such inter-se transfer
- If the shares of the target company are infrequently traded, the
acquisition price shall not be higher by more than 25% of the price determined by
taking into account valuation parameters including, book value, comparable
trading multiples, etc.
2. Rights issue – The Takeover Code of 2011 provides exemption from the
requirement of open offer to increase in shareholding due to rights issue, but
subject to fulfillment of two conditions:
(a) The acquirer cannot renounce its entitlements under such rights issue; and
(b) The price at which rights issue is made cannot be higher than the price of the
target company prior to such rights issue.
3. Buyback of shares – The Takeover Code of 1997 did not provide for any
exemption for increase in voting rights of a shareholder due to buybacks. The
Takeover Code of 2011 however provides for exemption for such increase.
Case-Law
Whether passive acquisition of voting rights shall attract provisions of
Takeover Regulations?
• Mode of Payment
Regulation 9 provides for the various modes by which payment with respect to
acquisition of shares may be made. As per sub-regulation (1), the prescribed modes
are:
(a) in cash;
(b) by issue, exchange or transfer of listed shares in the equity share capital
of the acquirer or of any person acting in concert;
(c) by issue, exchange or transfer of listed secured debt instruments issued
by the acquirer or any person acting in concert with a rating not inferior to
investment grade as rated by a credit rating agency registered with the
Board;
(d) by issue, exchange or transfer of convertible debt securities entitling the
holder thereof to acquire listed shares in the equity share capital of the
acquirer or of any person acting in concert; or
(e) combination (a), (b), (c) or (d) above.
• Offer Price in respect of Open Offer (Regulation 8)
The offer price shall be the highest of,—
(a) the highest negotiated price per share of the target company for any
acquisition under the agreement attracting the obligation to make a public
announcement of an open offer;
(b) the volume-weighted average price paid or payable for acquisitions,
whether by the acquirer or by any person acting in concert with him, during
the fifty-two weeks immediately preceding the date of the public
announcement;
(c) the highest price paid or payable for any acquisition, whether by the
acquirer or by any person acting in concert with him, during the twenty-six
weeks immediately preceding the date of the public announcement;
(d) the volume-weighted average market price of such shares for a period
of sixty trading days immediately preceding the date of the public
announcement as traded on the stock exchange where the maximum
volume of trading in the shares of the target company are recorded
during such period, provided such shares are frequently traded;
(e) where the shares are not frequently traded, the price determined by
the acquirer and the manager to the open offer taking into account valuation
parameters including, book value, comparable trading multiples, and such
other parameters as are customary for valuation of shares of such companies.
• Exemptions by SEBI
Regulation 11 empowers SEBI, for reasons recorded in writing, to grant exemption
from the obligation to make an open offer for acquiring shares under these
regulations subject to such conditions as the Board deems fit to impose in the
interests of investors in securities and the securities market.
OPEN OFFER PROCESS
Appointment of a Merchant banker as Manager to the Open Offer
Regulation 12 (1) makes it obligatory upon the acquirer to appoint a
merchant banker registered with SEBI, as the manager to the open offer. The
merchant banker so appointed should not be an associate of the acquirer.
The public announcement of the open offer shall be made through such manager
only.
Timing of Public Announcement (Regulation 13)
(1) The public announcement containing the specified particulars shall be made on
the date of agreeing to acquire shares or voting rights in, or control over the target
company.
(2) Such public announcement,—
(a) in the case of market purchases, shall be made prior to placement of
the purchase order with the stock broker;
(b) in the case of convertible securities with no fixed date of conversion, on
the same day as the date of exercise of the option to convert such securities
into shares of the target company;
(c) in the case of convertible securities with a fixed date of conversion ,
on the second working day preceding the scheduled date of conversion of
such securities into shares of the target company;
(d) pursuant to a disinvestment shall be made on the same day as the date
of executing the agreement for acquisition of shares or voting rights in or
control over the target company;
(g) in case of an acquirer acquiring shares under preferential issue, it
shall be made on the date on which special resolution is passed for
allotment of shares under sub-section (1A) of section 62 of the Companies
Act, 2013;
(3) In case of voluntary acquisition, the public announcement shall be made on
the same day as the date on which the acquirer takes the decision to voluntarily
make a public announcement of an open offer for acquiring shares of the target
company.
(4) Pursuant to the public announcement made under sub-regulation (1) and sub-
regulation (3), a detailed public statement in the prescribed manner shall be
published by the acquirer through the manager to the open offer, not later than five
working days of the public announcement.
Publication of Public Announcement and detailed public statement
(Regulation 14)
(1) The public announcement as well as detailed public statement shall be sent to
all the stock exchanges on which the shares of the target company are listed,
and the stock exchanges shall forthwith disseminate such information to the public.
(2) A copy of the public announcement shall be sent to the SEBI and to the target
company at its registered office within one working day of the date of the public
announcement.
(3) The detailed public statement pursuant to the public announcement referred to
in sub-regulation (4) of Regulation 13 shall be published in all editions of any
one English national daily with wide circulation, any one Hindi national daily
with wide circulation, and any one regional language daily with wide
circulation at the place where the registered office of the target company is
situated and one regional language daily at the place of the stock exchange where
the maximum volume of trading in the shares of the target company are recorded
during the sixty trading days preceding the date of the public announcement.
The manager to the open offer shall not release the escrow account until the
expiry of thirty days from the completion of payment of consideration to
shareholders who have tendered their shares in acceptance of the open offer.
In the event of non-fulfillment of obligations under these regulations by the
acquirer the Board may direct the manager to the open offer to forfeit the escrow
account, either in full or in part (Regulation 17(9)).
The escrow account deposited with the bank in cash shall be released only in the
manner prescribed under Regulation 17(10)).
Unless the open offer first made is an open offer conditional as to the minimum
level of acceptances, no acquirer making a competing offer may be made
conditional as to the minimum level of acceptances- Sub-regulation (6).
Upon the public announcement of a competing offer, an acquirer who had made
a preceding competing offer shall be entitled to revise the terms of his open
offer provided the revised terms are more favourable to the shareholders of the
target company.
Again, the acquirers making the competing offers shall be entitled to make upward
revisions of the offer price at any time up to three working days prior to the
commencement of the tendering period- Sub-regulation (9).
(2) In the event of withdrawal of the open offer, the acquirer shall through the
manager to the open offer, within two working days,—
(a) make an announcement in the same newspapers in which the public
announcement of the open offer was published, providing the grounds and
reasons for withdrawal of the open offer; and
(b) simultaneously with the announcement, inform in writing to,—
(i) the Board;
(ii) all the stock exchanges on which the shares of the target company
are listed, and the stock exchanges shall forthwith disseminate such
information to the public; and the target company at its registered
office.
Case-Law
It may be noted that the bar on appointment of the director would commence from
midnight of day when MOU is signed and same would continue till the end of the
day at midnight on which offer formalities are completed- Punrasar Holding (P.)
Ltd. V. SEBI [2010] 102 SCL 147(SAT-MUM)
(2) In case of open offer being subject to minimum level of acceptances, the
acquirer and persons acting in concert shall not be entitled to appoint any director
representing the acquirer or any person acting in concert with him on the board of
directors of the target company during the offer period.
(3) In case the acquirer or any person acting in concert is already represented by
a director on the board of the target company, such director shall not participate
in any deliberations of the board of directors of the target company or vote on
any matter in relation to the open offer.
DISCLOSURES OF SHAREHOLDING AND CONTROL (Regulations 28-
31)
Regulation 28 (1) and (2) provide that the aggregated shareholding, including any
convertible security, and voting rights of the acquirer or promoter of the target
company or every person acting in concert with him must be disclosed.
Regulation of Combinations
Section 6 of the Competition Act,2002 contains provisions with respect
to regulation of combinations. The Section provides as follows:
(1) No person or enterprise shall enter into a combination which causes
or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition within
the relevant market in India and such a combination shall be void.
(2) Subject to the provisions contained in sub-section (1), any person or
enterprise, who or which proposes to enter into a combination, 2 [shall]
give notice to the Commission, in the form as may be specified, and the
fee which may be determined, by regulations, disclosing the details of
the proposed combination, within thirty days of—
(a) approval of the proposal relating to merger or amalgamation,
referred to in clause (c) of section 5 by the board of directors of the
enterprises concerned with such merger or amalgamation, as the case
may be;
(b) execution of any agreement or other document for acquisition
referred to in clause (a) of section 5 or acquiring of control referred
to in clause (b) of that section.
(2A) No combination shall come into effect until two hundred and ten
days have passed from the day on which the notice has been given to the
Commission under sub-section (2) or the Commission has passed orders
under section 31, whichever is earlier.
(3) The Commission shall, after receipt of notice under sub-section (2),
deal with such notice in accordance with the provisions contained in
sections 29, 30 and 31.
(4) The provisions of this section shall not apply to share subscription or
financing facility or any acquisition, by a public financial institution,
foreign institutional investor, bank or venture capital fund, pursuant to
any covenant of a loan agreement or investment agreement.
(5) The public financial institution, foreign institutional investor, bank or
venture capital fund, referred to in sub-section (4), shall, within seven
days from the date of the acquisition, file, in the form as may be
specified by regulations, with the Commission the details of the
acquisition including the details of control, the circumstances for
exercise of such control and the consequences of default arising out of
such loan agreement or investment agreement, as the case may be.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, the expression—
(a) “foreign institutional investor” has the same meaning as assigned to
it in clause (a) of the Explanation to section 115AD of the Income-
tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961);
(b) “venture capital fund” has the same meaning as assigned to it in
clause (b) of the Explanation to clause (23FB) of section 10 of the
Income-tax Act, 1961.
Inquiry into combination by Commission (Section 20)
(1) The Commission may, upon its own knowledge or information
relating to acquisition referred to in clause (a) of section 5 or
acquiring of control referred to in clause (b) of section 5 or merger
or amalgamation referred to in clause (c) of that section, inquire
into whether such a combination has caused or is likely to cause
an appreciable adverse effect on competition in India.
However, the Commission shall not initiate any inquiry under this
sub-section after the expiry of one year from the date on which
such combination has taken effect.
(2) The Commission shall, on receipt of a notice under sub-section (2)
of section 6, inquire whether a combination referred to in that
notice or reference has caused or is likely to cause an appreciable
adverse effect on competition in India.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 5, the Central
Government shall, on the expiry of a period of two years from the
date of commencement of this Act and thereafter every two
years, in consultation with the Commission, by notification,
enhance or reduce, on the basis of the wholesale price index or
fluctuations in exchange rate of rupee or foreign currencies, the
value of assets or the value of turnover, for the purposes of that
section.
(4) For the purposes of determining whether a combination would have
the effect of or is likely to have an appreciable adverse effect on
competition in the relevant market, the Commission shall have
due regard to all or any of the following factors, namely:—
(a) actual and potential level of competition through imports in
the market;
(b) extent of barriers to entry into the market;
(c) level of combination in the market;
(d) degree of countervailing power in the market;
(e) likelihood that the combination would result in the parties to
the combination being able to significantly and sustainably
increase prices or profit margins;
(f) extent of effective competition likely to sustain in a market;
(g) extent to which substitutes are available or arc likely to be
available in the market;
(h) market share, in the relevant market, of the persons or
enterprise in a combination, individually and as a
combination;
(i) likelihood that the combination would result in the removal of
a vigorous and effective competitor or competitors in the
market;
(j) nature and extent of vertical integration in the market;
(k) possibility of a failing business;
(/) nature and extent of innovation;
(m) relative advantage, by way of the contribution to the
economic development, by any combination having or likely
to have appreciable adverse effect on competition;
(n) whether the benefits of the combination outweigh the
adverse impact of the combination, if any.
Orders of Commission on certain combinations (Section 31)
(1) Where the Commission is of the opinion that any combination does
not, or is not likely to, have an appreciable adverse effect on
competition, it shall, by order, approve that combination including
the combination in respect of which a notice has been given
under sub-section (2) of section 6.
(2) Where the Commission is of the opinion that the combination has,
or is likely to have, an appreciable adverse effect on competition,
it shall direct that the combination shall not take effect.
(3) Where the Commission is of the opinion that the combination has,
or is likely to have, an appreciable adverse effect on competition
but such adverse effect can be eliminated by suitable modification
to such combination; it may propose appropriate modification to
the combination, to the parties to such combination.
(4) The parties, who accept the modification proposed by the
Commission under subsection (3), shall carry out such
modification within the period specified by the Commission.
(5) If the parties to the combination, who have accepted the
modification under subsection (4), fail to carry out the
modification within the period specified by the Commission, such
combination shall be deemed to have an appreciable adverse
effect on competition and the Commission shall deal with such
combination in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
(6) If the parties to the combination do not accept the modification
proposed by the Commission under sub-section (3), such parties
may, within thirty working days of the modification proposed by
the Commission, submit amendment to the modification
proposed by the Commission under that sub-section.
(7) If the Commission agrees with the amendment submitted by the
parties under subsection (6), it shall, by order, approve the
combination.
(8) If the Commission does not accept the amendment submitted under
sub-section (6), then, the parties shall be allowed a further period
of thirty working days within which such parties shall accept the
modification proposed by the Commission under sub-section (3).
(9) If the parties fail to accept the modification proposed by the
Commission within thirty working days referred to in sub-section
(6) or within a further period of thirty working days referred to in
sub-section (8), the combination shall be deemed to have an
appreciable adverse effect on competition and be dealt with in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.
(10) Where the Commission has directed under sub-section (2) that the
combination shall not take effect or the combination is deemed to
have an appreciable adverse effect on competition under sub-
section (9), then, without prejudice to any penalty which may be
imposed or any prosecution which may be initiated under this Act,
the Commission may order that—
(a) the acquisition referred to in clause (a) of section 5; or
(b) the acquiring of control referred to in clause (b) of section 5;
or
(c) the merger or amalgamation referred to in clause (c) of
section 5,
shall not be given effect to.
However, the Commission may, if it considers appropriate, frame
a scheme to implement its order under this sub-section.
(11) If the Commission does not, on the expiry of a period of two
hundred and ten days from the date of notice given to the
Commission under sub-section (2) of section 6, pass an order or
issue direction in accordance with the provisions of sub-section
(1) or sub-section (2) or sub-section (7), the combination shall be
deemed to have been approved by the Commission.
Explanation.—For the purposes of determining the period of two
hundred and ten days specified in this sub-section, the period of
thirty working days specified in sub-section (6) and a further
period of thirty working days specified in sub-section (8) shall be
excluded.
(12) Where any extension of time is sought by the parties to the
combination, the period of ninety working days shall be reckoned
after deducting the extended time granted at the request of the
parties.
(13) Where the Commission has ordered a combination to be void, the
acquisition or acquiring of control or merger or amalgamation
referred to in section 5, shall be dealt with by the authorities
under any other law for the time being in force as if such
acquisition or acquiring of control or merger or amalgamation had
not taken place and the parties to the combination shall be dealt
with accordingly.
Objectives of FDI
The intent and objective of the Government of India to attract and promote
foreign direct investment is to supplement domestic capital, technology and skills,
for accelerated economic growth. Foreign Direct Investment, as distinguished
from portfolio investment, has a lasting interest in an enterprise. Presently, ‘FDI’
is being used to refer to both the aforesaid forms.
In 1991, as India faced a severe economic crisis, newly elected Prime Minister
P. V. Narasimha Rao surprisingly inducted the apolitical Dr. Manmohan Singh into
his cabinet as Finance Minister. On 24 July, 1991, Dr. Manmohan Singh, as the
Finance Minister, an n o u n c e d a ‘ N e w E c o n o m i c P o l i c y ’ wh i c h , i n t e r
a l i a , s o u g h t t o b r in g i n f o r e i g n f u n d s in c l u d i n g t h r o u gh D i r e c t
Foreign Investment.
I t w a s i m p e r a ti v e i n v i e w o f t h e e co n o m i c c r i s e s t h a t I n d i a n
e c o n o m y w a s f a ce d w i t h a t t h a t p o i n t o f ti m e . T h e m o s t v i s i b l e
s i g n o f t h e c o u n t r y ’ s e c o n o m i c c r i s i s i n early 1991 was:
• Ext r e m e l y l o w f o r e i g n e xc h a n g e r e s e r v e s o f R s .
2 4 0 0 c r o r e ( j u s t enough to buy from abroad only three
weeks requirements)
• Infl ati on was as high as 13.5%
Until the liberalisation of 1991, India was largely and intentionally isolated from
the world markets, to protect its economy and to achieve self-reliance. Foreign
trade was subject to import tariffs, export taxes and quantitative restrictions,
while Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was restricted by upper-limit equity
participation, restrictions on technology transfer, export obligations and
government approvals; these approvals were needed for nearly 60% of new FDI in
the industrial sector. The restrictions ensured that FDI averaged only around
$200 million annually between 1985 and 1991. A large percentage of the capital
flows consisted of foreign aid, commercial borrowing and deposits of non-
resident Indians
The “New Industrial Policy” paved the way for a new economic era in India by
starting the process of liberalization. The policy, at one stroke, opened up the
manufacturing sector by dismantling the system of licences and controls for most
industries and allowed 51% foreign equity in Indian companies. Subsequent
economic reforms carried out by Rao’s successors I.K. Gujral, A.B. Vajpayee and
incumbent Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who was Rao’s finance minister,
unshackled India’s potential as a magnet for foreign investment. In 2010, India
became the ninth most attractive destination for foreign direct investment (FDI).
However, we have not been able to retain that position in view of lack of some
policy initiatives.
In March 2005, the government amended the rules to allow 100% FDI in the
construction sector, including built-up infrastructure and construction
development projects comprising housing, commercial premises, hospitals,
educational institutions, recreational facilities, and city- and regional-level
infrastructure.
Table-1 gives a bird eye view of FDI inflows into India between 2000 and 2012
(Figures are based on the data published by RBI in Monthly Bulletin dated:
09.04.2012)
Table-1
Cumulative FDI Flows into India (2000-2012): [Equity Inflows +Re- US$
invested Earnings & Other Capital] 246,600
Million
• NRIs resident in Nepal and Bhutan as well as citizens of Nepal and Bhutan
are permitted to invest in the capital of Indian companies on repatriation
basis, subject to the condition that the amount of consideration for such
investment shall be paid only by way of inward remittance in free foreign
exchange through normal banking channels.
• FIIs may invest in the capital of an Indian Company under the Portfolio
Investment Scheme subject to the following ceilings:
A ‘Qualified Foreign Investor (QFI)’ means a non-resident investor (other than SEBI
registered FII and SEBI registered FVCI) who meets the KYC requirements of SEBI
for the purpose of making investments in accordance with the
regulations/orders/circulars of RBI/SEBI.
Indian companies can issue capital against permissible FDI. They can issue equity
shares, fully, compulsorily and mandatorily convertible debentures and fully,
compulsorily and mandatorily convertible preference shares subject to pricing
guidelines/valuation norms prescribed under FEMA Regulations.
Price of shares issued to persons resident outside India under the FDI Policy, shall
not be less than -
(a) the price worked out in accordance with the SEBI guidelines, as applicable,
where the shares of the company is listed on any recognised stock exchange in
India;
(b) the fair valuation of shares done by a SEBI registered Category - I Merchant
Banker or a Chartered Accountant as per the discounted free cash flow method,
where the shares of the company is not listed on any recognised stock exchange
in India ; and
• Sectoral Caps
Table 1 below shows the caps with respect to FDI in various sectors/activities.
The list is, however, not exhaustive. Besides, FDI is permissible in these sectors
subject to applicable laws/ regulations; security and other conditions. In most
of the sectors/activities not listed below, FDI is permitted up to 100% through
the automatic route.
Table-1
S. No. Sector/Activity % of FDI Entry Route
Cap/Equity
3. MINING
Mining and
Exploration of metal
and non-metal ores
including diamond, Automatic
gold, silver and 100%
precious ores but
excluding titanium
bearing minerals and
its ores; subject to the
Mines and Minerals
(Development &
Regulation) Act, 1957.
COAL & LIGNITE
4. 100% Automatic
Coal & Lignite
mining for captive
consumption by
power projects, iron
& steel and cement
units and other
eligible activities
permitted under
and subject to the
provisions of Coal
Mines
(Nationalization)
Act, 1973
PETROLEUM &
5.
NATURAL GAS
1 Exploration
. activities,
infrastructure
related to
marketing,
marketing of 100% Automatic
natural gas and
petroleum
products,
petroleum
product
pipelines,
natural
gas/pipelines,
LNG
Regasification
infrastructure,
market study Government
and formulation
and Petroleum
refining in the
private sector.
2. Petroleum 49%
refining by the
Public Sector
Undertakings
(PSU), without
any
disinvestment
or dilution of
domestic equity
in the existing
PSUs.
SERVICES SECTOR
7.
1. Broadcasting
-Terrestrial
Broadcasting FM (FM
26%
Radio)
______________ Government
________________ ____________
- Cable Network, DTH
74%[w.e.f.14.9.2012]
Up to 49 % -
Automatic; Balance
______________ - Government Route
49%
-Scheduled Air _____________ Automatic
Transport Service/ ______________
Domestic Scheduled
Passenger Airline
74% Automatic up to 49%
Government route
-Non-Scheduled Air
beyond 49% and up
Transport Service ____________ to 74%
______________
Other Services under
Civil Aviation
- Maintenance and
Repair organizations;
flying training
institutes; and 100%
technical training Automatic
institutions
_____________ _______________
Automatic up to 49%
-Ground Handling Government route
Services 74% beyond 49% and up
to 74%
8. Construction 100% Automatic
Development:
Townships,
Housing, Built-up
Infrastructure
Sample this:
“Over 65 clearances are required for a thermal power project at three different
levels — federal, state and local. There are 17 ministries at the central level that
directly or indirectly look after infrastructure projects”
Then, there are 29 states. Each of them mirror many of these ministries as state-
level departments. Some clearances are at the state capital level and some at
deeper local levels.
This is the maze that NIB will have to negotiate to get the economy moving.