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Impact of Npa On Profitability:Empirical Study of Private Sector Banks in India
Impact of Npa On Profitability:Empirical Study of Private Sector Banks in India
ON
Submitted to
Faculty Guide
Prof. Anupama Dave
Submitted by:
MANALI BHAVASR
Enrolment No.: 128260592002
RIDDHIBA CHUDASAMA
Enrolment No.: 128260592008
MBA Semester III and IV
Place: Rajkot
The institutional banking is a very wide area of management. We have tried to cover
impact of NPA on Profitability area of 12 private sector bank in India .
We have tried to fulfill all the requirements to prepare this report, suggestions from
the guide, colleagues, etc.
We are thankful to all those whose works, ideas have been useful in writing this
report; we wish to express my sincere appreciation.
First of all we would like to pay my gratitude to our Dean Dr. CHINNAM REDDY SIR.
DATE
Place: RAJKOT
PART-1
INTRODUCTION
It's a known fact that the banks and financial institutions in India face the problem of
swelling non-performing assets (NPA’s) and the issue is becoming more and more
unmanageable. In order to bring the situation under control, some steps have been
taken recently. The Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and
Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 was passed by Parliament, which is an
important step towards elimination or reduction of NPA’s.
MEANING OF NPA’s:
NPA surfaced suddenly in the Indian banking scenario, around the Eighties, in the
midst of turbulent structural changes overtaking the international banking institutions,
and when the global financial markets were undergoing sweeping changes. In fact
after it had emerged the problem of NPA kept hidden and gradually swelling
unnoticed and unperceived, in the maze of defective accounting standards that still
continued with Indian Banks up to the Nineties and opaque Balance sheets.
In a dynamic world, it is true that new ideas and new concepts that emerge through
such changes caused by social evolution bring beneficial effects, but only after
levying a heavy initial toll. The process of quickly integrating new innovations in the
existing set-up leads to an immediate disorder and unsettled conditions. People are
not accustomed to the new models. These new formations take time to configure,
and work smoothly. The old is cast away and the new is found difficult to adjust.
Marginal and sub-marginal operators are swept away by these convulsions. Banks
being sensitive institutions entrenched deeply in traditional beliefs and conventions
were unable to adjust themselves to the changes. They suffered easy victims to this
upheaval in the initial phase.
During all these years the Indian Banking, whose environment was insulated from
the global context and was denominated by State controls of directed credit delivery,
regulated interest rates, and investment structure did not participate in this vibrant
banking revolution. Suffering the dearth of innovative spirit and choking under undue
regimentation, Indian banking was lacking objective and prudential systems of
business leading from early stagnation to eventual degeneration and reduced or
negative profitability. Continued political interference, the absence of competition and
total lack of scientific decision-making, led to consequences just the opposite of what
was happening in the western countries. Imperfect accounting standards and
opaque balance sheets served as tools for hiding the shortcomings and failing to
reveal the progressive deterioration and structural weakness of the country's banking
institutions to public view. This enabled the nationalized banks to continue to flourish
in a deceptive manifestation and false glitter, though stray symptoms of the brewing
ailment were discernable here and there.
The government hastily introduced the first phase of reforms in the financial and
banking sectors after the economic crisis of 1991. This was an effort to quickly
resurrect the health of the banking system and bridge the gap between Indian and
global banking development. Indian Banking, in particular PSB’s suddenly woke up
to the realities of the situation and to face the burden of the surfeit of their woes.
Simultaneously major revolutionary transitions were taking place in other sectors of
the economy on account the ongoing economic reforms intended towards freeing the
Indian economy from government controls and linking it to market driven forces for a
quick integration with the global economy. Import restrictions were gradually freed.
Tariffs were brought down and quantitative controls were removed. The Indian
market was opened for free competition to the global players. The new economic
policy in turn revolutionalised the environment of the Indian industry and business
and put them to similar problems of new mixture Of opportunities and challenges. As
a result we witness today a scenario of banking, trade and industry in India, all
undergoing the convulsions of total reformation battling to kick off the decadence of
the past and to gain a new strength and vigor for effective links with the global
economy. Many are still languishing unable to get released from the old set-up, while
a few progressive corporate are making a niche for themselves in the global context.
During this decade the reforms have covered almost every segment of the financial
sector. In particular, it is the banking sector, which experienced major reforms. The
reforms have taken the Indian banking sector far away from the days of
nationalization. Increase in the number of banks due to the entry of new private and
foreign banks; increase in the transparency of the banks' balance sheets through the
introduction of prudential norms and norms of disclosure; increase in the role of the
market forces due to the deregulated interest rates, together with rapid
computerization and application of the benefits of information technology to banking
operations have all significantly affected the operational environment of the Indian
banking sector.
In the background of these complex changes when the problem of NPA was
belatedly recognized for the first time at its peak velocity during 1992-93, there was
resultant chaos and confusion. As the problem in large magnitude erupted suddenly
banks were unable to analyze and make a realistic or complete assessment of the
surmounting situation. It was not realized that the root of the problem of NPA was
centered elsewhere in multiple layers, as much outside the banking system, more
particularly in the transient economy of the country, as within. Banking is not a
compartmentalized and isolated sector delinked from the rest of the economy. As
has happened elsewhere in the world, a distressed national economy shifts a part of
its negative results to the banking industry. In short, banks are made ultimately to
finance the losses incurred by constituent industries and businesses. The
unprepared ness and structural weakness of our banking system to act to the
emerging scenario and de-risk itself to the challenges thrown by the new order,
trying to switch over to globalization were only aggravating the crisis. Partial
perceptions and hasty judgments led to a policy of ad-hoc-ism, which characterized
the approach of the authorities during the last two-decades towards finding solutions
to banking ailments and dismantling recovery impediments. Continuous concern was
expressed. Repeated correctional efforts were executed, but positive results were
evading. The problem was defying a solution.
The threat of NPA was being surveyed and summarized by RBI and Government of
India from a remote perception looking at a bird's-eye-view on the banking industry
as a whole delinked from the rest of the economy. RBI looks at the banking
industry's average on a macro basis, consolidating and tabulating the data submitted
by different institutions. It has collected extensive statistics about NPA in different
financial sectors like commercial banks, financial institutions, urban cooperatives,
NBFC etc. But still it is a distant view of one outside the system and not the felt view
of a suffering participant. Individual banks inherit different cultures and they finance
diverse sectors of the economy that do not possess identical attributes. There are
distinct diversities as among the 29 public sector banks themselves, between
different geographical regions and between different types of customers using bank
credit. There are three weak nationalized banks that have been identified. But there
are also correspondingly two better performing banks like Corporation and OBC.
There are also banks that have successfully contained NPA and brought it to single
digit like Syndicate (Gross NPA 7.87%) and Andhra (Gross NPA 6.13%). The
scenario is not so simple to be generalized for the industry as a whole to prescribe a
readymade package of a common solution for all banks and for all times.
1. human factors (those pertaining to the bankers and the credit customers),
Variable skill, efficiency and level integrity prevailing in different branches and in
different banks accounts for the sweeping disparities between inter-bank and intra-
bank performance. We may add that while the core or base-level NPA in the industry
is due to common contributory causes, the inter-se variations are on account of the
structural and operational disparities. The heavy concentrated prevalence of NPA is
definitely due to human factors contributing to the same.
Credit to different sectors given by the PSB’s in fact represents different products.
Advance to weaker sections below Rs.25000/- represents the actual social banking.
NPA in this sector forms 8 TO 10% of the gross amount. Advance to agriculture, SSI
and big industries each calls for different strategies in terms of credit assessment,
credit delivery, project implementation, and post advance supervision. NPA in
different sector is not caused by the same resultant factors. Containing quantum of
NPA is therefore to be programmed by a sector-wise strategy involving a role of the
actively engaged participants who can tell where the boot pinches in each case.
Business and industry has equal responsibility to accept accountability for
containment of NPA. Many of the present defaulters were once trusted and valued
customers of the banks. Why have they become unreliable now, or have they?
The credit portfolio of a nationalized bank also includes a number of low-risk and
risk-free segments, which cannot create NPA. Small personal loans against banks'
own deposits and other tangible and easily marketable securities pledged to the
bank and held in its custody are of this category. Such small loans are universally
given in almost all the branches and hence the aggregate constitutes a significant
figure. Then there is food credit given to FCI for food procurement and similar credits
given to major public Utilities and Public Sector Undertakings of the Central
Government. It is only the residual fragments of Bank credit that are exposed to
credit failures and reasons for NPA can be ascertained by scrutinizing this segment.
Secondly NPA is not a dilemma facing exclusively the Bankers. It is in fact an all
pervasive national scourge swaying the entire Indian economy. NPA is a sore throat
of the Indian economy as a whole. The banks are only the ultimate victims, where life
cycle of the virus is terminated.
Now, how does the Government suffer? What about the recurring loss of revenue by
way of taxes, excise to the government on account of closure of several lakhs of
erstwhile vibrant industrial units and inefficient usage of costly industrial
infrastructure erected with considerable investment by the nation? As per statistics
collected three years back there are over two and half million small industrial units
representing over 90 percent of the total number of industrial units. A majority of the
industrial work force finds employment here and the sector's contribution to industrial
output is substantial and is estimated at over 35 percent while its share of exports is
also valued to be around 40 percent. Out of the 2.5 million, about 10% of the small
industries are reported to be sick involving a bank credit outstanding around Rs.5000
to 6000 Crores, at that period. It may be even more now. These closed units
represent some thousands of displaced workers Previously enjoying gainful
employment. Each closed unit whether large, medium or small occupies costly
developed industrial land. Several items of machinery form security for the NPA
accounts should either be lying idle or junking out. In other words, large value of
land, machinery and money are locked up in industrial sickness. These are the
assets created that have turned unproductive and these represent the real physical
NPA, which indirectly are reflected in the financial statements of nationalized banks,
as the ultimate financiers of these assets. In the final analysis it represents instability
in industry. NPA represents the owes of the credit recipients, in turn transferred and
parked with the banks.
Recognizing NPA as a sore throat of the Indian economy, the field level participants
should first address themselves to find the solution. Why not representatives of
industries and commerce and that of the Indian Banks' Association come together
and candidly analyze and find an everlasting solution heralding the real spirit of
deregulation and decentralization of management in banking sector, and accepting
self-discipline and self-reliance? What are the deficiencies in credit delivery that
leads to its misuse, abuse or loss? How to check misuse and abuse at source? How
to deal with erring Corporate? In short, the functional staff of the Bank along with the
representatives of business and industry has to accept a candid introspection and
arrive at a code of discipline in any final solution. And preventive action to be
successful should start from the credit-recipient level and then extend to the bankers.
RBI and Government of India can positively facilitate the process by providing
enabling measures. Do not try to set right industry and banks, but help industry and
banks to set right themselves. The new tool of deregulated approach has to be
accepted in solving NPA.
The origin of the problem of burgeoning NPA’s lies in the quality of managing credit
risk by the banks concerned. What is needed is having adequate preventive
measures in place namely, fixing pre-sanctioning appraisal responsibility and having
an effective post-disbursement supervision. Banks concerned should continuously
monitor loans to identify accounts that have potential to become non-performing.
Also, with increasing deposits made by the public in the banking system, the banking
industry cannot afford defaults by borrowers since NPA’s affects the repayment
capacity of banks.
Further, Reserve Bank of India (RBI) successfully creates excess liquidity in the
system through various rate cuts and banks fail to utilize this benefit to its advantage
due to the fear of burgeoning non-performing assets.
People in the agricultural sector were hardly interested in returning the loans
as they were confident that the loans with the interest would be written off by
the successive governments.
The small scale industries also availed credit even though they were not sure
of performing to the extent of returning the loans.
Banks were also not in the position to press enough securities to cover the
loans in calls of timings.
Even if the assets were provided they proved to be substandard assets as the
values that could be realized were very low.
Free distribution done during “loan mails” (congress regime) also contributed
to the heavy increase in NPA’s.
Lack of accountability of the officers, who sanctioned the loans led to a caste
whole approach by the officers recovering the loans.
Poor credit appraisal system, lack of vision while sanctioning credit limits.
Deficiencies on the part of the banks like delay in release of limits and
delay in release of payments/subsidies by the government.
Operational definitions:
NPA: An asset is classified as non-performing asset (NPA’s) if dues in the form of
principal and interest are not paid by the borrower for a period of 90 days.
Doubtful Assets: Asset that has remained NPA for a period exceeding 18 months is
a doubtful asset.
Loss Assets: Here loss is identified by the banks concerned or by internal auditors
or by external auditors or by Reserve Bank India (RBI) inspection
Income Recognition: Income from Non Performing Assets should not recognize
on accrual basis but should be booked as income only when it is actually received.
Therefore interest should not be charged and taken into income account till the
account become standard asset.
Interest charged to be stopped
Provision to be made
Over Due: Any amount due to the Bank under any credit facility is “Over due” if it is
not paid on the due date fixed by the Bank.
Term Loan: Interest and/ or installment of principal remain “over due” for a period of
more than 90 days.
Cash Credit/ Over Draft: If the account remains out of order for a period more
than 90 days.
Other accounts: Any amount to be received remains overdue for a period of more
than 90 days.
Short duration crops: If the installment of principal or interest there on remains
overdue for two crop seasons.
Long duration crops: If installment of principal or interest there on remains overdue
for One Crop season.
An account would be classified as NPA only if the interest charged during any
quarter is not serviced fully within 90 days from the end of the quarter.
ASSET CLASSIFICATION
Standard Assets:
Is one which does not disclose any problem and which does not carry more than
normal risks attached to the business.
Substandard Assets:
Which has remained NPA for a period of less than or equal to 12 months.
Doubtful Assets:
Loss Assets:
A loss asset is one where loss has been identified by the bank.
Secured portion
Substandard Assets: Secured portion 10% and unsecured portion 20% on total
outstanding.
Standard Assets: A general provision of 0.40% (For direct Agriculture & SME
Sector 0.25%). Provisioning for standard assets will be done at corporate office
centrally.
BANK PERCENTAGE
Punjab National 6%
Bank
Bank of Baroda 5%
ICICI Bank 5%
Bank of India 5%
Canara Bank 5%
HDFC Bank 4%
IDBI Bank 4%
Axis Bank 3%
Central Bank of 3%
India
Others 42%
Market share of leading bank
State Bank of India Punjab National Bank
18%
Bank of Baroda ICICI Bank
42% 6% Bank of India Canara Bank
HDFC Bank IDBI Bank
5%
Axis Bank Central Bank of India
5% Others
5%
4% 4% 3% 3% 5%
FIGURE 1:
BANK FY11
SBI 24.16%
PNB 25.15%
BOB 19.92%
BOI 24.45%
ICICI Bank 33.15%
HDFC Bank 25.5%
30.00%
25.00%
20.00%
FY11
15.00% FY12
10.00%
5.00%
0.00%
SBI PNB BOB Canara Bank BOI ICICI Bank HDFC Bank Axis Bank
FIGURE 2:
[SOURCE: Annual reports, press releases, earning call transcripts and investor presentations
published by respective banks]
MAJOR BANKS IN INDIA
PRODUCTS PROFILE
The bank, 'The Kumbakonam Bank Limited' as it was then called was incorporated
as a limited company on 31st October, 1904. The first Memorandum of Association
was signed by twenty devoted and prominent citizens of Kumbakonam including
Sarvashri R. Santhanam Iyer, S.Krishna Iyer, V.Krishnaswami Iyengar and
T.S.Raghavachariar. T.S.Raghavachariar was the First Agent of the Bank.
.
( http://www.cityunionbank.com/english/AboutUs.aspx)
It was founded in 1994. It’s headquarter is in Mumbai. Their promoters include UTI
the largest and best financial institution in country. Their code and policies ensures
fair practices and fully transparency.
(http://www.axisbank.com/about-us/about-us.aspx)
The Housing Development Finance Corporation Limited (HDFC) was amongst the
first to receive an "in principle" approval from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to set
up a bank in the private sector, as part of RBI"s liberalisation of the Indian Banking
Industry in 1994. The bank was incorporated in August 1994 in the name of "HDFC
Bank Limited", with its registered office in Mumbai, India. HDFC Bank commenced
operations as a Scheduled Commercial Bank in January 1995.
(http://www.hdfcbank.com/aboutus/general/default.htm)
IndusInd Bank derives its name and inspiration from the Indus Valley civilisation -a
culture described by National Geographic as 'one of the greatest of the ancient
world' combining a spirit of innovation with sound business and trade practices.
(http://www.indusind.com/indusind/wcms/en/home/top-links/about-us/our-
profile/index.html)
It was founded in 1929 and its mission is To emerge as the most preferred bank in
the country in terms of brand, values, principles with core competence in fostering
customer aspirations, to build high quality assets leveraging on the strong and
vibrant technology platform in pursuit of excellence and customer delight and to
become a major contributor to the stable economic growth of the nation.
(http://www.southindianbank.com/content/viewContentLvl1.aspx?
LinkIdLvl2=5&LinkIdLvl3=67&linkId=67)
At Karnataka Bank, we understand that all customers are different in unique ways,
which is why, regardless of the size of your business or your aspirations, we treat
every one as individual and special. This means offering you choices, not only in
relation to our products and services but also in the way you interact with us. We
understand the changes in your lifestyle, recognize these changes and support you
with a high standard of professionalism and service.
As a premier bank, we have developed comprehensive range of customized
products & services suitable for every kind of market, trade or perceived need
- Business or Personal. They include, borrowing facilities, deposits, providing
optimum returns on surplus funds or helping with overseas transactions.
(http://www.karnatakabank.com/ktk/Aboutus.jsp)
ING Vysya Bank Ltd is a premier private sector bank with retail, private and
wholesale banking platforms that serve over two million customers. With 80 years of
history in India and leveraging ING’s global financial expertise, the bank offers a
broad range of innovative and established products and services, across its 527
branches. The bank, which has close to 10,000 employees, is also listed in Bombay
Stock Exchange Limited and National Stock Exchange of India Limited.
(http://www.ingvysyabank.com/personal-banking/ing-vysya/about-us/company-
overview.aspx)
Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd is a one stop shop for all banking needs. The bank offers
personal finance solutions of every kind from savings accounts to credit cards,
distribution of mutual funds to life insurance products. Kotak Mahindra Bank offers
transaction banking, operates lending verticals, manages IPOs and provides working
capital loans. Kotak has one of the largest and most respected Wealth Management
teams in India, providing the widest range of solutions to high net worth individuals,
entrepreneurs, business families and employed professionals.
(http://aboutus.kotak.com/kotak-mahindra-group/our-businesses.html)
Yes Bank is a private bank in India. It was founded by Ashok Kapur and Rana
Kapoor, with the duo holding a collective financial stake of 27.16%. Mr.Ashok Kapur
was killed in a terrorist attack in 2008 in Mumbai.
Headquarters: Mumbai, india
CEO: Rana Kapoor
(https://www.google.co.in/#q=yes+bank)
Dhanlaxmi Bank Ltd. was incorporated in 1927 at Thrissur, Kerala by a group of
ambitious and enterprising entrepreneurs.Over the 86 years that followed,
Dhanlaxmi Bank with its rich heritage has earned the trust and goodwill of clients. It
is due to our strong belief in the need to seek innovation, deliver best service and
demonstrate responsibility, that we have grown from strength to strength. Be it in the
number of customers, the scale of business, the breadth of our product offerings, the
banking experience we offer or the trust that people invest in us. With more
than 670 touch points across India at your service; our focus has always been on
customizing services and personalizing relations.
(http://www.dhanbank.com/aboutus/about_us.aspx)
ICICI Bank is India's largest private sector bank with total assets of Rs. 5,367.95
billion (US$ 99 billion) at March 31, 2013 and profit after tax Rs. 83.25 billion (US$
1,533 million) for the year ended March 31, 2013. The Bank has a network of 3,529
branches and 11,063 ATMs in India, and has a presence in 19 countries, including
India.
(http://www.icicibank.com/aboutus/about-us.html)
The Lakshmi Vilas Bank Limited (LVB) was founded eight decades ago ( in 1926) by
seven people of Karur under the leadership of Shri V.S.N. Ramalinga Chettiar,
mainly to cater to the financial needs of varied customer segments. The bank was
incorporated on November 03, 1926 under the Indian Companies Act, 1913 and
obtained the certificate to commence business on November 10, 1926, The Bank
obtained its license from RBI in June 1958 and in August 1958 it became a
Scheduled Commercial Bank.
(http://www.lvbank.com/aboutus.aspx)
(http://www.moneycontrol.com/financials/cityunionbank/ratios/CUB)
PROFITABILITY RATIO OF AXIS BANK
PROFITABILITY Mar’13 Mar’12 Mar’11 Mar’10
Mar’09
Interest Spread -- -- -- 3.95 4.24
Adjusted Cash Margin(%) 16.39 16.72 18.58 17.63 14.76
Net Profit Margin 15.35 15.47 17.12 16.10 13.31
Return on Long Term Fund(%) 75.72 88.84 72.25 66.34 97.35
Return on Net Worth(%) 15.64 18.59 17.83 15.67 17.77
Adjusted Return on Net Worth(%) 15.64 18.59 17.83 15.69 17.85
Return on Assets Excluding Revaluations 707.50 551.99 462.77 395.99 284.50
Return on Assets Including Revaluations 707.50 551.99 462.77 395.99 284.50
(http://www.moneycontrol.com/financials/axisbank/ratios/AB16)
(http://www.moneycontrol.com/financials/indusindbank/ratios/IIB)
(http://www.moneycontrol.com/financials/southindbk/ratios/SIB)
PROFITABILITY RATIO KARNATAKA BANK
(http://www.moneycontrol.com/financials/karnatakabank/ratios/KB04)
(http://www.moneycontrol.com/financials/ingvysyabank/ratios/ING)
PROFITABILITY RATIO OF KOTAK MAHINDRA BANK
(http://www.moneycontrol.com/financials/kotakmahindrabank/ratios/KMB)
(http://www.moneycontrol.com/financials/yesbank/ratios/YB)
PROFITABILITY RATIO OF DHANLAXMI BANK
PROFITABILITY Mar’13 Mar’12 Mar’11 Mar’10
Mar’09
Interest Spread -- 4.20 4.03 3.26 5.10
Adjusted Cash Margin(%) 2.36 -5.70 3.93 5.27 13.26
Net Profit Margin 0.18 -7.56 2.49 3.73 11.76
Return on Long Term Fund(%) 141.55 141.36 80.56 95.83 86.38
Return on Net Worth(%) 0.35 -15.87 3.08 5.29 13.53
Adjusted Return on Net Worth(%) 0.35 -16.02 3.02 5.13 13.49
Return on Assets Excluding Revaluations 85.82 85.54 99.21 68.64 66.21
Return on Assets Including Revaluations 85.82 85.54 99.21 68.64 66.21
(http://www.moneycontrol.com/financials/dhanlaxmibank/ratios/DB01)
(http://www.moneycontrol.com/financials/icicibank/ratios/ICI02)
POFITABILITY RATIO OF LAXMI VILAS BANK
PROFITABILITY Mar’13 Mar’12 Mar’11 Mar’10
Mar’09
Interest Spread -- 4.31 4.96 5.36 4.21
Adjusted Cash Margin(%) 5.97 7.83 10.18 4.74 8.00
Net Profit Margin 4.67 6.41 8.49 3.04 6.66
Return on Long Term Fund(%) 143.94 144.92 101.50 94.17 128.48
Return on Net Worth(%) 9.02 12.17 12.45 4.14 11.08
Adjusted Return on Net Worth(%) 9.02 12.17 12.44 4.13 10.50
Return on Assets Excluding Revaluations 103.99 90.14 83.23 75.79 93.02
Return on Assets Including Revaluations 103.99 98.27 91.51 75.79 93.02
(http://www.moneycontrol.com/financials/lakshmivilasbank/ratios/LVB)
PART : 2
Literature review
This paper provides a critical review of the theoretical and empirical basis of
four central areas of financial ratio analysis. The research areas reviewed are
the functional form of the financial ratios, distributional characteristics of
financial ratios, classification of financial ratios, and the estimation of the
internal rate of return from financial statements. It is observed that it is typical
of financial ratio analysis research that there are several unexpectedly distinct
lines with research traditions of their own. A common feature of all the areas
of financial ratio analysis research seems to be that while significant
regularities can be observed, they are not necessarily stable across the
different ratios, industries, and time periods. This leaves much space for the
development of a more robust theoretical basis and for further empirical
research.
The first objective of this study was to determine and evaluate the effects of
bank-specific factors; Capital adequacy, Asset quality, liquidity, operational
cost efficiency and income diversification on the profitability of commercial
banks in Kenya. The second objective was to determine and evaluate the
effects of market structure factors; foreign ownership and market
concentration, on the profitability of commercial banks in Kenya. This study
adopted an explanatory approach by using panel data research design to
fulfill the above objectives. Annual financial statements of 38 Kenyan
commercial banks from 2002 to 2008 were obtained from the CBK and
Banking Survey 2009. The data was analyzed using multiple linear
regressions method. The analysis showed that all the bank specific factors
had a statistically significant impact on profitability, while none of the market
factors had a significant impact. Based on the findings the study recommends
policies that would encourage revenue diversification, reduce operational
costs, minimize credit risk and encourage banks to minimize their liquidity
holdings. Further research on factors influencing the liquidity of commercials
banks in the country could add value to the profitability of banks and
academic literature.
A review of the literature brings to the fore insights into the determinants of
NPL across countries. A considered view is that banks’ lending policy could
have crucial influence on nonperforming loans (Reddy, 2004). He critically
examined various issues pertaining to terms of credit of Indian banks. In this
context, it was viewed that ‘the element of power has no bearing on the illegal
activity. A default is not entirely an irrational decision. Rather a defaulter takes
into account probabilistic assessment of various costs and benefits of his
decision’ Furthermore, in the context of NPAs on account of priority sector
lending, it was pointed out that the statistics may or may not confirm this.
There may be only a marginal difference in the NPAs of banks’ lending to
priority sector and the bank’s lending to private corporate sector. Against this
background, the study suggests that given the deficiencies in these areas, it is
imperative that banks need to be guided by fairness based on economic and
financial decisions rather than system of conventions, if reform has to serve
the meaningful purpose. Experience shows that policies of liberalization,
deregulation and enabling environment of comfortable liquidity at a
reasonable price do not automatically translate themselves into enhanced
credit flow.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
RESEARCH DESIGN :
Research Design of our report is Descriptive and
Analytical Research.
SOURCES OF DATA :
POPULATIONS:
There are 12 private sector banks analyzed by us.
6000 6111
5000 4842
4000 3967 NET NPA [RS.in million]
3000
2000
1000 964
540
0
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
INTERPRETATION:
Above this chart we can say that from year 2009 to 2013 the amount of NPA has
being decreased. So It is good for a bank. And also positive Impact on profitability.
AXIS BANK
INTERPRETATION:
Above this chart we can say that from year 2009 to 2013 the amount of NPA has
being decreased. So it is positive Impact on profitability of bank.
HDFC BANK
50000
30000 29641
20000
10000
3523 4690
0
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
INTERPRETATION:
Above this chart we can say that from year 2009 to 2013 the amount of NPA has
being decreased. The reason of decreasing NPA of bank we can say that
Proper pre-enquiry of bank for sanctioning a loan to a customer.
INDUSLAND BANK
INTERPRETATION:
Above this chart we can say that from year 2009 to 2012 the amount of NPA has
being decreased.And in 2013 NPA amoun has being increased.Here on this table
the reason of increment of NPA is one of the willful defaulter may be said.
INTERPRETATION:
Above this table we can say that the highest NPA amount is on year 2011.and less
amount is on 2012.The amount of NPA is going to fluctuate.
KARNATAKA BANK
20000
18861 NET NPA [RS.in million]
15000
11610
10000
INTERPRETATION:
Above this table we can say that from year 2009 to 2011 has being increased NPA.
And ten NPA has being started to decrease on year 2012 and 2013.Because of
Increasing in Interest rate in loan which has taken by borrower, it can be a reason to
increase NPA, in year 2009 to 2012.
10000 9179
5000
0 525 91
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
INTERPRETATION:
Above this table we can say that, the less amount of NPA is on year 2013 is 91
Million.
30000
NET NPA [RS.in million]
25000
20000 21116
15000
10000
5000
2374 3114
0
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
INTERPRETATION:
Above this table we can say that the less amount of NPA is on year 2012 and the
highest amount of NPA is on year 2009.
YES BANK
INTERPRETATION:
Above this table we can say that the reason of less amount of NPA on 2013 year is
efficient management of bank regarding its policy of loan also.
DHANLAXMI BANK
INTERPRETATION:
Above this table we can say that the less amounts of NPA on year 2011 and 2012
are same and the highest would be on 2010 year.
ICICI BANK
INTERPRETATION:
Above this table we can say that the highest amount of NPA on year 2009.The
reason behind that we can say that it may be recession in Economy also and as well
as price rice.
25000 25778
20000
NET NPA [RS.in million]
15000
10000
6485 7288
5000
2838
1771
0
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
INTERPRETATION:
Above this table we can say that, less amount on NPA is on 2012,and the highest
amount is on year 2010.
Conversely, a larger (insignificant) p-value suggests that changes in the predictor are
not associated with changes in the response.
1. Interest spread
Standa
Coefficie rd P-
nts Error t Stat value
Interce 18020.3 1.3200 0.1920
pt 23787.68 1 48 05
Int 0.3733 0.7102
spread 1571.612 4209.97 07 81
Interpretation:
In the output above, we can see that the predictor variables of Interest spread is not
significant because of their p-values are 0.710281. However, the p-value for Interest
Spread (0.710281) is greater than the common alpha level of 0.05, which indicates
that it is not statistically significant.
Coefficie Standard P-
nts Error t Stat value
12476.31 30131.791 0.4140 0.6803
Intercept 59 6 58 59
Adj Cash 1335.639 2248.4801 0.5940 0.5548
margin 83 87 19 09
Interpretation:
In the output above, we can see that the predictor variables of Adjusted Cash
margin is not significant because of their p-values are 0.554809 . However, the p-
value for Adjusted Cash margin (0.554809) is greater than the common alpha level
of 0.05, which indicates that it is not statistically significant.
Coefficie Standard P-
nts Error t Stat value
26962.49 0.68279 0.4974
Intercept 18409.96 801 88 52
Net pft 964.3496 2207.510 0.43684 0.6638
margin 1 039 95 43
Interpretation:
In the output above, we can see that the predictor variables of Net profit margin is
not significant because of their p-values are 0.663843. However, the p-value for Net
profit margin (0.663843) is greater than the common alpha level of 0.05, which
indicates that it is not statistically significant.
Coefficie Standard P-
nts Error t Stat value
Interce 32383.669 4.2313 8.37E-
pt 137026.84 19 56 05
-
Ret on 325.06485 3.4809 0.0009
l.t.f -1131.541 73 7 56
Interpretation:
In the output above, we can see that the predictor variables of Return on long term
fund is significant because of their p-values are 0.000956. However, the p-value for
Return on long term fund (0.000956) is less than the common alpha level of 0.05,
which indicates that it is statistically significant.
Coefficie Standard P-
nts Error t Stat value
64358.13 24727.23 2.6027 0.0117
Intercept 3 209 23 22
- -
Ret on 2612.604 1675.745 1.5590 0.1244
net worth 5 178 7 2
Interpretation:
In the output above, we can see that the predictor variables of Return on net worth
is not significant because of their p-values are 0.12442. However, the p-value for
Return on net worth (0.12442) is greater than the common alpha level of 0.05, which
indicates that it is not statistically significant.
Standar
Coefficients d Error t Stat P-value
-
13970.2 0.4915
Intercept -6866.544335 6 1 0.62492
Ret on
assets 55.4634 3.5243 0.00083
revaluation 195.4748736 6 9 6
Interpretation:
In the output above, we can see that the predictor variables of Return on assets
revaluation is significant because of their p-values are 0.000836. However, the p-
value for Return on assets revaluation (0.000836) is less than the common alpha
level of 0.05, which indicates that it is statistically significant.